Following is a transcript of Wolf's briefing:

JOHN S. WOLF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
THE FOREIGN PRESS CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 16, 2002

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN WOLF: Thank you. Thank you for coming -- what I hear is very early for the press corps. But I thought I'd make a few remarks about what we're trying to do in the nonproliferation area, and to frame our discussion.

I think a lot has been done in the past few years, but in the wake of September 11th, I think there has been much greater public awareness of the threat that weapons of mass destruction pose, not only in the hands of states that are seeking to acquire these capabilities, but also the risk that weapons of mass destruction could pass into the hands of terrorists. And we have all seen -- we all worry about the implications of that. The discovery effort that has taken place in Afghanistan indicates, for instance, how clearly that al-Qaida was intent upon acquiring weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Now why are we concerned? Well, the spread of such weapons and their delivery capabilities contributes to insecurity -- insecurity in regions. It spreads uncertainty and instability. That's certainly true whether it is in the Middle East and the areas adjacent, or whether it's in South Asia or in East Asia. Weapons of mass destruction, missiles also constitute a clear and direct threat to U.S. forces that are deployed around the world, as well as a threat to our allies around the world and to our friends.

Now President Bush has spoken and spoke in the State of the Union address about the "axis of evil," and I know that there's been an intense effort -- there was an intense effort for weeks afterwards to try to parse those phrases, dissect the terms. It talked about a phenomenon. The phenomenon is real. There is an intense sort of cooperation that goes on among countries that are trying to acquire such weapons. North Korea is prepared to sell missiles to any country that has money to buy. Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles with help from North Korea, from Russia, from China. Iraq is clandestinely diverting or smuggling in components that are helping it to reconstitute its weapons capabilities and its missile capabilities, all of which would be in defiance of [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 687, passed 11 years ago, and successor resolutions of the United Nations.

And it's not just those three. It's not just North Korea or Iran or Iraq. There are other countries that are in the same position. And the worrisome part of the phenomenon is that countries which clandestinely, covertly were trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and importing technology and components are now also, -- many of them -- exporting, which makes the risk that much greater.

We and our friends need to act together. I think a myth has grown up over the last two years that somehow this administration is a unilateralist administration. The facts in the nonproliferation area belie that. The Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] remains a bedrock of our nonproliferation policy. We want much more active enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. We are working in a whole host of multilateral export control regimes. We look for early signature of an international code of conduct to create an international consensus against the spread of ballistic missiles. We are working bilaterally with our friends to try to halt the spread of technologies and components that would aid the development of weapons of mass destruction.

But we are prepared to act unilaterally where our own interests are directly threatened. Let me just mention some of the things that we work on, and some of the areas where we have concerns. Certainly one of our largest efforts in the nonproliferation area is to work with Russia, and we have been for over a decade, to secure Russian fissile materials -- plutonium, highly enriched uranium. We do that through a variety of programs in the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense. We're working to engage Russian scientists in productive work and to redirect them away from BW [biological weapons] or CW [chemical weapons] research and development, and give them alternatives to the effort that are made by countries like Iran to entice them to help support their own weapons development.

We have an active dialogue with Russia about the technical assistance that Russian entities provide -- Russian individuals and entities provide -- to Iran for Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. It's simply not consistent with the kind of broad new relationship that President Bush and President Putin laid out, and we think it's important that the help that Russians give to Iran's nuclear efforts and its missile efforts, as well as the sale of advanced conventional weapons, it's important that that stop.

We are working actively in the [U.N.] Security Council to develop a new export control system for Iraq.

This has been a major effort, and that -- we hope that we will see this new export control system put into place as -- we hope that the Security Council will vote to put it in place this month, and that it will take effect in June. We strongly support the return of U.N. weapons inspectors. We're working, as I say, in a variety of export control -- for [the] Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group on biological and chemical weapons, the Nuclear Suppliers Group to expand the scope of their efforts and to make sure that dual-use technologies, which have many legitimate purposes, are used for those legitimate purposes, and not used to help expand clandestine weapons of mass destruction programs around the world.

We're working actively with friends in Central Asia to tighten export controls, and in fact, our export-control program works around the world. We are actively engaged with discussions on the risks that the nuclear-weapons programs of Pakistan and India pose to stability in South Asia. It's an important issue. We stay engaged. The fact that we lifted sanctions last fall doesn't mean that nonproliferation is not an issue for us, is no longer an issue for us. It remains an issue not only in terms of South Asia, but the risks of those various technologies -- not just nuclear -- escaping from -- being clandestinely exported from South Asia. This would be true for both Pakistan and for India.

We work, as I say, closely with our friends and allies. And in fact, we have active discussions with Europe and with Japan on the need to expand the work we do together on nonproliferation. The United States has spent over $6 billion in the last 10 or 11 years, working with the countries of the former Soviet Union. That is magnitudes larger than the European and Japanese contribution, and we think it's important that all of us increase our efforts. We, for one, are doing that in fiscal year 2003. The president's budget includes nearly $1.3 billion for funding for nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet Union.

The president said on March 11th that every nation in our coalition must take seriously the risks of terrorists armed with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. He said we will act with due deliberation in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He said inaction is not an option.

So that's what we do. It's a huge task but very important to proceed. We've made progress. There's more that we have to do. I'd be glad to answer your questions.

QUESTION: It is not clear to me how you view the nuclear issue in South Asia. I was under the impression that after September 1 (sic), India, as an ally, assuredly the world's largest democracy -- the populace now at a billion -- needs all the modern weapons, just like the U.S. or Britain or France or any of them. And secondly, what, exactly, are you suggesting with respect to the part of India in South Asia? It's not very clear to me.

Also, India has said from the beginning that it is for the complete dissection of all the nuclear weapons, where the nuclear posture statement of the United States appears to clear the groundwork for expanding nuclear weapons in the tactical field and use them even against Third World countries.

WOLF: We consider -- I consider -- I think that the situation in South Asia remains still one that is very worrisome. Two countries engaged -- are facing each other across the Line of Control and the international border, with nearly a million troops. Yes, the tensions have reduced, but the fact is that both countries are armed with nuclear weapons and missiles, and that is -- and that is of concern. Hopefully, as the tensions ease, both countries will look at this crisis and look at ways to -- to adopt the kinds of confidence-building measures that would reduce the risks of a nuclear exchange in South Asia. I'm not saying that that's where things are going, but there is the risk. These are new capabilities. The doctrine is still to be well-defined, and I think it's important that both countries, separately and together, over time find ways to reduce the risks of accidental warfare.

Proliferation: the risks of proliferation from South Asia are real. I think both Pakistan and India need to take -- to pay continuing close attention to the risks that individuals may seek to exploit -- export controls that are not -- are not sufficient for the task. It's not to say that export controls in South Asia or in Russia or in China are weak, and export controls here in the United States are strong. We have our own problems here. But we work very actively at trying to enforce our export controls. When we -- we look for -- we look for people who are violating them; when we find them, we try them. If we -- if they're found guilty, we punish them. It's important that the message in the marketplace, wherever -- whether it's in South Asia or in Europe or in East Asia -- it's important that the message in the marketplace be that governments will not tolerate exceptions to their export controls. Governments need to band together to stop the threat that individuals will always pose. So it's a question of constant vigilance. Not -- you know, it's not by way of an accusation; it's simply a fact of life that there are lots of people out there who are trying to make a fast buck.

There are lots of people out there who are prepared to export technologies or to provide technical assistance, and governments need to find them, and they need to stop it, because failure to arrest -- and I use that word advisedly -- failure to arrest those tendencies allows technologies to escape to countries that pose real risks to regional stability, pose real risks that the technologies could migrate to terrorists, and real risks that such weapons -- that weapons that might be developed from those technologies will be used somewhere around the world. And so it's an everyday vigil.

Q: Sir, I have an impression that -- excuse me. How successful Russian-American talks on nonproliferation are? When talking specifically about Iran, I have an impression that both sides simply keep on saying that -- well, you say that obviously there are leaks from some Russian entities of these products and technology to Iran, and the Russian side simply denies it. Is -- I mean, are you heading anywhere in these talks? Do they know --

A: Well, in general -- on the general question, I think we have addressed a number of issues together. As I say, we have had very successful cooperation over more than a decade, in terms of improving the security that Russia attaches to its own fissile materials, in terms of working with scientists -- BW and CW scientists, through the Science Center in Moscow. There are a variety of efforts that we're doing on plutonium disposition, on ending the production of new plutonium and plutonium production reactors. The work that we have done together -- the discussion that we've had together, for instance, over the last five months on a new export control regime system for Iraq, to ensure that goods can go to Iraq's civilian economy, but the dual-use items that Iraq would seek to acquire to expand its weapons of mass destruction -- that those are controlled and stopped. So, in general, we have a very good discussion.

On the question of Iran specifically, there does seem to be a difference. I would note that there appear to be a number of individuals in at least one area that are now under investigation. That's a good sign, because it shows that Russian investigative agencies are getting out there and looking for problems. You can't find problems if you don't look for them. When you find them, though, you have to be -- one has to be rigorous in terms of developing the case, taking the case to trial, and punishing the individual. It is not enough to slap a proliferator on the wrist; you need to slap him in jail.

And it would be difficult to believe, based on our own experience, that Russian controls are so effective that there are no individuals or entities that are clandestinely providing assistance, for instance, to Iran in the nuclear area or in the missile area. It would be difficult to believe. There are Americans who do it. We catch them; we punish them. So for Russia to simply say there is -- that nothing happens is not sufficient. For Russia to say, "Well, give us the evidence and we will act" really begs the question. The question is using Russia's own investigative agencies to find the problems -- and they are real -- and to stop them. And that's real, and the need is real if our bilateral relationship, the confidence in our bilateral relationship is going to continue to grow.

And I think we've had good discussions. There's more to go. But I think it's an important issue, and one where we hope we can make progress in the weeks ahead, even before the summit meeting in mid-May.

Q: Can you tell me, please, when there will be the -- when and where will be the next round of these talks? You'll go to Moscow, or you expect Russians here? Thank you.

A: We discuss it very regularly at a variety of levels, both Undersecretary Bolton and I, but [also] people from the Defense Department. So, whenever there is an opportunity, the issue tends to come up.

Q: What do you think is the likelihood of China signing on to the 2000 agreement you were speaking to them about? And would it be fair to say that the issue of arms sales to Taiwan was played down at a recent conference between the U.S. and China? And if so, why do you think this was the case? Because I know that in the past, China has said that arms sales to Taiwan are a kind of proliferation. Thank you.

A: We have had at least five or six rounds of discussions with Chinese officials since last summer on restoring the November 2000 agreement on missile -- on holding the spread of missile technology. The issues that need to be addressed, I think, are very clear to Chinese officials, and the issues are very important.

China has said that its policy is one of not allowing proliferation of missile technology capable of supporting rockets that can go further than 300 kilometers, or carry a payload more than 500 kilograms, or actually capable of carrying a nuclear device. And we think it's important that China put in place the export controls that will achieve that, and then rigorously enforce those controls across -- all across the Chinese marketplace.

So we -- the discussions continue, but actions are what are necessary, not talk. And the actions would be issuance of the export controls, and then firm implementation, firm use of that to cut off the kinds of efforts which undercut that commitment not to export missile technology -- missile-related technology.

Q: And Taiwan?

A: It hasn't been a subject that I've been discussing.

MODERATOR: Is there more up front here? In the back?

Q: I'd like to follow up on what [the previous questioner] asked. Did China promise to you that they would tighten the control of export in terms of WMD themselves? If so, is it possible that the United States would sign on any agreement with China by the time when Vice President Hu Jintao comes to Washington? That's my first question. My second question is: Could you kindly elaborate on the cooperation of Japan in nonproliferation of WMD and missiles?

A: I think the point for China is that it has stated, as its policy, that it does not condone and it will not support proliferation of missile technology -- missile technology, nuclear technology, chemical and biological technology. It states that as a matter of state -- it expresses that as a matter of state policy. And we welcome that, because they're not doing a favor to us; they're defining their national interests. And they, like many others, make the point that it is not in China's interest to have countries acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. And we applaud that stance.

The key is, and they have said that they are on their own developing improved controls in the nuclear area, chemical-biological area and the missile technology area. We welcome that. It's important to get those laws and those regulations in place. And it is important for them then to rigorously enforce their laws. It's all the worse to have laws on the books and have people who violate the laws freely. So we will see where those discussions go.

We can't force the pace. It's for China to determine when it does what it chooses to do. They have told us that they intend to tighten up their controls in the four areas. We look forward to seeing that in the marketplace. More importantly, we look forward to seeing how those new export controls are implemented.

It is important, as we work together on our broad relationship -- this is an important issue where we still have differences -- to carry the broad relationship forward that President Bush and President Ziang have talked about. We need to deal with some of the overhang that's still there, and we're not yet in perfect harmony on the questions of nonproliferation. The discussions -- the words point in the right direction, but the actions are not yet there.

On the question of Japan, Japan participates actively in many of the -- in all of the multilateral export control regimes: NPT, you know, in the IAEA. I guess I would say that especially there, I didn't say, but one of our goals in this administration is to strengthen the IAEA. It is the critical front line of the international community in terms of ferreting out clandestine nuclear programs. For countries -- and it is not sufficient simply for countries to be in compliance with their IAEA safeguards, if behind the scenes -- as Iraq did, as North Korea did, as Iran is doing -- they are seeking to acquire fissile material.

So one place where I know we are in discussions with Japan is on the question of how best we can move forward to strengthen the IAEA, and those are discussions, which we think are very important. Japan plays a major role throughout the multilateral community, U.N. community, and so we look for Japanese leadership there too. There are budgetary implications, but the dollars that we're talking about are very small in comparison to the consequences that we would face were there to be another successful clandestine nuclear program, or were we to face the consequences of some kind of development of -- you know, something that impacted on nuclear safety around the world.

MODERATOR: Anyone in the back? A follow-up?

Q: I take it that you don't expect either India or Pakistan to roll back their nuclear weapons and become non-nuclear weapon powers. And if that is so, realistically, won't it serve your purpose of subjecting them to the same regulations, restrictions and responsibilities as the five nuclear powers by inducting them formally as members?

And I know the problem with the Nonproliferation Treaty was in -- does not allow the Medes and the Persians -- set in stone. Surely what has been written can be revised.

A: No.

MODERATOR: Any other questions?

A: It doesn't serve our purpose. It undercuts the treaty in ways that would cause fundamental harm to what we're trying to achieve worldwide.

Q: Sorry for asking a question about Taiwan, but I was under the impression that Taiwan had been raised by a mainland delegation at a recent conference at the Monterey Institute. And I was just wondering how you counter their claims that sales of arms to Taiwan is a form of proliferation. Thank you.

A: Well, first of all, we are careful in terms of what we sell. We don't sell missile systems, for instance, that have -- that exceed the Missile Technology Control Regime limits. We certainly don't support CBW and nuclear programs. That's what -- when I talk about nonproliferation, I'm talking about those four clusters of things. And advanced conventional weapons -- I think, there are a series of U.S.-Chinese agreements with which we remain -- which remain as part of broad U.S. policy. I think every administration, dating back to the -- to President Nixon has subscribed to them, and we do, too.

MODERATOR: Final questions?

Q: Now in New York, the NPT Preparatory Conference is being held. And there has been certain criticism about the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, saying that it is contrary to the 2000 Review Conference agreement, particularly the unequivocal undertaking of the total [tape gap] of nuclear weapons. I would like to know how you respond to these critics.

A: I think we have said that we are confident -- we have explained in some detail -- and I won't try to go in any length here -- that we are in full compliance with our NPT Article Six obligations. We are building down. We are reducing deployed nuclear weapons.

There is a whole lot of discussion about the Nuclear Posture Review, most of which was misinformed. But there are plenty of administration spokespersons who have explained it in far more detail than I can here, or could if I had the time. The fact is that every administration looks -- I mean, we have nuclear -- we still have nuclear weapons. Those nuclear weapons are meant for our defense, and they are part of the broad defense relationships that we have with a series of allies. Each administration looks at how nuclear weapons would be used; that's sort of prudent management.

But the basic point is that if you look at the trend lines for deployed nuclear weapons, you will see they are going down: delivery systems going down. We are moving in the right direction. Russia is moving in the right direction on this question.

We are meeting our commitment. The concern is not the United States. The concern is the countries out -- the concern should be about the countries that are out there that are clandestinely trying to develop weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. And there are -- there is more than one that's moving in that direction.

The concern should be countries like North Korea, which is not yet moving to implement the Agreed Framework in ways that would give confidence to the international community. The concern is Iraq, which for nearly -- for 11 years has remained in defiance of its obligations to the United Nations -- its obligations. We don't have to prove what they're doing. They have to prove to the world that they are -- that they're not doing what we all know they are doing. We know they are trying to reconstitute their weapons of mass destruction capabilities, their missile capabilities, and their conventional weapons capabilities, and that is in defiance of [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 687 and a host of resolutions since.

There are other countries that are out there -- IAEA members or not -- which are developing nuclear weapons. Acquisition of nuclear weapons around the world is not some panacea. There seems to be the idea that you can keep -- for those who have them, that you can acquire more, and that it's not destabilizing.

Our experience with the Russians is that we're trying to build down. So when people start talking about wrong directions, they should be looking somewhere else, not at us.

MODERATOR: Very good, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you.

MR. WOLF: Thank you very much.