(The following article by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana) appeared in the latest issue of "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda" devoted to the topic "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The New Strategic Framework." This article and the rest of the electronic journal, which was published on July 18, may be viewed on the Web at: http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0702/ijpe/ijpe0702.htm. There are no republication restrictions.)

The U.S.-Russian Front Against Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation
By U.S. Senator Richard Lugar

(The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has demonstrated that "extraordinary international relationships are possible to improve controls over weapons of mass destruction," says Senator Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana). He says programs similar to this U.S.-Russian effort are needed to address proliferation threats around the world.)

Over the last decade the United States and the Russian Federation have accomplished something never before done in history. Former enemies, who squared off against each other for almost 50 years, laid aside a host of major disagreements and forged a new cooperative relationship aimed at controlling and dismantling weapons of mass destruction.

This logical course was never a foregone conclusion. Many in both countries failed to realize the magnitude of the threat and were unable to grasp the opportunities presented by the end of hostilities. While the world rejoiced with the end of the Cold War and leaders in Washington and Moscow grappled with the new geostrategic landscape, the weapons of the Cold War continued to threaten peace and stability.

One of the tremendous ironies of the post-Cold War world is that our countries may face a greater threat today than we did at the height of the Cold War. Whereas previous strategic calculations assumed more or less rational actors, experiences with Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and others make an assumption of rationality less plausible today.

The possibility of armed conflict between the United States and Russia continues to dwindle, but that does not mean our countries have little to fear. The attacks of September 11 in New York and Washington could have taken place in Moscow or St. Petersburg and could have employed weapons of mass destruction instead of commercial airliners.

We have agreed, through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the treaty signed by Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin in May, to liquidate the Cold War's nuclear legacy. We must preserve the momentum to finish the weapons dismantlement started a decade ago, as well as focus diplomatic energies on today's dangers: Osama bin Laden or other terrorists in possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

The Nunn-Lugar model can help build the foundation for an effective coalition that combats terrorism and secures weapons and materials of mass destruction around the world. Russia and the United States are the key players in establishing such a coalition. This cooperation can be grounded successfully in mutual self-interest.

EXPANDING COOPERATION IN RUSSIA

First, there are a number of areas in which we should expand our cooperative dismantlement and non-proliferation efforts with Russia.

Non-Missile Submarine Dismantlement: In visiting the shipyards of Severodvinsk and Murmansk on several occasions, I have been startled by the enormity of the task that lies before us in the area of submarine dismantlement. Nunn-Lugar is limited to dismantling strategic missile submarines. Current U.S. law mistakenly does not permit the Pentagon to dismantle general-purpose submarines.

There are important nonproliferation and security benefits to the timely dismantlement of conventional submarines. Many carry cruise missiles which could prove valuable to rogue nation missile programs. Others are powered by nuclear fuel enriched to very high levels which could pose serious proliferation risks if unsecured.

Debt-for-Nonproliferation Swaps: When President Putin visited the United States he spoke of the increasing debt burden facing Russia. An improving Russian economy and rising oil prices may have alleviated the debt burden in the short term, but the potential for the re-emergence of debt problems is real.

Senator Joseph Biden and I have proposed a law to allow "debt for nonproliferation swaps" between Russia and the United States. Such swaps would relieve some Russian financial pressures and address American security concerns.

Former Scientist Employment and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) Facility Opportunities: The United States implements a number of programs to employ former weapons scientists in peaceful scientific endeavors. Tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists have been employed by these programs. Considerable success has been realized, but with a renewed commitment of resources and leadership, the United States can make dramatic progress in ensuring that scientists forego the temptation of being lured back into weapons work. We must give these scientists an opportunity to succeed. If desperation and bankruptcy become the norm, many will believe they have little choice but to leave Russia and renew their weapons careers.

American, European, and G8 corporations have much to gain by cooperating with government efforts. I have urged American companies to explore the possibility of investing in Russian laboratories. These facilities would be an excellent investment in hardware and production technology, as well as access to the finest minds in Russia. Considerable thought and planning should be given to overcoming Western corporate hesitancy, sometimes caused by an inhospitable Russian investment environment.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: We must also begin to consider moving beyond strategic systems into the tactical weapons arena. In many ways the threat posed by the proliferation of tactical nuclear systems is more serious than that posed by strategic weapons. Tactical warheads are more portable, usually deployed closer to potential flashpoints, and many are not secured at the same level as strategic systems.

We must establish transparency in this area so that both sides can have confidence concerning the quantity, status, storage, and security of the other nation's weapons. It would be a great shame if our impressive record of success in the strategic arena was undercut by the vulnerability of tactical weapons.

Fissile Material Security: After eight years of close cooperation and considerable effort, only 40 percent of the facilities housing nuclear materials in Russia have received security improvements through U.S. assistance. Unfortunately, only half of these facilities have received complete security systems.

There are a number of steps that can be taken to speed this important effort. First, Russia should continue to consolidate materials in fewer locations. Such consolidation will save money and time. But, if facilities housing nuclear weapons materials are vulnerable, we cannot wait until a convenient budgetary situation arrives to complete our work. We must commit ourselves to installing necessary security as quickly as possible.

EXTENDING BEYOND RUSSIA

On September 11th, in a dramatic telephone call to President Bush, President Putin was the first foreign leader to join a global coalition against terrorism. The phone call and the cooperation that has followed the Afghan campaign constitute the best reflection yet of a new phase of relations. The two leaders must now build a coalition focused against terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. The goal of this coalition would be to creatively and aggressively safeguard nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their component materials and technology so that they do not fall into the wrong hands.

The problem we face is not just terrorism. It is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There is little doubt in my mind that Osama bin Laden and his operatives would have used weapons of mass destruction if they had possessed them. The horrible death and destruction of the September 11th tragedy was minimal compared to what could have been inflicted by a weapon of mass destruction. A simple and clear definition of victory in the war on terror is bringing into account all nations that house terrorists, as well as those countries that possess materials and weapons of mass destruction.

The United States and Russia, along with other members of the coalition, should seek to root out each cell in a comprehensive manner for years to come and maintain a public record of success that the world can observe and measure. Our common goal must be to shrink the list, nation by nation, of those that house terrorist cells, voluntarily or involuntarily.

We must further demand that all states possessing materials and/or weapons of mass destruction secure them from proliferation. If that country's funds are insufficient, then they should be supplemented with international funds.

Our campaign should not end until all nations on both lists comply with these standards. Today, we lack even minimal international confidence about many weapons programs around the world. Unfortunately, outside the former Soviet Union, Nunn-Lugar-style cooperative threat reduction programs aimed at these threats do not exist. They must now be created on a global scale. Nunn-Lugar has demonstrated that extraordinary international relationships are possible to improve controls over weapons of mass destruction. Programs similar to Nunn-Lugar should be established in each country that wishes to work with the United States, Russia, and our allies.

I have offered legislation to permit the Secretary of Defense to use Nunn-Lugar expertise and resources to address proliferation threats around the world. The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere, but the experience of Nunn-Lugar in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest.

This type of cooperation could be just the beginning. Nations cooperating on securing instruments of mass destruction might also pledge to work cooperatively on measures to retrieve weapons or materials that are in danger of falling into the wrong hands, and to come to the aid of any victim of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism.

By proposing that the next phase of the war on terrorism focus on weapons of mass destruction, and by forming a coalition to combat it, Presidents Bush and Putin would be addressing arguably the most important problem in international security today. Such a coalition could provide both presidents with a focus for the qualitatively new post-Cold War relationship they have propounded, but to which they have yet to give major content. It would be a fitting replacement for the old-style bilateral arms control regimes whose era is drawing to an end.

The United States and Russia can forge the most far-reaching and effective alliance for peace the world has ever witnessed. The last 10 years have shown that nothing is impossible. The next 10 years must show how Russia and the United States subdued terrorism and led our countries and all who joined with us to security and an enriched quality of life.