Following are excerpts from Van Diepen's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

Strengthening Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes

Testimony of Vann H. Van Diepen, Director
Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services

July 29, 2002

IV. Facing the Future

Nonproliferation faces a challenging future. As events of the past year have demonstrated, we face an increasing proliferation threat from terrorists and their state sponsors. The treaties face a continuous threat from states that would seek to violate them. We must scrutinize not only the nonproliferation regimes and treaties but also all our nonproliferation tools with an eye toward improving their effectiveness in helping to ensure global security and stability.

In this regard, we need to continue to work with our regime partners on "regional nonproliferation" -- focusing on steps, beyond simply controlling our own exports, that we and our partners can take individually or collectively to impede WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and missile proliferation. The regimes must continue to update control lists to reflect technological advances and ensure that they keep pace with proliferation trends; work to extend export controls in line with regime standards to all potential suppliers of WMD and missile equipment and technology as well as to those countries that serve as transshipment points, and increase efforts to make non-members more aware of the threat and consequences of unchecked proliferation. The regimes must also help non-members understand that responsible nonproliferation policies and practices do not hinder trade and can actually be beneficial to trade by increasing confidence, and urge them to adopt policies and practices consistent with regime standards, providing export control assistance as necessary.

AG [Australia Group] members need to take steps to deal with two key aspects of the regional CBW threat: 1) CBW programs in non-AG countries, and 2) sources of support for such programs in non-AG countries. The AG provides a valuable avenue for participants to discuss appropriate actions, divide the labor, and avoid duplication of effort.

At the urging of the United States, the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Partners continue to focus on additional ways to address ongoing missile proliferation challenges, particularly in the context of the global campaign against terrorism. We seek to place renewed emphasis on regional nonproliferation, information-sharing, and interdiction cooperation. We also will seek continuing refinements and updates to the MTCR Annex that will address emerging technological and proliferation trends.

The NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] is considering U.S. proposals to enhance its ability to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. These proposals include enhanced information sharing on approvals of Trigger List and nuclear-related dual-use exports as well as denials of Trigger List exports. Changes in the Guidelines have also been recommended. The NSG will continue to pursue vigorous outreach dialogue with key nonmember states, including China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The NSG also continues to focus on the problems raised by Russian nuclear supply to India.

In the Wassenaar Arrangement [WA], the United States is seeking ways to expand arms transfer reporting in existing categories and to add small arms/light weapons reporting for items on the Wassenaar Munitions List. We also want to reach agreement on a Statement of Understanding concerning catch-all controls as well as a provision for "no undercut" denial consultations in the Arrangement's Initial Elements.

The United States is actively working to develop more effective ways to combat the BW [biological weapons] threat. The unprecedented attack on the United States on September 11 and subsequent bioterrorism underscored the dangers posed by both determined state actors as well as non-state actors. The United States therefore has decided it must look beyond traditional arms control measures to deal with the complex and dangerous threat posed by BW. Countering this threat will require a full range of measures -- tightened export controls, intensified nonproliferation dialogue, increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and counterterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks as well as the full compliance with the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention] by all States Parties. The U.S. proposed "alternative measures" to strengthen the Convention before the November 2001 BWC Review Conference with a goal of highlighting compliance concerns and attempting to gain support from States Parties for the U.S. package and other measures that would address the BW threat of today and the future. We hope that BWC parties can agree on measures that will effectively do so.

As a first priority with respect to the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention], the United States seeks to ensure the effective operation of the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]. To correct serious mismanagement problems, the United States recently led a successful multilateral effort to remove and replace the head of the OPCW Technical Secretariat. We are now trying to restore financial stability to the OPCW to enable it to fulfill its worldwide verification mission. Furthermore, we are stressing the importance of addressing concerns with compliance, using bilateral and other appropriate mechanisms provided by the Convention, possibly including challenge inspection. The five-year Review Conference for the CWC is slated to commence in April 2003; we are actively examining ways to use this opportunity to refine and strengthen implementation.

As the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] inspection regime on which the NPT relies, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards system must be adequately funded and vigorously implemented. The powers of the IAEA under the NPT will be enhanced significantly if NPT parties adopt the Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agreements. President Bush forwarded the U.S. Additional Protocol to the Senate in May of this year to demonstrate the importance we attach to its universal acceptance. The IAEA can play an important role in efforts to address the risk of nuclear terrorism, not only through its safeguards systems but also through programs designed to help states with national programs to secure nuclear facilities and materials.

The NPT will realize its full potential only if the international community adopts an approach of zero tolerance for violations. That requires vigorous efforts to bring Iraq and North Korea into compliance, and to warn any other state contemplating a violation of the NPT that doing so will be met with a concerted action and effective response.

The Zangger Committee, owing to its link to the NPT, is uniquely positioned to engage NPT-Party critics of the nonproliferation regimes such as Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico and to present supplier government views at NPT conferences and meetings. The Committee also continues to take the lead in considering additions to the Trigger List, with the latest such effort, the addition of plutonium separation equipment, expected to be finalized by October 2002.

V. Emerging Threats

These regimes and treaties have contributed greatly to international nonproliferation efforts, but we cannot become complacent. As a starting point, rigorous, energetic, and ever vigilant enforcement is essential. Nonproliferation remains a perpetually unfinished project. More work always needs to be done. We must deal with continuing proliferation threats posed by countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. We must strengthen cooperation and cope with the impact of technological advances. We must continue to combat the terrorist threat. We must consider new potential threats, expand our nonproliferation toolkit, and improve the efficacy of those tools we have.

As the anthrax letters demonstrated last year, the use -- or the threat of use -- of a biological agent can have a profound and devastating impact. We need to recalibrate our focus to concentrate on the small-scale terrorist threat as well as the larger state-sponsored military threat. For example, we need to do more to ensure that terrorists do not gain access to the dual-use production equipment and the biological pathogens that could be used to produce BW. We must work with governments, institutes, academia, and research centers world-wide to improve accounting controls, security, and access to such items. Perhaps more importantly, we need to keep abreast of procurement trends and technological advances to stay ahead of the terrorist and state-sponsored programs. Many of these activities will require efforts both inside and outside the regimes and treaties.

MTCR Partners' vigorous enforcement of export controls consistent with the MTCR Guidelines and Annex continues to make it more difficult for proliferators to get items for their missile programs, increasing the cost, time, and effort required. Responsible countries must work to prevent proliferators, terrorists and smugglers from acquiring missiles. Ample information indicates significant movement of proliferation-related products through loosely-controlled transshipment points. MTCR Partner and like-minded countries must encourage such countries to adopt effective transshipment controls, shut down front companies, prosecute brokers involved in proliferation activities, and improve enforcement procedures. The MTCR must also examine what role it can play in strengthening efforts to keep WMD and means of production and delivery out of the hands of terrorists.

In addition to the MTCR, the United States supports the wide acceptance of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). Initiated by the MTCR countries in 1999, the ICOC is intended to be a new multilateral complement to the work of the MTCR. The Code will supplement and not supplant the MTCR. The ICOC would consist of a small set of broad principles, general commitments, and modest confidence-building measures. It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment to establish a broad multilateral norm against missile proliferation. It will complement the MTCR and other national missile nonproliferation efforts by establishing a widely-subscribed consensus that countries should cooperate on a voluntary basis to impede missile proliferation. We hope the ICOC will come into effect as early as the end of this year.

Both the NSG and Zangger Committee are expected to play an increased vital role in dealing with the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, once U.S. proposals for strengthening these regimes are considered and adopted. However, neither group is currently positioned to address a newly-identified concern -- the vulnerability of multinational nuclear companies to possible penetration by employees loyal to non-state actors. The globalization of the nuclear industry has been an accelerating phenomenon in recent years and U.S. government agencies have begun to consider ways to address potential threats to multinational companies.

The United States succeeded in convincing our WA partners to expand the Arrangement's mandate explicitly to prevent terrorists from acquiring controlled items. We will seek to maintain this momentum in addressing international terrorism issues to include establishment an appropriate information sharing mechanism in the WA General Working Group. Although some WA members have opposed our efforts to expand transparency commitments within the WA, we have made progress and are optimistic of our ability to continue to further this goal.

The U.S. "alternatives" proposal attempts to enhance implementation of and compliance with the 1975 BWC in light of concerns stemming from terrorism and regional proliferation. Such proposed measures include promotion of standards for biosafety and biosecurity, scientific and industrial codes of conduct and improved disease surveillance. The nature of developing threats is such that effective implementation of the BWC requires agreement on more specific measures addressing those threats.

The CWC is one of a number of tools that we have to address the chemical weapons threat. These tools complement and supplement each other. The Convention was designed primarily to deal with weapons programs of states. However, by obligating states not to assist any person in acquiring chemical weapons and requiring them to ensure domestic compliance, it indirectly assists in fighting terrorism, as well. It can directly impact regional proliferation, but only if the relevant states become parties.

The threat of a "dirty bomb" or radiological dispersal device has also gained more attention since September 11. The IAEA is expanding its activities in this area. It has coordinated assistance for member states in identifying, locating, and securing radiological devices that were carelessly abandoned after being used for peaceful and military purposes. Some of these devices have radioactive material that would be useful in a dirty bomb. The IAEA can also provide assistance to states in establishing a proper framework for regulation and control of these devices while in civilian uses. In addition to advising states on proper standards, the IAEA can assist in the procurement of equipment to detect illegal trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material.

In closing, multilateral nonproliferation regimes and treaties have an important role to play as two components of a comprehensive approach to advancing U.S. national security and nonproliferation policy. They must remain vibrant, active tools, focused on their collective and individual core mission -- impeding threatening weapons programs, especially via impeding the spread of weapons and related equipment and technology, and reinforcing and verifying treaty obligations against the acquisition of WMD. At the same time, these multilateral instruments must also possess the flexibility to adapt to new challenges on the battlefield of nonproliferation. The continued exercise of strong U.S. leadership will play an indispensable role in strengthening these multilateral regimes and treaties to better combat proliferation.