(The following article by Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, appears in the International Information Programs Electronic Journal "September 11: One Year Later" issued in September 2002. This article and the rest of the journal may be viewed on the Web at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/ijge0902.htm)

September 11 Launched a New Era in U.S. Strategic Thinking
By Robert J. Lieber
Professor of Government and Foreign Service
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

(The post-Cold War era, which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union almost 12 years ago, ended abruptly on the sunny, clear morning of September 11, 2001, In an instant, coordinated terrorist attacks transformed the international security environment and dictated a new "grand strategy" for the United States.)

September 11 marked the start of a new era in American strategic thinking. The terror attacks of that morning have had an impact comparable to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, that propelled the United States into World War II. Before September 11, the Bush administration had been in the process of developing a new national security strategy. This was taking place through the Quadrennial Defense Review as well as in other venues. In an instant, however, the September 11 attacks transformed the international security environment. An entirely new and ominous threat suddenly became a reality, and dictated a new grand strategy for the United States. This new policy, now dubbed the "Bush Doctrine," now focuses on the threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

End of the Post-Cold War Era

September 11 brought to a sudden end the post-Cold War era that had begun almost exactly 12 years earlier. That period originated with the dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall on the night of November 9, 1989, followed in rapid succession by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War, and, in December 1991, the breakup of the Soviet Union. For the first time in more than half a century, the United States seemed no longer to face a single great threat to its national security and way of life. In the late 1930s and in World War II that menace had come from fascism. During the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union and Soviet communism. In both cases, the danger was massive and unambiguous. As a result, within the United States and among its allies, there existed a broad consensus about the existence of a major threat, even though differences sometimes arose -- as in the case of Vietnam -- over specific courses of action.

During the years from 1989 to 2001, a multiplicity of lesser dangers existed -- for example, ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, terrorism, political and financial instability, failed states, the impact of climate changes, infectious diseases, and poverty. While no one danger proved dominant, the United States did find itself drawn into a number of military interventions in response to local or regional conflicts, as in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1990-91), Somalia (1991-92), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). At the same time, there were other conflicts in which the United States did not intervene, most notably during the Rwandan genocide (1994), in Bosnia from 1992 until July 1995, and in civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire), and elsewhere.

"Grand strategy" is the term describing how a country will use the various means it possesses -- military, economic, political, technological, ideological, and cultural -- to protect and promote its overall security, values, and national interests. During World War II, this meant a grand alliance, mobilization, and total war to defeat Nazi Germany and Japan. During the Cold War, American foreign policy doctrine could be described with one word -- containment. Unlike the Cold War era, formulation of a grand strategy or any one specific doctrine proved elusive during the 1990s. In contrast to the four decades of the Cold War, there was no consensus about the nature of threats to American national interests or even about how to characterize the new era. As a result, a number of tentative doctrines were put forward during the 1990s, among them ideas concerning a new world order, assertive multilateralism, and a strategy of engagement and enlargement to encourage the spread of democracies and market economies. Each of these approaches had its strong points, but none proved sufficiently comprehensive or durable as a grand strategy for the new era.

In retrospect, even without a grand strategy, three broad elements did condition American foreign policy during the post-Cold War years. The first of these was America's situation of primacy. That is, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States stood in an almost unprecedented position across all the dimensions by which power is typically measured: economic, military, technological, cultural. No other country came close to the same level, and none appeared to be a likely challenger in the immediate future. As the historian Paul Kennedy, author of "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," has written, "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing." (London Financial Times, February 1, 2002). This preponderance has precipitated reactions both of admiration and resentment.

Second, as a result of primacy, as well as the relatively limited capacities of international or regional bodies such as the United Nations and European Union, the United States possessed a unique role in coping with the most urgent international problems, whether in regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing, financial crises, or other kinds of issues. This did not mean that the United States could or would serve as the world's policeman, but it did mean that unless America was actively engaged, management of the world's most dangerous problems was unlikely to be effective.

Third, however, a single, overarching, and unambiguous danger was not apparent. In the domestic realm, this had the effect of relegating foreign policy to a low priority for most Americans and thus made it harder for any administration to gain support for the making of coherent foreign policy or for the allocation of substantial resources to those efforts. Abroad, despite allied collaboration in the Gulf War against Iraq and ultimately in dealing with the civil war in Bosnia and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the absence of the Soviet threat made cooperation more difficult because there no longer seemed to be an imperative for collective action in the face of a common enemy.

The Challenge of September 11

All this changed in a single day on September 11, 2001. Terrorism was no longer one among a number of assorted dangers to the United States, but a fundamental threat to America, its way of life, and its vital interests. The al Qaeda terrorists, who masterminded the use of hijacked jumbo jets to attack the Pentagon, destroy the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and kill 40 passengers and crew over Pennsylvania, were carrying out mass murder as a means of political intimidation. Whether their extreme and nihilistic use of Islam as a political doctrine constitutes the third great totalitarian challenge to America after fascism and communism, remains to be determined. Nonetheless, the willingness of terrorists to carry out mass casualty attacks, in this case directed at two of the most powerful symbols of America's commercial and government life, now poses a great and unambiguous danger.

The gravity of this threat is amplified by two additional factors. First, the ruthlessness and cold-blooded willingness to slaughter large numbers of innocent civilians without the slightest moral compunction has raised fears about potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the terrorists' conduct and statements by their leaders, as well as evidence that state sponsors of terrorism are seeking to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, there is now a risk that WMD might in the future be used directly against the United States as well as against America's friends and allies abroad. Second, in view of the fact that the 19 terrorists in the four hijacked aircraft committed suicide in carrying out their attacks, the precepts of deterrence are now called into question. By contrast, even at the height of the Cold War, American strategists could make their calculations based on the assumed rationality of Soviet leaders and the knowledge that they would not willingly commit nuclear suicide by initiating a massive attack against the United States or its allies. September 11 however, undermines this key assumption.

A New Grand Strategy for the United States

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration turned its attention to a war against terrorism. First, on the domestic front, the administration sought and received a joint resolution from Congress authorizing use of military force, in the exercise of legitimate self-defense. In the language of the resolution: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States ...."

The resolution passed by a margin of 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives. Public opinion, which had been deeply divided since the November 2000 presidential election, rallied in broad support not only of the war effort, but of the President himself.

Second, the United States sought and received a unanimous U.N. Security Council vote on September 28. Resolution 1373 -- adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that provides wide authority for the Security Council to enforce its decision and makes the resolution binding for all U.N. member countries -- requires all member states to criminalize al-Qaeda financial activities, share intelligence information, and take measures to prevent the movement of terrorists. While the resolution has a more symbolic than practical effect, it provides multilateral legitimacy for the American-led battle against terrorism.

Third, the 19 members of NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the alliance. Article V treats an attack on one member state as an attack on all, and requires that they take action under their respective constitutional procedures. Ultimately, some 16 of the 19 countries contributed personnel to the Afghan campaign, even though the war was not formally conducted as a NATO operation. Additional political, military, and intelligence cooperation was also provided by a large number of states, including Russia, China, and many of Afghanistan's Asian and Middle Eastern neighbors.

In the ensuing months, American airpower and U.S. Special Forces, in support of the Afghan opposition, quickly defeated the Taliban regime that had ruled Afghanistan along with their al-Qaeda allies. This victory occurred far more rapidly and with far fewer casualties than many observers had expected, and it was met with celebration by the local population, which saw itself liberated from oppressive Taliban rule.

From the beginning, however, the president has been explicit in saying that the war against terror will not be quickly completed, and in January 2002, speaking to a joint session of Congress, he outlined what quickly became known as the "Bush Doctrine."

"...(W)e will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And ... we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world ....

Yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." (State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002).

Two elements are crucial to the doctrine. The first is a sense of urgency, reflected in the words that "time is not on our side." The second is that the unique danger created by weapons of mass destruction requires the United States to be prepared to take swift, decisive, and pre-emptive action. Both of these imperatives reflect the calculation that whatever the risks of acting, the risks of not acting are more ominous. Moreover, the president made clear that a handful of states present the greatest threat, especially Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, which he termed "the axis of evil." The concern here is not only the danger of these countries acquiring WMD themselves, but also the risk that they might ultimately make such weapons available to others, particularly terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.

In the following months, senior foreign policy officials, as well as the president, have elaborated on the administration's approach, including the possibility of preemption, i.e., taking preventive action rather than waiting passively for the United States or its allies to suffer an attack before responding. For example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked: "A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using a range of techniques. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in every location .... When it's something like smallpox or anthrax or a chemical weapon or the radiation weapon or killing thousands of people at the World Trade [Center], even the U.N. Charter provides for the right of self-defense. And the only effective way to defend is to take the battle to where the terrorists are .... So preemption with military force is now an operative idea." (Interview, Jim Lehrer Newshour, PBS, February 4, 2002).

Subsequently, in a June 1 address at the U.S. Military Academy, the president told the assembled cadets that America must be ready for "preemptive action when necessary" to defend liberty and lives. In a similar vein, Vice President Cheney pledged that the United States would "shut down terrorist camps wherever they are," and observed of Iraq that a "regime that hates America must never be prepared to threaten Americans with weapons of mass destruction." (Washington Post, June 25, 2002).

At the same time, Secretary of State Colin Powell observed that if pre-emptive force is used, it must be used decisively. He also noted that preemption can involve military force, as well as arrests, sanctions, and diplomatic measures. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice pointed to the 1962 blockade during the Cuban missile crisis as an example of successful preemptive action. (Quotes from "The Economist," June 22, 2002, page 29).

The Bush Doctrine and its elaboration embody American grand strategy a year after September 11, but the doctrine does not exist in a vacuum. Its viability will depend in part on sustained domestic support, international reaction, and the ability of the United States to bear the burdens of this strategy. In the domestic arena, though sharp partisan differences are evident on other issues, broad bipartisan support continues in foreign policy. At the same time, public opinion strongly supports the war on terror. In addition, there is little indication that the burdens of increased defense spending will prove difficult to sustain. Prior to September 11, the share of gross domestic product devoted to defense had dipped to 3 percent, a level lower than at any time since Pearl Harbor. Even substantial increases in defense spending, which have raised this figure to 3.3 percent and could reach as high as 4 percent over a period of years, would not constitute a drastic burden when compared with Cold War levels.

International reactions to the Bush Doctrine have been more complex, and differences with allies and other countries have emerged concerning Iraq, the Middle East, and the extent to which the United States should be more "multilateral" in its approach to a wide range of international problems. Much of this dissent remains rhetorical, however, and extensive cooperation in military and intelligence efforts continues to take place. Some of the foreign reactions are an inevitable consequence of American primacy. Yet the muted reaction and tendency for it to remain largely symbolic reflect the lack of effective means of international enforcement through existing regional and world institutions. Ultimately, the Bush Doctrine represents a strategy to defend the United States against potential attacks with weapons of mass destruction. Further, it embodies a unique American world role in helping to protect others against such devastation.

(Lieber is the editor and a contributing author of "Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the 21st Century," a book published in 2002.)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.)

(end byliner)

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