The Proliferation Security InitiativeBureau of Nonproliferation Washington, DC July 28, 2004 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. Announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, it stems from the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to defeat the proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed.
Being Proactive
The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Actions will be taken in support of the PSI consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. The PSI seeks to use existing authorities -- national and international -- to defeat proliferation.
Statement of Interdiction Principles
In September 2003, 11 countries -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- agreed to and published the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Since then, many more countries have endorsed the Principles. This set of principles identifies specific steps for effectively interdicting WMD shipments and preventing proliferation facilitators from engaging in this deadly trade. Participation in the PSI is voluntary. PSI partners encourage all states to publicly support the PSI, and to take the steps outlined in the principles, including steps in support of PSI operational activities. Support for the PSI is an acknowledgment of the need for stronger measures to defeat proliferators through cooperation with other countries.
PSI Is a Part of the Solution
The PSI is part of an overall counterproliferation effort intended to apply intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and other tools at our disposal to prevent transfers of WMD-related items to countries and entities of concern. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD. The PSI is a positive way to take such cooperative action.
Why Do We Need the PSI?
States have cooperated for many years to prevent specific shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials from taking place. But these efforts have tended to be ad hoc and have mainly focused on items in ports.
Gaining Senior Government-Level Attention
Halting Proliferation-Related Shipments In addition to the increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures taken by proliferators and their facilitators to circumvent export controls, we also are dealing with a relatively new dynamic where proliferators are shipping to proliferators. This trend further limits opportunities to stop shipments before they are en route. The PSI builds on our interdiction experience to date and uses the full range of counterproliferation tools -- from diplomacy to intelligence to operations -- to stop WMD and missile-related proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land.
How Does the PSI Work?
Partnerships
The PSI is a set of activities, not a formal treaty-based organization. It is best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal "obligations" for participating states, but does represent a political commitment to establish "best practices" to stop proliferation-related shipments. PSI interdiction training exercises and other operational efforts will help states work together in a more cooperative, coordinated, and effective manner to stop, search, and seize shipments.
Coordination
The focus of PSI is on establishing greater coordination among its partner states and a readiness to act effectively when a particular action is needed. Actual interdictions will likely involve only a few PSI participants with geographic and operational access to a particular PSI target of opportunity. By working together, PSI partners will combine their capabilities in a way that adds up to more than their individual efforts.
How Can States Participate in the PSI?
There are many countries that can play a helpful role in building global counterproliferation capabilities. There are also countries -- such as flagship, coastal, or transshipment states, or states along major air shipment corridors -- whose cooperation is essential to counterproliferation efforts involving cargoes in transit. Since the Statement of Interdiction Principles was agreed upon and made public in early September 2003, many states worldwide have indicated their strong support for these principles and their interest in cooperating actively on PSI efforts.
States are becoming involved in the PSI in varying ways. Some states, for example, have attended interdiction training exercises or informational meetings to help build the basis for effective cooperation. Participation in the PSI will continue to expand based on countries' responses to the initiative. There are also concrete steps that states can take to establish the basis for their participation in the PSI. These include:
What Is the Future of the PSI? PSI is a lasting initiative that over time will establish a web of counterproliferation partnerships to prevent trade in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. Successful efforts involving PSI partners are a reality.
States must cooperate to make it more difficult and more costly for proliferators to engage in this deadly trade. Over time, proliferators, and others involved in supporting proliferation activities, will learn that there are countries determined to work together to take all possible steps to stop their efforts. PSI is an important contribution to global nonproliferation and is a strong deterrent to proliferation-related trafficking. PSI also seeks enhanced law enforcement cooperation to shut down proliferation-related networks and activities and bring those involved to justice.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."
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