U.N. Unable to Confirm or Disprove Iraq's Weapons Declaration
Blix says inspections to continue and interviews under preparation
The chief of the U.N. weapons inspections commission for Iraq
(UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, says so far the United Nations has not been able
to confirm or disprove Iraq's declaration that it does not possess
weapons of mass destruction.
"UNMOVIC at this point is neither in a position to confirm Iraq's
statements, nor in possession of evidence to disprove it," Blix said
December 19.
Blix's statement was contained in a draft document entitled "Notes for
briefing the Security Council regarding inspections in Iraq and a
preliminary assessment of Iraq's declaration under paragraph 3 of
resolution 1441 (2002)."
Blix said the statements Iraq made in its December 7 declaration
require documentation and other evidence in order to become
verifiable. He said many questions were left unanswered by information
Iraq provided from 1991 to 1998 when it terminated inspections.
According to Blix, many new question marks have been added in the
four-year interval before Iraq submitted to international pressure for
renewed inspections.
Blix said the preliminary assessment of the declaration indicates that
Iraq has not provided much new significant information about its
weapons programs, but has provided new material concerning its
non-weapons related activities from 1998 to 2002.
The U.N. official listed a number of areas related to development of
missiles, as well as chemical and biological weapons, which he said
U.N. inspectors will inspect and evaluate. Most of the questions
related to Iraq's declaration arise from a lack of supporting evidence
but in a few cases, the United Nations appears to have evidence that
contradicts its declaration, Blix said. He said the United Nations
will challenge Iraq's account of its production and alleged unilateral
destruction of anthrax between 1988 and 1991.
Blix said the United Nations will continue inspections anywhere,
anytime and is preparing to begin interviews with Iraqis who may have
information about the country's weapons programs.
Blix said the United Nations also has requested that Iraq enact
legislation that implements Security Council resolutions prohibiting
the development of weapons of mass destruction or longer-range
missiles.
Following is the text of Blix's notes for briefing the Security
Council
Notes for briefing the Security Council regarding inspections in Iraq and a preliminary assessment of Iraq's declaration under paragraph 3 of resolution 14411 (2002)
Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
19 December 2002
First part: situation report on inspection effort
Before I take up the major subject of my briefing; which relates to
the Declaration submitted by Iraq under operative paragraph 3 of
resolution 1441(2002), I should like, with your permission, to report
briefly on where the UNMOVIC inspection effort stands today, 41 days
after the adoption of the resolution on 8 November.
As you will recall, inspections resumed on 27 November.
-- Since then the number of UNMOVIC IC inspectors in Baghdad has
increased from 11 to over 90. In addition there are some 55 support
staff.
-- Since the adoption of the resolution on 8 November, we have signed
over 145 employment contracts, most of them for staff in Baghdad but
some to strengthen our capacity here in New York.
-- During the autumn, we have signed contracts for equipment and
services amounting to some 32.3 million dollars, assuming that the
services run for a year. Out of this, the largest part of 22.3 million
will be for air operations.
-- Since the adoption of the resolution, we have initiated an air
shuttle between Larnaca in Cyprus and Baghdad, with a field office in
Larnaca and service facilities at Saddam International Airport in
Baghdad.
-- We have recently deployed one helicopter to Baghdad and are
expecting 7 more before the end of the year. All will be stationed at
the Rasheed airbase, where the Iraqi authorities provide service
facilities.
-- We have put the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Centre (BOMVIC) into operation and the Iraqi authorities
are cooperating with us in the establishment of a field office in
Mosul.
The build-up could hardly have been faster. We have benefited from the
extensive preparations which we made for deployment during the past
years, the training of potential inspectors, the early identification
of potential suppliers and the identification of sites to be inspected
at the initial phase. We have also benefited from the excellent
cooperation and assistance extended to us by many divisions of the UN
Secretariat in New York and by the UN organizations in Baghdad, Cyprus
and Brindisi. Here, in New York, we have been given more office space
necessary for our functioning but difficult to obtain in the crowded
buildings of the UN. For Baghdad, we plan to expand the premises as
soon as possible. The Iraqi cooperation has been very helpful for our
logistical and infrastructure build-up.
Second part: results so far of the inspection effort
Let me next report on some of our activities and experiences from the
past three weeks:
-- We have inspected 44 sites declared by Iraq or inspected by UNSCOM
or the IAEA in the past, among them 3 in the Mosul area and 8
newly-declared locations.
-- We have inspected some sites, which were previously indicated by
Iraq as sensitive or presidential. They were now inspected in the same
manner as other sites.
-- Access to sites has been prompt and assistance on the sites
expeditious. It seems probable that a general instruction has been
issued not in any way to delay or impede inspection of the kind of
sites we have gone to so far. This is welcome and it is to be hoped
that such an instruction will extend to all sites we may wish to
inspect in the future, regardless of location, character and timing.
-- With respect to the results of our inspections, I should note that
several sites, which have been the subject of public discussion, have
been inspected and questions as to their use may have been answered.
-- We have identified the location of some artillery shells and
containers with mustard gas. They were placed under UNSCOM supervision
in 1998. They will now be sampled, and eventually destroyed.
-- Criticism has been voiced by the Iraqi side regarding some
inspections:
-- The inspection of a presidential site took place without problems -
after a minor delay in access. However, it was subsequently stated
from the Iraqi side that the inspection was unjustified and that the
inspectors could not have looked for weapons of mass destruction, as
they did not wear protective gear. Clearly, we do not need to justify
any of our selections of sites and one does not need protective gear
to look for documents or computer files.
-- Some sites were inspected last Friday -- the Muslim day of rest. In
one of them, the Iraqi staff were absent and a number of doors inside
locked, with no keys available. The Iraqi side offered to break the
doors open while videotaping the event. However, they agreed with a
suggestion that the doors in question could be sealed overnight and
the offices inspected the next morning. Clearly, we have the right to
undertake inspections at any time, night or day, whether on weekdays
or religious holidays. We intend to exercise this right -- not to
harass -- but to demonstrate that just as there are no sanctuaries in
space there are no sanctuaries in time.
Let the report, lastly, two formal requests that we have directed to
Iraq in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council.
Under subparagraph 4 of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), UNMOVIC
has asked Iraq to provide the names of all personnel currently or
formerly associated with some aspect of Iraq's programme of weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missiles. During my talks in Baghdad
last month, I indicated that this request would be made and in the
Declaration just submitted we find that, in several chapters, the
Iraqi side has refrained from submitting names explicitly on the
ground that they expected the request to come.
We have asked that the names be submitted to us before the end of the
year and suggested that Iraq may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting
from the leadership in programmes, going down to management,
scientists, engineers and technicians but excluding the basic layer of
workers.
The list of names may have several uses. It could, for instance, be of
use to learn where those who earlier worked on the biological weapons
programme, are now. Some persons on the list could be called for
interviews. We certainly consider interviews in Iraq a potentially
important source of information as it has been in the past.
Taking persons to be interviewed and family members out of Iraq is
authorized under paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002) and is an
option. Although Iraq would be obliged to cooperate, the practical
arrangements would have to be carefully examined. Clearly, we could
not take anybody out of Iraq without his or her consent.
The second formal request concerns legislation implementing Security
Council resolutions. I have reminded the Iraqi side several times in
the past year that it should be easy for it to enact such legislation,
notably laws prohibiting legal and physical persons to engage in any
way in the development, production or storing of weapons of mass
destruction or missiles of proscribed range. Model legislation was, in
fact; transmitted to Iraq by UNSCOM and the IAEA long ago.
Third part: a preliminary assessment of Iraq's declaration of 7
December
I shall now turn to discuss those parts of Iraq's Declaration of 7
December, which concerts biological and chemical weapons and
long-range missiles. I hope that my comments may he of some assistance
especially to those Members of the Council who have only had the
working version one day arid who are about to begin their analytical
work.
Although UNMOVIC has had access to this text a whole week before the
working version was made available, our analysts have been fully
occupied preparing the working version and my comments must
necessarily be, provisional. I trust there will be a further occasion
for discussion, when all have had more time for study and analysis.
The first point to be made is that Iraq continues to state in the
Declaration, as it has consistently done before its submission, that
there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, when inspectors
left at the end of 1998 and that none have been designed, procured,
produced or stored in the period since then.
While individual governments have stated that they have convincing
evidence to the contrary, UNMOVIC at this point is neither in a
position to confirm Iraq's statements, nor in possession of evidence
to disprove it.
The purpose of the Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to
declare all WMD programmes and creating an extensive and intensive
inspection system is to attain, through peaceful means, confidence
that Iraq is rid of or ridding itself of all such programmes and
proscribed items -- verified disarmament.
A declaration cannot, if it stands alone, create confidence. The
listing of sites or of persons, the reporting of production,
importation, destruction and consumption figures and the opening of
doors, giving access to inspections, is not enough to create
confidence that no weapons programmes and proscribed items remain. The
statements need to be supported by documentation or other evidence.
Only so do they become verifiable.
During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called,
full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations
proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by
evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed
programmes car items have been eliminated.
Such was the situation at the end of 1998, when inspectors left Iraq.
The many question marks are documented in a report to the Council
early in 1999 (S/1999/94) and in the so-called Amorim Report
(S/1999/356). To these question marks, nearly four years without any
inspection activity have been added.
In resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to provide a
fresh declaration and to make it verifiable to the inspecting
authorities by submitting supporting evidence. It remains to analyse
in detail how much is clarified by the new declaration and supporting
material. When we have performed a more thorough analysis, we may ask
Iraq for supplementary information and clarifications.
The overall impression is that not much new significant information
has been provided in the part of Iraq's Declaration, which relates to
proscribed weapons programmes, nor has much new supporting
documentation or other evidence been submitted. New material has, on
the other hand, been provided concerning non-weapons related
activities during the period from the end of 1995 to the present time.
It would appear that the part that covers biological weapons is
essentially a reorganized version of a previous declaration provided
by Iraq to UNSCOM in September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the
basis of the current Declaration is a declaration submitted by Iraq in
1996 with subsequent updates and explanations. In the missile field,
the Declaration fellows the same format, and seems to have largely the
same content as Iraq's 1996 missile declaration and updates.
Although it must be noted that much of what Iraq has provided in the
weapons part of its Declaration is not new, there are some sections of
new material. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq has further
explained its account of the material balance of precursors for
chemical warfare agents. Although it does not resolve outstanding
issues on this subject, it may help to achieve a better understanding
of the fate of the precursors.
In the missile area, there is a good deal of information regarding
Iraq's activities in the past few years. As declared by Iraq, these
are permitted activities which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to ensure
that they comply with the relevant Council resolutions. A series of
new projects have been declared that are at various stages of
development. They include a design for a new liquid oxygen/ethanol
propellant engine and replacement of guidance systems for several
surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need to be investigated
and evaluated by UNMOVIC.
Iraq has also provided information on a short-range rocket that is
manufactured using 81 mm aluminium tubes. Although this is not a new
disclosure, the information may be relevant to well-publicized reports
concerning the importation of aluminium tubes. At this stage, UNMOVIC
has drawn no conclusions concerning the tubes; and further
investigation of this will be conducted.
While I am on the subject of new information, I would like to mention
a document recently provided by Iraq. This is the so-called Air Force
document, which was once in the hands of an UNSCOM inspector and which
relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran War.
Potentially, it could assist in resolving some questions relating to
the material balance of chemical weapons. We are now closely examining
this document to establish the scope of the information and to
evaluate it in the light of information in our archives. It is too
early to say whether it will support the information in Iraq's
Declaration.
I now turn to some inconsistencies and issues that will need
clarification. In the biological area, Iraq previously provided, in
its submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999, a table
concerning the additional import of bacterial growth media. Growth
media was used by Iraq in the production of anthrax and other
biological warfare agents. This table has been omitted from the
current Declaration and the reasons for the omission need to be
explained.
In the civilian chemical area, Iraq has declared that it has repaired
and installed equipment that had previously been destroyed under
UNSCOM supervision, under Council resolution 687 (1991). The equipment
is now at a civilian chemical plant and used for the production of
chlorine and other chemicals. An UNMOVIC team has recently inspected
both the plant and the equipment. Consideration will now need to be
given to the fate of this equipment, as well as other equipment, which
was presumed destroyed.
In the missile area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile
known as the Al Samoud, which uses components from an imported
surface-to-air missile. A variant of the Al Samoud, with a larger
diameter (760 mm) than the standard version (500 mm) has been
declared. Because of the potential of such a missile, UNSCOM had
informed Iraq that such a development should not proceed until
technical discussions had resolved the question of capability. In the
latest update of the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has
declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud the missile has
exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183
kilometres.
The use of components from the imported surface-to-air missile, which
I have just mentioned, was also the subject of the letters of March
1994 and November 1997 in which the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM
stated that the activity was not permitted. Iraq disputed the UNSCOM
view that the activity was in violation of its obligations. From its
current Declaration, it appears that Iraq has, in fact, proceeded with
the conversion in recent years. The whole issue will now need to be
considered.
I have covered new information in Iraq's Declaration, some
inconsistencies and issues that need to be considered or clarified
through investigation or technical discussions.
As there is little new substantive information in the weapons part of
Iraq's Declaration, or new supporting documentation, the issues that
were identified as unanswered in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and in
UNSCOM's report S/1999/94 remain unresolved. In most cases, the issues
are outstanding not because there is information that contradicts
Iraq's account, but simply because there is a lack of supporting
evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation,
testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence, for
example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that
Iraq's Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete.
The issues that have previously been identified include the unilateral
destruction of indigenously produced "training" missile engines, the
accounting for 50 conventional warheads declared to be unilaterally
destroyed but not recovered, 550 mustard gas shells declared lost
after the Gulf War, declarations concerning the production and
weaponization of the nerve agent VX, the declared unilateral
destruction of biological warfare agents and Iraq's declaration
concerning the material balance of bacterial growth media.
While in most cases issues are outstanding because there is a lack of
supporting evidence, in a few cases, there is information in our
possession that would appear to contradict Iraq's account. At this
point, I will only mention that there are indications suggesting that
Iraq's account of its production and unilateral destruction of anthrax
during the period between 1988 and 1991, may not be accurate. On this
matter, we shall certainly ask Iraq to provide explanations and
further evidence.
Fourth part: Outlook
What role will the inspection system play if Iraq fails to provide
evidence supporting its statements that there remain no weapons of
mass destruction and that nothing was produced or developed or stored
during the period from the end of 1998 until now?
Inspections of sites have, as one important objective, the
verification of industrial, military, research and other current
activities with a view to assuring that no proscribed programmes or
activities are regenerated at any site in Iraq. This side of the
inspection system can be characterized as a form of containment.
Through the other side of the system of reinforced monitoring, there
is a continuation of investigations to complete the requirement of
disarmament as laid down in resolution 687 (1991) and many subsequent
resolutions.
The sites to be inspected in the future are not only those which have
been declared by Iraq or inspected in the past, but also any new sites
which may become known through procurement information, interviews,
defectors, open sources, intelligence or overhead imagery. New
techniques and increasing resources are available for this effort.
The use of multiple teams -- in all disciplines -- operating in
parallel all over Iraq has been the basis for planning our
inspections. To decrease the possibility of prediction, no systematic
patterns are being followed. Advanced technology will play its role
once procurement is finalized. Not only monitoring equipment, such as
cameras and sensors, will be used but also surveillance over-flights
from various platforms, including fixed-wing aircraft, drones and
helicopters.
Inspection activities at sites seek to establish the operational
objectives of sites. They comprise searches for proscribed material
and equipment, as well as documents and computers. Sampling may also
provide important information related to any undeclared activities at
sites. Arrangements are in place for the procurement of chemical and
biological analytical facilities to be installed at our Baghdad
Centre. None of these tools and inspection activities will guarantee
that all possibly concealed items and activities will be found, but
based on the extensive authority given in resolution 1441 (2002) and
backed by a united Security Council, they will make any attempted
concealment more difficult.
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