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TRANSCRIPT
U.S. Will Present Evidence Against Iraq When Time Is Right
State's Bolton explains U.S. policies in Iraq, N. Korea and Iran

In an interview with CNBC on January 24, Under Secretary of State John Bolton answered questions relating to U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, North Korea and Iran.

Asked when the U.S. will provide evidence of Iraq's weapons program, Bolton responded, "We will wait to see the U.N. weapons inspectors report to the Security Council on January 27, but we have a substantial body of evidence about Iraq's illicit program in weapons of mass destruction, and we'll be presenting that evidence at an appropriate time."

Bolton said time is running out for Saddam Hussein. "We've been waiting 12 years since the end of the Persian Gulf War for Iraq to have its weapons of mass destruction eliminated. I think that's a long time by anybody's definition, and shows enormous patience."

When asked about North Korea, Bolton said the United States is eager to develop better relations. Progress, he said, will not be made until North Korea completely abandons its nuclear program.

"We are not prepared to succumb to blackmail, and we're not prepared to engage in negotiations that reward bad behavior."

Bolton said he hopes the situation in North Korea can be resolved without the use of sanctions. "We do not seek sanctions in the near term, and our objective remains convincing North Korea that it's really in its long-term interest to give up this nuclear weapons program.... We want to make every effort on the diplomatic front."


Following is a transcript of the interview

Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton
Interview with CNBC

January 24, 2003
U.S. Embassy
Tokyo, Japan

QUESTION: With U.S. allies backing away on the use of force in Iraq, and Washington saying that time is running out, what sort of evidence do you have, and when will you present it, to try to convince the skeptics, in terms of the need for a conflict with Iraq?

U/S BOLTON: I don't think allies are backing away. We've had extensive consultations around the world for the past several weeks, and there is a substantial body of support for taking the line that we've been taking. Obviously we will wait to see the U.N. weapons inspectors report to the Security Council on January 27, but we have a substantial body of evidence about Iraq's illicit program in weapons of mass destruction, and we'll be presenting that evidence at an appropriate time, to show that Iraq continues to pursue chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. I think this evidence is very powerful and very persuasive, and if Saddam Hussein chooses not to comply with the existing Security Council resolutions, I think it will make a persuasive case to the Security Council and the world that additional steps need to be taken to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction.

QUESTION: Might some of that information come out, say, in the State of the Union address?

U/S BOLTON: Well, I don't know that I'm in a position to say where it will come out or in what form, and I think we've already begun publicly to make part of the case this week, talking about Iraq's very sophisticated campaign of deceit and denial and camouflage. With the U.N. weapons inspectors out of Iraq for four years, Saddam Hussein's regime has had a long time to hide these programs, to hide the stocks of weapons, and to cover up the discrepancies that previous U.N. inspectors noted. So it's a very sophisticated effort, and it's one that will be an important part of our demonstrating that Iraq has not been in compliance with its obligations, and indeed has not only not been cooperating with the inspectors, but has been deliberately been hiding what it's doing.

QUESTION: So you have no sort of time frame in terms of when this might become available?

U/S BOLTON: I don't think it's a precise time frame, but I think that as we've been indicating, time is running out for Saddam Hussein. We've been waiting for 12 years. This is not a matter of a few weeks here or there. We've been waiting 12 years since the end of the Persian Gulf War for Iraq to have its weapons of mass destruction eliminated. I think that's a long time by anybody's definition, and shows enormous patience. But I think because of the threat that Saddam poses - because of the demonstrated capacity to use weapons of mass destruction over the years - that it's time now to make the U.N. resolution stick and to eliminate those weapons.

QUESTION: The next question is regarding North Korea. The Russians apparently presented a three-point plan during the recent meetings with the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Il. I understand that you are still waiting to hear a full report, but just a few minutes ago you said that you would consider it very carefully. There seemed to be several points. I think one was making the peninsula nuclear-free, some sort of non-aggression agreement - you've already mentioned that - and then possible food and fuel aid. From what you know about the Russian proposal, how do you view it, and do you think that it's going to bear some sort of fruit?

U/S BOLTON: We have only some of the highlights of the discussions that Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov had in Pyongyang, and I think until we get a fuller read-out I'm really not in a position to comment definitively. But what is important is that I think all of us, including Russia, are very firmly united on the proposition that North Korea's nuclear weapons program has to be dismantled in a verifiable way. Now if the North is prepared to undertake a fundamental change in its behavior, then as Secretary Powell said, we're willing to consider a new arrangement with them. But we are not prepared to succumb to blackmail, and we're not prepared to engage in negotiations that reward bad behavior.

QUESTION: Before you said, in terms of moving things back to a more normal relationship with North Korea, you've added some other things, though, not just in terms of the nuclear things, but also issues like human rights. Is that something you expect the North Koreans to really agree to?

U/S BOLTON: Well, back in the summer about a year and a half ago, President Bush said we were prepared to talk to North Korea at any time, at any place on the whole range of subjects that are at issue between us, including their weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, the disposition of conventional forces and their human rights situation. That really remains the case. When we sent a delegation to Pyongyang in October of last year, though, we had learned about their uranium enrichment program, which we thought was such an egregious violation of the agreed framework and the non-proliferation treaty that we couldn't even get to these other subjects until that was resolved. The North Koreans, as we all know now, admitted to having such a program, and actually have taken the situation further downhill by unfreezing the plutonium facility at Yongbyon. So it has been a series of actions by the North Koreans that unfortunately have stood in the way of our willingness to have a broad-ranging discussion with them. I think now we're at the point where North Korea's credibility is so shredded that we require concrete actions by the North, not simply additional rhetoric, but concrete action, such as the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program.

QUESTION: Do you think in the final analysis that negotiations will bear fruit? It seems like the Bush administration's final goal is regime change.

U/S BOLTON: I think the North Koreans have so mistreated their people over the years that it's just fundamental to the way America views the rest of the world that we consider these kinds of questions. There was a cartoon a couple of weeks ago showing a crushed Korean peasant under a nuclear warhead with Kim Jong-Il riding on top, and the caption was, "Why enrich the people when you can enrich the uranium?" And that's a fundamental point.

QUESTION: Just briefly on your discussions with the Japanese officials - what sort of sense did you get, and what did you agree upon during your meetings?

U/S BOLTON: I think Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe were very clear on a couple of important points. First, they are in agreement with us that the only acceptable outcome of this matter is that North Korea's nuclear weapons program has to be eliminated, and second that we are both equally determined that that be done through peaceful means. I think in terms of the bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship, we are equally of a mind that we have to stay in closest touch, and that coordination on policy regarding North Korea will be very intimate throughout the remainder of the problem.

QUESTION: The next thing is regarding the IAEA. You were expecting a board vote maybe this week. When do you expect it, and once it's taken to the Security Council, what sort of actions do you expect, or what does the U.S. want the Security Council to do?

U/S BOLTON: It had been our hope to have the IAEA board of governors vote this week. It doesn't look like that's going to happen, but we'll continue to press for the earliest possible referral by the IAEA to the Security Council. We think that's appropriate, because the Security Council is the existing multilateral institution charged with addressing threats to international peace and security. North Korea's violation of the non-proliferation treaty and its ongoing nuclear weapons programs are really, unfortunately, beyond the IAEA's capacity to handle. So we think the Security Council is the place to go. What exactly happens in the council is something that we think needs further discussion, but the Security Council has a variety of means at its disposal, including political persuasion and other possibilities that we think are important to pursue, but importantly to have it in the Security Council so that North Korea understands once again how isolated it is in the world, and why its behavior is considered so dangerous by everyone else.

QUESTION: For example, in the Security Council, it seems like there has been quite a bit of political persuading going on from almost all the Security Council members right now. Just by taking it to the Security Council, is there something else that the U.S. is expecting?

U/S BOLTON: I think that what this demonstrates is that we regard the North Korean actions as a global problem, a threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and while it's obviously centrally important to South Korea and Japan, and they remain our critical countries of concern, we are at a worldwide problem now, and we need the Security Council, we need the five permanent members, who of course are also the five legitimate nuclear weapons states, to become involved in this and to seek a peaceful solution.

QUESTION: There have been some reports, though, that the hardliners in the administration eventually want some sort of sanctions.

U/S BOLTON: I think that sanctions are certainly an option, there is no question about it. But I think we have made it clear that our immediate objective is simply to have the matter taken up by the Security Council. We do not seek sanctions in the near term, and our objective remains convincing North Korea that it's really in its long-term interest to give up this nuclear weapons program. That's the path we're pursuing, and before we consider the other options, we want to make every effort on the diplomatic front.

QUESTION: This is somewhat related to Japan. What sort of role is the U.S. playing in preventing equipment and materials that can be used for weapons of mass destruction from going to North Korea? Also, what sort of role has Japan played? There was a report, I think in the Sankei newspaper, saying that the U.S. had provided intelligence on such equipment, and Japan was able to stop it. Would you comment on that?

U/S BOLTON: I wouldn't want to get into specific intelligence-related questions, but I can say that through the nuclear suppliers group, which is an informal multilateral group that worries about the sale of dual-use items possibly used in nuclear weapons programs, that we have reached agreement a couple of weeks ago to tighten up our scrutiny on continuing North Korean efforts to procure materials that are necessary for their uranium enrichment operation. I think it's significant that we know that North Korea, even as we speak, even as we're trying to address this problem, continues to pursue the resources that it needs to engage in uranium enrichment. So, unhappily, it's a further piece of evidence of how devoted North Korea is to achieving nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: This is not necessarily happening now, but in terms of the Japanese, there's a fair amount of capital and also goods and other trade flowing with the North. Is the U.S. concerned about that, and have they been concerned about that? Because it appears in the Japanese press that a lot of the NBC precursor equipment and chemicals and other things have come from Japan.

U/S BOLTON: I think Japan and the United States have cooperated over the years very effectively to try to prevent the sale of this kind of equipment internationally through our respective export-control systems, and I am confident that Japan is doing everything it can in that regard. I think what it shows is that we all need to have intensified efforts, and I think it's something that all of us who are concerned about the North Korean nuclear weapons program are working hard on.

QUESTION: Just one more question: This was brought up briefly - I guess it was the last question in the press conference. I know so much of the attention is focused on Iraq and also then North Korea, and it sort of begs the question - what about Iran?

U/S BOLTON: Well, we're working hard on Iran. I myself have spent a lot of time in discussions with the Russians about our concern about assistance to Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missile program. The Iranians are very active in seeking assistance from North Korea and China. Although the current focus is on Iraq, and to a lesser extent on North Korea, Iran remains a very serious problem, one that we're committed to addressing, and that we are trying to address by preventing the Iranian government from acquiring these capabilities in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles.

QUESTION: I know about it in terms of the nuclear, but what about in terms of the chemical and biological? What is ... ?

U/S BOLTON: We assess that they have ongoing programs in those fields. That's obviously a very disturbing violation of their treaty commitments, and it's another aspect of the threat they pose. Much of that is indigenous, although, again, we try and address it through multilateral export-control regimes in order to prevent the programs from growing even more sophisticated than they already are.

QUESTION: Can we just do one question on the North Korea-South Korea talks, and what this means in terms of moving to the Security Council?

U/S BOLTON: Obviously, with a new administration about to take office in South Korea, we're in very close touch with them, and we regard their talks with the North as potentially very important in order to pass on the message that the existing government in South Korea and the new government are of exactly the same view as the United States and Japan, that North Korea has to abandon its nuclear weapons program. We expect, as we draw closer to the South Korean inauguration, we will be in ever-closer touch with the new administration. All of us in the United States have experienced transitions. We want to make sure this one goes smoothly, and I expect that we're looking forward to the president-elect's visit to Washington soon after his inauguration.


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