United States Embassy
Tokyo, Japan
State Department Seal
Welcome to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. This site contains information on U.S. policy,
public affairs, visas and consular services.


   
Consulates
Osaka
Nagoya
Fukuoka
Sapporo
Naha
   
American Centers
Tokyo
Kansai
Nagoya
Fukuoka
Sapporo
   
TRANSCRIPT
U.S. Looks Forward to Prompt Adoption of New Iraq Resolution
U.S. Ambassador Negroponte's Security Council remarks

Co-sponsoring a new resolution on Iraq, U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said February 24 that "we now believe that it is abundantly clear that Iraq has refused to disarm and has no intention of doing so."

The United States believes, Negroponte said, that because of Iraq's refusals to comply with the tests of truthfulness, cooperation and disarmament set by resolution 1441, the council must work toward the prompt adoption of a draft resolution the United States is co-sponsoring with the United Kingdom and Spain.

According to a text of the ambassador's statement released by the U.S. Mission to the U.N., the ambassador cited examples of Iraq's failure to comply with resolution 1441 passed in November 2002 and recalled issues brought to the council by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in January and early February.

"We cannot allow ourselves to return to business-as-usual on Iraq," Negroponte said. "Over the past 13 years, a pattern has emerged. Each time that there is a renewed acknowledgement that a non-compliant Iraq poses a threat, political or military pressure mounts. The council then calls on Iraq to disarm. Iraq offers minimal signs of cooperation on process until the political pressure subsides and then returns to its standard operating procedures of non-compliance and non-cooperation."


Following is the text of the ambassador's remarks

Statement by Ambassador Negroponte
Informal Consultations of the Security Council
February 24, 2003

Nearly 12 years ago, the Security Council passed Resolution 687. This resolution stated that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security at the close of the Gulf War and laid out a number of conditions intended to ensure that Iraq could no longer pose such a threat.

Among its other provisions, Resolution 687 laid down a 45-day timeline for Iraq to disarm. Iraqi disarmament is now 4225 days overdue. Last November, this Council passed Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to comply. Regrettably, today, the story is still the same: No truth, no real cooperation, and most importantly, no disarmament.

We cannot allow ourselves to return to business-as-usual on Iraq. Over the past 13 years, a pattern has emerged. Each time that there is a renewed acknowledgement that a non-compliant Iraq poses a threat, political or military pressure mounts. The Council then calls on Iraq to disarm. Iraq offers minimal signs of cooperation on process until the political pressure subsides and then returns to its standard operating procedures of non-compliance and non-cooperation.

Unfortunately, to anyone familiar with the Security Council debates of the 1990s on Iraq, the discussions we have had over the past several weeks sound terribly familiar.

As Secretary Powell reminded us two weeks ago, the purpose of Resolution 1441 is disarmament. It is not about inspections. Inspections are a means to verifying and achieving disarmament when a country has determined that it will voluntarily disarm. To measure Iraqi willingness to voluntarily disarm, the Resolution contains two principal tests:

1. Would Iraq submit a "currently accurate, full and complete" declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and delivery systems and

2. Would Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in meeting its disarmament obligations?

Iraq has failed both tests.

As Dr. Blix said, "The declaration does not clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues...the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their numbers." No one on this Council has defended the Iraqi declaration. It was a transparent effort to delay and deceive. It was a further material breach of Iraq's obligations under 1441 and previous resolutions.

Iraq has also failed to cooperate fully and actively with the inspectors. Iraq has not accounted for biological and chemical materials that we know they had. And it declined to cooperate adequately or fully on interviews. It never showed the kind of active cooperation this Council demanded in 1441 - the kind that is absolutely necessary to verify disarmament. We concluded, therefore, that Iraq was yet in further material breach of resolution 1441.

There has been a lot of talk recently about "bench marks". Resolution 1441 is the benchmark. Here is another one: as Secretary Powell said last week, "If we were getting the kind of cooperation that we expected when 1441 was passed, documents would be flooding out of homes, flooding out of factories. There would be no question about access. There would be no question about interviews. If Iraq were serious in this matter, interviewees would be standing up outside of UNMOVIC and IAEA offices in Baghdad and elsewhere, waiting to be interviewed, because Iraq would be determined to prove to the world, to give the world, all the evidence needed that these weapons of mass destruction are gone."

Knowing as we do that what we have seen from Iraq is not active cooperation or compliance, let me cite just a few examples of Iraq's failures to comply with operative paragraphs of Resolution 1441:

-- OP3 - Iraq's December 7 Declaration was not currently accurate, full, or complete.

-- OP5 - Iraq has failed to allow all persons to be interviewed in the mode of UNMOVIC or the IAEA's choice.

-- OP7 - Iraq has failed to provide adequate lists of names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's WMD programs.

-- OP9 - Iraq has failed to cooperate actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

Over the past three months, we have a clear record of Iraq's failure to make the most of Resolution 1441's "final opportunity:"

Resolution 1441 is not about inspections. It is not about the inspectors proving that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Rather, it is about Iraq proving that it does not possess such weapons. And we have not seen what this Council insisted on seeing - a strategic decision to disarm. That is the bar set by Resolution 1441. Iraq is far from reaching that bar, and we all know it.

We have listened carefully to the many voices calling for more time. But 11 years, 10 months and 23 days is more than enough time for Saddam Hussein to prove that he has disarmed.

We gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm precisely because we wanted to be sure of ourselves. We gave Iraq more time after the briefing on January 27, now almost a month ago.

We now believe that it is abundantly clear that Iraq has refused to disarm and has no intention of doing so. We believe, therefore, that because of the failures that I have outlined here, Iraq has failed to comply with the tests of truthfulness, cooperation and disarmament set by Resolution 1441. It is truly regrettable that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.

Under the circumstances and given Iraq's continued disregard for its obligations, we fully support the draft resolution put forward by Ambassador Greenstock. In the days ahead, we look forward to working with Council colleagues towards the prompt adoption of this very straightforward draft. Iraq itself must bear the consequences of its continued disregard for the Council's decisions.


This site is produced and maintained by the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy, Japan. Links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.