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TRANSCRIPT
Powell Describes Coalition Plan for Post-Conflict Iraq
March 20: secretary of state interview by U.S. press syndicates

The U.S.-led coalition to disarm Iraq does not want to stay "a day longer than is necessary to put in place a responsible form of government, get them up and running, use their treasury for the benefit of their people, and not weapons of mass destruction and to threaten their neighbors," Secretary of State Colin Powell said in an interview in Washington March 20.

He added that once people see how the coalition conducts itself in Iraq, "they'll understand that the United States is not anti-Muslim, anti-Iraqi people, anti-people of the region, anti-Arab."

Responding to questions from U.S. press syndicates, the secretary of state said the United States is "in conversation" with a number of countries, the United Nations, and the European Union "as to how we can help the people of Iraq" when the war is over.

"We will be going back to the United Nations to get appropriate resolutions that would, in the first instance, deal with the Oil-for-Food program so that we don't have an interruption there, and in the second instance, to put in place broad Security Council authority to help the people of Iraq," Powell said.

The coalition will deal with those segments of the population that he described as having been "absolutely brutally deprived for years," and they "will start to see a better life very quickly. And we will show the Iraqis a better way to use their oil treasure to benefit their people and not to invest in weapons of mass destruction, palaces and threatening their neighbors."

Powell also described the "interim authority" -- an Iraqi group -- that the coalition plans to put in place quickly:

"We want the interim authority to begin acting as soon as possible, and as it gains standing, as it becomes more representative, as a system is put in place on the foundation of the authority, we will constantly turn more and more authority and responsibility over to the Iraqi people until they're up and standing on their own," he said.

Powell acknowledged that political support for the effort to disarm Saddam Hussein is not universal.

"Not every nation, in fact many nations, think we're not doing the right thing," he said, but "as the operation unfolds and as we are successful, more and more nations will understand and give us the kind of political support that you need."

Summing up the U.S. 'exit strategy' for Iraq, Powell said: "Get rid of the weapons of mass destruction, make sure you leave a government that is responsible to its people and that is using the treasure of Iraq for the benefit of its people, restore stability in the region, keep the country one country and not let it break up. All those, I think, are elements of how you finally turn it over to the Iraqi people and withdraw."

Asked whether the United States was concerned that Turkey might send its troops into Northern Iraq, Powell recounted his recent telephone conversations with Turkish officials: "We've clearly said to the Turkish Government that we think it's best that they not go over into Northern Iraq. We know they have a humanitarian concern and we are in conversation with them about how to deal with that humanitarian problem should it manifest itself, but that our efforts would best be served right now if there was no movement of Turkish forces into Northern Iraq."

Regarding North Korea, Powell left open the possibility that "there is something for the [United Nations] Security Council to do." The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he said, "has reported to the Council North Korea's dismissal of some of its obligations to the IAEA and it's being looked at by technical experts now."


Following is the State Department transcript of the interview

QUESTION: So (inaudible) can you (inaudible) take us inside the meetings yesterday a little bit at the White House? The President (inaudible) in terms of Turkey (inaudible) leadership, and so it's a fascinating development. And I wonder if there was much debate on the legality of attempted assassinations and so forth during the course of yesterday.

SECRETARY POWELL: The target that we went after yesterday was a leadership target. I'll stick with what Ari said. And there is no question in our mind as to the legality of it and the appropriateness of it, keeping in mind that the President went on the air a short time thereafter to say that this operation had begun. And so we were going after the leadership of the enemy forces, the opposing forces, and therefore there it is all the legal basis one needs.

Information became available and, quite appropriately, the national security team reviewed it all, presented options to the President, and he made his decision. I don't want to give you more tick-tock on it on the record.

QUESTION: Did it throw off the planning by doing that first, as opposed to the original?

SECRETARY POWELL: The word isn't "throw off." An opportunity presented itself that we took, and so you had to adjust some planning, but it wasn't a disruption of planning. There's an old military expression, "No plan survives the first contact with an enemy." And so this came along and I think it was a credit to our military intelligence officials that they were able to deal with this (inaudible). It really was impressive, and I know about such things. This was good.

QUESTION: Did it succeed? This morning, does Saddam have command and control of his forces?

SECRETARY POWELL: All I'm saying is that it was an attack against the leadership target and it was still making an assessment of (inaudible) and I would yield to the Pentagon or intelligence agencies to ultimately put out the results of this (inaudible).

QUESTION: Can I ask you a question in a larger sense? You have often lamented that the Muslim world gives the U.S. no credit for having liberated Muslims in Kosovo and Afghanistan and Kuwait, and now Iraq. Meanwhile, lots of Europe is, of course, vehemently opposed to this war, the French denunciation (inaudible) from Mr. Putin and others, and everyone portrays the U.S. as the aggressor. How is it that --

SECRETARY POWELL: Everyone does not portray the U.S. as the aggressor.

QUESTION: Okay.

SECRETARY POWELL: Not every European nation has come out and criticized in the way you just described. More have come out and supported us as leaders, often going against the prevailing view in their population, because they sense the danger, they understand their responsibility as leaders, and they're coming forward and speaking out in support of what we're doing. The Turkish parliament this morning did something of that nature.

QUESTION: Okay. But there is substantial opposition to the war.

SECRETARY POWELL: Yes.

QUESTION: My question is: How is it that your motives, which you insist are so good and decent in terms of helping Iraq, is so misunderstood by so many people in the world?

SECRETARY POWELL: Because people are concerned about war. People naturally always have a level of anxiety. And, frankly, some motives have been attributed to us which are not accurate, that we're in it for the oil, that we're in it in order to control that part of the world, the Middle East. But as the President said last night, I think it was, and as Don Rumsfeld has said and I've said, we don't want to stay there a day longer than is necessary to put in place a responsible form of government, get them up and running, use their treasury for the benefit of their people, and not weapons of mass destruction and to threaten their neighbors.

Now, that's what we're going to be doing and I hope that as we do it and as people see how we conduct our activities, then they'll understand that the United States is not anti-Muslim, anti-Iraqi people, anti-people of the region, anti-Arab. And we'll do it well and do it in a manner that we bring credit upon the coalition forces, and I hope we'll reverse this trend.

What I see in this trend of anti-Americanism, as it's been described, is anti-American policies. There are some policies that people -- that we have that people don't approve of. They think we should be doing more with respect to the Middle East peace process, that a different way should have been found to deal with Iraq. We tried to find a different way to deal with Iraq. We gave Iraq and the world a peaceful solution through 1441 and Iraq did not take it.

And I think between what we're going to do with the liberation of Iraq and what the President will be doing with respect to the Middle East peace plan following on his announcement last week of the roadmap and with the emergence of a new prime minister, I think we'll be able to start changing public opinion.

QUESTION: Compared to your policy in '91 and your policy now, your policy in '91 had widespread world support. This President, in some circles, is less popular than Saddam Hussein, arguably. I mean, you must sort of scratch your head and all that, how did we get here. How did we get here?

SECRETARY POWELL: This is not 1991. 1991 was a simpler political objective and a strategic objective that was easier to explain to the world, and it essentially was to kick the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. The decision was made before the war, not at the last day of the war, that we were not going to go to Baghdad and we were not planning to change their regime.

But what we discovered in the 12 years that followed, when we thought that the various resolutions would contain him, they did not. So we now find it necessary to use force. But in that 12-year period, Saddam has been able to play upon public opinion. He's been able to play on the sanctions that he claimed were hurting the Iraqi people, which were not accurate. He was hurting the Iraqi people.

And so we find ourselves in a different situation, and so we will deal with this situation and not compare it to where we were in 1991. It's different now. And a coalition of some 35 nations, and it will grow, has come together in support of what we're doing and made contributions in one way or another. For the most part, they are not significant military contributions. For many countries they are merely political statements, overflight rights, things of that nature. But for a country with a leader who is willing to make that kind of commitment with a population speaking in a different voice, you know, against that kind of commitment, that's a bold statement, and we're pleased to have those kinds of contributions in the coalition.

I may not have gotten all of your question (inaudible).

QUESTION: Bush is less popular than Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein -- in some circles.

SECRETARY POWELL: In some circles --

QUESTION: Saddam Hussein has been painted by you as a very severe threat (inaudible) but that message has now resonated --

SECRETARY POWELL: Remember, let's go back to 1991. Remember the Senate vote? We made it by, I think, four votes. So this memory that it was all sweetness and light before the war is not accurate. There were demonstrations. I still remember Congressman Ron Dellums walking across the street to file suit against us. I still remember all those people who were anxious about the war. I still remember enormous concern about the 15,000 body bags, and every think-tanker was on television saying that 20,000 people (inaudible). There was a great deal of unrest and there were protests and there were people who were not supportive of that conflict.

But when the conflict was fought, Desert Storm, and it was done very well, it was done quickly, relatively speaking, and efficiently, the Kuwaiti people were given their country back, the United States made it clear we had no other objective in mind, and the casualties were low, people saw that we had conducted that operation rather efficiently with respect to damage in Iraq itself. Then suddenly, there was a huge outpouring of support. Suddenly, everybody was for it. But that's not quite my memory of the buildup to it.

QUESTION: Of course, the other big difference now from '91 is that now you have something known as the Bush Doctrine, this idea that you will preemptively strike at threats, which was not an enumerated policy in the past. How much -- it plays into the perception of the world that the U.S. does behave unilaterally in so many ways, the list of global warming, ABM Treaty, International Criminal Court.

What example can you give of the United States being willing to compromise with the rest of the world? Because it seems as if all of the examples are kind of in-your-face confrontations with the rest of the world.

SECRETARY POWELL: We worked with the rest of the world to see the expansion of NATO. We're working, trying to work with the rest of the world to deal with the North Korean situation. Everybody is criticizing us for not acting unilaterally and working directly and bilaterally with North Korea.

We worked with the world in helping Macedonia last year. We worked with the world and we have shown our support to the European community expansion, the European Union.

We have worked with the world on what we have been doing in Afghanistan. Even though we went in initially to deal with an attack that we had received from there, we worked with the world and with the UN. We had the UN working side by side with us in Afghanistan. There are many nations involved in either ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom. We worked with the world on that.

And so yes, there have been some instances where people think we acted peremptorily and without concern to what other people think. But we did care about what other people think. We just came to a different conclusion as to what was best for us and best in terms of solving the problem. And unfortunately, we took a lot of criticism for that with respect to the Kyoto Protocol and with respect to the International Criminal Court and several others.

But I think that the way we went about Iraq, meaning if we had no interest in what the world thought, then we never would have gone through the United Nations. The President went to the United Nations last September to present the case. There was an alternate point of view. And we argued about it and we debated it, and all of us agreed in the National Security Council that the way to do this was to take the problem back to the owner of the problem, the United Nations. That's what the President did.

And then we took seven weeks of -- I don't have to tell you the whole litany, you know it well. Seven weeks of tough negotiations to get to 1441. And 1441 was, in my judgment, a major achievement because it laid it out clearly that Iraq is in violation and consequences would flow if they stayed in violation.

Now, the last four months we had a debate, a very strong debate as to whether or not they were or were not trying to come into compliance. And then we just had to come to a disagreement and the United States acted with likeminded nations -- Spain, Britain, principally, Bulgaria, and a number of other nations. Other nations felt differently.

QUESTION: All things considered, though, you were the biggest advocate, obviously, of taking this to the UN. Given where things ended up, given the profound divisions that have surfaced with some of your longtime allies, do you regret having made that decision?

SECRETARY POWELL: Not at all.

QUESTION: Would it have been better not to have gone?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, I don't think so. I think the President had to do that, and I think he thinks he had to do it, and I think he had an obligation to take it to the UN. And I can assure you, if we had acted unilaterally we would have received demonstrations and protests and howls of outrage from people who are now howling. And maybe it would have been a different matter and a different way and not always at the UN Security Council, but I think the same problem would have been there and people would be asking me the same questions you are now: "Why do you guys always act unilaterally?" And this is a case we tried not to act unilaterally. It's also a case where we felt strongly about an issue and made it clear from the beginning that we believed Saddam Hussein had to be disarmed one way or the other.

QUESTION: How are you going to -- following up on Howard's question too. In dealing with the rest of the world, how are you going to do this in terms of reconstructing Iraq and specifically shaping this new interim government that's going to be set up?

SECRETARY POWELL: We are in conversation with a number of countries, we're in conversation with the United Nations, we're in conversation with the European Union, as to how we can help the people of Iraq when this is over. We will be going back to the United Nations to get appropriate resolutions that would, in the first instance, deal with the Oil-for-Food program so that we don't have an interruption there, and in the second instance, to put in place broad Security Council authority to help the people of Iraq.

I don't use the word "reconstruct," although it's common and there's nothing wrong with it, but we don't plan to destroy Iraq. Any destruction that has to be reconstructed has been done by 20 years of bad leadership on the part of the regime that is in the process of being taken out.

But we will show the Iraqi people a better life. We'll deal with those segments of the population who have been shortchanged -- more than shortchanged, who have been absolutely brutally deprived for years, and they will start to see a better life very quickly. And we will show the Iraqis a better way to use their oil treasure to benefit their people and not to invest in weapons of mass destruction, palaces and threatening their neighbors.

QUESTION: And you'll be consulting with France, Russia in setting up the interim government?

SECRETARY POWELL: What we're looking at right now is an interim authority so that we can put in place an Iraqi group quickly so that we can show that it is not an American general who has come to Baghdad to be the governor for any length of time. We want the interim authority to begin acting as soon as possible, and as it gains standing, as it becomes more representative, as a system is put in place on the foundation of the authority, we will constantly turn more and more authority and responsibility over to the Iraqi people until they're up and standing on their own.

And yes, we will work with all countries. Now, obviously, there are countries who disapprove of everything we're doing right now and, you know, we are working in the first instance with those countries who are supporting us in this coalition effort.

QUESTION: A quick question about Turkey --

SECRETARY POWELL: And also, I believe the Security Council will have to pass these resolutions, which brings all of us together again.

QUESTION: In seven and a half weeks. How concerned are you that Turkey might unilaterally send troops into Northern Iraq. And I'm also curious, since we're on that subject, if you could talk a little bit about the phone calls you may have made overnight or this morning, if you've been in touch with the Turks.

SECRETARY POWELL: Yes. We've clearly said to the Turkish Government that we think it's best that they not go over into Northern Iraq. We know they have a humanitarian concern and we are in conversation with them about how to deal with that humanitarian problem should it manifest itself, but that our efforts would best be served right now if there was no movement of Turkish forces into Northern Iraq.

My conversations with the Turkish authorities really were the night before last when I had two conversations with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Gul and -- now, wait a minute, what's today? Today's Thursday? Tuesday, day before yesterday.

QUESTION: I've lost count of time. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY POWELL: A lot of calls. But I had two conversations with him that night, maybe even three -- Phil can check -- where we discussed the situation. And I told him that we really needed the overflights and I asked for his cooperation to take it to the parliament as quickly as possible. We know there was a larger package that was under consideration, and that was a more difficult challenge for them, and I encouraged him to take it to the parliament and to do it as soon as possible with a possibility of even it being done yesterday, although that was a long shot.

And then I called him again the second time or he called me back -- I forget the sequence -- later Tuesday night, it must have been about 2 o'clock in the morning their time, and assured me that overflights would be fine and that they would take it to the parliament, they had to get it to the party first so it might not happen Wednesday, but it would happen Thursday. And you saw it passed rather --

QUESTION: Did you get the assurance that they will not send troops into Northern Iraq?

SECRETARY POWELL: They understand our concern. They know that we want to talk to them about the humanitarian part of it and we are in close touch with them. I cannot tell you what a sovereign government might do, but right now they have made clear -- I don't want to speak for the Turkish Government, but I have a clear understanding in my mind that they have a clear understanding in their mind about concerns about that and how that would not be -- serve our mutual interests in this (inaudible). So far, they haven't done anything that should cause any concern.

QUESTION: Real quickly, (inaudible) business this morning (inaudible) can you tell us about (inaudible) you talked to Dominique or talked to --

SECRETARY POWELL: All my European friends are heading to Brussels for what was going to be a wonderful dinner. I spoke to Foreign Secretary Straw, Foreign Minister Palacio, and now his new title is Senior Councilor Tang, who was my Chinese colleague until Monday morning. I called to say, you know, nice working with you for two years and we entered into a conversation on this as well, so it was really talking to the Chinese Government. And that's pretty much it on the foreign side.

QUESTION: Just a quick question on North Korea. The Security Council now, according to your own definition and that of President Bush, has shown itself to be irrelevant on the question of Iraq and incapable of enforcing its own (inaudible). How is it that the Security Council can be helpful to you on the question of North Korea if it's an irrelevant body that is --

SECRETARY POWELL: I have never said the Security Council is an irrelevant body. I think it showed irrelevance on this issue. It didn't step up to the bar on this issue. It did in November, on the 8th of November. It stepped up fully to the bar 15-0, all 15 of us with our right foot on the bar, on the bar rail. And unfortunately, that didn't continue to the end of the process.

And we have to remember what happened here. What happened was that after four months of inspection, some of us reached a very different conclusion than others as to what the Iraqis were doing. And with a second resolution, let's say a second resolution had passed, there may have been a greater demonstration of support for military action, but military action was coming of the kind that you now see unfolding.

So we would have ended up at this same point, perhaps with greater support within the Council, if we had been able to convince those who were standing there to veto that you shouldn't veto, but we would have entered this point maybe a couple days one way or the other.

QUESTION: But if --

SECRETARY POWELL: But I don't think it means the Council is irrelevant. The IAEA has reported to the Council North Korea's dismissal of some of its obligations to the IAEA and it's being looked at by technical experts now. And we will see whether or not there is something for the Security Council to do.

And as you know, I'm pursuing a number of channels and trying to find a diplomatic way forward.

QUESTION: Can I ask you a question? You've heard, I'm sure, these criticisms before, that the operation underway is a violation of the Powell Doctrine on many levels. There is --

SECRETARY POWELL: What's the Powell Doctrine?

QUESTION: Well, the Powell Doctrine is up to you. You will find it in pieces of Foreign Affairs and other places (inaudible). But specifically, it's -- the commanders I've talked to, it's not overwhelming force, it's a squishy exit strategy, squishy foreign support for such an operation. Criticisms like that. You obviously don't think that's fair. Tell me why this is not -- do these go against the precepts you laid out (inaudible)?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, first of all, it isn't a doctrine. The term Powell Doctrine was coined by one of your colleagues. I always can't remember whether it was Jeffrey Smith or Michael Gordon who did it.

QUESTION: Gordon takes the credit.

SECRETARY POWELL: Michael takes credit? I was explaining this all to him one day and he called it the Powell Doctrine. Fine. But I accept it.

Clear political objectives. I think there's a clear political objective here.

I don't use the term "overwhelming force" and never have. If you ever look at what I've said, I may have slipped once and used it at the very beginning back in 1989 or 1990, but what I've always said is decisive force. There's a nuance difference, but it's a real one. You use the force necessary to accomplish the mission.

And I think that the young officers that I trained that you now see in the newspapers as the commanders of this operation clearly understand what decisive force means, and I think they will be applying decisive force. It doesn't necessarily mean huge numbers of people. It means decisive force. And I'm sure they are not going into this operation thinking that they don't have sufficient force to achieve a decisive outcome.

With respect to political support, I think they have political support, certainly from our leaders. It isn't universal. Not every nation, in fact many nations, think we're not doing the right thing, and many nations think we are doing the right thing. And I think as the operation unfolds and as we are successful, more and more nations will understand and give us the kind of political support that you need.

I have never said that you have to have political support around the world to conduct an operation. The use of the armed forces is first and fundamentally a sovereign mission conducted by a nation for principally its own interests as well as broader interests, and so you need the political support and the political objective given to you by the American people. I think this has it in this case.

And then exit strategy, I think you should always have some understanding of how a conflict will end and what you hope to achieve as a conflict is ending, and I think I touched on that. Get rid of the weapons of mass destruction, make sure you leave a government that is responsible to its people and that is using the treasure of Iraq for the benefit of its people, restore stability in the region, keep the country one country and not let it break up. All those, I think, are elements of how you finally turn it over to the Iraqi people and withdraw.

And one of the good things about doctrines is you can write it -- as soon as the guy who wrote it left, you can write a new one. I mean, it's (inaudible) can't (inaudible) anybody (inaudible).

QUESTION: Just for (inaudible) clarification, when the President was making his decisions last night as to what to do, were you part of that meeting? Because you weren't included in some of the press reports. That's why I wanted to know.

SECRETARY POWELL: The reason I wasn't included in The New York Times account but in The Washington Post account, and I hope you will correct this, is that I think when somebody came in to see who was there, he had made the decision and I had come back over here to make phone calls. I called Sharon and (inaudible) and others. So when they were looking around the room, I had left after three hours, just --

QUESTION: So there's no question that you are a part of the war camp? You participated in all of these decisions?

SECRETARY POWELL: I am part of the national security team, or whatever you call it, and I was there. If you wish to picture it as (inaudible).

QUESTION: I'll take your word for it.

SECRETARY POWELL: No. That's what happened. So they backgrounded it. Whoever backgrounded it was somebody who came in the room after I had come back here to make phone calls.

QUESTION: Is there -- so they found actionable intelligence that someone was in that bunker. Today, are there other people floating around in the leadership, or you have heard (inaudible) eavesdropping (inaudible) leaders floating around? I mean, is it in disarray? Can you (inaudible)?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, I can't. I really have to yield that to the intel guys. But I was there 4:45 to 7:25.

QUESTION: Some worry that in today's, in this first opening hours we have our troops sitting there and these missiles are being rained down, and it seems as if that's not supposed to --

SECRETARY POWELL: You mean coming our way?

QUESTION: Yeah. I mean, the Iraqis are firing these missiles into Kuwait. Why is that allowed to happen? It shouldn't happen.

SECRETARY POWELL: How do you stop it if somebody has a missile and can shoot it?

QUESTION: Well, I mean, don't you take out all those missile launchers and everything?

SECRETARY POWELL: If you know where they are. But the war hadn't started. It doesn't sound like they're being terribly effective, but I'm sure they are in the process of being taken out (inaudible).

I've got to run.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.


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