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Powell Remains Confident on June 30 Turnover of Power in Iraq

Secretary of State Colin Powell says that, despite "serious problems with respect to security" in Iraq, the United States and its coalition partners are continuing to work toward handing over sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government by June 30.

That transitional government should remain in control "long enough so the Iraqi people can vote for the kind of government they want to have...and they can adopt a constitution and then bring in place a fully representative government," Powell told interviewer Ted Koppel on ABC television's "Nightline" program April 23.

Powell acknowledged that the new sovereign entity will not be "ready to act with full authority" in the area of providing needed security, necessitating a continuing role for coalition troops. The new Iraqi government "will have to make arrangements with the United States forces and coalition forces that are present so that we are able to operate under our own command," he said.

The Secretary declined to respond directly to remarks attributed to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations' special envoy to Iraq, that his job there was being complicated by the "poison" of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.

"As (U.N.) Secretary General (Kofi) Annan said, that represents Ambassador Brahimi's personal opinion but not that of the UN or of the Secretary General. And I expect to be talking to Ambassador Brahimi over the next several days and I'm sure if he has these views and he holds them strongly, we'll have a chance to discuss it," Powell said.

"What I'm more interested in is the plan that he has brought back that he had developed as to how we will create an interim government in Iraq. And I'd be interested in anything he has to say about the opportunities to create such a government and the disadvantages and problems he sees in the region that would make it difficult to create such a government," Powell said.

Asked about Palestinian displeasure that President Bush has associated himself with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policy on removing settlements from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, Powell said Bush had simply "associated himself with the realities of the situation on the ground."

"He didn't bless any particular outcome or solution. He didn't endorse any number of settlements to remain; he didn't endorse any particular modification to the armistice line. He merely said we know that such modifications will be required," Powell said. And ultimately, Powell added, such issues must be decided in negotiations between the two parties.

When Koppel asked about Sharon's comments that he no longer considers himself bound by a pledge not to kill Yasser Arafat, Powell said Bush "firmly believes that he has a commitment from Prime Minister Sharon that no such attempt will be made," and has "made it clear that he would oppose any such attempts against Mr. Arafat."


Following is the State Department transcript

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
April 23, 2004

INTERVIEW

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
By Ted Koppel of ABC

April 23, 2004
Washington, D.C.

TED KOPPEL: Well, I might as well begin by saying we are in the Treaty Room where the Secretary of State has graciously joined us for a little while. Let me start with your least favorite subject: you and what the nattering nabobs of negativism have to say about you, particularly in light of the book. The New York Times, "What we seem to have once again with Mr. Powell is a desire to have it both ways, to be seen as a loyal member of the Bush team, but also as a wise man who knew all along that the Iraq war would be a mistake."

Then we've got Clarence Page's: "Did loyalty finally trip up Colin Powell?" And we've got Anne Applebaum: "Having it both ways;" and we've got Ellen Goodman: "It's time for us to quit on Powell." What did you do to all these folks?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, nothing that I can imagine that would cause them to have such reactions. Am I a loyal member of the Bush team? Sure. Do I give my best advice to the President to include things that I think might go well and problems we have to look out for in any military operation or in any political operation or action we're about to take? Sure I do. And that's my responsibility and that's my job and I do it.

TED KOPPEL: Have you read enough of the book to know whether, as far as you at least are concerned, he got it right?

SECRETARY POWELL: I've read the book -- rapidly; I can't say that I studied every page. And I think it's a pretty good account of things that happened during that period. And it should be read in that light.

TED KOPPEL: The famous line, the Pottery Barn line, which is a great line: "You break it, you own it."

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, I've been hearing from Pottery Barn, though.

TED KOPPEL: But they like it.

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, no, they don't like it. In fact, Pottery Barn has the opposite policy. It's one of those urban legends that crept in. And I don't think I'm the one who said it, but nevertheless, it's attributed to me and I would have said it because I thought it was a good line. But Pottery Barn has made it clear that, as a corporate policy, if you drop it and it's an accident, you do not have to pay for it. And I'm so glad, Ted, that you gave me an opportunity to correct the record, eliminate an urban legend and restore Pottery Barn's reputation.

TED KOPPEL: Let's apply the legend, whatever it is. Whichever way you choose to interpret it, let's apply it to Iraq. One way or another, for the time being, we seem to own it, at least in the context in which it was used in Mr. Woodward's book. How do we get rid of it?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, let's take a look at the context in which we own it. The President knew that when we undertook military action to eliminate this despotic regime, we would become responsible for the country and for 25 million people. And it was for that reason that he told the American people we'd be committed there for a period of time with our military forces and with our political presence and with Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority until such time as we could put in place an interim government.

We're working hard on that. We have an interim government coming together, a concept of one, and we're hoping that they will be able to take office very quickly, but certainly by the 30th of June. And we're working with the UN, Ambassador Brahimi and others on it.

But you know, what we went in there to do was to get rid of a despotic, awful regime, and we did. Saddam Hussein is gone. That regime is gone. Some problems have crept up, some serious problems with respect to security. We'll have to deal with those problems. I'm confident we will be able to deal with those problems, get on with the reconstruction effort, and create an interim government that will be there long enough so the Iraqi people can vote for the kind of government they want to have, for a representative -- and they can adopt a constitution and then bring in place a fully representative government, but it takes time.

TED KOPPEL: The President -- the President has been suggesting that what we are about to hand over on June 30th is sovereignty to the Iraqis. Some people have tried to modify that term and say, well, it isn't exactly sovereignty, it's partial sovereignty. My colleague, George Stephanopoulos just did an interview with Ambassador Brahimi and Ambassador Brahimi sort of rejects the notion of partial sovereignty as being an oxymoron and he has a point.

Is that group, whatever it's going to be, that takes over on June 30th, is it actually going to have any sovereignty whatsoever, and if so, what does that mean?

SECRETARY POWELL: We believe it will have sovereignty and we hope to get a UN resolution that would recognize its sovereignty. But it is reality that for purposes of providing security, for purposes of making sure the country is secure, that sovereign entity will have to make arrangements with the United States forces and coalition forces that are present so that we are able to operate under our own command.

To some extent, while they have sovereignty -- and we want them out front, we want them to be making decisions, we want them to be the face of the government to the people and no longer the CPA. We only want to have an ambassador there. We want them to exercise as much sovereignty as they are capable of exercising, but in areas like security, where they are not yet ready to act with full authority because they do not yet have the forces in place, we will make arrangements with them, which are already understood with the Governing Council now, and with the interim government when it comes into being, as to how our forces would operate with them.

TED KOPPEL: If we have a situation such as the one that the Marines confront in Fallujah right now, where there is a sense that they may have to go in to get the guys who are not coming out or at least not handing over their weapons. And let us say that this Iraqi body, in exercising its sovereignty, says, we don't want you going into Fallujah. And the U.S. commander says, 'The hell you say, we're going in'.

SECRETARY POWELL: If it has to do with risk to our troops, ultimately, our troops come under our command. Now, if the government at that time said to us, well, you know, we really are not sure how to deal with this situation, I think what we would do is consult with them, talk to them about it, and see if we cannot come up with a mutual solution to the problem, where, hopefully, they would be able to deal with it. And they would be able to use their political ability and their knowledge of the tribal sheiks in the region, their knowledge of the local government, and their own police, civil defense, and military forces to deal with such a problem.

But it may well be that it is beyond their capability to deal with such a problem and we are there to assist them. And if it's against those kinds of elements, the former Baathist regime, terrorists who have come into the country, I think they understand that sooner or later, it might be out of their capability to handle and we would have to do it. But this would be an arrangement we would have to work out with them.

TED KOPPEL: To the extent that you satisfy your domestic constituency here at home, and I can hear people up on Capitol Hill saying, you're not going to put our troops under the command of the Iraqis, are you?

SECRETARY POWELL: We never would.

TED KOPPEL: You're going to be hearing from the Iraqis, as I'm sure you know, what in heaven's name are you talking about with sovereignty? It is not sovereignty if you have 135,000 troops over here and in order for you to do ultimately what you perceive to be in your own troops' best interests. That is not sovereignty.

SECRETARY POWELL: I don't think it will be seen that way. I think it will be seen that the Iraqi people now have a president, a prime minister, deputy presidents and a cabinet of ministers who are working for them, who are calling the shots, who are determining how they would reconstruct their society, who are designing their constitution and writing their constitution, who are preparing for the elections that they will have early next year. They will see Iraqi faces in charge of all of that. They will see Iraqi faces assisting us in determining, how do we use the reconstruction money that the American Congress has generously provided, the American people have provided. That's what the Iraqi people will see.

It is not unusual for us to have military forces that are in countries that have sovereignty. We had it for many, many years in Korea, still have it to this day. Korea is sovereign but our troops are there at the behest of the Koreans, to serve alongside the Koreans, to help defend their country against threats that their country has. The threat in Korea for 50 years has been the potential North Korean threat.

The threat in Iraq right now will be the terrorists and the former Baathist regime elements that are still causing instability within the country. I think this is a problem that can be worked out and we have passed models that we could use to work it out.

TED KOPPEL: We're going to take a short break. Back with the Secretary, Colin Powell, in a moment.

(Commercial break.)

TED KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, to get back to the same subject but in a slightly different context. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been holding hearings. They would have loved to have you up there to answer the same questions you're being gracious enough to answer for me right now. You have sent some of your aides and assistants to go up there.

Why is this Administration not being more forthcoming to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in what is, after all, the most pressing foreign policy issue before us today?

SECRETARY POWELL: We have been very forthcoming. I have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have spoken to Senator Lugar and Senator Biden repeatedly over the last several weeks and several times this week alone.

In this particular group of hearings, where we went up with different members of the Administration -- earlier in the week, Under Secretary Grossman went up with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and this seemed to be adequate. Under Secretary Grossman is expert in all of the issues and questions that the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked. And if I got a call from Senator Lugar tonight and he said, "Colin, we need you to come up next week," I'll be there.

TED KOPPEL: I have a feeling you may be getting that call.

SECRETARY POWELL: That's fine.

TED KOPPEL: Let me just -- let me just read you something that Ambassador Brahimi was quoted as saying in an interview, I think, with a French radio station:

"Special U.S. Envoy to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi stoked the ire of his boss Kofi Annan as well as Israeli officials with comments made yesterday to France's Interradio, asserting that poisonous Israeli policies toward Palestinians and Washington's support for them plagued his work in Iraq." The problems are linked, there is no doubt about it. He said the big poison in the region is the Israeli policy of domination and suffering imposed on the Palestinians.

First of all, let's get a reaction to it.

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, as Secretary General Annan said, that represents Ambassador Brahimi's personal opinion but not that of the UN or of the Secretary General. And I expect to be talking to Ambassador Brahimi over the next several days and I'm sure if he has these views and he holds them strongly, we'll have a chance to discuss it.

What I'm more interested in is the plan that he has brought back that he had developed as to how we will create an interim government in Iraq. And I'd be interested in anything he has to say about the opportunities to create such a government and the disadvantages and problems he sees in the region that would make it difficult to create such a government.

TED KOPPEL: Let's assume that as among the things he says to you is: Mr. Secretary, I perceive that the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians is poisonous, that it has infused what is going on Iraq -- in Iraq, with many, many problems, and until we get that out of the way, we're not going to be fix it right. What would -- ?

SECRETARY POWELL: And I will respond to him that President Bush is determined to try to do something about this problem. We've been trying for three years and that a new opportunity was presented to us. With a Palestinian partner that was not a good partner to work with, in the person of Chairman Arafat, after three years of trying, Prime Minister Sharon decided that he would unilaterally eliminate settlements in all of Gaza and four settlements in the West Bank and he'd do this unilaterally.

And in our discussions with Prime Minister Sharon, we have been able to package this in a way that it would be consistent with the roadmap, consistent with the president's vision of two states living side by side in peace, Israel and Palestine. And the President's made it clear that mutually agreed positions have to be arrived at for final status issues.

Now we also, in our statement with Mr. Sharon, identified certain realities having to do with ultimate right of return and the fact that the armistice line will have to be adjusted because of realities on the ground.

TED KOPPEL: The Palestinians --

SECRETARY POWELL: This in no way takes away from the President's desire to do something to resolve this difficult, difficult issue between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

TED KOPPEL: The Palestinians, as you well -- before I get to that point, let me -- you've very delicately avoided responding directly to Mr. Brahimi's depiction of the Israeli role in the region as --

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, I think that my answer will be that I'll be speaking to Mr. Brahimi in the near future and I'll have a chance to talk to him directly rather than through television.

TED KOPPEL: I wouldn't expect you to talk to him indirectly, but the notion that the man who is, after all, our best current hope in Iraq is expressing that opinion, I think warrants some kind of a reaction.

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, I'll give you the reaction. It's his personal opinion and I look forward to exploring his personal opinion and talking to him directly, even though you are attempting to get me to talk to him indirectly.

TED KOPPEL: All right. The issue of right is return is one that which the -- the Palestinians have felt very, very strong, as you know, and while you have put the emphasis on the positive in talking about the settlements that the Israelis are going to return, the Palestinians are looking at what the Israeli Prime Minister has said as being very negative. And that they're saying he clearly is going to hold on to some significant and considerable settlements on the West Bank and he is denying us any right of return to Israel. They look upon that as a huge setback. You have put the best possible spin on it --

SECRETARY POWELL: It shouldn't surprise them that this is the view of Prime Minister Sharon. It's the view he's held for a long period of time. And reality is that all previous negotiations on this issue came to the conclusion that adjustments will be required to the armistice lines in order to take into account the population reality on the ground. And I think most people who have studied this realize that you cannot expect every Palestinian to be able to go back to Israel --

TED KOPPEL: Not all of them.

SECRETARY POWELL: But the point is that the reality is that, when you create a Palestinian state, is this not the logical place for Palestinians to go, and not to return to Israel, where they are once again under occupation, as opposed to being in their own state?

It's one of these issues that -is complex and has held up negotiations for so many years. The point here is that, remember that the President, before touching that issue, said that ultimately it is an issue that has to be resolved between the two parties through mutual agreement.

Now, I've spoken in the last 24 hours to the Palestinian Foreign Minister, Nabil Shaath, and I hope to meet with him in the not too distant future. Today, I spoke to the Palestinian Prime Minister, Abu Alaa. And we are engaged in a discussion on this issue. I know it's difficult, I know it's complex, and I know that there are serious disagreements, but we have to work our way through this and take advantage of the opportunity that is also presented in the midst of all this disagreement, that settlements are going to be removed from Gaza and the peace process has not produced that outcome for decades.

Settlements are going to be removed from Gaza. Settlements will be evacuated from the West Bank. Now, how do we get the Palestinians to take advantage of that new reality and that new opportunity? How do we reach a point where they can exercise political control over Gaza, reach a point where they can provide security in Gaza, so that we don't have a reintroduction of Israeli forces, and build a new future for the Palestinian people in Gaza and then get in the roadmap process with the removal of some settlements initially in the West Bank so we can get into a final discussion between Palestinians and Israelis directly as to what a contiguous Palestinian state will look like in the West Bank.

TED KOPPEL: I don't think the Palestinians were surprised by what Prime Minister Sharon said. I think they were surprised that the President of the United States has associated himself with that policy, and, in effect, given it his blessing.

SECRETARY POWELL: The President of the United States associated himself with the realities of the situation on the ground. He didn't bless any particular outcome or solution. He didn't endorse any number of settlements to remain; he didn't endorse any particular modification to the armistice line. He merely said we know that such modifications will be required.

But ultimately, without prejudging what the outcome will be in these negotiations, these are negotiations that must take place between the two parties, mutually agreed upon for an outcome.

MR. KOPPEL: We're going to take another break. When we come back, I'm going to ask you about Prime Minister Sharon's statement today about Yasser Arafat.

Back with Secretary of State Colin Powell in a moment.

(Commercial break.)

MR. KOPPEL: And we are back, once again, in the Treaty Room at the State Department with Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The Israeli Prime Minister today said that he had informed President Bush, when he was here in Washington a few days ago, that he no longer considers himself bound by the pledge not to kill Yasser Arafat. The implication is with the Israelis -- going -- with these targeted assassinations that, once again, Yasser Arafat - maybe not even once again. I don't think he has ever been on the target list, but then in effect, he now is. To which the U.S. response is what?

SECRETARY POWELL: The President made it clear that he would oppose any such attempts against Mr. Arafat, and the President firmly believes that he has a commitment from Prime Minister Sharon that no such attempt will be made.

QUESTION: And yet, what the Prime Minister said today clearly is not consistent with what your assumption seems to be.

SECRETARY POWELL: No, it's no my assumption. I know what the President believes and I speak for the President in this matter.

QUESTION: When the President says he is confident that he has a commitment from Ariel Sharon, and Ariel Sharon says publicly he no longer considers himself bound by that commitment, I know it's your business to smooth troubled waters and not roil them, but I'm in the roiling business.

SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, it's my duty right now to tell you what the President's understanding is, what the President's belief is. And the President made it clear to Prime Minister Sharon, as he had over the three-plus years of this Administration, that he would oppose any such attempt against the life of Prime Minister -- President Arafat, Chairman Arafat, and that the President continues to believe that he has a commitment from Prime Minister Sharon.

QUESTION: Clearly, the Israeli position is that what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If we can take the position that anyone who supports or finances terrorism is a pretty target for the United States, targeted either for arrest or elimination, why should they perceive things any different?

SECRETARY POWELL: Israel has a right of self-defense. We have always acknowledged that. But we have always said to our Israeli friends, as we say to ourselves as we think through these kinds of issues, you've got to consider the consequences of such actions. And we have thought through the consequences of such actions and we made our position clear to Prime Minister Sharon.

QUESTION: What do you think the consequences of killing Yasser Arafat would be that are so much greater than the assassinations that have taken over the last two weeks.

SECRETARY POWELL: I think they would be considerable, and the President believes so, and that's why he has expressed this position to Prime Minister Sharon.

QUESTION: I'd like to get back to -- it's an aspect of the Woodward book, but forget about the Woodward aspect of it, and that is the nature of this particular Vice Presidency. There is more than an impression that when the Secretary of State goes over to the White House, he and his positions are already outgunned in that you have a rather conservative Secretary of Defense who has associated himself with a very powerful and conservative Vice President, and that, in effect, the diplomat's point of view doesn't get a very fair shake over at the White House.

SECRETARY POWELL: I don't think that's accurate at all. We are all individuals of strong views, and the President listens to all of us and he takes into account everything we say. I know people like to focus on certain issues that are quite controversial, but, you know, our foreign policy is broader and deeper than that. We have the issues relating to our relationship with China, how to resolve, for example an airplane collision in 2001. We have issues with respect to Russia. We have issues with respect to NATO, issues with respect to how to deal with Liberia, with Libya, with Haiti. So many things that we work on.

And you ought to look at the full range of issues we have dealt with and the full range of advice the President has received, and what you will find is that the President takes into account all the advice he receives from his strong-willed, I'm pleased to say, advisors, and ultimately the President makes a decision.

QUESTION: When Woodward writes, as he does, that at least on the issue of Iraq you and the Vice President are barely on speaking terms --

SECRETARY POWELL: The Vice President and I are on good terms. I've known Vice President Cheney for some 18 years and --

QUESTION: No, no, no -- I'm keeping it very narrowly on the issue of Iraq --

SECRETARY POWELL: You can keep it narrowly. It's just not accurate. The Vice President and I had a very long conversation this morning on the subject of Iraq.

QUESTION: Cordial.

SECRETARY POWELL: Beg your pardon?

QUESTION: I said cordial conversation.

SECRETARY POWELL: Always. We speak cordially to one another, respectfully to one another, and we've done so for many, many years. Mr. Cheney and I have been through many experiences together -- the invasion of Panama, Desert Storm, the aftermath of Desert Storm, the end of the Cold War, reduction in the size of the Armed Forces of the United States -- and over the last three years we have been through many issues together, whether it's Iraq, how to deal with Iran, how to deal with Libya, how to deal with China, how to deal with Russia.

And we speak openly and candidly to one another, and always in the spirit of mutual respect and always with one purpose in mind, and that's to give the President our best advice -- ungarnished, gloves off, no fooling around. The President needs to know what we believe and what we think. And we always remember who's been elected, and it's been President Bush elected to be the President of the United States, ably served and elected by -- served by Vice President Cheney, who was elected by the American people.

QUESTION: Would you agree that this Vice President is arguably the most influential Vice President in the history of the United States?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, I have not examined all the Vice Presidents of the United States. I am pleased that he is influential. I think the President is well served by an influential Vice President. And Dick Cheney has very good experience with Congress, with his knowledge of business and industry, his experience as Secretary of Defense, and I think he should be influential.

But I can assure you that other voices are heard and the President avails himself of all the advice that is available to him.

QUESTION: Again, getting back to the Woodward book. Mr. Woodward suggests that the Vice President really tried to cook the books a little on intelligence with regard to Iraq and that you were put on to some -- or put in an awkward position before you gave your speech at the UN in that material was sent to the Vice President's office that you had some of your assistants vet at the CIA, you found it to be not usable.

Is that accurate, and why do you think that happened?

SECRETARY POWELL: A great deal of information was provided to me from the CIA, from many offices, to include the Vice President's office. And my job was to present the best case I could to the United Nations on behalf of the United States of America, and as solid a case as I could present. And I relied on the CIA to help me with that case. It wasn't something we wrote here in the State Department. It wasn't written in the White House or the Vice President's office. It was written out at the CIA over a period of four days and nights, and the CIA stood behind it. It was their best judgment at the time.

And once I examined all of that and once I put it into my own words and made sure that the CIA stood behind every word that I said, nobody tried to change it.

QUESTION: Why would the Vice President's office be under the impression that it needed to write even the first draft of the Secretary of State's speech?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, he didn't write it. He had staff members --

QUESTION: -- the Vice President's office.

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, it is nothing -- nothing untoward about that. Lots of people tried to provide information for speeches, Ted. It's -- I've seen this in every administration I've been in. The fact of the matter is --

QUESTION: You've gotten drafts from Vice Presidents before?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, I got from the Vice President's office a draft of one section of the speech. The fact of the matter is, though, the President called me and asked me to prepare the case to take to the United Nations, and he left it totally up to me, totally up to me, to decide what that case should look like, what should be in it, what would be the best presentation we could make. And there was no question in anyone's mind that the President trusted me to put that case forward.

QUESTION: I love to engage you in futile exercises so let me close on one. If the President asked you, would you stay on for a second term?

SECRETARY POWELL: I serve at the pleasure of the President.

QUESTION: Of course you do.

SECRETARY POWELL: Period.

QUESTION: And if the President's pleasure were that you serve a second term, would the loyalty of Colin Powell be such that he would say, "Whatever you say, Mr. President"?

SECRETARY POWELL: I will wait to hear the pleasure of the President directly from the President.

QUESTION: But serving at the pleasure of the President, I've just -- I've heard you say that so many times that --

SECRETARY POWELL: It's the only standard answer you can give.

QUESTION: Is the only answer you can give that --

SECRETARY POWELL: It's the only answer you can give that does not set people running off into a line of speculation and gossip that serves no purpose. I am very honored and proud to be a member of this Administration, to serve this President, to serve the American people and to serve the wonderful people in the State Department. And that's what I'm doing. That's what I will continue to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it's always a pleasure. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you, Ted.

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