Following is the text of Powell's remarks:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

September 26, 2002
As Delivered

REMARKS

Secretary Of State Colin L. Powell
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

September 26, 2002
Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, it's a great pleasure to be back before the committee. I always look forward to the opportunity to discuss the foreign policy of the United States before the distinguished members of this committee.

And I'm especially pleased to be here today to follow the very distinguished witnesses who have preceded me, Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Albright today, and Ambassador Holbrooke and my old friend and former National Security Advisor, as I was, Bud McFarlane yesterday, as well as other witnesses. As I was working down in my office this morning and watching television out of the corner of my eye, and also looking at the clock, I assumed that Henry was going to run the clock on me as well as himself and Madeleine, but I'm pleased that he allowed you to recess long enough to get a bite of lunch and therefore to be ready for me. (Laughter.)

I do welcome this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. We have talked about this issue on many occasions and I'm pleased to be able to do it again today. Before beginning, let me take the opportunity to again thank the committee for the support that they have provided to the State Department. You will have that opportunity once again with the State authorization bill that is before you, and we are very anxious to see action on that bill because there are a lot of authorities in there that we can use, and I hope that it will be moved promptly so that we can get going on that.

And Senator Helms, it would be remiss of me not to take note once again that this is probably the last time you and I will be together at a hearing and to thank you for the support you have provided to the men and women of the armed forces, to the men and women of the State Department, and the friendship and support you've extended to me over many years, Mr. Chairman, and for that I am deeply appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that you met with the President -- it was three weeks ago, if I'm not mistaken now.

SENATOR BIDEN: That's correct.

SECRETARY POWELL: And it was in a time of enormous debate and speculation as to what the President was going to do. August was over now. We were all back together. And he laid it out rather clearly in that afternoon session with the leadership that he was going to consult with Congress and that he was going to consult with the international community. And as you noted, he has done exactly just that, and that's what we have been doing for the last three weeks since he made that statement. And this appearance today and the appearance that my colleagues in the administration have been making before various committees -- Director Tenet and Secretary Rumsfeld -- are all part of that consultation process.

I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to summarize that now.

SENATOR BIDEN: Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

SECRETARY POWELL: I also am prepared to comment on the various issues that previous witnesses have made, the so-called doctrine of pre-emption and other issues that have been raised over the last two days, as we go through the hearing and as questions are raised.

Senator Biden, Senator Helms and so many other members of the committee, we have talked about Iraq a number a times over the years, and I always have to go back to 1990 when Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they brutalized the population and rejected at that time the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.

At that time, we built a worldwide coalition with the clear political purpose of liberating Kuwait, and the military instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose, and that was to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial support and military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our mission in the Gulf War, we did it in a way that I think was a model of American international leadership and international cooperation.

When that war ended, the United Nations Security Council agreed to take measures to ensure that Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein, we knew, was a man who, after all, had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and than against Kuwait in 1990. We knew he was a man who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries and who had used chemical weapons in the war with Iran, and even against his own people.

The United States and the international community were strongly determined to prevent any future aggression, so United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 fixed the terms of the ceasefire in the Gulf. And the fundamental purpose of this resolution, and many more that followed, was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.

Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability while at the same time -- and we did this deliberately -- not leaving Iraq so prostrate that it could not defend itself against Iran, its former enemy.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the story. You heard the President relate it at the United Nations two weeks ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Moreover, since December of 1998 when the U.N. inspections teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the United Nations, the Iraqi regime has been free to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically. Since September 11th, 2001, the world is a different place. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born. The world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is and it will continue to be our overriding concern for some years to come.

We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few terrorists with those weapons to threaten millions of innocent people. President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less. President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community. He understands how powerful a strong and unified international community can be, as we have seen so well demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The need to engage the international community is why the President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations on the 12th of September. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some would have us believe or might even claim. It was the United Nations resolutions that were systematically and brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work unfinished.

The President's challenge therefore to the United Nations General Assembly, and through them to the Security Council, was a direct one and it was a very simple one: If you would remain relevant, then you must act in the face of these repeated violations.

I was there that day and the President's speech was a powerful one and it energized the entire meeting hall. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed -- that one speech -- and it made it clear that Iraq is the problem, Iraq is the one who is in material breach of the demands placed upon it by the United Nations. It is not the United States that is in the dock, it is not the United Nations that is in the dock, it is not the Security Council that is in the dock, it is not France or Britain or Russia or the United Kingdom or all the other members of the Security Council. It is Iraq that is in the dock and we must not lose sight of that simple, clear fact.

The President in his speech then went on to make it clear what was expected of Iraq to repair this material breach. He made it clear that the issue was more than disarming Iraq by eliminating its weapons of mass destruction and its mid- and long-range missile programs. The United Nations resolutions also spoke of terrorism, of human rights, the return of prisoners and property. Iraq stands guilty. It convicts itself by its actions. There can be no question that it is in material breach of its obligations. All of these demands on Iraq are spelled out in the 16 Security Council resolutions levied against that country since 1991.

Over the weekend following the President's speech at the U.N., I watched the reaction. I watched the pressure build on the Iraqi regime as the Arab League, the Secretary General and so many others pressed Iraq on their need to take action. They essentially told Iraq the jig was up, nobody was going to listen to these phony excuses anymore, and the pressure built to an enormous level.

On Monday of that week, the next week, Iraq responded with a familiar tactical ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors back in without conditions. And later in the week in a speech at the United Nations, their Foreign Minister challenged President Bush's September 12th speech. He even called for a discussion of the issues of inspection teams in accordance with international law, already qualifying his Monday offer of inspections without conditions.

Now two days ago, we have an Iraqi presidential advisor telling the press in Baghdad that weapons inspectors would be allowed to go wherever they want. But these people are not deceiving anyone. It is a ploy we have seen before on many occasions, and on each occasion, each of these occasions, once inspectors began to operate, Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.

Mr. Chairman, I will just call your and the members' attention to the written statement that I have provided where I record a dozen examples of Iraq's defiance of these resolutions and of the U.N. mandate. Cited in my longer statement is everything from intimidation at gunpoint to holding up inspectors while all the incriminating evidence was removed. It is a litany of defiance and unscrupulous behavior and every sort of attempt at noncompliance. And I by no means in my longer statement have listed everything, only a sampling.

The regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demand on inspectors, sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has changed. At least they haven't given us any indications to suspect that they have changed. And this latest effort to welcome inspectors without conditions is another ploy. Let's be clear about the reason for their suddenly being willing after several years to accept inspectors. The Iraqis did not suddenly see the error of their ways. They were responding to the heat and pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech at the UN. We must keep that pressure on.

The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to apply more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe that inspectors going in on the same conditions and under the same terms that they went in on so many occasions earlier will be acceptable now. We won't fall for that. These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspections that were subject to Saddam's cheat and retreat approach from 1991 to '98.

It is up to the United Nations Security Council to decide what action is now required of Iraq to deal with this material breach of the U.N.'s mandate. If part of the solution involves an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that we are going to negotiate with Iraq. The resolution or resolutions must be strong enough and comprehensive enough so that they produce disarmament and not just inspections.

Many U.N. members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in right now without any new resolution or new authority. And we believe that this would be a recipe for failure.

The debate we are having within the Security Council now is on the need for and the wording of a resolution or, some feel, more than one resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in material breach. Then we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq. And President Bush has already discussed what he believes is appropriate.

And then there's a third element. We must determine what consequences will flow from Iraq's failure to take action. Just laying out a new inspection regime and declaring them in material breach isn't enough. The Security Council must face up to their responsibility to take action or allow action to be taken in the face of continued Iraqi violation. That is what makes it different this time. This time, unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time, Iraq must comply with the U.N. mandate or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.

We are listening to other points of view and we are working to reach agreement within the Security Council. It is a difficult debate. There are strong views one way or the other. As you may have noticed in some of the press reporting in the last 24 hours, we have come into agreement with the United Kingdom on what the elements of a resolution should look like. I am sending a senior official from my department to Paris this evening, and then on to Moscow to discuss with the French and the Russians what we believe should be in such a resolution. We are briefing representatives of the Chinese Government here in Washington today. And so far in the last 12 hours I've spoken to my French colleague, Foreign Minister de Villepin, my Russian colleague Foreign Minister Ivanov, my Chinese colleague Foreign Minister Tang, and Secretary General Kofi Annan, describing the progress we have made with the British and the fact that we are now expanding the circle of consultation.

We are a long way from getting agreement, but we're working hard. And there are many points where we are in agreement, and there are some outstanding issues that have to be dealt with.

Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that US interests should be our total concern. We are a member of the U.N. Security Council; we are a member of the United Nations. It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. So I think it is quite appropriate for the President to seek action by the United Nations through its Security Council. But the United States, as an entirely separate matter, believes that its interest is threatened. We believe that we are at risk and our interests in different parts of the world are at risk by Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction and by the nature of this regime.

We are trying to solve this problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way. But at the same time, if the United Nations is not able to act and to act decisively, and I think that would be a terrible indictment of the United Nations, then the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend our country and our interests.

I believe strongly, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped enormously by a strong congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take necessary and appropriate action. Language has been proposed by the President, and I know it's a subject of intense discussion in both bodies and with the White House and various members of the President's National Security Team. But I hope it is not too prolonged, and I ask for your action in the very near future to provide the President such a resolution to show the world that we are united in this effort.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and the Department of Defense are giving the Congress the information that it will need with respect to the details of our intelligence assessment and military contingency planning that Secretary Rumsfeld is conducting, and I will leave those issues to them. But let me just make two points before I end this presentation.

We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile. We can have debates about how long it will take them to reach this level of readiness or that level of readiness with respect to these weapons. But no one can doubt two things. One, they are in violation of these resolutions. There is no debate about that. And secondly, they have not lost the intent to develop these weapons of mass destruction, whether they are one day, five days, one year, or seven years from any particular weapon, whether their stockpile is small, medium or large, what has not been lost is the intent to have such weapons of mass destruction.

The challenge before us is to see whether or not the Iraqi regime makes a sea change in its behavior because of this international presence. And they'll only make this kind of change if they sense there will be consequences for not having made such a change. The President is determined that we cannot look away again, and I can assure you that this issue is receiving the highest attention within the State Department, Defense Department, and all the other institutions of government.

If I just may close with one other observation, because I know it came up earlier in the hearing, this comment about a new doctrine of pre-emption. If you would go to the new national security strategy that the President issued not too long ago and look at the specific section which talks about our strategy and doctrine, you will find that we have not abandoned containment, we have not abandoned deterrence. We still have thousands of nuclear weapons. We still have a magnificent military force that can deter. We haven't abandoned these time-honored methods of using our national power. But what that chapter specifically says, there is a new threat out there now. There is a threat that doesn't respond the way older threats did to deterrence, that does not respond to theories of containment. These are terrorists. These are people who are willing to ignore what's going to happen to them. They are suicidal. They believe in evil concepts. And they're going to come at us. And so, a doctrine of pre-emption, or an element of pre-emption in our strategy is appropriate. It's not a new doctrine. It's been around for as long as warfare has been around. I can give you example after example in our own history of pre-emptive actions. In fact, I might even suggest that when President Clinton thought it necessary to attack that chemical plant in Sudan not too long ago, one might say that was a preemptive act, or an act of prevention. When you have this kind of new threat, this kind new enemy, then this doctrine of pre-emption should rise a little higher in your consideration, because this kind of enemy will not be deterred or contained the way, perhaps, the Soviet Union might have been and was contained and deterred in the past.

So see it as elevation of one of the many tools that we've always had, but don't see it as a new doctrine that excludes or eliminates all the other tools of national security and military power.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.