Following is the text of Representative James Leach's opening statement, as prepared for delivery:

Opening Statement
Representative James A. Leach
Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
U.S.-North Korean Relations After the Policy Review
July 26, 2001

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our administration witness, Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, Special Envoy for Korean Peace Talks and U.S. Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). During the Clinton administration, Mr. Pritchard served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Director of Asian Affairs at the NSC, as well as deputy to Ambassador Kartman in his role as Special Envoy for Peace Talks with North Korea. Mr. Pritchard retired from the U.S. Army in July 2000 after 28 years of service, including various Asia-related assignments in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Pacific Command. We appreciate your appearance before us today, and look forward to a close and bipartisan working relationship in the months ahead.

The Subcommittee meets today to assess prospects for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, a region of the world long of vital interest to the United States, and to review in detail the results of the Bush administration's recently completed review of U.S. policy toward North Korea.

A little over a year has passed since the extraordinary three-day summit meeting in Pyongyang between South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Il. The Pyongyang summit, unprecedented in the history of the divided Korean Peninsula, raised hopes that one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints was moving from an era of cold war confrontation to one of peace and coexistence. North Korea's once-reclusive ruler, Kim Jong Il, appeared a confident leader comfortable on the world stage. Indeed, the hermit kingdom in 2000 embarked on an ambitious campaign of diplomatic engagement, normalizing relations with the EU and nearly a dozen countries, as well as hosting a visit by the U.S. Secretary of State. Rapprochement between North and South Korea brought with it exciting hints of change: heart-rending family reunions, athletic and cultural exchanges, pledges to reconnect rail links across the heavily fortified DMZ, deepened economic ties, and a meeting of defense ministers.

By early 2001, however, this promising momentum toward North-South reconciliation had stalled. Kim Jong Il has yet to fulfill his commitment to a return summit in Seoul. Despite the easing of tensions on the Peninsula, there is little indication of either economic reform or a shift in the North's "military first" policies at home. Indeed, despite a precipitous economic decline and chronic food shortages that have led to famine and death for hundreds of thousands if not millions of its citizens, North Korea has devoted its scarce resources to increasing the size and capabilities of its military.

Added to these uncertainties, the incoming administration was confronted with a multifaceted and complicated array of policy issues related to previous U.S. engagement with North Korea. Key components of that engagement included: the 1994 Agreed Framework for containing and if possible ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program; the four-party talks between the two Koreas, the U.S., and China regarding the process for reaching a permanent peace agreement on the Peninsula; as well as the comprehensive policy review initiated by former Secretary of Defense Perry, which gave highest priority to U.S. security concerns over DPRK nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs, and which recommended that the U.S. adopt the goal of normalizing relations with North Korea if Pyongyang was willing to agree to a verifiable cessation of those programs.

Additional elements included providing food aid and other international assistance to North Korea, seeking progress in the DPRK's dismal human rights record, addressing the plight of North Korean refugees, North Korean involvement with terrorism, and pursuing concerns about North Korea's chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Moreover, the administration would need to take into account the implications for U.S. policy of North Korea's expanded diplomatic outreach. Likewise, it would need to assess how and why the North Korean regime had defied confident Western predictions of its imminent demise and broader prospects for regime stability in this uniquely dynastic socialist dictatorship.

Given this circumstance, the Bush administration very appropriately chose to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea. The new policy announced on June 6th sets forth a comprehensive approach toward North Korea, reaffirming support for the U.S.-ROK alliance, and endorsing the historic "Sunshine Policy" of President Kim with the explicit goal of encouraging progress toward North-South reconciliation. President Bush further directed his national security team to "undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening military posture."

From a Congressional perspective, it would appear that the ball is now squarely in North Korea's court, both in terms of promptly resuming a high-level dialogue with Seoul, and responding affirmatively to the U.S. decision to proceed with comprehensive discussions with Pyongyang.

Having said that, the result of the administration's policy review raises a number of questions of interest to Congress:

-- In terms of process, will the broader Bush agenda combined with its approach of pursuing initial contacts with DPRK at a lower level prove successful?

-- What priorities will the U.S. establish in the context of its comprehensive discussions with North Korea?

-- With respect to the goals of U.S.-DPRK engagement, the Perry process appeared to lay out a "roadmap" for normalization of relations with the North. If that roadmap was presented to North Korea, does it still reflect U.S. policy?

-- What improvements is the U.S. seeking in the Agreed Framework and by what means will we seek to secure North Korean cooperation in effectuating those changes?

-- How close was the prior administration to reaching a verifiable missile deal with North Korea, and how will the Bush administration proceed to address U.S. concerns with the development, testing, deployment, and export by the DPRK of offensive ballistic missiles and by what means would we attempt to secure effective verification?

-- What will the venue be for U.S. and North Korean discussions of tension-reducing and confidence-building measures relating to the DPRK's forward-deployed conventional forces, and to what extent are we prepared to discuss the status of U.S. Forces in Korea?

-- North Korea's current political system has been described as "stability within instability." How long can North Korea continue to successfully "defy gravity," and to what extent are the U.S. and its allies prepared for a crisis in the North that is beyond the ability of its Stalinist leadership to manage?

In any regard, we look forward to the testimony Special Envoy Pritchard and his response to these and other questions.