OFFICE
OF COMPLIANCE
LA 200, John Adams Building, 110 Second Street, S.E.
Washington, DC 20540-1999
_____________________
DAVID CULVER
Appellant,
v. Case No. 96-AC-55 (AG, CV, FM)
OFFICE SUPPLY SERVICE,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
Appellee.
_____________________
Before the Board of Directors: Glen D.
Nager, Chair; James N. Adler; Jerry M. Hunter; Lawrence Z. Lorber;
Virginia A. Seitz, Members.
DECISION OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS
Appellant, David Culver ("appellant"), appeals
from those portions of the Hearing Officer's decision dismissing
his claims of employment discrimination based on race and failure
to comply with provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act, in
violation of sections 201 and 202 of the Congressional Accountability
Act of 1995 (the "CAA" or the "Act"), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312.
He also asserts that the Hearing Officer's decision was not timely
issued, in violation of section 405 of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. § 1405,
and section 7.16 of the Procedural Rules of the Office of Compliance
(the "Procedural Rules"). (1) For
the reasons set forth below, the Board finds appellant's contentions
to be without merit and affirms the Hearing Officer's decision.
I.
Appellant, an African-American, was employed
from 1993 to 1996 as the sole stock clerk of the Office Supply Service
(the "OSS") of the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer (the
"CAO") of the United States House of Representatives. See
Decision at 4, 8 (Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 3.d.(1)). The staff of
OSS is racially mixed: of the 27 employees, 14 are African-American,
including Willie Holliday, appellant's immediate supervisor, and
William Crain, the Associate Administrator of the Office of Media
and Support Services. See Decision at 9 (Findings of Fact
Nos. 3.e, 4.a). The mid-level supervisor, Gerald Bowles, the Director
of the Office Supply Service, is white. See id.
In 1995, the CAO tightened personnel policies
for all House employees; and, in 1996, a new personnel manual was
issued. See id. (Finding of Fact No. 3.d). On May 3, 1996,
appellant, by signed receipt, acknowledged that he had received,
read, and understood the new personnel policies and procedures contained
in the manual. See id. at 12 (Finding of Fact No. 5.a). The
personnel manual contained guidance concerning family and medical
leave; appellant was also mailed, through his employer, information
on family and medical leave prepared by the Office of Compliance.
See id. (Finding of Fact No. 5.b). In addition, the OSS work
space contained posters containing information respecting family
and medical leave. See Id.
Appellant was terminated from his employment
in OSS on August 19, 1996 "because of his multiple failures to comply
with the leave policies of the House of Representatives and his
work unit." Id. at 5 (Finding of Fact No. 2). Appellant's
leave history included some half dozen unauthorized absences in
1995 and 1996, which resulted in a number of verbal and written
disciplinary warnings. These incidents culminated in a formal "Notice
of Disciplinary Action - Last Chance Agreement," signed by him on
June 10, 1996, warning him that he might lose his job for further
infractions. See id. at 5, 7-8, 13 (Findings of Fact Nos.
2.a; 3.c.(1)-(3), 6.b); see also Respondent's Exhibit Nos.
3, 4, 47. After receiving that Notice, he was absent from work for
eight days beginning on August 7, 1996, without having secured approved
leave, despite a telephone warning from his supervisors. See
Decision at 8 (Finding of Fact No. 3.c.(4)). Following that
last unauthorized absence, appellant was sent a notice of termination
for cause, by letter dated August 14, 1996. See Respondent's
Exhibit No. 41.
The letter of termination, which "accurately
summarized his leave records," Decision at 5 (Finding of Fact No.
2.a), noted a number of incidents in which appellant failed to abide
by the procedures of the office, including the requirement that
all employees sign in and sign out and receive approval of leave
in advance unless the leave in question falls under the emergency
leave exception, see id. at 8 (Finding of Fact No. 3.d.(1));
see also Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 6, 9, 10. For example,
the termination notice cited an incident in which appellant was
disciplined when he left work early and stayed off work without
calling in for the following two days because he had not received
a parking sticker. See Decision at 7, 11 (Findings of Fact
Nos. 3.c.(1), 4.c.(1)). In another incident, appellant was disciplined
when he did not return to the office after a group function: "He
did not follow procedure by calling-in and gave a series of unsubstantiated
excuses including being locked out of the building, going to the
nurse and falling asleep in the park." Id. at 7-8 (Finding
of Fact No. 3.c.(3)).
The final instance in which appellant took unauthorized
leave arose in connection with a trip to a friend's family reunion
and to visit his mother, who was in poor health. See id.
at 12-13 (Finding of Fact No. 5). Appellant did not go through the
appropriate channels to secure leave, nor did he request leave under
the Family and Medical Leave Act. See id. at 8, 12 (Finding
of Fact No. 3.c.(4); 5.c). Rather than ask his immediate supervisor
for leave, appellant tried to enlist the help of William Crain,
who reminded appellant that he lacked the requisite leave for the
trip. See id. at 8 (Finding of Fact No.3.c.(4)). Appellant
failed to secure approval of his leave; on the eve of his trip,
he left an unapproved leave slip on the OSS receptionist's desk,
stating the reason for the leave was a "trip and visit mother."
Id. at 12 (Finding of Fact No. 5.c., quoting Respondent's
Exhibit No. 46). The following morning, having been warned by telephone
by his supervisors, appellant nonetheless left to attend the reunion
and to visit his mother. He did not request family leave or provide
his employers with information "alerting them to his possible entitlement
to family leave." Id. at 12-13 (Finding of Fact No. 5.d).
Pursuant to office procedures, he was placed in non-pay status and
then terminated. Id. at 5, 8 (Findings of Fact Nos. 2.a,
3.c.(4)).
Kay E. Ford, the Associate Administrator for
Human Resources in the Office of the CAO, decided to terminate appellant
for cause after "careful and impartial" review of appellant's leave
records, consultation with administrative counsel, and receipt of
the recommendation of all three supervisors in appellant's unit.
Id. at 5, 9 (Findings of Fact Nos. 2.a, 2.b.(1), 3.e). At
the time Ms. Ford decided that appellant's personnel record warranted
termination, she had not met appellant, did not know his race, and
was unaware that he had made any complaints of discrimination or
was encouraging others to do so; nor had he or anyone else in OSS
filed complaints of any unlawful employment practice. See id.
at 5, 14 (Findings of Fact Nos. 2.b.(2), 7). At appellant's request
and in light of his allegations concerning his termination, Ms.
Ford reviewed the basis of her decision: "She checked records, recomputed
leave, traced worker's comp. time and looked for any indicators
of need for a family leave opportunity. She found no inaccuracies,
falsifications or deprivations. She was alert to, but did not find,
pretextual firing." Id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 2.b.(3)).
Appellant was replaced by an African-American, see id. at
13 (Finding of Fact No. 6.a), who performs the duties of the stock
clerk and also works in receiving and shipping, see id. at
11 (Finding of Fact No. 4.c.(2)).
II.
Appellant filed a complaint with the Office
of Compliance alleging that he "was terminated without cause . .
. because of (. . . one or more of) the following factors: his color,
race, age, and (perceived) disability (back injury)." Complaint
at 1 (March 26, 1997). In addition, appellant alleged that he "received
disparate treatment and discipline in terms of being criticized
and reprimanded concerning sick, annual, and other leave policy
and procedures . . . ;" that he "suffered a racially hostile working
environment;" that after African-Americans complained about "racially
inflammatory" behavior, he was retaliated against "as a member of
the class of persons in the office who were complaining black African-Americans;"
and that "[v]erbal and written reprimands, such as the last chance
agreement, and the August 14, 1996, letter of termination are false
and misleading and pretext for illegal motives and acts in violation
of the [CAA]." Id. at 2-3. Appellant also alleged that his
termination violated section 202 of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. § 1312, which
made certain rights and protections under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 applicable to covered employees. Id.
As provided under section 405(d) of the CAA,
2 U.S.C. § 1405(d), a full evidentiary hearing was held before a
Hearing Officer. Appellant, who had been represented by counsel
during mediation, proceeded pro se at the hearing. He testified
on his own behalf and called one witness, Ms. Lillie Drayton, "who
had no personal knowledge of the job site occurrences but who spoke
to some of Mr. Culver's efforts and frustrations, particularly with
regard to attendance and leave." Decision at 3-4. Four of appellant's
exhibits were received into evidence. At the close of appellant's
case-in-chief, the Hearing Officer dismissed appellant's claims
of discrimination on the basis of age and perceived disability.
Appellee then called six witnesses and presented documentary evidence,
including appellant's leave records, the revised personnel manual
signed by appellant, posters giving notice of family and medical
leave, and other documents relating to specific events about which
appellant complained (e.g., the assignment of parking spaces).
The Hearing Officer concluded, based on the
documentary evidence and her assessment of the testimony, that appellant
had failed to prove any violation of the CAA. The Hearing Officer
found that the testimony of Kay E. Ford, the Assistant Administrator
for Human Resources, "was candid and persuasive of a termination
untainted by violations of the Congressional Accountability Act,"
Decision at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 2.b.(5)), while appellant's "testimony,
which was his primary evidence, was heartfelt, but on occasion strained
credulity and seemed to be the result of confused comprehension.
On key points, his testimony was contradicted by co-workers and
by written documents." Id. at 15 (Finding of Fact No. 2.(b)).
The Hearing Officer made detailed findings respecting each of appellant's
allegations. In sum, she found:
Although Mr. Culver was given wide evidentiary
latitude in his effort to prove violations of the Act, he did
not prove any of his claims. . . . [M]any of his allegations merely
reflect the usual work place contretemps over parking spaces,
work uniforms, work hours and close supervision by management.
He failed to establish that decisions which he did not like in
these areas were racially motivated. Similarly he failed to establish
that his leave records were "forged" or falsified or that he did
not receive notice of family and medical leave opportunities or
that he was fired for urging other employees to "speak out."
Decision at 2. Contrary to appellant's allegations
that he was singled out for more stringent application of the OSS
time and attendance policy, the Hearing Officer found that appellant's
leave problems "were not created by or exacerbated by racial discrimination."
Id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 3). Both white and African-American
employees received reprimands; all employees were subject to the
sign-in and sign-out procedures and, in 1995, to increased discipline;
and the specific reprimands and disciplinary actions taken against
appellant were based on racially neutral criteria. Id. at
6-8 (Finding of Fact No. 3). The Hearing Officer further found that
appellant received numerous warnings of the consequences of his
failures to meet job expectations, id. at 13 (Conclusion
of Law No. 6.b); that the decision to terminate him was made by
an official who acted carefully and impartially and without knowledge
of his race or any alleged exercise of activity protected by the
CAA, id. at 5, 14, (Findings of Fact Nos. 2.b., 7.a); and
that there was no pattern of racially suspect terminations of employment
in OSS, id. at 13 (Finding of Fact No. 6.d).
The Hearing Officer also found that appellant
was not subject to a racially hostile environment. Id. at
9 (Finding of Fact No. 4). Two incidents which appellant construed
as racially offensive behavior were dealt with promptly and effectively
by management. Id. at 10 (Finding of Fact No. 4.b.(2)). The
Hearing Officer found that other incidents which appellant viewed
as having a racial motivation did not: his failure to secure a parking
space was based on lack of seniority, rather than race, and the
fact that the African-American employee who replaced appellant was
given a uniform, while appellant was not, was based on the latter's
performance of additional job duties in receiving and shipping.
Id. at 11 (Finding of Fact No. 4.c.(1)-(2)).
Further, the Hearing Officer rejected appellant's
allegations that he did not receive adequate notice of the availability
of family and medical leave and that management had sufficient notice
of his mother's serious medical condition to inquire whether he
was eligible for family leave during his August 1996 absence without
leave. The Hearing Officer found that appellant had notice of the
availability of family and medical leave based on publication of
the family and medical leave policy in the personnel manual, signed
for by appellant; direct mailings of materials discussing family
and medical leave; and the display of posters within the OSS job
site describing the family and medical leave policy. The Hearing
Officer further found that appellant had neither requested family
leave nor provided OSS management with sufficient information to
suggest the possible applicability of family and medical leave to
the August leave request. Appellant's leave form stated the reason
for the requested leave as "'trip and visit mother;'" he discussed
the proposed leave with colleagues in terms of a family reunion;
and his much earlier comments about his mother's health condition
at the time of her original illness did not constitute notice to
his supervisors at this later date. Id. at 12-13 (Finding
of Fact No. 5).
Based on the above findings, the Hearing Officer
concluded that appellant neither produced "'[d]irect evidence' of
discriminatory practices which resulted in the termination of his
employment" nor "met the standards of the McDonnell Douglas
test" (2) in that he failed to establish
that "he met the legitimate expectations of the job, that he was
discharged despite good performance or that he was replaced by a
person of a non-protected class. His compliance with reasonable
time and attendance [policies] did not meet expectations. Further,
he was replaced by an African-American." Id. at 15-16 (Conclusion
of Law No. 2). The Hearing Officer further found that the CAO "convincingly
and persuasively" rebutted every "allegation, inference or colorable
claim of discrimination." Id. at 16 (Conclusion of Law No.
3). The Hearing Officer therefore concluded that "the evidence does
not establish the requisite proof of a racially motivated termination,
a retaliatory discharge or violations of the family and medical
leave provisions of the Act." Id. at 16 (Conclusion of Law
No. 2.d).
III.
Under section 406 of the CAA, "[t]he Board shall
set aside a decision of a hearing officer if the Board determines
that the decision was--
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not consistent with law;
(2) not made consistent with required procedures;
or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence."
2 U.S.C. § 1406(c). "In making determinations
under subsection (c), the Board shall review the whole record, or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error." 2 U.S.C. § 1406(d). Applying
these standards, and after review of the record as a whole, the
Board affirms the Hearing Officer's decision.
Appellant does not argue that the Hearing Officer
misapplied the relevant legal standards. Rather, appellant appears
to take issue with a number of the subsidiary factual findings on
which those legal conclusions are based and to argue that the Hearing
Officer failed to consider some (unspecified) record evidence. See
Appellant's Petition for Review and Brief (December 8, 1997). The
Hearing Officer's findings, however, are supported by substantial
evidence in the record, and these findings dispose of all germane
issues raised by appellant.
"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). The record in this case clearly
supports the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the CAO's termination
of appellant's employment did not violate any provision of the CAA.
Specifically, the record amply documents the
Hearing Officer's finding that appellant failed to meet the legitimate
expectations of the job and that his employment was terminated because
of his repeated failures to comply with the leave policies of his
office, despite numerous warnings. See, e.g. Respondent's
Exhibit Nos. 3, 13, Tr. at I:133-45 (supervisor gave appellant a
written warning after he left work early and failed to report in
for two days); Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, Tr. at I:160-63, 177-78
(supervisor gave appellant another written warning respecting attendance
violations, which described three unauthorized absences in violation
of attendance policy and explained to him that such violations could
result in dismissal); Respondent's Exhibit No. 17, Tr. at I:262-64,
Tr. at II:433-34 (appellant given a "Notice of Disciplinary Action
- Last Chance Agreement" noting a number of violations of time and
attendance policy which warned that further violations could result
in dismissal; appellant also orally warned when given that notice);
Tr. at I:25-34, 272-89, III:721-29 (appellant placed on non-pay
status and terminated when, after telephone warning from supervisors,
he was absent for eight days without approved leave).
The record also fully supports the Hearing Officer's
conclusion that the time and attendance and leave policies were
applied in a racially neutral manner. See, e.g., Respondent's
Exhibit No. 6 at 8-9 (1996 Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual
for the Officers and the Inspector General of the U.S. House of
Representatives, stating that all employees must notify appropriate
authorizing official if they are unable to report to work); Respondent's
Exhibit No. 9 (memorandum requiring all OSS employees to report
directly to the Assistant Chief to sign in formally and to obtain
permission from their supervisor and notify the Assistant Chief
for permission to arrive late or leave early); Respondent's Exhibit
No. 10 (memorandum which required all OSS employees to contact their
supervisor to call in sick or request emergency leave, was signed
by OSS staff including appellant); Tr. at III:642-47, 655-65 (supervisor
describes leave policies in effect in 1995-97, as set forth in exhibits
and unsuccessful attempts to counsel appellant to comply with these
procedures); Tr. at II:483-85; IV:813 (other African-American and
white employees disciplined for violation of personnel policies,
including time and attendance); Tr. at I:260-61 (all three supervisors
discuss and agree on disciplinary action respecting appellant's
excessive absenteeism); Tr. at I:271, 304, II:435-37, III:731-32
(same group of supervisors agree on recommendation that appellant's
employment be terminated for repeated violations of office time
and attendance policy).
There is also substantial evidence in the record
supporting the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the ultimate decision
to terminate appellant's employment was made impartially, after
review of appellant's leave records, by a neutral decision-maker
who did not know appellant's race and was unaware of any complaints
by appellant or any other OSS employee of racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Tr. at IV:828-835, 839-41, 882-86. Moreover, at
appellant's request, appellant's personnel records were reviewed
for signs of error or pretextual firing and none was found. See
Tr. at IV:849-51, 854-856, 858-62, 866-67, 886.
The record also entirely supports the Hearing
Officer's finding that appellant received adequate notice of the
availability of family and medical leave. See, e.g., Respondent's
Exhibit No. 6 at 10 (1996 Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual
for the Officers and the Inspector General of the U.S. House of
Representatives, describing the availability of family and medical
leave and alerting employees of circumstances requiring advance
notice to employer); Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 (appellee's signature
acknowledging receipt of the 1996 manual); Tr. at IV:867-71 (notice
of family and medical leave provided to employees by direct mailings
of brochures and by display of posters in work place); see also
Respondent's Exhibit No. 55 (poster containing information on family
and medical leave); Tr. at III:635-38 (posters containing information
on family and medical leave displayed in a number of locations in
OSS workplace). Assuming, arguendo, that appellant potentially
was entitled to family and medical leave, the record also supports
the Hearing Officer's finding that appellant did not provide sufficient
information to put the OSS on notice that he was requesting such
leave. See, e.g., Tr. at III:724 (supervisor believed that
appellant sought leave to attend family reunion); Tr. at IV:867
(appellant's letter referring to his mother's hospitalization in
March of 1996 did not alert reviewing official that appellant was
seeking family leave in August of 1997).
In sum, the record in this case contains substantial
evidence supporting the Hearing Officer's conclusion that appellant
failed to produce "proof of a racially motivated termination, . .
. or [of] violations of the family and medical leave provisions
of the Act." Decision at 16 (Conclusion of Law No. 2.d). Rather
this evidence establishes, as the Hearing Officer found, "a non-discriminatory
cause for termination of [appellant's] employment." Id. Conclusion
of Law No. 3.
In arguing to the contrary, appellant offers
little in the way of record evidence in support his sincere belief
that he has been wrongfully terminated. Appellant takes issue with
a number of the Hearing Officer's findings, but fails to demonstrate
that these findings are in error. Appellant states that "[a] copy
of my leave records of 93, 94, 95, and 1996 shows that OSS has no
record of me taking the leave claimed." Appellant's Brief at 1.
The Hearing Officer found that appellant had taken the leave charged
to him, based on Respondent's submission of relevant personnel records,
see Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 2-3, 10, 13, 14, 17-30, 33-44,
46-48, and testimony respecting those records, see Tr. at
II:424, IV:848-56, 885-87. Appellant argues that several of the
actual dates cited in the Decision are inaccurate. See Appellant's
Brief at 1. He disputes the Hearing Officer's finding, based on
the actual letter of termination and the supporting testimony thereto,
that he was taken off the payroll on August 19, 1996, arguing that
the actual date was August 13, 1996. Id. He also disputes
the accuracy of the leave records of August 15-16, 1996 which show
him signed in at OSS, when, according to his undisputed testimony,
Tr. at I:34-35, he was still absent without leave and had been taken
off the payroll. See Appellant's Brief at 1. Appellant does
not dispute, however, that he was absent without obtaining leave
according to normal OSS procedures from August 7, 1996 to August
19, 1996, see, e.g., Tr. at I:31-35, and that he had been
warned of the possible employment consequences of such unexcused
absences, see, e.g., Tr. at I:33, 281, II:432, III:723-29.
His arguments, thus, do not undermine the Hearing Officer's findings
respecting his August, 1996 absence without leave. There is simply
no evidence that his leave records were forged in a "cover up[]"
of a racially motivated termination. Accordingly, there is no record
evidence that would support reversal of the Hearing Officer's findings.
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113, (1992) ("A court
reviewing an agency's adjudicative action should accept the agency's
factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.").
Finally, appellant renews his denial that he
received information respecting family and medical leave, contending
once again that his signature acknowledging receipt of the 1996
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual was forged. See
Appellant's Brief at 2. However, the Hearing Officer credited the
contrary evidence, which is substantial. See, e.g. Respondent's
Exhibit No. 7 (acknowledgment of receipt form, signed by appellant
and his supervisor); Tr. at III:629-632 (supervisor describes circumstances
in which appellant was given 1996 personnel manual and identifies
appellant's signature along with his own on the form); Tr. at IV:860-61
(Associate Administrator of Human Resources explains procedure for
obtaining employee signatures on receipt form, where her office
retained the completed receipt forms, and the research undertaken
by her office to ensure that all employees signed the receipt form
or, in cases in which they preferred not to sign, that their supervisors
noted that refusal on the form). The Hearing Officer's finding that
appellant never requested family leave and did not give his supervisors
sufficient information to alert them to a possible entitlement to
such leave also is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g.
Respondent's Exhibit No. 46 at 37 (appellant's leave slip, requesting
leave for a "trip and visit my mother"); Tr. at I:272 (supervisor,
who had no documentation of appellant's mother's illness, thought
that appellant was going to a family reunion); Tr. at III:724 (another
supervisor also thought appellant was requesting leave for a family
reunion). The record supports the Hearing Officer's conclusion that
the supervisors in question were not sufficiently aware of his mother's
illness to treat his leave request as a request for family leave.
IV.
Appellant raises one further issue. He argues
that the Hearing Officer's decision was contrary to required procedures
because it was issued 145 days after the conclusion of the Hearing,
in violation of section 7.16 of the Procedural Rules. Appellant's
Petition for Review at 1. Appellant misunderstands the requirements
of the Procedural Rules. Although the last day of testimony in this
case occurred on June 23, 1997, the record remained open in accordance
with section 7.14 of the Procedural Rules, which gives a hearing
officer the discretion to permit the parties to file post-hearing
briefs on the factual and legal issues. Under section 7.15 of the
Procedural Rules, the hearing record remains open until that briefing
is completed. The Hearing Officer exercised her discretion to allow
appellant to file a post-hearing brief, which she received on August
13, 1997, nearly one month after the original deadline of July 14,
1997. The Hearing Officer thereupon closed the hearing record, in
accordance with section 7.15 of the Procedural Rules. Her decision
was issued on November 13, 1997, 91 days after the closing of the
record, as computed in accordance with section 1.03(b) of the Procedural
Rules, rather than the 90 days required by section 405 of the CAA,
2 U.S.C. § 1405, and section 7.16 of the Procedural Rules. However,
the Board finds the circumstances of this case to warrant application
of the de minimis doctrine. See Hessel v. O'Hearn,
977 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1992) (The de minimis
doctrine refers to a legal violation or harm, "often but not always
trivial, for which the courts do not think a legal remedy should
be provided."); see also Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v.
Wrigley, 505 U.S. 214, 232 (1992) ("Whether a particular activity
is a de minimis deviation from a prescribed standard must
. . . be determined with reference to the purpose of the standard.").
The time requirement for issuance of the Hearing Officer's decision
is designed to assure the parties of a timely resolution of their
dispute. The Hearing Officer has duly rendered her decision within
one day of that requirement, which complies with the purpose of
the statutory time requirement. Moreover, all but that one day of
the "delay" of which appellant complains is directly attributable
to the Hearing Officer's accommodation of his late filing of his
post-hearing brief. Under these circumstances, any violation of
the requirements of the CAA is de minimus.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above,
the Board affirms the Hearing Officer's decision.
It is so ordered.
Issued, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1998.
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