



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**MARITIME
ADMINISTRATION**

**Report of the
United States Mobile Training Team**

Inter-American Port Security Training Program - 2002
Regional Course on Port Security for Caribbean Countries

Bridgetown, Barbados
July 22-26, 2002

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Conducted in cooperation with the
Inter-American Committee on Ports of the
Organization of American States

Prepared by

U.S. Maritime Administration
(Coordinating Agency)

Regional Course on Port Security for Caribbean Countries - 2002

1. Background and Objectives

Port security is a strategic area of concern for the Inter-American Committee on Ports (IACP) of the Organization of American States (OAS), to which the U.S. Maritime Administration heads the U.S. delegation and (1) chairs the IACP Technical Advisory Group on Port Security; and (2) chairs the IACP Subcommittee on Port Training.

U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) is responsible for organizing, managing, and executing the Inter-American Port Security Training Program (IAPSTP) courses, as a cooperative initiative with the OAS. Funding for IAPSTP is provided through the OAS. Please direct any questions and comments to Thomas Morelli, Program Manager, Port and Cargo Security, or Raymond Barberesi, Director, Office of Ports and Domestic Shipping, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590, or telephone (202) 366-5473.

This training course is in conformance with the OAS IACP Subcommittee on Port Training Work Plan for 2002, which calls for four Regional Courses on Port Security, including for Caribbean countries. The Subcommittee urged port authorities of the member countries to seek support from their Foreign Ministries for the project presented by the United States to CIDI to develop courses on port security.

The Work Plan was adopted and documented by the IACP through resolution CIDI/CIP/RES.27(II-01), thus approving the OAS training program for 2002 (*Inter-American Port Training Program - 2002*). This program is financed by the OAS Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI) and executed by MARAD with the administrative support of the Executive Secretariat of the IACP of the OAS.

The objectives of the project are to reduce port and cargo security vulnerabilities of the Region's ports. The Regional Course on Port Security for the Caribbean Countries received essential and valuable support from the Barbados Port Authority and its Training and Special Services division which cosponsored the event and furnished the necessary local logistical support.

2. Venue and Date

The Course was held in the Grand Barbados Beach Resort in Bridgetown, Barbados, from July 22 to 26, 2002. The Port of Bridgetown was the site for one day's lesson plan.

3. Participants

The Course was attended by 45 port security officials from the following OAS member countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.

4. Schedule

The Topics of instruction are listed below. Details of the entire Course program is contained in Appendix A.

1. Security challenges facing seaport operations
2. Seaport security force operations and management
3. Physical security and access control at seaports
4. Methods of security for preventing and countering cargo theft
5. Training requirements for seaport security personnel
6. Enforcement of laws and security regulations in a seaport
7. Seaport security risk assessment and contingency planning
8. Container security to prevent and counter drug smuggling and terrorism
9. *Industry Partnership Programs* against drug smuggling and terrorism
10. Port vulnerability assessment planning and onsite field work
11. TAG on Port Security: Cooperation for Port Security Development
12. Recommendations and course evaluation

5. Documents

During the Course, the instructors distributed instructional material pertinent to the topics among the participants. Following the course, three supplemental reading documents were mailed to each participant, and a list of these documents is in Appendix B.

6. Proceedings

The Course consisted of an opening session, plenary training sessions, and a closing session. The Course had a full schedule of training sessions organized by the Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The U.S. Training Team consisted of Instructors from the United States, representing the Miami-Dade Police Department, Seaport Operations Unit (Lieutenant Kenneth Christopher and Sergeant Mauricio Rivera); and U.S. Customs Service - Area Port of Orlando, Florida (Supervisory Customs Inspector Russell Morgan); and a U.S. Coordinator (Thomas Morelli, Program Manager, Port and Cargo Security, U.S. Maritime Administration).

The Barbados Coordinator for the course was Ricardo Hinds, Manager for Training and Special Services, Barbados Port Authority, which also provided a supporting secretariat

staffed by Charleen Holder, Stephen Headley, and Cheryl Small. The course included a practical field exercise conducted at the Port of Bridgetown, arranged by the Barbados Port Authority.

Opening Session Proceedings

An opening ceremony was hosted by the Barbados Port Authority and served as a press conference announcing the commencement of the training course. The panel of speakers were: Cameron Nichols, pastor (invocation); Thomas Morelli, Program Manager, Port and Cargo Security, U.S. Maritime Administration (United States remarks); Vincent Yearwood, Deputy Chairman, Barbados Port Authority (featured address); Louis Sealy, Chief Security Officer, Barbados Port Authority (vote of thanks); and Ricardo Hinds, Manager, Training and Special Services, Barbados Port Authority, and Barbados Local Coordinator (Master of Ceremonies).

In his featured address, Deputy Chairman Yearwood spoke of the need for regional strategy that is workable and involves all stakeholders in the logistic chain that utilize seaports. He said the Caribbean needed an actionable strategy, but one that should not be organized like NATO. He pledged the support and leadership of the Barbados Port Authority in a regional strategy to improve seaport security among Caribbean countries. Deputy Chairman Yearwood affirmed the intention of Barbados to be also a leader in the international maritime industry and in contributing to improving the security of all the seaports and trade corridors of the Western Hemisphere.

The U.S. Maritime Administration was on the opening ceremony program for remarks, which were presented by Thomas Morelli, U.S. Training Team Coordinator. The text of the remarks as presented, are as follows.

"International crime and terrorist groups pose a threat to the legitimate control of political and economic systems in the Western Hemisphere and around the world. Greater regional integration and worldwide interdependence of national economies is being exploited by terrorist and criminal organizations to operate on an international scale and blend their operations into legitimate economic activity.

Improvements in commercial transportation infrastructures and modalities to facilitate international trade are also increasing the volume, speed, and efficiency of illegal transactions by international crime and terrorist groups. The consequences are a direct threat to the economic and trade interests of all countries. For countries that conduct maritime commerce, improved port and cargo security is, therefore, central to all efforts by government and industry to reduce criminal and terrorist exploitation of commerce transported in the international maritime trade corridors. Consequently, port security training is of greater importance among efforts by the international community to urgently

improve transnational border security capacities and establish multinational common security standards for transportation systems.

The Inter-American Port Security Training Program is the foundation of more secure Inter-American maritime trade corridors and enhanced security of the maritime transportation systems in the member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS). The Inter-American Port Security Training Program contributes also to other regional approaches to counter seaport crime and terrorism -- and it serves the efforts of the OAS Technical Advisory Group on Port Security to develop a broad Hemispheric strategy for improving port and cargo security in the Inter-American maritime trade corridors.

But additional training is needed each year -- and consistent institutional funding is required. And the success of the Inter-American Port Security Training Program depends on the cooperative engagement of the member countries of the OAS and the private sector stakeholders of the Western Hemisphere.

We thank the Government of Barbados and the Barbados Port Authority for hosting the training this week, and thereby, contributing so much to that success."

Introduction, Presentation of Participants, Classroom, and Secretariat

Following the formalities of the Monday morning opening ceremonies attended by senior officials, the participants proceeded to the classroom for commencement of the training. Ricardo Hinds introduced the Training Team and provided their professional biographic information. The three instructors were Lieutenant Kenneth Christopher and Sergeant Mauricio Rivera of the Miami-Dade Police Department Seaport Operations Section; and Supervisory Inspector Russell Morgan of the United States Customs Service. The coordinator for the Training Team was Thomas Morelli, Program Manager, Port and Cargo Security, United States Maritime Administration (U.S. MARAD). The head instructor, Lt. Christopher, made introductory remarks on the importance of the training course in order to more effectively counter the crime and security challenges facing seaports.

At the beginning of the Monday afternoon session, Mr. Hinds directed the course participants to briefly introduce themselves, including identification of their organization and a point regarding their expectations of the training and intentions for its subsequent application. Most of the participants represented governmental port security forces or law enforcement agencies including customs service, coast guard, and national police. A few participants were employed in seaport operations other than security.

Throughout this training course, multimedia audio/visual equipment was used to deliver presentations in the most effective manner to facilitate learning, including PowerPoint and video run simultaneously for dual screen presentation. The conference room used

as the classroom for the course was well lighted, adequately spacious, equipped with refreshments, and attractively appointed. The participants were seated in a double U-shaped arrangement (grouped by country) that was open to the front of the classroom, enabling instructors to walk among the audience and engage them most interactively. The secretariat staffed by the Barbados Port Authority and managed by Ricardo Hinds, provided outstanding services to support all administrative requirements throughout the week, and was essential to the successful execution of the training. The above were important factors in optimizing the learning experience of the participants.

Commencement of Instruction

(Topic 1 - Monday) Security Challenges Facing Seaport Operations

Lt. Christopher and Sgt. Rivera conducted this session in tandem presentations and provided an overview of the course, briefly touching on each subject of instruction planned. They explained that instruction would involve their interactive participation.

Participants were told they should consider themselves to all be custodians of the cargo moving through their seaports, and that the training is intended to improve the professionalism of the participants.

The economic importance of seaports in world trade was emphasized, and the national economic impact of cargo theft, smuggling, and other forms of cargo crime. Importation of illegal drugs and other contraband was identified as the most pervasive threat facing seaports. In addition, however, seaports remain very vulnerable to terrorism. The inconsistencies among seaport security operations are a vulnerability that impacts the international maritime trade corridors. Various forms of internal conspiracies are perhaps the most effective means used to perpetrate criminal or terrorist activities against seaports. Bribery by organized crime groups is an element in the process of effecting internal conspiracies. Systems for continual monitoring and challenging of people working in the seaport are a basic tool in countering internal conspiracies. Audits by an outside organization are necessary for comprehensive improvements in port security.

Stowaways and illegal immigration are crime problems that expose port security vulnerabilities to exploitation by terrorists for committing violent and destructive crimes. Commercial fraud and trade violations are threats that can be mitigated by improved port security cargo monitoring procedures. Cargo theft must be countered with systems and measures that reduce the vulnerabilities exploited by criminals, ranging from forged/false documentation to hijacking of shipments in road/rail transit. Prevention of illegal export of currency and controlled goods can be improved through methods similar to those used against drug smuggling.

Many of these security challenges require the involvement of various government agencies at different levels of government. Access control and physical security measures are the main contributions of the port security mission. The engagement of

other agencies in the seaport security mission for specialized assistance can be addressed only to the extent that certain crimes fall within the scope of an agency's responsibilities.

The vulnerabilities of cruise ships and terminals to terrorism was emphasized, including the indirect economic consequences of disruption to the tourism trade caused by acts of terrorism occurring even in a neighboring country. Consequence management is an essential capability needed by seaports. The terminals used for cruise ship operations should be physically separated from terminals used for cargo operations, each with tailored access control systems.

The ability to apply all available tools effectively requires that port security force personnel know the seaport operational environment in order to differentiate normal from anomalous activities. Therefore, cross training within the seaport is an important professional development tool for port security personnel, in order to recognize all forms of documentation used in seaport transactions and operations.

Participants from several countries made penetrating statements regarding serious security threats faced by their seaports, and the need for multinational cooperation. Participants identified the importance of effective port security senior management and supportive of elected officials, without which detracts significantly from port security's role in a country's national security.

(Topic 2 - Monday) **Seaport Security Force Operations and Management**

Lt. Christopher and Sgt. Rivera conducted this session in tandem presentations. Supervision was emphasized as paramount to successful port security operations and management. Documentation of policies and procedures into a manual is fundamental to effective supervision of a port security force.

Security force organizations require records and all personnel must be capable of writing reports. Oral and written communication skills are important even at the security guard level. Good interpersonal and organizational skills among a well-trained competent workforce are keys to successful security force management.

Access control systems are basic to security operations and depend on adherence to documented policies and procedures. The Port of Miami was offered as a model for the personnel identification system component of its port security operations for controlling physical access. This fingerprint-based identification system is the standard for other ports in south Florida. While the technology is available, the laws in each country will determine the feasibility of implementing such a system.

Port security conducted by governmental authorities or private sector firms present significantly different limitations, as do the differences between sworn and non-sworn officers employed by a governmental authority.

(Topic 3 - Monday) **Physical Security and Access Control at Seaports**

Lt. Christopher and Sgt. Rivera conducted this session in tandem presentations. Port security guidelines are important to the development of physical security and access controls. An overview and discussion was presented of the model guidelines contained in the U.S. Government's Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. The application of guidelines to integrated operations was illustrated by the instructors using an instructional video of the port security operations at the Port of Miami, produced for this training by Sgt. Rivera of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD). The MDPD is responsible for security and law enforcement at the Port of Miami, and does so utilizing police officers and non-sworn personnel. The MDPD video takes the viewer through key checkpoints in the Port of Miami, and includes interviews with the staff who explain the port operations and the security mission conducted at their post. Included in the video were coverage of, for example, port signage; the MDPD Identification Bureau and badge system; port gate operations; cruise ship terminal operations; MDPD scrutiny and inbound/outbound escort of tanker trucks servicing cruise ships; and the "area of concern" reporting system for which MDPD compiles observations on apparently non-security related matters in the port and routes them to responsible divisions for corrective action. In response to the instructors, the participants expressed that very few worked under a port security plan, or with the benefit of written standards or guidelines.

(Topic 4 -Tuesday) **Methods of Security for Preventing and Countering Cargo Theft**

Lt. Christopher and Sgt. Rivera conducted this session in tandem presentations. Initial interactive discussion was conducted with participants, citing the wide range of circumstances they experience which have a bearing on preventing and countering cargo theft. Most participants were from seaports that handled primarily palletized cargoes, rather than full container loads. Pallet loads often involve mixed consignees, requiring truck traffic to collect shipments, and necessitating that pallet loads be broken out according to consignee. This complicates the record keeping of warehouse clerks and the process of security verification, adding vulnerability exploitable by cargo thieves. An identification system serving the port operations generally could be implemented to serve also the security needs of a palletized cargo handle and warehouse operation, including traffic by vendors and visitors. The Port of Miami identification system is a model of sophistication and effectiveness. Participants noted a Jamaican system which facilitates pre-clearance of U.S.-bound cargoes departing the Port of Kingston, utilizing a closed circuit television link established with U.S. Customs Service operations at Port of Miami.

The session included further discussion on technology systems as tools for improving port security. Installed at the Port of Miami is a x-ray container scanning station called Stolen Automobile Recovery System (STARS), designed to detect stolen vehicles hidden in export-bound cargo containers. Noting the crime deterrent effect of STARS, since it commenced operation the incidence of stolen vehicles hidden in containers at the Port of Miami has dropped to nearly zero percent.

Working in conjunction with computerized identification system and x-ray scanners, other types of detectors installed in the same traffic lanes have the potential for detection of

weapons of mass destruction. The computerized Terminal Interchange Report system used at the Port of Los Angeles photographs the truck driver and the cargo documents simultaneously for inbound and outbound movements through the container terminals.

Special control measures for warehoused high value or special interest cargoes demand technical measures and extremely rigorous procedures.

Patrol techniques by vehicle and on foot should be integrated with non-mobile security measures, with methods varying according to day or night operations, and include varied patrol patterns. Effective patrol requires study of logs and incidents reports to exploit data collection, and good reading to and report writing skills. Also part of patrol operations is the preservation of crime scenes in order to obtain evidence, which is an important skill for security guards as they are often the first to arrive at a crime scene. Preservation of crime scene evidence is a specialized skill requiring formal training.

(Topic 5 - Tuesday) **Training Requirements for Seaport Security Personnel**

Lt. Christopher conducted this session. A wide range of functional issues germane to port security operations and the various aspects associated with training these subjects were presented. The various aspects of training particular subjects were discussed, including expanded curriculum of the subject taught in the IAPSTP course as well as additional port security topics. Training standards and certification were emphasized as key criteria in international efforts to develop modern and professional port security forces.

Several participants offered notable examples of the training received by their respective port security forces. St. Lucia's participants cited their requirement for seven months of regular police training prior to a port security assignment. Jamaica's participants explained that personnel assigned to port security duty receive six weeks of law enforcement training with emphasis on arrest powers. Grenada's participants cited their police training and arrest powers.

(Topic 6 - Tuesday) **Enforcement of Laws and Security Regulations in a Seaport**

Lt. Christopher conducted this session. Miami-Dade County ordinance code was used as the basis of instruction for this topic, and was offered as a model for adaptation and application to the ports of the OAS member countries. Despite the high degree of local law enforcement regulation in which the Port of Miami operates, skilled implementation by well-trained personnel of the MDPD Seaport Operations Section creates an asset preserving result and a competitive advantage for the port.

(Topic 7 - Tuesday) **Seaport Security Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning**

Lt. Christopher and Sgt. Rivera conducted this session. Risk is basically defined as the result of comparing threats against vulnerabilities ($T+V=R$). Therefore, the instruction centered on examination of threats in comparison to port security vulnerabilities. Most threats that are known via good intelligence remain difficult to neutralize or counter. A more certain approach for improving port security is to concentrate on reducing vulnerabilities, thus diminishing the potential of threats. Terrorism is of course the threat

with most serious consequences. A terrorist attack, for example, could be engineered by exploiting the presence of legitimate hazardous material cargo in port and the application of criminal intent, resulting in an improvised weapon of mass destruction. The most prevalent threat to port security in the Western Hemisphere, however, remains drug smuggling, followed by cargo theft, stowaways and alien smuggling, and sea robbery in the port or harbor.

Two types of threat do not involve criminals yet have the potential to compound the seriousness of even minor crimes. They are untrained security personnel, and an outdated policies and procedures manual. The importance of common standards for minimum levels of training was again emphasized, in order to develop professional personnel for the port security mission.

The techniques of categorizing and prioritizing security threats were presented. The approach to this involves a continuous cycle involving the collection and analysis of information applied to a process of implementing improvements. The dynamic nature of criminality, including terrorism, necessitates employment of a continuous assessment process. A risk assessment matrix was demonstrated and discussed. This matrix tool is based on a methodology that compares threat to its potential impact, and enables a numerical system for prioritizing the risks faced by a seaport and the available resources to mitigate those risks.

Contingency planning was explained in relation to risk assessment processes and methods. Contingency planning requires the incorporation of full awareness of the strengths and vulnerabilities of all port facility infrastructures in relation to actual threats and threat scenarios. The net result of contingency planning is to develop emergency response operations that can be effectively executed.

(Topic 8 - Wednesday) **Container Security to Prevent and Counter Drug Smuggling and Terrorism**

This session was conducted by Supervisory Customs Inspector Russell Morgan, U.S. Customs Service (USCS), and was highlighted by a combined video and PowerPoint multimedia presentation of instructional material.

Terrorism. The USCS training material on terrorism threats represented extremely current information, and was presented with particular applicability to cruise ship terminal operations. For the benefit of future cooperative bilateral relations, the work of USCS inspectors was explained, along with authorities, mission, and priorities for enforcement. Techniques in officer survival during terrorist attacks were conveyed to participants.

Case examples were presented focusing on profiling patterns and decision making of persons and cargo shipments currently, and compared to those utilized prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Information was presented on the recently established USCS Office of Border Security and its mission against terrorism.

Details were provided on analyzing the terrorist threat, including information on the terrorist mindset, methods of operation, and motivations.

Characteristics of transnational non-state terrorist organizations and state sponsorship of terrorist organizations were discussed. Incorporated into this segment was the U.S. Department of State official list of countries determined to be state-sponsors of terrorism, countries having terrorism "transshipment" status, and the listed terrorist organizations. The role of money laundering, currency smuggling, and front companies to support the financing of terrorism were discussed. Participants expressed thoughts based on their national experiences about the cultural factors contributing to terrorism. A segment on understanding terrorist weapons (mass destruction and conventional explosives, improvised explosive devices and the characteristics of explosive materials were discussed, along with bomb components such as timers, switches, and detonators. The detection similarities of explosives to drugs and natural substances were explained. Methods and procedures for detection and self-protection were also presented. Three types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were addressed, as were radiation dispersal device (RDD), biological weapons, and chemical weapons.

Radiation dispersal device (RDD). The RDD affords use of a wide range of radioactive materials. Personal radiation detectors the size of pagers -- such as those worn by USCS inspectors -- have been most helpful in marine terminal operations around the world.

Biological weapons. A dispersal event is seldom recognizable without specific detection systems. Aerosol and fans are the most effective means of dispersing biological agents. Weaponized biological agents are very difficult to construct. In a seaport, look for cargoes containing shipments of agents, production equipment, and associated materials. Legal shipments of such items will be well marked, but smuggled items will be concealed.

Chemical weapons. Everyday cleaning products and pesticides are commonplace examples of materials that can be used to fabricate a chemical weapon, which can affect the skin (blistering), the lungs (choking), blood (hemorrhaging), or failure of the nervous system. Because they cause immediate casualties on impact, awareness of their dispersal is correspondingly rapid, and aerosol dispersal is effective. Commercial chemicals are packaged in sturdy non-permeable containers. Dispersal equipment as indicators of weapons. In seaports, look for documentation irregularities in cargo shipment routing and manifesting. Inspections should be conducted with reliable techniques and through examination procedures.

Drug Smuggling. This segment of the program began with vessel manifest review, interpretation and analysis. This included the components of the manifest documentation, normal status, deviations, and factors in prioritization of suspect shipments. This was followed by contraband drug concealment techniques in shipping containers. This included indications of container alterations such as density or structural anomalies, and new welding. Alterations may involve container wall beams, doors, refrigeration unit, floor, or chassis. Profiling characteristics were examined, including a suspect freight forwarder;

first-time importer; suspect cargoes such as those usable as precursor chemical; non-registered container; privately owned container; and discrepancies between stenciled container number and that appearing in the documentation. Case examples of detection and inspection methods were presented, including investigation data and photographs. About 50 different commodities involved in containerized drug seizures were featured, detailing the smuggling concealment techniques used in each case. Diversion techniques were addressed, including alteration of container and its identification; fraudulent documentation; container seal forgery; extraneous movement of container to remote or unsecured site in port or from port; and hijacked shipment in transit.

Concealment techniques aboard vessels were also presented. Hidden compartments were prevalent and require an inspection approach with three-dimensional thinking and persistence. Fuel tanks and sealed spaces as concealment areas may be revealed by the presence of recently applied welds, cement, or paint as indicators. Case examples were used to demonstrate detection methods, including photos, diagrams, and investigation data. Vessels involved in this form of smuggling tend to be privately owned and engaged in selective trade trades, rather than common carriers.

Internal Conspiracies in Maritime Cargo. The greatest threat to narcotics interdiction efforts is the internal conspiracy. All of the diversion techniques mentioned above, for example, may involve the collaborative assistance of coerced or confederate employees. Anyone employed in the supply chain or the shipping cycle can act as internal conspirators. They have in-depth knowledge of the industry, cargo handling practices, and the procedures and enforcement techniques used by the customs agencies. One or many individuals may conspire to smuggle drugs concealed in legitimate commercial shipments. Drug smugglers prefer shipping routes and destination ports that handle large-volume container flows, and use varied concealment techniques.

Deterrence of internal conspiracies. Recommended measures include: conduct effective unloading consistent with procedures and by authorized personnel; maintain controls of shipment documentation and ensure propriety of same; conduct cargo inspections in teams equipped with proper tools; and use of longshoremen should be confined to the customs inspection site.

(Topic 9 - Wednesday) **Industry Partnership Programs**

The industry partnership programs of the U.S. Customs Service used to develop cooperative relationships with the commercial trade were the focus of this segment of instruction. Emphasis was placed on the elements of programs and the best practices that have made them effective allies with U.S. Government initiatives to counter drug smuggling and terrorism. The goal of industry partnership programs is to be effective at creating awareness about smuggling crimes through communication. The desired end result is the prevention of smuggling through reduced opportunities and access for exploitation of commercial shipping by smugglers and terrorists.

Mr. Raymond Barberesi, Director of Ports and Domestic Shipping, United States Maritime Administration (Coordinating Institution) arrived from Washington, DC during the Wednesday program to observe, evaluate, and participate in the training proceedings. Mr. Barberesi participated in the course program through the conclusion of the Friday closing ceremonies.

(Topic 10 - Thursday) Port Vulnerability Assessment Planning and Onsite Field Work

Instructors Christopher and Rivera conducted a classroom session in port vulnerability assessment planning to prepare the participants for the onsite field work that followed. The instruction of analytic tools conveyed to participants was derived from the model port guidelines set forth in the United States Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.

During the field trip, all three members of the Training Team applied themselves to instructing and answering questions of the participants. The tour of the Port of Bridgetown was managed and directed by Mr. Ricardo Hinds, Barbados Port Authority, and local Coordinator for the course. During the assessment tour, employees manning various key functions of the port gave informative presentations explaining their operations to the participants as the group walked and made their security observations. The facilities toured included the cruise ship passenger terminal and wharves; cargo wharves and storage sheds; container yards and ship loading operations; gate operations and trucker procedures at port entrance, container yards, and break bulk cargoes; and the shallow draft inter-island vessel wharf (east harbor) and cargo shed.

Presentation of Observations. This session was conducted in the classroom after the fieldwork and lunch. Participants raised discussions on a comprehensive range of topics inspired by their tour of the Port of Bridgetown, including: uniformed guards and plainclothes patrol; shared communications with law enforcement frequencies; dedicated law enforcement agencies at seaports; and restriction of shed parking and employee access. A range of intermediate remedial measures were discussed and debated, providing the Barbados Port Authority with a wealth of technical insight from the objective observations of participants and the experiences and priorities of their countries.

Participants also expressed generalized observations of issues affecting many seaports, including: recognition that the process for implementing seaport security improvements is cumbersome; engagement between line personnel and management is often not facilitative and probably too remote; port-wide initiatives are more challenging than smaller scale improvements; systems for improvement must be consistent with accepted business practices and enable/facilitate trade; legislated foundations for port security improvements are necessary for effective and sustainable results; and police and guards should receive some amount of common training, so that guards at least know the law.

(Topic 11 - Friday) Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Port Security

Thomas Morelli, the U.S. Coordinator of the Training Team, conducted this session. The United States chairs the TAG and Mr. Morelli serves as its Secretariat. His presentation

emphasized the Functions of the TAG in order to convey into instructional context the operational relevance of the TAG to the audience of working level port security professionals. This lesson plan is intended to stimulate the participants to comment on operational experiences related to the functions of the TAG, and to expand their perspective in development of Recommendations which they are required to document and present later on Friday.

Following a brief description of the TAG's organizational structure within the OAS Inter-American Committee on Ports (IACP) and background the TAG's establishment in 1999, the Functions were presented. They are to: Compile and exchange information on port security, including applications of advanced technology to reduce security risks; Design and maintain a database with information relevant to its work; Recommend training programs based on the member countries' needs; Recommend port security guidelines; Prepare specialized reports, studies and technical documents; Organize national and international meetings and activities on specialized topics in this area; Report to the Chair of the Executive Board (IACP), in writing, every six months, on the progress and results of its work; and Prepare proposals and recommendations on policies and strategies and present them to the Inter-American Committee on Ports through the Executive Board.

(Topic 12 - Friday) **Recommendations of Participants**

Ricardo Hinds, the Barbados Coordinator for this training course, conducted this session. The session constitutes a net product of the week of training and provides the opportunity for participants to formulate strategic concepts beyond the technical scope of the training and present them formally to the multinational group. One representative from each country delegation expresses these strategic concepts as recommendations for hemispheric port security improvements. Mr. Hinds introduced the session and spoke of its opportunity to contribute to the international process of improving security in the ports of the Caribbean member countries of the OAS, and throughout the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Hinds presided over the formal introduction of each country and its representative presenting the recommendations of that country.

Recognizing that training is a foundation for a more secure port and in order to enhance security within the region, the participants of the Inter-American Port Security Training Program made the following Recommendations.

REGIONAL SECURITY PLAN

- An effective regional security plan should be developed to cater to the following areas: legal responsibilities; traffic control; information gathering; report writing; patrol procedures; duties and responsibilities; hazardous material awareness; and should be made to be easily adaptable throughout the region.

TRAINING

- Training should be ongoing and continuous in such areas as drug detection, intelligence gathering, and K9 patrol. Given the constant changes in technological developments, training in the following high-technology areas should be a priority: closed circuit television systems; monitoring/scanning devices; and data coding. Training efforts should include non-security personnel who have responsibilities to interact on a direct and indirect basis with frontline security personnel.
- The University of the West Indies, Caribbean Shipping Association, and the Caribbean Regional Security System (a military arrangement) are a few of the entities noted as possible leading agencies in the drive to enhance training in the security discipline.
- Provisions should be made for an exchange program of work assignments at ports throughout the region, determine some level of commonality, and widen the knowledge and experience base of port security personnel.
- Piracy should be included as a subject area for future training.

PORT SECURITY STANDARDS

- Standards for port security personnel should be raised to those currently used by developed countries, particularly in the areas of gate control; dress code; knowledge of legislation governing ports and allied areas; code of behavior; controlled parking for both staff and port users alike; and use of shuttle services or pedestrian walkways where applicable.
- Proper fencing with appropriate perimeter lighting and patrols should form part of standard security features in all ports irrespective of the size of the port or its cargo throughput.
- There should be some level of consistency on action taken against all perpetrators of crime within the port area.
- There should be clear lines of demarcation between the various law enforcement agencies.
- There should be greater regional cooperation as it relates to intelligence gathering, dissemination of information on the smuggling of drugs, guns, and contraband items whether in-transit or destined for Caribbean ports.
- A common database should be established with regards to the movements of people within the region, in order to facilitate information exchange methods and to enhance information gathering in "real time".

- A task force should be established to look at all security arrangements within each port with a view to implementing zero tolerance for crimes within the port areas. This committee should meet on a regular basis to review security operations and to develop a working document for a comprehensive port security plan.
- A regional security committee should be established to look at the security needs in the region related to training. This would include retraining in container handling, airport and seaport security for drug smuggling detection and all other areas that enhances the security of the region.
- Policy makers within the Caribbean region should -- with a view to the early implementation -- review institutional and regulatory reforms modeled on international standards.
- Regional ports must set as its mission the improvement of its security by closely following the terms of the industry partnership programs and carrier initiatives, namely: Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Movement of Dangerous Goods (IMDG).

PORT PASSES

- All port passes should be electronically generated with scanning devices which only allows authorized personnel access to very sensitive areas.
- All passes should be tamper proof and worn at all times.
- Provision should be made for temporary passes for those conducting business on a short-term basis in the port.
- Develop a system of cooperation between all law enforcement agencies working within the port, such as customs, police, coast guard, port security, and private contract security.
- Ports of the region should look for technical assistance to offset the cost of implementing an all-embracing security manual, which should also encompass matters dealing with ecology and environmental impairment.
- The policy makers should have the political will to take timely decisions to protect the ports resources from drug trafficking barons, drug smugglers, and other criminal enterprises in illicit activities that exploit the port.
- Perimeter entrances and exits should be limited to a minimum for safe and efficient operations, and should be manned at all times.

- Develop a survey to provide a full risk analysis of critical areas within the port.

Closing Ceremony and Graduation

The closing ceremony was conducted the afternoon of the final day of the course, and was held in the hotel where the course classroom was located. The program for the closing ceremony was organized and carried out by the Barbados Port Authority. The program was moderated by Ricardo Hinds, Barbados Port Authority, and featured as speakers: Mr. Louis Sealy, Chief Security Officer, Barbados Port Authority; and Mr. Raymond Barberesi, U. S. Maritime Administration, and the senior United States official responsible for the execution of the Inter-American Port Security Training Program. They spoke of the importance of the training for professional development resulting in improved port security within the maritime trade corridors of the Western Hemisphere. The graduation ceremony then commenced and the participants received their certificates of participation, and tokens of appreciation extended to the training team. This was conducted amidst a warm, congenial atmosphere reflecting the camaraderie and esprit de corps developed among the participants and the training team.

Appendix A - TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional Course on Port Security for the Caribbean Countries

Bridgetown, Barbados

July 22-26, 2002

I. Objective

The objective of the course is to provide information and techniques to reduce security vulnerabilities of port facilities and infrastructure and in the movement of cargo, intermodal equipment, and passengers through the Region's ports.

II. Organizers

The Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee on Ports (CIP) of the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. Maritime Administration (US MARAD), and the Barbados Port Authority (BPA) organize this event.

III. Place and Date

Bridgetown, Barbados; 5 working days

IV. Preliminary Program

1. Security challenges facing seaport operations
2. Seaport security force operations and management
3. Physical security and access control at seaports
4. Methods of security for preventing and countering cargo theft
5. Training requirements for seaport security personnel
6. Enforcement of laws and security regulations in a seaport
7. Seaport security risk assessment and contingency planning
8. Container security to prevent and counter drug smuggling and terrorism
9. *Industry Partnership Programs* against drug smuggling and terrorism
10. Port vulnerability assessment planning and onsite field work
11. TAG on Port Security: Cooperation for Port Security Development
12. Recommendations and course evaluation

V. Preliminary Calendar

Monday –Day 1

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 0900-0930 | Opening ceremony and presentation of participants |
| 0930-0945 | Introductory session |
| 0945-1200 | Security challenges facing seaport operations (Topic 1) |
| 1200-1400 | Lunch |
| 1400-1530 | Seaport security force operations and management (Topic 2) |
| 1530-1730 | Physical security and access control at seaports (Topic 3) |

Tuesday – Day 2

0900-1130 Methods of security for preventing and countering cargo theft (Topic 4)
1130-1200 Training requirements for seaport security personnel (Topic 5)
1200-1400 Lunch
1400-1430 Enforcement of laws and security regulations in a seaport (Topic 6)
1430-1530 Seaport security risk assessment (Topic 7)
1530-1630 Seaport security contingency planning (Continue Topic 7)

Wednesday – Day 3

0830-1200 Container security to prevent and counter drug smuggling and terrorism (Topic 8)
1200-1400 Lunch
1400-1530 Container security to prevent and counter drug smuggling and terrorism (Continue Topic 8)
1530-1700 *Industry Partnership Programs* against drug smuggling and terrorism (Topic 9)

Thursday – Day 4

0830-1200 Port vulnerability assessment planning and onsite field work (Topic 10)
1200-1400 Lunch
1400-1630 Student presentations of vulnerability assessment exercise results (Continue Topic 10)

Friday – Day 5

0900-1030 TAG on Port Security: Cooperation for Port Security Development (Topic 11)
1030-1100 Evaluation (Topic 12)
1100-1230 Recommendations of participants (Continue Topic 12)
1230-1330 Closing ceremony
1330 Lunch

VI. Instructors

Three instructors will be in charge of presenting the course: two (2) from the Miami-Dade Police Department, Port of Los Angeles Police Department, or Port of New York/New Jersey Police Department; and one (1) from the U.S. Customs Service.

VII. Language English

VIII. Participants and Fellowships

The OAS through the US MARAD will provide fellowships covering expenses for

round-trip airfare tickets and room/board for 24 participants, two from each of the following 12 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, the Barbados Port Authority will provide 26 national participants. A total of 50 participants will attend the course.

IX. Candidate Requirements for Fellowship

Each candidate should meet the following requirements and present the following documents:

1. Employed in the capacity of port security personnel.
2. A government employee of a port authority security department, or responsible for conducting port security operations as either coast guard, customs, or police personnel, or contracted by the government agency responsible for port security to provide that service to a port authority.
3. At least two years experience in port security operations, including supervision or training of others in port security, or be qualified to do either.
4. Be between 25 and 55 years of age.
5. A working familiarity with commercial port freight operations and related interaction with customs and coast guard activities in their respective countries.
6. Be presented by the General Manager/Director of the Port Authority.
7. Mastery of English
8. Good Health.
9. Not previously attended this course

Participants from Barbados must also meet those requirements.

X. Presentation of Candidates

Port authorities or government agencies interested in presenting candidates to obtain a fellowship to participate at this course, that meet the established requirements, may send the documentation accordingly.

1. A letter of presentation of the candidate, signed by the General Manager/Director of the Port Authority which confirms the years of service of the candidate, current position, and also shows that the candidate is currently working in the area of port security and will continue working in port security for a minimum of two years.
2. A brief resume that details personal facts, education and work experience.

All documentation should be submitted to:

Executive Secretary
Inter-American Committee on Ports, OAS

1889 F Street, N.W., Suite 320-C, Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A.

The deadline for receiving application is:

XI. Attendance

It is mandatory and full-time.

XII. Diplomas

Diplomas, provided by OAS, will be given to participants with 100% attendance.

XIII. Coordinators

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Executive Secretary
Inter-American Committee on Ports
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Appendix B - DOCUMENTS

Port Security: Security Force Management, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1998.
(English)

Port Security: A National Planning Guide, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1997.
(English)

Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices ; U.S. Department of Transportation; 1999. (English)