



U.S. Department  
of Transportation

**Maritime  
Administration**

# ***MARITIME SECURITY REPORT***

***\* January 1997 \****



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## INTRODUCTION

The *Maritime Security Report* is an unclassified quarterly publication prepared to inform the commercial maritime industry, senior Maritime Administration officials, the Secretary of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security, and the *Federal Ad Hoc Working Group On Maritime Security Awareness*. The report focuses on international criminal activity and security issues which could pose a threat to U.S. commercial maritime interests and the movement of U.S. civilian cargoes in foreign trade.

The global nature of U.S. trade means that U.S.-flag ocean carriers call ports in nearly every country, and cargoes owned by U.S. interests may be embarked on ocean vessels of any flag or in any port worldwide. U.S. commercial maritime interests, therefore, can be jeopardized worldwide by a broad range of criminal activities, adversely affecting their competitiveness.

The *Maritime Security Report* is intended to increase awareness of the scope and severity of economic crime affecting U.S. maritime commerce. The Maritime Administration expects increased awareness to contribute toward deterring criminal exploitation of the maritime transportation system, its users and providers.

The *Maritime Security Report* is produced under the authorization of Margaret D. Blum, Associate Administrator for Port, Intermodal, and Environmental Activities. The information contained in the report is based on our research and analysis of recent, significant developments, and is compiled from commercial sources and U.S. Government reports.

Please direct any questions and comments on the information in this report to Thomas Morelli, Coordinator, Maritime Intelligence & Security, or John Pisani, Director, Office of Ports and Domestic Shipping, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590, or telephone (202) 366-5473/fax (202) 366-6988.

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Note: The preceding issue of the *Maritime Security Report* is dated September 1996. Issues previous to that are dated: April 1996, January 1996, and August 1995 (the initial issue of the report). Copies of back issues are available.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **CARIBBEAN - Increased Drug Smuggling Via Lesser Antilles Threatens Growing Maritime Container Trade**

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials assert that the use of legitimate commercial maritime freight containers by smugglers to conceal large shipments of cocaine is a fact supportable by many investigations and drug seizures. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), smuggling via commercial vessel is the primary maritime method for shipping drugs through the Caribbean transit zone. Because of the relatively low risk to the trafficking organizations, this cocaine smuggling method and pattern is likely to continue.

Cocaine shipments are being concealed in commercial maritime containerized cargoes transported through the eastern Caribbean at low risk to smuggling syndicates. Maritime shipping and transport firms are being used, without their knowledge or culpable negligence, by smugglers attempting to evade scrutiny and lower their risk of detection. The smuggling method and associated route pattern undermine the integrity of commercial maritime cargoes and the container trades with the U.S. and Europe, on which the eastern Caribbean=s Lesser Antilles economies are so dependent. However, an increased emphasis on applying predictive intelligence to selecting commercial containers for inspections in the eastern Caribbean maritime transit route, can improve cocaine seizure rates.

### **GLOBAL - Business and Government Cooperation Increasing To Stem Maritime Cargo Crimes In International Trade**

Vulnerabilities in the international commercial shipping cycle of freight containers are being exploited by transnational organized crime groups to commit a variety of cargo related crimes. Companies involved in intermodal transportation and at all levels of the shipping cycle are often made unwitting accomplices in cargo related crimes, such as shipments of illegal narcotics and stolen goods, customs and shipping frauds, and money laundering. Victimized firms are sustaining significant financial losses, erosion of operating integrity, and diminished corporate reputation. Increased cooperative efforts between governments and the maritime industry are underway to reduce the international freight transportation system=s vulnerabilities to exploitation by organized criminal enterprises.

**POLICY - U.S. DOT Publishes *Port Security: A National Planning Guide To Assist Commercial Industry***

*Port Security: A National Planning Guide* was produced and published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in January 1997. The planning guide conveys the United States Government's policy perspective on port security to the commercial maritime industry. The guide provides an overview of the essential aspects of port security and identifies many of the challenges facing a port. It is intended to provide governments and the commercial maritime industry with a common basis upon which to establish port security standards and the outcomes expected from meeting those standards.

*Port Security: A National Planning Guide* is the first document in a series that will include technical manuals on maritime security. These technical manuals will be produced through cooperative efforts of the U.S. Government and the commercial maritime industry. The planning guide and subsequent technical manuals are intended to be used by port directors, the directors of port security, and the officers of port security departments in fulfilling their responsibilities toward the development of an effective port security program.

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**CARIBBEAN - Increased Drug Smuggling Via Lesser Antilles  
Threatens Growing Maritime Container Trade**

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials assert that the use of legitimate commercial maritime freight containers by smugglers to conceal large shipments of cocaine is a fact supportable by many investigations and drug seizures. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), smuggling via commercial vessel is the primary maritime method for shipping drugs through the Caribbean transit zone. The United Kingdom's International Narcotics Control Board reported in early 1996, that it had detected a shift in cocaine transshipment routes from the northern Caribbean Sea to its eastern rim.

Cocaine shipments are being concealed in commercial maritime containerized cargoes transported through the eastern Caribbean at low risk to smuggling syndicates. Maritime shipping and transport firms are being used, without their knowledge or culpable negligence, by smugglers attempting to evade scrutiny and lower their risk of detection. The smuggling method and associated route pattern undermine the integrity of commercial maritime cargoes and the container trades with the U.S. and Europe, on which the eastern Caribbean's Lesser Antilles economies are so dependent.

The seven countries of the Lesser Antilles, all members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. CARICOM participation includes other island governments of the Caribbean and several Latin American countries bordering the Sea. The Lesser Antilles also include the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique.

**Caribbean Cocaine Smuggling.** Law enforcement officials estimate that about 30% of the cocaine smuggled into the U.S. transits the Caribbean. Approximately the remaining 70% of the cocaine smuggled into the U.S. is believed to transit Mexico. The total amount of cocaine that entered the U.S. in 1994 is estimated at 300 tons.

DEA has reported that during the three-year period 1993-95, an estimated seven tons of cocaine -- per month -- were successfully smuggled through the Lesser Antilles into Puerto Rico alone. Although it is difficult to calculate the percentage of cocaine tonnage being smuggled in commercial maritime containers through the eastern Caribbean transit route, it is believed to be significant. An example of the potential threat to the mainland

U.S. is illustrated by the fact that more than 50% of inbound maritime cargo arriving at the Port of Miami originates in countries which are sources of narcotics or which serve as transit points.

The transit route through the Lesser Antilles is also increasingly used as a corridor for smuggling cocaine to Europe and Russia. By one estimate, this route accounts for approximately 180 tons annually. According to the 1996 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, an estimated 30% of the drugs brought into the United Kingdom are believed to originate from or transit through the Caribbean region.

**Cocaine Seizures & Smuggling In Commercial Containers.** In fiscal year (FY) 1995, maritime seizures of cocaine increased as a proportion of total seizures, accounting for about 61%, compared to about 43% in FY 1992. During the period 1993-95, known maritime drug smuggling events (those which authorities have certain evidence of having been attempted) increased by 40%. However, total tonnage of cocaine seizures in the transit zone declined in 1995, to about 37 tons, -- in contrast to a peak of about 70 tons seized in 1992. The decline in total cocaine tonnage seized since 1992, can in part be accounted for by more tonnage being successfully smuggled in containerized commercial maritime transport.

The first dramatic increase in seizures of containerized cocaine shipments occurred in fiscal year (FY) 1987, when the total surged to over eight tons -- from less than 1.5 tons in FY 1985 and FY 1986. Since that time, single seizures exceeding one ton are not uncommon.

**Container Transshipment Trades at Risk.** The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) characterizes the economies of Caribbean countries as consisting of highly fragmented markets, largely dependent on exports to other regions. These Caribbean countries are striving to join regional and global trading blocs. Phillip Goddard, Minister of International Trade and Business for Barbados has said that there is a direct correlation between the efforts to contain drug trafficking and the maintenance of strong economies in the region.≡

According to the IDB, intra-regional export/import commerce has grown dramatically since 1989. A growing volume of container transshipment traffic is moving this trade through the Caribbean. Transshipment business is attracting ocean carriers with



dedicated Caribbean schedules and those relaying cargo to and from other routes. It provides the ports of the Lesser Antilles with the opportunity to handle cargo moving between Europe, the U.S., and South America. Transshipment has become a significant commercial segment and an important factor in the eastern Caribbean's regional economic development potential. The Port of Castries, Saint Lucia, for example, transshipped 46% of the approximately 27,000 containers (twenty-foot equivalent units) it handled in 1995.

The transshipment trade consists of an intra-regional, hub-and-spoke network of low-volume feeder ports, attempting to handle larger volumes. These feeder ports are serviced by coastal freighters which move their traffic to nearby load center ports for relay onto transoceanic routes. Limitations in landside and harborside throughput capacities, including the larger eastern Caribbean ports, necessitate such a feeder traffic arrangement.

**Port Congestion Also Elevates Risk.** High throughput volume in many ports where infrastructure and management may be inadequate to the demand is creating container handling congestion. This pressure often results in ports relaxing cargo processing procedures in an effort to expedite backlogged containers. Under these conditions, scrutiny of containers decreases and already vulnerable containers are often exposed to increased risk of exploitation.

It is probable that a significant percentage of cocaine shipments are being concealed in commercial maritime containers after initially being smuggled into eastern Caribbean islands aboard non-commercial vessels. Such vessels include yachts, fishing trawlers, and private industrial craft. Backlogged containers held idle in unsecured storage areas for inordinate periods of time provide smugglers with additional opportunities for surreptitious access.

**Threat of Corruption.** Lesser Antilles governments include parliamentary democracies and constitutional monarchies. The stability of these governments is threatened by narcotics trafficking and related organized criminal activities, such as official corruption and money laundering. Relatively small percentages of drug profits may be expended to induce collusion of public officials in control of government ministries and central banks.

Sandro Calvani, Director of the Caribbean Regional Office of the United Nations International Drug Control Program, has emphasized the danger to the democratic process posed by the transformation

of illicit profits into illegitimate political power. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Jonathan Winer, has pointed out that drug trafficking syndicates have been effective at infiltrating governments and pose a threat to Caribbean nations. The Administrator of DEA warned in March 1996, that Mexican drug trafficking organizations, for example, had sufficient wealth and power to rival legitimate governments for influence and control.

**U.S. Cocaine Interdiction Strategy.** Maritime interdiction is carried out at sea or in port. It consists of surveillance and apprehension. This includes detecting and intercepting suspected smugglers, searching cargoes, seizing contraband, arresting suspects and confiscating their equipment. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) agree that the large volume of ship traffic in the Caribbean Sea severely complicates efforts to interdict smuggling via commercial maritime trades. Although vessel boardings continue to be an essential tool in the maritime drug interdiction strategy, USCG recognizes that boardings clearly impart a cost or imposition on the commercial maritime industry. In conducting them, USCG strives to minimize any imposition on legitimate shipping.

Key U.S. agencies involved in implementing the strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean include the following. The Commandant of the USCG is designated as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, overseeing both the surveillance and apprehension aspects of the interdiction strategy. Maritime apprehension in the transit zones is led by USCG but carried out jointly with the U.S. Customs Service (USCS). The surveillance mission in the interdiction strategy is led by the Department of Defense (DOD).

U.S. international counternarcotics strategy for interdiction of cocaine traffic changed in 1993. The focus shifted from law enforcement and drug seizures in the Caribbean and Mexico transit zones, to stopping drugs in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru before shipments reach the transit zones. The principal responsibility for the source-country focus is led jointly by Department of State, DEA, USCG, and USCS. Those source countries account for most of the estimated 780 tons of cocaine produced annually in South America.

On the policy front, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) coordinates the international and domestic programs and policies of all U.S. Government agencies engaged in drug control activities. ONDCP is also responsible for developing an annual national drug control strategy and budget.

**Intelligence For Targeting Shipments.** Intelligence is key to interdiction success. In particular, it is essential to the aspect of maritime surveillance which attempts to accurately identify a particular container being used to smuggle illegal drugs. Intelligence for tipping-off and directing interdiction operations is regarded by DOD as the only effective means to segregate most maritime drug smuggling targets from normal maritime commerce. DOD officials have explained that without predictive intelligence, the detection and monitoring of ships is impossible, given the thousands of vessels of various types found daily in the Caribbean sea lanes.

Investigations involving the use of freight containers for smuggling cocaine depend heavily on explicit intelligence provided by informants. Labor intensive searches of containers based on random selection is less productive than inspections prompted by explicit intelligence. Predictive, operational

intelligence of a quality that provides explicit information usable at the tactical level can increase the probability of container inspections resulting in drug seizures and arrests.

Transporting narcotics shipments among commercial maritime cargoes tends to obfuscate and deceive the criteria used to Asort≅ or initially identify suspected smuggling attempts from legitimate maritime traffic. Profiles or inferential reporting, as primary discriminating tools, decrease in value when applied to commercial maritime traffic; although they have proven effective against non-commercial vessels. These circumstances necessitate the increased use of explicit, predictive intelligence for selecting containers for inspection in the eastern Caribbean maritime transit route. Higher rates of cocaine seizure and criminal apprehension would be expected.

It is probable that cocaine smugglers will continue to convert larger percentages of their illicit cargoes to commercial maritime freight containers. Various intelligence sources that can provide information pertaining to specific shipments enroute, particularly human agents, should be developed to increase interdiction results. Findings from inquiries by the U.S. General Accounting Office support the conclusion that increased expenditures to improve the production and coordination of actionable intelligence in the transit zones would be cost effective.

**Container Inspections.** Selecting containers for inspection in port can be daunting. Containers in port may be stacked among hundreds of identical units awaiting shipment. With more than

seven million containers moving around the world in maritime and intermodal trades at any given time, with an average of 2.5 consignments per container, smugglers face a statistically low risk of detection.

High-energy x-ray scanning technologies have demonstrated in tests to be effective for drug detection when used for passive screening of fully loaded containers. The level of scanning energy required in this application may be 70 times greater than that of a typical airport-passenger x-ray scanner, and cost as much as \$15 million per unit. Throughput rates of up to 25 loaded containers per hour have been achieved in tests. Labor intensive manual searches of containers could require four people up to eight hours to unload, search, and reload a single 40-foot container.

**Documentation Inspections.** During the transportation phase, the documentation is the principal source of information about the contents of a specific consignment of containerized cargo. Information pertaining to the movement of the ship or container carrying the shipment is less important. The U.S. Customs

Service uses dynamic profiles of known smuggling patterns and methods and analyzes all documentation to identify suspicious cargo before it arrives in port.

Documentation such as the letter of credit, bill of lading, and cargo manifest detail information about a transaction. Important indicators include: the terms of sale, ownership or responsibility for a containerized consignment of goods, its quantity, delivery date, country of origin and destination, special routing instructions, and the timing of each process.

Intelligence derived from cargo documentation is, therefore, essential to recognizing patterns in the shipping cycle that may be spurious, and can provide indications of smuggling which facilitate selection of suspect containers for inspection. It can be used to determine and verify information that includes the exporter and importer, forwarding agent, customs house broker, consignee's agent, transport operators, and their reputations. Combined with explicit intelligence, information derived from cargo documentation applied in transit zone ports to target containers for inspection, can significantly improve interdiction results.

COMMENT: Drug traffickers respond quickly to interdiction operations by adjusting their delivery routes and methods of transport. The eastward shift in the maritime pattern through

the Caribbean Sea transit zone is a recent example. It would follow, that in the Mexico transit zone, increases in overland interdiction results will motivate drug traffickers to reconsider their shipping methods and reconfigure routes.

In that event, additional percentages of cocaine shipments would likely be diverted from the overland route -- and from the South American source points of shipment -- to the lower-risk maritime transport through the Gulf of Mexico and eastern Caribbean transit routes. If concealment of cocaine in containerized commercial maritime shipments continues to be the least risky method, then even more tonnage should be expected via that mode of transport.

The opportunities to exploit commercial maritime container trades in the Caribbean by cocaine smugglers must be constricted until their use of commercial maritime transport is no longer a viable option. Increased seizure rates for cocaine smuggled in containers would deter illicit use of commercial maritime transport and displace subsequent cocaine smuggling attempts into non-commercial vessels. Consequently, more maritime smuggling events would be exposed to the interdiction tactics which have proven effective against non-commercial maritime transportation.

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**GLOBAL - Business and Government Cooperation Increasing To Stem Maritime Cargo Crimes In International Trade**

Vulnerabilities in shipping international freight containers are being exploited by transnational organized crime groups to commit a variety of cargo related crimes. Companies involved in intermodal transportation and at all levels of the shipping cycle are often made unwitting accomplices in cargo related crimes, such as shipments of illegal narcotics and stolen goods, customs and shipping frauds, and money laundering. Victimized firms are sustaining significant financial losses, erosion of operating integrity, and diminished corporate reputation.

Speaking on the importance of improved commercial port and vessel security, A. J. Herberger, Administrator, Maritime Administration, addressed the annual meeting of the Transportation Research Board in January 1997. Herberger's presentation included remarks on the importance of international cooperation to improve security and alleviate crime in maritime commerce. He said that,

Alf we are to establish more secure trade corridors in global maritime commerce, we need a fully-integrated international effort that orchestrates an alliance of national governments with the maritime industry. We strongly urge all countries to commit themselves to a policy of substantially improving the security of their ports and trade corridors. That commitment not only will benefit their own respective systems but also enhance the entire maritime transportation system worldwide. We must incorporate maritime transportation security right from the beginning as an integral part of all our bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. And we must begin to take all of these steps today if we are to have a more secure maritime transportation system for tomorrow.≡

**International Cooperation and Standards.** Even though ports, carriers, and shippers compete with each other, coordination on security is a matter of mutual self-interest benefiting the entire international maritime transportation system. Eric Ellen, Executive Director, Commercial Crime Bureau (a department of the International Chamber of Commerce), has stressed the importance of the highest degree of inter-port liaison among port security departments. Ellen favors establishment of regional port security liaison committees, independent of any outside national or commercial influence, which would set standards and rationalize resources. He has expressed to the Caribbean Shipping Association that such a committee within the Caribbean would be particularly appropriate.

For the European Community Transit System, Ellen has recommended that standards be enacted to enable verification of the financial integrity and business ethics of firms. All organizations involved in the issuance of customs and transport documentation, for example, would be required to meet standards of due diligence and include shippers, freight forwarders, transport operators, and guarantors. Those firms meeting the standards would qualify for information exchanged among the membership and with governmental authorities.

The global freight forwarding association, FIATA, is particularly concerned about organized crime=s affect on European Union trade and with emerging democracies or governments with weak institutional practices and limited resources. FIATA is particularly concerned about emerging organized crime groups in Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In a response to this threat, FIATA has established cooperative relationships with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to address its concerns

pertaining to cargo related crimes.

Conscientious efforts by international maritime trade associations have made progress in reducing their vulnerabilities to cargo crimes. For example, the Houston based Maritime Security Council (MSC), has advised its members to organize trading and shipping practices to aid in uncovering any attempts to use facilities for fraudulent purposes. Thomas Fitzhugh III, Executive Director, MSC, has said that Ashippers should cooperate with carriers and be responsible for the integrity of the loading process.≡ Member firms are urged to develop and implement well documented security programs specifically designed to address the risks confronted in their trade routes and avoid firms whose integrity is in question. MSC has also stressed the importance of intelligence exchange with law enforcement so that criminal methods of operation can be made known and used to reduce vulnerabilities.

**Intelligence Exchange.** The continued expansion of international organized crime necessitates that companies conducting business overseas make more of an effort to know with whom they are dealing. Intelligence pertaining to the reputation and creditworthiness of prospective clients, joint ventures and investments, employees, and suppliers is essential. With it, honest firms can make decisions that avoid engaging in transactions with individuals and companies which may be fronts for organized criminal enterprises. Organized crime groups increasingly use front companies to facilitate money laundering, trafficking in stolen goods, and the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, and illegal immigrants. The fraudulent interaction of these front companies with the legitimate commercial sector often causes unsuspecting firms to incur various forms of financial loss, legal jeopardy, and risk for their personnel.

Preventing sophisticated cargo crimes requires time and expertise to investigate the involved parties. For example, freight forwarders, attempting alone to authenticate the legitimacy of a consignor can incur the adverse affect of protracted processing time and result in inconclusive findings. The cooperative exchange of intelligence among the maritime shipping industry and governments, relevant to their mutual security interests is a cost effective measure for countering organized criminal activities.

The marine operations division of Revenue Canada has initiated a contraband enforcement program in the Port of Vancouver. It consists of intensified analysis of inbound containerized cargo

documentation, coupled with risk analysis methodology. The program was developed and conducted as a cooperative relationship with the shipping community and is funded in part by direct-cost inspection fees. Revenue Canada is attempting to balance the shipper=s need for seamless intermodal transportation and the country=s international competitive position with efforts to control the influx of narcotic smuggling.

Intelligence collection is at the core of the Revenue Canada initiative and includes police, customs officials worldwide, and international organizations such as INTERPOL to identify high-risk shipments, shippers, and vessel operators. In addition, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police=s Coastal Watch Program regards an international partnership of the utmost importance to enhance intelligence sharing and enforcement efforts.

The U.S. Customs Service (USCS) has established a business-led alliance called the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC). It is intended to significantly deter the use of legitimate commercial shipments as narcotic smuggling conveyances by examining the entire process of manufacturing, packaging, and shipping merchandise to the U.S. from foreign countries. It also addresses the growing problem of internal conspiracies at cargo handling and intermodal freight interchange points.

BASC is complementary to the USCS Sea Carrier Initiative Program which emphasizes deterring narcotic smuggling onboard commercial ocean carriers. Like that program, BASC is voluntary and without Customs-imposed mandates, relying instead on the international commercial industry to set standards.

In the United Kingdom, the British Ports Association and Her Majesty=s Customs and Excise recently formalized cooperation to protect against offenses involving the use of port, transportation, and cargo handling facilities. The two organizations believe that the cooperation between port operators and customs can significantly assist in the gathering of information applicable to countering customs offenses, such as drug smuggling.

**Intelligence for Port Security.** Ports function as intermodal interchange hubs which link the trade corridors of maritime commerce with inland markets. Port security, therefore, is a logical focal point for practicing intelligence exchanges for countering cargo related crimes. The cooperative partnering of the maritime industry and government authorities is needed for intelligence-sharing to be effectively applied against the



various security threats to international maritime commerce.

The security departments of port authorities, shipping companies, and ocean carriers can derive enormous mutual benefit from assistance arrangements with each other and law enforcement. They are in a position to identify unusual situations which may be indications of drug smuggling or other crimes exploiting cargo and the shipping cycle. Commercial information provided to police and customs authorities, beyond that required by law or regulation, may provide useful intelligence for preventing or investigating criminal conspiracies involving freight transport.

Proprietary maritime trade information in the possession of port authorities and other firms should, of course, be shared within the context of confidential exchange agreements.

**Internal Conspiracies.** Organized criminal groups are increasingly successful at infiltrating companies to effect internal conspiracies that facilitate their criminal enterprises.

The maritime industry sector being targeted includes steamship companies, warehouse operators, stevedoring firms and longshore unions, exporters, importers, freight forwarders, port authorities, and intermodal transporters. Compromising employees into acts of commission through bribery, extortion, or other means is often used to induce their collusion.

In addition to commercial employees, police, customs authorities and other government officials in various positions engaged with maritime trade are also targets of attempted corruption. Official corruption may entail acts of omission, such as the failure to perform required duties.

**U.S. Foreign Trade.** Foreign trade is important to the U.S. economy and its competitiveness in international markets. Foreign trade accounts for about 25% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). During the 1990s, overall export growth has accounted for one-third of the increase in GDP. Total exports over the last five years have reached nearly 12% of GDP averaging 8.5% of sales for U.S. companies. The threat posed by transnational organized crime to the competitiveness of U.S. firms engaged in international maritime trade is reason for concern.

**U.S. Government Assistance Against Crime.** The U.S. Department of State (DOS), through its Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) interacts with industry on overseas security problems of mutual concern. Over 1,400 private-sector organizations participate in OSAC's activities and receive information and guidance to defend against security threats such as terrorism,

economic espionage, and organized crime. U.S. firms voluntarily submit accounts to OSAC pertaining to security or crime incidents affecting their own or other U.S. overseas operations.

COMMENT: The global commercial competitiveness of U.S. maritime transportation and shipping companies is a component of national economic security and strategic industrial position. The financial losses attributed to the operations of transnational organized crime groups pose an economic threat to U.S. companies overseas and the development potential of the markets in which they compete. Small and medium-sized businesses are particularly disadvantaged in international markets where the threat of organized criminal exploitation may necessitate robust corporate security capabilities.

U.S. Government assistance to U.S. companies engaged in foreign trade is needed to deter and counter the operations of transnational organized crime groups targeting commercial operations. Such assistance enables U.S. firms to concentrate on their mercantile objectives and provides a more level playing field in those regions where the effort is applied.

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**POLICY - U.S. DOT Publishes *Port Security: A National Planning Guide To Assist Commercial Industry***

*Port Security: A National Planning Guide* was produced and published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in January 1997. This joint effort of the Office of Intelligence and Security, Maritime Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard, conveys the United States Government's policy perspective on port security to the commercial maritime industry. The planning guide provides an overview of the essential aspects of port security and identifies many of the challenges facing a port. It is intended to provide governments and the commercial maritime industry with a common basis upon which to establish port security standards and the outcomes expected from meeting those standards.

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The technical manuals will be sufficiently detailed to serve as *How to* manuals for planning and conducting the daily operations of port security. These manuals will include outcome based goals and measures of effectiveness. This can enhance the ability of port security managers to execute their risk management responsibilities and to document the impact and effectiveness of the security measures implemented at the port. The technical manuals are planned for completion in mid-1998 and are expected to address such topics as:

**Fundamentals of Port Security**

- \* Developing and Implementing a Security Plan
- \* Security Survey and Risk Assessment
- \* Roles/Responsibilities/Legal Authorities of Port Agencies

**Port Security Operations**

- \* Physical Security and Access Control
- \* Security Workforce Management
- \* Intelligence

## Threats and Issues Facing Port Security

- \* Maritime Terrorism
- \* Drug Smuggling
- \* Stowaways and Alien Smuggling
- \* Piracy and Sea Robbery
- \* Cargo Security and Hazardous Materials
- \* Information Security
- \* Bomb Threat Management

*Port Security: A National Planning Guide* and its subsequent technical manuals are intended to be dynamic and, therefore, flexible enough to be revised so that they may remain current and useful. The technical manuals will provide guidance and processes which can be selected, combined, and adopted to meet the unique needs of a given port. In this way, consistent port security objectives can be maintained, enabling government and the commercial maritime industry to achieve them regardless of changes in circumstances and technology.

COMMENT: *Port Security: A National Planning Guide* was produced under the direction of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security (OIS). Production of the document was cochaired by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In developing this guide, input and contributions were sought and received from the commercial maritime industry and other federal agencies.

Inquiries to obtain copies of *Port Security: A National Planning Guide* should be directed to the Deputy Associate Director of Maritime Policy, Office of Intelligence and Security, Room 10401, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street-Washington, D.C. 20590, or by telephone at (202) 366-6538.

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