Description
Organization: SPAWAR
Team Name: Digital Modular Radio Team
Related Acquisition Topic(s): Commercial Practices, Commercial and Non Developmental Items (CANDI), Evolutionary Acquisition, Financial Management, Integrated Product Teams (IPT), Open Systems
Description:
DoD initiatives in the RF area have capitalized on emerging capabilities in the commercial sector. Leveraging the work of the commercial Software Definable Radio Forum, DoD formed a Joint Program Office (JPO) tasked with developing a software-programmable radio for the Services-a Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). The United States Navy has taken the maritime/fixed domain requirements of the JTRS Operational Requirements Document and, working in parallel with the JTRS JPO, started an acquisition effort to meet the maritime/fixed domain need. Together the two government teams have synchronized appropriate and legal government actions for the good of the Department of Defense on the whole.
The Digital Modular Radio (DMR) fields a revolutionary new product, capable of consolidating into one system all the Navy's aging, stovepipe legacy 2 megahertz (2Mhz) to 2 gigahertz (2 Ghz) radio frequency (RF) communications systems. DMR is an open architecture, software programmable, multiple mode, multiple spectrum, radio system, fully interoperable with legacy radio systems while simultaneously providing the advanced state of the art communications capability required to maintain information dominance into the 21st century. By leveraging both ongoing military programs and industry-developed independent investments, the DMR acquisition achieved 100% Commercial Off the Shelf/Non-developmental Item (COTS/NDI) technology benchmarks.
The goal of the DMR acquisition team was to acquire as much of the envisioned DMR capability as possible at the time of contract award. To successfully meet this goal, the team developed and implemented an innovative acquisition strategy, forming "The DMR Vision". Foundations of the vision included building a compelling business case by using a unique life cycle cost approach, closely aligning government desires with near-term industry capability through close coordination with appropriate vendors, pursuing the COTS/NDI procurement using innovative contracting methodologies, and working a coordinated, parallel development across similar government teams.
Once the DMR vision reached a sufficient level of detail, the DMR acquisition team developed a compelling business case. The DMR Life Cycle Cost (LCC) model combined both acquisition cost for the new system and cost avoidance associated with a phased replacement of older systems. Current legacy equipment inventories call for multiple single-function, special purpose radio systems that use a unique engineering solution to meet a given need. These systems all require their own spare parts, documentation, training, technical and miscellaneous support. This in turn drives large Operation and Support (O&S)costs for the war fighter. DMR replaces more than thirty autonomous, aging, single purpose radios with a single box. This "single box" solution allows for manpower and other support required to operate and maintain fleet RF systems to be dramatically reduced. The flexibility of a multi-band multi-waveform will allow an overall reduction in the cost of outfitting a radio room. The "old way" required a ship to carry enough radios of each type to meet the maximum requirement for each type of circuit. Outfitting a ship with DMR will allow the maximum mission requirements to drive total number of radios, rather than maximizing each radio by waveform and frequency. Overall required radio counts will decrease.
Historically, RF communication requirements undergo constant change as new requirements and capabilities emerge. New requirements necessitate costly upgrade to the legacy system or demand the Navy buy a new system and install it on each ship. Modifying legacy systems has an expensive ripple effect on the support infrastructure due to updated training, new supplies, documentation, and technical support that compounds the user's high LCC. The inherent nature of the open architecture, software programmable DMR system makes necessary changes and upgrades in the form of updated software. DMR effectively avoids legacy system's cost driving ripple effect. This cost avoidance in calculating LCC was included in building the acquisition team's compelling business case for DMR.
The final factor that the DMR team used to build large LCC cost savings was the incorporation of a ten-year warranty for the product. The warranty serves two purposes. It shifts O&S costs from fleet repair funds to the procurement activity by embedding warranty into the unit price (thereby decreasing "out-year" costs). The DMR acquisition team also used the resultant pricing as a tool in the "best value" analysis of vendors' bids. Requiring a ten-year warranty ensured the vendors were highly motivated to produce significantly more reliable systems with accurate warranty pricing or risk operating at a loss. After the warranty expires, the fleet will continue to see a cost savings because the fleet support infrastructure will inherit a much more reliable product. The team's effort resulted in Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) rates for DMR on a per channel basis that are five to ten times higher than its legacy counterparts.
Developing the vision and working the business case, the DMR acquisition team further ensured success through close coordination with industry. The requirement to produce the initial Analysis of Alternative (AOA) caused the DMR team to become intimately acquainted with the kinds of technology available in industry as COST/NDI. Through coordination with industry, the team built the DMR performance specification using three iterations of vendor review before the final contract specification was established. The team's efforts ensured that the specifications resulted in a DMR that multiple vendors could build thereby promoting competition while still meeting fleet requirements.
The DMR contract award itself was an acquisition innovation. The DMR acquisition team made award decision (with options) vice awarding to a single vendor. This strategy minimized the government risk engendered by the state of the art nature of the DMR product. The dual award created competition and led the vendors to invest significant Internal Research and Development (IR&D) funds thereby leveraging government investment. Consequently, an aggressive price competition ensued between the vendors. Costs to the government was dramatically reduced, much more than it would have had there been a single award. The DMR acquisition team's incorporation of continued product development competition and coordination with the vendors has directly led to the government receiving a DMR product that provided more capability at a substantially lower cost in a shorter timeframe than if a traditional single award had been issued.
The success of the DMR acquisition effort is being leveraged by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program office to assist them in their mission to define the architecture of DMR-type software programmable radio systems for all of the military. Test procedures, evaluation criteria, user needs and other applicable information is being shared. This has resulted in further cost, performance and schedule pressure on vendors involved toward the ultimate goal of refitting the United States Military with cost-effective state-of-the-art communications devices.
The DMR acquisition team is delivering a state-of-the-art system that will save the fleet precious resources and will provide cutting edge communications capability into the 21st century. The efforts of the DMR acquisition team will benefit the Navy/Marine Corps team and the Department of Defense.
