Following is a transcript of the press conference:

U.S. EMBASSY TOKYO
Press Office
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage

Press Conference

August 28, 2002

U.S. Embassy Auditorium
Tokyo, Japan

3:10 p.m. local time

MODERATOR: Ambassador Baker will introduce the Deputy Secretary.

AMBASSADOR BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the U.S. Embassy. We are happy you're here. It gives me great pleasure to welcome my good friend, the Deputy Secretary of State, Rich Armitage, to the American Embassy in Tokyo. He has covered a lot of territory on this trip. I know he's anxious to answer your questions, and I yield the platform to the Deputy Secretary.

D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you very much, Ambassador, and good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It's great fun for me to be back with most of you who are very well known to me, and I'm thrilled to have the opportunity to return to Tokyo and to this embassy. It's been a little over a year since I was last here, and as far as I'm concerned, that's much too long a time.

I've engaged in extensive discussions with Japanese colleagues, a strategic dialogue with Vice Minister Yukio Takeuchi and his colleagues, for two days now. I was honored to be able to call on the Prime Minister, had a good discussion and lunch with Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda, I was able to see the Minister of State for Defense, Minister Nakatani, and to call on the three secretary generals of the coalition. Our discussions followed my trip to South Asia to Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, as well as a stop in Beijing for consultations prior to the Crawford Summit between President Bush and President Jiang Zemin.

I'm sure you'll have a lot of questions on just what sort of subjects were covered here in Tokyo, so I'll just stop right there and try to answer your questions in as explicit a manner as possible.

MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, I'd ask that you identify yourself and your organization when you start your question. I will go with Mr. Suzuki, TV Asahi. Yes, please.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am Sato Suzuki with TV Asahi. Good to see you again. Regarding your discussion with Japanese officials on Iraq, what did you say to them, or what would you say to those Japanese skeptics who tend to wonder why we have to deal with Saddam Hussein so urgently, now? Do you have any convincing evidence that the Iraqi regime has been connected with some Al Qaeda or any other terrorist groups, or do you have any convincing evidence that Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction is imminent, and are you going to ask the Japanese government to show the flag again as you did last fall in coping with, this time, Iraq. And secondly ... (laughter) If I may ask you, the second question is about the sanctions the State Department imposed against North Korea for alleged sale of missile technology to Yemen. Is there any concern whatsoever on the part of the U.S. State Department that the North Korean missile technology could be transferred to Al Qaeda in the Middle East? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: Wow, I'll try to answer all seven of your questions, Mr. Suzuki. In the first instance, I came among other things to discuss our views of Iraq. I think Secretary (Vice President) Cheney laid very well the other day the fact that an Iraq left unattended is a threat to, our belief that, an Iraq left unattended is a threat to its neighbors, and ultimately a threat to ourselves. Given the fact that the regime in Baghdad has had a consistent program striving for weapons of mass destruction, and has indeed used chemical weapons on its own population as well as the well-known invasion and attempted subjugation of Kuwait. We believe as we move forward that we'll be able to make a very compelling case for regime change. But having said that, the President of the United States has made it very clear that he has made no decisions, number one. Number two, that he's intent on full consultations. He said that again yesterday as he entertained a visitor, the Ambassador from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in Crawford, Texas. When he does make a decision he'll be moving forward in full consultation with friends and allies such as those in Japan.

Today and yesterday we simply exchanged views about the region and our views of Saddam Hussein. I think at a point in time when the President decides, we will move forward and try to make a compelling public case.

We do know that there are some Al Qaeda in Iraq. They may very well be, however, in some of the areas not controlled, necessarily, by the government of Iraq, in some of the areas that are disputed, under one of the two Kurdish parties' control. We believe that we will ultimately be able to make a compelling case about the weapons of mass destruction, and at an appropriate time we'll be moving forward.

Now your question on North Korea had to do with the recent announcement of sanctioning, by the Department of State, of North Korean entities. We are concerned whenever we have proliferation ongoing. We made the sanctions public against North Korea. In a way it's a very symbolic gesture, because we don't have a relationship with North Korea. We don't do business with them ourselves, and it is not necessarily divorcing them from business in the United States. But I think it was a useful reminder that problems of proliferation emanating from North Korea are real in our minds, and we believe real in the minds of our Japanese friends, among others.

MODERATOR: I'd ask that you limit yourself to one question at a time, please. From the Mainichi, Mr. Takehata.

QUESTION: Welcome back to Tokyo, Mr. Secretary Armitage.

D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you.

QUESTION: Everybody is talking about Iraq, and I think we need to cool down and think about the situation very calmly, and what should be the best way to go. And for this regard, I may quote your remarks from March of last year at the confirmation hearing in the Senate, when you were the designated Deputy Secretary of State. I quote: "I believe that many of the theoretical debates of the merits of unilateralism and multilateralism become truly relevant only when we have lost the ability to attract supporters to a course of action desired by the United States. The coalition built a decade ago to free Kuwait did not materialize out of thin air. It was built by those who are able to draw upon relationships of trust, which had been planted deeply and tended carefully. If we view foreign policy as an episodic endeavor to be engaged in only during times of crisis or convenience, we shall find unilateralism to be a fait accompli instead of an option. Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional, it is a precondition for sustaining American leadership." End of quote.

This is your remark, and I think this is truly the time that your model should be realized in reality and, therefore, my question is: How successful your consultations with allies, including Japan, (have been) so far. And secondly, do you agree or not with the idea put forth by those people like former Secretary Baker or Richard Holbrooke that new action needs a new resolution by the United Nations? Do you agree or not? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you, and thank you for reminding me of the eloquence of my comments during the hearing. (laughter) I had long forgotten. But the point is exactly relevant. I believe I should refer you, in a way, to our Japanese friends, to Vice Minister Takeuchi and his colleagues, and they can tell you how efficacious they thought the consultations were.

Remember, in the first instance, this is a consultation across a full range of activities, not simply limited to Iraq. It included South Asia, it included all of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, it was bilateral relations, the U.S.-Japan security relation, China, among others. So I consider the fact that we were able to sit for two days and talk completely openly as far as the U.S. side was concerned -- and I felt I had a reciprocal engagement from the Japanese -- as proof of the effectiveness and the successfulness of the consultations.

What is most disappointing perhaps to you all is I didn't come to ask Japan to do something specifically on Iraq or anything else. I came to share views on this question. And in that regard I think it was most successful, but I refer you to them.

The second part of the question had to do with, do I agree with Mr. Baker? Well, I'll note that recently in Washington there's been no end of people who have a lot of ideas, and they want to share them with the President and with the Administration, and we take a look at each of these ideas. Jim Baker's was one, Henry Kissinger has had recent articles, Brent Scowcroft ... Many have had articles. And we take them all into consideration as we move forward, and the only nationally elected leader in the United States, the President, makes a decision on his course of action, and I'll just make it clear that: (1) we have many tools at our disposal and he has many options, and (2) on the specific question of whether or not we need another UN Security Council Resolution, I think it's generally our view that the relevant and existing resolutions give us sufficient latitude to move forward, if that's the President's decision.

MODERATOR: We had a question in the middle of the floor, sir, yes. And I'd ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to stick to one question. And questions, please.

QUESTION: Tomohiko Taniguchi with Nikkei Business magazine. Can I ask what you exactly said to Jiang Zemin about U.S. policies toward Taiwan?

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I'll tell you what I said publicly about U.S. policy to Taiwan, sir. I said that we follow strictly our one-China policy, which is based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, and we depend on the continuation of the policy of the People's Republic of China for peaceful resolution of the question.

MODERATOR: Mr. Tomiyama, Jiji.

QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary.

D/S ARMITAGE: Great to see you.

QUESTION: Just to follow up the previous question on Taiwan. The basis of the American one-China policy was that both sides of the Taiwan Strait say that there is only one China, but now the situation has changed, because Taiwan says they are an independent, separate country. So what's the new basis of your one-China policy if you continue to keep it? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think first of all the question or the statement to which you refer was probably the one contained in President Chen Shui-bian's August 3 speech, and it occurs to me that the exact definition of what was said is open to some interpretation in the Chinese language, but the point remains that our response to that speech is we do not support Taiwan independence, and that is the U.S. position. And the basis for the position, our one-China policy, as you articulated, that people on both sides of the strait agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.

MODERATOR: Ms. McKinnon from CNN.

QUESTION: Rebecca McKinnon from CNN. I was wondering, earlier this week when Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials went to North Korea, there were reports that Pyongyang expressed the desire for Tokyo to facilitate dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. And I'm wondering if you could tell us a bit about what was discussed regarding North Korea in your talks here, and whether the Japanese side passed on any messages from the North Korean side that might facilitate resumption of dialogue or possibly a trip soon to North Korea by Assistant Secretary Kelly?

D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you very much. We were briefed on the recent discussions in Pyongyang held by Director General for Asian Affairs Hitoshi Tanaka, and we were briefed on the discussions, particularly concerning the bilateral issues, the very serious bilateral issues that exist between Tokyo and Pyongyang -- the abductions, the trawler incident, things of that nature. We also had a chance to exchange views about the way we both see the danger of any developments of weapons of mass destruction or missile delivery technology, etc.

We have received a variety of messages from North Korea over the past months, and it seems to me the general thrust is that they would welcome a visit by Assistant Secretary Kelly. We were prepared to send Mr. Kelly until the Yellow Sea incident occurred, and our view now is that at an appropriate time a trip by Mr. Kelly is probably warranted.

MODERATOR: In the back, Mr. Ota, from Kyodo.

QUESTION: Masakatsu Ota, Kyodo News. Thank you for yesterday, for making a brief stop at the Prime Minister's Office and taking some questions.

D/S ARMITAGE: I had no choice; you ambushed me. (laughter)

QUESTION: OK, my question about Iraq. What's your most persuasive point, persuasive element to persuade the Japanese government and the Japanese people to support your country's policy in the future? That's my question.

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, the most persuasive point, I think your question was, that I might use to persuade the Japanese public in the future about the necessity of regime change. I don't know what will be most persuasive to the Japanese public. Our view is the truth is always a good thing to engage in, and we'll move forward and make a public case when the President determines that the time is right.

I think there is a good bit to be learned from the history of the regime in Baghdad, and I earlier spelled out some of the past history, and nothing that has happened in the intervening years has shown that the regime in Baghdad has become any more benign toward their own population, or certainly, if you judge them by their rhetoric, to their friends and neighbors. And I would note with great dissatisfaction the offer of the regime in Baghdad to pay up to $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers in Israel.

So I think when we move forward we'll simply engage in the truth. And the Japanese public and the officials of the Japanese government can make their own decision up. I didn't come here to lay out a decision for the Japanese government. I simply came here to have a discussion and exchange of views on Iraq.

MODERATOR: The gentleman in the front.

QUESTION: Anatoli Karasnov of Itar-Tass News Agency. Again a question about North Korea: What do you think about the late visit of Kim Jong Il to Russia? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: What did I think of Kim Jong Il's visit to Russia? Well, I saw it was his second visit, and I saw that he met with President Putin in Vladivostok, I believe. I've not been briefed on the discussion. The United States government was briefed on a prior visit by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Pyongyang, and when Foreign Minister Ivanov visited with Secretary Powell in Brunei they had a good discussion about that. I think I should refer you to President Putin for his reaction to the bear hug from Kim Jong Il.

MODERATOR: Mr. Koyama (Nihon Kogyo Shimbun).

QUESTION: You mentioned that Al Qaeda was in the northern part of Iraq.

D/S ARMITAGE: Yes.

QUESTION: How would you interpret that? Does this mean that Hussein doesn't like Al Qaeda, or that Al Qaeda is under the protection of the Kurds?

D/S ARMITAGE: I have no idea whether Saddam Hussein likes Al Qaeda or not, and I'm certainly not suggesting that Al Qaeda is under the protection of the Kurds. I'm simply noting that there is Al Qaeda presence in an area that is disputed, that is primarily Kurdish controlled. I don't think the Kurds have any more affection for Al Qaeda than anyone else. This is not the first time U.S. officials have pointed this phenomenon of some presence in Iraq. I think Secretary Rumsfeld has also spoken about this recently.

MODERATOR: Mr. Kato, from the Asahi Shimbun.

QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. About North Korea: It seems to me North Korea has been showing some flexibility to Japan. I don't know what kind of outcome it's going to really bring about, but I was wondering what do you think is the right approach to North Korea this time around? Is the Sunshine Policy the right approach, or a hard-line approach that the Bush Administration seems to be putting out is the right approach? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I don't know that I'd characterize hard-line or soft-line approach; these are decisions to be made by Japanese officials at the present time, and as Mr. Tanaka and his colleagues at the Gaimusho move forward, I'm sure they'll determine the proper stance to take. From our point of view, we're informed, we welcome the discussions between Mr. Tanaka and North Korean counterparts. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi had informed us at Brunei that these discussions were going forward, and we followed them with some interest.

MODERATOR: Mr. Greimel, from AP.

QUESTION: Hello. Hans Greimel, Associated Press. To what degree is the United States right now trying to build a coalition that agrees with the United States position toward Iraq, and how many countries would you say are out there that actually subscribe to the U. S. point of view?

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think I've indicated that when the U.S. lays out the public case against Iraq we do expect to have a fair amount of international support. I don't think I'd care to give a laundry list because I don't think we've choosed up sides yet on the question of who would do what. We haven't asked anything of anyone, as yet. But I have no doubt that when the President makes a decision and that we lay out our public case and that we consult with friends and allies, that at the end of the day there are a good many people who will share the view of President Bush.

MODERATOR: Mr. Sugita, Kyodo News.

QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. My question is about reintroduction of the UN inspectors back to Iraq.

D/S ARMITAGE: Yes.

QUESTION: At this moment, what kind of achievement can you expect by those inspections again back to Iraq?

D/S ARMITAGE: Iraq, you mean.

QUESTION: Iraq, yes.

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I'd have two comments on that. Inspections themselves are not the end, they're simply a means. I'll note that the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution 687, calls not just for inspections but disarmament, that is the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, and that is the end, and that's what I would keep my eye on. And I would just note with interest, I believe it was Hans Blix in the Sunday TV shows in Washington, who stated that the Iraqi regime started to show a little nervousness and a little more, quote, "flexibility" once the United States started getting very serious about the question of -- again -- of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

MODERATOR: The gentleman in the middle.

QUESTION: Takashi Yokota of The Los Angeles Times. If President Bush decides to attack Iraq, what would you expect of Japan in terms of support, considering its legal restrictions?

D/S ARMITAGE: If I understand the question correctly, it was: If President Bush decides to attack Iraq, what would we expect the government of Japan to do? Well, I think I'd refer you to the government of Japan. I shouldn't make a prediction on what any sovereign government would do or not do.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

D/S ARMITAGE: No, I would think I'd give you an expectation after I'd engaged in intensive consultations on the subject and after we've laid a probable case, but I think I don't want to engage and try and judge a government's reaction prior to having heard all the facts.

MODERATOR: The gentleman on the aisle.

QUESTION: Mark Simkin, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Could I ask about the trilateral talks with Australia and Japan today. What was discussed, and were any decisions made?

D/S ARMITAGE: (laughs) Nice try. (laughter) We took advantage of the fact that Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi was here, and I was able to be here at the same time as Ashton Calvert, the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, former Ambassador to Tokyo I might add, was also here. We talked the full range of issues, mostly regional. We spoke about Iraq a little bit. No decisions were made because no decisions were asked for.

MODERATOR: Yes?

D/S ARMITAGE: One more.

MODERATOR: OK. Last question.

QUESTION: My name is Yokota with Nikkei Financial Paper. During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked Israel with SCUD missiles so many times, and at that time the United States asked them not to retaliate. And now the Israeli government deploys, you know, the latest missile defense systems, and they expect the Iraqi attack again in case of a U.S. attack against Iraq. In this case, are you going to ask Israel not to retaliate again? Are you going to allow them to strike back? Thank you.

D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think that I'd have to know the circumstances surrounding the event, which you describe. I think it's very difficult to keep a country from defending themselves. I think the circumstances surrounding would very much depend on what the United States and the coalition might be doing at the time, and it would be determined also by what was the extent of the attack. But I think no one could gainsay the intent and the readiness and the willingness of Israel to fully defend itself at any moment.

MODERATOR: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you all very much.

MODERATOR: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.