



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries

Inspection Report

Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties

DOE/IG-0636

January 2004



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

January 23, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:

Gregory H. Friedman
Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Protective Force Performance Test Improperities"

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2003, a protective force performance test was conducted at the Department of Energy's Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a component of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The purpose of the test was to obtain realistic data for developing the Y-12 Site Safeguards and Security Plan. The mission at the site includes a number of sensitive activities, such as enriched uranium material warehousing, and weapon dismantlement and storage. These activities necessitate that the site have a protective force capable of responding to potential security incidents such as a terrorist attack.

Computer simulations conducted prior to the June 2003 performance test had predicted that the responder (defending) protective forces would decisively lose two of the four scenarios that comprised the test. When the responder protective forces won all four of the scenarios, the Y-12 Site Manager became concerned that the test may have been compromised. The Manager initiated an inquiry, which identified issues regarding responder protective force personnel having had access to the computer simulations of the four scenarios prior to the performance test. Subsequently, at the Y-12 Site Manager's request, the Office of Inspector General initiated a review to address these issues.

Based on information developed during the course of the review, the scope of the inspection was expanded to examine whether there had been a pattern over time of site security personnel compromising protective force performance tests.

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

Our inspection confirmed that the results of the June 26, 2003, performance test may have been compromised. We found that shortly before the test, two protective force personnel were inappropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of the four scenarios. This action compromised controlled (test-sensitive) information. As a consequence, the test results were, in our judgment, tainted and unreliable.

During the Office of Inspector General review, several current and former protective force personnel provided us with compelling testimony that there has been a pattern of actions by site



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security personnel going back to the mid-1980's that may have negatively affected the reliability of site performance testing. We were told, for example, that controlled information had been shared with protective force personnel prior to their participation in a given performance test. This included such important data as:

- The specific building and wall to be attacked by the test adversary;
- The specific target of the test adversary; and
- Whether or not a diversionary tactic would be employed by the test adversary.

Two other protective force contractor employees who were identified as having some level of involvement in these actions denied any such involvement. However, it was clear that if controlled information was, in fact, disclosed prior to the performance tests, the reliability of the information used to evaluate the efficacy of the protective force at the Oak Ridge complex was in question.

The report includes several recommendations to Department management designed to enhance the integrity of future performance tests.

MANAGEMENT REACTION

NNSA concurred with our findings and recommendations and provided a series of corrective actions that either had been initiated or were planned as a result of direction from the NNSA Administrator and the Y-12 Site Office Manager. NNSA's comments, which are provided in their entirety in an appendix to this report, also represent the position of the Oak Ridge Operations Office. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, whose comments are also appended to this report, concurred with our recommendation to that Office.

We found management's comments to be responsive to our recommendations.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
Director, Office of Science
Manager, Y-12 Site Office
Manager, Oak Ridge Operations Office
Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management

PROTECTIVE FORCE PERFORMANCE TEST IMPROPRIETIES

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Overview

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is a component of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is an integral part of the nuclear weapons complex. The Y-12 mission includes the production of hardware to support nuclear weapon stockpile certification; the precision manufacturing of unique nuclear weapons components; weapon dismantlement, storage, and evaluation; and enriched uranium material warehousing and management, including overseeing the secure management and storage of special nuclear materials. These activities necessitate that the site have a protective force capable of responding to potential incidents such as a terrorist attack.

As part of the security planning process, Department sites identify potential threats and develop plans for addressing them, including protective force response. One of the key tools in this process is protective force performance testing, which is used to determine that the security features of a system are implemented as designed and are adequate for the proposed environment. Protective force performance testing commonly involves live exercises where "responder" protective forces defend against a simulated attack. Performance tests are frequently referred to as force-on-force exercises; however, technically, these constitute just one type of performance test.

Because of the high cost of live protective force performance tests, which at Y-12 we were told cost between \$50,000 to \$85,000 per test, sites use a computer program to simulate protective force responses to various threats. Select simulations are then validated through performance tests. It is DOE policy that performance tests must be used to, among other things, realistically evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force programs, identify and provide needed training, and validate implemented improvements.

On June 26, 2003, a type of Limited Scope Performance Test, locally identified as a Diagnostic Evaluation Exercise, was conducted at Y-12 to obtain realistic data for developing the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. Computer simulations had predicted that the responder protective forces (those defending the site) would decisively lose two of the four scenarios that comprised the performance test. When the responder protective forces won all four of the scenarios, the Y-12 Site Manager became suspicious that the test may have been compromised. The Manager initiated

an inquiry, and concerns surfaced regarding (1) responder protective force personnel having had access to the computer simulations of the four scenarios prior to the performance test and (2) conflicting information over who authorized that access. Subsequently, the Y-12 Site Manager requested assistance from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to address these concerns.

During our inspection, we were provided information that inappropriate actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980's in connection with performance tests at the Department's Oak Ridge complex. Several different contractors have held the protective force contract during the period in question. These contractors have provided security throughout the Oak Ridge complex, which includes Y-12, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the East Tennessee Technology Park, and other Department facilities.

Based upon this information, we expanded our inspection to examine whether there had been a pattern over time of site security personnel compromising protective force performance tests. Also, pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), we reviewed relevant performance measurement processes applicable to the current Oak Ridge complex security contractor, Wackenhut Services, Inc. Wackenhut was awarded the security contract in September 1999 and began operations in January 2000.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our inspection confirmed the concerns of the Y-12 Site Manager regarding the performance test conducted on June 26, 2003. We found that shortly before the test, two participating protective force personnel were permitted to view the computer simulations of the four scenarios. We concluded that this action was improper, since it had the potential to adversely impact the realism of the performance test and its outcome. In short, the test results were tainted and should not, in our judgment, be relied upon.

During the inspection, we interviewed over 30 current and former site security police officers (SPOs) and SPO supervisors. We received testimony from several individuals that there has been a pattern of actions by site security personnel over an extended period of time that may have negatively affected the realism and, therefore, the reliability of numerous performance tests at the Oak Ridge complex. Several individuals told us, for example, that controlled (test-sensitive) information was shared with SPOs prior to their participation in a given performance test. These concerns paralleled our findings regarding the June 2003 performance test. When queried as to the nature of the information that had been shared with SPOs in prior years, they provided a number of examples, including the following:

- The specific building and wall to be attacked by the test adversary;
- The specific target of the test adversary; and
- Whether or not a diversionary tactic would be employed by the test adversary.

These concerns were expressed by current and former protective force personnel who were in a position to be aware of the facts and circumstances of the prior performance tests. We found their assertions to be credible and compelling. Two protective force contractor employees who were identified as having involvement in these actions denied such activities. We could not find documentary evidence to support or refute the testimonial evidence. However, it was clear that if controlled information was, in fact, disclosed prior to the performance tests, such action would have influenced the reliability of the information used to evaluate the efficacy of the protective force program at the Oak Ridge complex.

Details of Findings

JUNE 26, 2003, PERFORMANCE TEST

The Y-12 Site Office Manager raised concerns with respect to the performance test conducted on June 26, 2003. We found that two protective force personnel who were to participate as responders in the test were provided information that could have had a direct bearing on the exercise outcome. Specifically, the day before the performance test, the two individuals were allowed to view computer simulations on the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) computer program of the four scenarios that would comprise the performance test. (Because of Privacy Act considerations, specific details regarding the events surrounding their viewing of the scenarios have been provided to the Y-12 Site Office Manager under separate cover.) The two individuals denied that the information to which they were given access affected their actions or directions to others who participated in the exercise. However, when we viewed the computer simulations, it became clear that the occurrence of certain specific events would identify which scenario was being initiated by the aggressor force. The order in which the targets would be attacked was controlled information.

We asked senior Department and contractor personnel if they believed it was appropriate for the two protective force personnel to view the JCATS simulations prior to the exercise. The Y-12 Site Manager said he was aware that members of the protective force participate in computer simulations and have been doing so for several years; however, when the same computer scenarios that will comprise the performance test are viewed by protective force members the day before the exercise, he believed there is a “problem.” A senior official for BWXT Y-12, LLC, the site operating contractor, said that by viewing the JCATS scenarios, the protective force personnel gained such an advantage that it raised concerns about the realism of the exercise results. A senior official for Wackenhut at Oak Ridge said that if Wackenhut supervisors inappropriately received information that other responders did not receive, then there was a possibility that a mishandling of information had occurred.

We also consulted with officials outside of Oak Ridge to obtain a broader perspective on this incident. A JCATS expert at Sandia National Laboratories told us that viewing the JCATS simulations prior to an exercise would give away too much information. Similar views were expressed by officials with DOE’s Office of Security and an official in NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security.

Based upon the facts and circumstances of this matter, we concluded that it was inappropriate for the two Wackenhut protective force personnel to have been allowed to view the four JCATS scenarios shortly before the performance test. This action had the potential to impact the realism and, therefore, the reliability of the performance test.

PERFORMANCE TESTING

We were provided testimonial information by several current and former protective force personnel that prior to performance tests, including those conducted during DOE Headquarters oversight reviews, controlled information regarding the performance test and specific adversary actions was provided to contractor protective force personnel by contractor management. We were told that this practice spanned from the mid-1980's to the present. Several individuals advised us that the types of information shared included identification of the specific building and wall that would be attacked, the target, and whether a diversionary tactic would be employed prior to initiation of the primary test assault.

While we treated this information as credible based on the job status and responsibilities of those providing the data, we could not find any documentary evidence to support the assertions. The individuals themselves acknowledged that they were not aware of any documentary evidence of these actions.

We were also told by a number of individuals that protective force members had disabled their Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) gear, thus providing the responder force with an unfair advantage. MILES gear is used to determine whether the exercise participant wearing it has received a simulated fatal gunshot and can no longer participate in the exercise. We were told that exercise participants had, at various times in the past, removed the batteries from the MILES gear; put the batteries in backwards; and/or placed material such as tape, mud, or Vaseline over the system sensors, so they would not operate properly.

We learned that new MILES gear purchased at Oak Ridge in 2000 could help to minimize the occurrence of such actions; however, the site is still working on fully implementing its capabilities. For example, although the new gear creates computer-generated information that can be used to reconstruct the activities of each participant to identify if certain types of tampering occurred, such reconstruction did not occur for the two tests we reviewed. Even after full implementation, some avenues for possible abuse will

still exist. For example, the sensors can still be obstructed by an individual applying a material such as tape, mud, or Vaseline.

Current or former protective force personnel provided a number of examples of improper actions related to prior performance tests:

- A protective force responder would be assigned to “tail” the aggressors and observe their movements while they were touring Y-12 buildings and targets prior to and in preparation for an exercise.
- Based on specific attack information, trucks or other obstacles would be staged at advantageous points to be used as barricades and concealment by protective force responders for shooting during the exercises.
- Training prior to a performance test would focus on the specific building to be targeted, and in some instances, an oral plan would be created that deviated from the established Y-12 tactical plan to counter the attack.
- Management would identify the best prepared protective force personnel and then substitute them for lesser prepared personnel who were scheduled to participate in an exercise.
- Protective force members who would normally relieve other protective force personnel for the purposes of physical training, medical appointments, or sick leave would be armed and held in “stand-by” to participate in an exercise. This would potentially result in six or seven additional available armed responders that would not normally have been available during a shift.

During our inspection, we learned that a Wackenhut official had recently acknowledged to a senior Department official that, as cited above, stand-by personnel had been used in performance tests in the past. We were told, however, that Wackenhut management had established new procedures to address this issue after becoming aware of it sometime in late 2000 or in 2001. One new procedure, for example, involves taking a figurative “snapshot” of the locations of protective forces at a given time, and starting an exercise with personnel stationed at the locations identified in the “snapshot.”

-
- In an exercise in late 2000 or early 2001, protective force management told protective force responders the building and target to be attacked, the exact number of adversaries, and the location where a diversion would occur. This information was reportedly provided about three weeks before the exercise occurred, which allowed the protective force to formulate special plans on how to counter the adversary.
 - For the June 26, 2003, exercise discussed in the prior section, after the first scenario had been run, word of the order of the attacks on the other three scenario targets spread among the lower ranked personnel. This was despite the fact that the specific order of the targets for this exercise was controlled information.

Although not all of the examples of alleged improper actions that were provided to us were attributed to specific individuals, two Wackenhut employees were identified as having been involved in such activities. When asked about the allegations, these individuals said that they had never provided controlled information to protective force personnel. They said that Wackenhut focused its training on those areas at Oak Ridge that present the greatest vulnerabilities, which also are the focus of performance tests. They further said that a Wackenhut employee who is not aware of these targeted preparations might conclude that controlled information had been provided. Regarding the MILES gear allegations, one of the individuals said he was aware that a number of years ago protective force personnel had tampered with the equipment, but when someone was caught doing this, corrective actions were taken. The other individual said he had heard stories of equipment tampering, but he had no first-hand knowledge.

As noted previously, protective force performance tests must be used to realistically evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force programs. Applicable policies and procedures require that the contents of the scenarios to be used in performance test exercises be controlled on a need-to-know basis. Although none of the individuals we interviewed had documentation to support their testimony that inappropriate actions occurred in connection with the protective force performance tests conducted at the Oak Ridge complex since the mid-1980's, the extent and nature of the testimonial evidence was so compelling that we

concluded that further action by management is needed if the credibility of the performance testing regime is to be maintained.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

As part of implementing GPRA, the Department is required to establish program goals and subsequently measure performance against those goals. We found that the contract between Wackenhut and DOE contained a performance objective and performance measure to address the efficacy of the protective force program. The performance objective required Wackenhut to execute a day-to-day protective services program that achieves the required level of protection, and the performance measure requires that optimum protective services support is provided in concert with site-specific needs. There is a Performance Evaluation Plan that is used for determining Wackenhut's award fee, and it establishes the criteria for Wackenhut to receive award fees.

We noted that in order to receive all fees that have been otherwise earned, Wackenhut must meet all DOE regulations. Given this performance standard and based on the information developed during the inspection, we believe that the results of the OIG review should be considered when DOE officials evaluate Wackenhut's contractual performance and award fee.

Also, our review of the test process at Oak Ridge disclosed that in addition to participating in the actual performance tests as the facility responder force, Wackenhut personnel also participated in the detailed planning and development of the tests. We believe that DOE officials should examine the extent to which a site protective force contractor should be involved in both these aspects of performance testing. Specifically, we believe that the Department should implement additional "firewalls" (controls) to ensure that responders do not receive inappropriate advance information that could undermine the integrity of a performance test.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Manager, Y-12 Site Office, and the Manager, Oak Ridge Operations Office:

1. Evaluate the information disclosed by our review and take appropriate action to ensure the integrity and realism of future performance tests.
2. Evaluate whether the information disclosed by our review impacts any previous analysis of the efficacy of the site's protective force, and take appropriate corrective actions.
3. Consider the information disclosed by our review when evaluating Wackenhut's performance, and take appropriate action with respect to determining award fee.
4. Evaluate whether it is appropriate for the same contractor to be responsible for both planning and participating as a protective force in protective force performance tests. Further, identify and implement additional safeguards to ensure that responders do not receive inappropriate advance information that could undermine the integrity of a performance test.

We recommend that the Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance:

5. Review the information provided in this report, and take action to ensure the integrity and realism of future performance tests at Y-12 and other Department facilities.

**MANAGEMENT
COMMENTS**

NNSA concurred with our findings and recommendations and provided a series of corrective actions that either had been initiated or were planned as a result of direction from the NNSA Administrator and the Y-12 Site Office Manager. NNSA's comments, which are provided in their entirety at Appendix B to this report, also represent the position of the Oak Ridge Operations Office. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance concurred with our recommendation to that Office. Comments from that Office are also appended to this report.

**INSPECTOR
COMMENTS**

We found management's comments to be responsive to our recommendations.

Appendix A

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY


We reviewed certain aspects of protective force performance tests at the Department's Oak Ridge Complex. The inspection fieldwork was conducted primarily from July through August 2003. We identified and reviewed applicable DOE regulations and other key documents applicable to the inspection. We interviewed Federal and contractor staff assigned to Department Headquarters and field locations in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Albuquerque, New Mexico. We also interviewed former contractor employees. We worked closely with the OIG Office of Investigations and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Tennessee. We reviewed several relevant JCATS computer scenarios. This inspection was conducted in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.



Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585

JAN 22 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Alfred K. Walter
Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections

FROM: Michael C. Kane 
Associate Administrator
for Management and Administration

SUBJECT: Comments to Draft Y-12 Protective Force
Performance Improprieties Inspection Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the Inspector General's (IG) draft Inspection report "Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties."

NNSA generally agrees with the report and concurs with the recommendations provided in the draft Inspection report and the separate draft Inspection report to management.

As you point out in your report the Y-12 site manager requested your office to conduct the subject review based on concerns that he had following completion of security exercises in summer, 2003. We appreciate the efforts of your office in conducting a review of the circumstances of those exercises. We consider the security of our nuclear complex to be one of our most critical responsibilities and your report will be very helpful in that regard. Y-12 security matters are of particular interest to NNSA currently and the Administrator has taken substantial additional steps to ensure we can be confident in our security program effectiveness there. Specifically, he has tasked the site manager and the Acting Chief Defense Nuclear Security to give disproportionate focus on Y-12 security matters in the coming months to provide necessary emphasis on all security activities at Y-12. In addition to focusing on the results of the recently completed inspection by the Office of Independent Oversight and Assurance, such attention will also include review of specifics of the circumstances which resulted in your recommendations. Further, we support your recommendation for a review of this matter by the Office of Independent Oversight and Assurance. Security performance testing by our NNSA sites is a key element in understanding how well sites are prepared to address potential threats to our national security assets. If such testing were in any way compromised so as to skew the quality of information we have about our ability to protect, the results could have extremely



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significant effects in a way which is entirely unacceptable. We will take all appropriate steps to ensure that is not the case.

I have attached the specific comments related to the recommendations. Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management. He may be reached at 202-586-5009.

Attachment

cc: Dr. Everet Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, NA-10
William Brumley, Manager, Y-12 Site Office
David Marks, Field Chief Financial Officer, SvcCen/NV

**Y-12 Site Office Responses to
Office of Inspector General Draft Inspection Report
“Protective Force Performance Test Improperities”**

Revision 3

Primary Draft Report

Recommendation 1 – Evaluate the information disclosed by our review and take appropriate action to ensure the integrity and realism of future performance tests.

Management Response – Concur. As a result of the findings cited in this investigation, continuous coordinated effort among the Y-12 Site Office, Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) and BWXT Y-12, LLC (BWXT Y-12) has occurred to identify actions not already in-place that may be required to ensure the reliability and realism of future performance tests. In addition to analyzing the propriety of the events specifically associated with the Diagnostic Evaluation Exercise held on June 26, 2003, alleged examples of improper actions that were provided to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) by current or former protective force personnel will also be a focus of examination.

Recommendation 2 – Evaluate whether the information disclosed by our review impacts any previous analysis of the efficacy of the site’s protective force, and take appropriate corrective actions.

Management Response – Concur. Analyses based on the new Design Basis Threat Policy characterize the current BWXT Y-12 security posture without reliance on any performance testing performed before July 2003. Y-12 has evaluated this data carefully to ensure that it is not relied on to select improvement initiatives without other supporting information. Therefore, the performance test held in June 2003, does not affect the current assumptions in the BWXT Y-12 security posture. The integrity of future testing to ensure the security posture, as well as safety and effectiveness, continues to be of utmost importance. To eliminate any confusion and avoid the perception of impropriety, test plans and procedures will be developed to ensure clarity of test expectations and roles and responsibilities of individuals who plan and participate in performance test exercises.

Recommendation 3 – Consider the information disclosed by our (OIG) review when evaluating Wackenhut’s performance, and take appropriate action with respect to determining award fee.

Management Response – Concur. Among other factors, the soundness of all activities performed by WSI, and/or any other contractors, will continue to be a significant consideration in the award fee process for WSI. However, consideration of alleged improper actions referenced prior to WSI assuming the contract in January 2000, would not be appropriate in the determination of fee allowance during the remaining years of the WSI contract. As pointed out in the report, the examples of alleged improper actions

were obtained as the result of testimonial information from current and former protective force personnel and could not be substantiated by written documentation. The alleged actions were reputed to have occurred during a period when several different contractors were contractually responsible for safeguard and security activities at the Y-12 site. With the exception of the June 26, 2003, performance test, the specific dates of exercises for which allegations of improper actions occurred were not provided. Notwithstanding, the alleged impropriety of each action cited in the report will be examined, and corrective actions will be developed and implemented for those deemed improper.

Recommendation 4 – Evaluate whether it is appropriate for the same contractor to be responsible for both planning and participating as a protective force in protective force performance tests and what additional controls can be established to ensure that defenders do not receive inappropriate advance information that could undermine the integrity of a test.

Management Response – Concur. We will continue to evaluate the roles of each Contractor in the planning and participation phases of all performance tests. Separation of duties alone between contractors can not ensure that information is inappropriately disseminated or that the validity of a test is not undermined but will go far in improving confidence that our information is not shared. Y-12 will achieve proper conduct of security performance testing through clear expectations, integrity, accountability, and the development, implementation, and enforcement of performance test procedures. Those procedures will clarify roles and responsibilities of Contractor employees involved in performance tests including the sharing of information between Contractors.

Recommendation 5 – Review the information provided in this report, and take action to ensure the integrity and realism of future performance tests at Y-12.

Management Response – This response is to be provided by the Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance.

[Due to Privacy Act considerations, information that was provided herein that was responsive to recommendations contained in the separate report referenced on page 4 of this report are only being included in that report.]



Department of Energy

Oak Ridge Operations Office
P.O. Box 2001
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831—

January 21, 2004

Mr. David H. Sumner
Inspector General Eastern Regional Office
105 Mitchell Road
Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Dear Mr. Sumner:

CONCURRENCE ON INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE, "PROTECTIVE FORCE PERFORMANCE TEST IMPROPRIETIES"

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report and recommendations concentrated on performance tests conducted at the Y-12 National Security Complex. However, since the Oak Ridge Operations (ORO) portion of the Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) contract is a mirror of the Y-12 portion, the intent of the recommendations is also valid for the ORO portion of the contract. A representative of the ORO Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) participated in review of the OIG Report and development of the Y-12 response. The one response appropriately incorporates the view of ORO OSS.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Don F. Thress, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

Don F. Thress, Jr., Acting Director
Office of Safeguards and Security



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

December 8, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alfred K. Walter
Acting Assistant Inspector General, IG-44

FROM: Glenn S. Podonsky, OA-1

SUBJECT: Comment on Draft Inspection Report on "Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties"

The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) concurs with the recommendation in your report, "Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties," November 2003, that OA ensure the integrity and realism of future performance tests at Y-12. As you may know, OA conducts tactical performance testing as a routine inspection activity, to include the ongoing inspection at Y-12. For this reason, OA has developed an extensive series of protocols to ensure the integrity of the outcome of such performance testing. These protocols include the following measures:


- The total number of site personnel (DOE and contractor) who are permitted insight into test scenarios prior to the conduct of the tests is strictly limited to those individuals essential to the preparation and presentation of safe, meaningful, and realistic tests.
- Site personnel who are permitted this insight are designated as "trusted agents" and are required to execute a trusted agent agreement that explicitly establishes restrictions on the communication of scenario information.
- OA controls the initiation of each individual test to minimize the impact of potential inadvertent or partial compromise. Specifically, site protective force personnel are pre-positioned in accordance with a predetermined "snapshot in time" and are held in that position until the onset of adversary actions, thus precluding artificial anticipatory movement of the protective force to target locations.
- OA details a cadre of independent evaluators to monitor the full range of performance test actions. These evaluators are trained to recognize actions that might compromise the results of the test (such as obscuring laser harness receptors).
- OA also conducts a detailed review of computer information recording "hits" resulting from laser engagements. Anomalies arising during this review are subject to follow up investigation.
- OA force-on-force performance testing is designed to support the evaluation of protective force performance against a range of evaluation criteria involving individual and team tactics, command, control, and communication, and other performance elements. It is not designed to support a simplistic "win/lose" outcome; as such, it is significantly less amenable to scenario compromise.



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In addition to these specific control measures, it should be noted that OA inspections address both the results of the performance tests and also the demonstrated ability of the site to conduct fair and objective performance tests. Although OA's recent experience is that site personnel do not attempt to deliberately compromise performance tests during inspections, we are always vigilant in considering the possibility of such compromise, and would consider validated instances of such activity as a significant weakness of the protective force management and performance.

Should you need additional information, please contact me at (301) 903-3777, or Arnold E. Guevara, Director, Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations, at (301) 903-5895. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this report.



Glenn S. Podonsky, Director
Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance

cc:
G. Friedman, IG-1
R. Speidel, NA-66
M. Kilpatrick, OA-1
A. Guevara, OA-10

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2. What additional information related to findings and recommendations could have been included in the report to assist management in implementing corrective actions?
3. What format, stylistic, or organizational changes might have made this report's overall message more clear to the reader?
4. What additional actions could the Office of Inspector General have taken on the issues discussed in this report which would have been helpful?
5. Please include your name and telephone number so that we may contact you should we have any questions about your comments.

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Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

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