

### United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

February 26, 2004

The Honorable Christopher Cox Chairman The Honorable Jim Turner Ranking Minority Member House Select Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives

Subject: Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange

Established in March 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System was designed to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local government agencies and the public. However, this system generated concern among federal, state, and local government agencies regarding whether they are receiving the necessary information to respond appropriately to heightened alerts and about the amount of additional costs protective measures entail.

You requested that we review (1) the operations of the Homeland Security Advisory System, including the decision making process for changing the national threat level, notifications to federal, state, and local government agencies of changes in the threat level, and ongoing revisions to the system; (2) guidance and information that federal, state, and local government agencies reportedly used to determine any protective measures to implement when the threat level is raised to high—or code-orange—alert; (3) any protective measures these agencies implemented during code-orange alert periods; (4) any additional costs these agencies reported incurring to implement such measures; and (5) any threat advisory systems that federal, state, or local government agencies had in place before the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

This report summarizes our preliminary observations on each of these objectives. The code-orange alert periods covered in this preliminary report and our ongoing work are March 17 to April 16, 2003; May 20 to 30, 2003; and December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004.

The preliminary observations in this report are based on information obtained as of February 9, 2004. This includes responses from 15 of the 28 federal agencies to which we sent a questionnaire regarding the Homeland Security Advisory System and codeorange alert periods, and information from 8 federal agencies, four states, the District

of Columbia, and nine local governments that we contacted during the design of our methodology. We selected the 8 federal agencies using agencies' reports to the Office of Management and Budget on the amount of homeland security funding they received for fiscal year 2003.<sup>2</sup> Five of the 8 selected agencies reported receiving the most homeland security funding. We selected the four states, the District of Columbia, and nine local governments on the basis of their critical infrastructure assets, such as national landmarks, ports, and oil pipelines. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) generally has not documented the policies and procedures it has used for assessing intelligence information, determining whether to raise or lower the threat level, and notifying federal, state, and local government agencies about changes in threat levels. Thus, our findings about the operations of the Homeland Security Advisory System are principally based on interviews with DHS officials. We will continue to assess the Homeland Security Advisory System and related guidance, measures implemented during code-orange periods, and the costs incurred during code-orange alerts. We expect to issue a final report later this year. On February 23 and 24, 2004, officials representing the Department of Homeland Security provided oral technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. We conducted our work from July 2003 to February 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For more detailed information on our scope and methodology, see enclosure I.

#### **Results in Brief**

Based on analyses of intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with members of the Homeland Security Council, determines whether the national threat level should be elevated or lowered. Once the Secretary makes this decision, DHS and others begin the process of notifying federal, state and local government agencies, through various means, such as conference calls. The department has not yet documented its protocols for executing notification. DHS officials told us they are working to develop such documentation. However, they could not provide us with a specific time frame as to when they expect to complete this effort. Federal, state, and local government agencies we met with expressed concern about hearing of threat level changes from media and other sources prior to receiving notification from DHS. DHS officials maintain that the Homeland Security Advisory System is evolving and that they are continually adjusting it to provide additional information regarding specific threats.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For this review, we analyzed information from the District of Columbia with information from states. <sup>2</sup>Office of Management and Budget, *2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: September 2003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Members of the Homeland Security Council include the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

Various sources, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),<sup>4</sup> provided guidance and information to federal, state, and local government agencies to assist them in developing plans for responding to each of the advisory system's five threat levels following establishment of the system in March 2002. Additionally, DHS and others provided federal, state, and local government agencies with guidance and information to assist them in determining actions to take in response to each codeorange alert occurrence. For the most part, the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire noted that the guidance and information they received was useful and timely. However, 14 of these 15 federal agencies, along with officials from three states and six local governments we met with, noted that they would have benefited by receiving additional information on region-, sector-, site-, and event-specific threats when deciding additional actions to take for the three most recent codeorange alerts. We will continue to assess this guidance and information to determine its consistency and the extent to which the entities that provided the guidance and information coordinated with other agencies providing similar information.

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that they maintain a high security posture and, as a result, did not need to implement a substantial number of additional protective measures to respond to code-orange alerts. For the most part, these 15 federal agencies reported enhancing protective measures they already had in place to respond to the code-orange alerts, such as increasing the frequency of facility security patrols. To a lesser degree, these federal agencies indicated that they continued existing protective measures at their pre-code-orange alert levels, such as the use of intrusion detection systems. To ensure that protective measures operate as intended, federal agencies for which we received questionnaire responses reported conducting tests on the functionality and reliability of protective measures. They also reported receiving confirmation of the enhancement or implementation of measures from component entities, offices, or personnel. Protective measures benefited federal agencies in various ways, but also affected agency operations, according to the agencies responding to our questionnaire. For example, while actions taken during code-orange alerts promoted employees' sense of security, they also resulted in delays for employees entering facilities. State and local government officials we met with noted that their agencies implemented various protective measures for code-orange alerts, including additional law enforcement patrols.

Thirteen federal agencies, one state, and six localities provided information on the additional costs incurred during at least two of the three orange alert periods in our review. The cost information the federal agencies provided was generally estimates. Nine agencies reported incurring additional costs while 4 stated that they did not incur any additional costs. Eight of the 9 agencies provided cost estimates, whereas the ninth provided actual costs extracted from its financial accounting system. For the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs, we calculated the additional average daily costs incurred during each of the three orange alert periods. The additional average daily costs varied by alert period and ranged from as little as about \$160 dollars for a small independent agency to more than \$165,000 for a cabinet department. For 8 of the 9 agencies, the additional average daily costs were lower for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The Federal Emergency Management Agency was incorporated into the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security upon the department's creation in March 2003.

the third alert period than the first alert period. Cost information for the one state and six localities was limited, and we have little or no information on how those costs were determined. Thus, we cannot assess the reliability and comparability of these costs.

Some federal, state, and local government agencies we contacted reported that they have threat advisory systems in place to ensure government agencies are notified of impending emergencies such as natural disasters or terrorist threats, allowing them to prepare a response. These systems, which were generally in place before the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System, are similar to the Homeland Security Advisory System or have been revised to conform to it and include threat levels with associated protective measures. For example, one federal agency told us that it had developed its own five-level alert system 8 years ago to ensure protection of critical national security assets. While federal, state, and local government agencies said they raise or lower their systems' threat levels to correspond to changes in the national threat level, they also independently change threat levels to respond to specific threats or for large public events.

#### **Background**

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) established the Homeland Security Advisory System in March 2002. Through the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System, HSPD-3 sought to produce a common vocabulary, context, and structure for an ongoing discussion about the nature of threats that confront the nation and the appropriate measures that should be taken in response to those threats. Additionally, HSPD-3 established the Homeland Security Advisory System as a mechanism to inform and facilitate decisions related to securing the homeland among various levels of government, the private sector, and American citizens.

The Homeland Security Advisory System, as shown in figure 1, is comprised of five color-coded threat conditions, which represent levels of risk related to potential terror attack. As defined in HSPD-3, risk includes both the probability of an attack occurring and its potential gravity.

Figure 1: Homeland Security Advisory System



Source: Department of Homeland Security.

Since its establishment in March 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System national threat level has remained at elevated alert—code-yellow—except for five periods during which the administration raised it to high alert—code-orange. The periods of code-orange alert follow:

- September 10 to 24, 2002;
- February 7 to 27, 2003;
- March 17 to April 16, 2003;
- May 20 to 30, 2003; and
- December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004.

The Homeland Security Advisory System is binding on the executive branch. HSPD-3 directs all federal departments, agencies, and offices, other than military facilities, to conform their existing threat advisory systems to the Homeland Security Advisory System. These agencies are responsible for ensuring their systems are consistently implemented in accordance with national threat levels as defined by the Homeland Security Advisory System. Additionally, federal departments and agency heads are responsible for developing protective measures and other antiterrorism or self-protection and continuity plans in response to the various threat levels and operating and maintaining these plans. While HSPD-3 encourages other levels of government and the private sector to conform to the system, their compliance is voluntary.

When HSPD-3 first established the Homeland Security Advisory System, it provided the Attorney General with responsibility for administering the Homeland Security Advisory System, including assigning threat conditions in consultation with members of the Homeland Security Council, except in exigent circumstances. As such, the Attorney General could assign threat levels for the entire nation, for particular

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The Homeland Security Advisory System does not directly apply to the armed forces, including their military facilities. Rather, the Department of Defense's Force Protection Condition system rates threats and sets specific measures for military facilities.

geographic areas, or for specific industrial sectors. Upon its issuance, HSPD-3 also assigned responsibility to the Attorney General for establishing a process and a system for conveying relevant threat information expeditiously to federal, state, and local government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the private sector.

In November 2002, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, which established the Department of Homeland Security. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the DHS Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) is responsible for administering the Homeland Security Advisory System. As such, IAIP is primarily responsible for issuing public threat advisories and providing specific warning information to state and local governments and to the private sector. The act also charges IAIP with providing advice about appropriate protective actions and countermeasures.<sup>6</sup>

In February 2003, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act, the administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which amended HSPD-3 by transferring authority for assigning threat conditions and conveying relevant information from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security. HSPD-5 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the Attorney General and other federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate, including other members of the Homeland Security Council, when determining the threat level, except in exigent circumstances.

# The Advisory System Includes Threat Analysis, Notifications, and Ongoing Revisions, but Protocols for Notification Have Not Been Documented

According to DHS officials, the intelligence community continuously gathers and analyzes information regarding potential terrorist activity. This includes information from such agencies as DHS, <sup>7</sup> the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. <sup>8</sup> Analyses from these and other agencies are shared with DHS's IAIP, which is engaged in constant communication with intelligence agencies to assess potential homeland security threats.

DHS officials told us that when intelligence information provides sufficient indication of a planned terrorist attack, and is determined to be credible, IAIP recommends to the Secretary of Homeland Security that the national threat level should be raised. To decide whether to lower the national threat level, DHS officials told us that the department reviews threat information to determine whether time frames for threats have passed and whether protective measures in place for the code-orange alerts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>P.L. 107-296, Sec. 201(d)(7).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>DHS's Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and its IAIP Directorate monitor threats and conduct information assessments on a daily basis. The HSOC is comprised of representatives from DHS component entities, other federal agencies, and local law enforcement agencies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is responsible for analyzing and sharing terrorist-related information that is collected domestically and abroad. It is an interagency joint venture that is comprised of elements of DHS, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, the Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, the Department of Defense, and other agencies.

have been effective in mitigating the threats. DHS officials further told us that analysis of the threat information and determination of threat level changes are specific for each time period and situation and include a certain amount of subjectivity. They said no explicit criteria or other quantifiable factors are used to decide whether to raise or lower the national threat level.

Based on a review of the threat information and analyses, DHS officials said that the Secretary of Homeland Security consults with the other members of the Homeland Security Council on whether the national threat level should be changed. DHS officials told us that if the Homeland Security Council members could not agree on whether to change the national threat level, the president would make the decision. After the determination has been made to raise or lower the national threat level, DHS begins its notification process.

DHS used the following methods, among others, to notify entities of changes in the national threat level, according to responses from our federal agency questionnaire and discussions with DHS and other government officials:

- Conference calls between the Secretary of Homeland Security and state governors and/or state homeland security officials;
- Telephone calls from Federal Protective Service (FPS, a component of DHS) officials to federal agencies;
- E-mail or telephone communications from Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) representatives to the federal, state, or local agencies they represent;
- HSOC electronic systems such as the Joint Regional Information Exchange System;
- FBI electronic systems such as the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System; 10 and
- E-mail and/or telephone communications with federal agencies' chief of staff and public affairs offices.

Of the 13 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire that received notification from DHS for the code-orange alert period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, 9 reported being notified by more than one method. These agencies most often reported receiving notification of threat level increases via electronic communications systems, such as the Washington Area Warning Alert System. Preliminary questionnaire responses and discussions with federal, state, and local government officials indicate that DHS also used multiple methods to notify federal, state, and local agencies of threat level changes for the other two code-orange alert periods in our review.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Under HSPD-5, the Secretary can change the national threat level without consulting other Homeland Security Council members in exigent circumstances. However, DHS officials told us that this did not occur for any of the three most recent code-orange alerts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>We will continue to assess the various communication systems DHS utilizes to notify entities of threat level changes, including their relationship with one another. We expect to report the results of this work to you later this year.

DHS officials stated in recent congressional testimony that the department's communications of national threat level changes also provide specific information regarding the intelligence supporting the change in the threat condition, and that protective measures are developed and communicated, along with the threat information, prior to a public announcement of the decision. Some federal, state, and local officials indicated in meetings and questionnaire responses that they have not received information on region-, sector-, site-, or event-specific threats in DHS notifications of threat level changes. Some of these officials commented that they would like specific information on threats to determine the most appropriate protective measures for their agencies or localities. Thirteen of the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported receiving notification of the threat level change from DHS during the most recent elevation to code-orange. Six of the 13 agencies reported receiving region- or sector-specific threat information; 5 reported receiving information on threat time frames; and 5 reported receiving site- or eventspecific information. Two of the 15 federal agencies responding to the questionnaire reported that they did not receive notification from DHS. In addition, for each codeorange alert period, 12 of the 15 federal agencies identified insufficient information on the threat as an impediment to responding to the heightened alert. DHS officials maintain that they provide federal, state, and local officials with specific threat information whenever it is available. We will continue to review DHS's notification methods, including the content of such notifications. We expect to report the results of this work later this year.

Some federal agencies, as well as state and local officials we interviewed, reported hearing about notification of national threat level changes from other entities, such as the FBI and media sources, before being notified by DHS. For example, 3 federal agencies and five state and local entities noted learning about national threat level changes via media sources prior to being notified by DHS. This raises questions about whether DHS is always conveying information regarding threat level changes to government entities expeditiously, as required by HSPD-3.

Officials from one federal agency, one state, and two localities would prefer to receive notification of threat level changes from DHS prior to hearing about the changes from media sources. These officials told us that after the change is reported via media sources, their agencies receive requests for detailed information on the change from the public and other entities. They noted that their agencies appear ineffective to the public and other entities because, without notification of the national threat level change before it is reported by media sources, they do not have time to prepare informed responses. DHS officials indicated they were aware that the media sometimes reported threat level changes before DHS notified federal, state, and local officials and in the case of the second alert period in our review, before the decision to raise the threat level was even made. In addition, DHS officials told us that they send notifications/advisories to the media to inform them of impending press conferences, and that the media may speculate about announcements of threat level changes that may be made at the press conferences.

DHS officials told us that they have not yet formally documented protocols for notifying federal, state, and local government agencies of national threat level

changes. They told us that they are working to document their protocols. However, they could not provide us with a specific time frame as to when DHS expects to complete this effort. For an entity to control its operations, it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external events. As we have previously reported, to establish channels that facilitate open and effective communication, agencies should clearly set out procedures, such as communication protocols, that they will consistently follow when doing their work. Communications protocols would, among other things, help foster clear understanding and transparency regarding federal agencies' priorities and operations. Moreover, protocols can help ensure that agencies interact with federal, state, local, and other entities using clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures.

DHS officials told us that the Homeland Security Advisory System is constantly evolving based on their ongoing review of the system. To provide more specific threat information and respond to sector- and location-specific security needs, DHS officials told us they adjust the system based on feedback from federal, state, local and private sector officials; tests of the system; and experience with previous periods of code-orange alert. For example, during the most recent code-orange alert, there was heightened concern about the use of aircraft for potential terrorist attacks and several geographic locations were also reported to be at particularly high risk. In a recent testimony, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security noted that DHS provided specific recommendations for protective measures to industry sectors and for geographic areas in response to specific threat information. When the national threat level was lowered to yellow on January 9, 2004, DHS recommended that some sectors, such as the aviation industry, and certain geographic locations continue on a heightened alert status. According to the Deputy Secretary, this was the first time since the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System that DHS lowered the national threat level but recommended maintaining targeted protections for a particular industry sector or geographic location.

DHS officials also told us that the department issues threat advisories and information bulletins for specific threats that do not require changes in the national threat level. Threat advisories contain information about incidents or threats targeting critical national infrastructures or key assets, such as pipelines. Information bulletins communicate information of a less urgent nature to nongovernmental entities and those responsible for the nation's critical infrastructures. The threat advisories and bulletins we reviewed also include advice on protective measures for law enforcement agencies.

## Federal, State, and Local Agencies Reported Receiving Useful Information and Guidance, but Would Prefer More Specific Information

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported receiving and using guidance and information from various sources to develop plans for responding to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>U.S. General Accounting Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>U.S. General Accounting Office, *Office of Compliance: Status of Management Control Efforts to Improve Effectiveness*, GAO-04-400 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

each of the five national threat levels. In particular, these federal agencies indicated that they received and used guidance from FEMA, FPS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the White House. For example, 6 federal agencies reported using DOJ's *Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities*.<sup>13</sup> This guidance established security levels for different types of federal facilities and minimum-security standards for each level. In addition, 5 federal agencies reported using HSPD-3, which established the Homeland Security Advisory System and suggested general protective measures for each threat level. Twelve federal agencies also reported using their agencies' vulnerability assessments to help them develop appropriate measures to take in responding to national threat levels.

In addition to developing response plans for each threat level, federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported receiving and using both guidance and information and intelligence from various sources to determine additional protective measures to implement in response to the code-orange alerts included in our review. They indicated that the guidance and information was generally useful and timely. For example, as shown in table 1, the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported using guidance from a variety of sources to determine actions to take for the most recent code-orange alert period from December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004. Most federal agencies that reported using guidance from the agencies listed in table 1 noted that the guidance was useful and timely.

Table 1: Number of Federal Agencies that Used Guidance and Found It Useful and Timely for the Code-Orange Alert Period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004

Source of guidance	Number of federal agencies	Useful	Timely⁵
DHS	11	10	7
FBI	5	5	5
White House	4	4	4
Local law enforcement	1	1	1

Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO's guestionnaire.

<sup>a</sup>We asked federal agencies to indicate whether guidance they received was very useful, somewhat useful, or of little or no use. Useful reflects respondent ratings of very useful and somewhat useful.

<sup>b</sup>We also asked agencies to indicate whether the guidance they received was timely by responding yes or no.

Likewise, as shown in table 2, the 15 respondents to the federal agency questionnaire indicated that they used multiple sources of information and intelligence in determining actions for the most recent code-orange alert period. These agencies also generally reported that information and intelligence from the sources listed in table 2 was useful and timely.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Department of Justice, *Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities* (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 1995).

Table 2: Number of Federal Agencies that Used Information and Intelligence and Found It Useful and Timely for the Code-Orange Alert Period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004

Source of information/intelligence	Number of federal agencies	Useful <sup>a</sup>	Timely⁵
DHS	9	8	8
FBI	10	8	8
White House	4	4	4
National Joint Terrorism			
Task Force <sup>14</sup>	5	5	4
Agency intelligence sources	3	3	2
Local law enforcement	2	2	1

Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO's guestionnaire.

Results for the other two code-orange alert periods included in our review—March 17 to April 16, 2003, and May 20 to 30, 2003—were consistent with those reported in tables 1 and 2 for the code-orange alert period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004.

State and local government officials we met with told us that they also used guidance and information from several sources, including DHS, to develop actions to take for the code-orange alert periods. For example, they told us that their agencies used guidance and information from DHS on critical infrastructure assets and airport security. They also indicated that they used information from the FBI and local law enforcement agencies, such as additional intelligence information, to determine areas in which to strengthen protective measures.<sup>15</sup>

For the most part, federal agencies responding to our questionnaire along with officials we met with from 3 state and 6 local government agencies indicated that receiving information with greater specificity about threats would have been helpful in determining additional actions to take in response to code-orange alerts. For example, 14 of 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that information on region-, sector-, site-, or event-specific threats, if available, would have been helpful. Additionally, all 15 federal agencies reported that information on threat time frames, if available, would have assisted them in determining appropriate actions to take in responding to the code-orange alerts. Fourteen federal agencies also indicated that receiving information on recommended measures for preventing incidents would have been helpful in determining appropriate protective measures to implement or enhance for each code-orange alert period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> We asked federal agencies to indicate whether the information and intelligence they received was very useful, somewhat useful, or of little or no use. Useful reflects respondent ratings of very useful and somewhat useful. <sup>b</sup>We also asked agencies to indicate whether the guidance they received was timely by responding yes or no.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The National Joint Terrorism Task Force is comprised of numerous federal agencies co-located in the Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI headquarters. This task force provides a central fusion point for terrorism information and intelligence to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which include state and local law enforcement officers, federal agents, and other federal personnel who work in the field to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>We expect to learn more about the guidance used by states and localities as we receive responses from our state questionnaire and will continue to develop this information through our site visits with various local officials. We expect to report the results from this work to you later in this year.

In addition, one state official noted that receiving more specific information about the type of threat—against bridges and dams, for example—would enable the state to concentrate its response in those areas, a more effective approach than simply blanketing the state with increased general security measures. One local official also noted that specific information about the location of a threat should be provided to law enforcement agencies throughout the nation—not just to localities that are being threatened—thus allowing other local governments to determine whether there would be an indirect impact on them and to respond accordingly. DHS officials indicated that the department works with state and local officials to develop specific protective measures. One official said that DHS communicates regularly with and provides technical advice to state and local officials to assist in the development of specialized and appropriate protective measures.

#### Federal Agencies Reported Enhancing Existing Protective Measures More Often than Implementing New Measures, While State and Local Agencies Reported Implementing Additional Measures

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire as well as those we visited indicated that they substantially enhanced security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Thus, these agencies operate at high security levels regardless of the national threat level. In responding to our questionnaire, most federal agencies noted that they did not significantly increase the number of additional protective measures in response to the code-orange alerts. Federal agencies reported that their primary response for the three code-orange alerts was to enhance or more frequently use measures already in place, such as increasing the frequency of existing facility security patrols. Less often, these agencies indicated that they continued, or did not change, existing protective measures as a result of the code-orange alert periods, such as the use of intrusion detection systems.

During the code orange alert period from December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, preliminary responses to the federal agency questionnaire indicate that about 49 percent of all protective measures these agencies reported were enhanced in response to the threat level increase. About 37 percent of all protective measures reported for this period were continued at their pre-code-orange alert levels, or not changed, by federal agencies in response to the code-orange alert. About 13 percent of the protective measures federal agencies reported for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, code-orange alert period were implemented by these agencies solely in response to the code-orange alert. For instance, one measure implemented solely in response to the code orange alert period was the extension of shifts for emergency personnel. Preliminary analysis of responses regarding the other two periods of code-orange alert is consistent with those from the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, period.

As indicated in table 3, among the most commonly reported protective measures, only one was implemented solely in response to the code-orange alert period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, according to federal agencies' questionnaire

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Percentages do not total to 100 percent due to rounding.

responses. Even so, only 2 of the 14 federal agencies that reported having the measure indicated that they implemented the measure solely in response to the code-orange alert, while the other 12 agencies indicated that the measure was already in place. The protective measures most commonly reported by federal agencies for the code-orange alert period were already in place and continued at pre-code-orange alert levels or were enhanced for the code-orange alert period. Preliminary results for the other two code-orange alert periods in our review were similar to those reported in table 3.

Table 3: Protective Measures Most Commonly Reported by Federal Agencies for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, Code-Orange Alert Period

	Number of federal agencies that reported measure	Number of agencies that indicated no change in measure that was already in place	Number of agencies that enhanced measure that was already in place <sup>b</sup>	Number of agencies that Implemented measure for code-orange only°
Screen mail	15	8	7	0
Activate monitoring systems	15	11	4	0
Activate intrusion detection systems	15	14	1	0
Implement facility security patrols	15	2	13	0
Inspect visitors	14	8	6	0
Escort visitors	14	5	7	2

Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO's questionnaire.

To ensure that protective measures operate as intended and are implemented as planned, federal agencies for which we received questionnaire responses indicated that they conducted tests or exercises on these measures within the past year. These federal agencies also reported receiving confirmation from component entities, offices, or personnel that protective measures were enhanced or implemented during the code-orange alert periods. Fifteen federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported that they conducted tests or exercises on the functionality and reliability of intrusion detection systems, mail and delivery screening equipment and procedures, monitoring systems, and continuity of operations and emergency response measures. Fourteen of these agencies indicated that they conducted tests or exercises on visitor and employee screening procedures and vehicle inspection equipment and procedures. Furthermore, 12 of these agencies noted that they confirmed that protective measures were enhanced or implemented during each of the three code-orange alert periods.

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that they benefited in various ways from the protective measures they implemented during code-orange alerts, but also noted that their operations were affected. For example, these federal agencies reported that protective measures enhanced employees' sense of security,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>No change in a protective measure indicates that the measure was already in place prior to the code-orange alert period and continued at the same level of use or frequency during a code-orange alert.

The enhancement of a measure that was already in place refers to the increased use of an existing protective measure, such as more frequent facility security patrols or increased volume of mail screened.

The implementation of a measure for code-orange only refers to the use of an additional measure that was not already in place solely to respond to a code-orange alert.

promoted staff awareness, and provided visible deterrents to possible threats. On the other hand, they said that their operations were affected by delaying visitors, employees, and vehicles from entering facilities; limiting tours, meetings, and conferences; and shifting resources away from normal daily operations to ensure measures required for code-orange alerts were implemented.

Additionally, these federal agencies noted that they faced a number of operational challenges in responding to the code-orange alerts. For example, 12 of the 15 federal agencies indicated that insufficient information on threats was an operational challenge. In particular, 6 federal agencies noted that without specific information on threats, they could not effectively focus resources on protective measures to respond to possible threats. Other operational challenges identified by some federal agencies responding to our questionnaire include insufficient personnel training to implement protective measures, insufficient equipment and materials, and insufficient facilities and space, particularly to screen visitors.

Officials from two states and three local governments told us that they responded to code-orange alerts by implementing a variety of protective measures, such as enhanced entry screening, additional law enforcement patrols, and increased surveillance of critical infrastructure. They also told us that, in some cases, their agencies implemented heightened airport security measures and increased coordination with other agencies during the code-orange alert periods.

## Cost Data Reported by Federal, State, and Local Government Agencies Is Limited

Thirteen federal agencies, one state, and six localities provided information on additional costs, if any, that they incurred during code-orange alert periods. The cost information federal agencies reported in response to our questionnaire were generally estimates; the methods the state and six localities used to develop their information are generally unknown.

Thirteen of the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire provided information on whether they incurred additional costs during each of the three code-orange alert periods in our review. Of these 13 federal agencies, 9 noted they had incurred additional costs and provided a dollar amount for those costs; 4 agencies said that they did not incur any additional costs.

Eight of the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs provided cost estimates. In addition, most of these agencies reported using similar methods to develop their estimates. Based on our preliminary analysis, these methods appear to be reasonable. For example, 5 of these agencies reported using the additional hours accumulated by security personnel during code-orange alerts multiplied by the hourly rates of security personnel to develop estimates for additional personnel costs incurred during code-orange alerts. The 8 agencies' cost estimates do not necessarily include all nonpersonnel costs that may have been incurred during one or more of the three code-orange alert periods included in our survey.

One agency tracked additional costs incurred in response to code-orange alerts, and thus was able to provide actual cost information. This agency extracted cost information from its financial accounting system, which was subjected to auditing procedures. However, as reported in the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget, this agency's financial management performance had serious flaws as of December 31, 2003. Thus, we have concerns regarding the reliability of the cost information provided to us. We will continue to assess this issue and expect to report the results of this effort to you later this year.

For the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs, we calculated the additional average daily costs incurred during each of the three code-orange alert periods. The additional average daily costs for these 9 agencies ranged from \$172 to \$155,000 for the March 17 to April 16, 2003, period; from \$467 to \$165,660 for the May 20 to 30, 2003, period; and from \$158 to \$142,725 for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, period. For each code-orange alert period, the lowest cost was for a small independent agency and the largest for a cabinet department.

We conducted preliminary analysis on the additional average daily costs the 9 federal agencies incurred between the first and second alert periods, and no specific trends emerged. For example, of the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs during code-orange alert periods, 5 agencies had an increase in additional average daily costs between the first and second alert periods under review, and 3 agencies had a decrease. One agency's additional costs remained the same for each of the first two code-orange alert periods. For these 9 agencies, the total percentage change between the first and second alert periods ranged from a decrease of approximately 22 percent to an increase of about 179 percent. However, this 179 percent increase, reported by a small independent agency, represented only a difference of about \$300.

Based on the cost information these agencies reported, 8 of the 9 agencies incurred fewer additional costs during the third code-orange alert period than during the first code-orange alert. Percentage decreases in additional costs between these two periods ranged from about 8 percent to 83 percent. One agency did not experience any difference in additional costs incurred between the first and third code-orange alert periods under review.

Even though the percentage decreases are similar for some of the 9 federal agencies, the actual dollar amount of the decreases could vary considerably. For example, while 2 federal agencies experienced an 8 percent decline in additional average daily costs between the first and third alert periods, 1 of these, a small independent agency, had a \$14 decline in additional average daily costs, while the other, a larger cabinet level agency, had a \$12,275 decline.

Currently, we do not have sufficient information to explain the differences in additional costs the 9 federal agencies incurred between the first and second code-orange alert periods and the overall decline in additional costs for 8 of the 9 agencies between the first and third code-orange alert periods. As our analysis of the additional costs incurred by federal agencies continues, we will continue to examine differences in the additional costs individual agencies incurred in each alert period, and, where possible, obtain information about the reasons for these differences. We expect to report the results of this work to you later this year.

Two of the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire said that they did not report cost information for any of the three orange alert periods in the survey because they did not track additional code-orange alert costs. These agencies explained that they did not have the capability to separate additional code-orange alert costs from their total annual security-related costs.

To date, we have received code-orange alert cost information from one state and six localities. These state and local cost estimates included little or no information on how they were developed or on internal control procedures used to verify the reliability of the costs provided. Therefore, we were unable to verify the comprehensiveness, consistency, reliability, or comparability of the cost estimates they provided. Based on the cost information provided by one state, we calculated the additional average daily cost for 10 of the state's agencies, which amounted to just under \$400 for the code-orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003. Five of its agencies collectively incurred an additional average daily cost of just over \$90 for the code-orange alert from May 20 to 30, 2003. No cost information was provided for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, code-orange alert period.

We do not yet know how the localities developed their cost information. Thus, we cannot assess the reliability of this information. We calculated additional average daily costs for the six localities based on the cost information they provided to us. Five localities had additional average daily costs for the March 17 to April 16, 2003, period, ranging from a low of about \$8,000 to a high of about \$68,000. Two localities had average daily costs of about \$12,000 or less and two had costs of more than \$60,000. For the May 20 to 30, 2003, period, three localities had additional average daily costs of approximately \$100, \$6,000, and \$9,000, respectively. One of the localities provided cost information for all three orange alert periods included in our review—but its information was limited to costs for 3 agencies. That locality had additional average daily costs for 3 agencies of about \$12,000 in the March 17 to April 16, 2003, period; approximately \$9,000 in the May 20 to 30, 2003, period; and about \$11,000 for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, period. Finally, one locality had about \$5,000 per day in police overtime, equipment, and contractual costs for each day the locality was at code-orange during February through May 2003.

We sent a questionnaire to 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 4 territories to collect a variety of information, including additional costs they incurred during code-orange alerts. However, we did not receive responses from any states and territories in time to include the results in this report. We expect to report any cost information collected through this effort to you later this year. Based on our work to date, states and localities generally may not systematically and uniformly collect the additional costs associated with higher (e.g., code-orange) alert levels; thus, we do not expect to collect reliable, comparable, and comprehensive state and local government costs. For example, one locality we visited told us they had tracked some additional code-orange costs by using a specific job code, but the level of effort involved to get all agencies to comply had been considerable. To the extent that inconsistent methods were used in estimating costs, reasonable comparisons of cost information are limited.

## Some Federal, State, and Local Government Agencies Have Similar Advisory Systems, but Can Change Threat Levels Independently

Of those agencies and entities that we have met with or contacted, 5 federal agencies, 4 states, and one locality have their own threat advisory systems to ensure that government agencies are notified of impending emergencies, such as natural disasters or terrorist threats, allowing them to prepare a response. These systems were generally in place prior to the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System. One federal agency told us that it had developed its own five-level alert system 8 years ago to ensure the protection of critical national security assets. This system and those of the other 9 agencies are similar to the Homeland Security Advisory System or have been modified to conform to it, as required for federal executive agencies by HSPD-3. The systems include varying threat levels with protective measures specified for each. For example, all federal agencies' threat advisory systems we have identified to date have five threat levels that correspond to the five levels of the Homeland Security Advisory System and specify a variety of protective measures for each level. Protective measures specified in these threat advisory systems include the implementation of contingency and emergency response plans; surveillance of critical locations; screening of mail coming into facilities; limitation of facility entry and exit points; and coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

Likewise, one state's threat advisory system has five threat levels, while another state's system has four. Again, these threat levels are similar to those of the Homeland Security Advisory System. A third state's threat advisory system has three threat levels that correspond to the Homeland Security Advisory System's yellow, orange, and red threat conditions. Protective measures included in these states' systems include inspection of mail and packages, coordination of emergency response plans, establishment of command centers, and enhanced security at public events. The one locality threat advisory system we have identified to date is also similar to the Homeland Security Advisory System and has four threat levels with specific actions designated for each.

Federal, state, and local government agencies we reviewed can raise or lower threat levels for their own advisory systems in response to threats or events that specifically affect their operations. They can make these adjustments regardless of whether the national threat level is raised or lowered at the same time. For instance, for 3 of the federal agencies' threat advisory systems we identified, managers can raise the alert level of their specific facilities to respond to local threat conditions. However, in general, managers cannot lower alert levels for their facilities below the level specified by an agency head or designated authority. States and local governments can also raise or lower their own threat levels based on local threats or events. For example, one state raised its threat level in early February 2003 in response to the crash of the space shuttle *Columbia*, while one locality raised its threat level for July 4, 2003, due to public events and large crowds in the city, even though the national threat level remained at yellow.

#### **Agency Comments**

On February 23 and 24, 2004, officials representing the Department of Homeland Security provided oral technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform; Senator Joseph Biden; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at <a href="http://www.gao.gov">http://www.gao.gov</a>. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at <a href="mailto:jenkinswo@gao.gov">jenkinswo@gao.gov</a>.

William O. Jenkins, Jr.

Milliam Henking

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

**Enclosures: 4** 

#### Scope and Methodology

To address the objectives of our review, we met with and received information from 8 federal agencies, three states, the District of Columbia, and seven local governments and obtained information from another state and two local governments. We met with and received documentation from these federal agencies, states, the District of Columbia, and the local governments to obtain preliminary information on the following: how they were notified of national threat level changes for the three most recent periods of code-orange alert from March 17 to April 16, 2003; May 20 to 30, 2003; and December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004; the guidance and information they reported using to assist in determining protective measures to implement during the three code-orange alerts; the protective measures they reported implementing during those periods; the additional costs they reported incurring as a result of implementing such measures; and any threat advisory systems they indicated were in place before the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

We selected the 8 federal agencies to visit based on the amount of homeland security funding each agency reported to the Office of Management and the Budget for fiscal year 2003. We visited the 5 federal agencies that reported receiving the most homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003—the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. We visited one federal agency that reported receiving a moderate amount of homeland security funding, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; one federal agency that reported receiving a small amount of homeland security funding, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum; and one federal agency that did not report receiving any homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003, the Department of Education.

The three states we visited were Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. We also visited the District of Columbia. The seven local governments we visited were Baltimore, Maryland; Austin, Dallas, and Travis County, Texas; and Alexandria, Arlington County, and Fairfax County, Virginia. We also received information from Montgomery County, Maryland, and Seattle, Washington. We selected Maryland and Virginia because they have critical infrastructure assets such as national landmarks and ports. Moreover, we selected the local governments in these states and the District of Columbia because they are part of the National Capitol Region, which has various important infrastructure assets, including landmarks and federal agency headquarters. We visited Texas, and three local governments in Texas, because it is a large coastal state with a variety of critical infrastructure assets, including national landmarks, ports, and oil pipelines. We also received information from Seattle, Washington, because it is a large city with critical infrastructure assets such as landmarks and ports.

We examined documentation provided by the federal agencies, states, and local governments mentioned above to identify the guidance and information they used in determining protective measures for the three code-orange alert periods, the measures they implemented during those periods, the additional costs they incurred

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Office of Management and Budget, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism.

as a result of the measures implemented, and the threat advisory systems they had in place prior to the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We also obtained information from Georgia on its threat advisory system.

To obtain more detailed information on federal and state agencies' guidance, measures, and additional costs for the three code-orange alert periods, we developed and sent a questionnaire to 28 federal agencies and another to the 50 states and the District of Columbia, four U.S. territories<sup>18</sup> and Puerto Rico. We received comments on draft versions of the federal questionnaire from the 8 federal agencies we visited, and we pre-tested the federal questionnaire with 4 of those agencies—the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. To develop a questionnaire to use in surveying states and territories, we adapted the final version of the federal questionnaire to correspond with information gathered during our preliminary visits to the 3 states, the District of Columbia, and the seven local governments and information provided to us by 1 state and two local governments. We then pre-tested this questionnaire with 3 states—Delaware, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.

We sent the questionnaire to the 25 federal agencies that reported homeland security funding for fiscal year 2003 to the Office of Management and Budget. <sup>19</sup> In addition, we sent the questionnaire to 3 federal agencies that are Chief Financial Officers Act agencies but did not report homeland security funding for fiscal year 2003. Thus, we included all Chief Financial Officers Act agencies in our review, except the Department of Defense. Although the Department of Defense is a Chief Financial Officers Act agency and, along with the Army Corps of Engineers-Civil Works, reported homeland security funding for fiscal year 2003, we excluded these agencies from our review because these agencies and their component entities did not follow the Homeland Security Advisory System.

We conducted preliminary analysis on the questionnaire responses received from 15 federal agencies for this report. While we received questionnaire responses from additional federal agencies, we did not receive the responses in time to incorporate the results into this report. We did not receive responses from any states or territories to our questionnaire in time to include the results in this report.

For the 15 federal agencies' questionnaire responses, we analyzed the responses to determine the most commonly reported ways in which these federal agencies were notified of changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System national threat level, the types of information included in the notifications, the methods through which these federal agencies would like to be notified of national threat level changes, and the types of information they would like to have included in the notifications.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>The four U.S. territories include American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Office of Management and Budget, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. Of the 25 federal agencies that reported homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003, 22 are Chief Financial Officers Act agencies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>P.L. 101-576 (Nov. 15, 1990).

In addition, we analyzed the questionnaire responses to determine the most commonly reported types of guidance and information received by these federal agencies in determining protective measures for the code-orange alerts and federal agencies' perspectives on the usefulness and timeliness of the guidance and information. We also reviewed the questionnaire responses to identify agency perspectives on the types of additional information that would have been helpful in determining protective measures.

We evaluated the questionnaire responses to identify the most commonly reported types of measures that the 15 federal agencies implemented during the three codeorange alert periods, the extent to which these federal agencies conducted tests on protective measures and received confirmation on the implementation of measures, the benefits to these federal agencies from the implementation of measures, and the most commonly reported operational challenges faced by the 15 federal agencies in implementing measures.

Furthermore, we analyzed cost data reported by these federal agencies in the questionnaire responses to determine the average daily additional costs incurred by federal agencies during the code-orange alert periods. We analyzed the federal agencies' cost data to determine the percentage change in additional average daily costs across the three code-orange alert periods. We evaluated the questionnaire responses to identify methods used by these federal agencies to determine their actual or estimated additional costs for each of the code-orange alert periods and their actual or estimated total costs for each code-yellow alert that preceded the code-orange alert periods. We reviewed these methods to assess the level of consistency in the ways that these federal agencies collected actual cost data or developed costs estimates and also reviewed procedures reported by federal agencies for reviewing and certifying the reliability of cost data.

To obtain information on these federal agencies' threat advisory systems, we analyzed questionnaire responses to determine the number of federal agencies that had their own threat advisory systems in place prior to the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System as well as the number of agencies that follow their own threat advisory systems and the Homeland Security Advisory System. We reviewed documentation of the threat advisory systems that these federal agencies provided with their questionnaire responses to identify the characteristics of the systems, including the systems' threat levels and protective measures and the systems' conformance to the Homeland Security Advisory System.

On the basis of our work to date, we collected detailed information on the experiences of Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia, during the code-orange alert periods through visits with local government officials. We plan to collect detailed information from seven additional cities and four additional counties. We selected locations based on the following criteria: the local governments' receipt of urban area grants<sup>21</sup> from DHS, geographic location, topography (e.g., inland or border/seaport), and type of locality (e.g., metropolitan or nonmetropolitan area). We selected some

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The Urban Area Security Initiative grants are awarded based on a combination of current threat estimates, critical assets within the urban area, and population density.

cities and counties that received grants from DHS and some that did not. We also selected cities and counties from different geographic regions and with different topographic characteristics, as well as cities and counties that are in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.

#### **Enclosure II**

#### Federal Agencies Surveyed

Department of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

Department of Education

Department of Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Department of the Interior

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Department of State

Department of Transportation

Department of the Treasury

Department of Veterans Affairs

Agency for International Development

Corporation for National and Community Service

**Environmental Protection Agency** 

Federal Communications Commission

**General Services Administration** 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Archives and Records Administration

**National Science Foundation** 

**Nuclear Regulatory Commission** 

Office of Personnel Management

**Small Business Administration** 

**Smithsonian Institution** 

Social Security Administration

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum



#### United States General Accounting Office

#### Survey of Federal Agencies' Protective Measures, Guidance, and Costs for Elevated Threat Alerts

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has been requested by Congress to review federal agencies' security-related protective measures, guidance, and costs for periods when the national threat level was raised from yellow (elevated) to orange (high). As part of this request, GAO is surveying 28 federal agencies that received homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003, as reported to the Office of Management and Budget, and/or are Chief Financial Officers Act agencies. Results from this survey will help GAO to inform Congress of (1) protective measures taken by federal agencies during periods of orange alert, specifically for the periods March 17 to April 16, 2003, May 20 to May 30, 2003, and December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004; (2) guidance and other information used by federal agencies in implementing those measures; and (3) costs incurred by federal agencies as a result of protective measures implemented during those three orange alert periods.

This questionnaire should be completed by the person(s) most knowledgeable about your agency's security-related measures, guidance, and costs for the orange alerts from March 17 to April 16, 2003, May 20 to May 30, 2003, and December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004, including your agency's protective measures for threat levels; guidance and other information used by your agency in developing and implementing protective measures during those periods; your agency's methods for tracking or collecting cost data and ensuring data reliability; your agency's national threat level notification processes; and financial and operational challenges your agency faced during the three orange alert periods. If your agency, or certain of its facilities, remains on orange alert even though the national threat level has been lowered, please answer the questions about the most recent orange alert period considering your agency's actions and costs through January 9, 2004. Most of the questions can be answered by marking boxes or filling in blanks. Space has been provided at the end of the survey for any additional comments, and we encourage you to provide whatever additional comments you think appropriate. In our report, the responses from your agency will be presented only after they have been aggregated with responses from other responding agencies. GAO will not release individual agency responses to any entity unless requested by Congress or compelled by law. In addition, GAO will take appropriate measures to safeguard any sensitive information provided by your agency, and, upon request, can provide security clearance information for staff reviewing survey responses.

Please complete this questionnaire within 2 weeks of receipt. Your agency's participation is important! A member of our staff will pick up your completed questionnaire. If you have any questions or when you are ready for your questionnaire and any accompanying materials to be picked up, please contact Dr. Jonathan Tumin on (202) 512-3595, Rebecca Gambler on (202) 512-6912, or Kristy Brown on (202) 512-8697.

	, title, agency, and telephone number of the primary person completing this questionnaire so that son if we need to clarify any responses.
Name:	
Title:	
Agency:	
Telephone number: (	_)

GAO Survey on Threat Alerts

<u>Definition of term "agency"</u>: Any entity within the executive branch, including federal departments, independent establishments, and government corporations. If the questionnaire is to be completed by a federal agency's components, then "agency" refers to the component entity rather than the department.

#### Agency Protective Measures for National Threat Levels

issuance of the directive

1,		res and	other antiterrorism or self-protection and continuity plans for national e 2 of the attachment.)
	Has your agency developed protective	measure	es for national threat levels? (Please check only one answer.)
	<ol> <li>Yes, agency modified protective measures developed prior to the directive to conform with national threat levels established in the directive</li> </ol>	•	Please provide a copy of the measures along with your completed questionnaire.
	2. ☐ Yes, agency developed protective measures for	•	Please provide a copy of the measures along with your completed questionnaire.

 Agency is in the process of modifying or developing protective measures
 Please provide time frames your agency has established for completing the measures:

No, agency has <u>not</u> modified or developed protective measures

Please briefly describe the reasons why your agency has not modified or developed the measures:

If you answer #4, please skip to question 5; otherwise, please continue.

2

GAO Survey on Threat Alerts

2,	Did your agency use guidance and/or	r information from any of the following sources in developing your protective
	measures for national threat levels?	(Please check one answer in each row.)

Source	Yes	No	Don't know
a. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	50		Tarabbanda Tarabbanda
b. Federal Protective Service (FPS)	94		
c. Department of Defense	-		
d. Department of Justice	10		
e. White House	-		
f. Local law enforcement			
g. Vulnerability assessments for your agency			
h. Other sources (Please specify.)	0000		

3.	If you answered "yes" for any source in question 2, please answer:
	Please list the source and titles or topics of any written guidance used by your agency in developing your protective
	measures for national threat levels.

Title or topic (e.g., how to identify critical infrastructure)

4. Within the past year, did your agency (or at least one component) conduct exercises or tests on the functionality and reliability of any of the following protective measures? (Please check one answer in each row.)

Protective measure	Yes	No	Don't know	Not applicable
a. Intrusion detection systems	25.5			
b. Visitor/employee screening equipment and procedures	81 6	1		
c. Vehicle inspection equipment and procedures	81 6	1	1	
d. Baggage and/or cargo screening equipment and procedures	85 69	1	1	
e. Mail and delivery screening procedures	\$5 G			
f. Monitoring systems, such as surveillance cameras	(3) E			
g. Continuity of operations measures	E2 11			
h. Emergency response measures	(A) (D)			
i. Other measures (Please specify.)	2) (2)			

		GAO Survey on Threat Alerts
5.	the Assistant to the President for Homeland Secu	ires federal agencies to develop and submit to the President, through rity, an annual written report on steps taken to develop and t levels. (See highlighted passage on page 2 of the attachment.)
	In accordance with this directive, what is the state (Please check one answer.)	us of your agency's most recent annual report to the President?
		Please provide a copy of the report along with your completed questionnaire.
	Agency has completed but not submitted the annual report	Please provide time frames your agency has established for submitting the report, and a copy of the report if possible:
	3. ☐ Agency is in the process of completing the annual report	Please provide time frames your agency has established for completing and submitting the report:
	Agency has not begun the annual → Freport but intends to do so	Please provide time frames your agency has established for beginning, completing, and submitting the report:
		Please briefly describe the reasons why your agency does not intend to prepare and submit an annual report:
		4

ło	meland Security Advisory System	GAO Survey on Threat Alert
		or preparing and responding to homeland security threats prior y System (HSAS) in March 2002? (Please check only one
	1. $\square$ Yes, agency had its own threat-advisory system	<ul> <li>Please provide the name of your agency's threat- advisory system and a copy of system documentation, if available, along with your completed questionnaire</li> </ul>
	2. $\square$ No, agency did not have its own threat-advisory s	ystem
	To what extent, if at all, does your agency follow the H responding to homeland security threats? (Please check	omeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) for preparing and k only one answer.)
	1. ☐ Agency only follows the HSAS	
	Agency follows the HSAS <u>and its own</u> threat—advisory system that <u>conforms</u> with the HSAS	Please provide the name of your agency's threat-advisory system and a copy of system documentation, if available, along with your completed questionnaire.
	Agency follows the HSAS <u>and</u> its own threat–advisory system that <u>does not</u> conform with the HSAS	Please provide the name of your agency's threat-advisory system and a copy of system documentation, if available, along with your completed questionnaire.
	Agency does not follow the HSAS, but uses its own threat–advisory system  →	Please provide the name of your agency's threat-advisory system and a copy of system documentation, if available, along with your completed questionnaire.
	If you answered #4, please stop and return this	questionnaire according to the instructions on page 1.
	<ol> <li>☐ Agency does not follow the HSAS and does not use its own threat-advisory system, but uses another threat-level system (e.g., the Department of Defense's Force Protection Condition system)</li> </ol>	Please provide the name of the other threat-advisory system used by your agency.
	If you answered #5, please stop and return this	questionnaire according to the instructions on page 1.
	6. ☐ Agency does not follow any threat-advisory system	m
	If you answered #6, please stop and return this	questionnaire according to the instructions on page 1.

GAO Survey on Threat Alerts Types of Protective Measures Used During HSAS Code-Yellow Alerts and Specifically in Response to Code-Orange Alerts from March 17 to April 16, 2003, from May 20 to May 30, 2003, and from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004

We would like to know the types of protective measures your agency has in place during Code-Yellow alerts and the types of measures used during the Code-Orange alerts from Narch 17 to April 16, 2003, from May 20 to May 30, 2003, and from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004.

8a. Please indicate the protective measures your agency (or at least one component) has in place for Code-Yellow aloris. (Please check "Yes", "No", or "Not applicable-NA" for each measure.)

8h, 8c, and 8d. Please indicate the protective measures your agency (or at least one component) implemented or increased the use of age<u>ctifically</u> in response to the Code-Orange alorts, that is, measures implemented in addition to the measures used in the preceding Code-Yellow alort period. (Please cheek "Implemented, Code-Orange only", "Increased use of", or "NA or no change in measure" for each measure in each column.)

	Question 8a	Question 8b	Question 8c	Question 8d
	Measure already in place for Code- Yellow alerts	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, March 17 - April 16, 2003	Implemented or increased use of mensure for Code-Orange alert, May 20 - May 30, 2003	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004
<ol> <li>Protection of agency facilities (including critical infrastructure), personnel, and systems</li> </ol>				
■ If your agency did not implement any types of measures in earligery "1", please check this box and skip to entegory "2".				
a, Implement facility security patrols	AND OND SYD	Implemented, Code-Orange only     Increased use of     NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange on ly ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange cuity ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
b. Implement random shift changes for security personn d	□Yœ □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange on ly ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
c. Extend shifts for security personnel	□Y∞ □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
d. Inspect visitors and their belongings upon entry	AND NO DYA	Implemented, Code-Orange only     Increased use of     NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange on ly ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange culy. ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure.
$\boldsymbol{e}.$ Inspect employees and their belongings upon entry	□Yes □Ne □NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange cuty ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
f. Inspect vehicles entering or parking near facilities	□Y∞ □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
g. Restrict parking near ficellities	AND OND SYD	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange on ly ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
Continued on next page				

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### **Enclosure III Federal Questionnaire**

				and the same of th
	Question 8a	Question 8b	Question 8c	Question 8d
	Measure already in place for Code- Yellow alerts	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange akert, March 17 – April 16, 2003	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, May 20 - May 30, 2003	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, Dec. 21, 20t6 – Jan. 9, 2004
h. Place vehicle barriers around facilities	□Yα □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure
i. Expand security perimeter at facilities	□Yα □ No □ NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no dampe in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Ingreased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
j. Limit number of facility access points	DYS DNO DWA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
k. Sereen mail and/or other deliveries	$\Box Y \otimes \Box N \circ \Box N A$	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
I. Escort facility visitors	□Yα □ No □ NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Ingreased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
m. Activate menitoring systems, such as surveillance cameras	□Yes □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
n. Activate intrusion detection systems	□Y∞ □ No □ NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
o. Recommend that on ployees limit travel	□Yα □ No □ NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
p. Limit and/or close facilities to visitors	□Yes □ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
q. Limit and/or close facilities to non-essential employees	$\Box Y \otimes \Box N \circ \Box N A$	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
r. Close facilities to essential employees and/or move operations to alternative site	□Yα □ No □ NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Ingreased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
s. Other measures in this category (Please specify.)	OYS ON ONA		☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure


Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange akert, Implemented, Code-Orango only
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☐ Increased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure alert, May 20 - May 30, 2003 ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only
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☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only
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☐ Ingreased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure of measure for Code-Orange ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure of measure for Code-Orange alert, March 17 - April 16, 2003 Implemented or increased use ☐ Implemented, Code-Orango only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only
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☐ Increased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure Measure already in place for Code-DYS DNO DNA DYes DNo DNA DYC DNO DNA OYS ON ONA DYS DNO DNA O Yes O No O NA DYS DN DNA UND OND OYes ON ONLY Yellow alerts Ouestion 8a OYes ☐ If your agency did not implement any types of measures in category "Z", please check this box and skip Extend shifts for inspectors, particle agents, screeners, and/or Air and Sea Marshals Conduct security checks of sensitive areas at ports of e. Inspect/screen vehicles, cargo, baggage and persons Deploy inspectors, partel agents, passenger and baggage screeners, and/or Air and Sea Marshals Implement random shift changes for inspectors, Other measures in this category (Plazze specify.) f. Screen and/or detain visa and asylum applicants Implementairs, waters, and land-based patrols around borders and ports of entry 2. Border and transportation security efforts Activate monitoring systems at ports of entry Excert ferries and cruise ships patrol agents, and screeners эйод ганн но рэмн to category "3" antid d

Per al Implemented or in creased use of measure for Code-Orange only of increased use of in increased use of in indicensing only of indicensing only of indicension of indicension of indicension of indicension only of indicension of indicension only of indicension of indicension of indicension only of indicension of indicension only of indicension of only of indicension of only of indicension of only of indicension of only of indicension of indicen	å	Onestion Sa	Ouestion 8h	Ouestion &	Onestion 84
Yea   No   N/A   Display	Measur place Yell	re already in for Code- low alerts	Implemented or in creased use of measure for Code-Orange akert, March 17 – April 16, 2003	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, May 20 – May 30, 2003	Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange akert, Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004
Yea   No   N/A     Implemented, Code-Orange only	ormation collection, analysis, and anation				
Implemented, Code-Orange only	our agency did not implement mytypes of se in category "3", please check this box and skip poy "4".				
O' ss   No   N/A   Discressed use of	management D Y co	O No O N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no clange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure
Dinylemented, Code-Orange only	ΟYα	O No O N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure
and   Yes   No   NNA   Increased use of   Implemented, Code-Orange only	for protective   Yes	□ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure
and   Yes   No   NA   Instrused use of   NA or no dange in measure   Implemented, Code-Crange only   NA   Instrused use of   NA or no dange in measure   NA or no dange in	offices □ Yes	□ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure
and   Yes   No   NA   Increased use of   NA or no change in measure   NA or no change in measure   NA or no change in measure   Implemented, Code-Orange only   Implemented, Code-Orange only   Implemented, Code-Orange only   Implemented, Code-Orange only   NA or no change in measure   NA or no change in me	ΟYα	O No O N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
and	ПΥα	□ No □ N/A	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure
Implemented, Code-Orange only     Independent of the Code-Orange only     NA or no change in measure     Implemented, Code-Orange only     Ne    No    NA	ΟYœ		☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ NA ☐ Insplemented, Code-Orange only	information	O No O WA	☐ Implemented Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no clange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure
■ N/A or no change in measure		O No O NA	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure	☐ Implemental, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no clange in measure	☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure

Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drunge in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no drange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure GAO Survey on Threat Alerts Dec. 21, 2003 - Jan. 9, 2004 Implemented or increased use of measure for Code-Orange alert, May 20 - May 30, 2003 ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only
☐ Increased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only
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☐ Increased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no shange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no drange in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Increased use of ☐ NA or no change in measure ☐ Implemented, Cede-Orange only
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☐ Increased use of
☐ NA or no change in measure Implemented, Code-Orange only ☐ Implemented, Code-Orange or ☐ Increased use of ☐ N/A or no change in measure Question 8b 0 Measure already in DNA DWA DNA DNA NNO N.V. DNA DYes DNo DNA UND ON D place for Code-Ž Yellow alerts Question 8a oN D 20 200 0 N 20 OYes ONe OYes ONe DYes DNo D Ye D Yes ολο OYes OYes D Yes ■ If your agency did not implement any types of measures in ortegory "4", please check this box and skip Detail foderal personnel to state or local jurisdictions d. Activate reserve personnel or make arrangements for e. Ensure that response procedures and communication Conduct emergency response drills and/or training Ensure emergency response materials are staged. . Other measures in this category (Planse specify). Prepare for possible biological, chemical, or military reserve personnel called to serve 5. Other types of measures (Please specifi.) a. Extend shifts for emergency workers c. Mobilize emergency response teams secured, and complete plans are up to date ndiological artacks

#### GAO Survey on Threat Alerts 2 Question 9d and 9d. How useful was the guidance and/or We would like to know about the guidance and/or information/intelligence your agency received and used to determine the protective measures implemented specifically in response to the Code-Orange elect from March 17 to April 16, 2003. information/intelligence from the source? question 9b, please answer questions 9c Yes 9d. Was the guidance and/or information/ %. For each item you answer "yes" in intelligence from the source timely? ٠ ٠ Of little or nouse Question 9c Somewhat Very If 'yes' to U"yes" to Don't know In addition to your agency's planned protective measures for national threat levels, did your agency receive guidance and/or information/intelligence from any of the following sources to determine the measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from March 17 to For each item you answer "yes" in question 9a, please answer. Did your agency use the guidance Question 9b and/or information/intelligence received from the source to determine the measures implemented 2 specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from March 17 to April 16, 2003? 3, Π If"ya"to Q9a+ 1f"yes"to April 16, 2003? (Please check one answer in each row under question 9a.) Don't know Question 9a 2 Yes . Guidance (e.g., recommended measures, identification Information/Intelligence (e.g., region, sector or site-Guidance and/or information/intelligence and sources d. National or regional Joint Terrorism Task Force e. Your agency's own intelligence sources specific fireats, fireattimefames) from: b. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a. DHS (including FPS and FEMA) a. DHS (including FPS and FEMA) Officer sources (Please specify. g. Other sources (Please specifi). of critical in frastructure) from: d. Local law enforcement f. Local law enforcement c. White House c. White House 98 8 b.FBI 6

10. We would like to know about the guidance and/or information/intelligence your agency received and used to determine the protective measures implemented specifically in response to the Code-Orange alert from May 20 to May 30, 2008.	articm/into 30, 2003	elligeno	youragen	cy roce	ived and	used to	determine the	protecti	ve measures	implemented	specifi	ally in
10a. In addition to your agency's planned protective measures for national threat levels, did your agency receive guidance and/or information/intelligence from any of the following sources to determine the measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from May 20 to May 30, 2003? (Please check one answer in each now under question flat.)	nues for	f the foll Code-O	I threat lev lowing sou frange alert on 10a.)	cls, did roes to from N	your ags determin fav 20 te	e the		10c. 75	For each item and 10d: How and/or inform source?	10c. For each itemyon answer "yes" in question 10h, please answer questions 10c and 10h: How useful was the guidance and/or information/intelligence from the source?	"yes" ii r quest be guid noe froi	ons 10c nce nthe
10b. For each item you answer "yes" in question 10a, please answer: Did your agency use the guidance and/or information/intelligence received from the source to determine the measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from May 20 to May 30, 2003?	ource to calent from	swer: D determin n May 2	id your age e the meas 00 to May 3	ares im 30, 200	the guix plement \$7	lance xl		10d. W	as the guida telligence fr	10d. Was the guidance and/or information/ intelligence from the source timely?	formati timely	2 m/
0	Question 10a Received?	a c		15000	Question 10b Used?	10b	ı		Question 10e Useful?	×	8	Question 10d Timely?
Guidance and/or information/intelligence and sources	No.	Don't know	11"50"10	Yes	No	Don't know	~	Very	Somewhat	Of little or no use	Y	Yes No
<ol> <li>Guidance (e.g., recommended measures, identification of critical in fast tracture) from:</li> </ol>			Ø10a <b>♦</b>				<b>€</b>			İ	Ļ	-
a. DHS (including FPS and FEMA)									8		85, 10	
b. FBI								. V			v 22	
c. White House		2				32		PR	33		. 10	
d. Local law enforcement		×				83		88			307	
e. Ofter somees (Please specific)											Øs.	
<ol> <li>Information/Intelligence (e.g., region, sector or site- specific fireats, fireat timeframes) from:</li> </ol>			11"yes" to				If 'yes' to					- 10
a. DHS (including FPS and FEMA)		- 14				. 33		. PA		72	100	
b.FBI												
c. White House											31 0	
d. National or regional Joint Terrorism Task Force									3 50		9 10	
e. Your agency's own intelligence sources											2.2	
f. Local law enforcement												
g. Other sources (Please specific)						,		3	3		55	



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- 12. In addition to guidance and information indicated above, what other types of information, if any, would have been helpful to your agency in deciding what protective measures to implement specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each applicable column.)

  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
    b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?
    c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

	Part A	Part B	Part C
Types of information	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Code-Orange Aler Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004
<ul> <li>a. Information on regional or sector-specific threats</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
b. Information on site or event-specific threats	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DR
c. Information on threat time frames	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ Dk
d. Recommended measures for preventing incidents	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ Dk
e. Recommended measures for responding to incidents	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
f. Other types of information (Please specify.)	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
Please describe examples of ways in which y March 17 to April 16, 2003, May 20 to May ines for visitors or shifting of resources from	30, 2003, and Decembe		
	14		

CAO	Commen	on Threat	Alasta
UMU	SHIVEY	OIL LINEAU	AICHS

15. Did your agency receive confirmation from component entities, offices, and/or personnel that the additional protective measures indicated in questions 8b, 8c, and 8d (on pages 6 through 10) were actually implemented during the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer in each row.)

Code-Orange alert period	Yes	No	Don't know
a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?			
b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?			
c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?			

If you answered "yes" for <u>any</u> of the three Code-Orange alert periods in question 15 (a, b, or c), please answer question 16; otherwise, skip to question 17:

- 16. How did your agency receive confirmation that the additional protective measures indicated in questions 8b, 8c, and 8d were actually implemented during the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each applicable column.)
  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
  - b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?
  - c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

	Part A	Part B	Part C	
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003		Code-Orange Alert Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004	
<ul> <li>Received oral notification of implementation of protective measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	
<ul> <li>Received written notification of implementation of protective measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	
<ul> <li>Inspected implementation of protective measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	
d. Other methods (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	

#### Costs Incurred During the HSAS Code-Orange Alerts

- Does your agency have any data on actual or estimated additional security-related costs incurred during the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003? (Please check only one answer.)
  - 1. ☐ Yes . (Continue with question 18.)
  - 2. □ No . (Skip to question 23.)

GAO Survey on Threat Alerts

- To provide a context for assessing additional costs incurred during the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003, please answer:
- What were your agency's total security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from February 28 to March 16, 2003, that immediately preceded the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003?
- What additional security-related costs, if any, did your agency incur for protective measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003?

(NOTE: For each category, please indicate whether the costs provided are actual or estimated, or if you "Don't Know" costs for the category.

For categories where no costs were incurred, please list costs as \$0. If costs by category cannot be provided, give "Grand total costs".)

Types of security-related costs	Question 18 Total security-related costs for Code-Yellow alert, February 28 to March 16, 2003		Question 19 Additional security-related costs for Code- Orange alert, March 17 to April 16, 2003	
<ul> <li>Personnel (e.g., security personnel, overtime)</li> </ul>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
<ul> <li>Equipment/materials (e.g., screening equipment, canine/explosives detection materials, patrol vehicles)</li> </ul>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
c. Other costs (e.g., travel, training)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
d. Grand total costs (add stems a, b, c from above)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s

If you provided data for <u>actual</u> security-related costs in questions 18 and/or 19, please answer questions 20 and 21; otherwise, skip to question 22:

	from February 28 to March 16, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from March e.g., financial accounting system, Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).
. Please briefly li	he procedures used by your agency to review and certify the reliability of this financial data (e.g. occdures).

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If you provided data for <u>estimated</u> security-related costs in questions 18 and/or 19, please answer question 22; otherwise, skip to question 23:

om March 17 to	April 16, 2003.			

- Does your agency have any data on actual or estimated additional security-related costs incurred during the <u>HSAS</u> Code-Orange alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003? (Please check only one answer.)
  - 1. ☐ Yes → (Continue with question 24.)
  - 2. ☐ No → (Skip to question 29.)

To provide a context for assessing additional costs incurred during the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003, please answer:

- 24. What were your agency's total security-related costs for the <u>HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003</u>, that preceded the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003?
- 25. What additional security-related costs, if any, did your agency incur for protective measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003?

(NOTE: For each category, please indicate whether the costs provided are actual or estimated, or if you "Don't Know" costs for the category.

For categories where no costs were incurred, please list costs as \$0. If costs by category cannot be provided, give "Grand total costs".)

Types of security-related costs	Question 24 Total security-related costs for Code-Yellow alert, April 17 to May 19, 2003		Question 25 Additional security-related costs for Code- Orange alert, May 20 to May 30, 2003	
<ul> <li>Personnel (e.g., security personnel, overtime)</li> </ul>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
<ul> <li>Equipment/materials (e.g., screening equipment, camine/explosives detection materials, patrol vehicles)</li> </ul>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
c. Other costs (e.g., travel, training)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
d. Grand total costs (add stems a, b, c from above)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s

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	If you provided data for <u>actual</u> security-related costs in questions 24 and/or 25, please answer questions 26 and 27; otherwise, skip to question 28:
26.	Please describe how your agency determined the total and/or additional security-related costs for the <u>HSAS Code-Yellow</u> alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the <u>HSAS Code-Orange</u> alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003 (e.g., financial accounting system, Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).
27.	Please briefly list the procedures used by your agency to review and certify the reliability of this financial data (e.g., internal auditing procedures).
28.	If you provided data for estimated security-related costs in questions 24 and/or 25, please answer question 28; otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from May 20 to May 30, 2003.
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from
28.	otherwise, skip to question 29:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from April 17 to May 19, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from

GAO Survey of	n Threat Alerts
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- 29. Does your agency have any data on actual or estimated additional security-related costs incurred during the <u>HSAS</u> <u>Code-Orange alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?</u> (Please check only one answer.)
  - 1. ☐ Yes (Continue with question 30.)
  - 2. □ No (Skip to question 35.)

To provide a context for assessing additional costs incurred during the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004, please answer:

- 30. What were your agency's total security-related costs for the <u>HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003</u>, that preceded the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?
- What additional security-related costs, if any, did your agency incur for protective measures implemented specifically in response to the HSAS Code-Orange alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

(NOTE: For each category, please indicate whether the costs provided are actual or estimated, or if you "Don't Know" costs for the category.

For categories where no costs were incurred, please list costs as \$0. If costs by category cannot be provided, give "Grand total costs".)

Types of security-related costs	Total security-related	tion 30 I costs for Code-Yellow to Dec. 20, 2003	Additional security	stion 31 -related costs for Code- 21, 2003 to Jan. 9, 2004
<ol> <li>Personnel (e.g., security personnel, overtime)</li> </ol>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
<ul> <li>Equipment/muterials (e.g., screening equipment, canine/explosives detection materials, patrol vehicles)</li> </ul>	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
c. Other costs (e.g., travel, training)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s
d. Grand total costs (add stems a, b, c from above)	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s	☐ Actual costs ☐ Estimated costs ☐ Don't know costs	s

	GAO Survey on Threat Alert
	If you provided data for <u>actual</u> security-related costs in questions 30 and/or 31, please answer questions 32 and 33; otherwise, skip to question 34:
32.	Please describe how your agency determined the total and/or additional security-related costs for the <u>HSAS Code-Yellow</u> alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the <u>HSAS Code-Orange</u> alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004 (e.g., financial accounting system, Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).
3.	Please briefly list the procedures used by your agency to review and certify the reliability of this financial data (e.g., internal auditing procedures).
	Internal auditing procedures).
4.	If you provided data for <u>estimated</u> security-related costs in questions 30 and/or 31, please answer question 34; otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the <u>HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003</u> , and/or the <u>HSAS Code-Orange alert period from December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004</u> .
34.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period
4.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period
4.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period
4.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period
4.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period
34.	otherwise, skip to question 35:  Please briefly describe how your agency developed the estimates for total and/or additional security-related costs for the HSAS Code-Yellow alert period from May 31 to December 20, 2003, and/or the HSAS Code-Orange alert period

GAO Survey on Threat Alerts

### Agency Notification Process

- How did your agency learn about the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each column.)
  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
  - b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?
  - c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

	Part A	Part B	Part C
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Code-Orange Alert Dec. 21, 2003 - Jan. 9, 2004
<ul> <li>a. Direct notification from DHS (not via media sources)</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK
<ul> <li>b. Direct notification by another federal entity, such as the White House or the FBI (not via media sources)</li> </ul>	□Yes □No □DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
c. Media sources	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
d. Other methods (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK

If you answered "yes" that your agency received direct notification from DHS for <u>any</u> period in question 35 (Part A, Part B, or Part C) above, please answer questions 36 and 37; otherwise, skip to question 38:

- 36. How did DHS notify your agency about the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each applicable column.)
  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
  - b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?
  - c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

	Part A	Part B	Part C
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Code-Orange Alert Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004
<ul> <li>Through your agency representatives at the Homeland Security Operations Center</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Through a single official announcement to all federal agencies via telephone, E-mail, or fax</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>c. Through an individual agency message via telephone, E-mail, or fax</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
d. Through an electronic communications system, such as the Washington Area Warning Alert System (WAWAS)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
e. Other methods (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK

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- 37. What type(s) of information was included in DHS's official notification for the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each applicable column.)
  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
  - b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?
  - c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 2004?

22.5	Part A	Part B	Part C
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Code-Orange Alert Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan, 9, 2004
<ul> <li>Notification only of a national threat-level increase</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>General information on homeland security threats</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Information on regional or sector-specific threats</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
d. Information on site or event-specific threats	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
e. Information on threat time frames	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK
<ul> <li>Recommended measures for preventing incidents</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Recommended measures for responding to incidents</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
h. Other methods (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK

38. What types of information would your agency like to receive along with the notification of future national threat-level changes? (Please check one answer in each row.)

Types of information	Yes	No	Don't know
a. Information on regional or sector-specific threats			
b. Information on site or event-specific threats			
c. Information on threat time frames			
d. Recommended measures for preventing incidents			
e. Recommended measures for responding to incidents			
f. Other types of information (Please specify.)			

			Yes No	Don't know
a. Through your agency representatives at the H	omeland Security Operatio	ns Center		KHOW
b. Through a single official announcement to all				
c. Through an individual agency message via te	lephone, E-mail, or fax			
<ul> <li>d. Through an electronic communications system System (WAWAS)</li> </ul>	n such as the Washington A	Area Warning Alert		
e. Other methods (Please specify.)				
<ul> <li>a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?</li> <li>b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?</li> <li>c. December 21, 2003 to January 9, 200</li> </ul>	94? Part A	Part B	P	Part C
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Dec.	range Alert 21, 2003 – . 9, 2004
<ul> <li>Insufficient funding available to implement measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes	□ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Difficulty redirecting other funds to security-related measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes	□ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Difficulty tracking costs for measures implemented</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes	□ No □ DK
d. Other methods (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes 1	□ No □ DK
If you answered "yes" to any financial chal above, please answer question 41; otherwise			A, Part B	, or Part C)

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- 42. What operational challenges, if any, did your agency face in responding to the HSAS Code-Orange alert from: (Please check one answer ("Yes", "No", or "Don't Know-DK") in each row in each column.)
  - a. March 17 to April 16, 2003?
  - b. May 20 to May 30, 2003?

	Part A	Part B	Part C
Method	Code-Orange Alert March 17 - April 16, 2003	Code-Orange Alert May 20 – May 30, 2003	Code-Orange Alert Dec. 21, 2003 – Jan. 9, 2004
a. Insufficient information on the threat	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK
b. Insufficient number of available personnel	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
<ul> <li>Insufficient training of personnel to implement assigned measures</li> </ul>	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
d. Insufficient equipment and/or materials	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK
e. Technological or other limitations of available equipment and/or materials	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
f. Insufficient facilities and/or space	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK
g. Insufficient guidance to implement measures	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
h. Lack of federal government-wide coordination	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK
i. Other (Please specify.)	□ Yes □ No □ DK	□Yes □No □DK	□ Yes □ No □ DK

above, please answer question 43; otherwise, skip to question 44:

43. Briefly describe one or more examples of operational challenges faced during the alerts.

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14.	If you have any comments regarding any of the issues covered in this questionnaire or have any other comments about protective measures, guidance, and costs for HSAS Code-Orange alerts, please use the space provided.
Th	ank you for your assistance. Please return the questionnaire and, dependent on your answers to estions 1, 5, 6, or 7, any accompanying documentation according to the instructions on page 1.

# **Enclosure IV**

# **GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments**

## **GAO Contacts**

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# Acknowledgments

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