ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 No. 00-1433 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT _______________________________ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C., Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 709, Intervenor. _______________________________ ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY DAVID M. SMITH Solicitor ANN M. BOEHM Attorney Federal Labor Relations Authority 607 14th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20424 (202) 482-6620 ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES A. Parties and Amici Appearing below in the administrative proceeding before the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) were the United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. (Agency) and the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 709. The Agency is the petitioner in this court proceeding; the Authority is the respondent. B. Ruling Under Review The ruling under review in this case is the Authority's Decision and Order on an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) case in United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 709, Case No. DE-CA-80076, decision issued on August 11, 2000, reported at 56 F.L.R.A. (No. 87) 556. C. Related Cases This case has not previously been before this Court or any other court. Counsel for the Authority are unaware of any cases pending before this Court which are related to this case within the meaning of Local Rule 28(a)(1)(C). TABLE OF CONTENTS STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 A. Background 3 B. The ALJ's Decision and Recommended Order 4 C. The Supreme Court's Decision in NASA 5 D. The Authority's Decision and Order 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 ARGUMENT 12 THE 5 U.S.C. § 7114(A)(2)(B) REPRESENTATION RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES AND UNIONS APPLIES TO AN AGENCY OIG INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 12 A. Section 7114(a)(2)(B) Provides for the Right to Union Representation During OIG Investigations of Criminal Activity 12 1. The Language and Purpose of § 7114(a)(2)(B) 12 2. The NASA Court's Agreement with and Deference to the Authority's Interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) 14 3. The IG Act 15 B. Relevant Precedent Indicates that OIG Investigations into Criminal Activity Do Not Merit Different Treatment under 7114(a)(2)(B) 17 C. There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between an Administrative and a Criminal OIG Investigation 19 1. Denomination of Investigations as Criminal or Administrative 20 2. Reasonable Fear of Discipline - the Employee and the Union 20 3. Agency's Involvement and Interest 21 4. Harm to Criminal Investigations 22 5. Employee's Rights 23 CONCLUSION 25 ADDENDA Relevant portions of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) A-1 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5d (1994 & Supp. V 1999) B-1 Agency's Reply Brief in NASA v. FLRA C-1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2343 v. FLRA, 144 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 8 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 8 * Def. Criminal Investigative Serv., Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1988) 6, 19 Dep't of the Treasury v. FLRA, 837 F.2d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 9 FLRA v. NASA, 120 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1997), aff'd 527 U.S. 229 (2001) 4, 23, 24 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) 15 NFFE & FLRA v. Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86 (1999) 9 * NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. , 420 U.S. 251 (1975) 2, 14 NRC v. FLRA , 25 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 1994) 16 * Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. FLRA , 527 U.S. 229 (1999) passim Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. FLRA, 858 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 8 United States Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 18 * United States Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 18, 19 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY Amer. Fed'n of Gov. Employees, Fed. Prison Council 33, 51 F.L.R.A. 1112 (1996) 22 * Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 23 F.L.R.A. 876 (1986) 13 Headquarters, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Washington, D.C., 50 F.L.R.A. 601 (1995), enforced sub nom. FLRA v. NASA, 120 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1997), aff'd 557 U.S. 229 (2001) 4, 13, 15 United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 46 F.L.R.A. 1210 (1993), petition for review denied, 22 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Table) 14 * Dep't of Def., Def. Criminal Investigative Serv., Def. Logistics Agency, 28 F.L.R.A. 1145 (1987), enforced sub nom. Def. Criminal Investigative Serv., Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1988) 6, 19 DECISIONS OF OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES Pope v. Dep't of the Navy, 63 M.S.P.R. 51 (1994) 23 United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979) 19 United States Postal Serv., 288 N.L.R.B. 864 (1988) 19 STATUTES Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 1 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(G) 1 * 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) passim 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (8) 2, 3, 4 5 U.S.C. § 7118 2 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) 2, 3 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b) 3 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c) 8 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 8 *Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 et. seq. (1994 and Supp. V 1999) 5, 24 § 2 18 § 4(a) 18 § 4(d) 16, 17 § 5(d) 17 § 6(a)(2) 18 *Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked by asterisks. GLOSSARY Add. Addendum Agency United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. And United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. ALJ Administrative Law Judge App. Appendix Authority Federal Labor Relations Authority DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Serv., Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1988) DOD, DCIS Dep't of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Serv.; Defense Logistics Agency, 28 F.L.R.A. 1145 (1987) DOJ U.S. Department of Justice DOJ United States Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1994) DOJ-OIG U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General FCI Englewood Federal Correctional Institution Englewood, Littleton, Colorado IG Act Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 et seq. (1994 and Supp. V 1999) IRS Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 23 F.L.R.A. 876 (1986) Local 709 American Federation of Government Employees, Local 709 NASA Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999) OIG Office of the Inspector General Pet. Petitioners Petitioners United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. Statute Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) Weingarten NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) ULP unfair labor practice USPS United States Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 00-1433 _______________________________ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C., Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 709, Intervenor. _______________________________ ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The decision and order under review in this case was issued by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) in 56 F.L.R.A. 556 (2000), a copy of which is found at Appendix (App.) 166 - 173. The Authority exercised jurisdiction over the case pursuant to § 7105(a)(2)(G) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (Statute).[1] This Court has jurisdiction to review the Authority's final decisions and orders pursuant to § 7123(a) of the Statute. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Whether the 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) representation right of employees and unions applies to an agency Office of the Inspector General investigation into allegations of criminal activity. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case arose as an unfair labor practice (ULP) proceeding brought under § 7118 of the Statute.[2] The American Federation of Government Employees, Local 709 (Local 709) filed ULP charges with the Authority's General Counsel alleging that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ-OIG) (collectively "petitioners" or "Agency") violated § 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute. App. 68-70. Specifically, Local 709 alleged that DOJ-OIG agents failed to comply with 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B)[3] by not granting an employee's request for union representation during an investigation by the agents. App. 68-70. The General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Agency had violated the Statute as alleged. App. 13, 31. The Agency filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision and recommended remedial order. App. 90-100. On July 23, 1999, the Authority issued an Order to Show Cause (App. 119) noting that the issues raised in the Agency's exceptions appeared to have been resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in National Aeronautics & Space Administration v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999) (NASA) (a copy of which is at App. 121), and directing the parties to show cause why the Authority should not adopt the ALJ's decision and order. After considering the parties' responses, the Authority determined that NASA supported the Authority's long held interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B). App. 170. Thus, the Authority determined, the Agency's failure to comply with § 7114(a)(2) (B) violated § 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute. Id. Accordingly, the Authority issued an appropriate remedial order. App. 171. Petitioners seek review, and the Authority seeks enforcement of the Authority's decision and order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) and (b). Local 709 has intervened in this proceeding. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS A. Background This case arose from the interview of a bargaining unit employee of the Federal Correctional Institution Englewood, Littleton, Colorado (FCI Englewood) by two DOJ-OIG agents. App. 166. The DOJ-OIG agents were conducting an investigation regarding allegations that the employee brought illegal drugs into FCI Englewood. App. 167. An OIG agent contacted the employee and instructed him to report to Personnel. App. 16. The employee was next met by the two DOJ-OIG agents in an Agency conference room. Id. Prior to commencing the interview, the DOJ- OIG agents informed the employee that they were conducting a criminal investigation into the drug allegations. App. 16, 167. The employee requested union representation, but the DOJ-OIG agents denied the request. Id. One of the agents told the employee that he was not entitled to representation because this was a criminal investigation. Id. The agents proceeded with the interview of the employee. Several weeks after the investigation, the warden of FCI Englewood wrote a letter to the employee explaining that the allegations had not been substantiated and the investigation was complete. Id. Local 709 filed the ULP charges (an original and two amended charges) that form the basis of this case. App. 68-70. Based on those charges, the Authority's General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the Agency violated § 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute by denying the employee's request for union representation in violation of § 7114(a)(2)(B). App. 71-77. The General Counsel moved for summary judgment (App. 53-55), and the Agency opposed the motion (App. 35-51). B. The ALJ's Decision and Recommended Order On November 10, 1998, the ALJ granted the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the Agency had committed a ULP as charged. App. 31. Relying on the Authority's decision in Headquarters, National Aeronautics & Space Administration, Washington, D.C., 50 F.L.R.A. 601 (1995) (HQ, NASA), and the Eleventh Circuit's enforcement of that decision in FLRA v. NASA, 120 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1997),[4] the ALJ concluded that the DOJ-OIG agents were "representatives of the agency" within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(B). App. 10-31. In light of the Agency's admission that the employee reasonably feared discipline (App. 16), the ALJ concluded that all of § 7114(a)(2)(B)'s requirements were satisfied and that the DOJ-OIG agents violated the § 7114(a)(2)(B) representation rights by denying the employee's request for union representation. App. 31. Following established precedent, the ALJ determined that both DOJ and DOJ-OIG committed ULPs. Id. The ALJ recommended that the Authority order the Agency to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and to post, nationwide, an appropriate notice. Id. The Agency timely excepted to the ALJ's decision on December 11, 1998, raising issues that were at that time pending before the Supreme Court in NASA. App. 90-100. C. The Supreme Court's Decision in NASA On June 17, 1999, the Supreme Court issued its decision in NASA, holding that an investigator from an agency's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is a "representative" of the agency "when conducting an employee examination covered by § 7114(a)(2)(B)." App. 125. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that "NASA-OIG's investigators are employed by, act on behalf of, and operate for the benefit of NASA." App. 129. Recognizing policy arguments that support an opposite conclusion, the Court nevertheless determined that its holding was necessitated by "the plain text of" the Statute and the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 et seq. (1994 and Supp. V 1999) (IG Act), as well as "administrative deference and Congress' countervailing policy concerns." App. 124. The Court also upheld NASA's liability for the ULP committed by NASA-OIG. According to the Court, "our conclusion that the investigator in this case was acting as a 'representative' of NASA for purposes of § 7114(a)(2)(B) makes it appropriate to charge NASA-OIG, as well as the parent agency to which it reports and for which it acts, with responsibility for ensuring that such investigations are conducted in compliance with the [Statute]." App. 131. D. The Authority's Decision and Order Initially, the Authority determined that the arguments raised in the Agency's exceptions had been resolved by NASA. App. 168. As a result, on July 23, 1999, the Authority issued to the parties an Order to Show Cause why the Authority should not adopt the ALJ's decision and order due to NASA's resolution of the issues in the case. App. 119, 168. In response, the Agency argued that the instant case was not resolved by NASA because the investigation was criminal in nature, whereas the investigation in NASA was administrative in nature.[5] App. 170. The Agency asserted that because the DOJ-OIG agents questioned the employee in connection with a criminal investigation in which no administrative action was contemplated, the agents were acting independent of the Agency and were not "representatives of the agency" within the meaning of § 7114(a) (2)(B). Id. In support of this position, the Agency relied primarily upon a footnote in NASA (App. 130 n.8) in which the Court stated that the application of § 7114(a)(2)(B) "to law enforcement officials with a broader charge" was not before and therefore not decided by the Court. App. 170. Following established precedent applying the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to criminal investigations, the Authority rejected the Agency's argument. Id. The Authority noted in this regard that it had held that § 7114(a)(2)(B) applies to OIG investigations that involve allegations of criminal activity, including a case involving a joint investigation by the OIG and local police. Id. n.7 (citing Dep't of Def., Def. Criminal Investigative Serv.; Def. Logistics Agency, 28 F.L.R.A. 1145, 1149 (1987) (DOD, DCIS), enforced sub nom. Def. Criminal Investigative Serv., Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988) (DCIS)). Turning to the Agency's NASA argument, the Authority determined that the Agency failed to demonstrate that NASA distinguishes between criminal and administrative investigations with regard to whether an OIG investigator is a "representative of the agency" within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(B). Although the investigation in NASA was "administrative," the Court did not focus on that aspect of the investigation. Rather, the Court focused on the OIG's role within the agency. App. 170. The Authority highlighted the Court's statement that "'unlike the jurisdiction of many law enforcement agencies, an OIG's investigative office, as contemplated by the [IG Act], is performed with regard to, and on behalf of, the particular agency in which it is stationed.'" App. 170 (quoting NASA, App. 128). To further explain, the Authority noted that the Court found that "'as far as the [IG Act] is concerned, [OIG] investigators are employed by, act on behalf of, and operate for the benefit of'" the agency. App. 170 (quoting NASA, App. 129). The Authority observed that this role of OIGs within the agency prompted the Court to find that § 7114(a)(2)(B) applies to OIG investigations. App. 170. Thus, the Authority concluded that nothing in the NASA decision indicates that this interrelationship between the agency and OIG changes when a criminal matter is investigated. Id. The Authority analyzed the Supreme Court's footnote comment regarding "law enforcement officials with a broader charge" where the Court addressed NASA's concerns about "joint or independent FBI investigations of federal employees" (NASA, App. 130 n.8). App. 170. Based upon that analysis, the Authority determined that it was only in this specific context that the Supreme Court stated that "the application of [§ 7114(a)(2)(B)] to law enforcement officials with a broader charge" was not before it. Id. Thus, the Authority concluded that the Agency misinterpreted the Court's statement by seeking to apply it to OIG investigations involving criminal matters. Id. The Authority held that the phrase "law enforcement officials with a broader charge" clearly refers to the FBI, and given the Supreme Court's above-noted distinction between OIG investigators and law enforcement agencies, this footnote in NASA does not support Respondents' asserted distinction between criminal and administrative OIG investigations. Id. Finally, the Authority concluded that the Agency's own factual admission undercut its argument regarding how the criminal nature of this case makes it distinct. Id. Specifically, the Authority found that the Agency admitted that it was reasonable for the employee in this case to fear that disciplinary action might result from the investigation. Id.; see also App. 14. The Authority reasoned that the Agency would not have acknowledged that the employee had reason to fear disciplinary action if this had been an independent investigation into criminal activity as the Agency claimed. App. 170. In light of this admission, the Authority found that the Agency could not then claim that labeling the investigation "criminal" takes it outside of the § 7114(a)(2)(B) context. Id. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of Authority decisions is "narrow." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2343 v. FLRA, 144 F.3d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Authority action shall be set aside only if "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c), incorporating 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. FLRA, 858 F.2d 769, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Under this standard, unless it appears from the Statute or its legislative history that the Authority's construction of its enabling act is not one that Congress would have sanctioned, the Authority's construction should be upheld. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). A court should defer to the Authority's construction as long as it is reasonable. See id. at 845. This case also concerns the Authority's interpretation of its own organic statute as it relates to another statute, the IG Act. When the Authority's work requires interpretation of other statutes, while it is not entitled to deference, the Authority's interpretation should be given "respect." Dep't of the Treasury v. FLRA, 837 F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Dep't of the Treasury). In its interpretation of other federal statutes, the Authority's reasoning should be followed to the extent the reasoning is "sound." Dep't of the Treasury, 837 F.2d at 1167. Further, as the Supreme Court has stated, the Authority is entitled to "considerable deference" when it exercises its "'special function of applying the general provisions of the [Statute] to the complexities of federal labor relations.'" NFFE & FLRA v. Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 99 (1999) (internal citations omitted). As the instant case demonstrates, among the "complexities of Federal labor relations" that the Authority must address as part of its everyday work is the interrelationship of the Statute and other laws governing the federal employment relationship. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Authority correctly adhered to its established precedent holding that the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to representation applies to an OIG investigation involving allegations of criminal matters. The Authority's determination on this point is entitled to deference because it is premised upon a reasonable interpretation of the Authority's own statute and consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in NASA holding that OIGs are "representatives of the agency" for whom they are employed. The plain language of § 7114(a)(2)(B) protects the interests of both federal employees and the unions that represent them during investigative examinations conducted by a "representative of the agency" when a bargaining unit employee reasonably fears disciplinary action. It is undisputed in this case that the employee reasonably feared discipline. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the criminal rather than administrative nature of this investigation eliminates the § 7114(a)(2)(B) representational rights of both the employee and the union. Nothing in the plain language of the Statute or the NASA decision suggests that these statutory representation rights are lost in an investigation involving allegations of criminal activity. To the contrary, the need to protect both an employee fearful of discipline and a union's institutional interest in ensuring, for example, fair treatment of employees, exist regardless of whether an investigation is labeled as "criminal." The Supreme Court in NASA agreed with the Authority's interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B), noting both the Authority's "reasonable judgment" and the unique nature of OIGs because of their role within the agency. The Court also expressly rejected a theory petitioners reargue here - that a collective bargaining relationship implicating the investigating entity is required to trigger the § 7114(a)(2)(B) rights. The IG Act offers no support for petitioners' assertion that OIGs are not representatives of the agency, within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(B), during investigations involving a criminal matter. The Authority and the Supreme Court carefully analyzed the language and legislative history of the IG Act, and found no inconsistency between the two that would negate the obligations of § 7114(a)(2)(B). Other than a duty to report violations of criminal law, petitioners point to nothing in the IG Act that compels the exemption of OIG investigators from § 7114(a)(2)(B). The Authority's application of § 7114(a)(2)(B) to OIGs in this case is consistent with important and unchallenged precedent of this and another court of appeals. Reviewing a determination of the National Labor Relations Board, this Court concluded that the private sector analogue to § 7114(a)(2) (B), the Weingarten right, is properly afforded to bargaining unit employees during a criminal investigation conducted by Postal Service Inspectors. These Inspectors, like OIGs agents, enjoy a degree of autonomy from the Postal Service when conducting investigations of alleged criminal activity by bargaining unit employees. Petitioners make no attempt to distinguish this persuasive precedent or to address the Third Circuit's affirmance of the Authority's application of the § 7114(a)(2)(B) to investigations involving criminal matters. Undercutting petitioners' argument here is the impracticality of premising important rights on the characterization of an investigation as administrative or criminal. Because virtually any workplace incident can be characterized as a crime, exempting so-called criminal investigations from § 7114(a)(2)(B) could lead to attempts to designate investigations as "criminal" in order to evade § 7114(a)(2)(B)'s requirements. If, as is conceded in this case, an employee reasonably fears discipline, it is irrelevant whether an investigation is labeled "criminal" or "administrative." Nor is an agency likely to be any less involved or interested in an investigation into criminal matters. Here, the employee was on duty when summoned to agency personnel for the interview, the agency provided a room for the examination, and the agency notified the employee of the results of the investigation. Moreover, an agency has an undeniably significant interest in an investigation of one of its employees involving allegations of criminal activity. Finally, petitioners have not established that the application of § 7114(a) (2)(B) in cases such as this will compromise investigations in any meaningful way. Nor have they demonstrated that the § 7114(a)(2)(B) representation right is unnecessary because of additional rights that may be afforded an employee during investigations designated as criminal. ARGUMENT THE 5 U.S.C. § 7114(A)(2)(B) REPRESENTATION RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES AND UNIONS APPLIES TO AN AGENCY OIG INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY The Authority properly determined that the DOJ-OIG agents were "representatives" of the agency when conducting what the agents characterized as a "criminal" investigation. In this case, the Authority reaffirmed its long-standing interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) as applying in OIG investigations in light of the Supreme Court's agreement with that interpretation in NASA. In NASA, the Supreme Court looked carefully at the language of both § 7114(a)(2)(B) and the IG Act, as well as congressional intent behind both, and determined that "the plain text of the two statutes, buttressed by administrative deference" and Congress's policy concerns, "dictates" finding that an OIG investigator is a "representative of the agency" under § 7114(a)(2)(B). App. 124. To prevail here, petitioners must demonstrate that the Statute or IG Act "dictates" a different result for criminal investigations, even though this and another court of appeal have applied the representation right to investigations into criminal activity. This the petitioners cannot do. A. Section 7114(a)(2)(B) Provides for the Right to Union Representation During OIG Investigations of Criminal Activity 1. The Language and Purpose of § 7114(a)(2)(B) Section 7114(a)(2)(B) provides that an exclusive representative "shall be given the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency in connection with an investigation" if the employee "reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee" and "the employee requests representation." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B). Here, petitioners concede that all of these elements are satisfied save whether the DOJ-OIG agents may be considered "representative[s] of the agency." Pet. Brief at 13. Petitioners assert that "'representative of the agency' cannot mean an investigator from an Inspector General office conducting a criminal investigation." Id. Neither the language of the Statute nor the Authority's interpretation thereof supports this assertion. The plain language of § 7114(a)(2)(B) is broadly drafted. It refers to "any examination" in connection with "an investigation," without further explication. The Authority long ago recognized that § 7114(a)(2)(B) "applies to requests by an employee for union representation at an examination by an agency representative in connection with a criminal investigation." Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 23 F.L.R.A. 876, 879 (1986). The Authority observed that "[s]ection 7114(a)(2)(B) . . . does not exclude or refer in any way to criminal investigations," and thus concluded that "Congress intended section 7114(a)(2)(B) to apply to all investigations, not just to examinations of employees in connection with non-criminal matters." Id. at 878. The Authority noted that in drafting this section "Congress was undoubtedly aware that, unlike the private sector, many Federal agencies . . . conduct criminal investigations that sometimes . . . include their own employees." Id. The Authority has consistently applied the §7114(a)(2)(B) right to criminal investigations, including criminal investigations conducted by OIG agents. App. 170 n.7. The Authority's interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) is consistent with the purpose of the representation right afforded to both the employee and the bargaining unit as a whole. With regard to employee protection, the Authority has recognized that through § 7114(a)(2)(B), "Congress intended that Federal employees have the same rights as their counterparts in the private sector-the assistance of a union representative when they are called upon to provide information that exposes them to the risk of disciplinary action." HQ, NASA, 50 F.L.R.A. at 615. The Supreme Court stated in Weingarten that such representation is necessary during an investigatory examination that may result in discipline because the employee "may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263. A union representative, present at the examination, "could assist" both the employer and the employee by "eliciting favorable facts" and "getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview." Id. The Authority's interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) is also consistent with the "express Congressional recognition" in that section "of a union's institutional right to be represented at examinations." United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 46 F.L.R.A. 1210, 1221 (1993), petition for review denied, 22 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Table). Weingarten recognized that an exclusive representative "protects the interests of the entire bargaining unit." 420 U.S. at 260. Through his or her presence at the examination of an employee, a union representative can "make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly." Id. at 260-61. These significant interests and rights of both the employee and the union are implicated every bit as much in a criminal as in an administrative investigation. 2. The NASA Court's Agreement with and Deference to the Authority's Interpretation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) The Supreme Court agreed with the Authority's view that § 7114(a)(2)(B) applies to OIG investigations. The Court observed that "[i]n resolving this issue, the Authority was interpreting the statute Congress directed it to implement and administer." NASA, App. 126. The Court then determined that the Authority's conclusion was "certainly consistent with the [Statute]" and noted, that "to the extent the statute and congressional intent are unclear, we may rely on the Authority's reasonable judgment." Id. In NASA, the agency challenged the Authority's interpretation of § 7114(a) (2)(B) by arguing that the term "'representative' refers only to 'the entity that has a collective bargaining relationship with the employee's union.'" (App. 125 (quoting Brief for Petitioners)). The Supreme Court rejected this theory, holding that "[b]y its terms, § 7114(a)(2)(B) is not limited to investigations conducted by certain 'entit[ies]' within the agency in question." App. 125. Petitioners reassert that argument to this Court, claiming that in a criminal investigation a collective bargaining relationship involving the OIG is required. Pet. Brief 15-16. But after examining what it described as the congressional "endorsement of a government employee's right to union representation" through the drafting of § 7114(a)(2)(B), the Supreme Court refused to restrict the representation right by adding this same "uncodified limitation proposed by NASA and its OIG." App. 127 (emphasis added). In short, petitioners' argument fails because the Court's analysis of and ultimate conclusion regarding § 7114(a) (2)(B)'s plain language in this regard did not focus on the type of investigation being conducted. 3. The IG Act The IG Act does not provide any justification for treating investigations into criminal activity differently than administrative investigations. Previously, the Authority carefully considered the language and legislative history of the IG Act and concluded that nothing in the IG Act justifies exempting OIG investigators from the requirements of § 7114(a)(2)(B). HQ, NASA, 50 F.L.R.A. at 616-619. Following the standard set forth in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974), the Authority interpreted § 7114(a)(2)(B) and the IG Act in a manner giving effect to both laws - applying § 7114(a) (2)(B) to OIG investigations. The Supreme Court agreed with the Authority's determination that the requirements of the IG Act do not conflict with the application of § 7114(a) (2)(B) to OIG investigations. NASA, App. 127. Contrary to petitioners' suggestion (Pet. Brief at 16), the Supreme Court's determination in this regard was not premised on the administrative nature of the examination in NASA. Instead, the Court reached this conclusion based upon careful analysis of the IG Act in light of the independence undeniably granted OIGs by the IG Act. In the final analysis, the Court recognized the OIG's "statutorily defined role within the agency," App. 130, and relied on that factor in finding that no statutory incongruities resulted from applying § 7114(a)(2)(B) to OIG investigations. In arguing that the IG Act presents a justification for distinguishing between criminal and administrative OIG investigations, petitioners rely upon § 4(d) of the IG Act. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(d). Petitioners' reliance is misplaced. Section 4(d) states: "In carrying out the duties and responsibilities established under this Act, each Inspector General shall report expeditiously to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law." But petitioners offer no reason why this reporting requirement is affected by the rights contained in §7114(a)(2)(B). Instead, petitioners mistakenly assert that the IG Act requires OIGs to report to the Attorney General "'directly, without notice to other agency officials.'" Pet. Brief at 23. This quotation is not found in the IG Act or its legislative history. Instead, the quotation comes from the Fourth Circuit's unsubstantiated interpretation of § 4(d) in NRC v. FLRA, 25 F.3d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, § 5(d) of the IG Act[6] undercuts petitioners' assertion. That section requires that the "Inspector General shall report immediately to the head of the establishment involved whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of such establishment." 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(d) (emphasis added). The obligation to "immediately" report "serious or flagrant problems" to the agency head presumably includes significant criminal violations. Thus, petitioners cannot rely on § 4(d) to support their position that OIG criminal investigations are excluded from § 7114(a)(2)(B) coverage. B. Relevant Precedent Indicates that OIG Investigations into Criminal Activity Do Not Merit Different Treatment under § 7114(a)(2)(B) Relevant precedent also supports the Authority's determination in this case that the DOJ-OIG agents were "representatives of the agency" within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(B). Specifically, determinations of the Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals reviewing decisions of the Authority and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) establish that OIGs are "representatives of the agency" during investigations into allegations of criminal activity. As discussed previously, notwithstanding the unique nature of OIGs, in NASA the Supreme Court held that OIG investigations were covered by § 7114(a)(2) (B). In reaching this conclusion, the Court was well aware of IGs' law enforcement authority, but based its decision on other considerations. It observed, "unlike the jurisdiction of many law enforcement agencies, an OIG's investigative office, as contemplated by the IG [Act], is performed with regard to, and on behalf of, the particular agency in which it is stationed." NASA, App. 128 (citing 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 2, 4(a), 6(a)(2)). Hence, the Court concluded that OIG's are "unquestionably 'representatives' of [the agency] when acting within the scope of their employment." Id. As a result, regardless of their law enforcement authority (Pet. Br. at 14-15, 22-25), OIGs remain representatives of the agency for the purposes of § 7114(a)(2)(B). Petitioners correctly point out that the investigation in NASA was administrative, but ignore the important distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between the jurisdiction of "law enforcement agencies" and OIGs. As pertinent here, § 7114(a)(2)(B) is applicable to OIG investigations because "[a]s far as the IG [Act] is concerned, [OIG] investigators are employed by, act on behalf of, and operate for the benefit" of the agency. App. 128. This statutory fact remains true whether an OIG is conducting a criminal or an administrative investigation. Petitioners incorrectly assert that this Court's decision in United States Department of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (DOJ), supports their position that the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right does not apply to OIG criminal investigations. Pet. Brief at 13-15. This argument has no merit in light of this Court's clarification in DOJ that "[o]ur analysis does not turn on the fact . . . that when investigator Nelson questioned Gillies, Nelson was in the midst of a criminal investigation, sanctioned by the Assistant United States Attorney." 39 F.3d at 369 n.12 (emphasis added). Rather, the DOJ decision turned on this Court's determination that "in light of the language of § 7114(a)(2)(B) and the autonomy of the [OIG]" under the IG Act, an OIG investigator is not a "representative of the agency." Id. at 368. That specific determination of the DOJ Court was rejected by the Supreme Court in NASA. The more applicable and unchallenged precedent from this Court is United States Postal Service v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (USPS). In that case, this Court reviewed the NLRB's application of the private sector Weingarten right to a criminal investigation of a United States Postal Service employee by Postal Inspectors. Postal Inspectors, like OIG investigators, are employees of the parent agency, USPS, 969 F.2d at 1066, but "are not under the supervision or direction of postal supervisors or managers." United States Postal Serv., 288 N.L.R.B. 864, 865 (1988). Postal Inspectors "undertake[] investigations only when criminal conduct is suspected." USPS, 969 F.2d at 1066. Regardless, this Court held that there is no obligation "to except Postal Inspector interrogations from the [Weingarten] consultation right at issue based on the potentially criminal character of the conduct that Inspectors investigate," because "Weingarten protections have been consistently accorded to private sector employees suspected of criminal conduct." Id. at 1072. Further, "neither 'public safety' nor 'legitimate employer prerogatives' necessitate the suggested exemption of Inspector interviews and the attendant 'sacrifice' of the statutory right of postal employees." Id. at 1072 (quoting United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 & n.12 (1979)). Petitioners ignore this precedent. Instead, they wrongly assert without any support that "[t]he Weingarten rule was never intended to apply in the criminal context." Pet. Brief at 26. Nor do petitioners address the fact that the Authority's application of the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to an OIG investigation into criminal activity (DOD, DCIS) has been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (DCIS). C. There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between an Administrative and a Criminal OIG Investigation Petitioners' arguments are further undercut by the fact that for purposes of § 7114(a)(2)(B), there is no meaningful distinction between an administrative and a criminal investigation by an OIG. Specifically, and contrary to petitioners' assertions, an investigation into alleged criminal activity triggers §7114(a)(2)(B) and implicates interests of the employee, union, and agency just as much as an administrative investigation. 1. Denomination of Investigations as Criminal or Administrative To begin, almost any workplace incident can be characterized as a crime. For example, an altercation between employees could be criminal assault, and missing property or inventory shortages could be larceny or embezzlement. Contrary to petitioners' arguments (Pet. Brief at 16-18), this reality could encourage the designation of investigations as "criminal." As a consequence, virtually any OIG investigation could be labeled as "criminal" and effectively trump the rights set out in § 7114(a)(2)(B). A ruling that permitted such a practice would, as the Supreme Court noted in a related context, "frustrate Congress' apparent policy of protecting certain federal employees when they are examined and justifiably fear disciplin[e]." NASA, App. 125. Moreover, before the Supreme Court, the agency conceded that making the application of § 7114(a)(2)(B) to OIG investigations dependent upon whether the investigation is criminal or administrative is "unworkable" from a practical standpoint. In the agency's view, in that case, linking the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to representation to the nature of the investigation would result in "intolerable" uncertainty where "the OIG cannot be certain whether its investigation of the facts will culminate in a criminal prosecution or disciplinary proceedings." (See Add. C, Agency's Reply Brief in NASA at 19). 2. Reasonable Fear of Discipline - the Employee and the Union An employee's reasonable fear of discipline, a key element of the § 7114(a) (2)(B) representation right, is equally present in "criminal" and "administrative" investigations. The Agency has admitted throughout this case that notwithstanding the fact that this investigation was assertedly "criminal," the employee reasonably feared discipline within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(B). This admission is not based on any special characteristics of this case. Moreover, as petitioners acknowledge, an agency OIG may turn over the results of a criminal investigation to the agency at the close of the investigation. (Pet. Brief at 22, n.10). In addition, petitioners fail completely to explain why such a criminal investigation does not implicate a union's institutional rights just as much as would an administrative investigation during which a bargaining unit employee developed a reasonable fear of discipline. 3. Agency's Involvement and Interest Petitioners also incorrectly assert that criminal and administrative investigations are distinct because agencies and OIGs do not have the close working relationship in criminal investigations that they have in administrative investigations. Pet. Br. 18-19. The facts of this case do not support petitioners' contention. The NASA Court found that "honest cooperation between an OIG and management-level agency personnel" can be expected in "many cases." NASA, App. 129. Here, cooperation manifested itself in at least three ways. First, the employee being questioned was told to report to the agency's "Personnel" for the examination. App. 16. Second, the employee was questioned by the DOJ-OIG agents in a regular agency facility, the FCI Englewood conference room. App. 16. Third, after the investigation was completed, the employee received a letter from an agency management official, the warden of FCI Englewood, informing him that "'there was nothing to substantiate the allegations, and that there would be no further investigation.'" Id. These facts exemplify the NASA Court's important recognition that, in the final analysis, OIG investigators still are "employed by, act on behalf of, and operate for the benefit of" the agency. NASA, App. 129. Nor is it correct, as petitioners suggest, that the agency has any less interest in a criminal investigation than it does in an administrative one. Pet. Brief at 21-22. An agency's interest in ferreting out criminal misconduct within its workforce cannot be gainsaid. An OIG agent who is conducting any type of investigation is acting in the agency's interest and, as such, is a "representative of the agency." 4. Harm to Criminal Investigations Petitioners erroneously posit a number of reasons why application of the § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to criminal OIG investigations could compromise such investigations. On close scrutiny, none of these assertions has merit in this case. First, petitioners claim that in light of a union representative's duty to the whole bargaining unit, there exists the possibility of disclosure of information regarding the investigation. Pet. Brief at 28. However, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in NASA. The Court reached its conclusion even while recognizing the likelihood of disclosure of investigation information, because there is "no legal authority restricting an employee's ability to discuss the matter with others." NASA, App. 130. Moreover, the Authority has interposed no objection to the negotiation of bargaining agreement proposals requiring confidentiality by bargaining unit employees and their representatives concerning information discussed during § 7114(a)(2)(B) examinations. Amer. Fed'n of Gov. Employees, Fed. Prison Council 33, 51 F.L.R.A. 1112, 1117-1118 (1996). Second, petitioners contend that joint investigations by the OIG and the FBI could be hampered by applying § 7114(a)(2)(B) to investigations involving a criminal matter. Pet. Brief at 31. This contention does not present any basis for objecting to the Authority's decision in this case. There is no joint investigation here - nor was there one in NASA. As the Supreme Court explained: "joint or independent FBI investigations of federal employees" are cases that "present distinct questions not now before us." App. 130 n.8. Thus, the question of whether the Authority would or could extend § 7114(a)(2)(B) to such an investigation is not before this Court. Third, petitioners argue that the Authority has interpreted the § 7114(a)(2) (B) right to include additional rights (e.g., consultation, breaks, notice) that could hamper a criminal investigation. Pet. Brief at 29-30. Again, these additional rights are not at issue here nor were they present in NASA. As the Supreme Court recognized, "representation is not the equivalent of obstruction," and "[i]n many cases, the participation of a union representative will facilitate the factfinding process and a fair resolution of an agency investigation." App. at 130-31. In any event, as chronicled in petitioners' brief (Pet. Brief at 29-30), the Authority's interpretations of the scope of §7114(a)(2)(B) can be subjected to judicial review. 5. Employee's Rights Petitioners' argument that the nature of the agency's involvement in a criminal investigation distinguishes it from an administrative investigation is also without merit. Petitioners assert in this regard that an agency is less involved because, for example, employees cannot be compelled, on threat of discipline, to answer questions in a criminal investigation. Pet. Brief at 19. Contrary to the petitioners' assertion, this is not a distinguishing consideration. Regardless of who is conducting a criminal investigation within an agency, "[a]n agency may not discipline an employee for refusing to answer questions about conduct that the employee reasonably believes could serve as the basis for criminal charges." Pope v. Dep't of the Navy, 63 M.S.P.R. 51, 53 (1994). Petitioners also try to distinguish administrative and criminal investigations based upon an employee's right to an attorney in a criminal investigation, suggesting that this ameliorates the denial of § 7114(a)(2) (B) representation. Pet. Brief 19-20, 27. However, in NASA v. FLRA, the Eleventh Circuit determined that employees have the right to be represented by an attorney during administrative investigations. 120 F.3d at 1215. Notwithstanding the fact that the employee interrogated in the NASA case had an attorney present during the examination, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court still found a § 7114(a)(2)(B) right to representation. NASA, App. 124. Moreover, even assuming that the individual employee's representational interests are protected through outside counsel, the petitioners fail to address how the union's interests would be so protected. Finally, petitioners mistakenly contend that a union representative during a criminal investigation could harm an employee if called as a witness before a grand jury or trial. Pet. Brief at 28. This contention is without merit. A union representative could always be called as a witness in such proceedings regardless of the nature of the investigation conducted by OIG agents. In sum, petitioners' attempt to exclude investigations into criminal activity from the application of § 7114(a)(2)(B) finds no support in the Statute, the IG Act, or judicial interpretations of these statutes. As such, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the Authority's construction is erroneous. CONCLUSION The Authority's decision and order should be enforced. Respectfully submitted, DAVID M. SMITH Solicitor ANN M. BOEHM Attorney Federal Labor Relations Authority 607 14th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20424 (202) 482-6620 June 2001 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT _______________________________ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C., Petitioners, v. No. 00-1433 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 709, Intervenor _______________________________ SERVICE LIST I certify that copies of the Brief for the Federal Labor Relations Authority have been served this day, by mail, upon the following: William Kanter Mark D. Roth Howard S. Scher General Counsel Attorneys, Appellate Staff American Federation of Civil Division, Room 9102 Government Employees 601 D Street, NW (PHB) 80 F Street, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 Washington, DC 20001 Stuart Kirsch Assistant General Counsel American Federation of Government Employees 6724 Church Street, Suite 2 Riverdale, GA 30274 Thelma Brown Paralegal Specialist June 14, 2001 RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994 & SUPP. V 1999) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(G) A-1 2. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) A-2 3. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (8) A-3 4. 5 U.S.C. § 7118 A-4 5. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a), (b), (c) A-9 § 7105. Powers and duties of the Authority * * * * * * * (a)(2) The Authority shall, to the extent provided in this chapter and in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Authority- * * * * * * * (G) conduct hearings and resolve complaints of unfair labor practices under section 7118 of this title; * * * * * * * § 7114. Representation rights and duties * * * * * * * (a)(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at- * * * * * * * (B) any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency in connection with an investigation if- (i) the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee; and (ii) the employee requests representation. * * * * * * * § 7116. Unfair labor practices (a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter; * * * * * * * (8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter. * * * * * * * § 7118. Prevention of unfair labor practices (a)(1) If any agency or labor organization is charged by any person with having engaged in or engaging in an unfair labor practice, the General Counsel shall investigate the charge and may issue and cause to be served upon the agency or labor organization a complaint. In any case in which the General Counsel does not issue a complaint because the charge fails to state an unfair labor practice, the General Counsel shall provide the person making the charge a written statement of the reasons for not issuing a complaint. (2) Any complaint under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall contain a notice- (A) of the charge; (B) that a hearing will be held before the Authority (or any member thereof or before an individual employed by the authority and designated for such purpose); and (C) of the time and place fixed for the hearing. (3) The labor organization or agency involved shall have the right to file an answer to the original and any amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the time and place fixed in the complaint for the hearing. (4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, no complaint shall be issued on any alleged unfair labor practice which occurred more than 6 months before the filing of the charge with the Authority. (B) If the General Counsel determines that the person filing any charge was prevented from filing the charge during the 6-month period referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph by reason of- (i) any failure of the agency or labor organization against which the charge is made to perform a duty owed to the person, or (ii) any concealment which prevented discovery of the alleged unfair labor practice during the 6-month period, the General Counsel may issue a complaint based on the charge if the charge was filed during the 6-month period beginning on the day of the discovery by the person of the alleged unfair labor practice. (5) The General Counsel may prescribe regulations providing for informal methods by which the alleged unfair labor practice may be resolved prior to the issuance of a complaint. (6) The Authority (or any member thereof or any individual employed by the Authority and designated for such purpose) shall conduct a hearing on the complaint not earlier than 5 days after the date on which the complaint is served. In the discretion of the individual or individuals conducting the hearing, any person involved may be allowed to intervene in the hearing and to present testimony. Any such hearing shall, to the extent practicable, be conducted in accordance with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of this title, except that the parties shall not be bound by rules of evidence, whether statutory, common law, or adopted by a court. A transcript shall be kept of the hearing. After such a hearing the Authority, in its discretion, may upon notice receive further evidence or hear argument. (7) If the Authority (or any member thereof or any individual employed by the Authority and designated for such purpose) determines after any hearing on a complaint under paragraph (5) of this subsection that the preponderance of the evidence received demonstrates that the agency or labor organization named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, then the individual or individuals conducting the hearing shall state in writing their findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the agency or labor organization an order- (A) to cease and desist from any such unfair labor practice in which the agency or labor organization is engaged; (B) requiring the parties to renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement in accordance with the order of the Authority and requiring that the agreement, as amended, be given retroactive effect; (C) requiring reinstatement of an employee with backpay in accordance with section 5596 of this title; or (D) including any combination of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph or such other action as will carry out the purpose of this chapter. If any such order requires reinstatement of any employee with backpay, backpay may be required of the agency (as provided in section 5596 of this title) or of the labor organization, as the case may be, which is found to have engaged in the unfair labor practice involved. (8) If the individual or individuals conducting the hearing determine that the preponderance of the evidence received fails to demonstrate that the agency or labor organization named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, the individual or individuals shall state in writing their findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the complaint. (b) In connection with any matter before the Authority in any proceeding under this section, the Authority may request, in accordance with the provisions of section 7105(i) of this title, from the Director of the Office of Personnel Management an advisory opinion concerning the proper interpretation of rules, regulations, or other policy directives issued by the Office of Personnel Management. § 7123. Judicial review; enforcement (a) Any person aggrieved by any final order of the Authority other than an order under- (1) section 7122 of this title (involving an award by an arbitrator), unless the order involves an unfair labor practice under section 7118 of this title, or (2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit determination), may, during the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the order was issued, institute an action for judicial review of the Authority's order in the United States court of appeals in the circuit in which the person resides or transacts business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. (b) The Authority may petition any appropriate United States court of appeals for the enforcement of any order of the Authority and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. (c) Upon the filing of a petition under subsection (a) of this section for judicial review or under subsection (b) of this section for enforcement, the Authority shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served to the parties involved, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein and may grant any temporary relief (including a temporary restraining order) it considers just and proper, and may make and enter a decree affirming and enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Authority. The filing of a petition under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not operate as a stay of the Authority's order unless the court specifically orders the stay. Review of the Authority's order shall be on the record in accordance with section 706 of this title. No objection that has not been urged before the Authority, or its designee, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Authority with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. If any person applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the Authority, or its designee, the court may order the additional evidence to be taken before the Authority, or its designee, and to be made a part of the record. The Authority may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed. The Authority shall file its modified or new findings, which, with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. The Authority shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with the court, the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the judgment and decree shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28. * * * * * * * [1] Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in Addendum (Add.) A to this brief. [2] As explained in footnote 1 of petitioners' brief (Petitioners' (Pet.) Brief at 4 n.1), the Authority's decision below involved two separate ULP cases. Petitioners are not challenging the decision regarding Case No. WA-CA-80156; therefore it is not discussed herein. [3] This statutory provision extends to federal employees the right to union representation recognized for private sector employees by the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (Weingarten). [4] Subsequent to the ALJ's recommended decision, the Authority and Eleventh Circuit determinations were affirmed by the Supreme Court in NASA. [5] The Agency's challenge to the ALJ's recommended remedy, which was rejected by the Authority (App. 169), is not raised by petitioners here. Pet. Brief at 6 n.2. [6] Add. B. Petitioners' statutory addendum does not include this provision of the IG Act.