CASE SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON FEBRUARY 7, 2002
No. 01-5170
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
_______________________________
ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS, INC.,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
Appellee
_______________________________
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
DAVID M. SMITH
Solicitor
WILLIAM R. TOBEY
Deputy Solicitor
WILLIAM E. PERSINA
Attorney
Federal Labor Relations Authority
607 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20424
(202) 482-6620
CASE SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON FEBRUARY 7, 2002
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
A. Parties and Amici
Appearing below in the proceeding before the district court were the
Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc. (plaintiff) and the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (defendant). The Association of Civilian
Technicians, Inc., is the appellant in this court proceeding; the
Authority is the appellee.
B. Ruling Under Review
The ruling under review in this case is the district court's March 31,
2001, Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the union's complaint
seeking review of an Authority's decision declining to order
consolidation of bargaining units. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Nat'l Guard,
55 FLRA 657 (1999).
C. Related Cases
This case has not previously been before this Court or any other court.
Counsel for the Authority are unaware of any cases pending before this
Court which are related to this case within the meaning of Local Rule
28(a)(1)(C).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3
A. Factual Background 3
B. The Authority's Decision 6
C. The District Court's Decision 7
STANDARD OF REVIEW 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10
ARGUMENT 13
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT WAS
WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER A
COMPLAINT SEEKING REVIEW OF AN AUTHORITY
DECISION IN A UNION REPRESENTATION CASE, WHEN
THAT TYPE OF DECISION IS EXPRESSLY BARRED FROM
DIRECT JUDICIAL REVIEW BY STATUTE, AND NO
EXCEPTION TO THE BAR IS APPLICABLE 13
A. The Express Statutory Ban On Judicial Review of Authority
Representation Case Decisions Cannot Be Avoided By A
District Court Suit Under the APA 13
B. The District Court Correctly Rejected the Union's Argument
That Certain Authority Rulings In This Case Constitute
Reviewable "Legal Interpretations" 18
1. The Crowley And McNary Cases Upon Which The
Union Relies Are Inapposite 19
2. The Authority Did Not Make A Reviewable General
Policy Decision In This Case 21
C. The District Court Correctly Held That the Authority
Did Not Erroneously Disclaim Jurisdiction, Abdicate
Enforcement Authority, Or Openly Violate the Clear
Mandate of § 7112(a) 25
CONCLUSION 29
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FRAP RULE 32 AND CIRCUIT
RULE 28 30
ADDENDUM
Relevant portions of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000) and other
pertinent statutory provisions A-1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Am. Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) 13, 14
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) 17
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89
(1983) 10, 24
* Columbia Power Trades Council v. Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325
(9th Cir. 1982) 16
* Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497
(D.C. Cir. 1984) 15, 16, 17
* Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pe¤a, 37 F.3d 671
(D.C. Cir. 1994) passim
Darby v. Cis¤eros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) 18
Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 27
Hartz Mountain Corp. v. Dotson, 727 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 16
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) 26
Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 9
* ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270 (1987) 11, 19
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) passim
* McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) passim
Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1990) 27
Nat'l Taxpayers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428
(D.C. Cir. 1995) 9
* NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112
(1987) 10, 16, 17
Patent Office Prof'l Ass'n v. FLRA, 128 F.3d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998) 20
* Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) 14
State of Neb., Military Dep't, Office of the Adjutant General v. FLRA,
705 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983) 4
Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297
(1943) 16
United States Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons v. FLRA,
981 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 27
United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Serv.
v. FLRA, 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 27
U.S. Dep't of Defense, Nat'l Guard Bureau v. FLRA, 982 F.2d 577
(D.C. Cir. 1993) 4
Wydra v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 722 F.2d 834
(D.C. Cir. 1983) 14
STATUTES
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute,
5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000) 2
5 U.S.C. § 7112 6, 14
5 U.S.C. § 7112(a) passim
5 U.S.C. § 7112(d) 3
5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(3) 6, 23, 24, 28
5 U.S.C. § 7123 14
5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) passim
*5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(2) passim
28 U.S.C. § 1291 2
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. passim
* § 701(a)(1) 10, 11, 16, 20
§ 701(a)(2) 11, 20
National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, 32 U.S.C. § 709 passim
§ 709(c) 5
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
5 C.F.R. § 2422.18(a) (2001) 12, 26
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 153 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2860, 2887 15
MISCELLANEOUS
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 2
*Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked by asterisks.
GLOSSARY
APA Administrative Procedures Act
App. Appendix
Authority Federal Labor Relations Authority
BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,
464 U.S. 89 (1983)
Br. Brief
Crowley Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pe¤a,
37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Customs Service United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States
Customs Serv. v. FLRA,43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Fanning Physicians National House Staff Association v. Fanning,
642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
Hartz Hartz Mountain Corp. v. Dotson, 727 F.2d 1308
(D.C. Cir. 1984)
Leedom Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)
McNary McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991)
NLRA National Labor Relations Act
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
Statute Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute,
5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000)
Union Association of Civilian Technicians
United Food and Commercial Workers NLRB v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987)
CASE SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON FEBRUARY 7, 2002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 01-5170
_______________________________
ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS, INC.,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
Appellee
_______________________________
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the district court under review in this case was issued on
March 31, 2001. A copy of the district court's unpublished memorandum
opinion and order is at Appendix (App.) 53. The district court concluded
that it was without subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint and
dismissed the action. The appellant filed its notice of appeal of the
district court's judgment on May 23, 2001, within the 60 day period for
filing such an appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). This Court has
jurisdiction to review the district court's decision and order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court correctly held that it was without subject matter
jurisdiction over a complaint seeking review of a Federal Labor Relations
Authority decision in a union representation case, when that type of
decision is expressly barred from direct judicial review by statute, and no
exception to the bar is applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose from a petition filed with the Appellee Federal Labor
Relations Authority (Authority) by the Appellant Association of Civilian
Technicians (union) under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000) (Statute).[1] The union's petition
sought to consolidate into a single unit various bargaining units of
National Guard civilian technicians in forty-two individual states and
territories. These individual units at that time were represented by the
union as exclusive bargaining agent. The Authority denied the petition on
the ground that the proposed consolidated unit was not appropriate under the
statutory criteria for making such determinations. The union then filed the
instant law suit in the district court, alleging that the Authority had
committed various legal errors in its decision warranting review. The
Authority moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the district court granted the Authority's motion. This
appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Factual Background
This case originated with the union's petition under § 7112(d) of the
Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7112(d), to consolidate into a single unit various
bargaining units of National Guard civilian technicians in forty-two
individual states and territories.[2] At the time the petition was filed,
these individual units were represented by the union as exclusive bargaining
agent.[3] (App. at 35.)
An Authority Regional Director considered the union's consolidation petition
and concluded that the proposed consolidated unit would not be appropriate
for exclusive recognition under the Statute. He therefore dismissed the
petition. (App. at 49.)
The Regional Director based his conclusion on the criteria specified in §
7112(a) of the Statute for making such appropriate unit determinations, 5
U.S.C. § 7112(a), and on established Authority precedent applying that
statutory provision. Specifically, the Regional Director considered whether
under § 7112(a) the proposed consolidated unit would ensure a "clear and
identifiable community of interest among the employees in the unit," and
whether it would "promote effective dealings with, and efficiency of the
operations of, the agency involved." (App. at 46.) After weighing all the
record evidence, both in favor of and against consolidation, the Regional
Director held that the proposed consolidated unit would not satisfy these
appropriate unit criteria. (App. at 47.)
The Regional Director found that certain evidence in the case, such as the
interchange of technicians among the various state National Guards,
supported a finding that a consolidated unit would be appropriate. (App. at
47.) However, the Regional Director found that other record evidence did
not support an appropriate unit finding. In this connection, he determined,
among other things, that each of the state Guards "has an individual mission
unique to its state or territory and each performs slightly different
functions based on that mission." (Id.)
The Regional Director also ruled that under the Technicians Act, 32 U.S.C. §
709(c), each individual state Adjutant General has "overall authority over
all personnel and labor relations matters arising in their respective State
Activities." (App. at 41.) As a result, because the decision making
authority for setting working conditions was at the state level, the
Regional Director held there would not be sufficient commonality of working
conditions to ensure a community of interest among technicians nationwide.
(App. at 48.) This was an additional factor contributing to the Regional
Director's finding that a consolidated unit is inappropriate.
B. The Authority's Decision
On appeal the Authority affirmed the Regional Director's dismissal of ACT's
consolidation petition, finding that the Regional Director "properly
construed the provisions of the Technicians Act and properly applied the
appropriate unit test." (App at 29.) More specifically, the Authority
first held that the Regional Director correctly found that the State
Adjutants General are the locus of labor relations and personnel functions
for technicians. (App. at 31.)
Next, the Authority concluded that the Regional Director properly applied
established law in determining that the proposed consolidated unit is not
appropriate. (App. at 31.) In this connection, the Authority stated that
the proposed consolidated unit met neither the "community of interest" nor
the "effective dealings and the efficiency of [agency] operations" criteria
for establishing a consolidated unit under § 7112 of the Statute. (App. at
31-33.)
The Authority also rejected the union's contention that the Authority should
find the proposed consolidated unit appropriate because if the Authority did
so find, the union would be able to enjoy expanded representational rights
under § 7117(a)(3) of the Statute. (App. at 32.) That section provides
that if a union represents a majority of employees who are subject to an
agency regulation for which a compelling need exists, the union can bargain
on the subject matter of the regulation. Thus, if the consolidation petition
was granted by the Authority, the union would be able to bargain with the
National Guard Bureau on the substance of all regulations issued by the
Bureau governing dual status National Guard technicians nationwide.[4] The
Authority held that such expanded bargaining rights come about only after a
unit is found appropriate under the criteria set out in § 7112(a). The
expanded rights are not themselves a basis for finding a unit appropriate in
the first place. (Id.) Accordingly, the Authority denied the union's
Application for Review of the Regional Director's decision. (App. at 33.)
C. The District Court's Decision
The union filed suit in the district court seeking judicial review of the
Authority's decision. The district court, on the Authority's motion,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (App. at 66.)
First, the court held that the statutory ban on judicial review of Authority
representation case decisions in § 7123(a)(2) of the Statute applies both to
suits brought by a petition for review directly in a court of appeals under
§ 7123(a), and to suits like this one, brought by complaint in a district
court under general jurisdictional statutes. (App. at 56 - 59.)
Second, the court held that the exception to the bar on judicial review in §
7123(a)(2), based on Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (Leedom), does not
apply in this case. (App. at 61.) The district court ruled that there was
not the kind of open violation of a clear mandate of a statute on which
Leedom jurisdiction must be based. (App. at 59-60.) Specifically, the
union claimed that the Authority violated § 7112(a) of the Statute, which
states in relevant part that the Authority shall make appropriate unit
determinations in each case consistent with ensuring employees the "fullest
freedom in exercising their rights" guaranteed under the Statute. (App. at
60.) The district court concluded that, regardless of whether the Authority
correctly interpreted § 7112(a), it is not the kind of provision that can
form the basis for Leedom jurisdiction. (App. at 61.)
Finally, the district court rejected the union's argument that the court had
jurisdiction to review certain "legal interpretations" in the Authority's
otherwise unreviewable final decision, pursuant to this Court's decision in,
among other cases, Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pe¤a, 37 F.3d 671
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Crowley); and McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S.
479 (1991) (McNary). The district court held that the Authority's decision
"evaluated a specific set of facts . . . ; nowhere in the decision is there
a conclusion by the Authority that the Technicians Act, 32 U.S.C. § 709,
'prohibits' the existence of a consolidated technician bargaining unit as a
matter of law under all circumstances." (App. at 62-65.) Thus, the court
held that the Authority's decision was "simply the kind of analysis and
explanation used in the ordinary course of adjudicating a particular case,
not the kind of 'general policy' pronouncement that would subject the
decision (or any portion thereof) to judicial review under the narrow
exceptions established in Crowley and McNary." (App. at 65.)
Based on the foregoing, the district court dismissed the union's complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal then followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for this Court's review of the district court's dismissal of
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is de novo. Nat'l Taxpayers Union v.
United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Herbert v. Nat'l Acad.
of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). However, to the extent that
the Court finds it necessary to construe and apply provisions of the
Statute, the Court must defer to the Authority's interpretation of those
provisions. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. FLRA, 464
U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (BATF).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The district court correctly held that the prohibition on judicial
review of Authority representation case decisions in § 7123(a)(2) of the
Statute extends to a suit brought in a district court under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Contrary to the union's claim, §
7123(a)(2) is not limited to barring just a petition for review of a
representation case decision filed directly in a circuit court of appeals.
This conclusion is supported by § 701(a)(1) of the APA, which bans suits
under the APA if, as here, "statutes preclude judicial review." The lower
court's holding is also supported by the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (it would
be "absurd" to allow an APA suit when Congress has barred judicial review
under a specific review scheme like the Statute). The cases cited by the
union are inapplicable to this case because they do not involve a
prohibition on judicial review like § 7123(a)(2) of the Statute.
2. The district court also correctly rejected the union's claim that the
Authority made supposedly reviewable holdings that can be "carved out" of
the Authority's otherwise unreviewable decision. The Supreme Court has
squarely rejected this approach to judicial review in ICC v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
Moreover, the cases relied on by the union do not have even threshold
relevance to this case. Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pe¤a, 37 F.3d
671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Crowley), concerned judicial nonreviewability under §
701(a)(2) of the APA, based on an agency's discretionary decision not to
take enforcement action. It did not implicate § 701(a)(1) of the APA,
concerning nonreviewability based on an express statutory bar to judicial
review, as is involved in the instant case. McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (McNary), concerned a law suit that
challenged on constitutional grounds an agency's across-the-board procedures
applied to an entire class of cases. The suit did not challenge an
individual agency action in a particular case, which challenge would have
been barred by a statutory prohibition on judicial review of individual
agency actions. Thus, both Crowley and McNary are readily distinguished
from the instant case.
Even assuming that those two cases have some threshold relevance to this
case, they are nonetheless distinguishable. The Authority did not make the
kind of general policy decision that the courts in Crowley and McNary
suggested might be subject to judicial review. Instead, the Authority here
made an individualized adjudication, based on the specific facts of this
case and how established law applies to those facts. There is no basis to
conclude that the Authority might not reach a different result, given a
different factual record. This is not the kind of agency action that, under
Crowley and McNary, can be subject to judicial review in the face an express
prohibition on such review as set out in § 7123(a)(2) of the Statute.
3. The court below also correctly held that the Authority did not disclaim
jurisdiction, abdicate enforcement responsibility, or violate a "clear
mandate" of the Statute. The Authority asserted jurisdiction over the
union's consolidation petition, and simply reached a decision on the merits
of the matter that the union does not like. Further, the Authority did not
improperly fail to assert enforcement responsibility. Authority
representation cases are not enforcement actions, but rather are
nonadversarial fact gathering proceedings. 5 C.F.R. § 2422.18(a) (2001).
Finally, the Authority did not violate a clear mandate of the Statute, such
that jurisdiction under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), is properly
invoked.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT WAS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER A COMPLAINT SEEKING REVIEW OF AN AUTHORITY DECISION IN A UNION
REPRESENTATION CASE, WHEN THAT TYPE OF DECISION IS EXPRESSLY BARRED FROM DIRECT
JUDICIAL REVIEW BY STATUTE, AND NO EXCEPTION TO THE BAR IS APPLICABLE
The district court correctly held: 1) the prohibition on judicial review of
Authority representation case decisions in § 7123(a) of the Statute cannot
be circumvented by a law suit brought in district court under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.; 2) there is
no judicially reviewable "legal interpretation" in the Authority's otherwise
unreviewable decision; and 3) the Leedom v. Kyne exception to the bar on
judicial review in § 7123(a) is not applicable here, nor has the Authority
improperly declined to assert jurisdiction or enforcement power over this
matter. The union's contrary arguments are without merit and should be
rejected.
A. The Express Statutory Ban On Judicial Review of Authority Representation
Case Decisions Cannot Be Avoided By A District Court Suit Under the APA
1. It is axiomatic that federal court jurisdiction is conferred by Congress
and that Congress may limit or foreclose review as it sees fit. Am. Fed'n
of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Wydra v. Law Enforcement Assistance
Admin., 722 F.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The district court correctly
recognized (App. at 56-59) that Congress in the Statute prescribed a
specific statutory scheme for judicial review of Authority orders. The only
provision for judicial review jurisdiction is set forth at § 7123 of the
Statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7123.
Pursuant to § 7123(a), a party who is aggrieved by a final Authority order
may petition a United States Court of Appeals for judicial review. However,
Congress limited the opportunity for judicial review in two areas, one of
which is relevant here:
Any person aggrieved by any final order of the Authority other than an order
under--
. . .
(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit determination),
may . . . institute an action for judicial review of the Authority's order . . .
.
5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of § 7123(a)
(2) bars judicial review of Authority decisions involving appropriate unit
determinations, such as is involved in the instant case.[5]
As the district court also recognized (App. at 57-58), the legislative
history of § 7123(a)(2) provides further support for this conclusion. A
House-Senate Conference Committee, on the bill that eventually became the
Statute, said that "[a]s in the private sector, there will be no judicial
review of the Authority's determination of the appropriateness of bargaining
units" under § 7123(a)(2). H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 153 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2860, 2887. This provides further proof,
if any was necessary, of Congress' intent to bar judicial review of the kind
of Authority decision at issue in this case.
2. The district court correctly rejected the union's argument that §
7123(a)(2) only bars petitions for review of Authority orders filed directly
in the circuit courts under § 7123(a). (App. at 57-58.) Contrary to the
union's claim (Brief (Br.) at 20-22), in addition to foreclosing circuit
court review of certain types of Authority decisions, the specific statutory
scheme in § 7123(a) for judicial review of Authority orders also renders
inapplicable general jurisdictional grants that might otherwise provide
original jurisdiction in federal district courts. See Council of Prison
Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (in a case involving
a component of the FLRA, this Court held that the specific review procedure
in § 7123(a) bars general federal question and mandamus jurisdiction over
district court suit); see also Columbia Power Trades Council v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1982).[6] This includes
suits brought under the APA.
The union's argument is patently wrong under the terms of the APA itself, as
well as case law of the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit, as the district
court recognized. (App. at 57-58.) Under § 701(a)(1) of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1), judicial review under the APA is unavailable if "statutes
preclude judicial review." It could not be plainer that § 7123(a)(2) of the
Statute does just that. Thus, by its own terms, APA review is unavailable,
as the district court correctly held.
The Supreme Court has also made abundantly clear that a party cannot "end
run" a congressional prohibition on judicial review in a specific statutory
scheme by bringing a case under the general review provisions of the APA.
In NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987)
(United Food and Commercial Workers), a union sought judicial review of a
determination by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to enter into an informal settlement agreement after having issued an
unfair labor practice complaint, but before a hearing was held on the
complaint. Such a determination, like the Authority appropriate unit
decision here at issue, is barred from judicial review under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court held that it would be "absurd" to
allow judicial review in a district court under the APA, thereby destroying
Congress's purpose of barring direct judicial review in the courts of
appeals under the NLRA. United Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. at
133; see also Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d at 1501. As the
district court correctly recognized (App. at 57-58), it would be equally
absurd to do so here.
The Supreme Court decisions relied on by the union (Br. 21-23) are
inapposite, as neither involves an express prohibition on judicial review
like § 7123(a)(2) in this case. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879
(1988), involved an action for equitable relief that was found not to come
within the meaning of the APA's bar on suits for money damages. The issue
then became whether the action should have been filed under the APA or
another statute that may have provided a jurisdictional basis for the suit.
This situation is irrelevant to the instant case.
Similarly, Darby v. Cis¤eros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), is inapposite, as the
district court held (App. at 59 n.6). That case concerned whether a
plaintiff who had failed to take a discretionary administrative appeal
before filing suit in district court had exhausted his administrative
remedies as called for under the APA. The Court found that he was not
required to take the discretionary agency appeal to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement. Because exhaustion is not an issue in this case, Darby is
irrelevant.
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that the ban on judicial
review of Authority representation case decisions in § 7123(a)(2) of the
Statute applies to this suit brought under the APA.
B. The District Court Correctly Rejected the Union's Argument That Certain
Authority Rulings In This Case Constitute Reviewable "Legal Interpretations"
The union also erroneously argues (Br. 23-31) that the district court erred
in not finding subject matter jurisdiction to review two supposedly
reviewable "legal interpretations" in the Authority's otherwise unreviewable
decision in this case. The two supposed Authority "interpretations" the
union asserts are reviewable are that: 1) the Technicians Act, 32 U.S.C. §
709, prohibits a consolidated unit; and 2) the enhanced bargaining rights
that would result from the Authority's finding a consolidated unit
appropriate are not a basis for determining appropriateness. The district
court again correctly rejected these union claims. (App. at 62-66.)
First and foremost, the union's entire premise of "carving out" reviewable
holdings in an otherwise unreviewable agency decision was squarely rejected
by the Supreme Court in ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S.
270 (1987). The union tries to overcome this obstacle by relying on Crowley
Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pe¤a, 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Crowley);
and McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (McNary).
As discussed below, and as the district court pointed out, neither of these
decisions is applicable to the instant case. (App. at 62-66). Moreover,
the Authority did not make the kind of general policy decisions in this case
that the courts have suggested might be subject to judicial review.
1. The Crowley And McNary Cases Upon Which The Union Relies Are Inapposite
a. Crowley is inapposite because there was no express bar to judicial
review at issue in that case, as there is here in the form of § 7123(a)(2)
of the Statute. As previously discussed at p. 16, above, this express bar
to review implicates § 701(a)(1) of the APA, which prohibits judicial review
under the APA if review is precluded by statute.
Furthermore, Crowley concerned an agency decision not to seek enforcement
action. The case therefore implicated the APA's prohibition on judicial
review of agency action that is "committed to agency discretion by law"
under § 701(a)(2) of the APA. Accordingly, all of the Court's discussion in
Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676, concerning distinctions between non-reviewable
"single shot non-enforcement decision[s]" versus reviewable "general
enforcement policy" expressed in regulations, is entirely irrelevant in this
case. These distinctions concerning discretionary agency enforcement action
have never been applied in cases where, as here, there is an express
statutory bar to judicial review. See Patent Office Prof'l Ass'n v. FLRA,
128 F.3d 751, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998).[7]
b. McNary is equally far afield. That case concerned a class action law
suit alleging a pattern of procedural due process violations by an agency in
its administration of a program. The Court held that a statutory
prohibition on judicial review of individual agency actions was inapplicable
to the class action suit, which did not focus on reversing such an
individual agency action.
This is obviously distinguishable from the instant case, where the union
attacks only the Authority's specific resolution of how the facts of the
case before it relate to the statutory criteria for appropriate unit
determinations. The union is not pursuing a claim that the Authority has
adopted procedures that are violating parties' constitutional rights in
representation cases across-the-board. McNary is therefore not applicable
here either.
2. The Authority Did Not Make A Reviewable General Policy Decision In This Case
Even if the circumstances of this case were comparable to Crowley and
McNary, the Authority did not make the kind of general policy decision in
this case that the courts in Crowley and McNary suggested might be subject
to judicial review. E.g., Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676-77. The union's contrary
claim (Br. at 24-25) should therefore be rejected.
The types of decisions reviewable under the rulings cited by the union are
commonly embodied in regulations or interpretive rules, "abstracted from the
particular combinations of facts the agency would encounter in individual
enforcement proceedings." Id. Instead, the Authority here made an
individualized adjudication decision, based on a "mingled assessment[] of
fact, policy, and law that drive[s] an individual [agency] decision," that
the Court recognized is not subject to judicial review. Id.
Even the most cursory review of the Regional Director's and the Authority's
decisions in this case makes clear the individualized, adjudicative nature
of those decisions. For example, the Regional Director discussed at length
the particular facts and circumstances in the case, and how they supported,
or did not support, a finding of appropriateness of the proposed
consolidated unit under the Statute's criteria for making such
determinations. (App. at 46-49.) This analysis of the facts under the
statutory appropriate unit criteria was adopted by the Authority. (App. at
29.)
a. The Authority certainly did not hold, as the union claims (Br. at 24),
that the Technicians Act "prohibit[s], as a matter of law" nationwide
consolidation of technician bargaining units. Thus, although the Regional
Director and the Authority did consider that the state Adjutants General
employ and administer the technicians under the Technicians Act, and that
the proposed consolidated unit would therefore "require a structuring of the
National Guard inconsistent with the dictates of the Technicians Act" (App.
at 30-31, 33, 47-48), this was only one of a number of factors that went
into the eventual decision to find the consolidated unit inappropriate.
For example, if a future unit consolidation proceeding were to establish a
marked increase in the movement of technicians from state to state, this
could theoretically be sufficient to outweigh the Adjutants' General
authority to employ and administer technicians, resulting in a finding by
the Authority that a consolidated unit is appropriate.[8]
b. Additionally, the Authority did not make a reviewable general policy
decision when it held that the enhanced bargaining rights to which the union
would be entitled under § 7117(a)(3), if a consolidated unit was found
appropriate, were not a basis for finding the consolidated unit appropriate
in the first place. (App. at 32.) The Authority determined that the
enhanced bargaining rights that might accrue under § 7117(a)(3) apply only
after the proposed unit is found appropriate under the criteria of §
7112(a).[9] (Id.)
The Authority reached this conclusion solely by way of rejecting the union's
reliance on § 7117(a)(3), that enhanced bargaining rights should be a factor
in determining the appropriateness of a unit under § 7112(a). Such an
agency ruling concerning the applicability of a particular legal provision
to a case's facts in an individual adjudication is not the kind of
generalized policy action that the Crowley and McNary Courts suggested may
be subject to judicial review. This is so even if, as the union suggests
(Br. at 25), the agency consistently adheres to that response in subsequent
adjudications in which a party raises the same legal argument.
In sum, the district court correctly held that no aspect of the Authority's
decision-making in this case comes within the scope of reviewable agency
actions discussed in Crowley and McNary. Indeed, if the lower court held
otherwise, virtually every Authority representation case decision would be
subject to judicial review. This is so because the instant case is by no
means unique in terms of the Authority's application of law to facts.
Therefore, if this case contains reviewable Authority holdings, then so will
virtually every Authority representation case decision. This untenable
result must be rejected.
C. The District Court Correctly Held That the Authority Did Not Erroneously
Disclaim Jurisdiction, Abdicate Enforcement Authority, Or Openly Violate the
Clear Mandate of § 7112(a)
The union's final effort at pounding the square peg of this case into the
round hole of judicial review is to argue (Br. 33-35) that the two Authority
"legal interpretations" mentioned at p. 19, above, constitute improper
disclaimers of jurisdiction, abdication of enforcement responsibility, and
"open[] violat[ion] [of] the clear mandate" of § 7112(a) by the Authority.
Again, the district court correctly rejected these union arguments. (App.
at 59-62.)
It could not be plainer that the Authority in no way disclaimed jurisdiction
or abdicated enforcement authority in this case.[10] Rather, as indicated
at pp. 22 to 24, above, the Authority merely ruled on the merits of the
Union's consolidation petition, consistent with the record in the case, the
provisions of the Statute, and Authority case law. The Authority never even
hinted that it was without jurisdiction to resolve the Union's consolidation
petition on the merits. The union's inaccurate claim is simply a reflection
of its displeasure with the Authority's determination on the merits of the
union's petition. This is obviously not a basis for the Court to assert
jurisdiction.
None of the cases cited by the union (Br. at 33) support its jurisdictional
claim. As the district court pointed out (App. at 61 n.9), Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), concerned an agency decision not to seek
enforcement of a statutory provision. However, the Authority here has not
refused to take enforcement action. Similarly, the Authority did not find
itself to be without jurisdiction to act, as was the case with the
Authority's General Counsel in Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1990).
The district court correctly held (App. at 62) that the union's reliance on
Leedom to establish jurisdiction is also misplaced because the union cannot
establish that the Authority "openly violate[d] a clear mandate" of the
Statute. United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Serv.
v. FLRA, 43 F.3d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Customs Service). The Leedom
exception is "intended to be of extremely limited scope." Griffith v. FLRA,
842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Griffith).
The circumstances of this case are not comparable to Leedom. In making its
decision, the Authority followed its ordinary process of considering and
interpreting the relevant statutory provisions regarding appropriate unit
determinations; applying the provisions to the facts in the record; and
making the bargaining unit determination with which the union now disagrees.
At most, the union's challenge to the Authority's decision merely raises the
"'garden-variety' error of law" claims that fall outside the Leedom
exception. United States Dep't of Justice, Fed'l Bureau of Prisons v. FLRA,
981 F.2d 1339, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493).
The union's mere disagreement with the merits of the Authority's holding in
this regard does not rise to the level of a colorable Leedom claim because,
as the district court held (App. at 61), under Leedom, whether the
Authority's statutory interpretation is correct is irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes.
The union alleges (Br. at 34-35) that the Leedom standard for review is met
because the Authority held that the goal of § 7112, i.e., to ensure
employees the "fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed" under
the Statute, was not a factor in determining the appropriateness of the
consolidated unit. This claim does not establish Leedom jurisdiction.
The "fullest freedom" passage in § 7112(a) does not mandate that the
expanded bargaining rights of § 7117(a)(3) be considered in determining unit
appropriateness. Yet this is the kind of clear statutory mandate that the
union would have to identify, to be able to prevail on this issue. As
pointed out at page 23, fn. 9, above, the Authority reasonably construed §
7117(a)(3) rights not to apply to appropriate unit determinations. In other
words, the Authority held that it "puts the cart before the horse" to say
that a right gained, if consolidation is otherwise appropriate, is a basis
for granting the petition. The union's mere disagreement with the
Authority's reasonable interpretation of the Statute is not a basis for
Leedom jurisdiction, as the district court correctly recognized.
CONCLUSION
The district court's dismissal of the union's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
____________________________
DAVID M. SMITH
Solicitor
____________________________
WILLIAM R. TOBEY
Deputy Solicitor
____________________________
WILLIAM E. PERSINA
Attorney
Federal Labor Relations Authority
607 14th Street, N.W.
Suite 330
Washington, D.C. 20424-0001
(202) 482-6620
OCTOBER 2001
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FRAP RULE 32
AND CIRCUIT RULE 28
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 and Circuit Rule 28, I
certify that the attached brief is proportionately spaced, utilizes 14-point
serif type, and contains 6,215 words.
___________________________
William E. Persina
October 17, 2001
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
_______________________________
ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS,
INC.,
Appellant
v. No. 01-5170
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
Appellee
_______________________________
SERVICE LIST
I certify that copies of the Brief for the Federal Labor Relations Authority
have been served this day, by mail, upon the following:
Daniel M. Schember
Gaffney & Schember, P.C.
1666 Connecticut Ave., NW,
Suite 225
Washington, D.C. 20009
Thelma Brown
Paralegal Specialist
October 17, 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(a), (d) A-1
2. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(3) A-2
3. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a), (a)(2) A-3
4. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 A-4
5. National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, 32 U.S.C. § 709 A-5
§ 7112. Determination of appropriate units for labor organization
representation
(a) The Authority shall determine the appropriateness of any unit. The
Authority shall determine in each case whether, in order to ensure employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed under this chapter,
the appropriate unit should be established on an agency, plant,
installation, functional, or other basis and shall determine any unit to be
an appropriate unit only if the determination will ensure a clear and
identifiable community of interest among the employees in the unit and will
promote effective dealings with, and efficiency of the operations of the
agency involved.
* * * * * * *
(d) Two or more units which are in an agency and for which a labor
organization is the exclusive representative may, upon petition by the
agency or labor organization, be consolidated with or without an election
into a single larger unit if the Authority considers the larger unit to be
appropriate. The Authority shall certify the labor organization as the
exclusive representative of the new larger unit.
§ 7117. Duty to bargain in good faith; compelling need; duty to consult
* * * * * * *
(a)(3) Paragraph (2) of the subsection applies to any rule or regulation
issued by any agency or issued by any primary national subdivision of such
agency, unless an exclusive representative represents an appropriate unit
including not less than a majority of the employees in the issuing agency or
primary national subdivision, as the case may be, to whom the rule or
regulation is applicable.
* * * * * * *§ 7123. Judicial review; enforcement
(a) Any person aggrieved by any final order of the Authority other than an
order under-
* * * * * * *
(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit
determination),
may, during the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the order was
issued, institute an action for judicial review of the Authority's order in the
United States court of appeals in the circuit in which the person resides or
transacts business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
* * * * * * *
[1] Relevant statutory and regulatory provisions are set out in the
addendum to this brief.
[2] Section 7112(d) provides as follows:
(d) Two or more units which are in an agency and for which a labor organization
is the exclusive representative may, upon petition by the agency or labor
organization, be consolidated with or without an election into a single larger
unit if the Authority considers the larger unit to be appropriate. The
Authority shall certify the labor organization as the exclusive representative
of the new larger unit.
[3] National Guard dual status technicians are full-time civilian employees
of the federal government, but they are employed and administered by the
Adjutant General of the State Guard for whom they work under the National Guard
Technicians Act of 1968, 32 U.S.C. § 709. Technicians are required, as a
condition of their civilian employment, to maintain military membership of
appropriate rank in the State Guard in which they are employed. United States
Dep't of Defense, Nat'l Guard Bureau v. FLRA, 982 F.2d 577, 578 (D.C. Cir.
1993). Thus, they are "hybrid" employees, i.e., federal civilian employees who
work in a military environment under the immediate control of state officers.
State of Neb., Military Dep't, Office of the Adjutant Gen. v. FLRA, 705 F.2d
945, 951 (8th Cir. 1983).
[4] As the Regional Director found (App. at 41), the National Guard Bureau
is responsible for "liaison and coordination" between the United States
Department of Defense and the various state National Guards. It issues
regulations governing, among other things, working conditions for dual status
technicians.
[5] However, an underlying unit determination by the Authority can be
reviewed by a court of appeals if the Authority subsequently renders an unfair
labor practice holding based on a refusal to bargain. Cf. Physicians Nat'l
House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(Fanning), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). Contrary to the union's claim
(Br. at 21-22), the adequacy of this indirect review scheme is irrelevant to
determining whether Congress intended to bar all direct review of Authority
representation case decisions in § 7123(a)(2) of the Statute. The district
court noted the availability of this indirect review scheme (App. at 59 n.5, 66
n.11), but did not find it determinative of the district court's holding on the
application of § 7123(a)(2).
[6] The courts have reached the same conclusion in analogous cases
involving other labor statutes. See Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) (federal district court was without
jurisdiction to review a National Mediation Board representation decision where
Congress specified how the representation rights it created were to be
enforced); Hartz Mountain Corp. v. Dotson, 727 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Hartz) ("except in the rarest of circumstances, district courts are without
jurisdiction to entertain direct appeals of [National Labor Relations] Board
actions in representation" cases).
[7] The court below chose not to distinguish Crowley on the basis set out
in the text above. Rather, the court below relied on this Court's distinction
in Crowley, 37 F.3d at 676-77, between general agency statements of enforcement
policy contained in regulations or interpretive rules, which may be judicially
reviewable; and "single shot" discretionary agency enforcement decisions, which
are not reviewable. As set out at pp. 21 to 24, below, even applying this
aspect of Crowley, the district court ruled correctly.
[8] Because of its faulty premise as to what the Authority held, the
union's lengthy critique of the Authority's decision concerning the significance
of the Technicians Act (Br. at 25-31) is much ado about nothing. As indicated
in the text, the Authority viewed the Adjutants' General role in employing and
administering technicians as established in the Technicians Act as only one of a
number of factors in applying the appropriate unit criteria of § 7112(a) of the
Statute.
[9] Although the merits of this Authority holding are not properly before
the Court, it is noteworthy that, contrary to the union's assertion (Br. at
31-33), the Authority reasonably rejected the union's claim on this point.
First, the Authority's holding involves a construction of the Statute which is
entitled to deference from a reviewing court. E.g., BATF, 464 U.S. at 97.
Second, the Authority reasonably concluded that bargaining rights enjoyed after
a unit is found appropriate are not a factor in deciding whether a unit is
appropriate in the first instance. As the Authority pointed out (App. at 32),
the expanded bargaining rights established in § 7117(a)(3) presume the existence
of an appropriate unit. This is so notwithstanding Congress's urging in §
7112(a) to apply appropriate unit criteria "to ensure employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed" under the Statute. That provision
is reasonably construed as being limited only to application of the appropriate
unit criteria in § 7112(a) itself, as the Authority did here.
[10] Authority representation case proceedings are not in the nature of
enforcement. Rather, they are nonadversarial fact gathering proceedings, to
enable the Authority to make a determination as to the applicability of the
statutory criteria for appropriate units. 5 C.F.R. § 2422.18(a) (2001)
(Authority representation case hearings are "considered investigatory and not
adversarial").