Written Statement
for the Record of the
Director of Central Intelligence
Before the
Joint Inquiry Committee
17 October 2002
I welcome the opportunity to be here today and to be part of an inquiry
that is vital to all Americans. On September 11th, nearly
three thousand innocent lives were taken in brutal acts of terror. For
the men and women of American Intelligence, the grief we feelthe
grief we share with so many othersis only deepened by the knowledge
of how hard we triedwithout successto prevent this attack.
It is important for the American people to understand what CIA and
the Intelligence Community were doing to try to prevent the attack that
occurred and to stop attacks, which al-Qa'ida has certainly planned
and remains determined to attempt.
What I want to do this morning, as explicitly as I can, is to describe
the war we have waged for years against al-Qa'ida the level of
effort, the planning, the focus, and the enormous courage and discipline
shown by our officers throughout the world. It is important for the
American people to understand how knowledge of the enemy translated
into action around the globeincluding the terrorist sanctuary
of Afghanistanbefore September 11.
It is important to put our level of effort into context to
understand the tradeoffs in resources and people, we had to make
the choices we consciously made to ensure that we maintained
an aggressive counterterrorist effort.
We need to understand that in the field of intelligence, long-term
erosions of resources cannot be undone quickly when emergencies arise.
And we need to explain the difference that sustained investments in
intelligenceparticularly in peoplewill mean for our country's
future.
We need to be honest about the fact that our homeland is very difficult
to protect. For strategic warning to be effective, there must be a dedicated
program to address the vulnerabilities of our free and open society.
Successive administrations, commissions, and the Congress have struggled
with this.
To me, it is not a question of surrendering liberty for security, but
of finding a formula that gives us the security we need to defend the
liberty we treasure. Not simply to defend it in time of peace, but to
preserve it in time of wara war in which we must be ready to play
offense and defense simultaneously. That is why we must arrivesoonat
a national consensus on Homeland Security.
We need to be honest about our shortcomings, and tell you what we
have done to improve our performance in the future. There have been
thousands of actions in this waran intensely human endeavornot
all of which were executed flawlessly. We made mistakes.
Nevertheless, the record will show a keen awareness of the threat,
a disciplined focus, and persistent efforts to track, disrupt, apprehend,
and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladin and his lieutenants.
Somehow lost in much of the debate since September 11 is one unassailable
fact: The US intelligence community could not have surged, as it has
in the conflict in Afghanistan, and engaged in an unprecedented level
of operations around the world, if it was as mired as some have portrayed.
It is important for the American people to know that, despite the
enormous successes we have had in the past yearindeed over many
yearsal-Qa'ida continues to plan and will attempt more deadly
strikes against us. There will be more battles won and, sadly, more
battles lost. We must be honest about that, too.
Finally, we need to focus on the future, and consider how the knowledge
we have gained in this war will be applied.
These are some of the themes that I hope you will reflect on as you
listen to this testimony today.
Let me begin by describing the rise of Usama Bin Ladin and the Intelligence
Community's Response.
- We recognized early on the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin and
his supporters.
- As that threat developed, we tracked it and we reported it to Executive
Branch policymakers, Congress, and, when feasible, directly to the
American people.
- We reacted to the growing threat by conducting energetic, innovative,
and increasingly risky operations to combat it. We went on the offensive.
- And this effort mattered. It saved livesperhaps in
the thousands. And it prepared the field for the rapid successes in
Afghanistan last winter.
The Early Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)
The first rule of warfare is "know your enemy." My statement documents
our knowledge and analysis of Bin Ladin, from his early years as a terrorist
financier to his leadership of a worldwide network of terrorism based
in Afghanistan.
Bin Ladin gained prominence during the Afghan war for his role in financing
the recruitment, transportation, and training of Arab nationals who
fought alongside the Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets during the
1980s.
- While we knew of him, we have no record of any direct US Government
contact with Bin Ladin at that time.
- Bin Ladin came to the attention of the CIA as an emerging terrorist
threat during his stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996.
CIA reported that during Bin Ladin's five-year residence in Sudan he
combined business with jihad under the umbrella of al-Qa'ida.
- In May 1993, for example, al-Qa'ida financed the travel of more
than 300 Afghan war veterans to Sudan after the Pakistani government
launched a crackdown against foreign Islamic extremists based in Pakistan.
- By January 1994, al-Qa'ida had begun financing at least three terrorist
training camps in northern Sudan. Among the trainers were Egyptian,
Algerian, Tunisian, and Palestinian extremists.
- Islamic extremists, who in December 1992 bombed a hotel housing
US servicemen in Aden, Yemen, said Bin Ladin financed their group.
- We learned in 1996 that Bin Ladin sent members to Somalia in 1993
to work as advisors with Somali warlord Aideed in opposing US forces
sent there in support of Operation Restore Hope. Bin Ladin later publicly
claimed responsibility for this activity, and CIA has confirmed his
involvement in Somalia.
- After Bin Ladin had left Sudan we learned that al-Qa'ida had attempted
to acquire material used in pursuing a chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear (CBRN) capability and had hired a Middle Eastern physicist
to work on nuclear and chemical projects in Sudan.
As Bin Ladin's prominence grew in the early 1990's, it became clear
to CIA that it was not enough simply to collect and report intelligence
about him.
- As early as 1993, our units watching him began to propose action
to reduce his organization's capabilities.
I must pause here. In an open forum I cannot describe what authorities
we sought or received. But it is important that the American people
understand two things.
- The first is about covert action in general: CIA can only pursue
such activities with the express authorization of the President.
- The second point is that, when such proposals are considered, it
is always because we or policymakers identify a threatening situation,
a situation to which we must pay far more attention and one in which
we must run far greater risks. As long ago as 1993, we saw such a
situation with Usama Bin Ladin.
By the time Bin Ladin left Sudan in 1996 and relocated himself and
his terror network to Afghanistan, the Intelligence Community was taking
strong action to stop him.
- We established a special unitknown as the Bin Ladin Issue
Stationwith CIA, NSA, FBI and other officers specifically to
get moreand more actionableintelligence on Bin Ladin and
his organization. We took this step because we knew that traditional
approaches alone would not be enough for this target.
- We monitored his whereabouts and increased our knowledge about
him and his organization with information from our own assets and
from many foreign intelligence services.
- We were working hard on an aggressive program to disrupt his finances,
degrade his ability to engage in terrorism, and, ultimately, to bring
him to justice.
We must remember that, despite this heightened attention, Bin Ladin
was in the mid-1990s only one of four areas of concentration within
our Counter-Terrorist Center, CTC.
- In addition to the Bin Ladin Issue Station, we had a group working
against Hizballah; a group working Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'at,
and Palestinian rejectionists; and a group working on an assortment
of smaller terrorist groups, such as Shining Path in Peru, Abu Sayef
in the Philippines, and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.
Taliban Sanctuary Years: Becoming a Strategic Threat
Beginning in January 1996, we began to receive reports that Bin Ladin
planned to move from Sudan. Confirming these reports was especially
difficult because of the closure in February of the US Embassy as well
as the CIA station in Khartoum for security reasons.
- We have read the allegations that, around this time, the Sudanese
Government offered to surrender Bin Ladin to American custody.
- Mr. Chairman, CIA has no knowledge of such an offer.
Later in 1996, it became clear that he had moved to Afghanistan. From
that safehaven, he defined himself publicly as a threat to the United
States. In a series of declarations, he made clear his hatred for Americans
and all we represent.
- In July 1996, Bin Ladin described the killing of Americans in the
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 as the beginning
of a war between Muslims and the United States.
- One month later, in August 1996, Bin Ladin issued a religious edict
or fatwa entitled "Declaration of War," authorizing
attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.
- In February 1998, six months prior to the US Embassy bombings in
East Africa, al-Qa'idaunder the banner of the "World Islamic
Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders"issued another fatwa
stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans
and their allies, both civilian and military" worldwide.
By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'ida had established
its intention to inflict mass casualties and a modus operandi emphasizing
careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin
saw as a prerequisite for the type of spectacular operations he had
in mind.
- For example, when asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization
had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August fatwa
statement, Bin Ladin replied, "If we wanted to carry out small operations,
it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature
of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary,
which obviously requires good preparation."
The East Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole
in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous preparation
and effective security practices.
- CIA analysts looked at captured al-Qa'ida targeting studies and
training materials around the time of the East Africa and USS Cole
attacks. They published an in-depth intelligence study of al-Qa'ida's
terrorist operations that revealed that much of the terrorists' advance
planning involved careful, patient, and meticulous preparation.
Beyond the conventional threat, we were also becoming increasingly
concernedand therefore stepped up our warningabout al-Qa'ida's
interest in acquiring unconventional weapons, not only chemical or biological
elements, but nuclear materials as well.
- In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition
of these weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them
is up to us."
- We reported in 1998 that an extremist associated with Al-Qa'ida
said Bin Ladin was seeking a "Hiroshima."
- As early as July 1993, in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, DCI Woolsey warned of the Intelligence Community's heightened
sensitivity to the prospect that a terrorist incident could involve
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In February 1996, in testimony
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, DCI Deutch expressed
his concern about the growing lethality, sophistication, and wide-ranging
nature of the terrorist threat, and that terrorists would push this
trend to its most "awful extreme by employing weapons of mass destruction."
I made similar warnings to these committees as early as 1998, when
I pointed to Bin Ladin's attempts to purchase or manufacture biological
and chemical weapons for an attack against US facilities.
- CIA analysts published two in-depth assessments on al-Qa'ida's
CBRN capabilities in 1999.
The terrorist plotting, planning, recruiting, and training that Bin
Ladin and al-Qa'ida did in the late 1990s were aided immeasurably by
the sanctuary the Taliban provided.
- Afghanistan had served as a place of refuge for international terrorists
since the 1980s. The Taliban actively aided Bin Ladin by assigning
him guards for security, permitting him to build and maintain terrorist
camps, and refusing to cooperate with efforts by the international
community to extradite him.
- In return, Bin Ladin invested vast amounts of money in Taliban
projects and provided hundreds of well-trained fighters to help the
Taliban consolidate and expand their control of the country.
- While we often talk of two trends in terrorismstate-supported
and independentin Bin Ladin's case with the Taliban we had something
completely new: a terrorist sponsoring a state.
Afghanistan provided Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating environment
to oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities.
- Militants who received training there were sent afterwards to fight
in jihads in Kashmir, Chechnya, or Bosnia.
- The al-Qa'ida/Taliban training camps formed the foundation of a
worldwide network by sponsoring and encouraging Islamic extremists
from diverse locations to forge long-standing ideological, logistical,
and personal ties.
- Extremists in the larger camps received basic training in the use
of small arms and guerrilla tactics. In the smaller camps, militants
received more advanced and specialized training in subjects like explosives,
poisons, and assassination techniques.
- Clandestine and counterintelligence tradecraft courses included
basic instruction on how to establish secure, cell-based, clandestine
organizations to support insurgencies or terrorist operations.
- Indoctrination in extremist religious ideas was emphasized and
included the repetition of ideas that the United States is evil, and
that the regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam
and should be overthrown as a religious duty.
- Some of the Afghan camps provided the militants instruction in
the production and use of toxic chemicals and biological toxins.
In summary, what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan after he relocated
there in 1996 was a sophisticated adversaryas good as any that
CIA has ever operated against.
Going to War against al-Qa'ida"The Plan"
As the Intelligence Community improved its understanding of the threat,
and as the threat grew, we refocused and intensified our efforts to
track, disrupt, and bring the terrorists to justice.
By 1998, the key elements of the CIA's strategy against Bin Ladin and
al-Qa'idainside Afghanistan and globallyplaced us in a strongly
offensive posture. They included:
- Hitting al-Qa'ida's infrastructure;
- Working with foreign security services to carry out arrests;
- Disrupting and weakening UBL's businesses and finances;
- Recruiting or exposing operatives; and
- Pursuing a multi-track approach to bring Bin Ladin himself to justice,
including working with foreign services, developing a close relationship
with US federal prosecutors, increasing pressure on the Taliban, and
enhancing our capability to capture him.
CIA's policy-and-objectives statement for the FY 1998 budget submission
to Congresswhich was prepared in early 1997reflects this
determination to go on the offensive against terrorism.
- The submission outlined our Counterterrorist Center's (CTC's) offensive
operations, listing as their goals to "render the masterminds, disrupt
terrorist infrastructure, infiltrate terrorist groups, and work with
foreign partners."
- It highlighted efforts to work with the FBI in a bold program to
destroy the infrastructure of major terrorist groups worldwide.
- The FY 1999 submissionprepared in early 1998continued
the trend in requesting a substantial funding increase for offensive
operations against terrorism.
- The FY 2000 budget submission prepared in early 1999 described
Bin Ladin as "the most significant individual sponsor of Sunni Islamic
extremist and terrorist activity in the world today." Our FY 2000
submission noted our use of a wide range of operational techniques,
joint operations with foreign partners, and the recruitment of well-placed
agents.
- Commenting on the Bin Ladin-dedicated Issue Station in CTC, the
FY 2000 submission noted that, "This Station, staffed with CIA, FBI,
DOD, and NSA officers, has succeeded in identifying assets and members
of Bin Ladin's organization, and nearly 700 intelligence reports have
been disseminated about his operations."
Despite these clear intentions, and the daring activities that went
with them, I was not satisfied that we were doing all we could against
this target. In 1998, I told key leaders at CIA and across the Intelligence
Community that we should consider ourselves "at war" with Usama Bin
Ladin. I ordered that no effort or resource be spared in prosecuting
this war. In early 1999, I ordered a baseline review of CIA's operational
strategy against Bin Ladin.
In spring 1999, CTC produced a new comprehensive operational plan of
attack against the Bin Ladin/al-Qa'ida target inside and outside Afghanistan.
- This new strategy was previewed to senior CIA management by the
end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational
level personnel, and to NSA, the FBI, and other partners.
- CIA then began to put in place the elements of this operational
strategy, which structured the Agency's counterterrorist activity
until September 11th, 2001.
This strategywhich we called "The Plan"built
on what CTC was recognized as doing wellcollection, quick reaction
to operational opportunities, renditions, disruptions, and analysis.
Its priority was plain: to capture and bring to justice Bin Ladin and
his principal lieutenants.
- The Plan included a strong and focused intelligence collection
program to trackand then act againstBin Ladin and his
associates in terrorist sanctuaries. It was a blend of aggressive
human source collectionboth unilateral and with foreign partnersand
technical collection.
- To execute the Plan, CTC developed a program to select and train
the right officers and put them in the right places. We moved talented
and experienced officers into the Center. We also initiated a nation-wide
program to identify, vet and hire qualified personnel for counterterrorist
assignments in hostile environments. We sought native fluency in the
languages of the Middle East and South Asia, combined with police,
military, business, technical, or academic experience. In addition,
we established an eight-week advanced Counterterrorist Operations
Course to share the tradecraft we had developed and refined over the
years.
The parts of "the Plan" focused on Afghanistan faced some daunting
impediments (some of which would change after 9/11). For example:
- The US Government had no official presence in Afghanistan, and
relations with the Taliban were seriously strained. Both factors made
it more difficult to gain access to Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida personnel.
- US policy stopped short of replacing the Taliban regime, limiting
the ability of the US Government to exert pressure on Bin Ladin.
- US relations with Pakistan, the principal access point to Afghanistan,
were strained by the Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 and the military
coup in 1999.
Collection Profile
Despite these facts, our surge in collection operations paid off.
- Our human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting on the difficult Bin
Ladin/al-Qa'ida target increased from roughly 600 reports in 1998
to 900 reports in the first nine months of 2001.
- Our HUMINT sources against the terrorism target grew by more than
50 percent between 1999 and 9/11.
- Working across agencies, and in some cases with foreign services,
we designed and built several collection systems for specific use
against al-Qa'ida inside Afghanistan.
- By 9/11, a map would show that these collection programs and human
networks were in place in such numbers to nearly cover Afghanistan.
This array meant that, when the military campaign to topple the Taliban
and destroy al-Qa'ida began last October, we were able to support
it with an enormous body of information and a large stable of assets.
The realm of human source collection frequently is divided between
"liaison reporting" (that which we get from cooperative foreign intelligence
services) and "unilateral reporting" (that which we get from agents
we run ourselves). Even before "the Plan," our vision for HUMINT on
terrorism was simple: we had to get more of both types.
The figures for both rose every year after 1998. And in 1999, for
the first time, the volume of reporting on terrorism from unilateral
assets exceeded that from liaison sourcesa trend which has continued
in subsequent years.
The integration of technical and human sources has been key to our
understanding ofand our actions againstinternational terrorism.
It was this combinationthis integrationthat allowed us years
ago to confirm the existence of numerous al-Qa'ida facilities and training
camps in Afghanistan.
- On a virtually daily basis, analysts and collection officers from
NSA, NIMA, and CIA came together to interactively employ satellite
imagery, communications information, and human source reporting.
- This integration also supported military targeting operations prior
to September 11, including the cruise missile attack against the al-Qa'ida
training camp complex in northeastern Afghanistan in August 1998.
In addition, it helped to provide baseline data for the US Central
Command's target planning against al-Qa'ida facilities and infrastructure
throughout Afghanistan.
Countering Al-Qa'ida's Global Presence
Even while targeting UBL and al-Qa'ida in their Afghan lair, we did
not ignore its cells of terror spread across the globe. Especially in
periods of peak threat reporting, we accelerated our work to shake up
and destroy al-Qa'ida cells wherever we could find them.
- This took resourcesoperations officers, desk officers, analysts,
translators throughout the Intelligence Community and law enforcement
agencies.
- We also mobilized intelligence services around the globe.
By 1999, the intensive nature of our operations was disrupting elements
of Bin Ladin's international infrastructure. We believe that our efforts
dispelled al-Qa'ida's impression that it could organize and operate
with impunity. Our operations sent the message that the United States
was not only going after al-Qa'ida for crimes it had committed, but
also was actively seeking out and pursuing terrorists from al-Qa'ida
and other groups engaged in planning future attacks whenever
and wherever we could find them.
- By 11 September, CIA (in many cases with the FBI) had rendered
70 terrorists to justice around the world.
During the Millennium threat period, we told senior policymakers to
expect between five and fifteen attacks, both here and overseas. The
CIA overseas and the FBI in the US organized an aggressive, integrated
campaign to disrupt al-Qaida using human assets, technical operations,
and the hand-off of foreign intelligence to facilitate FISA court warrants.
Over a period of months, there was close, daily consultation that included
Director Freeh, the National Security Adviser, and the Attorney General.
We identified 36 additional terrorist agents at the time around the
world. We pursued operations against them in 50 countries. Our disruption
activities succeeded against 21 of these individuals, and included arrests,
renditions, detentions, surveillance, and direct approaches.
- We assisted the Jordanian government in dealing with terrorist
cells that planned to attack religious sites and tourist hotels. We
helped track down the organizers of these attacks and helped render
them to justice.
- We mounted disruption and arrest operations against terrorists
in 8 countries on four continents, which also netted information that
allowed us to track down even more suspected terrorists.
- During this same period, unrelated to the Millennium threats, we
conducted multiple operations in East Asia, leading to the arrest
or detention of 45 members of the Hizballah network.
- In the months after the Millennium experiencein October 2000we
lost a serious battle, when USS Cole was bombed and 17 brave American
sailors perished.
The efforts of American intelligence to strike back at a deadly enemy
continued through the Ramadan period in the winter of 2000, another
phase of peak threat reporting.
- Terrorist cells planning attacks against US and foreign military
and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf region were broken up, capturing
hundreds of pounds of explosives and other weaponsincluding
anti-aircraft missiles. These operations also netted proof that some
Islamic charitable organizations had been either hijacked or created
to provide support to terrorists operating in other countries.
- We succeeded in bringing a major Bin Ladin terrorist facilitator
to justice with the cooperation of two foreign governments. This individual
had provided documents and shelter to terrorists traveling through
the Arabian Peninsula.
- We worked with numerous European governments, such as the Italians,
Germans, French, and British to identify and shatter terrorist groups
and plans against American and local interests in Europe.
Fusion and Sharingthe Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement
Taking the fight to Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida was not just a matter
of mobilizing CTC, or even CIA. This was an interagencyand internationaleffort.
Two things which are critical to this effort are: fusion and sharing.
- The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA was created in 1986 to
enable the fusion of all sources of information in a single,
action-oriented unit. Not only do we fuse every source of reporting
on terrorists from US and foreign collectors, we also fuse analysis
and operations. This fusion gives us the speed that we must
have to seize fleeting opportunities in the shadowy world of terrorism.
Based on this proven philosophy, by 2001 the Center had more than
30 officers from more than a dozen agencies on board, ten percent
of its staff complement at that time.
- No matter how much is fused within CTC, no matter how large CTC
may be, there are still key counterterrorist players outside it, making
the sharing of knowledge essential. Interview anyone in CTC, and he
or she will likely tell you of work they are doing with counterparts
across CIAespecially in the fieldor with NSA, NIMA, FBI,
or today with a Special Forces unit in Kandahar or Bagram.
It is also clear that, when errors occurwhen we miss information
or opportunitiesit is often because our sharing and fusion are
not as strong as they need to be. Communication across bureaucracies,
missions, and cultures is among our most persistent challenges in the
fast-paced, high-pressure environment of counterterrorism. I will return
to this issue later in my testimony when I present some prescriptions
for the future.
One of the most critical alliances in the war against terrorism is
that between CIA and FBI. This alliance in the last few years has produced
achievements that simply would not have been possible if some of the
recent media stories of all-out feuding were true.
- An FBI officer has been serving as deputy to the Chief of CTC since
the mid-1990s, and FBI reciprocated by making a CIA officer deputy
in the Bureau's Counter-Terrorist Division.
- In the Bin Ladin Issue Station itself, FBI officers were detailed
there soon after it opened in 1996, with the presence growing to four
officers by September 2001.
There are abundant examples of close FBI-CIA partnership in counterterrorism.
- After the first World Trade Center bombing, FBI headed the investigation
and CTC created an interagency task force to develop intelligence
leads for the FBI. At FBI request, CIA obtained intelligence from
a foreign service on Ramzi Yousef, who subsequently was convicted
for the attack.
- After we received a rash of reports in 1998 threatening attacks
in the United States, CIA worked together with FBI to provide advisories
for local law enforcement agencies. One such episode occurred when
CIA provided reporting of a plot to hijack a plane on the east coast
of the United States to attempt to free the "Blind Shaykh" from prison.
The report also said that there had been a successful test to elude
security at a major airport.
- Also in 1998, FBI and CIA worked closely in the wake of the East
Africa bombings to disrupt a planned attack on another U.S. Embassy
in Africa. In a three-day period, more than 20 al-Qa'ida operatives
were arrested in that country.
Of course, the relationship is not perfect, and frictions occasionally
arise. A 1994 CIA Inspector General report noted that interactions between
the two organizations were too personality dependent. This has been
particularly so when the two were pursuing different missions in the
same case: FBI trying to develop a case for courtroom prosecution, and
CIA trying to develop intelligence to assess and counter a threat.
- In 2001 (before 9/11), the CIA IG found significant improvement,
citing, for example, the Center's assistance to the FBI in two dozen
renditions in 1999-2000.
- Director Freeh and I worked on this very hard. We had quarterly
meetings of our senior leadership teams. Through training and other
means, coordination between our Chiefs of Station overseas and legal
attaches was significantly improved. Today, Bob Mueller and I are
working to deepen our cooperation, not only at headquarters, but in
the field. We both understand that despite different missions and
cultures, we need to build a system of seamless cooperation that is
institutionalized.
Increasing the difficulty of inter-agency communications is an unfortunate
phenomenon known as "the Wall." It has been mentioned before in these
hearingsthe complex system of laws and rules (and perceptions
about them) that impede the flow of information between the arenas of
intelligence and criminal prosecution. The "Wall" slows and sometimes
stops the flow of informationsomething we simply cannot afford.
The Patriot Act has helped alleviate this.
Runup to 9/11Our Operations
The third period of peak threat was in the spring and summer 2001.
As with the Millennium and Ramadan 2000, we increased the tempo of our
operations against al-Qa'ida. We stopped some attacks and caused the
terrorists to postpone others.
- We helped to break up another terrorist cell in Jordan and seized
a large quantity of weapons, including rockets and high explosives.
- Working with another foreign partner, we broke up a plan to attack
US facilities in Yemen.
- In June, CIA worked with a Middle Eastern partner to arrest two
Bin Ladin operatives planning attacks on US facilities in Saudi Arabia.
- In June and July, CIA launched a wide-ranging disruption effort
against Bin Ladin's organization, with targets in almost two-dozen
countries. Our intent was to drive up Bin Ladin's security concerns
and lead his organization to delay or cancel its attacks. We subsequently
received reporting that attacks were delayed, including an attack
against the US military in Europe.
- In July, a different Middle East partner helped bring about the
detention of a terrorist who had been directed to begin an operation
to attack the US Embassy or cultural center in European capital.
- Also in the summer of 2001, local authorities, acting on our information,
arrested an operative described as Bin Ladin's man in East Asia.
- We assisted another foreign partner in the rendition of a senior
Bin Ladin associate. Information he provided included plans to kidnap
Americans in three countries, and carry out hijackings.
- We provided intelligence to a Latin American service on a band
of terrorists considering hijackings and bombings. An FBI team detected
explosives residue in their hotel rooms.
Runup to 9/11the Watchlist Issue
During the period of the Millennium threats, one of our operations,
and one of our mistakes, occurred during our accelerating efforts against
Bin Ladin's organizationwhen we glimpsed two of the individuals
who later became 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al- Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
- In December 1999, CIA, FBI, and the Department of State received
intelligence on the travels of suspected al-Qa'ida operatives to Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. CIA saw the Kuala Lumpur gathering as a potential
source of intelligence about a possible al-Qa'ida attack in Southeast
Asia. We initiated an operation to learn why those suspected terrorists
were traveling to Kuala Lumpur. Khalid and Nawaf were among those
travelers, although at the time we knew nothing more about them except
that Khalid had been at a suspected al-Qa'ida logistics facility in
Yemen. We arranged to have them surveilled.
- In early January 2000, we managed to obtain a photocopy of al-Mihdhar's
passport as he traveled to Kuala Lumpur. It showed a US multiple-entry
visa issued in Jeddah on 7 April 1999 and expiring on 6 April 2000.
We learned that his full name is Khalid bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah
al-Mihdhar.
- We had at that point the level of detail needed to watchlist himthat
is, to nominate him to State Department for refusal of entry into
the US or to deny him another visa. Our officers remained focused
on the surveillance operation, and did not do this.
At this early stage, the first days of January 2000, CIA briefed the
FBI, informally, about the surveillance operation in Kuala Lumpur. We
noted in an internal CIA communication on 5 January 2000 that we had
passed a copy of al-Mihdhar's passportwith its US visato
the FBI for further investigation. A CTC officer at the FBI wrote an
e-mail in January 2000 reporting that he briefed FBI officers on the
surveillance operation, noting suspicious activity but no evidence of
an impending attack.
The relative importance of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi at this time should
be kept in perspective. Neither al-Mihdhar nor al-Hazmi at the time
of their travel to Kuala Lumpur were identified as key al-Qa'ida members
or associates. Thus, at this point, their significance to us was that
they might lead us to others or to threat information. During this period
when all CIA facilities were involved in dealing with the Millennium
Threat, there was particular CTC focus on three separate groups of al-Qa'ida
personnel:
- Those known to have been already involved in a terrorist attack
such as the East Africa embassy bombings, or suspected of being involved
in planning a reported attack (e.g., East Africa embassy bombing suspect
Abdul Rahman al-Muhajir);
- Senior al-Qa'ida personnel outside Afghanistan known to be directors
or coordinators of terrorist operations, or senior money couriers,
liaison officers or manipulators of NGO's and businesses supporting
terrorist groups (e.g., terrorist operational planner Abu Zubaydah);
and
- Senior al-Qa'ida personnel inside Afghanistan, particularly those
close to Bin Ladin who might know of his attack or travel plans (e.g.,
Bin Ladin deputy Muhammad Atef).
Surveillance began with the arrival of Khalid al-Mihdhar on 5 January
2000, and ended on 8 January, when he left Kuala Lumpur. Surveillance
indicated that the behavior of the individuals was consistent with clandestine
activitythey did not conduct any business or tourist activities
while in Kuala Lumpur, and they used public telephones and cyber cafes
exclusively.
Other individuals were also positively identified by the surveillance
operation.
- Later in 2001 an individual was identified as Saeed Muhammad Bin
Yousaf (aka Khallad), who became a key planner in the October 2000
USS Cole bombing. Because of his later connection with the Cole bombing
and other serious plotting, we believe he was the most important figure
to attend the Kuala Lumpur meeting.
- Another individual identified by surveillance was Malaysian citizen
Ahmad Sajuli Abdul Rahman. During the period, 6-8 January, Sajuli
took the al-Qa'ida visitors around Kuala Lumpur. Two years later,
Sajuli has been arrested and has admitted being part of the logistics
unit for Jemaah Islamiah, an affiliate of al-Qa'ida.
- Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian chemist who, it was later determined,
was directed by a terrorist leader to make his apartment available
to the al-Qa'ida operatives. He is now under arrest.
- Sufaat's name would later be connected to that of Zacarias Moussaoui.
To this day, we still do not know what was discussed at the Kuala Lumpur
meeting. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi remained there a few days. On 8 January
2000, they traveled to another Southeast Asian country with Khallad.
We learned in March 2000 that al-Hazmi flew from that country to Los
Angeles on January 15, 2000. We did not learn that al-Midhar was on
the same flight until August, 2001.
- Our receipt of the information in March should have triggered the
thought to watchlist al-Hazmi, but no CTC officer recalls even having
seen the cable on his travel to LA when it arrived.
Al-Mihdhar departed the US on 10 June 2000 and obtained a new passport
and US visa, possibly for operational security reasons. Al-Mihdhar applied
for this new US visa in Jeddah in 13 June and stated that he had never
traveled to the US before. On 4 July 2001, he returned to the US, entering
in New York.
During August 2001, CIA had become increasingly concerned about a major
terrorist attack on US interests, and I directed a review of our files
to identify potential threats. CTC reviewed its holdings on al-Mihdhar
because of his connections to other terrorists. In the course of that
review, CTC found that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had entered the US on
15 January 2000. It determined that al-Mihdhar departed the US on 10
June 2000 and reentered on 4 July 2001. CTC found no record of al-Hazmi's
departure from the US.
- On 23 August, CIA sent a messagemarked "immediate"to
the Department of State, INS, Customs, and the FBI requesting to enter
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, Bin Ladin-related individuals, into VISA/VIPER,
TIPOFF and TECS. The message said that CIA recommends that al-Mihdhar
and al-Hazmi be watchlisted immediately.
There are at least two points before August 2001 when these individuals
were on our scope with sufficient information to have been watchlisted.
During the intense operations to thwart the Millennium and Ramadan threats,
the watchlist task in the case of these two al-Qaida operatives slipped
through. The error exposed a weakness in our internal training and an
inconsistent understanding of watchlist thresholds. Corrective steps
have been taken.
- The CIA and the State Department are cooperating to transform the
TIPOFF all-source watchlist into a National Watchlist Center. This
center will serve as the point of contact and coordination for all
watchlists in the US Government.
- We have increased managerial review of the system to reduce the
chance that watchlist opportunities will be missed in the crush of
other urgent business.
- We have designed a database and assembled a team to consolidate
information on the identities of known and suspected terrorists, and
to flag any that has not been passed to the proper audience.
- We have lowered the threshold for nominating individuals for the
watchlist and clarified that threshold for our officers
- We have lowered the threshold for dissemination of information
that used to be held closely as "operational."
These corrective steps notwithstanding, we must not underestimate our
enemies' capabilities.
- We know that the plot was extremely resilient.
- We know that al-Qa'ida deliberately chose young men who had no
record of affiliation with terrorist activities; 17 of the 19 hijackers
were clean in this respect.
- We know that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar tried to become pilots but
abandoned the effort because of poor technical and English language
skills. By the end of 2000, a replacement pilot for Flight 77, Hani
Hanjur, was in the United States.
- We know that Ramzi bin Al-Shib tried on multiple occasions to get
into the US and failed, and yet the plot continued.
- Finally, we know that Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested but refused
to provide information on the plot.
Runup to 9/11the Warning Issue
In the months leading up to 9/11, we were convinced Bin Ladin meant
to attack Americans, meant to kill large numbers, and that the attack
could be at home, abroad, or both. And we reported these threats urgently.
Our collection sources "lit up" during this tense period. They indicated
that multiple spectacular attacks were planned, and that some of these
plots were in the final stages.
- Some of the reporting implicated known al-Qaida operatives.
- The reports suggested that the targets were American, although
some reporting simply pointed to the West or Israel.
- But the reporting was maddeningly short on actionable details.
The most ominous reporting, hinting at something large, was also the
most vague. The only occasions in this reporting where there was a
geographic context, either explicit or implicit, it appeared to point
abroad, especially to the Middle East.
- By long established doctrine, we disseminated these raw reports
immediately and widely to policymakers and action agencies such as
the military, State Department, the FAA, FBI, Department of Transportation,
the INS, and others.
- This reporting, by itself, stood as a dramatic warning of imminent
attack.
Our analysts worked to find linkages among the reports, as well as
links to past terrorist threats and tactics. We considered whether al-Qa'ida
was feeding us this reportingtrying to create panic through disinformationyet
we concluded that the plots were real. When some reporting hinted that
an attack had been delayed, we continued to stress that there were,
indeed, multiple attacks planned and that several continued on track.
And when we grew concerned that so much of the evidence pointed to attacks
overseas, we noted that Bin Ladin's principal ambition had long been
to strike our homeland. Nevertheless with specific regard to the 9/11
plot, we never acquired the level of detail that allowed us to translate
our strategic concerns into something we could act on.
The Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board also issued several
threat advisories during the summer 2001. These advisoriesthe
fruit of painstaking analytical workcontained phrases like "al-Qa'ida
is most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous
casualties," and "al-Qa'ida is prepared to mount one or more terrorist
attacks at any time."
A sign that our warnings were being heardboth from our analysis
and from the raw intelligence we disseminatedwas that the FAA
issued two alerts to air carriers in the summer of 2001.
Our warnings complemented strategic warnings we had been delivering
for years about the real threat of terrorism to America.
- Recall, Mr. Chairman, my testimony in open session before your
committee on February 2, 1999 when I told you "there is not the slightest
doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers
are planning further attacks against us." I told you "he will strike
wherever in the world he thinks we are vulnerable" and that we were
"concerned that one or more of Bin Ladin's attacks could occur at
any time."
- In February 2000, I testified in open session that, "Everything
we have learned recently confirms our conviction that (UBL) wants
to strike further blows against America" and that he could strike
"without additional warning."
- Again in 2001 I told you that "terrorists are seeking out 'softer'
targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties" and that Bin
Ladin is "capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning."
- In a National Intelligence Estimates in 1995 we warned, "As
an open and free democracy, the United States is particularly vulnerable
to various types of terrorist attacks. Several kinds of targets are
especially at risk: National symbols such as the White House and the
Capitol, and symbols of US capitalism such as Wall Street; power grids,
communications switches, water facilities, and transportation infrastructureparticularly
civil aviation, subway systems, cruise lines, and petroleum pipelines;
places where large numbers of people congregate, such as large office
buildings, shopping centers, sports arenas, and airport and other
transportation terminals."
- The same estimate also said, "We assess that civil aviation
will figure prominently among possible terrorist targets in the United
States. This stems from the increasing domestic threat posed by foreign
terrorists, the continuing appeal of civil aviation as a target, and
a domestic aviation security system that has been the focus of media
attention: We have evidence that individuals linked to terrorist groups
or state sponsors have attempted to penetrate security at US airports
in recent years. The media have called attention to, among other things,
inadequate security for checked baggage. Our review of the evidence
obtained thus far about the plot uncovered in Manila in early 1995,
suggests the conspirators were guided in their selection of the method
and venue of attack by carefully studying security procedures in place
in the region. If terrorists operating in this country are similarly
methodical, they will identify serious vulnerabilities in the security
system for domestic flights."
- In a National Intelligence Estimate in 1997, we said "Civil
aviation remains a particularly attractive target for terrorist attacks
in light of the fear and publicity the downing of an airliner would
evoke and the revelations last summer of the vulnerability of the
US air transport sector."
Message Received
In February 1997, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security reported that:
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of
terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer
just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in
the United States have joined the list of targets, and Americans have
joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center
in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples
of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to
bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific Ocean.
The second change is that in addition to well-known, established terrorist
groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone
or in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying
out their designs."
In its publication, "Criminal Acts against Civil Aviation 2000, " the
FAA stated:
"Although Bin Ladin is not known to have attacked civil aviation,
he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so. Bin Ladin's
anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers
a significant threat to civil aviation, especially U.S. civil aviation."
In discussing the plot by convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramzi
Yousef to place explosive devices on as many as 12 U.S. airliners flying
out of the Far East, the FAA's report points out that at least one other
accused participant in the conspiracy remains at large, and
"There are concerns that this individual or others of Yousef's
ilk who may possess similar skills pose a continuing threat to civil
aviation interests Increased awareness and vigilance are necessary
to deter future incidents be they from terrorists or non-terrorists.
It is important to do the utmost to prevent such acts rather than to
lower security measures by interpreting the statistics as indicating
a decreasing threat."
We have heard the allegation that our analysts erred by not explicitly
warning that hijacked aircraft might be used as weapons. Your staff
has been given access to over half a million pages of documents and
interviewed hundreds of intelligence officials in their efforts to investigate
this complex issue. The documents we provided show some 12 reports,
spread over seven years, which pertain to possible use of aircraft as
weapons in terrorist attacks.
- We disseminated those reports to the appropriate agenciessuch
as the FAA, Department of Transportation, and FBIas they came
in. Moreover, we also provided sanitized versions of intelligence
reports that were about threats to civil aviation so they could be
distributed more widely through the airline industry.
- But if one goes back and collects the reports over the same period
that pertained to possible truck bombs, car bombs, assassinations,
kidnappings, or attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear devices, those lists would have been far longer. A quick scan
of such reporting since 1996, for example, showed about 20 times as
many reports concerning car bombs and about five times as many reports
concerning weapons of mass destruction.
BUDGET AND RESOURCES
To evaluate our work on al-Qa'ida before 9/11 objectively, it is essential
that you look at three issues: global geopolitical issues we were grappling
with including counterterrorism; resource changes throughout
the 1990s that affected our ability to fight the counterterrorism fight;
and the overall health of US intelligence during this period. It is
simply not enough to look at al-Qa'ida in isolation.
The last decade saw a number of conflicting and competing trends: military
forces deployed to more locations than ever in our nation's history;
a growing counterproliferation and counterterrorism threat; constant
tensions in the Mid East and, to deal with these and a host of other
issues, far fewer intelligence dollars and manpower. At the end of the
Cold War, the Intelligence Community, like much of the National Security
Community, was asked by both Congress and successive Administrations
to pay the price of the "peace dividend."
The cost of the "peace dividend" was that during the 1990s our Intelligence
community funding declined in real terms - reducing our buying power
by tens of billions of dollars over the decade. We lost nearly one in
four of our positions. This loss of manpower was devastating, particularly
in our two most manpower intensive activities: all-source analysis and
human source collection. By the mid-1990s, recruitment of new CIA analysts
and case officers had come to a virtual halt. NSA was hiring no new
technologists during the greatest information technology change in our
lifetimes. It is absolutely essential that we understand that both Congress
and the Executive Branch for most of the decade embraced the idea that
we could "surge" our resources to deal with emerging intelligence challenges,
including threats from terrorism. And surge we did.
- As I "declared war" against al-Qa'ida in 1998 which was
in the aftermath of the East Africa embassy bombings we were
in our fifth year of round-the-clock support to Operation Southern
Watch in Iraq.
- Just three months earlier, we were embroiled in answering questions
on the India and Pakistan nuclear tests and trying to determine how
we could surge more people to understanding and countering weapons
of mass destruction proliferation.
- In early 1999, we surged more than 800 analysts and redirected
collection assets from across the Intelligence Community to support
the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
During this time of increased military operations around the globe,
the Defense Department was also reducing its tactical intelligence units
and funding. This caused the Intelligence Community to stretch our capabilities
to the breaking point because national systems were covering
the gaps in tactical intelligence. It is always our policy to give top
priority to supporting military operations.
While we grappled with this multitude of high priority, overlapping
crises, we had no choice but to modernize selective intelligence systems
and infrastructure in which we'd deferred necessary investments while
we downsized or we would have found ourselves out of business.
We had a vivid example of the cost of deferring investments a few years
ago when NSA lost all communications between the headquarters and its
field stations and we were unable to process any of that information
for several days. We have a more current example of the cost of deferred
investments today as we struggle to recapitalize our aging satellite
constellation another "return" on the peace dividend, given that
conscious decisions to accept risk and defer replacing these systems
were made in the mid-1990s. At the same time, we added the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency to the Intelligence Community along with
enormous funding shortfalls required to merge and modernize its geospatial
and imagery functions.
Throughout the Intelligence Community during this period we made difficult
resource reallocation decisions to try to rebuild critical mission areas
affected by the funding cuts. For example,
- In CIA we launched a program to rebuild our Clandestine Service.
This meant overhauling our recruitment and training practices and
our infrastructure. We launched similar initiatives to rebuild our
analytic depth and expertise, and to re-acquire our leading edge in
technology. Although we will not be given credit for these efforts
in the war on terrorism, they most assuredly contributed to that effort.
- NSA made the hard decision to cut additional positions to free
up pay and benefit dollars to patch critical infrastructure problems
and to modestly attempt to capitalize on the technology revolution.
But with the al-Qa'ida threat growing more ominous, and with our resources
devoted to countering it clearly inadequate, we began taking money and
people away from other critical areas to improve our efforts against
terrorism.
Despite the resource reductions and the enormous competing demands
for our attention, we managed to triple Intelligence Community-wide
funding for counterterrorism from fiscal year 1990 to 1999. The Counterterrorism
Center's resources nearly quadrupled in that same period. As your own
Joint Inquiry Staff charts show, we had significantly reallocated both
dollars and people inside our programs to work the terrorism problem.
This inquiry has singled out CIA resources specifically and I want to
address it specifically.
From a budget perspective, the last part of the 1990s reflects CIA's
efforts to shift to a wartime footing against terrorism. CIA's budget
had declined 18 percent in real terms during the decade and we suffered
a loss of 16 percent of our personnel. Yet in the midst of that stark
resource picture, CIA's funding level for counterterrorism just prior
to 9/11 was more than 50 percent above our FY 1997 level. CTC personnel
increased by over 60% for that same period. The CIA consistently reallocated
and sought additional resources for this fight. In fact, in 1994, the
budget request for counterterrorism activities equaled less than four
percent of the total CIA program. In the FY 2002 CIA budget request
we submitted prior to 9/11, counterterrorism activities constituted
almost 10 percent of the budget request. During a period of budget stringency
when we were faced with rebuilding essential intelligence capabilities,
I had to make some tough choices. Although resources for virtually everything
else in CIA was going down, counterterrorism resources were going up.
But after the US embassies in Africa were bombed, we knew that neither
surging our resources nor internal realignments were sufficient to fund
a war on terrorism. So in the fall of 1998, I asked the Administration
to increase intelligence funding by more than $2.0 billion annually
for fiscal years 2000-2005 and I made similar requests for FY 2001-2005
and FY 2002-2007. Only small portions of these requests were approved.
Counterterrorism funding and manpower needs were number one on every
list I provided to Congress and the Administration and, indeed, it was
at the top of the funding list approved by Speaker Gingrich in FY1999,
the first year in which we received a significant infusion of new money
for US intelligence capabilities during the decade of the 90s.
That supplemental and those that followed it, that you supplied, were
essential to our efforts - they helped save American lives. But we knew
that we could not count on supplemental funds to build multi-year programs
and that's why we worked so hard to reallocate our resources and to
seek five year funding increases. Many of you on this Committee and
the Appropriations Committees understood this problem very well. You
were enormously helpful to us. And we are grateful.
I want to conclude with a couple of comments about manpower. In CIA
alone, I count the equivalent of 700 officers working counterterrorism
in August 2001 at both headquarters and in the field. That number does
not include the people who were working to penetrate either technically
or through human sources a multitude of threat targets from which we
could derive intelligence on terrorists. Nor does it include friendly
liaison services and coalition partners. You simply cannot gauge the
level of effort by counting only the people who had the words "al-Qa'ida"
or "bin Ladin" in their position description.
We reallocated all the people we could given the demands placed on
us for intelligence on a number of the highest priority issues like
chemical, nuclear and biological proliferation and support to operational
military forces, and we surged thousands of people to fight this fight
when the threat was highest. But when we realized surging wasn't sufficient,
we began a sustained drumbeat both within the Administration and here
on the Hill that we had to have more people and money devoted to this
fight.
We can argue for the rest of the day about the exact number of people
we had working this problem but what we never said, was that the numbers
we had were enough. Our officers told your investigators that they were
always shorthanded. They were right. America may never know the names
of those officers, but America should know they are heroes. They worked
tirelessly for years to combat bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida and have responded
to the challenge of combating terrorism all during this time, with remarkable
intensity. Their dedication, professionalism and creativity stopped
many al-Qa'ida plots in their tracks they saved countless American
lives. Most of them are still in this fight are essential to
this fight and they honor us by their continued service.
Thanks to the last two emergency supplementals and the Administration's
FY03 budget request, which both Houses approved during the past week,
we have begun to move aggressively to reverse the funding shortfalls
that have had such an impact on the nation's intelligence capabilities.
But we have hardly scratched the surface in our efforts to recover from
the manpower reductions, and we cannot reconstitute overnight the cadre
of seasoned case officers and assets overseas, or the expert team of
analysts we've lost. It will take many more years to recover from the
capabilities we lost during the resource decline of the 1990s.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Success against the terrorist target must be measured against all
elements of our nation's capabilities, policies and will. The intelligence
community and the FBI are important parts of the equation, but by no
means the only parts. We need a national, integrated strategy in our
fight against terrorism that incorporates both offense and defense.
The strategy must be based on three pillars:
- Continued relentless effort to penetrate terrorist groups, whether
by human or technical means, whether alone or in partnership with
others.
- Second, intelligence, military, law enforcement, and diplomacy
must stay on the offense continually against terrorism around the
world. We must disrupt and destroy the terrorists' operational chain
of command and momentum, deny them sanctuary anywhere and eliminate
their sources of financial and logistical support.
Nothing did more for our ability to combat terrorism than the President's
decision to send us into the terrorist's sanctuary. By going in massively,
we were able to change the rules for the terrorists. Now they are the
hunted. Now they have to spend most of their time worrying about their
survival. Al-Qa'ida must never again acquire a sanctuary.
- Third, on defense, we need systematic security improvements to
protect our country's people and infrastructure and create a more
difficult operating environment for terrorists. The objective is to
understand our vulnerabilities better than the terrorist do, take
action to reduce those vulnerabilities, to increase the costs and
risks for terrorists to operate in the United States and, over time,
make those costs unacceptable to them.
We have learned an important historic lesson: We can no longer race
from threat to threat, resolve it, disrupt it and then move on. Targets
at risk remain at risk.
- In 1993, the first attack on the World Trade Center did, in comparative
terms, modest damage. A plot around the same time to attack New York
City tunnels and landmarks was broken up. We all breathed a sigh of
relief and moved on, focusing the effort mostly on bringing perpetrators
to justice. The terrorists came back.
- At the Millennium, a young terrorist panicked at a Canada-US border
crossing and his plan to attack an airport in Los Angeles was exposed
and thwarted. We breathed another sigh of relief and prepared for
his trial. Al Qa'ida's plan has only been delayed.
- Last winter, another young terrorist on an airliner ineptly tried
to detonate explosives in his shoes and was stopped by alert crew
and passengers. At this point, we're smarterwe started checking
everyone's shoes for explosives. It is not nearly enough.
- In the last year, we have gone on high alert several times for
good reason, only to have no attack occur. We all breathed a sigh
of relief and thought, "maybe it was a false alarm." It wasn't.
- We must design systems that reduce both the chances of an attack
getting through and its impact if it does. We must address both the
threat and our vulnerability. We must not allow ourselves to mentally
"move on" while this enemy is still at large.
I strongly support the President's proposal to create a Department
of Homeland Security. The nation very much needs the single focus that
this department will bring to homeland security. We have a foreign intelligence
community and law enforcement agencies, but we have not had a cohesive
body responsible and empowered for homeland security. The President's
proposal closes that gap while building bridges between all three communities.
- The Department's most important role will be to correlate threat
warnings and assessments about evolving terrorist strategies with
a fine-grained understanding of the vulnerabilities of all sectors
of the homeland and translate that into a system of
protection for the people and infrastructure of the United States.
While the Department will be vital to our homeland defense, the most
valued resource for our work against terrorism has always been and will
forever be our people.
Moving from this necessary organizational change, I cannot emphasize
enough our overwhelming need to recruit and train the intelligence officers
we need to win this war.
Terrorists have a tactical advantage. They can pick and choose any
target they please, who are willing to sacrifice their lives, and who
don't care how many innocents they hurt or kill have tactical advantage.
Developing the intelligence to combat them is manpower intensive. With
the personnel we have invested in counterterrorism today, we can do
much more than we could before 9/11, but more are still needed. I remind
you that we lost nearly 1-in-4 of our positions since the end of the
Cold War.
Our people also need better ways to communicate. Moreover, we also
need systems that enable us to share critical information quickly across
bureaucratic boundaries. Systems to put our intelligence in front of
those who need it wherever they may be, whatever their specific responsibilities
for protecting the American people from the threat of terrorist attack.
That means we must move information in ways and to places it has never
before had to move. We are improving our collaborative systems. We need
to improve our multiple communications linksboth within the Intelligence
Community and now in the Homeland Security community as well. Building,
maintaining, and constantly updating this system will require a massive,
sustained budget infusion, separate from our other resource needs.
Now, more than ever before, we need to make sure our customers get
from us exactly what they need which generally means exactly
what they want fast and free of unnecessary restrictions. Chiefs
of police across the country express understandable frustration at what
they do not know. But there's something else: Intelligence officers
in the federal government want to get their hands on locally collected
data. Each could often use what the other may already have collected.
The proposed Department of Homeland Security will help develop this
vertical sharing of information. So, too, will the Intelligence Community's
experience in supporting our armed forces. We're going to have to put
that experience to work in "supporting the mayor." We don't
have the luxury of an alternative.
One last point with regard to our human talent. As critical as terrorism
is, our people will not concentrate solely on counterterrorism. Even
in the last year, when national attention was focused on terror, other
events occurred which demanded the attention of experienced intelligence
officers. The risk of an Indian-Pakistani war and the deterioration
of the situation in the Mid East are just two examples. The Intelligence
Community must keep skilled, experienced officers on all such issues.
CONCLUDING STATEMENT
Our effectiveness has increased since September 11, and the Intelligence
Community will continue to pursue a strategy of bringing the war to
the terrorists.
But in the counterterrorism business there is no such thing as 100
percent successthere will never be.
- Some of what terrorists plan and do will remain hidden. The al
Qa'ida practice is to keep their most lethal plots within a small,
tightly knit group of fanatics. This is not an impossible target,
but it is among our hardest.
- Total success against such targets is impossible. Some attackers
will continue to get through us.
It may be comforting on occasion to think that if we could find the
one process that went wrong, then we could remedy that failing and return
to the sense of safety we enjoyed prior to 9/11. The reality is that
we were vulnerable to suicidal terrorist attacks and we remain vulnerable
to them today. That is not a pleasant fact for Americans to live with,
but it is the case. There are no easy fixes. We will continue to look
incisively at our own processes and to listen to others in an ongoing
effort to do our jobs better. But we must also be honest with ourselves
and with the public about the world in which we live.
The fight against international terrorism will be long and difficult.
- It will require the patience and diligence that the President has
asked for.
- It will require resourcessustained over a multi-year periodto
re-capitalize our intelligence infrastructure on a pace that matches
the changing technical and operational environment we face.
- It will also require countries that have previously ignored the
problem of terrorism or refused to cooperate with us to step up and
choose sides.
It will require all of us across the government to follow the example
of the American people after September 11 to come together, to
work as a team, and pursue our mission with unyielding dedication and
unrelenting fidelity to our highest ideals. We owe those who died on
September 11 and all Americans no less.
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