Our squadron just had returned from a successful deployment in the eastern Med where we flew missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It was a relatively incident-free cruise. Morale was high, and we all had confidence in our abilities to do our jobs. However, a routine task with a fuel tank would force us to step back, re-examine ourselves, and re-focus our procedures.
I had to release drop-tanks from their wing stations with a team of other mechs. I was the team leader and was inspecting the tanks to make sure they were fuel-free before we released them. Other team members were doing the same. Looking back, I realize we had no organization and had not decided who would inspect specific drop-tanks. I assumed they all were checked and completely empty. Part of this procedure calls for an AO team leader to do visual inspections as a backup, just to make sure everything is safe. We failed to have an AO on the team, and that decision almost was disastrous.
I approached aircraft 310, the next one to have its fuel tank released. It just had returned from a flight, so I assumed the tank was empty. I also asked other members of the team, believing one of them already had checked it. Once I verbally confirmed the status, we placed a tank skid underneath it, unhooked the pivot ball in the back, and disconnected the I cable.
Other members of the team stood on both sides of the tank, interlocked their arms, and prepared to carry it. When everyone was ready, I released the tank; it immediately fell onto the skid and then to the ground. I asked what was wrong, and the team members said it was too heavy. Luckily, no one was hurt, but I realized that the tank still had fuel inside. I opened the cap on the top of the tank to look; it was half full.
The tank was dented slightly. This incident occurred because of a breakdown in procedures and a hurry up and get the job done attitude. Too many assumptions were made, and doubting Sailors stayed silent. As I learned, if anyone has doubts, there is no doubt; stop what youre doing, and start again from the top. Procedures are written for a reason, and no steps can be skipped. That missing AO definitely would have prevented this incident, and a simple ORM review would have pointed out that control.
Petty Officer Preszler works in the power-plants shop at VFA-15. |
