Director: Brian Latell
Publications Officer: Henry Appelbaum
Chief Historian: Gerald K. Haines
Editor, Bulletin: Ben Fischer
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection: Donald P. Steury
Editor, Studies in Intelligence: Paul Arnold
Curator, Exhibit Center: Elizabeth Bruins
Conference Coordinator: Carole Minor
CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) supports research and publishing on the intelligence profession and its various disciplines. CSI Fellows write on theoretical, practical, and historical intelligence issues. The History Staff prepares studies on CIA and other intelligence topics and publishes collections of declassified documents. The Center also promotes exchanges with academic institutions and scholars through conferences and seminars as well as by arranging for guest speakers and sponsoring CIA Officers-in-Residence at colleges and universities. Monographs and videos prepared under Center auspices are available from the Library of Congress and the National Technical Information Service. The Center welcomes inquiries from intelligence professionals and scholars about its programs and publications. Find us--and many of our publications--on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/csi/
Some readers are probably wondering if their newsletter got lost in the mail. If so, don't blame the US Postal Service. You haven't missed a thing--we haven't sent one since issue number 7. Beginning with this issue there will be three changes. First, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) Newsletter has become the CSI Bulletin. Second, the Bulletin is to be published twice a year instead of quarterly. Reduced resources and increased workload on the Center staff necessitate this new publishing schedule. Even the cost of postage is a burden. Third, as we indicated in an enclosure accompanying issue 7, we are reducing the number of hard copies and urging readers to use the Internet for access to this publication. It is available at CSI's home page http://www.cia.gov/csi/.
In addition, CSI has been affected by a major reorganization. Effective 1 January 1998, all of the declassification functions were aggregated in CSI's Historical Review Group (HRG) and then transferred to CIA's Office of Information Management (OIM). Among the activities transferred to OIM were: CIA liaison with the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board; oversight of the declassification of Cold War analytic products on the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; Agency coordination of the declassification of CIA material for the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series; declassification of CSI studies on Cold War–related issues such as covert actions in Guatemala in the 1950s; and declassification of selected articles from CSI's Studies in Intelligence.
OIM was established on 1 October 1997; its Director is Edmund Cohen. It has three primary missions: to establish corporate records and classification management policies, procedures, and practices; to provide central coordination and resource oversight of information release activities; and to develop and maintain automated tools for Agency-wide information management and release activities.
The transfer of HRG to OIM is part of a larger effort to consolidate all of the CIA's review, de-classification and release programs, including responses to Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests; coordination of litigation cases and special searches; oversight of automatic, systematic, mandatory reviews as required under Executive Order 12958 (guidelines for classification and de-classification of national security information); and performance of pre-publication reviews. The Historical Review Program within OIM will, in addition to the functions noted above, continue to host the DCI's Historical Review Panel, coordinate Intelligence Community systematic declassification projects, and declassify and approve release of material for CSI's highly successful academic conferences.
On 3 July 1997, President Clinton signed H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 and authorizes $1.6 million for the Assassination Records Review Board to continue its work until 30 September 1998. (The Senate passed a companion bill, S. 844). Judge John R. Tunheim, chair of the Review Board, stated that the new law would enable his panel to "complete the review and release thousands of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy."
The Review Board, created by the JFK Act, began its work in 1994. The law gives it a mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Board is responsible for deciding which records are to be made public immediately and which will be released at later dates. The Review Board has set 1 September 1998 as the deadline for reviewing, declassifying, and transferring CIA records to the National Archives Records Administration (NARA).
On 28 October 1997, HRG released some 11,000 pages of finished intelligence analysis on the Soviet Union produced by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and its organizational predecessors. This was a milestone in the CIA's systematic declassification program. It was the first in a series of planned releases intended to make available to the public as much finished intelligence on the USSR as possible, starting with the CIA's oldest records.
Documents in the October release span the period from 1946 to 1972. The first analysis of Soviet issues was produced by the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), then part of the Central Intelligence Group, CIA's immediate predecessor. Many of ORE's early reports appear in a 1997 CSI anthology, Assessing The Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (see item later in this Bulletin on a CSI-sponsored conference on this topic).
The declassified records include 225 lengthy reports on the Soviet Union compiled in CIA's Office of Research and Reports (ORR)--created in 1950--and its successor offices from 1953 to 1972. ORR's duties included producing detailed economic assessments on the Communist bloc. Its responsibility for analyzing Soviet and East European technological and industrial developments was a formidable challenge in the Cold War's early days, when few human and technical collection efforts existed. Many of the reports from the 1950s and 1960s cite as sources unclassified Russian-language books and periodicals. ORR analysts referred to their work as compiling an "inventory of ignorance," but the documents reveal a comprehensive attempt to collect and examine nearly all aspects of Soviet economic activity.
Most of the reports are detailed studies on energy, agriculture, trade, industrial capacity, communications, strategic commodity availability and reserves, and military preparedness, intentions, and potential. Also included is a sampling of shorter items, including project action memoranda and selected weekly and daily intelligence summaries that range in original classification level from Top Secret to For Official Use Only. Some were unclassified, but most were classified Secret. More than half of the documents released in October were not "sanitized." The rest were slightly edited to remove source descriptions and other technical details. In addition to this project, HRG oversees the ongoing program to review, declassify, and release National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the Soviet Union. In fact, some of the material produced by the Directorate of Intelligence found its way later into judgments reached in the Estimates. (NIEs are prepared with the participation of the entire Intelligence Community, not just CIA.) In December 1997 HRG released to NARA 58 NIEs on the USSR. This brought the total of 519 NIEs released.
President Clinton signed an Executive Order in February 1995 declassifying imagery collected by the first US satellite reconnaissance systems. Under this declassification initiative, the Intelligence Community has released more than 800,000 reconnaissance photographs taken between 1960 and 1972 by 145 spy satellite missions known collectively as the CORONA program. As a means of gathering intelligence on military installations and movements in the Soviet Union, China, the Middle East, and other areas of international tension, these photographs supplied information that profoundly influenced US presidential decisionmaking during a volatile period in superpower relations.
Following this presidential declassification initiative, the CSI and George Washington University's Space Policy Institute cohosted a two-day conference in May 1995 entitled Piercing the Curtain: CORONA and the Revolution in Intelligence. More than 500 people from government, the academic community, the media, and elsewhere attended this first-ever public forum on Cold War satellite reconnaissance. Before the conference, CIA published a volume of documents containing 360 pages of declassified reports pertaining to CORONA. (See CSI Newsletters Nos. 3 and 4, published in spring and fall 1995.)
In conjunction with these events, a new book entitled Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites, was recently published by the Smithsonian Institution Press. Eye in the Sky presents the full story of the reconnaissance satellites' origins, technology, and far-reaching impact on foreign policy and national security. Contributors to this book--who include people intimately involved in the CORONA program's design and management as well as leading scholars--relate how the program documented not only all Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile sites, but also all warship and submarine bases and military/industrial complexes. This was accomplished without running the risks involved in intrusion into Soviet airspace.
The editors(1) conclude that the CORONA program yielded its most valuable information by proving the nonexistence of the much-ballyhooed "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union. This proof enabled the United States to scale back its plans for new missiles and provided a firm intelligence basis for subsequent arms control agreements. Arguing that satellite reconnaissance was a key factor in shaping the course of the Cold War, this new book documents one of the most important breakthroughs in 20th-century intelligence-gathering and space technology.(2)
The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Britain's counterpart to the National Security Agency (NSA), has released decrypted intercepts of Communist International (Comintern) clandestine radio communications from 1934 to 1937. J. H. Tiltman of the UK's prewar Government Code and Cypher School (GCHQ's predecessor organization) spearheaded the project, which was codenamed MASK. Copies of the decrypts were deposited at the Public Records Office (PRO) in London and at NSA's National Cryptologic Museum at Ft. Meade, Maryland.
The MASK collection includes several thousand deciphered radio messages between the Comintern headquarters in Moscow and about a dozen foreign Communist parties. Most were communications with parties in Europe and China, but several hundred messages between Moscow and the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) also are included. (An officer from the Comintern's International Liaison Department was stationed in the United States to operate the party's shortwave radio station.) The messages deal with a broad range of inter- and intra-party affairs; perhaps the most valuable to scholars will be the communications with Comintern representatives in France and Spain during the Spanish Civil War.
In August 1997, British intelligence released what journalist Patrick French called a "remarkable set of documents" on the Comintern's revolutionary aspirations in the United Kingdom in the early 1920s.(3) The documents show that the USSR was trying to subvert the British Empire and even had "optimistic plans" for fomenting revolution in London. They are on display at the Oriental and India Office collections in the British Library.
The new release bears directly on a long-running debate over the so-called Zinoviev letter, one of the most controversial suspected forgeries of the 20th century. Grigori Zinoviev, a member of the Soviet Politburo and head of the Comintern, allegedly wrote the letter, which urged British Communists to mobilize "sympathetic forces" in the governing Labour Party, the trade unions, and the armed forces in preparation for a socialist revolution. The text, which appeared in the 25 October 1924 edition of the Daily Mail, was headlined: "Civil War Plot by Socialists' Masters; Moscow Orders to Our Reds; Great Plot Disclosed."
The Zinoviev letter contributed to the landslide defeat of Britain's first Labour-led government in a general election two weeks later, although historians still argue about how much weight it actually carried with voters. Many Britons already saw the Labourites as having jeopardized national security by opening diplomatic relations with the internationally outcast USSR and negotiating a series of British-Soviet trade and economic agreements. (Any chances for Parliamentary ratification of these agreements were eclipsed by the "Zinoviev letter" episode.) Ironically, Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald had gone out of his way to convince the British "Establishment" that he was not a radical, and had even planned to use his emergency powers to stop a dockworkers' strike. His efforts to placate his countrymen led Moscow to denounce him later as a "mouthpiece of imperialism." Fate was even crueler to Zinoviev, who threw in his lot with Leon Trotsky against Josef Stalin in the post-Lenin power struggle. Stalin expelled him from the party in 1927, re-admitted him a year later, and then had him arrested in 1935. In 1936 Zinoviev was put on trial--this was the first of the Stalin regime's major "show trials"--and executed.
The released intelligence documents shed new light on an old controversy and suggest that the "letter" was a clever leak by British intelligence designed to undermine MacDonald while also protecting a British agent. The British, it appears, had a source who was providing them with verbatim transcripts of Politburo sessions in which Moscow's revolutionary plans were discussed. The Zinoviev letter, therefore, appears to be genuine in content but fake in form.
Michael Smith of the Daily Telegraph believes London's agent was Boris Bajanov, who had been Stalin's private secretary and was then secretary to the Politburo in 1923-1924.(4) Bajanov came under suspicion in 1927, was exiled to Central Asia under secret police guard, and escaped to Persia on New Year's Day in 1928. London refused to resettle Bajanov in the UK, apparently to prevent speculation in Moscow about his former agent status, but it arranged for him to reside in France, where he lived under official protection and remained accessible for debriefings. Smith also has suggested that Sidney Reilly (known to American public-television viewers as the "Ace of Spies") may have prepared the Zinoviev letter.
Most of the records released to the British Library came from an MI5 offshoot called Indian Political Intelligence (IPI). They include intelligence reports IPI received from MI6, MI5, and Special Branch.
Among the major revelations:
Dr. Gerald K. Haines has been appointed Chief Historian of the CIA, succeeding Dr. L. Kay Oliver, who retired in 1997. Dr. Haines joined CIA in 1989 and became Deputy Chief of the History Staff six years later. In 1996 he left the Agency to establish a new history office at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); he returned to CIA in late 1997. His background is in US diplomatic history; he received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1973. A year later he joined NARA as a foreign policy specialist, moving on to the National Security Agency in 1981 as a staff historian.
The CIA History Staff was established in 1950. It has had several "homes" within the Agency over the years. In 1992 it became part of an expanded CSI. Staff historians research and publish classified and unclassified studies dealing with the missions and functions of CIA. The nine-person staff also teaches a classified "History of CIA" course twice a year, runs an oral history program, and assists the State Department's Office of the Historian in the compilation of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Dr. Donald Steury of the History Staff manages CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, located in the CIA Library.
The DCI's Historical Review Panel, an advisory group of senior scholars and archival experts, held its semiannual meeting at CIA on 15-16 December 1997. The Panel met privately with DCI George Tenet and heard several briefings on developments in the CIA's records management and declassification efforts. Dr. Frederick Starr of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University chairs the Panel, which is preparing a report and recommendations on historical declassification for DCI George Tenet.
The Center sponsored this day-long conference at CIA Headquarters on 24 October 1997. About 400 people attended. Dr. Woodrow J. Kuhns, of CSI's History Staff, prepared the anthology published in conjunction with the conference. This volume contains intelligence reports and analytical pieces produced by the Office of Reports and Estimates from 1946 through the Chinese intervention in the Korean war in 1950. Panelists at the conference included distinguished scholars and former civil servants. Ambassador Paul Nitze, a drafter of NSC-68--one of the cornerstones of the US policy of containment--addressed the conference, and Ambassador George Kennan, author of the famous 1947 "X" article in Foreign Affairs that foreshadowed containment, delivered a commentary on the anthology by telephone.
| Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years Central Intelligence Agency 24 October 1997 Program Welcome Brian Latell, Director Center for the Study of Intelligence Opening Address Philip Zelikow Harvard University Eastern Europe: Consolidation of Soviet Control Woodrow Kuhns, moderator John Campbell Charles Gati John Waller Reflections Paul Nitze Western Europe: Threat to Democracy Michael Warner, moderator Robert Bowie James Hershberg William Hyland Lloyd Gardner East Asia: Coming of War William Heaton, moderator Michael Sheng Robert Sutter Allen Whiting Conclusions William Hyland |
Charles Gati, senior vice president of an international investment firm and former professor, found ORE's reports accurate and timely with regard to the Soviet takeover in Eastern Europe. They were neither naive nor alarmist. In his opinion, however, the reports underestimated Stalin's personal power and reacted slowly to the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. John Campbell, a former State Department official, noted that good intelligence has little impact if there is no policy in place to act on it, citing as an example ORE's fine analysis--ignored by policymakers at the time--of the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s. Drawing on his experience at the State Department, he also said there had been a greater risk of war over Turkey in 1946 than was reflected in the reports. John Waller, a retired senior CIA official, observed that there were repeated warnings of imminent US-Soviet war during the post–World War II years and that some of these came from the policy community. He commended the analysts for concluding correctly that the war danger was less than many supposed.
| "X" Comments Fifty Years Later Ambassador George F. Kennan, author of the seminal 1947 "X" article in Foreign Affairs on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," was asked to comment on the assessments made during 1946-1950 from the perspective of the time when they were made and in light of subsequent events. His response follows: I found the assessments, particularly in the period 1946-1948, to be, generally speaking, remarkably good. I would commend particularly the realism and restraint shown in the judgments of Soviet military intentions and capabilities. Beginning with the latter part of 1948 there was, it seems to me, a certain deterioration in this respect. There were evidences of the assumptions, and the tendency to overrate, allegedly blindly aggressive military commitments of the Soviet side--commitments quite divorced from the political restraints, and awareness of the basic weaknesses in the civilian and economic backgrounds that inevitably modified Soviet diplomacy. Similar comments could be made in the case of developments in China, and particularly in Chinese-Soviet relations. I fear that from 1948 on, violent pro-Chinese Nationalist impulses in dominant Congressional circles had a stultifying and distorting effect even on the intelligence community. It would in fact have been surprising had this not been the case. While I think I understand some of the reasons for this, I find the assessments in some respects inadequate because of what seems to have been a blanket ruling out of any critical reference to our own policies and actions. Nevertheless, often the reactions of other governments, particularly the Soviet one, were not fully comprehensible unless brought into connection with what we ourselves were saying and doing at that point. The treatment of the Berlin Blockade seemed to me to be a good example of this. You would not have thought that we had had anything to do with it or that our reactions were a significant factor in the way that the crisis developed. This deficiency was particularly marked in the technical rather than in the strategic field; but even in this latter respect a greater attention to our own policies and to the effect they were having on others would have added depth and usefulness to the assessments. |
China scholar Allen Whiting, professor at the University of Arizona and formerly with the State Department and the Rand Corporation, recalled that State Department experts were closer to the mark than were CIA analysts in anticipating Beijing's decision to intervene in Korea. Michael Sheng, associate professor of history at Southwest Missouri State University, praised the ORE reports, saying they correlate with his own research showing that Mao was a more faithful ally of Stalin than many assumed then or later. Dr. Whiting disagreed with that view, asserting that the Chinese communists were among the most independent in the Soviet bloc. Robert Sutter of the Congressional Research Service found the early reports on Vietnam especially accurate, characterizing them as more nuanced than the ones dealing with Chinese affairs.
In September 1997 the CIA Museum, in association with the Agency's Fine Arts Commission and the CIA 50th Anniversary Program Office, opened a thought-provoking exhibit entitled The Cold War: Fifty Years of Silent Conflict. The Exhibit Hall in the Original Headquarters Building was renovated for this display, which features "spy" artifacts from the collection of H. Keith Melton. Mr. Melton is an internationally recognized expert on espionage paraphernalia who has assembled an extensive collection of equipment, weapons, books, and papers of famous spies and has written three books on these topics.
The exhibit is divided into three separate galleries. Gallery A focuses on the early days of espionage, with a special emphasis on World War II. It features equipment used by members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Special Operations Executive, as well as Soviet intelligence/secret police badges, medals, and credentials. Gallery B contains profiles of notorious spies and some of the devices they used, including concealed cameras, clandestine communications equipment, and "bugs." Gallery C features an array of Cold War weapons, "dead drops," microdots, and sophisticated counterintelligence devices.
Since its opening on 16 September 1997, with a ribbon-cutting by President Clinton, the exhibit has been well received among Agency employees and official visitors. President George Bush, a former Director of Central Intelligence, visited the exhibit and called it "impressive." FBI Director Louis Freeh expressed interest in borrowing it for display at FBI Headquarters. The exhibit was also a major hit on Family Day, when thousands of employees and family members waited in line for up to an hour to see it.
Dr. Brian Latell, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), has named Elizabeth Bruins as Curator of the CIA Museum, a component of CSI. Ms. Bruins assumed her new duties on 2 February. As Curator, she is responsible for developing new exhibits; acquiring, cataloguing, and preserving CIA artifacts; working with the public and the media; collaborating with the CIA's Fine Arts Commission; and showcasing CIA's rich heritage.
Ms. Bruins has served as Assistant Curator and has extensive experience in creating displays of intelligence artifacts. She was instrumental in putting together the popular "Cold War" exhibit currently on display at CIA Headquarters. This exhibit features items on loan from noted collector H. Keith Melton (see preceding article). Thanks primarily to Ms. Bruins' efforts, the exhibit was a centerpiece of the CIA's 50th Anniversary celebrations in 1997. "I'm looking forward to working with all of CIA's Directorates," Ms. Bruins said. "Each one has a story to tell, and it's a special responsibility to help them preserve their histories through collecting and displaying the unique objects that helped them do their jobs."
The Center for the Study of Intelligence has released Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police, a compilation by Ben Fischer of several articles published in Studies in Intelligence in the mid-1960s. The articles discuss personalities and operations of the main tsarist intelligence and security service in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Also included are a letter from the author of the articles and a book review, both of which discuss the still-debated issue of whether Josef Stalin was an Okhrana agent. A Preface by Mr. Fischer provides context and background on this organization and the often-colorful men and women who worked for or against it--in some cases simultaneously.
According to Mr. Fischer, "The old Counterintelligence Staff under James Angleton arranged for these articles to be written in the belief that history--in this case the only archive in the Western world on imperial Russian police/ intelligence operations--matters and has political and operational implications for Soviet and post-Soviet espionage practices. This was controversial; many people believed, for example, that the KGB was a qualitatively new organization with no ties to the Russian or Soviet past. In fact, the KGB used an Okhrana tradecraft manual for training foreign intelligence officers."
This anthology is the first in a planned series of thematic collections of articles that initially appeared in classified editions of Studies in Intelligence. It is available at CSI's Web Site: http:/www.cia.gov/csi/.
East German spymaster Markus Wolf's biggest coup--and one of the biggest espionage coups of the Cold War--was placing an agent at the pinnacle of the West German Government. Günter Guillaume was Chancellor Willy Brandt's top aide when he was arrested in April 1974 and confessed to being a captain in the East German intelligence agency known as the HVA. Six weeks later Brandt resigned, citing the spy scandal as the reason for ending his political career.
The impact of these events was felt in Moscow, where Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev exploded after learning that "my good friend Willy" had fallen victim to a flap. Brezhnev had depended on his personal relations with Brandt to implement a grand scheme of détente in Europe and revive the stagnating Soviet economy. The spymaster's greatest success suddenly became my "greatest defeat up to that time," Wolf says in his 1997 memoir.(5)
Guillaume's arrival in West Berlin in the mid-1950s was a textbook example of an HVA "sluicing" operation. Spies were planted in the streams of refugees who fled to the West looking for a better life or, in Guillaume's case, espionage opportunities. With a knack for politics and organizational work, Guillaume climbed the ladder of Brandt's Social Democratic Party (SPD). By 1969 he was serving as the party leader's liaison with labor and trade unions.
In 1972, Brandt's coalition won a big victory in national elections, gaining a parliamentary majority that ensured ratification of treaties he had signed with the USSR, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin now had many eggs in Brandt's basket. Guillaume moved up to become the Chancellor's personal aide and chief of his private secretariat, with access to foreign and defense policy documents as well as Brandt's correspondence with US and NATO leaders. While there were new risks involved, Wolf admits, the "temptation was too great" not to keep running Guillaume.
Guillaume's arrest had ironic consequences. Some of Wolf's agents said it actually bolstered their confidence in the HVA's agent-handling ability, inasmuch as the operation had run for so long. In East Germany, where Brandt had become a hero and symbol of hope for national and family reunification, anonymous protesters--apparently suspecting that their own government had pulled the rug out from under the Chancellor--painted his name on street signs and put up posters with his picture.
The affair also caused strains in East Berlin's relations with Moscow. Brezhnev took East German party boss Erich Honecker to task and also scolded his own intelligence chief, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, for "not knowing" about Guillaume and not removing him once a personal relationship with Brandt had been established.(6)
Brezhnev had reason to be suspicious. Honecker and other East German leaders, who had joined the Weimar-era Communist Party and battled the Social Democrats before Hitler came to power, despised Brandt as "no normal class enemy." They still had scores-- left over from the 1930s and 1940s--to settle with the old non-communist German left. When Brandt was elected Mayor of West Berlin in 1957, for example, the HVA launched a disinformation campaign denouncing him as a Gestapo collaborator during his wartime exile in Norway. Now Honecker had reason to fear, as well as hate, Brandt as a popular figure in East Germany who challenged the communist regime's legitimacy. Did he engineer Brandt's fall?
To the end of his life, Honecker claimed he did not even know about Guillaume. Archival records show that he was rattled by the flap, concerned over Brezhnev's reaction, and even considered sacking Wolf.(7) All that "may be true," Wolf notes, suggesting that he has doubts. Moscow, for its part, was glad to get high-level intelligence from Guillaume without asking where it came from. The political risk became apparent only after the fact. The Soviets, Wolf says, wanted results without risk. Wolf was able to convince Honecker, who in turn persuaded Brezhnev, that Brandt's decision to resign was rooted in internal SPD intrigues, a sense of weariness after so many years and so many political battles in office, and a threatened expose of his personal life. The spy case was at best a pretext, not a cause.
Was there more to the story? While Moscow found Guillaume's information useful, East Berlin must have considered it absolutely vital. Guillaume was Honecker's sole means of monitoring the Brandt-Brezhnev "back channel" and secret negotiations that had potentially serious implications for East Germany's future. Even if Honecker did not "know"--or did not want to know--about the spy with the French name, years later he gave Guillaume a national hero's welcome and East Germany's highest award when he and his wife were released from a West German prison in a periodic inter-German spy swap. That may have been a more accurate reflection of Honecker's true feelings than the written account in the East German archives.
| Studies in Intelligence The latest unclassified edition of the Intelligence Community's professional journal Studies in Intelligence is to be published soon. It will also be available at the Center's Internet home page http://www.cia.gov/csi/.. This edition will include the following articles: Held Hostage in Iran Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers Commentary on Congress as a User of Intelligence Reviewing the Work of CIA Authors The Need for Improvement Intelligence and Operational Support for Anti-Nazi Resistance Of Market Garden and Melanie |
Please note that copies of Studies in Intelligence and other publications are available from:
Documents Expediting Project (DOC EX)
ANA Division–Government Documents Section
Library of Congress
101 Independence Ave., S.E.
Washington, DC 20540-4172
Phone: (202) 707-9527
FAX: (202) 707-0380
or
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Phone: (703) 605-6000 or
1-800-553-6847
FAX: (703) 321-8547
| CSI Publications
The following CSI monographs and anthologies were published in 1997 and early 1998. They are available upon request or (with the exception of The Chinese Media) on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/csi/. |
| Other Publications
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a book by Harvard faculty members Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, was published recently by Belknap Press. The authors received financial backing from the Harvard University Intelligence and Policy Project, which is supported by the Center for the Study of Intelligence. A book by retired CIA analysts Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren entitled Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 is scheduled for publication in June by Texas A&M University Press. |
(2) The book may be obtained by mail for $29.50 (plus $3.50 postage and handling for the first copy and $1 for each additional book) from Smithsonian Institution Press, P.O. Box 960, Herndon, VA 20172. Phone numbers are (800) 782-4612 or (703) 661-1599. Orders also may be faxed to (703) 661-1501. Overseas orders should be paid for with a major credit card. Overseas purchasers will be charged actual shipping/handling costs, and books will be sent by surface freight unless otherwise specified.
(3) See Patrick French, "Red Letter Day," Sunday Times (London), 10 August 1997, p. 12.
(4) Michael Smith, "The forgery, the election and the MI6 spy," Daily Telegraph, 13 August 1997, p. 10.
(5) Markus Wolf with Ann McElvoy, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1997), Chapter 9, "The Chancellor's Shadow," pp. 151-173.
(6) Wjatcheslaw Keworkow, Der geheime Kanal: Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), p. 176.
(7) "Kleinliches Gewese," Der Spiegel, 23 June 1997, pp. 76-77.