Why Build It in Bethesda?

Nearly a decade before the first design concept for Bldg. 33 was suggested, and many years even before 9/11 accelerated the need for an expanded biodefense research program, there was the 1995 NIH Campus Master Plan. In that plan, several new research facilities were slated for construction, including a lab building located at the site for Bldg. 33. So the prospect of a new building project is not what has some NIH'ers — and others in the local region — questioning the location of the new infectious disease research facility. Concern expressed by neighbors, a local congressman and even a group of NIH scientists over the last several months all generally boils down to one query: Given the increased security measures of the past 2 years, why locate a building whose main research program is both critical and sensitive in Bethesda, a heavily populated area that is also widely traveled every day?

NIAID scientific director Dr. Tom Kindt offered the answer.

"Simply put, scientific research can be a remarkably painstaking and time-consuming endeavor, but such research invariably flourishes and yields the best results most rapidly in a diverse, collegial environment," he noted. "Research scientists can accomplish the most when they have support services, specialized laboratories and both proximity and access to a cadre of other world-class scientists working in a multitude of diverse disciplines. The shorthand word for this process is 'synergy.' Over and over again, it is this cross-pollination and weaving together of ideas — the synergy of NIH — that has led to historic biomedical breakthroughs."

Citing historic examples of the importance of NIH synergy — such as the development of AZT as the first drug to fight AIDS — Kindt said many of the agency's past intramural successes were due to the campus atmosphere already in place here.

This view shows how the new complex will look from Rockville Pike.

"The craft of research science has time and time again been dramatically accelerated by the collaboration of many scientists working closely together, looking simultaneously at similar problems from multiple perspectives," Kindt pointed out. "The case has been overwhelmingly made that what can be accomplished by working in isolation can most generally be accomplished more rapidly by working collaboratively. A major part of the genius of the NIH is the growing collaboration and the emerging interdisciplinary focus on disease."

Some NIH employees have asked whether building and maintaining a research complex along Rockville Pike might prove to be a distraction to area motorists and other passersby.

"Bldg. 33 will be more than 400 feet from the closest lanes of Rockville Pike, well within the campus, behind the perimeter fence, and screened by existing and planned landscaping," noted Stella Serras-Fiotes, director of the Division of Facilities Planning in the NIH Office of Research Facilities. "While the upper levels of the building may be visible from some portions of Rockville Pike, the building will not serve as any more of a distraction than any other development currently located along this busy roadway."

Other people have questioned the placement on campus of Bldg. 33, and whether a more interior site — nearer to the center of the campus and farther away from main thoroughfares — might make a more secure site.

"In regard to whether other alternative locations on campus for Bldg. 33 were considered," Serras-Fiotes responded, "the critical consideration in determining an appropriate location for Bldg. 33 was conformity with the NIH Campus Master Plan. This plan, as approved by the National Capital Planning Commission, the federal review agency, in 1996, identifies appropriate land uses for every area of the campus. The location of Bldg. 33 is consistent with the approved master plan for a lab facility along with a multi-level parking garage at this site. There are no other immediately available sites for lab construction. Relocating it to the center of the campus, as some have suggested, would require the removal of existing serviceable buildings, and funds are not currently available to replace these structures and accommodate the activities that would be displaced. Moving the new lab to Lot 41 would require eliminating valuable parking spaces. We do not believe it's feasible from a planning perspective to move the building to another campus location or, more importantly, necessary from a safety or security standpoint."

Summing up the decision, Kindt cited other practical reasons, and reiterated NIH's critical part in helping to keep the nation safe.

"Having Bldg. 33 at Bethesda allows NIAID to take full advantage of the physical and intellectual research infrastructure that is already available on campus and minimize replication of costly support services as NIH carries out the President's mandate to expand NIAID biodefense research capabilities."

The new lab sits compatibly amid other NIH buildings.

What Do the BSLs Mean?

The four categories describing laboratory environments — called the biosafety level (BSL) system — are defined by federally established requirements for conducting research and are used worldwide. Below are brief descriptions of each level. For a chart of federal biosafety requirements, visit the online document at http://bmbl.od.nih.gov/sect3tab1.htm.

According to "1, 2, 3's of Biosafety Levels" by Dr. Jonathan Richmond of the CDC, BSL-1 is "appropriate for working with microorganisms that are not known to cause disease in healthy humans. This type of lab can be found in municipal water-testing laboratories, in high schools, and in some community colleges teaching introductory microbiology classes, where the agents are not considered hazardous." Standard microbiological practices are required, using routine safety measures.

"The facility, containment devices, administrative controls, and practices and procedures that constitute BSL-2 are designed to maximize safe working conditions for people working with agents of moderate risk to personnel and the environment," Richmond noted. "The agents manipulated at BSL-2 are often ones to which workers have had exposure in the community — often as children — and to which they have already experienced an immune response."

A BSL-3 lab "is suitable for work with infectious agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal diseases as a result of exposure by the inhalation route," according to Richmond. In addition to all BSL-2 requirements and conditions, a BSL-3 laboratory would need — among other considerations — specific secondary barriers to set labs apart from one another, and special attention to air-flow, since BSL-3 agents can be transmissible through aerosol methods.

In the NIH-CDC publication Biosafety in Biomedical and Microbiological Laboratories, BSL-4 is used for work with "dangerous/exotic agents that pose high risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections; or related agents with unknown risk of transmission." Recommended conditions for BSL-4 labs include all level-3 measures in addition to a "separate building or isolated zone, and dedicated supply and exhaust, vacuum, and decontamination systems." Bldg. 33 will not include BSL-4 capacity.