FMFM 3-21

MAGTF Intelligence Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

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FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*, establishes doctrine for the employment and use of military deception in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

2. SCOPE

This manual presents a detailed account of intelligence doctrine, tasks, and structure in MAGTF and joint/combined operations, specifically for intelligence personnel.

3. SUPERSESSION

FMFM 2-1, *Intelligence*, dated September 1980.
Operational Handbook (OH) 3-2, *Intelligence*, dated October 1986.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Form format to—

Commanding General
Doctrine Division (C 42)
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
2042 Broadway Street Suite 210
Quantico, VA 22134-5021

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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DISTRIBUTION: 139 000221 00

User Suggestion Form

From:

To: Commanding General, Doctrine Division (C 42), Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2042 Broadway Street Suite 210, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS*

1. In accordance with the foreword to FMFM 3-21, which invites individuals to submit suggestions concerning this FMFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded:

____	_____	_____	_____
Page	Article/Paragraph No.	Line No.	Figure/Table No.

Nature of Change:
- ☐ Add
- ☐ Delete
- ☐ Change
- ☐ Correct

2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.)

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

Note: Only one recommendation per page.

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Change No.	Date of Change	Date of Entry	Organization	Signature

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MAGTF Intelligence Operations

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Part I. Intelligence

Chapter 1

Introduction

1001. Doctrinal Foundation

Intelligence is the foundation on which the operational effort is built. Intelligence is not a combat support function. It is an essential element of combat, a component of combat power, and the means which allows the commander to apply combat power at the decisive time and place. Success of the intelligence effort will depend upon command awareness and appreciation of intelligence as an element of combat power.

1002. Mission

MAGTF intelligence staffs are responsible to provide the commander, the staff, and the organization at each level of command with the intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) necessary to the decision-making process and to the successful planning and conduct of assigned missions.

1003. Objectives

The first intelligence objective is to keep the MAGTF commander and senior, adjacent, and subordinate commanders informed on the characteristics of the enemy, weather, and terrain within the area of operations (AO).

The second intelligence objective is to assist the MAGTF commander in planning and implementing counterintelligence measures. These measures are designed to discover, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive activities.

1004. Related Publications

This manual furnishes guidance concerning MAGTF intelligence operations. It provides an essential understanding of the intelligence process through the relationship of intelligence and information. This manual is the basic reference for intelligence. It is used in conjunction with Joint Pub 3-02, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*; NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*; FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action* and other appropriate FMFMs, FMFRPs, and OHs. It should be noted that since signals intelligence operations is of a particularly sensitive nature, it will not be discussed in this manual. For details, see FMFM 3-23, (C) *Signals Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare Operations* (U). FMFM 3-22, *Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group* (SRIG) (currently under development) contains details describing Marine Corps counterintelligence, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unattended ground sensor, interrogation-translation, imagery interpretation, and amphibious reconnaissance operations. For details concerning air reconnaissance operations, see FMFM 5-6, *Air Reconnaissance*.

1005. Doctrine for Intelligence Support

a. General. Intelligence support is based on the command's mission. In MAGTF intelligence operations, intelligence support is the fulfillment of the

commander's needs rather than production of intelligence for its own sake. Based on the commander's needs, the intelligence officer identifies intelligence requirements that the commander deems essential and/or useful—essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR). Intelligence requirements are derived from the MAGTF mission. EEI provide the commander with critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment. The commander relates those answers with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. OIR are normally requested by other staff officers to provide the commander with a more complete picture of the battlefield.

Intelligence support is provided by the intelligence staff. The basic tenet of the intelligence staff is to provide the commander with timely, integrated, all-source intelligence that enhances mission accomplishment. The highest priority of the intelligence section is to immediately inform the commander of critical intelligence/information so that he can make decisions that will institute timely and appropriate responses to actions by a potential or actual enemy. Answering the commander's EEI is the second priority of the intelligence section, while satisfying other intelligence requirements for other staff sections is its third priority. The second tenet is that of prior planning in all phases of intelligence operations. The adherence to the staff planning process will ensure that proper planning takes place at all stages of MAGTF operations. Prior planning is essential for successful accomplishment of assigned missions.

b. Principles of Intelligence

(1) Interdependence. Intelligence is an integral component of planning and is essential to all decisions. MAGTF staff agencies, with the responsibility and authority for preparing and issuing operational orders, must work as one in pursuit of the mission. Only in such a manner can each agency complement the others in satisfying the needs of the commander.

(2) Usefulness. When intelligence is produced for no other purpose than increased knowledge, then it is merely interesting and provides no service to the commander. All intelligence activities must have a clearly identified objective that coincides with the needs of the commander.

(3) Timeliness

(a) The best intelligence is without value unless it reaches the user in a timely manner. It must reach the commander to allow sufficient time for him to make a decision, formulate a plan, effect any needed preparation, and initiate planned action before the enemy is able to react effectively.

(b) The competing requirements for timeliness and accuracy will often require careful judgement. It must be recognized that a sacrifice of completeness and accuracy may be involved to meet the requirement for timeliness. In mobile, high-intensity combat environments, decisions may frequently be based on incomplete combat intelligence that has been modified by selected combat information.

(4) Flexibility

(a) Intelligence operations must be highly flexible and must be capable of accommodating varying requirements to dynamic situations.

(b) The principle of flexibility is particularly applicable to the procedural aspects of intelligence. While it is generally true that standardized procedures make for more effective operations, these procedures should not be followed blindly if they are unable to meet the needs of the situation.

(5) Imagination

(a) Imagination and innovation are required to meet the needs of a constantly changing environment and to fully exploit the possibilities of each situation.

(b) The production of intelligence requires that the self-evident is never accepted without

close scrutiny and careful examination. The possibility of enemy deception operations must always be considered. When the enemy is apparently doing nothing, imagination and redoubling of intelligence efforts are required to determine the enemy's capabilities and his most probable use of those capabilities.

(6) Security

(a) Only through proper security measures can the enemy be denied knowledge of friendly intelligence activities and the intelligence produced from those activities. The compromise of sources of information may lead to the loss of those sources or the enemy using these sources in deception operations. Significant tactical advantages will accrue to the combatant who becomes fully aware of the extent and limit of the opposing commander's knowledge.

(b) Knowledge of intelligence operations must be strictly limited to those who have the need-to-know. Likewise, the operations must be conducted in such a manner as to conceal the intelligence or tactical objectives of the command. Security must, however, be based on a realization that intelligence is useless unless it gets to the person who needs it and security measures must not prevent the rapid dissemination of intelligence.

1006. Factors Affecting the Intelligence Effort

As with all military endeavors, intelligence operations are affected by and must be adapted to many variables, some of which are:

a. Level of Command. It is important to consider the level of the command when intelligence objectives are established. Since the concerns of commanders are not identical at each level, the level of command will play a major role in determining intelligence objectives and activities. Those valid intelligence objectives are identified within the capabilities of the command.

b. Command Mission. Combat intelligence must be mission-oriented. It is imperative that intelligence personnel have a thorough knowledge of the command mission and the proposed means of accomplishment of that mission. This will assume that intelligence activities will be conducted as an element of mission planning and that resultant combat intelligence will fully contribute to mission accomplishment.

c. Force Organization. The intelligence requirements of commanders of various type units will differ. This distinction is especially true with respect to aviation and ground units and must be a major factor in using the intelligence efforts of each type command. Since the different nature of intelligence operations derives from the differences in the nature and composition of the force, it becomes imperative that the intelligence officer be knowledgeable of the organizational characteristics and operational employment concepts of his command.

d. Area of Operations. The weather and terrain aspects of the area of operations are fundamental elements of combat intelligence. The effort required to fulfill these fundamental elements will increase when tactical operations shift from well-developed, well-documented areas to more remote locales on which little or no documentation is available. In remote locales, a greater proportion of the total intelligence effort will be necessary to satisfy weather and terrain requirements.

e. Enemy. The diverse enemy capabilities which may be encountered by a force with a global mission greatly increases the scope of the commander's possible intelligence requirements. Such enemy forces may range from ill-equipped, sophisticated modern armies to austere, loosely organized unconventional forces. Each will generate its own peculiar set of intelligence requirements which must be identified and satisfied.

f. Intelligence Requirements. These requirements play a profound role in the design and conduct of intelligence operations. The sum total of the command intelligence requirements constitute one of the two factors necessary to establish an initial estimate of the required intelligence effort. The second factor is the identification of available intelligence.

g. Available Intelligence. The identification of available intelligence permits formulation of the second factor necessary to determine the nature and extent of intelligence activity. The intelligence officer will then compare the available intelligence to the previously determined total intelligence requirements and identify those requirements which remain unsatisfied. It is these unsatisfied requirements which play the primary role in planning the intelligence effort.

h. Intelligence Structure Capacity. In planning the intelligence effort, it is important to determine the intelligence needs of the various commands and to assess the capacity of the command to provide that support through organic capabilities. The intelligence architecture then must be adjusted through either augmentation to the unit or reorientation of intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination means to ensure that appropriate support is available. Centralization of analysis and dissemination functions must be minimized due to the inherent delays that such an effort builds into the intelligence system.

i. Time Available. Each operation will have time schedules and constraints that will determine the time available to plan and execute an intelligence operation. Time constraints, or the lack of them, must be considered when determining the elaboration and formation of the intelligence effort.

j. Availability of External Support. A certain number of valid intelligence requirements will be beyond the capacity of the intelligence structure. It will then be necessary to identify the external intelligence support required and the means of obtaining that support.

Chapter 2

Types of Intelligence

2001. General

Before making a decision or beginning an action(s) to accomplish the mission, the commander needs information on the weather, enemy, and terrain. Once a decision is reached, the commander will require accurate information/intelligence to initiate/continue operations. Intelligence describes the AO and reduces the commander's risk. It enhances sound operational decision making and this, in turn, provides sufficient combat power at the decisive time and place. Thus intelligence plays a significant role in every decision made.

2002. Information

Information is the basis for the development of intelligence in MAGTF operations. Information is defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as the unevaluated material of every description that may be used in the production of intelligence. It includes knowledge or data gathered in any manner. However, not all information can be turned into intelligence in time to satisfy the commander's tactical intelligence requirements. In MAGTF operations, the commander has to apply some information to the battle in progress and some information to the planned battle of tomorrow. When conducting MAGTF intelligence activities, information can be separated into two categories: combat information and intelligence information. As a general observation, where combat information supports today's battle, intelligence information supports tomorrow's battle.

a. Combat Information. Due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, combat information is gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander. It is unevaluated data that cannot be processed into combat intelligence in time to satisfy the user's combat intelligence requirements. Combat information is only a part of the informational whole. It is extracted from the overall body of information and applied to the battle in progress. The commander uses combat information to obtain or stimulate an immediate response to an existing or a rapidly developing situation. Having satisfied its immediate tactical purpose, combat information may be used as data in the analytical process. In this new role as data, it can be turned into intelligence information to support tomorrow's battle.

b. Intelligence Information. In most instances, intelligence information does not have an urgent bearing on the battle in progress. Intelligence information is used primarily in the planning of the battle of tomorrow. Intelligence information is unevaluated material of every description, including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources, which, when processed, may produce intelligence. The words *when processed* are key when distinguishing intelligence information from combat information. Although combat information may find subsequent use as intelligence information, the reverse is not true. This is due to the time required to process intelligence information.

2003. Intelligence

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,

and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas, present or potential enemies, and climatic or weather conditions. When used by the commander, intelligence will reduce his unknown factors and, therefore, his risks. If intelligence is properly produced, it can provide the commander with reliable, timely, detailed, and accurate knowledge about the enemy, weather, and terrain. Intelligence provides an estimate of enemy capabilities and possible courses of action and supports the planning of friendly operations. In MAGTF intelligence operations, intelligence embraces strategic, tactical, and combat intelligence.

a. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligence supports the formation of policy and military plans and plays an important part at the national and international levels. It also influences the MAGTF commander's overall picture of the battlefield. The components of strategic intelligence are the factors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations. In conducting MAGTF intelligence operations during tactical operations, the landing force may collect and report information used in the production of strategic intelligence.

b. Tactical Intelligence. Tactical intelligence is used for the battle in progress and is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. In MAGTF operations, the commander uses tactical intelligence for the planning and conduct of tactical operations in the amphibious objective area (AOA) and the area of interest to that AOA. See Part III, *MAGTF Intelligence Planning.*

c. Combat Intelligence. Combat intelligence bridges the gap between strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence. Combat intelligence concerns itself with the operational level of war. While tactical intelligence is used for the battle in progress, combat intelligence contributes to the needs of the planned battle to be fought in the future. See Chapter 3, *Combat Intelligence.*

2004. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence are those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. CI identifies for the commander the hostile intelligence collection threat, determines friendly vulnerabilities to that threat, and evaluates security measures. It also recognizes that terrorism is an extension of subversion and sabotage. Therefore, terrorism is now considered a part of the threat by the counterintelligence field. See Chapter 4, *Counterintelligence.*

2005. Target Intelligence

Target intelligence is the specific intelligence effort to support effective targeting. It portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. Personnel involved in target intelligence must be familiar with the following terms: target, target acquisition, target analysis, target list, target materials, targeting, deliberate targeting, reactive targeting, and target bulletin. See Chapter 5, *Target Intelligence.*

Chapter 3

Combat Intelligence

3001. Introduction

a. The combat intelligence that a commander receives greatly affects the degree of success he achieves. If the commander has sufficient combat intelligence, then it can be used to minimize uncertainty concerning the effects of enemy, weather, and terrain on the accomplishment of the mission. The weather and terrain aspects of the AO are fundamental elements of combat intelligence. However, conditions of combat change continually and, due to the needs of timeliness, decisions are sometimes based on incomplete combat intelligence. The commander employs combat intelligence to determine how to use available resources in accomplishing the mission and in maintaining the security of his command.

b. Combat intelligence contributes to the needs of the planned battle being fought in the future. It has little, if any, application to the battle in progress, mainly because producing combat intelligence during engagements invariably leads to the intelligence produced being overcome by events. Target-oriented and decision-oriented intelligence are the two types of intelligence used to distinguish combat intelligence as an integral element of the planning and conduct of future engagements.

(1) Target-oriented intelligence or simply target intelligence portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex. It also indicates its vulnerability and relative importance.

(2) Decision-oriented intelligence supports the commander's decision-making process or those decisions made during combat operations. Combat intelligence is normally limited to the area of influence of the combat commander.

3002. Combat Intelligence Planning

a. Determination of Intelligence Objectives

(1) Initial Considerations. Every mission has one or more tactical objectives that have been assigned by senior headquarters. However, it is not always understood that a mission rarely generates intelligence objectives. Intelligence objectives are discerned from the mission and require detailed analysis.

(2) Combat Mission Analysis. The intelligence mission derives without exception from the combat mission. It may be thought of as the specific goal of the intelligence effort in the combat mission. The intelligence objectives themselves are those component elements of the intelligence mission whose accomplishment is essential to the successful execution of tactical activity. Intelligence objectives, therefore, must be directed at specific elements of the enemy, weather, and terrain. The knowledge from this will substantially reduce or eliminate the commander's unknown risks and facilitate the conduct of tactical activity.

b. Information Collection Planning

(1) Purpose. The haphazard unplanned collection of information will almost invariably result in the intelligence structure being immobilized by an inundation of information,

which may or may not be necessary, appropriate, or accurate. Careful planning will alleviate the worst of these errors.

(2) **Derivation.** Planning derives from the previously identified intelligence objectives which, in turn, had their origin in the commander's unknown risks.

(3) **Collection Planning Process.** Collection planning is performed by agencies and individuals designated by the MAGTF G-2.

(a) Define the required command activities for collection.

(b) Identify circumstances which could interfere.

(c) Obtain knowledge to conduct the following activities and establish—

1 **Intelligence Requirements.** Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information or production intelligence.

2 **Basic Requirements.** Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject.

3 **EEI.** Critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision.

4 **OIR.** Secondary requirements of the commander, intelligence requirements from staff officer, elements of the MAGTF, or from main subordinate commanders.

5 **Information Requirements.** Items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.

(4) **Collection Plan**

(a) **Purpose and Use.** Through the collection plan, the intelligence collection officer equates identified preparatory activity with specific enemy units, activities, and intent. He plans the actions by friendly elements to establish the presence, direction, and intent of the enemy along with the gathering of weather and terrain data through the plan.

(b) **Characteristics.** Certain characteristics of the collection plan and its overall contribution to combat intelligence planning should be considered. These characteristics are as follows:

1 Each mission needs a separate plan.

2 Each plan is ever changing with the tactical situation.

3 The collection officer must have current knowledge of friendly positions and intent.

4 Assigned information collection tasks must be communicated as orders to the friendly units involved.

(c) Principles of Collection Agency Taskings

1 **Capability.** Determine the ability of each agency to collect under existing conditions and the best employment of each. Once that ability is determined, the MAGTF G-2 is responsible for tasking those various agencies.

2 **Suitability.** Is the mission appropriate and achievable for the intended collection agency.

3 **Multiplicity.** Wherever possible, each collection requirement should merit the assignment of two or more collection agencies.

4 **Balance.** The effort to ensure that collection agencies are neither overworked nor underemployed. A balanced collection effort contributes to the acquisition of information by multiple agencies with resulting confirmation.

(d) Considerations During Execution

1 Coordination is continuous.

2 New conditions are immediately analyzed for their impact upon the collection plan. Needed changes are executed on a timely basis.

3 Modifications to the plan may cancel certain collection tasks. These are immediately communicated to the affected collection agencies.

4 New or additional requirements may dictate new taskings. The collection officer will issue the proper orders or requests to fulfill the requirements.

3003. Combat Intelligence Production

a. General. Every intelligence analyst must be fully capable of functioning as an operations officer or noncommissioned officer at the appropriate level. Only through the knowledge of tactical activity can the analyst apply combat intelligence to the solution of military problems.

b. Production Considerations. The two considerations in the production of combat intelligence are the roles of the analyst and the sytems which produce that intelligence.

(1) **Role of the Analyst.** The duty of the analyst is to apply knowledge and judgment to the facts of each combat situation so as to determine what the enemy is capable of, what the enemy is most likely to do, and what will be the effect upon the friendly mission if the enemy does in fact execute his most likely capability.

(2) **Role of Automatic Systems.** Properly managed, automatic systems can make notable contributions to the production of combat intelligence. The primary areas where automatic systems contribute most to combat intelligence production are those of recording, data base management, information storage and retrieval, and the comparison of informational elements.

c. Processing Information Into Intelligence (See Chapter 15). In doctrine, the processing of informational raw material into combat intelligence consists of five steps. These steps are recording, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.

d. Operational Keys in Production

(1) **Effects of Weather and Terrain.** Weather and terrain are the greatest modifiers of doctrine. While commanders may wish to do a great many things, they generally settle for what the weather and terrain allow them to do. Terrain influences where battles will be fought while weather sets the conditions under which they will be fought.

(2) **Related Activity.** All modern military activity is composed of interrelated elements. The identification of one element will provide valuable clues as to the probable locations where other elements are being conducted.

(3) **Logistics Considerations.** While an enemy commander may wish to conduct a variety of actions, he is usually limited to those his logistician can support. A detailed and constant examination of the enemy's logistics system will provide extensive information bearing upon what the enemy is preparing to do.

(4) Friendly Action. The intelligence officer must keep constantly abreast of the friendly situation and operations in order to identify and correctly assess any effect they may have upon the enemy and determine what the enemy reaction will be.

e. Production Pitfalls. As there are key areas that will assist the intelligence officer in his production activities, there are also opportunities for failure which carry the potential for hindering or crippling the production of combat intelligence. These opportunities for failure, or pitfalls, are areas of human failure and represent judgmental shortcomings on the part of the intelligence officer. Even the most experienced intelligence officer can fall victim to the following pitfalls if he does not remain constantly alert to them and does not keep his proper perspective on the situation. Some of the pitfalls to be avoided are—

- Lack of objectivity.
- Preconceived conclusions.
- Exclusive source/agency reliance.
- Excessive involvement with detail.
- Improperly managed automatic systems.

f. Pattern Analysis; A Production Tool. Every military operation, regardless of its seeming complexity, is composed of separate, logical, identifiable, and predictable activities. These activities present the analyst with patterns or a series of patterns which, when analyzed, will enable the analyst to identify enemy dispositions, actions, and preparations. This analysis will allow the analyst to project with acceptable accuracy the future movements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the enemy. Pattern analysis is an intelligence technique which uses written and graphic records as a means of identifying and analyzing the activities of individual enemy units and the force as a whole. Pattern analysis procedures are to—

- Determine the objectives.
- List known factors versus unknown factors.
- Record and utilize data.
- Work in pattern development, analysis, and utilization.
- Determine conclusions and risk determination.

g. Security Considerations. A final, although by no means least important, aspect of combat intelligence production is that of security. There are two specific areas that are peculiar to the application of security to combat intelligence production—information security and enemy deception operations.

(1) Information Security. When processing information into combat intelligence, the location, identification, and activity are major elements that need to be addressed. Each of these elements represents a factor of the enemy situation that is known to the enemy and which the enemy attempts to keep unknown to the friendly force. The extent to which these elements become known to the enemy will provide the enemy with important elements of the friendly commander's decision-making process.

(2) Enemy Deception Operations. The intelligence officer must be constantly alert during the production of combat intelligence for evidence of false information being provided to the intelligence structure by enemy deception operations. Generally speaking, information which seems too good to be true, often is; no form of information comes complete with a determination of validity. The only sure safeguard against bogus information lies in a strict adherence to the procedures of production. Nothing that is unconfirmed should be accepted at face value. Plus the requirement to evaluate critically the known factors of the situation must not be sacrificed to any form of expediency.

3004. Combat Information in the Production of Combat Intelligence

Combat information has been defined as unevaluated data of a highly perishable nature which is passed directly to the tactical commander. The commander uses combat information in tactical activity to obtain or stimulate an immediate response to an existing or a rapidly developing situation. The use of combat information on the battlefield is predicated on good judgment and knowledge of the command's mission. All combat information is created by the tactical operations of friendly and enemy units and by the situations resulting from the collision of these forces.

a. Perishability. The characteristic of perishability is the major distinguishing feature which differentiates combat information from intelligence information. Combat information has a much shorter useful life span. The exact length of this lifespan is determined by the situation and the type forces involved.

b. Application. As has been noted, the nature of combat information is such that its application is limited to the situation at hand. The primary characteristic of this application is immediacy.

c. Deriving Combat Information. Combat information is a product of a combat engagement in progress. It occurs spontaneously to the many variables which influence a given situation. As a result, most combat information is not used for planned collection. However, some combat information can find subsequent use as intelligence information.

d. Acquiring Combat Information. Units in contact are the primary means by which information is developed and reported. Information collection agencies will play a relatively minor role in the handling of this type of information. Information collection agencies may from time to time detect, develop, and report combat information as an ancillary function. However, this is not done as the result of specific planning.

e. Guidelines for Utilization

(1) Operational Considerations. In using combat information for operational purposes, it should be noted that the use of combat information is mainly related to target acquisition. Little of combat information at the operational level is decision-oriented. Rather, most combat information will stimulate a friendly response to a developing situation. Thus the response is more reactive than planned. As a result, the role of combat information in the commander's decision-making process is limited and should remain so.

(2) Intelligence Considerations. The intelligence structure is primarily interested in combat information for its future use as intelligence information. However, the same pitfalls exist for the intelligence officer that exist for the commander. In this area of application, the natural tendency is to incorporate combat information directly into the production process, giving inadequate attention to evaluation, analysis, and integration. The intelligence officer must keep in mind that any individual combat information report must be treated as only one report from one agency. Each of these reports must receive proper evaluation before it is incorporated into the body of intelligence knowledge and before it plays a role in determining the enemy situation. This is necessary since the application of the combat information has now shifted from the battle in progress to the planned battle.

3005. Dissemination of Combat Intelligence

a. Principles of Dissemination

(1) Timeliness. The product must reach the consumer in time for it to be of use.

(2) **Pertinence.** All intelligence dissemination must be based on requirements and needs of the recipient.

(3) **Usability of Form.** The form and transmitted means used must be the most responsive to the needs of the recipient.

(4) **Security.** The enemy must not become aware of the extent of friendly knowledge.

b. Dissemination Requirements. The first step in disseminating combat intelligence to the commander is the identification of those tactical decisions which will confront him.

(1) **Commander.** The commander is the primary recipient of combat intelligence. However, care should be taken to ensure that dissemination is limited to that combat intelligence required by the commander.

(2) **Higher Headquarters.** The purpose of disseminating combat intelligence to higher headquarters is to provide the intelligence officer at that level a complete intelligence picture of the entire command.

(3) **Subordinate Headquarters.** Combat intelligence disseminated to subordinate headquarters is selective and limited to that which supports the mission of the subordinate unit.

(4) **Adjacent and Supporting Headquarters.** Dissemination of combat intelligence to adjacent and supporting units ensures that both tactical and intelligence operations are coordinated.

c. Dissemination Means

(1) Electronic.

(2) Written and Graphic.

(3) Oral.

d. Primary Dissemination Documents (See Appendixes)

(1) Intelligence Estimate. The goals of the intelligence estimate should be clarity, brevity, and a concise examination of the facts.

(2) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM).

(3) Periodic Intelligence Summary. (PERINTSUM).

(4) Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM).

(5) Other Intelligence Reports.

Chapter 4

Counterintelligence

4001. General

The object of counterintelligence (CI) is to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy intelligence system. Failure to adequately plan for and implement CI measures may result in serious damage to the MAGTF. To prevent this, continuing attention to CI is required at all levels of command, from the MAGTF commander to the individual Marine. The effective use of CI is activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security. This threat is posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. CI identifies for the commander the hostile intelligence collection threat, determines friendly vulnerabilities to that threat, and evaluates security measures. It also recognizes that terrorism is an extension of subversion and sabotage. Therefore, terrorism is now considered a part of the threat by the counterintelligence field. Further guidance on counterintelligence planning and operations will be found in FMFM 3-22, *Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group* and FMFM 3-25, *Counterintelligence*.

4002. Responsibility

CI is a responsibility of command. Some organizations have counterintelligence responsibilities assigned to the G-2/S-2 or the staff counterintelligence officer, but the function remains one of command.

a. Commander. The commander, at any level, is responsible for the formulation and implementation of adequate CI measures. These measures are designed to ensure the security of his command and to deny the enemy information which might be used to increase the effectiveness of hostile operations against friendly forces.

b. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer is directly responsible to the commander for planning, implementing, and supervising the counterintelligence effort of the command. This includes CI indoctrination and training.

c. Staff Counterintelligence Officer. The staff counterintelligence officer is included in the intelligence section of the headquarters in the FMFs and most MAGTFs. The staff counterintelligence officer assists and advises the intelligence officer on the latter's counterintelligence responsibilities, including the effective use of the attached counterintelligence teams from the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group (SRIG).

d. Operations Officer. The operations officer has specific staff responsibilities pertaining to deception, counterreconnaissance, and operations security. CI information and support for these matters is coordinated through the intelligence officer.

e. Counterintelligence Teams. Counterintelligence teams are assigned to the SRIG. They are then assigned or attached to elements of the MAGTF. In these capacities, they advise and assist in planning and implementing the command's CI effort and conduct CI operations as directed by the commander.

f. Counterintelligence Support Personnel. Counterintelligence support personnel are assigned to major Marine Corps bases and supporting establishments to advise and assist in planning and implementing the command counterintelligence effort.

g. Naval Investigative Service (NIS). The NIS operates a worldwide organization to fulfill the investigative and counterintelligence responsibilities of the Department of the Navy, except those combat-related counterintelligence matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps. The NIS has exclusive jurisdiction for investigations within the Department of the Navy in matters involving actual, potential, or suspected espionage, sabotage, and subversion, including defection. In a combat environment, this exclusive CI jurisdiction held by the NIS in garrison is assigned to Marine Corps CI units in support of Marine commanders. Such authority is subject only to legal considerations and restrictions which may be imposed by the senior operational commander, and it encompasses all aspects of counterintelligence.

h. Other Personnel. All personnel, regardless of rank or billet, are responsible for the safeguarding of information which could be of possible value to the enemy or to a potential enemy. Within their capabilities, all staff officers are responsible for providing required support to the counterintelligence efforts of the command.

4003. Staff Counterintelligence Section

A staff counterintelligence section normally consists of at least two CI personnel. This section is assigned to Marine expeditionary force (MEF) and Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) staffs and may be assigned to a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). Counterintelligence planning support for a MEU will normally be provided by the counterintelligence team or subteam provided by the SRI detachment. Specific staff counterintelligence officer responsibilities during the conduct of MAGTF operations are contained in Chapter 7, MAGTF Intelligence Organization. The staff counterintelligence officer performs the following functions: (**NOTE:** In commands where no CI personnel are assigned, these duties are performed by the intelligence officer or other designated officer.)

a. Assists and advises the G-2 in the formulation, interpretation, and implementation of counterintelligence policy.

b. Coordinates counterintelligence services provided to the command.

c. Serves as the principal point of contact between the command and NIS in matters involving the investigation of actual, potential, or suspected espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities, including defection, ensuring that information about these activities is reported promptly to the nearest NIS representative.

d. Maintains liaison with the NIS and other counterintelligence agencies.

e. Monitors the command CI and security training program and provides advice and assistance for the maintenance of an effective program.

f. In coordination with the communication officer and other staff officers, advises in the maintenance of the physical security aspects of communication security.

4004. Counterintelligence Teams

a. Counterintelligence teams are combat support elements, organic to the SRIG of the MEF. As intelligence specialist teams, they are tasked by the SRIG to accomplish specific counterintelligence objectives. The G-2 makes requests for specific counterintelligence taskings normally through the staff counterintelligence officer.

b. Four CI teams are normally assigned to each SRIG/MEF. Counterintelligence teams are normally retained in general support of the MAGTF. However, in cases where units are widely separated, teams or subteams may be attached or assigned in direct support. Due to the unique nature of most counterintelligence operations, support responsibility will be broken down into geographical areas rather than by unit supported. Direct liaison between CI teams and all units operating within a specific teams' area of responsibility (AOR) is normally granted.

c. The standard CI team consists of five officers, nine enlisted CI specialists, and two administrative clerks. The team is organized as depicted in figure 4-1. A fourth team in each MEF is designated as a CI team (technical). They hold the counterintelligence special allowance equipment and provide counterintelligence technical support throughout the MAGTF.



Figure 4-1. Counterintelligence Team Organization.

d. Counterintelligence teams are equipped for tactical operations and they maintain sufficient organic equipment to support the team headquarters and subteams. The team is not capable of self-administration and requires logistics and administrative support from the intelligence company of the SRIG to which it is assigned.

4005. Counterintelligence Measures

a. General. The three general CI measures are denial, detection, and deception. Frequently, the actions applied to accomplish one of these measures contribute to the accomplishment of one or both of the other measures. For example, patrol activity may be used both to deceive and to deny.

(1) Denial Measures. Denial measures are applied to prevent the enemy from gaining access to classified and sensitive information, subverting personnel, and penetrating the physical security barriers established at installations. Counterreconnaissance is an example of a denial measure.

(2) Detection Measures. Detection measures are used to expose and to neutralize enemy efforts directed toward intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Tactical units detect or aid in the detection of these enemy efforts by collecting, analyzing, and reporting information on enemy activities that may indicate an intelligence effort, by establishing checkpoints to control the movement of personnel within or through their AORs, and by evacuation of possible enemy agents to higher echelons for interrogation. Other detection measures, usually accomplished by specialists, include document translation and analysis, screening, interrogation, and special counterintelligence operations.

(3) Deception Measures. Deception measures are used to mislead or otherwise confuse the enemy concerning our capabilities actions, and intentions. Deception measures may include feints, ruses, demonstrations, and the provision of false information to the enemy. Control of deception operations should be at the highest level of command that is likely to be significantly affected by the enemy's reaction. Deception measures depend upon complete security for success. Special precautions must be taken to ensure that there is no leakage of

information during the planning or execution of an operation. When enemy intelligence collection activities are identified, consideration must be given to the potential for using that activity in support of deception measures. The potential threat posed by that collection activity must be weighed against the potential benefit of obtaining a direct *pipeline* into the enemy's intelligence system.

b. Scope. Counterintelligence operations consist of both active and passive measures.

(1) Active Measures. Active CI measures are those designed to neutralize the hostile multidiscipline intelligence effort (all disciplines used to collect intelligence such as HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT) and hostile efforts toward sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Active counterintelligence measures include, but are not limited to, counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, counterterrorism, counterreconnaissance, concealment, and deception operations. Active counterintelligence measures vary with the mission of the unit.

(2) Passive Measures. Passive CI measures are those designed to conceal and deny information to the enemy, protect personnel from subversion and terrorism, and protect installations and material against sabotage. Measures include, but are not limited to, security of classified material, personnel security, security education, communications security, censorship, camouflage, concealment, light, and security discipline. Passive measures are readily standardized in the unit's standing operating procedures regardless of the unit's mission.

4006. Counterintelligence Operations

a. Mission. The mission of Marine CI units is to conduct activities designed to discover, neutralize and/or destroy the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist or subversive activities. In addition, CI assets are in a unique position to identify weaknesses and recommend measures necessary to protect information from espionage, personnel from subversion and terrorism, and installations and material from sabotage.

b. Categories. MAGTF CI operations normally fall within the following five categories.

(1) Military Security. Military security consists of those measures taken by a unit to protect itself from sabotage, terrorism, and subversion and to deny information to the enemy. They include operations security measures, counterreconnaissance, and countersigns.

(2) Civil Security. Those CI measures affecting the population of the areas of operations. This includes, but is not limited to, screening of civilian labor, imposing curfews, travel, and circulation control measures, and monitoring of suspect political groups.

(3) Embarkation Security. Those military and civil security measures taken to deny the enemy espionage, sabotage, or terrorist threat to embarking MAGTF elements.

(4) Wartime Information Security Program (WISP). The control and examination of communications to prevent disclosure of information of value to an enemy and the collection of information of value to the MAGTF. A wartime censorship program administered by the G-1/S-1 is part of the WISP.

(5) Counterintelligence Special Operations. The specialized employment of active and deceptive CI techniques and procedures in the conduct of covert actions against hostile intelligence collection sabotage, terrorist and subversive organizations and activities. These operations are conducted by trained CI personnel and include counterespionage, countersubversion, countersabotage, and counterterrorism.

c. Coordination of Counterintelligence Operations. While many of the measures taken in the conduct of CI operations involve the participation of noncounterintelligence assets or units, these activities must be coordinated with the staff counterintelligence officer. Examples of this include counterreconnaissance patrolling; port physical security; measures, population and resource control measures, etc.

d. Limitations of Counterintelligence Operations. The jurisdiction and scope of CI investigations and operations will vary according to legal considerations, operational circumstances, and AORs. As a result of DOD and DON policy directives, Marine Corps counterintelligence functions are directed to planning, preparing, and implementing CI activities during combat and to providing CI security services designed to enhance overall unit security during peacetime as well as during combat operations. Directions pertaining to limitations of counterintelligence operations include Executive Order 12333, DOD Instructions in the 5200 series, SECNAV Instructions 3800.8 and 2820.3, related Marine Corps Orders, and various Status of Forces Agreements, as applicable.

Chapter 5

Target Intelligence

5001. Introduction

All fire support means in the MAGTF require direction to achieve the MAGTF's combat mission. Target intelligence provides support to the targeting effort to give the MAGTF that required direction. Targeting is the process of acquiring information regarding all types of targets, choosing the best method to attack those targets, and identifying the means to achieve the desired result. Common difficulties encountered in targeting result from lack of coordination, a misunderstanding of responsibilities, and lack of training. Target intelligence portrays and locates the components of a target or a target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. Target intelligence requires deliberate planning, detailed analysis, and continual coordination between the CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE of the MAGTF.

5002. Targeting Agencies

The flow of intelligence relating to targets begins with the intelligence collection activities of the MAGTF as well as those of the amphibious task force (ATF) that are performed in the joint intelligence center (JIC). The targeting agencies involved in the MAGTF targeting effort are the JIC and the supporting arms coordination center (SACC), along with the fire support coordination center (FSCC). Targeting data flows into both the JIC and the SACC through intelligence channels and fire support coordination channels, respectively. Other target nominations are received through the lists of targets in the SACC through fire support coordination channels from the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. The targeting effort of the MAGTF centers on the activities of the target intelligence officer (TgtIntelO) from the JIC and his operational counterpart from the SACC, the target information officer (TIO). MAGTF TsgtIntelOs are normally assigned to MEF and MEB command elements.

a. Joint Intelligence Center

(1) **Function.** In the area of target intelligence, the JIC is responsible for providing current intelligence concerning targets or potential targets to the target information center (TIC) for inclusion in the ATF target list.

(2) **N-2/G-2.** The N-2 and G-2 should be guided in the execution of their target intelligence responsibilities by NWP 22-2, *Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations*.

b. Supporting Arms Coordination Center

(1) **Function.** The commander, amphibious task force (CATF) establishes the SACC at the beginning of the planning phase to exercising overall coordination of supporting fires, to include artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. With advice of the landing force (LF) fire support coordinator, the SACC integrates the fire plans of supporting arms to ensure the most effective support for the LF scheme of maneuver. When responsibility for the coordination of supporting arms is passed to the commander, landing force (CLF) ashore, the SACC continues to monitor appropriate communications nets. In the event the FSCC ashore becomes a casualty, the SACC is then capable of resuming control without interrupting fire support coordination activities.

(2) **Target Information Center.** TIC contains the TIO functions within the SACC. Besides preparing, controlling, and updating the ATF target list and issuing target bulletins (TARBULs), the TIC must keep the N-2/G-2/S-2 informed of information received over the fire support communications net. For more information on the ATF target list and TARBULs, see paragraph 5005.

c. Fire Support Coordination Center

(1) **Function.** The CLF establishes FSCCs at each appropriate echelon of the LF to implement LF fire support coordination responsibilities beginning with the planning phase and extending through execution of the operation. While afloat, the FSCC and SACC function in close cooperation; however, the SACC is the senior agency.

(2) **Target Intelligence Officer.** The TgtIntelO is not a member of the FSCC but must maintain a close working relationship with the TIOs of the established SACC/FSCCs down to and including the infantry battalion level. This is necessary to ensure the uninterrupted flow of timely target information and target intelligence. Since tables of organization do not provide for a TgtIntelO below the division or landing force level, the GCE S-2 will be designated the TgtIntelO.

5003. Target Intelligence Officer/Target Information Officer

a. The TgtIntelO maintains close and continuous liaison with the TIO in the SACC/FSCC to ensure continuous and timely exchange of information and target intelligence. JIC intelligence data pertaining to target locations, identification, and characteristics is passed to the MAGTF target intelligence officer. The TgtIntelO analyzes this information and provides data to the TIO that will allow the TIO to analyze targets for weapons employment, to determine methods of engagement, to schedule fires, and to determine target classifications and priorities.

b. The MAGTF target intelligence officer may be located in the JIC or in the SACC, wherever he can be most effective. The MAGTF G-2 makes the determination of where the TgtIntelO will be located. Ashore, the TgtIntelO works in the G-2 operations section. The TgtIntelO is specifically responsible for providing target analysis in the form of target intelligence files to the TIO. The TgtIntelO's duties include the following:

(1) Advise the MAGTF G-2 on the employment of intelligence collection means for target intelligence purposes.

(2) Identify and describe targets in sufficient detail to allow the TIO to analyze the targets for weapons employment.

(3) Consolidate and disseminate target intelligence to the SACC/FSCC and to the GCE, ACE, and CSSE as appropriate.

(4) Maintain target intelligence files and updated target intelligence data on the SACC and fire support coordination maps.

(5) Provide target intelligence to the TIO for use in the preparation of the ATF target list.

c. The target information officer is assigned to the SACC (afloat) or to the FSCC (ashore). The TIO acts as an advisor and assistant to the LF fire support coordinator and as head of the FSCC's target information section. The TIO is normally a qualified supporting arms officer who has the knowledge to satisfy fire support planning requirements. During operations, the TIO will have access to enormous quantities of information that is reported over various fire support nets. This information along with the target intelligence files produced by the TgtIntelO provide the TIO with the knowledge needed to enhance fire support. The TIO duties include—

(1) Assisting and advising in determining the most suitable weapons for engaging specific targets, scheduling of fires, methods of engagement, and the target classifications and priorities.

(2) Advising and assisting the supporting arms coordinator and fire support coordinator in preparation of the ATF target list.

(3) Maintaining the target list when control of supporting arms has been passed ashore.

(4) Preparing and maintaining target files and TARBULs.

5004. Target Analysis

a. General. Target analysis provides an examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. The TgtIntelO conducts target analysis to produce target intelligence files. The TIO uses information from these files to develop the ATF target list. The use of automated data handling systems leads to a greatly enhanced and efficient targeting effort.

b. Target Intelligence Files. Target intelligence files are developed selectively and aggressively to include the targets which, when attacked, will have an effect on the enemy. To attack a targets without confirmed intelligence data dilutes the MAGTF's fire support effort and should be avoided. Target intelligence files consist of the following information:

(1) **Location.** The capability to convert geographic coordinates (normally) used by the ATF to UTM grid coordinates and vice-versa is essential at the MAGTF. Desired locational accuracy is within 10 meters.

(2) **Altitude.** An expression in meters (or feet) above sea level of that point of ground on which the target is located.

(3) **Description.** Targets described as to type, size, shape, attitude, dispersion, and composition.

(4) **Vulnerability.** The assessed vulnerability of the target to ordnance delivery. This includes construction, degree of protection, and the dependence of the target on component parts.

(5) **Recovery Time.** An accurate assessment of the time required for the enemy to return the target to an active or usable status or to replace the target.

(6) **Accessibility.** The location of a target with respect to other terrain or cultural features which may limit the direction or angle of attack. This factor is of critical importance to the ACE.

(7) **Importance.** The importance of the target is determined by estimating how the enemy would be affected by damage to that target.

5005. Target List in Amphibious Operations

a. Target List. The target list is a listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command. It contains those targets which are to be engaged by supporting arms. The target list is not a list of targets which may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspect, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes; nor is it a vehicle for dissemination of intelligence in general. In selecting targets for inclusion in the target list for amphibious operations, the following criteria must be met:

(1) Be fixed or semifixed. Transient targets are not suitable for inclusion in the target list.

(2) Be suitable for attack by air, artillery, or naval gunfire.

(3) Be of sufficient importance to the operations to warrant a preplanned attack. A permanently emplaced coastal defense gun that is remote and cannot fire into the landing area may be ignored rather than attacked.

(4) Restricted targets (to be used in the future). Included here are targets that are to be used in the future, such as bridges or tunnels, and those which are restricted for humanitarian reasons, such as churches, hospitals, and schools.

b. CATF Responsibility of the Target List. In an amphibious operation, there is only one target list used throughout the force to identify targets. It is prepared, promulgated, and controlled initially by the CATF. Its control is subsequently exercised by the commander to whom authority and responsibility has been passed for the coordination of supporting arms. If an advance force is used, control of the target list will normally be passed to the commander of the advance force for those operations. When the CATF arrives in the objective area, he resumes responsibility for the maintenance of the target list and the issuance of TARBULs. The CATF retains responsibility until the CLF moves ashore and assumes control of air and naval gunfire. At this time, control of the target list normally is passed to the CLF. However, the TIC of the ATF continues to ensure the flow of target information. During this phase, the CATF must be prepared to resume control of the target list and to issue TARBULs in the event of an emergency. For detailed information regarding this target list, see FMFM 7-1, *Fire Support Coordination*, and NWP 22-2, *Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations*.

c. CLF Responsibility of the Target List. Although the CATF has the overall responsibility for the preparation of the target list, the CLF has certain responsibilities regarding the list. The CLF must be prepared to assume control of the target list. The CLF also nominates to the CATF for inclusion in the target list targets of interest to the LF. The LF staff advise and assist the CLF in this responsibility by performing the following duties:

(1) Within the overall plan for the collection of information and the production of intelligence, the intelligence officer plans for target acquisition and the production of target intelligence.

(2) The resulting target intelligence is consolidated and disseminated to the operations officer and the fire support coordinator.

(3) Keeping in mind the commander's planning guidance and his initial concept of operations, the operations officer and the fire support coordinator prepare a recommended list of targets which should be taken under attack. This includes target classification and priority, the time and frequency of attack, appropriate fire support means, and any restrictions on the attack of certain targets that may be dictated by the tactical situation. This is an integrated effort in which the intelligence officer plays an advisory role. The recommended list of targets is then submitted to the CLF for approval.

(4) After approval, the fire support coordinator, assisted by the TIO, prepares the LF targets to be proposed for inclusion in the target list. The fire support coordinator then coordinates with the task force supporting arms coordinator in including these targets in the target list.

(5) Usually, the CATF promulgates a tentative target list very early in the planning phase. After comments and recommendations have been consolidated, the target list is promulgated. It is an appendix to the supporting arms annex to the CATF's operation plan. However, the target list is usually promulgated prior to the promulgation of the operation plan. The senior supporting arms coordinator incorporates the entire target list as the LF target list.

d. Other Commanders' Responsibilities of the Target List. Commanders of subordinate units of the landing force also have responsibilities regarding the target list. Each subordinate commander, following the steps outlined in subparagraph 5005c(1), (2), and (3), prepares a list of targets which are of interest to his command. This list of targets is then submitted, via channels, to the CLF for inclusion in his list of targets. On many occasions, however, the target list will be promulgated prior to the commencement of planning by subordinate units. The subordinate unit commanders are still responsible for reviewing the target list as compared to their list of targets and to submit recommended changes, if required, to the CLF. When the target list has been promulgated, each subordinate commander of the landing force extracts pertinent portions of the list for subsequent dissemination to his command.

e. Target Card Files. Target card files are comprised of sets of cards, each card containing a target serial number and certain information concerning a specific target. These cards serve as a basis for the preparation of the target list and TARBULs. They are prepared not only for all targets currently in the target list, but for potential targets which are not listed. Target cards will be prepared and maintained on unlisted targets so that if units change their status, they can be added to the target list without delay. Complete target card files are maintained by all commands who will, at some phase of the operation, exercise control of the target list. Thus, control of the target list can be shifted by message without the necessity of physically transferring target card files. Other commands will maintain target cards on all targets of concern to them. For detailed instructions regarding target cards, see FMFM 7-1, *Fire Support Coordination*.

f. Target Bulletins. TARBULs are published to keep the target list current. They add new targets, cancel inactive or destroyed targets, reactivate previously canceled targets if required, and promulgate damage assessment of targets upon completion of attacks. TARBULs are issued by the commander who has control of the target list at that particular time. When control of the target list has been passed to the CLF, TARBULs are prepared and released by the target information section of the FSCC. For detailed instructions regarding TARBULs, see FMFM 7-1.

5006. Target Acquisition

a. Sources and Agencies. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. Every source and agency that can provide information concerning targets must be exploited. Some of sources that are particularly significant in target acquisition are as follows:

(1) Target Materials Program. Target materials come in several forms to fit a variety of operations. The forms are graphic, textual, tabular, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapon systems. The operations that target materials are most suitable for are training, planning, executing, and evaluating same operations. Included in the target materials program are the air target materials program and the tactical target materials program.

(2) Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS). This data base is available in many places to include command-configured ships and shore facilities, and thanks to PC-NIPS, provides automated storage, retrieval, and dissemination of target-related intelligence.

(3) FMF Agencies. All FMF agencies, from combat units to intelligence specialists teams, should be tasked to provide appropriate information regarding targets.

b. Reporting. Target information must be reported expeditiously to all interested commands so they can plan and execute appropriate attacks.

Where possible, these reports should contain sufficient information to permit a detailed target analysis.

5007. Targeting for Operations Ashore

In amphibious operations, after control has passed ashore, the target list discussed in paragraph 5005a will continue in use until termination of the amphibious operation. However, subsequent to the termination of the amphibious operation, the MAGTF may remain to conduct extended operations ashore. Given today's large AORs, MAGTF requires a system to catalog and identify targets. The format used for the target list in amphibious operations does not lend itself to use in extended operations ashore. This is true both for the sections into which the target list is divided; i.e., time and type of fire, and for the classification of targets, categorized as to influence on the phases of amphibious operations.

For extended operations ashore, each command adopts a targeting system that best suits its requirements. Regardless of the system used, the duties of the intelligence officer remain unchanged, in that he must continue to acquire, produce, and disseminate target intelligence.

5008. Target Intelligence Below the MAGTF Level

There is no provision for a TgtIntelO or TIO below the division/GCE or wing/ACE level. In subordinate units, the intelligence officer will generally be assigned the function of TgtIntelO. The TgtIntelO at the wing/ACE has the function of providing detailed target intelligence data to facilitate the use of air-delivered ordnance. The TgtIntelO at the wing/ACE also assists in planning the air tasking order. In the absence of a TIO, the unit intelligence officer should establish necessary liaison with the unit fire support coordinator. This relationship should be nearly identical to that between the TgtIntelO and TIO at the MAGTF level. In addition to close coordination and cooperation with the unit fire support coordinator, the unit intelligence officer should establish and maintain continuous contact with the higher level TgtIntelO. The MAGTF targeting effort is dependent on the timely submission of lists of targets from the GCE, the ACE, and the CSSE. These lists of targets should include those within the unit's zone of action which should be nominated to the ATF target list.

Part II. Intelligence in the MAGTF

Chapter 6

Intelligence Community

6001. General

The intelligence community supporting the United States Government consists of a variety of agencies, councils, boards, groups, and staffs, both military and civilian. The intelligence community contributes to the Marine Corps' intelligence posture and functioning by providing information, and at times, equipment and personnel directly to Marine Corps tactical units.

6002. Intelligence Organizations

a. The foundation for the operations of the intelligence community is set forth in Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. "The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats."

b. The intelligence community includes the following agencies and organizations:

- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- Department of Defense (DOD) Intelligence Agencies:
  - •• National Security Agency (NSA).
  - •• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
  - •• Offices within the DOD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
  - •• Intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
- Department of State.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- Department of the Treasury.
- Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

6003. Central Intelligence Agency

a. The Central Intelligence Agency was established under The National Security Act of 1947. The CIA is under the authority of the National Security Council (NSC). The director and deputy director of the CIA are appointed by the President and with advice and confirmation from the Senate. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is the primary advisor to the President and theNSC on national foreign intelligence matters. The DCI is the head of the CIA and such other staff elements as are required for the discharge of his intelligence community duties.

b. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, for

conducting counterintelligence abroad, and for the research and development of technical collection systems. It also exploits new systems and new technology for its primary responsibility. It is also responsible for the production of political, military, economic, biographic, sociological and scientific and technical intelligence to meet the needs of national policymakers. The CIA supports the DCI in his role as coordinator of the intelligence community. In the interest of national security, the DCI coordinates the intelligence activities of several government departments and agencies. In this capacity, the CIA—

(1) Collects foreign intelligence information.

(2) Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological, and geographic intelligence to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the U.S. Government.

(3) Develops and conducts programs in accordance with directives of the NSC to collect information that relates to foreign intelligence and information that is not obtainable by other means. Areas of information are political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological.

(4) Collects and produces intelligence on foreign aspects of international terrorist activities and traffic in narcotics.

(5) Conducts foreign CI activities outside the United States and, when inside the United States, conducts counterintelligence activities in coordination with the FBI, subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

(6) Carries out such other special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as may be directed by the President or the NSC and which are within the limits of applicable laws.

(7) Contracts services of common concern for the intelligence community as directed by the NSC, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and television broadcasts and foreign press services, collection of foreign intelligence information from cooperating sources in the United States, acquisition and translation of foreign publications, and photographic interpretation.

(8) Carries out or contracts for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices.

(9) Protects the security of its installations, activities, information, and personnel. To maintain this security, the CIA conducts investigations of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA, as necessary.

(10) Conducts administrative, technical, and support activities in the United States or abroad as may be necessary to perform the functions described.

(11) Has primary responsibility for the writing and coordination of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Special National Intelligence Estimate, and National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. The NIE is an estimate produced by complex coordinating machinery representing the entire national intelligence community. Dealing with appraisals of a foreign nation's current and future capabilities and actions, the NIEs are regarded as vital building blocks of national security policy. They are classified secret or higher and released on a *need to know* basis.

6004. Department of Defense

a. General. Before November 1971, the five major intelligence organizations within the DOD were the NSA, the DIA, and the offices of the chiefs of intelligence of the Departments of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since then some important changes have been made in intelligence organization and management. The positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, Telecommunications, Command, and Control Systems were abolished, and their resource management and systems development functions were consolidated under Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence). Other intelligence-related changes within the DOD include the establishment of the Central Security Service (CSS), the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and the position of Director of Net Assessments. A Deputy Under Secretary (Policy) was also established to monitor and develop overall intelligence policy for DOD. Separation of this function from the hardware-oriented responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) assured that full consideration is given to the needs of product users. These changes were made to ensure that the Secretary of Defense could better meet his intelligence responsibilities and provide better management of resources within the DOD.

Since DOD performs most U.S. intelligence collection operations, its intelligence resource levels and the scope and direction of its intelligence efforts take into account—

(1) National intelligence needs.

(2) Defense intelligence needs for support of research, development, and planning.

(3) Needs of military commanders to maintain intelligence capabilities and assets that are essential to operations.

The DOD is also responsible for overt collection outside of the United States. This includes—

(1) Collecting foreign military and military-related information.

(2) Production and dissemination of such information.

(3) Conducting CI activities outside the United States in coordination with the FBI.

(4) Directing, operating, monitoring, and performing fiscal management for the NSA and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities.

(5) Conducting signals intelligence and communications security activities except as otherwise directed by the NSC.

(6) Monitoring intelligence programs.

(7) Carrying out or contracting for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions.

b. National Security Agency. NSA was established in 1952 as an agency within the DOD. NSA's responsibilities include—

(1) Establishing and operating an effective organization for SIGINT activities.

(2) Controlling SIGINT collection and processing activities.

(3) Collection of SIGINT information both for the support of military commanders and for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the DCI.

(4) Processing and dissemination of SIGINT information in accordance with guidance from the DCI.

(5) Collection, processing, and dissemination of SIGINT information for CI purposes.

(6) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of the United States for SIGINT and COMSEC.

(7) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices. These operating practices include the transmission, handling, and distribution of SIGINT and COMSEC material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA.

c. Central Security Service. The CSS was established in 1972 under the Director, NSA, who serves concurrently as the Chief, CSS. The purpose of this organization is to be an effective structure for controlling or funding operations by Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE). SCEs include all Service resources performing SIGINT activities, fixed and mobile, including integral cryptologic elements of tactical or combat commands. The CSS supports national and military requirements. Combined cryptologic program (CCP) resources primarily support national requirements in peacetime, while tactical cryptologic program resources support military operations. In addition, CCP resources also support military operations in peacetime, and portions are in a direct support mode in crises and war. Military departments retain command, administrative, and logistic support responsibilities.

d. Defense Intelligence Agency

(1) **General.** The DIA was established in 1961 to improve the coordination and management of defense intelligence collection and production activities and to reduce the considerable duplication which then existed among the Service intelligence organizations. As a first step, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff) was abolished and its functions assigned to the Director, DIA.

DIA consists of about 5,000 people in four locations in the Washington area, with an additional 900 people abroad in the Defense Attache System operating in 92 foreign countries.

The mission of the DIA director is to satisfy the foreign military intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major components of the DOD. This is done through the use of DIA's own assigned resources, through the management and coordination of other DOD components, or through cooperation with other intelligence organizations such as the CIA. The DIA, under its director, coordinates actions with DOD components and governmental agencies having collateral or related functions in the field of its assigned responsibilities and maintains liaison for the exchange of information and advice with them. The military departments and other DOD components support and assist the DIA as necessary.

(2) **Organization and Command.** The director, DIA, is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Director reports to the JCS and is under their operational control for the purposes of obtaining the intelligence support required to perform their statutory and assigned responsibilities, including the strategic direction of the unified and specified commands and ensuring that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence support is available to the unified and specified commands. The director of DIA is the DOD spokesman and member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and also manager of the General Defence Intelligence Program which is part of the NFIB. DIA is organized into five directorates: Management and Operations, Foreign Intelligence, Resources and Systems, Intelligence and External Affairs, and JCS Support. Functionally, these directorates handle the attache system, plans and policy, resources and support, current intelligence estimates, intelligence research, and scientific and technical research. Elements of these directorates perform the following tasks:

(a) Furnish intelligence and intelligence staff support to the JCS and ensure that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence in available to the unified and specified commands.

(b) Coordinate the operational and planning aspects of the DOD Indications System

and support the National Military Command System through the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC).

(c) Validate, prioritize, register, assign, and monitor the satisfaction of DOD collection requirements.

(d) Direct, operate, and support the Defense Attache System.

(e) Participate in operation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.

(f) Establish, maintain, and operate facilities for DOD imagery indexing, processing, duplication, evaluation, exploitation, and central repository services in support of DOD and other authorized recipients.

(g) Supervise a DOD-wide intelligence dissemination program and furnish centralized dissemination services in support of DOD and other authorized recipients.

(h) Furnish intelligence bibliography, reference library, and research services as required to fulfill the DIA mission.

(i) Establish and conduct or recommend RDT&E programs or projects required to fulfill the DIA mission.

(j) Operate the Defense Intelligence College.

(k) Recommend priorities for military intelligence production and collection.

(l) In coordination with other intelligence agencies concerned, plan for intelligence operations, including the use of national intelligence systems to support military operations commander; as directed, coordinate the execution of approved intelligence operational plans.

(m) Act as central technical and management authority for all DOD intelligence information systems except those systems dedicated to SIGINT operations and support functions. Plan for the integration of DOD intelligence information systems and the interfacing and, where appropriate, the interoperability of these systems with command and control systems, tactical systems, and intelligence community information systems.

(n) In conformance with policies of DOD and the Director of Central Intelligence, guide DOD components concerning the release of defense intelligence information to foreign governments, international organizations, and the public.

(o) Administer DOD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods, and direct the Defense Special Security System.

(p) Adjudicate clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the defense agencies, with the exception of NSA, including contractors and consultants.

(q) Be represented on national and international intelligence committees, boards, and working groups, as appropriate.

(r) Act as the DOD focal point for non-SIGINT relationships with foreign intelligence services.

(s) Prepare and submit to the DCI the DIA and Services' intelligence programs and budgets.

(t) Ensure that all DIA policies, plans, programs, and activities are carried out in accordance with law and the provisions of executive orders and other directives from higher authority establishing oversight controls on foreign intelligence activities.

(u) Report to the Inspector General for Defense Intelligence any activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(3) Major Functions. The continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DOD rests with the DIA. The DIA's functional responsibilities are encompassed within the broad areas of collection, production, and support. Although production is not the initial step in the intelligence process, it is produced by DIA and under DIA guidance by the military departments and the unified and specified commands.

(a) Collection. To obtain the information needed by U.S. intelligence producers, DIA coordinates all defense intelligence collection and processing activities. The Defense Attache System is the only collection activity directly controlled by DIA. Other intelligence collection resources, including those belonging to NSA and the Services, respond to DIA collection requirements together with the requirements of other nondefense intelligence customers.

In the collection process, DIA assembles, integrates, validates, and assigns relative priorities to all defense intelligence requirements. These are evaluated to determine the most economical means of collection and to avoid unnecessary duplication in tasking. Collection results are routinely checked to determine whether stated requirements are being satisfied and whether tasking should be reassigned or terminated.

(b) Production. The DIA production is separated into categories. These categories are supplemented by specialized production units operated by the military departments and unified and specified commands. These units are under DIA's management and include special imagery, electronics, and fleet intelligence/ocean surveillance analysis.

1 The first production category is basic intelligence. Basic intelligence forms the data base for all military intelligence studies, estimates, and short-term assessments. It contains, for example, basic information on strengths and capabilities of forces, target information, and biographic data on foreign military personalities.

2 The second category is time-sensitive current intelligence. It reports on major worldwide happenings and evaluates their significance. To support this function, DIA operates the NMIC on a 24-hour basis to identify and report indications of impending foreign developments that may have major impact on DOD responsibilities.

3 The third category is estimative intelligence. DIA furnishes the military input to national intelligence estimates prepared by the DCI and produces DOD estimates for departmental, joint, and international use. Both types include estimates of foreign capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

4 The final category is scientific and technical intelligence. This intelligence is produced by DIA and by the military departments under the overall management of DIA. Foreign scientific and technical intelligence includes research in natural and applied sciences, applied engineering techniques, and all aspects of weapons technology.

(c) Support. In the area of support, DIA operates the Defense Intelligence College. Here, both military and career civilian personnel who are selected to fill key intelligence assignments and personnel preparing for foreign duty in the Defense Attache System are given extensive instruction. Other DIA-support functions include broad planning and managerial efforts to ensure proper coordination of DIA activities with those of other U.S. entities involved in foreign intelligence; control and direction of DOD general intelligence information

(ADP) systems and associated communications; counterintelligence and internal security; and the usual housekeeping activities, such as personnel and administration.

e. Defense Investigative Service. Before 1972, investigative agencies in each of the military departments conducted personnel security investigations. In 1972, these investigative agencies were combined into one central agency established as the DIS. The DIS now controls all personnel security investigations and some related matters with DOD. The DIS was created to save money, to promote efficient management, and to provide a prompter response to overall defense needs for personnel security investigations, as well as a more uniform product. At the same time, it is another management tool for conducting investigative activities with due respect for the rights of all citizens. The DIS operates under staff supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). It receives advice and counsel from the Defense Investigative Review Council. This council enables top-level civilian leadership to establish detailed guidance for investigative activities and to assure that these activities are consistent with law and tradition on civil-military relationships.

f. Defense Mapping Agency. On 1 January 1972, DOD was directed to combine the three Service mapping organizations for optimum efficiency and economy in production without impairing legitimate requirements of the separate Services. Resources and personnel were transferred from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DIA to form the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). The agency became operational on 1 July 1972. The mission of DMA is to furnish mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) support and services to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the military departments, and other DOD components. DMA provides MC&G support and services through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also has a very close relationship with the JCS, especially in the requirements approval process. It has the responsibility for validating all MC&G product or Service requirements (submitted by the Services and unified and specified commands) for the JCS and for reporting the approved requirements to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), who has oversight responsibilities.

g. Department of the Army

(1) General Staff. The following are general staff responsibilities concerning intelligence:

(a) Formulate and justify the Army's portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program which includes the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, General Defense Intelligence Program, and the Army Security and Investigative Activities Program.

(b) Formulate, justify, and supervise the Army budget for Program 381 Intelligence Activities within overall guidance and policies developed by the controller of the Army.

(c) Develop policy on intelligence organization, force structure, and installations; develop and coordinate intelligence aspects of strategy applications in joint and Army plans.

(d) Formulate policy for the Army's cryptologic effort.

(e) Exercise general staff responsibility for intelligence doctrine and assist DCSOPS and DCSPER in the development of policy and in other matters of intelligence training and readiness of intelligence units.

(f) Formulate Army policy on intelligence aspects of organization and operations concepts to support the Army in the field, including standardizing office intelligence activities relating to reconnaissance and surveillance; act as the Army staff point of contact for environmental services (excluding environmental protection and pollution

control programs); make program and budget recommendations and justification to the DSCOPS for intelligence units in Program 2.

(g) Develop policy, act as national level liaison, and coordinate within DOD and other federal agencies on CI, special investigations, operations, and related matters Army-wide.

(h) Formulate Army personnel and information security policy and plans and perform program development and resource use of counterintelligence elements as they pertain to the DOD Personnel and Information Security Program.

(i) Formulate Army policy for foreign disclosure and censorship, give associated guidance and Army general staff supervision, and review material to ensure proper level of classification.

(j) Formulate Army policy for HUMINT collection activities and take general staff responsibility for U.S. Army attache matters within the Defense Attache System and for intelligence on U.S. Army prisoners of war and members missing in action.

(k) Exercise general staff responsibility and act as the Army staff point of contact for reconnaissance and surveillance imagery collection, exploitation, security policy, and research and development; joint reconnaissance matters; special activities office policy; MC&G, and military geographic information (MGI); and SIGINT collection requirements.

(l) Give intelligence support to the Army staff and CONUS major Army commands and activities by interpreting and adapting finished intelligence; contribute to formulation of departmental, joint, and national intelligence through participating in national and DOD-level boards, committees, and working groups; furnish current intelligence assessments for headquarters, Department of the Army elements.

(m) Produce scientific and technical intelligence-related matters, relying on the Army Intelligence Agency and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.

(n) Formulate policy and supervise the implementation of foreign liaison.

(o) Formulate policy for the use of intelligence contingency funds; program and budget for these funds; and through the intelligence Inspector General conduct inspections to verify their proper use.

(p) Manage and coordinate Army technical transfer.

(2) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). The DCSINT is responsible to the Chief of Staff for overall coordination of the general staff responsibility for U.S. Army intelligence; counterintelligence; censorship; cryptologic, personnel, and information security; threat analysis; and meteorologic and topographic activities. The DCSINT participates in the preparation of national intelligence and also serves as chairman of the Army Information Security Review Board, Army representative to the Military Intelligence Board, Army alternate member to the Defense Intelligence Board, and Army principal to the National Foreign Intelligence Board. He is director for Army Budget Program 3 (Intelligence) and functional chief of the Civilian Intelligence Career Development Program. He is responsible for monitoring Army intelligence training, force structure, organizations, and readiness, and supervises and controls some intelligence elements of U.S. Army field activities. His relationship to the Chief of Staff U.S. Army corresponds to that of deputy chief of staff.

(a) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT). The ODCSINT is functionally organized as follows:

1 Plans, Program, and Budget Office.

2 Management Support Office.

3 Foreign Liaison Directorate.

4 Counterintelligence Directorate.

5 Intelligence Systems Directorate.

6 Intelligence Automation Management Office.

These directorates and offices have the following responsibilities:

1 Serve as the official point of contact and channel of communication between Department of the Army and foreign military and civilian representatives in the United States and act as representative at functions hosted by foreign embassy personnel.

2 Fulfill Department of the Army and certain major command requirements for substantive intelligence support and manage the Army's general, scientific, and technical intelligence production programs.

3 Perform CI analysis for the Army staff; exercise operational control of the U.S. Army Intelligence Operations Detachment; and act as Program Element Director for HUMINT and Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities.

4 Formulate and justify Army intelligence resource requirements.

5 Develop and coordinate intelligence aspects of tactical Army intelligence, including tactical and strategic command and control in support of the Army in the field.

(b) U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency is a field operating agency of the ODCSINT. Its mission is to manage and produce general, scientific, and technical intelligence to support strategic planners, force and material developers, and tactical commanders. Its major subordinate elements are the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, the Foreign Technology and Science Center (FTSC), and the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC).

(c) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). INSCOM has the mission to perform nontactical intelligence operations above corps level. It conducts counterintelligence investigations and operations. INSCOM gives Army-wide all-source, multidiscipline operations security (OPSEC) and intelligence support. It also furnishes technical advice and operational assistance as required to help other functional and operating major Army commands in the discharge of their electronic warfare, intelligence, and security responsibilities.

h. Department of the Navy

(1) Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). The DNI, as chief of naval operation intelligence, exercises overall authority throughout the Department of the Navy in intelligence and security matters and maintains liaison with all federal intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The DNI isalso the Commander of the Naval Intelligence Command. The DNI—

(a) Reviews all interdepartmental and DOD directives and plans on matters related to his mission for impact on the requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy. Recommends actions to be taken thereon by the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.

(b) Represents the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations at NFIB meetings and on duly established interdepartmental and DOD committees for the consideration of matters related to his mission. Maintains liaison with intelligence and security agencies, foreign and domestic, to ensure coordination of Navy participation in or support to activities conducted by those agencies.

(c) Directs the development, coordination, and issuance of guidance and directives to implement within the Department of the Navy approved policies, plans, programs, and procedures on matters related to his mission.

(d) Directs the development and coordination of mid- and long-range intelligence and security policies and objectives. Sponsors the related requirements of manpower, equipment, facilities, and services within the framework of the Navy Planning and Programming System and the DOD Programming System.

(e) Coordinates, publishes, and monitors in compliance with existing criteria and standards. Ensures training, readiness, effectiveness, and responsiveness of intelligence and security personnel. Activities designed to meet the current and mobilization requirements of the Navy are accomplished under his direction.

(f) Acts as a point of contact for liaison with foreign officials accredited to the Department of the Navy and advises and assists on protocol matters.

(g) Sponsors requirements for research, development, testing, and evaluation of new and improved equipment. Techniques related to his mission and collaboration on actions to fill these requirements fall under his cognizance.

(2) Commander, Naval Intelligence Command. The commander of the Naval Intelligence Command directs and manages the activities of this command to fulfill the intelligence and security requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(a) Task Force 168. Task Force 168 was established to give more responsive intelligence support to the fleet. Over the years Task Force 168 has acquired additional duties, this organization now serves as the naval intelligence collection manager. The task force is composed of a headquarters in Washington and has units at nine locations around the world. Forward area support teams of TF 168 often deploy aboard ships and aircraft to support major fleet commands to facilitate operational responsiveness. Scientific and technical intelligence groups also carry out essential collection functions at major theater locations. The commander, Task Force 168, also serves as Assistant COMNAVINTCOM, for operations.

(b) Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity (NIPSSA). NIPSSA supports the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of major commands. NIPSSA supports them by developing and implementing naval intelligence-sponsored automatic data processing systems for incorporation into the Navy Command and Control Systems, the National Military Command System, and the worldwide Military Command and Control System.

(c) Naval Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC). The NOIC produces finished operational intelligence. Finished operational intelligence includes indications and warning, ocean surveillance information, merchant shipping analysis, applied special naval support, and in-depth analysis of Soviet strategy, doctrine, tactics, and readiness in response to requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Navy Defense Intelligence Agency, and joint commands. NOIC disseminates the intelligence in time to support planning and execution of military and naval operations. It also operates the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, one of six nodes of the Navy's Ocean Surveillance Information System.

(d) Naval Tech Intelligence Center (NTIC). NTIC provides the following:

1. Produces scientific and technical intelligence that would be of interest to the Navy as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the director, DIA.

2. Gives scientific and technical intelligence support to the Navy.

3. Maintains close scientific and technical relationships with the U.S. Government research and development community.

4. Operates facilities for image interpretation and merchant marine intelligence support to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and DIA.

5. Produces image-derived information in support of the National Tasking Plan for the Exploitation of Multisensor Imagery.

6. Furnishes miniaturized and automated intelligence data bases and intelligence production support to the operating forces of the Navy.

7. Gives targeting intelligence support, including Single Integrated Operating Plan, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, Navy planning staffs, and fleet commanders.

8. Conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of image exploitation equipment, materials, and techniques.

(3) Naval Investigative Service. The NIS under the DNI and the centralized control of the Defense Investigative Service operates a worldwide organization to fulfill the investigative and CI responsibilities of the Department of the Navy (less those combat-related CI matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps).

(4) Naval Security Group (NSG). The NSG performs specialized technical functions relating to national security. NSG is managed and controlled by the CSS, while the Department of the Navy retains administrative and logistic support responsibilities.

(5) Director, Intelligence U.S. Marine Corps. The Director of Intelligence U.S. Marine Corps is responsible for the formulation of plans and policies pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare. The director—

(a) Discharges Marine Corps responsibilities in connection with intelligence estimates, plans, reports, and studies.

(b) Handles the analysis and dissemination of pertinent intelligence for the Commandant and the staff of Headquarters Marine Corps.

(c) Develops, in coordination with MAGTF Warfighting Center, MCCDC, Quantico, VA., plans, policies, operational concepts, doctrine, and responsibilities in intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare.

(d) Formulates, in coordination with MCRADC, research and development requirements in combat intelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare; monitors progress on R&D projects in response to those requirements.

(e) Analyzes JCS papers of an intelligence nature. Recommends positions for the Commandant's approval and for his use at meetings of the JCS.

(f) Monitors the actions of other U.S. intelligence agencies concerning intelligence and CI matters of interest to the Marine Corps.

(g) Monitors Marine Corps participation in the Naval Attache System.

i. Department of the Air Force

(1) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/I). The ACS/I supervises the overall execution of departmental intelligence responsibilities to develop, maintain, and monitor a coherent intelligence program. The intelligence program ensures the proper application of intelligence in all Air Force activities and furnishes adequate, timely, and reliable departmental intelligence for use within DoD. The specific responsibilities of the ACS/I fall into three categories: substantive intelligence; intelligence management and systems development; and administration, representation, and supervision.

(a) Substantive Intelligence. The ACS/I is responsible for giving substantive intelligence support to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, the Air Staff, and, as required, Air Force commands, and the Joint Staff. The type of substantive intelligence support given by the ACS/I regards threats. This includes capabilities and physical composition to the security of the United States and allies which affect the U.S. Air Force. This responsibility includes—

1 Furnishing current all-source intelligence affecting, or potentially affecting, U.S. Air Force policies, resources, missions, or force deployments and employments.

2 Participating in preparation of joint and national intelligence estimates.

3 Adapting and formatting substantive intelligence for Air Force use and assuring that intelligence is appropriately included in departmental, joint, and unified/specified commands' planning, programming, and operational documentation.

4 Evaluating all-source aerospace-related intelligence to determine capabilities of foreign aerospace forces and associated military, political, economic, and psychosocial strengths and vulnerabilities.

5 Determining substantive all-source intelligence voids and initiating appropriate requirement satisfaction actions.

6 Performing intelligence research and analytical, gaming, and assessment support for Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Office of Secretary of Defense, and OSD study groups.

7 Furnishing staff guidance and review services for intelligence aspects of MC&G, target materials, and scientific and technical intelligence activities.

8 Assisting in satisfying substantive intelligence support responsibilities to the USAF Contingency Planning Staff, the Air Force Emergency Operations Center, and USAF alternate headquarters.

(b) Intelligence Management and Systems Development. The ACS/I gives the Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff, and the Air Staff advice, technical evaluations, and recommendations for developing, planning, programming, funding, and managing intelligence personnel, equipment, and systems. This responsibility includes—

1 Formulating policy and staff guidance for developing, managing, and operating U.S. Air Force intelligence collection, processing, production, data handling, and dissemination systems.

2 Monitoring development and acquisition of advanced systems.

3 Furnishing staff guidance concerning U.S. Air Force intelligence collection and exploitation activities.

4 Collaborating in the generation of substantive intelligence requirements.

5 Developing and reviewing intelligence aspects of concepts, doctrine, policy, plans, and programs.

6 Issuing guidance and exercising, in coordination with affected Air Staff Offices, primary staff direction for submitting the USAF General Defense Intelligence Program and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program.

7 Assisting with intelligence systems and management information support for USAF Contingency Planning Staff, the Air Force Emergency Operations Center, and USAF alternate headquarters.

(c) Administration, Representation, and Supervision. These responsibilities include—

1 Interpreting and implementing U.S. National Disclosure Policy and other applicable instructions concerning security and use of compartmented intelligence.

2 Sitting on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee, and the Military Intelligence Board.

3 Directing the activities of the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC). The AFSAC conducts worldwide HUMINT collection and coordinates and provides staff, policy, and special support to ACS/I and other USAF elements on HUMINT matters.

(2) Inspector General, USAF. Inspector General, USAF handles the functions of security and counterintelligence. Within that office, the responsibilities for physical security, law enforcement, and security police have been delegated to the Director of Security Police, who directs base chiefs of security police. The responsibilities of the Inspector General for CI operations and activities within the Air Force are assigned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). AFOSI is a separate operating agency which conducts criminal, CI, and special investigative services for all Air Force activities. It collects, analyzes, and disseminates information of investigative and counterintelligence significance. AFOSI also collects and reports information available from human sources near overseas U.S. Air Force installations for base security. As the commander of AFOSI, the Director of AFOSI acts for the Chief of Staff and for the Inspector General in conducting investigative and CI programs through subordinate districts, detachments, and other operating locations throughout the Air Force. This includes the investigation of treason, sedition, subversion, security violations, disaffection, and espionage and sabotage activities and threats which affect the Air Force and are within AFOSI jurisdictional authority.

(3) Foreign Technology Division (FTD). The FTD is a subordinate field activity of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). Its mission is to produce scientific and technical intelligence in response to tasks that are levied by the DIA on the Department of the Air Force or that originate within the Department of the Air Force. FTD collaborates with other AFSC subordinate elements to increase and improve use of foreign technology and intelligence in AFSC research, development, test and evaluation programs, systems projects, and studies. Under the general guidance of and tasking from DIA, the ACS/I provides overall management control and general staff supervision of scientific and technical intelligence production in the Air Force.

(4) Electronic Security Command (ESC). ESC has an all-source intelligence function and furnishes electronic combat (EC) support, OPSEC, communications and computer systems security, and communications support to Air Force units and unified and specified commands. ESC units perform rapid radio relay; command, control, and communications countermeasures (C_3CM) support; and communications and computer systems security support

to U.S. and allied forces worldwide. Two of the important organizations in the ESC are the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (AFEWC) and the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center (AFCSC).

(a) AFEWC is a primary source of EC and Air Force C_3CM analysis. They—

1 Furnish battle commanders analytical reports of EW systems' effectiveness.

2 Assist strategic and tactical commanders in making combat decisions and perform analysis to support planning, developing, testing, and using EW equipment.

(b) AFCSC is responsible for the Air Force's Communications and Computer Systems Security Program, composed of communications security, emanations security (TEMPEST), and computer security.

(5) **EW AND C_3CM.** The approximately 13,000 people stationed at various locations around the world play an important role in developing Air Force EW and C_3CM capabilities, techniques, and systems. They offer C_3CM training in many ways to operational elements during exercises; e.g., acting as the adversary.

6005. Department of State

The Department of State is charged with the following intelligence missions:

a. Overtly collects foreign political, political-military, sociological, economic, scientific, technical, and associated biographic information.

b. Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to U.S. foreign policy as required for the execution of State Department responsibilities and in support of policymakers involved in foreign relations within the U.S. Government.

c. Disseminates reports within the U.S. Government that have been received from U.S. diplomatic missions abroad.

d. Coordinates with the DCI to ensure that U.S. intelligence activities and programs are useful and consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

e. Transmits reporting requirements of the intelligence community to U.S. chiefs of missions abroad and guides their collection efforts.

f. Supports chiefs of missions in discharging their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the activities of all elements of their missions.

6006. Federal Bureau of Investigation

a. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the FBI is responsible for the following:

(1) Detecting and preventing espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf of foreign powers through lawful CI operations within the United States.

(2) Conducting within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the intelligence community designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.

(3) Collecting foreign intelligence by lawful means within the United States and its territories when requested by officials of the intelligence community designated by the President to make such requests.

(4) Disseminating, as appropriate, foreign intelligence and CI information to appropriate federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and cooperating foreign governments.

b. Coordination and Dissemination of Security Data. The FBI has the responsibility of referring coordination and dissemination of security data under the jurisdiction of any other federal agencies to the appropriate sources. During the course of the bureau's investigations, particular attention is given at all times to information indicating any Soviet/Communist hostile action. As a part of this overall program, the FBI makes name checks of its files for the various agencies of the government.

c. Specialized Security Programs. Executive Order 10450, 27 May 1953, assigns the FBI responsibilities concerned with various sensitive types of applicant and employee investigations. This order establishes the security procedure covering "all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the government." It also directs that all investigations conducted by any other agencies which developed adverse information involving loyalty of information showing coercion of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the national security should be referred promptly to the FBI for a full field investigation. Other legislative enactments and Presidential directives require the FBI to ascertain facts about the loyalty and security risks of certain employees and applicants who have or want positions in the government or who are involved in activities in which the government has an official interest.

6007. Department of the Treasury

The Secretary of the Treasury is represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The Secretary of the Treasury has the responsibility to—

- Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information.
- Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.
- Produce intelligence required for the execution of the secretary's interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury.
- Contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.
- Disseminate acquired foreign intelligence information within the U.S. Government.

6008. Drug Enforcement Agency

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the administrator of DEA—

- Collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the foreign and domestic aspects of narcotics production and trafficking in coordination with other intelligence agencies.
- Participates with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign political, economic, and agricultural information on narcotics production and trafficking.
- Coordinates with the DCI to ensure that the foreign narcotics intelligence activities of DEA are consistent with other foreign intelligence programs.

Chapter 7

MAGTF Intelligence Organization

7001. Overview

Before examining MAGTF intelligence organization, it is helpful to review basic MAGTF doctrine, the function of intelligence at the various levels of war, and the relationship among the G-2, G-3, and the SRIG.

a. Doctrine. Marine forces are most effectively employed as a MAGTF, a combined arms air-ground combat force possessing its own combat service support, all under a single commander. The MAGTF is structured and equipped for expeditionary operations and the defense of advanced naval bases in support of a naval campaign. A MAGTF also is capable of sustained operations ashore in support of a land campaign as part of a larger joint or combined force.

b. Levels of War. War occurs simultaneously on several levels—each with different but interrelated ends, means, characteristics, and requirements. These three levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical. Each generates its own set of intelligence requirements described respectively as strategic intelligence, combat intelligence, and tactical intelligence. See paragraph 2003 for discussion of the levels of intelligence.

(1) Strategic Level of War. At this level of war, a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Intelligence at the strategic level of war influences the MAGTF commander's understanding of his mission and helps shape his overall picture of the battlefield. The MAGTF commander, in turn, may collect and report information used in the production of strategic intelligence at the national/alliance level.

(2) Operational Level of War. At this level of war, campaigns and major operations are planned and executed to accomplish strategic objectives within a theater of operations.

(3) Tactical Level of War. At this level of war, battles and engagements are planned and fought to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. MAGTF commanders, particularly MEB and MEU commanders, are most likely to be involved at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence is used by the MAGTF commander to plan and conduct the battle being fought at the present time. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy. At the operational level, the MAGTF commander is concerned with orchestrating tactical actions to achieve strategic goals—when, where, and under what terms it fights or to avoid action. Intelligence that supports such decisions is classified as combat intelligence and pertains to planning battles to be fought in the future.

7002. Marine Air-Ground Task Force

The MAGTF is a unique military organization consisting of a CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE task-organized to accomplish a specific mission. (See fig. 7-1.)



Figure 7-1. Organization of a MAGTF.

7003. MAGTF Sizes

There are three sizes of a MAGTF that normally may be formed to respond to an operational commitment:

a. Marine Expeditionary Force. The MEF, the largest of the MAGTFs, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The MEF is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. Figure 7-2 depicts a notional MEF.



Figure 7-2. Notional Marine Expeditionary Force.

b. Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A MEB is a task organization which is normally built around a regimental landing team (RLT), a provisional Marine aircraft group (MAG), and a logistics support group. It is capable of conducting amphibious assault operations of a limited scope. During potential crisis situations, a MEB may be forward deployed afloat for an extended period to provide an immediate combat response. Figure 7-3 depicts a notional MEB.

c. Marine Expeditionary Unit. The MEU is a task organization which is normally built around a battalion landing team, reinforced helicopter squadron, and logistics support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis situations, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations. Figure 7-4 depicts a notional MEU.



Figure 7-3. Notional Marine Expeditionary Brigade.



Figure 7-4. Notional Marine Expeditionary Unit.

7004. MAGTF Command Element

The CE is the MAGTF headquarters. The CE accomplishes the command, control, and coordination necessary for effective planning and successful execution of operations. The CE is a permanent organization composed of the commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications and service support facilities. The CE staff extends and complements, but does not duplicate, the efforts of the major subordinate element (MSE) staffs. There is only one command element in a MAGTF. Figure 7-5 depicts the organization of the MAGTF CE. **NOTE:** The CO/OIC SRI det/group is both a commander and a special staff officer. Due to the unique, multifaceted nature of this organization, elements of the SRIG will be operating under the staff cognizance of the G-2, G-3, and G-6. See paragraph 7005c for more on the SRIG in the command element structure.

7005. Responsibilities and Authority

a. Commander. The MAGTF commander is responsible for all intelligence and CI activities of the command. The commander's authority is equal to his responsibility, subject to limitations prescribed by law and regulations. The commander may delegate specific authority to subordinates to assist in the performance of command functions. However, the commander remains fully



Figure 7-5. MAGTF Command Element Relationship to SRIG Det/Group.

responsible for the performance of those duties which are delegated. With respect to intelligence, the officers most closely involved with exercising this authority are the intelligence officer, the SRIG commander, and the operations officer. The main function of the MAGTF commander in intelligence operations is controlling the direction of intelligence.

b. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer is the principal staff officer assigned to advise and assist the commander in carrying out his intelligence and CI responsibilities. To fulfill these responsibilities, the intelligence officer must properly plan, implement, and supervise the following activities:

(1) Oversee the direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence required by all MAGTF elements.

(2) Conduct intelligence and counterintelligence operations as directed by higher headquarters.

(3) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence to subordinate and adjacent commanders that is consistent with the operational requirements of the command.

(4) Assist the commander in forming his intelligence requirements for the planning and execution of operations. Ensure that those requirements developed by other staff officers and subordinate commander's are included.

(5) Compile and recommend EEI to the commander. Ensure the EEI are passed to the MAFC and SARC for fulfillment and resolution.

(6) Disseminate intelligence and information to all who have a requirement for such data. This includes—

- Preparing and continually updating the intelligence estimate.
- Preparing the intelligence annex to the operation plan/order.

- Preparing and disseminating any other intelligence analysis, studies, and reports as required by the commander, the staff, higher headquarters, or as dictated by the situation.
- Planning and supervising the timeliness and physical dissemination of intelligence and information in coordination with the operations officer, the communications officer, and the SRIG commander.

(7) Determine requirements for and recommend allocation of intelligence specialists to subordinate units.

(8) Provide information to the operations officer concerning special weapons (nuclear, biological, and chemical) employed by the enemy, their capabilities, and terrain and weather conditions affecting both enemy and friendly employment of such weapons.

(9) Coordinate the collection of weather data in the AO and in other areas not under friendly control.

(10) Plan and supervise the conduct of special intelligence operations activities to include the establishment and maintenance of a special security office and the required communications capability.

(11) Direct the CI effort to include—

- Preparing the CI estimate.
- Planning, implementing, and supervising all active and passive CI measures.
- Coordinating all counterintelligence measures, operations, and activities with higher and adjacent headquarters.

(12) In coordination with the operations officer, determine the map, chart, imagery, and geodetic requirements for the command and supervise the procurement and distribution of such information and material.

(13) In coordination with the operations officer, plan and supervise the intelligence training of the command.

(14) Plan, direct, and supervise the intelligence training of the intelligence section.

(15) Prepare and update intelligence SOPs and intelligence-related directives as required by the commander.

(16) Plan, direct, and supervise the administrative requirements needed for intelligence functioning.

(17) With the assistance of the SRIG commander, establish, operate, and maintain a surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) in order to plan, coordinate, task, and manage collection of information from all MAGTF resources (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT) in support of EEI and OIR.

(18) Plan, coordinate, and conduct the following:

- Human and counterintelligence operations and activities.
- SIGINT and EW operations.
- SCAMP operations and activities.
- IMINT operations and activities.
- Terrain analysis and topographic support operations.
- UAV operations and activities.

(19) With the assistance of the SRIG commander, establish, operate, and maintain the MAGTF all-source fusion center (MAFC) to receive, process, and analyze information and produce intelligence based on the commander's EEI and OIR.

(20) As coordinated with the intelligence officer, disseminate combat information and intelligence.

(21) With the assistance of the SRIG commander, establish, operate, and maintain a signals intelligence/electronic warfare coordination center (S/EWCC) to coordinate and deconflict SIGINT and EW operations.

c. SRIG Commander. The commander of the SRIG is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping task-organized detachments for service with MAGTFs or designated commanders to execute integrated reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations.

d. Operations Officer. The operations officer is responsible for advising the commander on operational matters and ensuring that subsequent decisions are carried out. In fulfilling this responsibility, it is imperative to keep in mind that friendly courses of action must be originated in consonance with the realities of the enemy situation, the terrain, and the conditions of weather. Through knowledgeable planning, the operations officer along with the intelligence officer can conserve limited resources and exploit enemy weaknesses. Hence, the operations officer should maintain a close, constant working relationship with the intelligence officer, who, in turn, must observe the same principle.

e. All Staff Officers and Subordinate Commanders. The requirements of and support from all members of a command are important to the command mission. All staff officers and subordinates can contribute to the accomplishment of the mission by being responsible for—

(1) Informing the intelligence officer on a timely basis of their respective intelligence requirements.

(2) Providing required support, within their capabilities, to the intelligence and CI activities of the command.

(3) Coordinating with the intelligence officer to ensure that orders and plans properly reflect available intelligence and intelligence requirements.

f. Other Intelligence Responsibilities. The intelligence officer has other intelligence responsibilities that are either directly or indirectly related to other staff officers. They are to—

(1) Provide intelligence input to plans and orders which are normally the purview of other staff officers.

(2) Supervise and coordinate intelligence aspects in coordination with the cognizant staff officer (indicated in parenthesis below). Specific responsibilities include the intelligence aspects of—

- Tactical operational security and deception (G-3/S-3).
- Civil affairs (Operations Officer or G-5, when authorized).
- Employment of special weapons (nuclear and chemical) to include enemy capability to employ such weapons and enemy reaction to friendly employment (G-3/S-3).
- Psychological operations to include estimating the conditions and vulnerabilities of prospective target groups; estimating the effectiveness of friendly psychological operations, as well as the enemy's; and assisting in the planning and supervision of training activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda (G-3/S-3).
- Barrier and denial operations (G-3/S-3).
- Survival, evasion, resistance and escape (G-3/S-3).
- Electronic warfare (G-3/S-3, CEO).
- Operations Security (G-3/S-3).
- Handling of prisoners of war and detainees and captured documents and materiel (G-1/S-1).
- Terrorism counteraction (G-3/S-3).

7006. MAGTF Command Element Intelligence Section

a. Integrated Intelligence. The overall integrated intelligence effort is planned and coordinated by the MAGTF G-2/S-2. The production of intelligence, from the determination of intelligence requirements to the final dissemination of intelligence, must be carefully orchestrated to ensure timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence required by the command. If a single step is deficient, the entire intelligence process may fail, regardless of how well all the other steps are executed. The planning and coordination of the integrated intelligence effort requires early identification of information requirements, timely collection planning, analytical effort to produce intelligence, and dissemination of intelligence early enough to affect determination of the MAGTF's course of action.

Integrated intelligence is achieved when the ground, air, and naval intelligence effort is properly coordinated. This requires mutual intelligence support and close cooperation at each level of command. Despite the difference in size and capability of the three MAGTFs and their intelligence sections, each must be able to accomplish the actions required to complete the five phases of the intelligence cycle: direction, collection, processing and production, and dissemination.

b. Mission. The MAGTF command element intelligence section provides the commander and staff with mission-specific, all-source intelligence and CI required for decision making during the planning and execution of assigned missions. This section also contributes to the satisfaction of intelligence requirements of senior, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

c. Objectives. The goals of the MAGTF command element intelligence section are to—

(1) Keep the commander and staff continuously informed on the characteristics of the weather, enemy, and terrain and their impact on the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) Assist the commander and staff in planning and implementing CI measures to discover, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive activities.

(3) Provide tailored all-source intelligence support to subordinate units. Assist higher and adjacent headquarters in meeting their intelligence requirements. Provide collections management functions for MAGTF controlled assets and advise higher and adjacent headquarters of unfilled requirements.

d. Battlefield Perspective. The lethality and range of weapons and mobility of forces, against which the MAGTF may be employed, require commanders to have a clear understanding of the extended battlefield in order to concentrate combat power at critical times and places. This requires the G-2 and G-3 to work hand in hand. The G-2 presents the unknowns on weather, enemy, and terrain, whereas the G-3 presents the known information on friendly forces. Together they should work to present the MAGTF commander with a complete picture of the battlefield. The battlefield perspective changes with time and distance in relationship to the landing force. The MAGTF commander is particularly concerned with—

(1) **Area of Operations.** The AO is that portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration such operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(2) **Area of Responsibility.** The area of responsibility is a defined area of land in which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under his control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(3) **Area of Influence.** The area of influence is that geographical area wherein a commander

is directly capable of influencing operations, by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02) The area of influence varies with each operation and is based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time.

(4) Area of Interest. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(5) Intelligence Focus of Effort. While closely monitoring the enemy situation within the areas of influence/interest of the major subordinate elements, the MAGTF command element intelligence section will normally concentrate its assets and attention on the enemy forces and activities that could affect the operation up to 96 hours in the future.

7007. Organization

The MAGTF command element intelligence section will function as the all-source intelligence entity for direction, collection management, processing, and dissemination activities. It will operate 24 hours a day.

a. Afloat Configuration. The MAGTF command element intelligence section will be manned, organized, and equipped to participate in the JIC as directed in chapter 8 of this manual.

b. Ashore Configuration. The MAGTF command element intelligence section will be manned, organized, and equipped to support a main command post (CP) and, when required, a forward CP. The MEF and MEB intelligence sections will normally be organized into branches and units which are shown in figure 7-6.

(1) Main Command Post. Within the MAGTF main CP, the intelligence section will establish five components:

- A combat information center (CIC).
- A combat operations center (COC).
- A command center (CC) intelligence plans unit.
- A surveillance and reconnaissance center.
- A signals intelligence/electronic warfare coordination center.

The G-2/S-2 must be prepared to provide intelligence support elements to Alpha and Bravo command groups, when required during displacement of the main CP. While there is no fixed organization for these command groups, the intelligence support elements will normally consist of one watch section of the CIC, COC, CC, SARC, and S/EWCC.

(2) Forward Command Post. A forward CP will be established when directed or when the situation requires. The MAGTF commander and designated staff (e.g., Alfa command group) will relocate, when appropriate, to the forward CP.

c. Integral Intelligence Structure. Because the intelligence structure is a physical entity, the practice and conduct of combat intelligence should commence from an appreciation of the role that the intelligence structure will play in the intelligence effort. Two general factors form a preliminary step in analyzing and evaluating the intelligence structure.

(1) Principle of Economy of Force. Classed as an immutable military principle, principle of economy of force is that total energy and activity of every individual and organization expended for the sole purpose of victory in combat. When this principle is applied to intelligence structures, it states that the assigned Marines to an intelligence structure must render a proper return of combat effectiveness to compensate for their absence in combat with the enemy.



* Manned entirely or in part by elements of the SRIG.

Figure 7-6. Intelligence Section Organization.

(2) Command Mission. The nature of the mission of a given command will be a major contributory factor in establishing combat intelligence objectives and requirements.

d. Factors Affecting Intelligence Structures

(1) Intelligence/Information Elements. It is desirable to first establish the definitions of those terms which may be applied to pertinent elements of intelligence and information.

(2) Internal Agency Information/Intelligence. Information/intelligence obtained and reported by organic or attached element of MAGTF.

(3) External Agency Information/Intelligence. Information/Intelligence obtained and reported by agencies which are neither organic nor attached to the MAGTF.

(4) Processing. The method of subjecting intelligence information to analysis, hypothesis, and synthesis in the production of intelligence.

(5) Immediate Use. The application of combat information in conduct of the battle in progress.

(6) Future Use. The ultimate application of combat intelligence in the planning and conduct of future battles.

(7) Target Intelligence. Intelligence which locates and portrays the components of a target

or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance to the enemy.

(8) Target Selection Criteria. The standards of target permanence, suitability, importance, and restrictions considered in the selection of target for engagement by supporting arms.

(9) Commander's Decision Making. The evaluative process pursued by the commander in reaching combat decisions used as the basis for planning future battles.

(10) Staff Estimates. The analytical contributions of staff officers to the commander's decision-making process.

(11) Plans and Orders. The expression and means of implementation given to the commander's combat decision.

(12) Workload Irregularities. An additional factor influencing the intelligence structure is the workload. The intelligence workload is never constant. Intelligence workloads continually expand and contract in both volume and scope due to fluctuations in the combat situation. The nature of the intelligence workload should be understood so that actions can be taken to ensure the required flexibility of the intelligence structure.

(13) Aviation/Ground Aspects. The different intelligence requirements of the aviation and ground commanders will require different types of effort. The basic rule that the intelligence effort must complement the tactical effort continues to apply.

(14) Time Constraints. Time is the final influence upon the intelligence structure's capability. Given that the total time available for all intelligence tasks has defined limits, a necessary step in evaluating the intelligence structure is an analysis of time and assets.

e. Hindrances to Intelligence Structural Capabilities. The foregoing factors hinder the intelligence structure:

(1) Irregular Workload. The intelligence effort, like all other aspects of warfare, develops a tempo with periods of great activity and comparative lulls. At times certain cells within the intelligence structure will appear to be overwhelmed, while at other times the same cells may appear to be under used.

(2) Time Constraints. In the contest of competing wills that is war, "Tempo is itself a weapon—often the most important." (FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 29.) Intelligence requirements satisfied too late to constitute the basis for timely decision making by the commander are worthless.

(3) Requirements/Assets Imbalance. The mutual desire of commanders and staffs to reduce uncertainty tends to generate more intelligence requirements than can be satisfied by the intelligence assets available.

(4) Aviation/Ground Dichotomy. Significant differences exist between the intelligence requirements of ground commanders/staffs and aviation commanders/staffs. Marines and equipment trained or designed to support one type of major subordinate command (MSC) often are not well prepared to support the intelligence requirements of another type of MSC.

(5) Misdirected Effort. Limited intelligence assets may be strained in responding to requests for intelligence that are uncoordinated, overly broad, or of marginal utility in accomplishing the command's mission.

f. Corrective Action. The corrective action required to offset the above hindrances are—

(1) Focus of Effort. Distinguish what intelligence is most critical to accomplishment of the

command's mission and concentrate intelligence assets upon producing that intelligence. Clearly stated, specific EEI help in the process.

(2) Flexibility. As the demands for intelligence and the focus of effort of the intelligence section changes, the intelligence section must respond by shifting duty assignments, altering organizational structure, and modifying procedures.

(3) Augmentation. Request additional personnel and assets, specialized units or equipment, and assistance from exernal sources when the need for such is anticipated. The assets are there to be used, so use them. Also consider compositing intelligence structures, such as in a JIC, when the use warrants such action and it would lead to more efficient operations.

7008. Duties and Responsibilities

The MEF and MEB intelligence sections will normally be structured as described below. The MEU intelligence section personnel will be required to be dual- and often, triple-hatted. The MAGTF intelligence section's organization supports the fulfillment of the MAGTF's intelligence requirements. (See fig. 7-7.)

a. Executive/Intelligence Support Branch

(1) Intelligence Officer/Special Security Officer. The G-2/S-2 is the senior intelligence officer of the MAGTF. The senior intelligence officer provides overall direction and supervision to the MAGTF intelligence section to ensure the provision of timely, all-source intelligence and counterintelligence to the commander, staff, and senior, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The intelligence officer duties as special security officer (SSO) are detailed in the following documents:

(a) DOD TS-5101.21-M-1, *Sensitive Compartment Information Security Manual-Administrative Security* (M-1 Manual).

(b) DOD TS-5101.21-M-2, *Department of Defense Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy* (M-2 Manual).

(c) DOD TS-5105.21-M-3, *Department of Defense Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual TK Policy* (M-3 Manual).

(d) NAVSUPP to DOD TS-5105.21-M-2, *Navy Department Supplement to DOD Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual on Administrative Security.*

(2) Assistant Intelligence Officer. The assistant G-2/S-2 is responsible for the internal functioning of the MAGTF intelligence section in accordance with the G-2/S-2 guidance and direction. The assistant G-2/S-2 will be prepared to assume all duties of the G-2/S-2 when required.

(3) Intelligence Chief. The intelligence chief is the MAGTF senior enlisted intelligence specialist. He is responsible for the administrative and supply support of the intelligence section. He also supervises the intelligence support branch which performs the following functions:

(a) Picks up messages at least hourly from the adjutant and the classified material control center and delivers them to the intelligence operations chief.

(b) Prepares the daily administrative message boards.

(c) Types intelligence messages, reports, and other correspondence, as directed.

(d) Performs logistics, supply, and housekeeping functions to ensure optimum working conditions and morale.

(e) Functions as the intelligence section secondary control point custodian for classified material.



Figure 7-7. Intelligence Section Assets That Fulfill MAGTF Intelligence Requirements.

b. Intelligence Operations Branch. The intelligence operations branch is comprised of four units: collection, analysis and production, target intelligence, and the COC watch.

(1) Intelligence Operations Officer. The intelligence operations officer is responsible to the G-2/S-2 for the development and dissemination of combat information and all-source intelligence. He directs and supervises the units within the intelligence operations branch. He will—

- Review all incoming operational messages.
- Determine internal routing of and action to be taken on incoming operational messages.
- Coordinate the preparation, review, and release of intelligence messages, as directed by the AC/S, G-2.
- Coordinate the preparation, review, and presentation of current intelligence briefings.
- Ensure all GENSER messages and briefings are reviewed/cleared by SSO personnel prior to release/presentation.
- Coordinate direct support from theater and national agencies (e.g., NMIST, ISS/AF, SAWIC, JILE).

(2) Intelligence Operations Chief. The intelligence operations chief is responsible to the intelligence operations officer for the efficient functioning of the branch. He cooordinates closely with the intelligence chief to ensure that administrative, supply, and logistics matters are handled promptly and correctly. He supervises the branch enlisted members and advises and assists the intelligence operations officer. He functions as the intelligence operations branch subcustody control point (SCCP) custodian for classified material. Additionally, he will—

- Receive incoming messages from the intelligence support branch, the MEF intelligence net radio operator, the special intelligence communications center watch chief, and other branches/units of the intelligence section.
- Separate incoming messages into administrative and operational categories, indicate recommended routing/action, and deliver to the intelligence operations officer for review and routing instructions.

(3) Intelligence Operations Assistant. The intelligence operations assistant is reponsible to the intelligence operations officer for the flow of intelligence information within and from the branch. He will —

- Route or deliver incoming and outgoing intelligence messages, as directed.
- Maintain the intelligence operations journal and journal file.
- Function as MAGTF intelligence net radio operator, if required.
- Assist the intelligence operations chief, as directed.

c. Collection Section. The MEF collection section serves as the MAGTF collections management office (CMO). It is the interface between the subordinate commands and senior/adjacent commands for collections requirements.

(1) Collections Requirements Officer. The collections requirements officer is responsible for formulating detailed collection requirements and tasking external collection agencies for required information. Chapter 14 in this manual provides guidance on collection management. The collections requirements officer receives approved EEI, OIR, and RIIs (request for intelligence information) from the intelligence operations officer and then plans how to satisfy the requirements by—

- Assessing collection and reporting implications of each new requirement and planning collection operations. Assessment and planning of operations involving organic assets (less VMAQ-2 and VMO) will be conducted in conjunction with the collection operations officer and representatives of the unit to be tasked. This process occurs in the SARC.

- Developing multidiscipline tasking to exploit the capabilities of intelligence resources, with regard to the priorities established.
- Identifying and tasking national, theater, and organic collection units or agencies.
- Maintaining a constant awareness of the operational status of organic collection assets.
- Evaluating requirement satisfaction, providing requester feedback, and adjusting the collection plan.

(2) Collections Requirements Chief. The collections requirements chief will aid the collections requirements officer in developing, implementing, and monitoring the MAGTF collection plan. In addition, he will—

- Arrange for coordination of packing, shipping, and operation of any special collection management and secondary imagery dissemination system (e. g., SWIFTHAWK, PORTS, FIST).
- Arrange for and coordinate secondary dissemination of imagery.
- Maintain the collection unit journal, asset status board, and collection plan situation map.
- Coordinate with the intelligence operations chief to ensure the administrative efficiency and supply of the collection unit.

(3) Collections Operations Officer. The collections operations officer's responsibilities are set forth in chapter 14 of this manual.

(4) Collections Operations Assistant. The collection operations assistant's duties are set forth in chapter 14 of this manual.

d. Analysis/Production Unit. The analysis/production unit is responsible for assisting the G-2/S-2 and the intelligence operations officer in determining the enemy's disposition, composition, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and most probable course of action. The unit will maintain, from all sources, the intelligence data base (manual or automated) on the commander's areas of responsibility, influence, and interest. The unit will produce intelligence reports (INTREPs), INTSUMs, responses to request for intelligence information (RRIIs), updated estimates, and briefings. See appendixes BB and CC for samples of INTREPs and INTSUMs. The unit will assist the intelligence plans unit in the preparation of intelligence estimates for future operations special studies. Chapter 15 of this manual provides guidance on the processing of intelligence information.

(1) Analysis/Production Officer. The analysis/production officer is responsible for operation of the unit. He will —

- Ensure the maintenance of the all-source intelligence base (manual or automated).
- Maintain a current assessment of the enemy situation and be prepared to brief, as required.
- Ensure the maintenance of the *operational battle* and the *tactical battle* situation maps.
- Ensure the maintenance of the intelligence workbook.
- Develop and provide INTREP, INTSUM, RRII, and updated estimates to the intelligence operations officer.
- Oversee the operation of the intelligence analysis center (IAC) and the performance of the assigned maintenance/technical personnel, when deployed in support of the MAGTF.
- Advise the intelligence operations officer if there are IAC system difficulties.

(2) Ground Order of Battle Officer. The ground order of battle (GOB) officer is responsible for processing intelligence information and producing intelligence on enemy ground and surface-to-surface missile forces. The GOB officer will—

- Ensure the maintenance of that portion of the all-source intelligence data base related to ground and surface-to-surface missile forces.
- Maintain a current assessment of the enemy ground and surface-to-surface missile threat and be prepared to brief, as required.
- Ensure the maintenance of the enemy ground and surface-to-surface missile force disposition and composition on the *operational battle* and *tactical battle* situation maps.
- Ensure the maintenance of the ground activity portion of the intelligence workbook.
- Develop/provide ground and surface-to-surface missile force input for INTREP, INTSUM, and RRII.

(3) Ground Order of Battle Chief. The GOB chief will assist the GOB officer in all his duties and will supervise the recording, posting, and research activities of the GOB analysts. The GOB chief will conduct special research projects, as directed.

(4) Ground Order of Battle Analyst. The GOB analyst will—

- Maintain current disposition and composition of enemy ground and surface-to-surface missile forces on the *operational battle* and *tactical battle* situation maps.
- Maintain the enemy ground and surface-to-surface missile force order of battle files of the intelligence data base.

(5) Air Order of Battle Officer/Chief/Analyst. The air order of battle (AOB) officer and his assistants have the same responsibilities and duties as the GOB officer and his assistants, but the focus is on enemy air and air defense forces.

(6) MC&G/Terrain Analysis Officer. The MC&G/terrain analysis officer is responsible for ensuring the availability of MC&G products to support, command element, and subordinate elements during all phases of the operation. (See chapter 12 for MC&G.) He is further responsible for receiving requirements for terrain analysis products from the analysis/production officer and coordinating the development and dissemination of those products with the supporting topographic unit. Specifically, he will—

- Validate command element and subordinate element requests for terrain analysis products.
- Produce and arrange for transportation of MC&G products, in accordance with DOD Dir 5105.4, *Defense Mapping Agency*.
- Coordinate the production of terrain analysis products with the supporting topographic unit.
- Coordinate the distribution of MC&G and terrain analysis products.

e. Target Intelligence Unit. The target intelligence unit is responsible for locating and identifying components of a target or target complex. Sufficient detail and accuracy are required to permit an evaluation of the target's importance in relation to the mission and to permit an analysis by the G-3 TIO. The analysis by the G-3 determines the most effective weapon or warhead to produce the desired level of damage or casualties.

(1) Target Intelligence Officer. The TgtIntelO will—

- Acquire and maintain targeting materials for AO.
- Assist the TIO in the development of a target list and maintaining that target list.
- Coordinate closely with the analysis/production unit to identify potential high value targets against which the commander may employ ACE or supporting long-range strike assets.
- Maintain the target intelligence map showing targets which are recommended to be struck in the next 24, 48, 72, and 96 hours.
- Coordinate with the TIO to obtain bomb damage assessment.

(2) **Target Intelligence Chief/Assistant.** The target intelligence chief and assistant will perform duties as directed by the TgtIntelO.

f. Combat Operations Center Watch Unit. The COC watch unit is the primary interface between the COC and CIC. Its mission is to ensure the continuous exchange of information and intelligence between the COC and CIC.

(1) **COC Watch Officer.** The COC watch officer is responsible for –

- Keeping the COC watch informed on the enemy situation.
- Keeping the COC watch informed on MEF intelligence collection operations.
- Keeping the CIC intelligence operations officer informed on the friendly situation and plans.
- Keeping the CIC intelligence operations officer informed of requests for intelligence information.

(2) **COC Watch Assistant.** The COC watch assistant will –

- Receive from the intelligence operations officer copies of the INTSUM and all significant INTREP.
- Receive from the collection officer the status of ongoing collection operations.
- Maintain the location of enemy ground and air units and the location/status of friendly reconnaissance and surveillance activities on the *operational battle* map.
- Provide to the intelligence operations officer copies of all unit contact and situation reports.

g. Intelligence Plans/Liaison Branch. This branch, located in the CIC, is responsible to the G-2/S-2 for preparation of intelligence estimates and annexes required to support planning for future operations. The intelligence plans officer and his assistants effect close and continuous coordination with the G-3/S-3 and G-5 to be aware of envisioned future operations. In the execution of its responsibilities, this branch will ensure that the intelligence operations officer is kept fully apprised of future plans. The intelligence liaison officers represent the G-2/S-2 at senior and adjacent headquarters. They serve to expedite the exchange of intelligence and combat information between the command element and these headquarters. Depending on the situation and transportation availability, the liaison personnel will be located at the senior/adjacent headquarters or will travel between those headquarters and the command element.

h. Human Resource Intelligence Branch (HIB). The HIB will plan, coordinate, and supervise all MEF HUMINT collection activities conducted by the detachment, interrogation translator platoon (ITP); counterintelligence teams (CITs); and technical intelligence (TECHINTEL) specialist elements. In addition, the HIB will plan, coordinate, and supervise CI activities conducted by the CITs.

(1) **HUMINT Branch Coordinator (HIBCOORD).** The HIBCOORD is responsible to the AC/S, G-2 for the effective management and utilization of all MEF HUMINT collection activities and CI operations. The HIBCOORD is assisted by the interrogator-translator operations advisor (ITOA) and the staff CI operations officer. The HIBCOORD will effect close and continuous liaison with the CMO and chief.

(2) **ITOA.** The ITOA will assist the HIBCOORD in the employment and utilization of interrogation-translation detachment assets.

(3) **OIC, ITP.** This officer will assign tasks to and monitor the employment of interrogation-translation teams (ITT) and TECHINTEL specialists elements attached to the command element. The OIC, ITP will be responsible to the HIBCOORD for planning, coordinating, and supervising all HUMINT collection activities conducted at the interrogation facility (IF),

CDEC, and CMEC. The OIC, ITP Det will be assisted in the performance of his duties by the ITP operations chief assigned to the interrogation-translation operations center (ITOC) at the IF. The OIC, ITP will—

(a) Coordinate with the force service support group (FSSG) the collecting, safeguarding, administrative processing, evacuation, utilization, treatment, discipline, and feeding of captured enemy personnel.

(b) Establish and command MEF IF, CDEC, CMEC, and ITOC.

(c) Coordinate with the ITOA for the maintenance of the IF, CDEC, CMEC, and ITOC.

(d) Coordinate with the ITOA on all requests for communications equipment required to support HUMINT collection activities at the IF, CDEC, CMEC, and ITOC.

(e) In coordination with the ITOA, develop plans and procedures for specially trained ITP subteams to support other MEF HUMINT collection agencies in the accomplishment of special missions.

(4) ITP Operations Chief. The ITP operations chief will be the senior SNCO assigned to the detachment. The ITP operations chief will —

(a) Be directly responsible to the OIC, ITP for ensuring that all a administrative, operational, and logistic support requirements for the ITOC are met.

(b) Supervise the support personnel assigned to the ITOC.

(c) Function as the SCCP custodial of the ITOC.

(d) Establish and maintain a reference library of intelligence publications, documents, and such other materials as are necessary to support operations and collection activities of the ITP Det.

(e) Establish and maintain liaison with appropriate MAGTF staff sections for procurement of guard personnel, transportation, subsistence, and such other administrative and logistic support as will be required by the ITP.

(f) Maintain the interrogation, translation, and exploitation logs.

(g) Establish and maintain files of all interrogation, translation, and exploitation reports, to include cross-references, when applicable.

(h) Maintain a current listing of EEI, OIR, standing intelligence collection requirements, and other intelligence collection requirements (OICR).

(i) Maintain the ITOC situation map and other maps as necessary to conduct interrogations and debriefings.

(j) Maintain the ITOC order of battle (OOB) files.

(k) Maintain the ITOC intelligence workbook.

(l) Maintain the ITP Det status board.

(5) ITT Commanders. The ITT commanders will be directly responsible to the OIC, ITP for the effective employment of their respective ITTs.

(6) Staff CI Operations Officer. This officer will assist the HIBCOORD in the performance of the follwing duties:

(a) Develop and maintain the CI estimate.

(b) Maintain CI reference materials relevant to the operation.

(c) Prepare and maintain the CI files within the intelligence data base (manual or automated).

(d) Produce and maintain the CI portion of the intelligence workbook.

(e) Prepare CI input to the intelligence operations officer for INTREPs, INTSUMs, RRIIs, and briefings.

(f) Recommend employment of CI elements.

(g) Plan, coordinate, and implement approved active and passive CI measures.

(h) Publish the passwords and countersigns.

(i) Plan, coordinate, and implement, in concert with the OIC, ITP; the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence information through HUMINT operations; and process and forward all such information to the intelligence operations officer.

(j) Plan and coordinate the intelligence and CI processing of friendly prisoners of war who have returned to MAGTF control.

(k) Function as the RODCA control officer and C&CI fund coordinator/source adminstrator.

(l) Function as the focal point control officer for programs.

(m) Plan, coordinate, and conduct CI special operations.

(n) Coordinate with NIS for their operations in support of the MEF.

(7) Staff CI Operations Chief. The staff CI operations chief is responsible for the administrative and logistical management for the staff CI operations officer.

i. SIGINT/GEW/SSP Branch. This branch is responsible for planning, coordinating, and directing the SIGINT/EW; special intelligence communications support; and special security functions to the MEF.

(1) SIGINT/EW Officer. The SIGINT/EW officer and his assistants perform the following tasks:

(a) In conjunction with the intelligence operations officer, the CMO, and CO of the Rad Bn or OIC, Rad Bn Det—

- Prepare SIGINT plans and orders in support of operations.
- Develop SIGINT collection requirements and taskings.
- Plan for and ensure rapid handing of perishable special intelligence (SI) information.
- Coordinate the movement and operation of SIGINT/EW units.

(b) In conjunction with the G-2/S-2 electronic warfare officer (EWO) and VMAQ-2 representative, establish and operate the S/EWCC.

(2) Special Security Communication. The SIGINT/GEW officer will coordinate with the G-2/S-2; CO, Rad Bn; CO, Comm Bn; and headquarters commandant for the planning, installation, and operational maintenance of special security communications equipment.

(3) Assistant Special Security Officer (ASSO). The duties of the ASSO are directed by the G-2/S-2 (SSO).

7009. MAGTF Intelligence Assets

See figure 7-9 for the intelligence/information collection assets of the MAGTF.

a. SRIG. The SRIG is subordinate to the MEF and part of the command element. It consists of a Rad Bn, Comm Bn, HQ Co, ANGLICO, force reconnaissance company (Force Recon Co), INTEL Co, and a UAV Co. The SRIG of a MEF, or a SRIG detachment of a MEB, MEU, or SPF, is employed and operates as a unit. Elements of



Figure 7-8. MAGTF Information/Information Collection Assets.

the SRIG/SRIG detachment are tasked through the SRIG commander/SRIG detachment OIC. It is a source of specialized units, each of which possesses unique capabilities essential to accomplishment of the missions which may be assigned to MAGTFs or SPFs. The SRIG has the capability to simultaneously support either three MEUs, or two MEBs, or one MEB/MEU and the MEF for a limited period, or the MEF.

(1) Mission. The mission of the SRIG is to provide surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, direct action, ANGLICO, tactical deception, and communications support to the MEF, subordinate MAGTFs, and other commands as directed. To accomplish its mission, the SRIG will provide trained and equipped task-organized detachments to MAGTFs or other designated commands to execute these services and other directed operations.

(2) Tasks. Tasks of the SRIG are to—

(a) Conduct of multi-source information collection missions and the processing, production, and dissemination of fused, all-source intelligence during all phases of amphibious and/or expeditionary operations.

(b) Provide core elements of the maritime SPF for deploying MAGTFs or other commands as directed.

(3) SRIG Organization. The SRIG consists of a HQ Co, Comm Bn, Rad Bn, ANGLICO, Force Recon Co , UAV Co, and an INTEL Co.

(a) Command and Control. The CO, SRIG, exercises command of the SRIG through an executive staff.

(b) Firepower. Organic firepower capability is limited to individual and crew-served weapons.

(c) Mobility. The basic means of ground mobility is organic vehicular transportation, but organic transportation cannot lift the entire SRIG without augmentation.

(d) Communications. The SRIG establishes command communications to subordinate units. Communications support is provided by the organic H&SCo communications platoon.

(4) Employment. The SRIG can provide support to a maximum of two MEB/MEU simultaneously or one MEB/MEU and the MEF for limited periods of time. The coordinating bodies through which SRIG operations are coordinated include the MAGTF SARC, S/EWCC, Systems Control Center, and COC.

(5) Administrative Capabilities. Subordinate units of the SRIG, less the intelligence and UAV companies, are capable of self-administration. When required, administrative

support may be provided less capable subordinate units by establishing a SRIG administrative support center.

(6) Logistic Capabilities

(a) Maintenance. The headquarters company of the SRIG provides organizational (1st and 2d echelon) maintenance support to the headquarters, HQ Co, INTEL Co and UAV Co (less UAV-unique equipment). All other subordinate units have the requisite organic maintenance capability.

(b) Supply. The HQ Co of the SRIG provides ground supply support to the headquarters, HQ Co, INTEL Co, and UAV Co. All other subordinate elements have the essential organic supply capability.

(c) Transportation. The SRIG is capable of providing sufficient motor transportation to partially displace. Transportation support is required to displace all essential elements simultaneously.

(d) Medical. The medical section at the SRIG HQSVC Co provides technical supervision and coordination of all medical activity with the group. Subordinate units, less the INTEL Co and UAV Co, have sufficient medical personnel assigned to provide appropriate medical support.

(7) Representative Intelligence Elements. The SRIG fields intelligence detachments which includes representative elements of the following units.

(a) Rad Bn. The primary mission of the Rad Bn is to conduct SIGINT and GEW operations.

(b) Force Recon Co. The mission of the Force Recon Co is to conduct preassault and deep post-assault reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(c) UAV Co. The mission of the UAV Co is to conduct day and night UAV operations in support of the MAGTF.

(d) INTEL Co. The mission of the INTEL Co is to provide the support described by the mission statements of its subordinate components as listed below.

1 **MAFC.** The mission of the MAFC is to provide the personnel, intelligence data bases, and equipment required to man the MAGTF intelligence section's analysis and production unit and target intelligence unit. The MAFC also ensures the smooth flow of intelligence/information within the MAGTF. (See fig. 7-9.)

2 **CIT.** The mission of the CIT is to collect information regarding the threats of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and counterintelligence operations.

3 **ITP.** The mission of the ITP is to obtain intelligence information through the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war detainees and the civilian internees, and to exploit foreign language documents for intelligence information. This is not to be confused with interpreter teams.

4 **Topographic Platoon.** The mission of the topographic platoon is to provide tailored MC&G and terrain analysis products and services.

5 **Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP).** The mission of the SCAMP is to plan for and provide all-weather remote ground sensor surveillance capability.

6 **Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (FIIU).** The mission of the FIIU is to plan for and provide the MEF with imagery and imagery interpretation to support operations.



Figure 7-9. MAGTF Intelligence/Information Flow.

7010. Ground Combat Element Intelligence

The GCE is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is constructed around an infantry unit and varies in size from a reinforced infantry battalion to one or more Marine divisions. Normally, there is only one GCE in a MAGTF. The GCE also includes combat support and combat service support units. It is the GCE which executes maneuver and is the focal point for applying firepower and executing combined arms. Overall responsibility rests with the G-2/S-2 for the quality and timeliness of intelligence provided to the GCE commander.

a. Marine Division (MarDiv). The ground combat element of the MEF will be a MarDiv. The intelligence section will vary in organization and size somewhat in each of the four divisions. However, all divisions are similar to the organization as follows:

(1) Organization

(a) G-2 Executive Branch

- Assistant chief of staff, G-2
- Deputy chief of staff, G-2
- Intelligence chief, division

(b) Intelligence Operations

- Administration
  - •• Intelligence officer
  - •• Intelligence operations chief
  - •• Admin clerk
- Analysis Section
  - •• Chief analyst (captain)
  - •• Asst chief analyst (WO)
  - •• Intel analyst (SNCO)
  - •• Intel analyst (3 × Sgt)
  - •• Intel analyst (3 × Cpl)
- Collections Requirements Section
  - •• Collections requirements officer (major)
  - •• Collections requirements chief (SNCO)
  - •• Collections requirements analyst (Sgt)
- Targeting Section
  - •• TarIntelO (captain)
  - •• Targeting intel assistant (SNCO)

(2) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The AC/S, G-2, is the principal staff assistant in intelligence matters concerning the enemy, the area of operations, and information concerning foreign countries which are significant to military planning and operations. The AC/S, G-2 provides for the timely accomplishment of command intelligence functions, either by use of assigned resources or through management control and coordination of intelligence means and activities of other elements of the command. The AC/S, G-2 has staff responsibility for production of intelligence; dissemination of intelligence; other intelligence; maps, charts, photographs, and other graphic aids; and intelligence training.

(a) Production of Intelligence. The AC/S, G-2 directs the GCE effort for collection of information including technical, electronic, and special intelligence information, and processing the information into finished intelligence. The processing of information includes recording, evaluation, and interpretation. The AC/S, G-2 specific responsibilities in the production of intelligence include:

1 Determining the intelligence required in conjunction with the G-3 for GCE as a whole in planning and executing operations. Included are intelligence requirements developed by other staff officers and subordinate commanders.

2 Recommending, in coordination with the G-3, EEI to the commander.

3 Preparing plans, orders, and requests to higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters for the collection of information to include target acquisition and combat surveillance.

4 Supervising and coordinating the information collection activities of the GCE, including employment of airborne, surface, and subsurface detection/collection devices or systems.

5 Coordinating with the operations of the SCAMP within the GCE AOR.

6 Integrating applicable intelligence requirements received from higher and adjacent commands into the information collection effort of the GCE.

7 Determining requirements for and recommending allocation of intelligence specialists to subordinate units.

8 Planning, supervising, and exploiting technical intelligence, imagery (photographic, airborne radar, and infrared), remote air/ground sensors, agent reports, interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents, and other sources in support of the GCE effort.

9 Providing information and coordinating with the G-3 NBC officer regarding enemy capabilities and weather and terrain conditions effecting the employment of special weapons, to include predicting fallout from enemy employed nuclear weapons.

10 Coordinating weather data collection in areas not under friendly control.

11 Planning, supervising, and coordinating with SRIG signals intelligence operations and activities within the GCE AOR.

12 Planning and supervising the conduct of special intelligence operations including establishing and maintaining a facility for the security and dissemination of sensitive intelligence and the operation of an exclusive communication system for the GCE.

13 Coordinating the conduct of other special intelligence activities of a particularly sensitive nature for the GCE.

14 Processing information into intelligence.

15 Recording pertinent information and intelligence systematically for ease of study and comparison.

(b) Dissemination of Intelligence. The AC/S, G-2 disseminates intelligence and information to the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and to all others who may have an impact on accomplishing the mission. Specific responsibilities in disseminating intelligence include—

1 Preparing the intelligence estimate. This will include continually estimating the effects of the characteristics of the AO on friendly and enemy courses of action and continually estimating enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities (e.g., including the courses of action the enemy is most likely to adopt).

2 Preparing or coordinating for the intelligence annex, the periodic intelligence summaries, intelligence summaries, climatology, terrain, and hydrographic studies, OOB studies, helicopter landing area studies, coast and landing area studies, road and trail net studies, town and city**plans, trafficability studies and reports, and enemy weapons, tactics, techniques, and equipment studies. This will also include any other intelligence analysis and studies required by the commander, the staff or dictated by the tactical situation.

(c) Other Intelligence. The AC/S, G-2 is responsible for intelligence input to plans and orders which normally are the purview of other staff officers. He supervises and coordinates intelligence aspects in coordination with cognizant staff officers. Specific responsibilities include—

1 Intelligence aspects of tactical cover and deception.

2 Civil affairs.

3 Employment of mass destruction weapons (nuclear and chemical) to include the enemy capability to employ like weapons and their reaction to our employment.

4 Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.

5 Psychological operation to include estimating the conditions and vulnerabilities of prospective target groups; estimating the effectiveness of friendly psychological operations, as well as the enemy's; and assisting in the planning and supervising of training activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda.

6 Barrier and denial operations.

7 Electronic warfare.

(d) Maps, Charts, Photographs, and Other Graphic Aids. Specific responsibilities include—

1 Determining the requirements for and supervising the procurement and distribution of maps, imagery, and intelligence graphic aids.

2 Coordinating with the engineer officer and the commander (or officer in charge) of the unit assigned reproduction and/or storage responsibilities.

(e) Intelligence Training. Specific responsibilities include—

1 Planning and supervising, in coordination with the G-3, the intelligence training of the command as a whole.

2 Planning, directing, and supervising the intelligence training of the intelligence section, to include attached intelligence specialist teams.

b. Infantry Regiment

(1) Organization. The regimental intelligence section is usually organized as follows:

- S-2 officer (major)
- Asst S-2 officer (Capt/Lt)
- Intel chief (MSgt)
- Intel asst (Sgt)
- Chief scout (Sgt 0311)
- Intel asst (LCpl)
- Scout (Cpl)

(2) S-2, Intelligence. The S-2 officer acts as the regimental commander's intelligence assistant for the planning and supervision of all intelligence activities of the command. His primary staff responsibility is to produce intelligence of the enemy and the area of operations not under friendly control. Included within this responsibility is the planning, supervision, and collection of information needed by the command; rapid processing of this information into intelligence; and immediate dissemination of the resulting intelligence to senior, subordinate and adjacent units. The S-2 also assists the regimental commander in the planning of appropriate CI measures.

(3) Regimental Intelligence Planning. Intelligence planning commences with the receipt of planning memoranda from senior authority and continues through the operation. Intelligence efforts must, so far as possible, satisfy the immediate needs of the commander, serve as a basis for other planning, and ensure the development of adequate intelligence to support the assault and subsequent operations ashore. Intelligence planning at the RLT level must also be responsive to the needs of subordinate commanders. One of the peculiar characteristics of planning for an amphibious operation is the complete dependence of subordinate units upon higher headquarters for intelligence. This dependence does not relieve the RLT commander of the responsibility for initiating requests to higher headquarters for additional intelligence needed to assist in formulating the RLT plan of attack.

The infantry regiment, formed as an RLT, may be assigned various types of intelligence specialists when directed by senior headquarters. However, during widely separated or independent landings, the RLT is usually augmented by several different intelligence specialists. Augmented intelligence specialists may be assigned to subordinate units or directed to operate independently within the RLT zone of action based on the desire of the RLT commander.

An amphibious operation requires more detailed intelligence than other forms of warfare. An early determination of basic

requirements is essential to ensure timely collection. The greatest limiting factors in collecting amphibious intelligence are the distance from the objective and the requirement for careful coordination of collection activities with other operations. These may result in an increased lead time before the mission can be undertaken. The RLT will normally receive topographic maps and charts of the objective area, aerial photographs, shoreline photographs, and area intelligence studies, including the composition and strength of enemy forces in the area. This intelligence is required for the staff estimates. Basic intelligence requirements at all echelons of the command emphasize requirements as—

- Enemy situation.
- Hydrographic conditions.
- Landing beaches.
- Weather conditions.
- Terrain.
- Political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological conditions.
- Cultural features.
- NBC operations.

To provide the RLT commander with means to enhance the surveillance and reconnaissance capability of the unit, reconnaissance teams and remote sensor personnel may be attached. These will augment the organizational capabilities. However, it is essential that all ground surveillance and reconnaissance missions be coordinated to provide for an effective collection effort.

c. Infantry Battalion. The battalion S-2 section is organized as follows:

- Intelligence officer (captain).
- Intelligence chief (GySgt).
- Intelligence specialist (Sgt).
- Intelligence specialist/driver (Pvt).

The intelligence functions of the battalion are similar to the operations outlined under the regimental intelligence operations. However, in addition to the S-2 section, the infantry battalion has the scout/sniper platoon.

d. GCE Reconnaissance Assets. The following ground collection agencies of the GCE provide valuable support to the MAGTF.

(1) Reconnaissance Battalion. The mission of the reconnaissance battalion is to provide ground reconnaissance to the MarDiv and its elements.

(2) Scout/Sniper Platoon. The mission of scout/sniper platoons is to provide reconnaissance and sniper support to infantry regiments/battalions.

e. SRIG and Its Relationship to the GCE. SRIG's mission is to provide sustained intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications support to the MEF and subordinate MAGTFs in amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore.

(1) The GCE of the MEF, MEB, and MEU can expect intelligence support from the SRIG/Det. Operations are coordinated through the MAGTF SARC and S/EWCC. The SRIG will provide task-organized detachments to subordinate MAGTFs and other designated commands to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, ANGLICO,and core elements of the MSPF.

(2) Normally, the MAGTF commander's taskings are received through the G-2/S-2 for intelligence operations, the CEO for communications support, and the G-3/S-3 for direct action, special operations, and ANGLICO. (See fig. 7-5, page 5.)

(3) MEB GCE will be supported by a task-organized detachment consisting of a recon

element, radio recon team/radio battalion det, communications det, UAV company det, topographic squad, CIT, ITT, FIIU element, sensor squad, a SARC, and a detachment of the MAFC.

(4) MEU GCE will be supported by a task-organized detachment consisting of the intelligence element in approximately one-third to one-half strength as those in a MEB.

(5) Task-organized detachments will have capabilities from any of these types of assets:

- Deep ground reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Aerial reconnaissance/surveillance/target acquisition.
- Unattended ground sensor operations.
- Collection, analysis, and reporting SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT.
- Preparation of a wide variety of intelligence products supporting planning and execution of operations.
- Preparation of requests for MAGTF aviation collection requirements for inclusion in the air tasking order (ATO).

By accomplishing the above, the SRIG/Det will be providing the combat intelligence required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

7011. Aviation Combat Element Intelligence

The ACE's capability to observe the battlefields and report in near-real-time gives the MAGTF commander a multidimensional intelligence capability. This potential is often overlooked by MAGTF planners. The ACE can view the area of operations in depth. This allows early indications and warning and surveillance activities which are essential to MAGTF success. The ACE is task-organized to provide all or a portion of the functions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and the MAGTF mission and size. These functions are air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is organized around an aviation headquarters and varies in size from a reinforced helicopter squadron to one or more Marine aircraft wing(s). It includes those aviation command (including air control agencies), combat, combat support, and combat service support units required by the situation. Normally, there is only one aviation combat element in a MAGTF.

a. ACE Intelligence Potential. Aircrews, radars, low altitude air defense teams, and the variety of information sources inherent in the air command and control system provides timely information/ intelligence. The ACE intelligence organization should be embedded within the critical nodes of the air command and control system and with flying and support units. Within the ACE, combat information is of more immediate value than finished intelligence and must be both acquired and disseminated with speed that exceeds the requirements most commonly found in ground units. Frequently, intelligence personnel must extract their combat information from the operational communications nets and therefore require a detailed knowledge of the system, the pattern of operations, and the time factors that affect air operations.

b. ACE-Unique Intelligence Requirements. Air operations take place over significant distances, but in short periods of time. As a result, the intelligence requirements of the ACE are time-sensitive. Additionally, the ACE has critical requirements for imagery products and for timely SIGINT support. The MAGTF intelligence organization must be sensitive to the ACE's needs for timely intelligence and to products which are unique to its mission. It also must be organized to meet those needs and provide those products.

c. ACE Intelligence Flow. Due to the speed of modern aircraft and missiles, time factors are compressed in air operations. The combination of

increased distances and decreased reaction time means that traditional communications and information handling must be carefully planned and implemented to fully support the near-real-time potential of intelligence for air command and control. The information is more critical to the ACE than to any other MAGTF component. Detailed planning and coordination between the MAGTF intelligence officer, ACE intelligence officer, and the communications officer are required to meet the information requirements of the ACE and MAGTF.

d. Exploiting the ACE Intelligence Potential. The intelligence potential of the ACE can be exploited by building an intelligence organization that places trained officers and analysts at the critical nodes of the air command and control system. The officers and analysts can extract the time-sensitive information when it becomes available. This information must then be disseminated so it can be used. Additionally the intelligence organization must extend throughout the ACE, down to the ultimate consumer level: the air squadrons, air control squadrons, and support squadrons. Only in this way can information be pushed throughout the system and reach the decision makers in time. The critical nodes of the air command and control system are the tactical air command center (TACC), tactical air operations center (TAOC), direct air support center (DASC), and air groups, squadrons, air defense, and air support units. ACE intelligence functions are not dependent on the size of the MAGTF, but must be carried out in each ACE.

e. TACC Intelligence Tasks. The intelligence activities conducted at the TACC can be grounded into the functional intelligence cycle steps of direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.

(1) Direction. This consists of translating the commander's guidance and the concept of operations into intelligence requirements such as EEI and OIR. It means directing the overall ACE intelligence operation and conducting administrative control over the intelligence section. Direction also entails maintaining a close, continuous working relationship with the air operations section and with the GCE, and MAGTF intelligence organizations.

(2) Collection. Collection is the process in which information is gathered from a variety of organic and external sources in response to the requirements initially established by the executive branch. A sustained ACE collection effort includes—

- Compiling the collection requirement of the aircraft groups and air defense units.
- Drafting the wing Intelligence Collection Plan.
- Coordinating the tasking of organic collection means.
- Requesting intelligence collection action by external means through the MAGTF intelligence section.
- Planning post-strike reconnaissance in conjunction with the air operations section.

(3) Processing, Production, and Dissemination. Intelligence is created by the processing and production of information. Emphasis is placed on using all sources to produce intelligence. Like collection, processing and production takes place in the air intelligence operations section, and includes analysis, evaluation, correlation, target intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence, SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. The dissemination of estimates, summaries, briefings, and target files also occurs here. Yet due to the time-sensitive nature of air intelligence requirements, dissemination occurs continually within the ACE intelligence structure.

f. TAOC Intelligence Requirements. The TAOC executes a portion of the ATO. Defensive AAW is the primary concern of the TAOC, a subordinate agency of the TACC. The TAOC controls

an air defense sector, en route air traffic and air defense operations with manned interceptors and SAMs. The TAOC has several functions that require intelligence support and must be staffed to accomplish these functions. An intelligence link between the TACC and TAOC is required for the rapid transmission of any current intelligence and combat information which may be of immediate value to aircrews and planners.

g. TAOC Tasks. The air intelligence activities at the TAOC relate to the enemy's air warfare capabilities. The TAOC provides an air surveillance function that is facilitated by knowing the technical capabilities of enemy aircraft, missiles, and weapons. Such information can be provided to the TAOC by periodic updates. External intelligence sources can provide the capability to augment early warning for the ACE defensive AAW effort. Such timely early warning data from the air intelligence operations branch must be made immediately available at the TAOC through a communications link. For planning, defensive AAW requires AOB information, technical data on enemy air warfare capabilities, intelligence relating to the surveillance capabilities of the enemy air force, and evaluations of enemy tactics and weapons. Intelligence support to the TAOC includes—

- Responding to requests for enemy technical capabilities relating to communications and surveillance means.
- Providing early warning data when possible.
- Providing updates relating to enemy air warfare capabilities and technical characteristics of aircraft, missiles, and weapons systems.

h. DASC Intelligence Requirements

(1) Close Air Support (CAS). The DASC, like the TAOC, executes a portion of the ATO. Its function is to oversee the execution of air support for the GCE. In this capacity, it can serve as a *clearing house* for GCE and ACE intelligence data. As a result of air tasking, detailed target intelligence pertaining to CAS targets should be transferred to the TACC by ACE intelligence representatives placed at the DASC.

The DASC has the continual task of updating the air intelligence section in the TACC with the current enemy ground situation and GCE/MAGTF-derived intelligence pertaining to selected CAS targets. There is also a flow of air intelligence data in the other direction to the GCE. This consists of results of air interdiction missions and strike damage assessments from CAS strikes transmitted from the TACC to the DASC and then to the FSCC. The CAS missions require the integration of GCE-originated target intelligence with the ACE's detailed target normally associated with offensive AAW and/or air interdiction. Special emphasis is placed on immediate CAS, as these missions will probably take place within the weapon envelopes of ground threat systems. Timely interchange of target intelligence between the ACE, GCE, and SRIG is essential for building accurate, complete target intelligence files and conducting immediate CAS in the face of the enemy AAW threat. This task can only be accomplished by an interchange of target intelligence. Timely and accurate intelligence is also required to support DASC mission briefs for immediate CAS missions. The ACE must be continually advised of the enemy ground situation. A small but aggressive ACE intelligence detachment at the DASC is required to facilitate these critical functions.

(2) Assault Support. At the GCE, the requests for assault support are prepared and submitted by the tactical air control party (TACP) at the battalion and regiment and are passed through the division air section. During this procedure, the DASC can provide a critical coordination node. Through this coordination node, the ACE intelligence section can be advised that intelligence requirements for the assault support mission are anticipated and available information regarding the request can be forwarded to the TACC to facilitate intelligence collection and preparation. An alert intelligence detachment at the DASC can also forward any GCE/SRIG-derived intelligence

regarding the requested mission to the ACE intelligence section.

The ACE assault support planning in the TACC is tanslated into missions in the ATO. In this case, the order applies to a mission for helicopter groups or squadrons. The air intelligence aspects of the mission are evaluated in general terms since the detailed planning will take place as a result of coordination between helicopter units and helicopterborne commanders and their staffs. These initial aspects include—

(a) Enemy air and air defense capabilities in relation to the assault support mission.

(b) Accurate intelligence relating to enemy ground dispositions (passed to the helicopter group), evaluating enemy ECM capabilities, evaluating the enemy's ability to respond to the mission, developing information on the proposed landing areas, intelligence relating to the planned approach and retirement lanes (if applicable), terrain intelligence, and the enemy's obstacle and mining capabilities.

At the TACC during assault support planning, the emphasis is on developing the picture for executing helicopter units, initiating needed collection via the MAGTF intelligence section regarding the mission and the objective area, and validating additional requests for intelligence from the helicopter units. Assault support planning encompasses a close and continuous effort between air and ground agencies and units, ACE agencies, and helicopter units.

(3) DASC Intelligence Tasks. The importance of the air-ground intelligence exchange at the DASC cannot be overemphasized. The intelligence tasks at the DASC are to—

(a) Advise the TACC on the trace of the FEBA and friendly unit boundaries as available and such intelligence information that can be derived from the in-flight reporting of air crews and reports from other terminal control agencies.

(b) Advise the FSCC/GCE on combat information derived from CAS and assault support missions derived intelligence information.

(c) Provide intelligence information to air crews under DASC control.

i. ACE Imagery Requirements. The ACE requirements for imagery products place a heavy demand on MAGTF imagery production and dissemination capabilities. The ACE requirements differ by aircraft type. For example, AV-8B squadrons require the timely dissemination of specific imagery products which will greatly enhance mission planning, execution, and the potential of the bombing delivery system. In the same manner, A-6 squadrons need imagery of target complexes to use the aircraft's offset bombing capabilities. Helicopter missions in support of GCE operations are facilitated by timely imagery products of helicopter landing zones (HLZs). These requirements add up to a need for imagery production and dissemination planning at the MAGTF level that will meet the time-sensitive ACE requirements and allow the ACE to carry out its mission in accordance with the full capabilities of each aircraft.

j. ACE SIGINT Requirements. The MAGTF SIGINT officer must be attuned to ACE-unique requirements. These needs should be stated early enough in the planning of the operation to be resolved by organic collection means. Requirements which cannot be resolved by organic means must be stated as early as practical to agencies outside the MAGTF, keeping in mind the ACE requirement for time-sensitive information and the need for detailed dissemination planning.

k. ACE Target Intelligence. The ACE lacks the staff personnel needed to conduct an extensive target intelligence and target information effort. Such detailed and extensive efforts take place at the MAGTF command element (MAFC). At the ACE, the objective of target intelligence is to develop detailed intelligence on targets which allow

the effective employment of air delivered weapons. This is done both by reactive targeting and by deliberate targeting. In the current and projected air threat environment, accurate air targeting is totally dependent on accurate and timely intelligence data. The offensive air support mission of the ACE succeeds or fails directly with the air target intelligence effort. The MAGTF intelligence officer must be particularly sensitive to the target intelligence requirements of the ACE when planning for external intelligence support. In particular, interdiction targets and AAW targets may be located at distances beyond the capabilities of MAGTF collections means. The ACE target intelligence requirements must be addressed early in planning to achieve early prioritization of requirements for IMINT, SIGINT, or other support at the naval task force, fleet, or other command level.

(1) Target intelligence at the TACC supports the development of the ACE ATO. Air groups and squadrons will execute a specific portion of the ATO. When the order reaches the group or squadron, detailed mission planning using automated air mission planning is then conducted to execute the ATO. The use of automated air mission planning aids allows for rapid and effective execution, but such aids are dependent on a continuous flow of detailed, timely intelligence to update the mission planning system. Inputs to automated mission planning require early identification as they require manual loading in the system.

(2) ACE target intelligence depends to a great degree on the MAGTF intelligence effort at developing all-source collection requirements, prioritizing those requirements, and transmitting intelligence to the ACE. Such an effort requires that special attention be paid to the development of communications links and automated systems to meet the ACE's needs.

(3) The ultimate consumers of the ACE target intelligence effort are the pilots who deliver the ordnance. The MAGTF intelligence officer must work closely with the ACE intelligence officer to develop procedures for imagery dissemination and graphics support aimed at providing target materials for pilots. These materials are critical to the accuracy of air-delivered ordnance. An ongoing, responsive effort will result in a dramatic increase in ACE effectiveness.

l. Aircraft Group Intelligence Requirements. The aircraft groups require detailed intelligence to execute missions. Aircrews must receive the information necessary to enter hostile areas while avoiding enemy threat systems, to conduct the assigned missions, and to successfully egress and return to base.

(1) Aircraft Group Intelligence Tasks. Intelligence planning at the aircraft groups is more limited in scope than that at the ACE TACC, but is carried out in more detail. Specific tasks of the air group intelligence section include—

- Directing and coordinating the group intelligence effort.
- Producing air target intelligence files to support CAS/AI/AAW strike planning.
- Analyzing air defense threats, air threats, terrain, target vulnerability, and astronomic and meteorological data to find gaps, weaknesses, and favorable conditions in which to carry out attacks.
- Conducting aircrew briefings and debriefings.
- Disseminating information derived from aircrew debriefings to the TACC.
- Requesting imagery and other special products.
- Submitting requests for intelligence support to the ACE intelligence section.
- Directing and coordinating the air group mapping and charting effort.
- SAM/AAA analysis.
- Maintaining intelligence on the current enemy ground situation.
- Producing intelligence estimates and terrain studies.

m. Aircraft Squadron Intelligence Requirements. The squadron intelligence officer plays a critical role in the intelligence effort. He must participate in the briefing and debriefing of squadron aircrews and becomes the intelligence conduit between the group intelligence effort and the squadron. Raw information resulting from debriefings is evaluated by the group and wing intelligence sections and becomes an important source of intelligence that finds its way back to aircrews, operations officers, and commanders. The resulting intelligence relating to gaps in enemy weapons systems, defenses, enemy vulnerabilities and operating patterns facilitates operational planning at all levels, and its source is an active squadron intelligence officer. He provides yet another function—coordinating and conducting the training to enable the accurate identification of enemy equipment, weapons, and operating patterns. This makes each aircrew a collection platform and gives depth to the overall collection effort. Finally, the squadron intelligence section is the means through which maps, charts, imagery products, and terrain studies are made available to the aircrews.

n. Aircraft Squadron Intelligence Tasks. Sustained intelligence support at the squadron level is required during 24-hour operations. Squadron intelligence tasks include—

- Integrating all squadron operational intelligence requirements into the group intelligence effort.
- Augmenting the group intelligence section when centralized intelligence operations are conducted at the group headquarters.
- Disseminating maps, charts, and terrain studies to the squadron.
- Briefing and debriefing squadron aircrews.
- Conducting intelligence training.
- Reporting the results of aircrew debriefs to group intelligence.
- Assisting in the production of intelligence estimates and reports at the group level.

7012. Combat Service Support Element Intelligence

a. General. The CSSE of the MAGTF is task-organized to provide the full range of CSS beyond the organic capabilities of supported units necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The CSSE provides support in the functional areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and miscellaneous services (to include disbursing, postal, exchange services, security support, information systems, legal services, civil affairs support, and graves registration). The CSSE varies in size from a MSSG to an FSSG. Normally, there is only one CSSE in a MAGTF.

(1) Intelligence Capabilities. The organic intelligence gathering and processing capabilities of CSSEs are limited. The requirements for detailed information conflict with the lack of dedicated organic intelligence collection assets within its structure. This creates a requirement on the MAGTF command element to provide a capability. Additionally, close and continuous liaison must be maintained with the ACE and GCE.

(2) Sources of Information. Although a major consumer of intelligence, the CSSE has few organic intelligence collection assets. Generally, information will be provided by senior headquarters, but the CSSE commander must use his organic resources in the accomplishment of his intelligence functions. A comprehensive convoy briefing and debriefing program within motor transport units will provide information on route conditions, enemy activity, and refugee flow. Medical assets can provide information on local health conditions and their potential impact on operations. The key is a concerted effort in apprising each member of the command of his/her role in the intelligence collection function.

b. Intelligence Requirements. CSSEs, regardless of size, generate a vast array of intelligence requirements. Some of these requirements closely

parallel those of the GCE and ACE, but many are unique to the CSSE. These requirements generally fall into three main categories. The first is within the traditional grouping of enemy, weather, and terrain; the second concerns the availability of facilities for use by friendly forces; and the third concerns nonmilitary requirements within the AO and their effects on the MAGTF and CSSE missions.

(1) Enemy, Weather, and Terrain

(a) Enemy Order of Battle. Enemy aviation and artillery/missile assets will impose a considerable threat to the MAGTF's CSS capability if not neutralized. By-passed enemy forces, while not particularly large, can cause serious disruption of CSS operations within the AO. This holds true also for enemy conventional and special forces which may operate throughout the MAGTF rear area. Additionally, terrorist activity may pose a greater potential threat to the CSSE than to other MAGTF elements. CSS personnel will be required to perform a large part of the defensive mission in the CSSAs, other CSS installations, and the MAGTF rear area. A balance must be struck between the CSSE's mission and the requirements for defense.

(b) Weather. Precipitation and extremes in temperature will have a profound impact on MAGTF operations. Supplies and equipment may respond differently to hot or frigid conditions; some may be damaged or destroyed by heavy moisture when unprotected. Personnel may be adversely affected by the same extreme conditions. Damage to lines of communications will slow the movement of some service to supported units.

(c) Terrain and Cultural Features. Terrain studies and terrain intelligence will provide a wealth of information with potential impact on the CSSE's mission and operations, particularly, regarding trafficability and the distribution system within the AO.

1 **CSSAs.** CSSAs may vary in size according to the MAGTF supported and the services provided. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield will reveal areas of sufficient size and in the appropriate locations to serve as CSSAs. Selection should consider the requirement for ingress and egress by ground and air transport assets. Trafficability and proximity to the supported unit will facilitate responsive support and assistance in defense.

2 **Beaches.** Some situations will require that the CSS function be carried out across a landing beach. This requirement will include information such as the length, width, trafficability, exits, gradient to the 10-meter curve, proximity to lines of communications, and causeway requirements.

3 **Helicopter Landing Areas.** These may be used in conjunction with any other facilities (beaches, roadways, ports/harbors). Required information will include the length, width, slope, surface material, flight hazards, flight references, exits, and proximity to other lines of communication.

4 **Ports/Harbors.** An existing port or harbor will facilitate the delivery of large amounts of supply directly from the rear area. Information needed will include berthing facilities, lighterage services, crane capacities, storage areas (buildings and open areas) and proximity to other lines of communication.

5 **Airfields.** If available, an airfield will also allow the rapid delivery of supplies from a great distance. Information required will include the length and width of the runway(s), surface materials, load bearing capacity (by aircraft types), loading/loading facilities, storage areas (buildings and open areas), aircraft control facilities (day/night operations), and proximity to other lines of communication.

6 **Main Supply Routes.** A majority of CSS will be accomplished by organic vehicle assets, dependent on roads or highways. An in-depth knowledge of these routes is an absolute necessity. Such knowledge will include the geographic location of each route, number of lanes, surface composition, trafficability in all weather conditions, locations of possible choke points, location and load capability of bridges, possible rest areas, and locations of possible ambush sites.

7 **Bridges.** It is a certainty that the enemy will use the destruction of bridges to slow CSS. The study of bridges must be conducted from two viewpoints; their use on transportation routes and their replacement by engineer assets. Particulars of this requirement include bridge length, load bearing capacity, construction type and materials, overhead height limitation, and possible bypasses. Note that bypasses of use to infantry and mechanized units may not be usable by heavily loaded wheeled vehicles.

(2) **Facilities.** In any MAGTF operation, the CSS effort will expand to such size that organic capabilities may not be adequate to support the MAGTF. Therefore, CSS planning and intelligence requirements should include and identify any facilities resident in the AO which might be exploited. Such facilities will commonly include:

(a) **Water Purification and Storage.** The requirement includes purification capability in gallons per day. Additionally, the volume of storage capacity and normal amount of water on hand should be determined.

(b) **Food Supply and Storage.** This includes the determination of the amount of food storage capacity, including refrigeration. Commercial- or government-owned food storage or distribution centers should be located. All food should be tested for contamination.

(c) **Electrical Power.** Required information includes the layout of the entire power grid, including all power production plants and transformer stations. This will apply to thermal, hydroelectric, or fossil fuel-generated power.

(d) **Telecommunications.** This includes all available information on telephone, telegraph, radio, and television facilities. Particular attention should be paid to all components of the telephone system, a major augmentation to organic communications assets.

(e) **Construction Materials and Equipment.** Information required includes the location and inventories of all dealers or producers/manufacturers of construction materials and equipment.

(f) **Motor Transport Equipment.** Military and civilian motor transport equipment will be of use in the CSS effort. Information as to equipment brand and country of manufacture will be of use.

(g) **Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.** Information required includes refining capacity, storage facilities, and amounts on hand by location and type.

(h) **Railways.** CSS over great distances can be accomplished through the use of rail facilities, thereby saving wear on organic assets. Needed information includes the question of track gauge standardization throughout the area (uncommon in Third World countries), routes of track within the area, condition of track and associated bridges and tunnels, location of central control facilities, and the amount and locations of rolling stock.

(3) **Nonmilitary Requirements**

(a) **Medical Intelligence**

1 That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis,

and interpretaion of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

2 The collection of medical intelligence must be initiated very early in the planning phase. The knowledge gained will reveal the need for any additional immunizations required prior to embarkation. It will also enable medical personnel to deploy with equipment and supplies necessary to treat refugees or prisoners of war. Assistance in this effort should be requested of veterinary personnel to ascertain animal-borne diseases common to the operations area.

(b) Prisoners of War. The long term prisoner of war detention compound will likely be located within the CSS area. The primary concern in CSS is not exploitation as these assets will be provided from the SRIG by the MAGTF commander. The focus within the CSS effort will be the logistical support required to feed and house a large number of personnel in accordance with applicable guidelines. Failure to plan for this additional support will result in a serious draw down on organic assets required to support friendly forces.

(c) Refugees. A large volume of refugee traffic will be a constant disruption in rear areas. Lines of communication will become clogged, slowing the forward movement of supply. The enemy's capability to direct refugee flow must be determined and neutralized. Refugees will lack adequate food and clothing and will view our stores as a source of their support. If this situation is not planned for, a serious draw down on organic resources will result.

(d) Local Population. Local residents will add to the security problem. A lengthy deployment in a particular area will enable them to become familiar with our security practices (schedules and areas of primary concern). Pilferage will increase as these factors become apparent. Local vendors will soon target the military force personnel as customers for health and comfort items, creating a reciprocal internal control problem. Should the local population feel threatened by enemy activity, they will certainly seek shelter within the CSS area perimeter.

Chapter 8

Intelligence for Amphibious Operations

8001. General

The environmental aspects of amphibious warfare create conditions not encountered in land warfare. These differences are significant, creating requirements for the intelligence structure which are not identical in each case, no more than the forms of warfare themselves are identical. Because of the inherent differences between amphibious warfare and land warfare, the intelligence officer must identify these differing conditions and act on them. The commander should be aware that the differing conditions require unique collection planning, communications requirements, and collection tasking. These factors will not change the basic principles of intelligence but will require modification to the intelligence effort to meet the needs of amphibious or land operations. The degree to which the intelligence officer identifies the peculiar requirements of an amphibious environment is the degree to which the intelligence effort will succeed.

a. Land Warfare. In land warfare, enemy and friendly forces operate in relative proximity with each other. Seldom separated by great distances, opposing forces are almost constantly in contact with each other. Much of the conventional practice of intelligence is predicated on this continuing contact and the tactical considerations arising from it.

b. Amphibious Warfare. Amphibious warfare has extensive periods of time when there is no contact between the opponents. This physical separation has a major impact on intelligence support and serves as the major distinguishing factor between land and amphibious operations. As a result, the intelligence structure will be confronted by conditions which do not exist in land warfare.

8002. Factors Affecting Amphibious Intelligence Support

a. Primary Factors

(1) Separation of Opposing Forces. The initial physical separation of opposing forces is the single most important factor affecting intelligence support for amphibious operations because it inhibits the gathering of intelligence. All other factors influencing intelligence support to amphibious operations derive from this factor.

(2) Separation of Friendly Forces. In most instances, the separation of friendly forces will be an additional factor impacting on the intelligence structure. For example, separation exists between the landing force and amphibious shipping during the preembarkation phase, between the CATF and the CLF, between elements of the intelligence structure, or between elements of the MAGTF. Separation may also occur with the landing force element of the GCE, ACE, and CSSE at different locations. While this separation normally ends with the embarkation phase, it may pose considerable challenges to the intelligence officer and the staff during planning.

b. Derivative Factors. The primary factors affecting amphibious intelligence lead to a number of derivative factors. While the primary factors

are broad in scope, the derivative factors are more specific. Each derivative factor will influence an individual aspect of the intelligence effort.

(1) Curtailed Collection Capability. The distance which separates the opposing forces during the early phases of an amphibious operation curtails friendly organic information collection. Faced with the requirement for information and unable to deploy organic collection assets, the landing force depends upon external agency support. Because of this dependency, the landing force must identify intelligence requirements as early as possible to CATF. This also allows the time required to task national and theater assets.

(2) Staff Coordination Problems. In those cases where friendly forces are physically separated, staff coordination can be a major problem. These coordination problems come at a critical time in planning amphibious operations, and, if permitted, may present a crippling flaw at the very outset of the intelligence effort.

(3) Dissemination Difficulties. The same separation of friendly intelligence staffs which inhibits proper coordination of the intelligence effort also poses problems in dissemination. Additional problems in intelligence dissemination may be encountered in the movement phase when OPSEC considerations such as emission control (EMCON) limit communications between the MAGTF intelligence structure and both shoreside supporting agencies and the other elements of the MAGTF.

(4) Changes in the Enemy Situation. The MAGTF is separated from the AO not only in distance but in time. The enemy situation may change radically between embarkation and arrival in the objective area. During the transition period, the MAGTF is generally forced to rely on external agencies tasked to force feed information to embarked units. The intelligence officer's ability to influence this period of intelligence development is limited at best.

c. Impact on the Intelligence Structure

(1) Impaired Ability to Function. At a time when the intelligence structure is faced with its greatest requirements for information, it is least able to collect this information with organic assets. The reason being is that the production of intelligences, predicated on the availability of suitable intelligence information, is limited to only partial analysis of partial information. In addition, the separation of the MAGTF throughout amphibious shipping will exert a fragmenting effect in the intelligence structure and further inhibit its ability to provide meaningful intelligence to support the commander's requirements.

(2) Enemy Intelligence Advantage. The enemy's intelligence structure may be developing far greater intelligence on friendly force options at the same time the friendly intelligence structure is unable to collect information with organic assets. Because the enemy is occupying the objective area, the enemy will probably have the opportunity to thoroughly explore the terrain and apply his knowledge of friendly doctrine to develop intelligence. This intelligence can include an accurate assessment of likely landing beaches and helicopter landing areas (HLAs), as well as likely times for the amphibious assault and friendly objectives for the assault.

d. Intelligence Objectives. The intelligence effort must be conducted in pursuit of clearly identified and validated objectives. Given the disadvantages inherent in the conduct of amphibious operations, the intelligence officer must expend every effort to ensure intelligence assets are not wasted on nonessential tasks. Accurate identification and clear definition of intelligence objectives are a major factor in overcoming the inherent disadvantages to the intelligence support of amphibious operations.

8003. Amphibious Intelligence Requirements

a. Planning Phase. During the planning phase, it is very important to establish amphibious intelligence requirements early because of the lack of organic assets needed to satisfy these requirements. The CATF and the CLF will lean heavily on external agencies for intelligence support during this period to satisfy these requirements. They will also want to establish the JIC as soon as possible after receiving notice that an amphibious operation is to be conducted. However, the practical course of events usually prevents establishing the JIC until the embarkation phase. (See par. 8003b.) Establishing the JIC early in the planning phase will—

- Result in the production and dissemination of more comprehensive and timely intelligence.
- Consolidate intelligence materials, personnel, and intelligence support functions.
- Prevent duplication of efforts and functions of intelligence personnel.
- Ensure close cooperation and coordination among the ATF intelligence staffs.
- Allow for the timely dissemination of required documents that will obtain external intelligence support.

(1) EEI. Early identification of EEI is critical. The importance of identifying EEI early on is to allow time for external agencies to be able to satisfy the requirement. It then becomes important to develop a detailed collection plan and to obtain knowledge of external agencies' capabilities and tasking procedures.

(2) National and Theater Assets. At the national theater level, there are national intelligence assets and capabilities that offer the means of overcoming the collection limitations inherent in amphibious operations. Encyclopedic material produced by these agencies will answer many of the basic intelligence requirements. Obtaining information to satisfy intelligence requirements at this level requires properly planned and requested information collection assets. The Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) manual and local directives contain specific guidance requesting national and theater level support. Certain other federal agencies and departments may be able to provide some information in response to the basic intelligence needs. These potential sources of information should not be overlooked. (See Chapter 6, Intelligence Community.) Theater-based intelligence agencies and assets may also be capable of assisting the intelligence officer. While these agencies focus their effort in satisfying the theater CinCs intelligence requirements, they may also assist operational forces assigned to or planning operations in a given theater. Foremost among these agencies are the fleet intelligence centers and the intelligence production facilities of the unified and specified commanders.

(a) Fleet Intelligence Centers (FICs). The FICs, especially, can provide valuable intelligence support to the intelligence section that is planning an amphibious operation. FICs provide intelligence support by producing many amphibious-related products such as coast and landing beach studies, port and harbor intelligence, HLA/LZ data, target materials and biographic data as well as basic order of battle information.

(b) Unified and Specified Commands Facilities. These commands generally have intelligence production facilities at the joint level, as well as separate ground, air, and naval intelligence production facilities at the component level. The answers to many MAGTF EEI may already exist at these facilities. In addition, theater intelligence collection assets may be tasked in response to MAGTF EEI. Specific guidance for obtaining theater intelligence support varies in each command. The initiating directive and other operation orders relating to the amphibious operation should identify these procedures.

(3) Planning for Dissemination During the Movement Phase. A major area of concern is planning for intelligence dissemination during the movement phase. Redundant communications means must be incorporated into the planning phase to ensure that adequate dissemination means are available. In most cases, the communications means will not be under the control of the MAGTF intelligence officer or the SRIG commander, but must be arranged through the ATF counterpart.

(4) Security Considerations. Information concerning an impending amphibious operation is very susceptible to compromise during the planning phase. The extensive amounts of information exchanged by geographically separated friendly elements present lucrative targets to the enemy intelligence collection process. This information flow during the planning phase must be adequately protected. The intelligence officer is responsible to identify enemy intelligence collection capabilities as well as friendly vulnerabilities subject to exploitation.

b. Embarkation Phase. During the embarkation phase, all aspects of intelligence dissemination are tested to ensure proper functioning. This emphasizes establishing alternate means of dissemination when electronic communications are restricted or prohibited. The embarkation phase is the phase where normal operations of the JIC normally begin. As noted in paragraph 3003a, the JIC should be established in the planning phase. But due to the practical course of events, the JIC normally is established in the embarkation phase. However, the establishment of a JIC should not be delayed past the embarkation phase. (See par. 8003c.)

(1) Automated Support. Automated intelligence support systems are playing an increasing role in allowing the intelligence staff to process large volumes of data. Planning for automated support must receive careful and detailed consideration due to the initial problems of geographic separation, followed by shipboard collocation, then subsequent movement ashore. ADP hardware used in the planning phase may be available during the embarkation and movement phases. MAGTF intelligence personnel must plan on using shipborne ADP equipment during these phases. Interoperability of data bases, therefore, is critical to the smooth flow of ADP support. Likewise, the intelligence data contained in shipborne ADP systems must be capable of being downloaded into the tactical ADP systems that will accompany the MAGTF ashore.

(2) Security. The commander should be aware that the threat of sabotage exists due to the large quantities of equipment that have to be marshalled and transported during the embarkation phase. Proper measures are taken through the staff CI officer to deny the enemy access to potentially lucrative targets. The following considerations are of utmost importance to the exercise/operation.

(a) Establish liaison with other CI agencies to control civilians. This occurs both in the embarkation area and along the routes to that area. Before employment, screen those civilians working in the embarkation area.

(b) Keep contact between the troops and civilians to an absolute minimum, both en route and in the embarkation area.

(c) Establish security over the embarkation area to prevent espionage and sabotage.

(d) Ensure the positive identification of all embarked persons of the ATF, the workers and personnel of the embarking area, and any individual in or around the immediate staging area.

c. Joint Intelligence Center. Establishing a JIC provides an effective means of accomplishing the intelligence mission in amphibious operations. Because the intelligence requirements of the CATF and CLF are different yet mutually supportive of the ATF mission, the JIC, as a single organization, can focus these requirements in support of the mission. The JIC is established in a

joint decision by the CATF and the CLF. The JIC is manned by personnel from the CATF, the CLF, and the flagship's intelligence center. It functions under the coequal direction of the ATF and LF intelligence officers. The JIC combines the efforts of ATF and LF intelligence officers in mutual areas of concern plus allows them to pursue their own concerns more efficiently. The CATF N-2 and the CLF G-2 have equal responsibilities for the JIC; however, the N-2 is directly responsible to the CATF for intelligence support to the ATF as a whole. Direct liaison and close coordination between members of all ATF/LF intelligence staffs are encouraged. Deployed ATFs/groups contain organic intelligence staff elements and SRIG detachments which provide intelligence support to their respective commanders and staffs.

(1) Mission. The mission of the JIC is to direct the intelligence effort during amphibious operations and to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to embarked and subordinate commanders.

(2) Organization and Manning. The following paragraphs contain the billet descriptions, organizational structure, and manning for a notional JIC supporting a PHIBGRU/MEF/MEB-sized task force.

(a) N-2/G-2. The N-2 is the supervising intelligence officer. The N-2 is responsible for intelligence support to the ATF as a whole, while both the N-2 and G-2 are directly responsible to their respective commanders for the unique intelligence requirements of each command. At a minimum, they are responsible for the intelligence planning duties described in paragraphs 601 and 602 of LFM 01, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operation*.

(b) JIC Operations Officer. This billet may best be filled by the flagship's intelligence officer. The JIC operations officer is responsible to the N-2 and G-2 for the coordination and supervision of internal operations of the JIC. This officer manages the technical aspects of JIC operations, assists in the provision of automated intelligence support, and acts as liaison between the JIC and other departments of the flagship to ensure smooth and effective operations. If there are enough personnel, designating an assistant JIC operations officer is recommended. Having an assistant JIC operations officer will allow 24-hour continuity and accomplishment of other shipboard duties.

(c) JIC Watch Officer (JWO). The JWO is the senior Navy or Marine watch stander in each watch section. The JWO is responsible for screening all incoming traffic, integrating information from the SSES, taking immediate action on critical items, ensuring that messages are properly journalized and routed for action within the JIC, and disseminating intelligence to embarked and subordinated commanders in a timely manner. The JWO also—

- Ensures that situation maps, Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) plots, and OOB files are maintained.
- Supervises the preparation of daily briefs, intelligence summaries, and other JIC products.
- Reviews all outgoing JIC messages for content, accuracy, and format.

(d) Collections Section. The collections section is responsible for the managing and tasking intelligence collection assets organic to the ATF and for requesting collection by external activities. Close coordination with the analysis and production section is essential to ensure that accurate and timely collection planning and tasking are conducted. Representatives from organic units with a collection capability may be assigned to this section to provide operational and technical advice concerning the proper employment of their units' assets. The J-TENS manual provides additional guidance for collections management and national collections capabilities.

(e) Analysis and Production Section. The analysis and production section is responsible for the processing of information into usable intelligence, disseminating usable intelligence to the tactical commander, and identifying intelligence gaps which require collection. The analysis and production section consists of naval, ground, and air analysts. The section should be organized to allow 24-hour operations.

1 **Naval Analysts.** The naval analysts are responsible for maritime intelligence analysis, to include threat warning for protection of the ATF. They maintain the OSIS plot, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, and perform other tasks as required by the JWO.

2 **Ground Analysts.** The ground analysts are responsible for all ground intelligence analysis dealing with operations ashore. They maintain the enemy ground situation map, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, and perform other tasks as required by the JWO.

3 **Air Analysts.** The air analysts are responsible for intelligence analysis dealing with all enemy air activity. They maintain the enemy air situation map, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, conduct analysis of air defense, and perform other tasks as required by the watch officer. Due to overlapping requirements for air intelligence by CATF and CLF, it is recommended that the air analysts include both Navy and Marine intelligence personnel. This will ensure that both task force and landing force concerns are addressed.

(f) Imagery Interpretation Section. The imagery interpretation section is responsible for interpreting and analyzing imagery and for providing derived intelligence to the analysis and production section. It identifies targets and provides target and terrain studies and other products as required. This section also provides technical assistance to the collections section for the planning of aerial reconnaissance and maintenance of the SAO package. It also operates the secondary imagery dissemination system, if available. This section should include both Navy and Marine personnel.

(g) Administration Section. The administration section is jointly manned by the N-2, G-2, and flagship enlisted personnel. It is responsible for providing clerical assistance to the JIC. This includes—

- Maintaining the intelligence journal.
- Typing messages and briefs.
- Picking up and routing incoming message traffic.
- Maintaining and researching various instructions and regulations.
- Performing SSO administrative functions.
- Maintaining MC&G products and other duties as may be required by the JWO.

(h) Storage and Retrieval Section. The storage and retrieval section maintains intelligence data bases to support intelligence analysis. Organic data base support to the JIC varies among flag-configured ships. This support includes the noncomputerized, minidata base (microfiche) and automated NIPS data base, Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal (POST), Tactical Intelligence Processing System (TIPS), Military Intelligence Integrated Data System (MIIDS), and other microcomputer-driven data bases.

(i) HUMINT Section. As the CLF normally deploys the majority of HUMINT resources, the G-2 HUMINT section is responsible for HUMINT/CI matters. Additionally, it provides personality and organizational targeting information. The section also includes the ITP. ITP representatives to the JIC ensure ITP reports are received by the JIC in a

timely fashion and provide guidance to the collections and requirements section on employment of these assets.

(j) Special Warfare Intelligence Section. The special warfare intelligence section prepares target folders for special warfare forces assigned to the ATF. Target folders are prepared in support of advance force operations and subsequent direct action missions. The section nominates targets to and receives target tasking from the CATF special warfare plans officer.

(k) Joint Ship's Signal Exploitation Space (J/SSES). The J/SSES operates under the direction of the CATF cryptologic officer and provides cryptologic electronic warfare support measures (ESM), SIGINT, and special intelligence communications (SPINTCOMM) support to the ATF. Due to the complexity and sensitive nature of J/SSES operations, detailed planning and coordination is essential early in the planning process between the CATF cryptologic officer and the LF SIGINT officer. Although the CATF cryptologic officer is solely responsible for all support requirements and for activation/deactivation of the J/SSES, he is jointly responsible with the LF SIGINT officer for providing critical SIGINT support to embarked commanders and subordinate elements of the ATF. Augmented by naval security group and dDetachment, RadBn personnel, or FMF SPINTCOMM operations, the J/SSES collects, translates, transcribes, sanitizes, provides SIGINT and ESM reports, and SIGSEC support to the ATF, as required. The J/SSES coordinates the collection of information in support of ATF EW plans/objectives and in response to intelligence requirements identified by the collection and requirements section of the JIC. It is imperative that J/SSES personnel work in close coordination with the flagship EW module to ensure flow of combat information to appropriate decision makers, as well as to ensure that EW (ECM) operations are closely coordinated to preclude interference.

(l) Target Information Center (TIC). The TIC is located in the SACC. It assists the CATF supporting arms coordinator in the preparation of the ATF target list and TARBULs. The TIC is headed by the ATF TIO. The ATF TIO is assisted by the LF target intelligence officer, a member of the G-2 section, and the LF target information officer, who is a member of the LF supporting arms special staff. The TIC processes intelligence data to identify likely targets for attack by the ATF and supporting units. It is of paramount importance that the TIC receive timely and accurate target intelligence from the JIC. In this regard, TIC personnel must ensure that analysis and production section personnel are familiar with TIC requirements and that JIC personnel are cognizant of the duties and functions of TIC personnel. The TIC is dissolved when the LF CE is phased ashore; however, it must be prepared to resume normal operations if required.

(m) LF Operations Center (LFOC) Intelligence Watch Section. This section provides intelligence interface between the JIC and LF operations center. Intelligence watch sections, consisting of one Marine officer and one Marine SNCO, will be provided for duty in the LFOC watch section, if required.

(n) Additional JIC Intelligence Sources. The JIC must be cognizant of and receive input from numerous sources. The following are particularly important:

1 **EW Module.** The flagship EW module provides ESM to the tactical action officer (TAO) in the ship's CIC. The JIC operations officer must ensure ESM is also provided to the J/SSES and to the JWO.

2 **CIC.** The flagship CIC derives intelligence from the Navy tactical data system (NTDS) and organic sensors. The JIC operations officer must ensure that a viable communication link exists

between the CIC and JIC. The JWO will ensure that the CICWO/TAO receive periodic updates on intelligence information vital to the operation.

3 **SCAMP.** SCAMP conducts remote surveillance operations and provides enemy movement reports to the JIC. If a SCAMP unit is embarked, its location within the task force is a function of available deck space and ship's antennas to support a battlefield area surveillance system van.

4 **Aerial Observer Representative.** The aerial observer representative is a member of the LF who ensures that intelligence gleaned from inflight reports over the aerial observer radio net are disseminated to the JIC and TIC. The aerial observer representative normally is in the SACC.

5 **Reconnaissance Representative.** The reconnaissance representative provides intelligence collected by reconnaissance teams ashore and passed via the LF Recon Net, which terminates in the JIC. He also assists the collections and requirements section in making recommendations to the N-3/G-3 for employment of reconnaissance teams to best satisfy EEI.

6 **Special Warfare Group (SPECWARGRU) Representative.** The SPECWARGRU representative provides surf observations, advance force and beach surveillance information collected by SPECWARGRU teams ashore passed via the Navy SEAL Command Net of LF Recon Net.

7 **Other.** The JIC may receive information from other sources including the flag plot module, LF operations, ship's bridge, ship's signal bridge, and other adjacent and subordinate task force elements.

(3) Training and Orientation. To ensure the most effective use of amphibious flagship intelligence capabilities, designated JIC personnel should be provided instruction and hands-on experience with the various support systems available. This instruction and orientation should be conducted as often and as early as possible. Intelligence personnel from both CATF and CLF staffs should conduct training visits to the amphibious flagship whenever the opportunity arises. Prior to operations and before the staffs embark, key personnel should conduct training and systems preparation aboard the designated flagship.

(4) Functions. The JIC provides intelligence support that includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) Determines and consolidates intelligence requirements for the ATF as a whole.

(b) Prepares the intelligence annex and/or operational tasking INTEL messages.

(c) Collects and evaluates information, production, and dissemination of derived intelligence required for the planning and conduct of amphibious operation or exercises.

(d) Prepares an integrated joint collection plan and/or worksheet.

(e) Coordinates and processes collection requests to higher and supporting activities.

(f) Manages organic collection assets and activities.

(g) Prepares and updates intelligence plans, estimates, summaries, target and other special studies, situation maps, and list of targets.

(h) Acquires, distributes, and consolidates MC&G products, photos, and pertinent directives. Planning considerations should include economy of storage and avoidance of duplication.

(i) Prepares joint intelligence briefings, joint analysis of information and imagery products, and storage and retrieval of information.

(j) Provides target intelligence support to the TIC.

(k) Formulates and implements CI measures.

(l) Establishes liaison with higher, adjacent, and supporting intelligence activities.

(m) Integrates cryptologic support to amphibious warfare into the overall intelligence effort.

(n) Formulates and implements SIGSEC measures.

(5) Initial JIC Planning. Once a decision to establish a JIC is made, the N-2, G-2 and the flagship's intelligence officer, if available, will have an initial planning meeting. Information to be exchanged during this meeting should include, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) Mutual staff requirements (e.g., scenario, estimates, etc.).

(b) Physical location of JIC ashore, prior to embarkation.

(c) Flagship type, physical layout of working spaces and available support systems.

(d) JIC organization requirements.

(e) Requirements for maps, photos, directives, and other materials and documents, to include duplicates of documents required by the CLF after debarkation.

(f) Times/dates/locations for follow-on conferences and workshops.

1 **Subsequent Planning Meetings.** The following issues, at a minimum, should be addressed at subsequent JIC planning meetings:

a Numbers, rank, source, MOS/NEC/DESIG and reporting and detachment dates of JIC personnel. The assignment of personnel to critical billets should be made as soon as possible. This will allow personnel time to familiarize themselves with their responsibilities and duties and provides single points of contact for functional areas.

b JIC organizational structure, to include manning and functions of each section, as well as establishment of a watch schedule and assignment of functions and tasks by watch billet.

c Communication requirements, including dedicated intelligence nets, dissemination and routing requirements, address indicator groups, and DSSCS address groups.

d Milestones and deadlines, including specific designation of responsibilities for attaining each JIC requirement and goal. The milestones should address, at a minimum, the planning responsibilities of CATF and CLF as set forth in paragraphs 601 and 602 of LFM-01, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.*

e Mutual intelligence requirements, such as EEI, TENCAP, hydrographic data, imagery, etc.

f Physical, electrical, and communications requirements of MAGTF intelligence support systems.

g Administrative and logistics requirements, such as TAD orders, billeting, messing, etc.

2 **Personnel Augmentation.** All possible sources of personnel augmentation for operations should be explored. If Navy or Marine Corps personnel external to the ATF are required, it is essential that requests be initiated as early as possible.

(6) JIC Operations. JIC operations progressively expand from initial coordination and planning conferences and working groups to a fully manned and functioning JIC. Prior to embarkation, and if geographically feasible, a mutually acceptable location for a JIC should be designated. The following actions should be undertaken:

(a) Collection Planning. A joint collection plan or worksheet should be prepared at the outset of JIC operations to meet intelligence requirements. CATF, CLF, and external collection assets should be employed with the goal of producing an integrated intelligence collection plan.

(b) Signals Intelligence Support. The N-2 and G-2 coordinate to be followed by J/SSES personnel to provide special intelligence support to embarked commanders. When a cryptologic direct support element is embarked aboard the flagship, the N-2 is responsible for its establishment and functioning within the J/SSES. (See par. 8003c(3)(k).)

(c) MC&G Support. The N-2 and G-2 ensure that required DMA combat support center (DMACSC) support is activated, to include LF contingency map packages, in accordance with applicable fleet/force directives.

(d) Counterintelligence. CI support for the ATF is normally planned and provided by the G-2, with concurrence of the N-2.

(e) Target Intelligence. The JIC shall be responsible for providing current intelligence concerning targets or potential targets to the TIC for inclusion in the ATF target list. The N-2 and G-2 should be guided in the execution of their target intelligence responsibilities by NWP 22-2, *Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations.*

(f) Weather and Astronomical/Climatological Data. The flagship meteorological section provides current weather forecasts and information to all elements of the ATF. Prior to the commencement of an operation, the JIC tasks**the meteorological section with providing climatological and astronomical data for the intended area of operations in the form of regular, periodic forecasts, to include aviation-related weather data.

(g) OPSEC. Although this is a N-3/G-3 function, the JIC provides key inputs to OPSEC planners. Examples of support include SIGSEC monitoring, satellite vulnerability reports, and safe window intelligence reports.

(h) Systems Support. The flagship's intelligence officer, in close coordination with the N-2 and G-2, is responsible for intelligence support systems acquisition, installation, and operation.

(7) Intelligence Communications Requirements. Reliable, timely and secure communications means are essential to support intelligence operations. Dedicated intelligence nets must be established early to support time-sensitive, reporting requirements. Communications requirements must be identified early to the respective N-5/G-6 (CEO). Requirements must reflect the needs of both the JIC and the SSES.

(8) Photographic Intelligence Requirements. Though normally under the flagship intelligence officer's cognizance, the flagship photo lab is not dedicated to intelligence support. Early identification of requirements is essential to ensure sufficient quantities of material and supplies are available to support CATF and CLF intelligence and Public Affairs Office requirements.

(9) Phasing Ashore and Disestablishment of the JIC. A critical point in JIC operations occurs when elements of the LF intelligence staff and SRIG transfer ashore and begin to establish a CIC. It is important that the JIC continue to operate during this period to ensure that crucial intelligence is processed and disseminated appropriately. To accomplish this, representatives from the G-2 should remain in the JIC to provide adequate ground intelligence support. They will transfer ashore when the CIC becomes fully operational. Once the CLF assumes control ashore or the operation is terminated, the JIC will be disestablished and the N-2 and G-2 sections will function independently. However, it is important that the two intelligence centers continue to mutually support each other through close coordination and the exchange of essential intelligence/information. The shipboard intelligence center must remain ready in the event of a withdrawal or follow-on amphibious operations.

d. Rehearsal Phase

(1) Evaluation of the Intelligence Structure. A major opportunity exists in the rehearsal phase for the intelligence officer and SRIG commander to test the intelligence system that is planned for the operation. Whenever possible, all agencies and functions of the intelligence effort should be employed during the rehearsal. This includes, but is not limited to, intelligence-dedicated communications, ADP systems, agencies such as the S/EWCC, SARC, and collection agencies. Any aspect of the intelligence system which fails to perform as planned must be corrected. The planned corrections must be assessed to determine their impact on other aspects of the intelligence system as well. By conducting a realistic rehearsal, the intelligence staff may identify additional intelligence requirements previously overlooked.

If conditions in the rehearsal phase do not permit a complete test of the intelligence system, a partial evaluation should be conducted to the maximum extent possible. The intelligence organization must rely on scripted or other internally generated data to exercise as much of the intelligence system as conditions will permit. To the extent possible, the rehearsal should address the internal functioning of the intelligence system, as well as dissemination of the finished intelligence.

(2) Security Considerations. The prime consideration for MAGTF security during the rehearsal phase is to avoid compromise of the actual operational objectives of the command. This goal can often conflict with the need for realism in rehearsal. Therefore, it is important for the OPSEC to evaluate carefully all aspects of the rehearsal phase from an OPSEC viewpoint.

e. Movement Phase

(1) Employment of Organic Assets. Generally speaking, the movement phase offers the first opportunity to use MAGTF organic intelligence collection assets. At this point, organic and other fleet collection assets may begin to answer information requirements that national and theater assets were unable to fill. Other, newer, information requirements will also be identified and added to the collection plan. As the use of organic collection assets begins, it is important to remember that national and theater agencies may still be tasked to satisfy these requirements. In many cases, continued use of national and theater assets will preclude compromising friendly information requirements or interests, while preserving organic assets for those requirements that national and theater assets remain unable to satisfy.

(2) Security Considerations. Most of the security considerations undertaken in the movement phase are the responsibility of the ATF commander. There are certain areas, however, where the MAGTF commander can have an impact. One critical area is the observance of EMCON and the desire to test MAGTF electronic equipment. Adherence to the electronic security plan must take precedence over such testing. Command attention to this matter is critical.

f. Assault Phase

(1) Intelligence/Information Shift. The assault phase is characterized by a gradual but distinct shift in the flow of intelligence and information. Earlier in the operation, intelligence flowed downward; however, once the assault commences, this flow becomes a two way effort. While some intelligence still comes in from external agencies, more and more data is collected by organic fleet and MAGTF assets, and greater effort is expended in processing this information and disseminating it to the required consumers. A point is reached when internally produced intelligence becomes more valuable than that provided by external agencies. This situation is simply the result of access and timeliness. Careful consideration must be given at this time to prioritization of intelligence collection activities. Despite the MAGTF commander's desire for information from the assault forces, that information should most appropriately come from the forces in contact, and generally not through MAGTF collection assets. The MAGTF intelligence officer must continue to focus his efforts on that information needed to support the MAGTF intelligence mission. As the assault develops, this focus should generally be on enemy forces reinforcing those already in contact.

(2) Phasing the Intelligence Structure Ashore. Displacement of the actual intelligence production effort must generally await displacement of the CE ashore. In the early phase of the assault, it may be profitable to send liaison parties ashore, but the bulk of the intelligence production effort must remain where it can best satisfy the commanders continuing intelligence requirements. As the CE shifts ashore, the intelligence structure must be capable of conducting split operations, until such time as the staff is fully functioning ashore. Once the MAGTF intelligence structure is established ashore, the JIC is established. Provision must be made to ensure continued communications and liaison with embarked naval intelligence elements as required.

Part III. MAGTF Intelligence Planning

Chapter 9

Intelligence Estimate

9001. General

Military intelligence is an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of subsequent operations. Coherent decisions or plans cannot be made without a clear, brief, and concise estimate of the area of operations and the enemy's capabilities and courses of action. The form of the estimate, written or oral, will depend on the time available and type of MAGTF.

9002. Purpose

The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to assist the commander in preparing his estimate of the situation.

Secondary functions of the intelligence estimate include providing an early means to disseminate intelligence to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units and determining EEI/OIR.

9003. Relationship to Commander's Estimate and Staff Planning

The sequence of command and staff action provides for a direct relationship between the intelligence estimate and the commanders estimate of the situation. (See fig. 9-1.) This relationship exists in both time and content.

The planning of the entire staff hinges on the timely preparation and dissemination of the intelligence estimate. Although assigned as an appendix to the intelligence annex, the intelligence estimate must be published immediately on completion rather than waiting for the production of the remaining appendixes of the annex.

Time constraints will determine the form and content of the intelligence estimate, particularly in planning and executing special operations. The ability of the intelligence officer to anticipate potential contingencies and to prepare accordingly will enhance his ability to prepare an intelligence estimate rapidly on the receipt of a mission.

9004. Distribution

The entire intelligence estimate should be distributed to all staff sections. This keeps the other staff sections properly informed and enables them to understand the analytical judgements made by the intelligence officer.

The entire intelligence estimate (received by subordinate units) is not normally included in Annex B, *Intelligence*. The intelligence annex will contain information on the enemy situation and capabilities extracted from the intelligence estimate.



Figure 9-1. Relationship of Intelligence Estimate and Commander's Estimate.

9005. Discussion of the Intelligence Estimate

The following is a detailed discussion of the contents of each of the paragraphs of the intelligence estimate format included as appendix C. A formal written estimate as detailed here will probably be prepared at the MEB or MEF level.

a. Heading. The heading and ending tell when and where the estimate was prepared, its classification, and its author. The heading includes the headquarters in which the estimate is prepared, the name of the place or FPO number where the headquarters is located, and a date/time issue with the name of the month spelled completely. The hour might not be included in this date/time issue if the termination of the estimating process cannot be determined precisely or is considered unimportant. However, the date is always important because it indicates to the reader the day the estimating process ceased.

b. Title. The heading is followed by the title, INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. All of the maps necessary for an understanding of the situation described in the estimate should be listed. Enough information about each map should be included to properly identify it, including the scale of each map. The number and designations of pertinent imagery, special charts, etc., used in the estimating process and needed for a complete understanding of the estimate are also included.

c. Mission. (Paragraph 1) The mission is stated concisely. The mission statement should relate to the principal purpose of the intelligence estimate. The purpose is to determine the enemy capabilities which are used by the commander in his estimate of the situation. If the mission involves the accomplishment of several tasks, then all tasks are stated. If priorities have been assigned, they are indicated. The reason, or reasons, for assignment of the mission to the command is indicated, if known.

d. Area of Operations. (Paragraph 2) The intelligence officer (G-2) states conditions which exist and indicates the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. The enemy situation is discussed under four main subheadings: Characteristics of the Area of Operations; Enemy Military Situation; Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation; and Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. The G-2 considers the amount of information available to him and whether the factor under consideration is important enough to the commander to require detailed treatment. The degree of detail included in the intelligence estimate will depend on the operating situation in which it is written.

Paragraph 2 should include all or most of the data used later in the analysis of enemy capabilities. A full list of pertinent facts must be made in order that a solution to the problem may be developed. Sufficient data must be presented to indicate all general capabilities of the enemy that will affect our mission. However, if it is obvious that these same facts must be repeated in detail in the paragraph which follows and if exclusion of these facts does not eliminate certain capabilities, then it is permissible to place such facts in the analysis rather than in the situation paragraph.

(1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. (Paragraph 2a) Determining what characteristics will be included in the estimate is based on the purpose of the estimate. The degree to which the characteristic will affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission may also be included. However, if the only purpose of the estimate is to derive enemy capabilities, characteristics that will have no effect are omitted or, if listed, are followed by a short negative statement such as, "Hydrography. No effect on enemy capabilities or the friendly mission." Normally, since dissemination of the estimate is of relative importance, only those characteristics which will affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission are listed or discussed. The determination of what characteristics to include in the estimate will depend also on whether they exist in the area of operations. If any characteristic is not applicable or does not exist in the situation, it should be followed by a short statement, such as, "not applicable." Each significant characteristic in the area of operations should be described as it is expected to exist during the conduct of the operations required by the mission. Included should be the effects of each characteristic on possible enemy operations and on the mission of friendly command.

If appropriate, a discussion of the effects of these characteristics (e.g., mountainous terrain) upon employment of nuclear and chemical weapons will be included. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area on possible enemy operations normally includes consideration of the effects on the enemy's ability to attack, defend, and withdraw. It may also include consideration of other possible operations and on his possible employment of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces.

The extent of the discussion of the effects of each characteristic on the friendly mission is limited by the nature of the mission. Thus, when the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include the effects of the characteristics on the friendly defense. Lengthy discussion should be avoided, if possible. Maximum use should be made of maps, charts, graphics, and pictorial presentations.

Brevity often can be attained when finalizing the estimate by eliminating duplication of analyses. Frequently, an extensive analysis in paragraph 2 of the estimate is repeated in paragraph 4, "Analysis of Enemy Capabilities." One of the two can be a brief of the other.

(a) Military Geography. (Paragraph 2a[1]) Terrain features or other factors of military geography in the area of operations normally will affect the accomplishment of the mission; therefore, the intelligence estimate should describe them. If this portion of the intelligence estimate is bulky, it may be treated separately and attached as an appendix. When other staff members require geographic studies of the friendly territory, the intelligence officer should

prepare or obtain them. These are presented to the staff in a form other than the intelligence estimate of the situation, because it is a study of the enemy and not of friendly territory and because its form is not suitable for terrain studies. The terrain study which is prepared by the engineer officer, is an important document for the intelligence officer in writing paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate.

1 **Topography.** (Paragraph 2a[1][a]) When discussing topography, include all possible information concerning the military characteristics of the area such as key terrain features, obstacles, avenues of approach, rivers, streams, lakes, and any other natural or manmade features which may have an effect on military operations within the area. If considered applicable, the effects on the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons should be mentioned.

2 **Hydrography.** (Paragraph 2a[1][b]) Hydrography is an important subject in any contemplated amphibious operation. The following items are discussed in this subparagraph: general relief of beaches, beach approaches and surf conditions, tides and currents, navigational aids, identifying features, channels, water depths, rocks and shoals, obstacles (both natural and manmade), anchorages, beach trafficability, compartmentation, effects on employment of supporting arms and logistics, and coastline and contiguous islands.

3 **Climate and Weather.** (Paragraph 2a[1][c]) Climate and weather are described as to how they affect enemy capabilities and friendly courses of action. Complete coverage is given to temperature, precipitation, icing conditions, cloud cover, visibility, winds, storms, daylight and darkness, and phases of the moon. If considered applicable, the effects on the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons should be mentioned.

Weather can be defined as the conditions of the atmosphere at a given time for a given place or region. A portion of the estimate should discuss the weather's effect on the enemy's capabilities. When day-to-day intelligence estimates are being prepared, it fits readily into the enemy's situation paragraph of the estimate. If the intelligence estimate is for a single operation, weather during the period of that mission only need be summarized. For intelligence estimates covering a general situation over a longer period of time, a long-range forecast based on a general climatology study of the enemy area for the past years may be used.

Climate is defined as the statistical collection of individual conditions of weather and climatic intelligence as the scientific analysis of climate for determining its useful application to intelligence. This intelligence is not factual in the same sense as in a weather forecast. It is general and broad in scope and is not as objectively applied. Were climatic intelligence to be included in the body of the intelligence estimate, it would go in the "Enemy Situation" paragraph. However, because of its general and bulky nature, its integration into the intelligence estimate normally requires more space than should be allotted to it. The significance of the climatic intelligence element usually does not warrant greater consideration than what other factors are receiving. If this should occur, then it would be better to place climatic intelligence as an appendix of the intelligence estimate.

No weather officer is assigned to the intelligence staff, so the intelligence estimator must go to the ATF or air weather service for this information. Light conditions imposed by twilight and moonlight, although not an integral part of the weather, are so closely allied that they are considered under weather in intelligence estimates and terrain studies.

Generally, tables are included to indicate times for the beginning and ending of nautical twilight, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, and the phases of the moon. The data can be prepared by a meteorologist or extracted from a publication such as The Nautical Almanac, published annually by the United States Naval Observatory. Nautical twilight is most frequently used for military purposes and is often expressed as the beginning of morning nautical twilight and the ending of evening nautical twilight. These conditions are defined as the time when the sun's position is 12 degrees below the horizon. Under ideal conditions, nautical twilight provides enough illumination to carry on most ground movement. Visibility is limited to 400 meters or less. Detailed operations such as repair work or bomb loading require artificial light. Civil twilight is sometimes used for military reference. Civil twilight begins in the morning and ends in the evening when the sun is 6 degrees below the horizon. Under ideal conditions, civil twilight affords sufficient light to carry on normal day activities. Solar illumination allows for efficient observed artillery fire or daylight bombing techniques.

(b) Transportation. (Paragraph 2a[2]) All forms of civil transportation are described in the estimate. These include roads, railways, airways, subways, and inland waterways. The following are treated as necessary: capacities, surface conditions, bridges, amount and condition of rolling stock, motor and air transport, barges, freighters, and other inland waterways craft. Vulnerabilities are discussed in as much detail as possible.

(c) Telecommunications. (Paragraph 2a[3]) Telecommunications are described from the aspect of the availability and condition of existing telecommunication systems and equipment, both military and civil. Critical shortages and sensitive bottlenecks are indicated.

(d) Politics. (Paragraph 2a[4]) The political as well as the economic, sociological, scientific, and technical topics which follow are discussed if they have a bearing on enemy capabilities or on the friendly mission. Generally speaking, information on these subjects is provided by higher authority and only incidentally provided by the SRIG intelligence agencies. The discussion of the political situation should include a description of the political situation and the political organization of the area, the extent of civil and military control of the region, and the amenability of the civilian population to political control, the political organizations, and the key political figures.

(e) Economics. (Paragraph 2a[5]) Economics of the area are included only to the extent demanded by the operations to be conducted. Certain types of information will be invaluable to the command with regard to resources and facilities in the area available to the enemy or which may be available to friendly forces when occupying or passing through the area. Also indicated is the lack of any specific economic resources which may be necessary for conduct of the operation.

(f) Sociology. (Paragraph 2a[6]) The sociology factor deals with the people of the area, their psychology, social customs, characteristics, religions, minority or dissident groups, allegiance to either the enemy or friendly forces, and other items which may indicate military government requirements, the necessity for troop indoctrination, etc.

(g) Science and Technology. (Paragraph 2a[7]) Scientific and technical topics are discussed to provide a basis for comparison of weapons and equipment as well as the possibility of the enemy's employment of new weapons and equipment and techniques during the course of the operations.

(2) Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air Services). (Paragraph 2b) The enemy's military and paramilitary forces, facilities, and equipment with indications of their effect on enemy capabilities and the friendly mission are described in this subparagraph.

(a) Strength. (Paragraph 2b[1]) Enemy strength in this subparagraph is categorized as committed forces and reinforcements. The purpose of the categorization is to assist in developing enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities for use by the command and staff in selecting courses of action.

1 **Committed Forces.** (Paragraph 2b[1][a]) Includes artillery and other units in position to support the committed forces with fire, chemical, and biological agents. Units which can deliver nuclear fires, chemical agents, etc., as appropriate, are specified. Omit if there are no committed forces. Committed forces are those enemy ground, air, and/or naval units (including guerrillas, if appropriate), together with their supporting ground fire units, which are reasonably certain of being employed within a definite area regardless of the specific friendly course of action that may be implemented. Disposition, location, echelon of control, or other factors at the time of the estimate are considered in determining which enemy forces are committed forces. The major subordinate units of the comparable enemy commander committed against our force are usually considered as committed forces. The reserves of the enemy command, comparable to those of the estimator's command, committed against our force and the reserves of higher enemy commanders are usually considered as reinforcements. If there is doubt as to whether a unit should be considered as committed for enforcement, then it is considered as a reinforcement. This attributes to the enemy the maximum capability to reinforce his forces that can oppose a given friendly course of action.

2 **Reinforcements.** (Paragraph 2b[1][b]) Include designation and location. Omit if there are no reinforcements. Reinforcements are those enemy forces which may or may not be employed against us depending on our choice of a specific course of action and enemy plans. To be considered as reinforcements, the enemy forces must also be capable of being employed against us at various times and places, subject to time and distance considerations, in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. Disposition, location, echelon of control, or other factors considered at the time of the estimate are considered in determining which enemy forces are considered as reinforcements.

(b) Composition. (Paragraph 2b[2]) In the discussion of the composition of the enemy forces, only a summary of the enemy OOB is given. Include here the identification, when known, of all enemy units which may affect the enemy's capabilities and the accomplishments of the friendly mission.

(c) Location and Disposition. (Paragraph 2b[3]) The location and disposition of the enemy's forces, facilities, and logistics installations can best be shown on a map or overlay with a brief written description of those matters not subject to visual portrayal. As a matter of technique for clarity and ease of examination, the overlay should have on it all pertinent OOB information and enemy disposition information necessary for the construction of enemy capabilities.

Sound knowledge as to the disposition of relatively strong and weak units might be the basis for decisions affecting the employment of our own offensive and defensive forces. Again, the knowledge might indicate enemy capabilities for future moves. For example, the movement into a ground battle area of highly efficient ground support units, while another sector of the front was receiving less well-trained units of the same

category, might indicate enemy plans for an offensive in the first area. Of particular importance is the discussion in the following paragraphs of the enemy's logistics situation and the description of his air and naval facilities. They are essential factors in the consideration of the enemy's ability to maintain his ground forces, aircraft, and naval forces. The availability of air facilities will control the disposition of his air forces and the availability of naval facilities will determine the capability of supporting his naval forces.

(d) Movements and Activities. (Paragraph 2b[4]) The factor of movements and activities should include a description of all significant enemy movements which may affect the friendly mission and enemy capabilities of those activities which may give some clue to the relative priority of adoption of enemy capabilities.

(e) Availability of Information. (Paragraph 2b[5])

(f) Logistics. (Paragraph 2b[6]) The logistics portion of the intelligence estimate should treat all elements of the enemy's logistics system—transportation, storage, distribution, levels of supply, critical shortages, and bottlenecks. This paragraph should also include a discussion of the enemy air and naval facilities such as fuel storage, repair facilities, runways, port facilities, etc., as they affect the enemy capabilities.

(g) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. (Paragraph 2b[7]) In describing the operational capability to launch missiles, mention should be made of the numbers and types of missiles; guidance systems; ranges; types of warheads; type of launching sites (e.g., if fixed, whether hardened or not); mobility, rate of fire, and readiness time for mobile launchers; and for other than land launch, whether naval surface, submarine, or air launch is a capability. If their kill effectiveness has been estimated, it should be included.

(h) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. (Paragraph 2b[8]) Serviceability and operational rates of aircraft are expressed in terms of sorties per type of aircraft per stated period of time (e.g., 500 fighter-bomber sorties per day in the initial period or 300 medium bomber sorties per day for an indefinite period). The serviceability rate is the percentage of assigned aircraft that the enemy is capable of maintaining in operation for a specific period of time. Information which leads to estimates on the serviceability factor may come from a number of different sources. Indications may be had from detailed study of photographs of enemy airfields, with attention paid to partially disassembled aircraft, indications of movement on the ground of aircraft from day to day, or signs that maintenance is being performed. Valuable information may be derived from questioning prisoners of war from the enemy air units. Reports dealing with enemy reaction to missions by our forces against critical enemy targets may indicate the approximate number of defenders available for a maximum strength interception. Friendly radar may range into enemy territory and give valuable information as to strength and activity at airfields within their coverage. If information is not available from such sources, the intelligence officer may use the experience of friendly units with aircraft of generally similar types for an analysis of enemy air units.

(i) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. (Paragraph 2b[9]) In describing the operational capabilities of combatant vessels, such items should be discussed as vessel by type, modernness or obsolescence, armament, fire control systems, armor, speeds and cruising radii, underway replenishment systems, number of vessels on station, aircraft warning and control systems, naval aviation cover or protection, and state of training and morale of crews.

(j) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. (Paragraph2b[10]) The discussion in this subparagraph should be on the technical

aspects of weapons, weapon systems, and equipment which are different from those of the friendly forces. Superiority and inferiority of those characteristics should be clearly stated.

(k) Electronics Intelligence. (Paragraph 2b[11]) This paragraph should include a discussion of the enemy's electronic equipment counterelectronic potentials, concentrating on the enemy's electronic equipment and his methods of employment of counterelectronic measures.

(l) Nuclear and CBR Weapons. (Paragraph 2b[12]) Nuclear and chemical weapons should be dealt with according to type, yield, numbers, method of delivery, and enemy doctrine concerning their use.

(m) Air Defense. (Paragraph 2b[13]) This important topic may fit into "Composition" or "Location and Disposition" subparagraphs or, if excessively detailed, set forth as a separate annex. It is critically important to a commander's offensive air operations and should include complete tabulation of fighter-interceptor units, SAMs, launching sites, control radars, antiaircraft guns, and automatic weapons. If the intelligence staff does not include a radar specialist, an estimate of the early warning and control radars may be made by the communication staff, but should always be included as a part of the intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate should reveal the complete enemy situation affecting the mission and should not have to refer to appendixes which are not a part of the intelligence estimate, nor refer to other separate staff estimates.

(n) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. (Paragraph 2b[14]) The discussion of significant strengths and weaknesses should provide the material which may disclose specific enemy vulnerabilities. It should also describe any other peculiarities of the enemy or of the enemy situation which are not properly presented elsewhere in the intelligence estimate and which may influence the friendly commander's choice of a course of action. It should include a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy situation with respect to personnel, units, state of training, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and personalities.

Information as to the relative effectiveness of enemy combat units is of critical importance to a commander. It is particularly significant in a large area of operations where enemy units vary widely in their efficiency. There is no established method for deriving the relative efficiency factor. In circumstances where it is desirable to estimate enemy effectiveness and where a sufficient quantity of intelligence information is available, any method which results in comparing on a simple scale the enemy units being considered may be used. For example, knowledge of the number of assigned enemy aircraft in commission from day-to-day is desirable because the availability figure, rather than the table of organization figure, is highly significant in estimating the enemy's air capabilities.

(o) Recent and Present Significant Activities. (Paragraph 2b[15]) Listed here are selected items of information that will be used to determine relative probability of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy vulnerabilities. Enemy failures to take expected actions are listed as well as positive information.

(3) Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situations (Paragraph 2c)

(a) Guerrilla. (Paragraph 2c[1]) In considering the enemy's conventional and psychological warfare situations, the first item to be treated is the enemy's experience in and ability to organize and conduct guerrilla warfare against the friendly forces and in friendly areas or areas newly seized from the enemy. This will include details concerning his methods of organization, control,

and support of guerrilla forces. Information concerning the likelihood of the native population's participation in the enemy's guerrilla movement and a discussion of the areas most sensitive to guerrilla warfare should also be included.

(b) Psychological. (Paragraph 2c[2]) The discussion of psychological warfare should deal with enemy methods and facilities for the conduct of propaganda, the susceptibility of the population of the target areas, and the major or main line of the enemy's psychological warfare effort.

(c) Subversion. (Paragraph 2c[3]) The treatment of the enemy's subversive warfare effort should include a study of the susceptibility of the native population to subversion, likely targets among civilian as well as military personnel, subversive methods employed by the enemy, and the enemy's previous successes and failures.

(d) Sabotage. (Paragraph 2c[4]) The description of the enemy's sabotage effort should include information on his methods, targets, sensitive targets in the area of operations, and his successes and failures.

(4) Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. (Paragraph 2d) This discussion should present and treat information regarding the enemy's intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Included should be information regarding the enemy's efforts to negate, degrade, or mislead friendly intelligence, as well as information concerning the enemy's activities to collect intelligence-type information about friendly personnel, installations, equipment, plans, and operations.

e. Enemy Capabilities. (Paragraph 3) This paragraph is the first of three in the intelligence estimate concerned with enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are also considered in the commander's estimate and in the intelligence annex. Enemy capabilities are defined in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces.

(1) Courses of Action. It is important to note the distinction between general courses of action (e.g., attack, defense, withdrawal) and particular courses of action. In many situations, an intelligence estimate is prepared on the basis of an assumption that the enemy will attack. Hence, in such situations, the general course of action (attack) is assumed. The task is to enumerate the particular courses of action under the category of *attack*.

(a) Purpose. The primary and ultimate purpose of determining and stating enemy capabilities is to inform the commander what the enemy is physically capable of doing which will affect the accomplishment of our mission.

(b) Knowledge. Knowledge of a possible enemy course of action which will aid the accomplishment of the friendly mission may prepare the commander to take advantage of a weakness developing in the enemy situation. Such knowledge will enable him to save men, time, and material. He also may gain a more favorable position from which to continue action against the enemy. The intelligence officer must be alert to situations in which enemy capabilities favorable to friendly forces might have an important bearing on the action.

(2) Statement of Capabilities. In stating enemy capabilities, the following considerations are applicable:

(a) Any set of enemy capabilities must be focused on our own mission and must present every significant line of enemy action which will produce a significant effect on the accomplishment of our mission.

(b) The enumeration of enemy capabilities is not intended as an end in itself. Instead, this enumeration serves as a starting point and an integral part of a planning process which enables the commander to weigh the result of each of his own possible future courses of action against each of the enemy's in order to determine which of his own lines of action is most promising. Therefore, in the intelligence estimate, enemy capabilities should be expressed in terms of what the enemy is capable of doing without considering action on our part to prevent or hinder the execution of that capability. In the intelligence estimate, the enemy capabilities are developed without considering our military opposition, whereas in the commander's estimate, the effect of that opposition to these capabilities is considered.

(c) A statement of enemy capabilities should be objective. The human tendency to err should not be compounded by either undue timidity or recklessness, prejudices or preconceived notions, and least of all by the capability of friendly forces in similar circumstances.

(d) The statements of capabilities should be concise and to the point with no discussions of order of battle, doctrine, tactics, or strategy. Each capability, however, must contain as much pertinent information as is necessary to answer four questions:

1 **What?** What is the enemy capability that will affect the friendly mission? If the estimate is based on the assumption that the enemy will attack them, each particular course of action under the *attack* category must be stated as the *what*.

2 **Where?** In the case of ground forces, if the action is of an extended or continuous nature, indicate routes to probable objectives. In the case of air and naval forces, indicate areas which could be brought under attack.

3 **In What Strength?** In the case of ground forces, if the action is of an extended or continuous nature, indicate strengths or reinforcements at key intermediate stages. For air forces, initial strike and monthly sustained sortie rates by type of aircraft should be given. In all cases, maximum forces should be shown.

4 **When?** When can the enemy execute this capability? The earliest time the enemy can initiate each capability is computed. Time calculations for the conduct of the operations are considered in the most favorable light from the enemy's point of view, and are computed so as to determine the earliest time by which the given capability or parts thereof can be effected.

(4) **Determination of Capabilities.** In determining the initial list of capabilities, the following procedure should be considered as a guide:

(a) Consider the overall enemy and strategic situation. Answer such questions as, **Is the enemy committed on other fronts?; Is this operation a part of a general strategic offensive or defensive?; Is this a critical area from the enemy standpoint?; Is this the enemy's major effort?**; and others of that nature in order to understand the significance of this area to the enemy.

(b) List all the enemy capabilities that will affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission considering the availability of enemy ground, naval, and air forces. For each separate capability, compute what, where, in what strength, and when for each component force of the capability. This

must be done in consideration of probable enemy objectives insofar as those objectives affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

(c) Eliminate from the listing the capabilities which are grossly disadvantageous, insignificant, or entirely unreasonable.

(d) Reevaluate the list and then group smaller related capabilities and supporting operations into the major capabilities indicating possible intermediate and final enemy objectives in light of the friendly mission. This reevaluation is extremely important because each enemy capability must be analyzed against each friendly course of action in the commander's estimate. Consequently, as a practical matter, the number of enemy capabilities should be limited to as few as will state adequately the enemy's combined potential against the friendly command. Further, the possibility of duplication and resulting error is greatly increased when a large number of capabilities is considered.

(e) Reword each capability until it is clear and concise but still adequately expresses the capability. Certain capabilities may be expressed in a simple sentence or two. Some of the joint capabilities may require three or more sentences to make the meaning absolutely clear. Use only enough words, phrases, and sentences to ensure that there is no doubt as to what the enemy capability is.

(f) Finally, state each separate capability as a lettered subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate. Either list the capabilities according to their relative importance in affecting the accomplishment of the friendly mission or in the relative chronological order of their initiation by the enemy.

f. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities (Enemy Courses of Action). (Paragraph 4) In this paragraph, the G-2 analyzes each capability separately. He makes the analysis in the sequence in which the enemy capabilities are listed in paragraph 3. In each analysis where appropriate, consider the effect of all factors discussed under the various subheadings of paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate on each enemy capability.

(1) **Possible courses of action** will not be eliminated with a statement of **None** or **Has no capability.** If there is nothing to discuss about a listed capability or if an analysis is not possible, it should be removed from paragraph 3. Each capability open to the enemy is worthy of complete, detailed analysis; where paragraph 3 considers broad action, paragraph 4 analyzes detail.

(2) **Time and space** should be carefully analyzed to determine the maximum enemy strength by type of forces during each period or phase and the reinforcement potential in the execution of the capability being analyzed.

(3) **The enemy** should be given the benefit of the doubt. The intelligence officer must always assume, in the absence of positive facts to the contrary, that the enemy will make the best possible tactical decisions, will conduct a maneuver in the best possible way, and will execute movements in the shortest possible time. So by assuming that the enemy will do his best prevents us from being surprised. For example, in estimating the time of a possible enemy attack, the major interest from the intelligence viewpoint is the earliest possible time of attack. If our troops can be prepared to resist an immediate attack, they certainly can be ready at a later time. Such a viewpoint requires a difference in approach by the intelligence officer and the operations officer. The intelligence officer interest lies in the enemy's capabilities, and the operations officer concerns lay with the capabilities of our own troops.

(4) Throughout this analysis, the G-2 should be alert for indications that the enemy will or will not adopt a particular capability. He

should also pay particular attention to the effect the adoption of the capability will have on the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The analysis should include a discussion of enemy vulnerabilities, that is, conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation which render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Here the G-2 considers, in addition to those factors listed in paragraph 2b(14) of app. C, such items as characteristics of the area, enemy tactical doctrine, and the G-2's own background knowledge of the enemy. The vulnerabilities considered should be actual vulnerabilities, either known or deduced.

(5) Purposes. The purposes of paragraph 4 are to—

(a) List significant known facts regarding each enemy capability.

(b) Examine those facts in order to fully understand the capability.

(c) State those facts that specifically facilitate or hinder enemy execution of the capability.

(d) Determine whether each capability listed is a major capability requiring separate listing or should be grouped with other capabilities.

(e) Determine what auxiliary capabilities should be analyzed in connection with each major capability.

(f) Determine the effect of each capability on the friendly mission.

(g) Point up evidence which would tend to indicate the relative order in which the enemy might adopt the capabilities and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of adoption. If evidence of enemy activity is not definitive enough to justify stating relative probability, the basis for probability must be the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, enemy practices, and the available evidence.

g. Conclusions. (Paragraph 5)

(1) Determination of Relative Probability of Adoption. (Paragraph 5a) The final paragraph of the intelligence estimate is the statement of the G-2's interpretation of the evaluated information which has been presented, analyzed, and integrated in paragraph 4. It contains the statement of enemy capabilities that the enemy is most likely to adopt and the enemy capabilities listed in the relative order of priority of adoption. It is, in effect, a statement of the conclusions the G-2 has reached through a comparative study of the preceding analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Since this determination of probable enemy capabilities is based on interpretation of intelligence which is indicative of future enemy action, the determination must be fully justified by the analysis and discussion of the enemy capabilities in paragraph 4 of the estimate. It is objective; it is not an attempt to guess what the enemy will do. It is an attempt to decide from available evidence what the enemy is most likely to do. If the available evidence of enemy activity is not definitive enough to justify an enemy course of action for probable adoption, the intelligence officer selects one based on the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, enemy practices, and available evidence. Conclusions reached on this basis are so indicated by the commander. If the enemy is capable of implementing two or more capabilities simultaneously, that fact should be plainly indicated. This also applies to any combination of the listed capabilities. Where possible, the five standards should be covered in stating these capabilities:

- What it is.
- Where (in what area) it can occur.
- In what strength it can be accomplished.
- When it can occur.
- From where he can carry it out.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities. The final part of the last paragraph of the estimate should list exploitable vulnerabilities. The list is, in fact, a statement of conclusions reached through comparative study of the vulnerabilities discussed in the previous paragraph. The list is confined to vulnerabilities which may be exploited by friendly forces. In determining what enemy vulnerabilities should be listed, the G-2 must necessarily give some consideration to the feasibility of exploitation by his own commander. However, the recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adopted is not within the province of the G-2, but belongs to the G-3 after careful coordination and consultation with the G-2. Therefore, in the estimate, the G-2 lists those vulnerabilities which may be needed by the commander and makes no recommendation for specific exploitation.

Chapter 10

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

10001. General

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the systematic and continuous approach to analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a specific geographic area. This approach integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain information as they relate to the mission and the specific battlefield conditions to evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. The IPB process is nothing new. It is a method of analysis that must be seen as a thought process. All or parts of it can be done by any type of unit and tailored to meet specific requirements. IPB is a visual method to express the information contained in an intelligence estimate. IPB is a cyclical process of intelligence analysis and evaluation that orients on the assigned battlefield area and the enemy forces that are expected to be operating in that area. There are five functions in the process. The first three functions of the process are *battlefield area evaluation, terrain analysis,* and *weather*. The fourth and fifth functions of the process, *threat evaluation* and *threat integration*, are accomplished through the analytical technique known as templating. A template is a graphic illustration of enemy force structure, deployment, or capabilities, normally drawn to scale. Templates enable one to visualize enemy capabilities, predict likely courses of action before the battle, and confirm or refute them during combat. They also provide a means for continuous identification and assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

10002. Battlefield Area Evaluation (1st Function)

a. When the areas of operation, influence, and interest are applied to the battlefield, attention is focused on a specific geographic area for enemy, terrain, and weather effects analysis.

(1) The area of operations represents an area in which authority and responsibility for the conduct of operations has been assigned to a commander by a senior commander and is thus defined by a boundary or geographical feature.

(2) The area of influence is that area wherein the commander is capable of engaging the enemy with forces normally under his control or in support of his operations.

(3) The area of interest is selected by the commander based on the estimate of the situation. The dimensions of this area are not constrained by the organic ability to acquire information on that area. The area of interest must extend in all directions to safeguard the command from surprise.

b. The commander must view these areas in four dimensions:

- Width.
- Depth.
- Height or airspace.
- Time.

c. After the specific areas have been defined, the intelligence personnel assemble the information and materials required to continue the IPB process.

10003. Terrain Analysis (2d Function)

a. This function focuses on the military aspects of terrain and their effects on friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate. Key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment are related to and dependent on intervisibility (the ability to see from one point to another). Obstacles and avenues of approach are related to cross-country movement (the ability to move across the terrain without the use of roads). Commanders must have all critical terrain information available to properly *see* the battlefield and use this information as a combat multiplier.

b. Commanders are generally not interested in detailed terrain data; they are more concerned with the effects of the terrain on capabilities and limitations of enemy and friendly forces. Although an outstanding product, the standard 1:50,000 scale topographic map does not contain all the information that commanders and other users need.

c. The key to rapid response to satisfy the needs of the commanders is the availability of prepared data bases. The production of rapid response products was the driving force behind the establishment of the tactical terrain analysis data base by the Defense Mapping Agency. This data base consists of selected terrain information to be exploited by terrain analysts to satisfy military requirements. This data base is limited to those natural and manmade features of tactical military significance. The tactical terrain analysis data base consists of six terrain factor overlays.

(1) Surface configuration (slope) factor overlay, which portrays the maximum slope of the surface at each point on the ground.

(2) Vegetation factor overlay, which depicts vegetation type, canopy closure, undergrowth, vegetation height, and tree spacing and stem diameter.

(3) Surface materials factor (soils) overlay, which depicts soil types, rock outcrops, permanent snow fields, and open water. Also included are depth of surface material, soil moisture, and roughness.

(4) Surface drainage factor (hydrographic) overlay, which outlines shorelines, lakes, and rivers. Annotated on each are width, depth, velocity, bottom materials, and fords.

(5) Lines of communication (transportation) factor overlay, which delineates roads, bridges, tunnels, ferries, airfields, and railroads. Data includes route classification, widths, slopes, bypasses, areas under construction, and other route information required for military operations.

(6) Obstacle factor overlay, which clearly shows those natural and artificial terrain features that hinder military movement. Depressions, escarpments, embankments, and hydrographic features are all delineated.

d. The terrain analyst supplements these data bases with field-collected data and current intelligence information, including all-source intelligence, to provide an up-to-date picture of the battlefield terrain. By combining information from one or more of the terrain factor overlays with weather data and the operational parameters of tactical equipment in light of the military aspects of the area, the terrain analyst provides the commander with an analysis of the effects of terrain and weather on contemplated operations.

(1) When terrain is analyzed as to how it supports cross-country movement, it is classified using the terms of GO, SLOW-GO, and NO-GO. GO terrain is terrain which will support

a particular size force to maneuver in accordance with its doctrine. SLOW-GO terrain will permit this maneuver with slight modification to its doctrine. NO-GO terrain will not permit a particular size force to maneuver without extreme modification to its doctrine. When analyzing terrain to classify it as GO, SLOW-GO, or NO-GO, it is important to consider the size and type force that is expected to maneuver through it. For example, it you are concerned about what a light infantry platoon can maneuver through, you may classify the same terrain differently than you would if you were analyzing that terrain and how it would support a mechanized company's maneuver.

(2) This analysis should identify what effect the environment has on likely friendly and enemy courses of action and should provide the commander the necessary focus to make the best use of the terrain in the battlefield area.

e. Mobility Corridors and Avenues of Approach

(1) The ability to maneuver is analyzed in terms of mobility corridors and avenues of approach. A mobility corridor is a relatively open area through which a maneuver unit can move. According to their doctrine, mobility corridors are drawn on the map as arrows. These corridors will generally follow the direction of roads and trails. They can usually be traveled in either direction. However, in some cases, mobility corridors can only be traveled in one direction (e.g., down hill). These are just guides. Common sense and the tactical situation must also be taken into consideration. Avenues of approach are determined by combining two or more mobility corridors, provided that the corridors are close enough. The maximum distances between mobility corridors, in order for them to be included in an avenue of approach, is dependent on the tactical situation.

(2) Once avenues of approach are drawn on the map, mobility corridors connecting them within the prescribed distances are likewise combined for crossover corridors. Avenues of approach are a function of terrain and direction of attack or counterattack. Some NO-GO or SLOW-GO terrain may be present in an avenue between mobility corridors, but no attempt should be made to extend avenues through terrain with no mobility corridors.

10004. Weather Analysis (3d Function)

a. Although commanders have virtually no control over weather, they can take advantage of it or minimize its effects through planning.

b. During the weather analysis step, we analyze the weather in detail to determine how it affects friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate.

c. Because the weather has a tremendous effect on terrain, terrain and weather analysis are closely integrated. In fact, terrain and weather are inseparable factors of tactical intelligence. Weather in intelligence must be considered when the commander develops his courses of action. The types and amounts of weather support needed for a particular mission are situational depending on the type of mission, the types of forces involved, the terrain, and the enemy.

d. As in terrain analysis, graphics play a major role in analyzing the effects of weather on combat operations. Through weather effects overlays, weather data is converted to graphic displays. Overlays are particularly convenient for integrating weather effects with terrain analysis. The development of weather graphics allows for the visual integration of weather and its effect on mobility and intervisibility with the terrain and threat data bases.

10005. Threat Evaluation (4th Function)

a. Threat evaluation consists of a detailed study of threat forces—their composition and organization, tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, and supporting battlefield functional systems. Here the intelligence section determines threat capabilities and how the threat operates relative to doctrine and training or how he would fight if not restricted by weather and terrain.

b. The primary product of the threat evaluation are doctrinal templates. Doctrinal templates depict enemy doctrinal deployment for various types of operations without the constraints imposed by weather and terrain.

c. Once established, doctrinal template files can be reproduced and distributed to subordinate intelligence sections. If changes to the tables of organization and equipment or doctrine are identified, the templates must be updated to incorporate the changes.

10006. Threat Integration (5th Function)

Threat integration is a sequential process accomplished through development of situation, event, and decision support templates. The basic tools for threat integration are doctrinal templates developed in threat evaluation, and terrain and weather factor overlays developed in terrain and weather analysis.

a. Situation Template

(1) The situation template is a doctrinal template with terrain and weather constraints applied. It shows how the threat forces might deviate from doctrinal dispositions, frontages, depths, and echelon spacing to account for the effects of the terrain and weather.

(2) Situation templating is basically a visual technique. A situation template is a visualization of what a threat force might do at a certain time and place on the battlefield. It can be sequential snapshots of what the threat might look like as the battle progresses. As an example, a doctrinal template is placed over the map to observe the possible absurdities of tanks in swamps and artillery setting up in marshes. Then, using tactical judgement, one adjusts units, equipment dispositions, and/or boundaries to depict where the enemy might actually fight in this situation. Always remember that known enemy positions must never be adjusted.

b. Event Template

(1) Situation templating is a basis for event templating. Event templating is the vital link between the success of the commander's tactical concept and the collection plan needed to fulfill the command's intelligence requirements. Event templating is the identification and analysis of significant battlefield events and enemy activities which provide indicators of the enemy course of action. It is a projection of what will most likely occur if the enemy adopts a particular course of action. By knowing what the enemy can do and comparing it with what he is doing, we can predict what he will do next.

(2) As the enemy force is visualized moving along a mobility corridor, critical areas become apparent. These areas are important because they are where significant events and activities will occur. These areas are designated as named areas of interest (NAIs).

(3) An NAI is a point or area along a mobility corridor where enemy activity will confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. NAIs facilitate intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and analysis because—

(a) Attention is focused on areas where the enemy force must appear if it has selected a particular mobility corridor.

(b) Militarily significant events can be framed by time and location within the NAI.

(c) Events in one NAI can be compared to events occurring in the NAI of other mobility corridors as the basis for determining enemy intentions.

(d) Events within NAIs can be analyzed for indicators against which intelligence and target acquisition resources can be directed. NAIs are a basis for collection planning.

(4) The event template depicts the NAI along each mobility corridor and the relationship of events along all mobility corridors. It provides a means for analyzing the sequence of activities and events that should occur for each enemy course of action and how they relate to one another. The event template is developed by mentally wargaming each enemy course of action from a start point to potential enemy objectives.

(5) Time lines are used to assist the collections manager in directing collection assets to areas on the battlefield at the right time to observe specific enemy activity. They provide a graphic means for comparing enemy movement capabilities on separate avenues of approach and mobility corridors. Time lines are based on doctrinal rates of movement. Movement rates are adjusted to compensate for the effects of the weather and terrain and for friendly actions. During the operation, time lines are adjusted based on actual rates of movement.

(6) The times calculated between NAI are used to establish lines. The time lines would be identified as **H** (hour at the enemy's line of departure and successively as **H+1, H+2,** and so forth), depending upon both enemy doctrinal movement rates and the effects of weather and terrain on those rates. Time lines will be transcribed onto the decision support template across avenues of approach or mobility corridors, which will reduce the commander's uncertainty about the maximum extent of the enemy's advance within the constraints of time. During the operation, time lines are adjusted based on actual rates of movement.

(7) The event analysis matrix supports the event template. It correlates the expected events and activities within each NAI and adds the dimension of time. Through analysis of enemy doctrinal movement rates and the effects of the terrain and weather on their mobility, the time required for the enemy to move between NAIs is estimated.

(a) An event analysis matrix is prepared for each mobility corridor to facilitate the analysis of enemy capabilities in each corridor.

(b) Before combat, the event analysis matrix and event template illustrate possible enemy courses of action as a basis for comparing friendly courses of action. During combat operations, it focuses on enemy probable courses of action.

(8) Event templating enables the G-2/S-2/MAFC to develop precise collection requirements, maximizing the effectiveness of limited resources over extended areas against a vast array of enemy targets. It provides answers to the questions of where to look, when to look, and what to look for. The event template and events analysis matrix enable the collections manager to establish collection priorities based on those courses of action the enemy is most likely to adopt. Movers and emitters, the primary indicators of events and activities, can be framed in time and location, allowing the collections manager to determine the optimum mix of collection sensors.

(9) Event templating also tells the G-3—

- Where and when to shoot, jam, and maneuver.
- What to shoot, jam, and maneuver against.

c. Decision Support Template. The commander is vitally concerned with wresting the initiative from the enemy commander; that is,

that is, forcing the enemy commander to choose a less desirable course of action through design rather than chance. The decision support template will frame the commander's opportunities and options ensuring timely and accurate decisions. This provides the means to influence enemy actions rather than just react to them.

(1) Event templating is the basis for decision support templating. Event templating relates the detail of events to decision points that are of significance to the commander. It does not dictate decisions to the commander, but it does identify critical events and threat activities relative to time and location which may require tactical decisions. Event templating provides a structured basis for using experience and judgement to reduce battlefield uncertainties.

(2) Through event templating, identification is made of those areas on the battlefield where significant events and activities will occur and where targets will appear. Decision support templating identifies those areas where enemy or terrain targets can be attacked to support the commander's concept of operations and his fire support plan.

(3) Areas along each avenue of approach and mobility corridor, where the commander can influence the action through fire and maneuver, are designated target areas of interest (TAIs). A TAI is an engagement area or point, usually along a mobility corridor, where the interdiction of threat forces by maneuver, fires, or jamming will deprive or reduce a particular threat capability. It can also cause him to abandon a particular course of action or require the use of unusual support to continue operations. In the latter option, TAIs must be terrain-dependent to inhibit or deny movement. Sample TAIs include key bridges, road junctions, choke points, drop zones (DZs), LZs, and known fording sites.

(4) Identification of TAIs is a joint effort between the intelligence and operations staffs and the FSC. The intelligence staff evaluates enemy forces and the effect of interdiction on their capabilities. The operation staff and fire support coordinator consider the availability of interdiction resources, the effects of interdiction on the accomplishment of friendly missions, and priorities for the use of available resources.

(5) Following the selection of TAIs, decision points are identified. The location of decision points is largely influenced by the availability and capability of friendly fire and maneuver systems; therefore, their selection is primarily a G-3 or S-3 function. However, this task requires the efforts of both the G-3 or S-3 and G-2 and S-2 and their respective staffs.

(6) Decision points identify those battlefield events which may require tactical decisions and when these decisions must be made for the commander to retain available options. Decisions must be made early enough to ensure that they can be implemented in time to achieve the desired effects. However, they cannot be made until there are indications that particular battlefield events will occur and their location determined with a high degree of confidence.

(7) Decision points equate time to specific points on the battlefield. They are determined by comparing times required to implement decisions, enemy movement rates, and distances. For example, it requires 2 hours to implement a decision. The decision must be made while the enemy is at least 2 hours from the TAI where the event will occur. Enemy doctrinal movement rates, adjusted to compensate for the effects of the terrain, weather, and friendly action on mobility, provide the basis for computation.

Chapter 11

Military Geography

11001. Introduction

In military operations, intelligence plays another important role by gathering information concerning topography, hydrography, climate, and weather. The intelligence information gathered forms the basic background on which plans for a military operation are drawn. The negative and positive effects of these physical environmental factors have to be carefully evaluated to see how they will affect friendly and enemy forces. The commander who uses these factors best will be the one who successfully employs troops and materiel and will ultimately have the decisive advantage over the enemy.

11002. Topography

Topography is a detailed and accurate description of an area. It is used to obtain military characteristics of a geographical area. A terrain study is an analysis of the topography of an area, including the effects of climate and weather, and its effects on military operations. A failure to properly evaluate the terrain in an amphibious operating area may result in a disaster of greatest magnitude.

a. Coastal Terrain. An analysis of coastal terrain is facilitated by an understanding of standard geological patterns. A knowledge of the physical characteristics of coastlines can aid in analysis of inland terrain. The basic geological patterns are—

(1) Emergent. When a relatively recent uplift has occurred in a coastal area and the resultant slope into the sea is steep, the coastal type is an emergent highland. If there are hills close to the shore, it is probable that the slope continues to be steep under the water. Where the slope inland is slight, shallow water probably lies well offshore. Along the emergent highland type coast, the former ocean bottom has been raised by faulting or warping.

The ground is much less rugged than average terrain. It commonly lacks the stream-cut valleys which roughen the land. Along this type of coast, the water deepens rapidly seaward, and there are few outlying islands. Even though the formation is still geologically young, the waves from the open ocean have been able to cut long sea cliffs. This type of coast lies in long sweeping curves with few bays of any consequence because the incoming tides tend to cut back the cliffs evenly and do not form notable indentations or pronounced headlands. Harbors are almost nonexistent and few navigational hazards exist. The coast is inhospitable and, in spite of the existence of deep water close offshore, dangerous when it becomes a lee shore in a gale. Whenever a small-scale map or chart has the form of long sweeping curves without pronounced indentations or embankments, we may presume that the coast is emergent.

(2) Submergent. Where a land of rugged hills and valleys has sunk relative to sea level or the sea level has risen, there is a very irregularly indented shore. This contrasts with the smooth long curves of the emergent highland. The sea floods into river valleys making each an estuary. There are many excellent harbors. Ridges of land project seaward as promontories or as strings of islets, islands, or rocks to form navigation hazards offshore. The coast of Maine is an example of a submergent coast.

(3) Compound. There are coasts where the land has been elevated, then depressed and then elevated again so frequently that the character of each mile of coast is ambiguous. This is a compound-type coastline. It combines the characteristics of the two types so far discussed. The coast of California is a good example. Near San Francisco, the old river valleys run parallel to the present coastline instead of perpendicular as in Maine. San Francisco Bay is completely landlocked and the sea has found a way in through the hills. Harbors are rare on the western coast south of Puget Sound. Few coasts are of a pure type and the compound condition is common. The eastern coastal plain of the United States is emergent; however, the last geological event has seen the rise in sea level which has submerged the mouths of the principle rivers.

(4) Neutral. This type of coast is divided into five main subtypes, the essential characteristics of which depend on the processes of land building involved and are independent of either of the previous listed types.

(a) Coral Reef. Coral reefs are the product of lime secreting organisms known as corals and algae. Corals extract lime from sea water and build external skeletons. These skeletons are broken down by wave action into coral sand which is cemented into reef rock. Coral formations are not normally found in latitudes greater than 30 degrees or opposite the mouths of fresh water streams.

(b) Delta. This type shoreline is formed by deposits of alluvium in the sea and resembles in many respects the emergent shoreline. Deltas generally consist of mudflats with many meandering distributaries.

(c) Volcanic. This type of shoreline is the result of nearby volcanic action. The water is usually very deep offshore and offers very few navigation hazards.

(d) Fault. This type shoreline is caused by the fracture of bedrock attended by displacement of one side of the fracture with respect to the other. If the fault plane is steep, the water near the shore is usually very deep and wave erosion slight. This type is very similar to the mature submergent shoreline.

(e) Manmade. Manmade coastlines are cultural developments superimposed on the natural shoreline and are normally found in protected areas. Examples of these are harbors, breakwaters, causeways, seawalls, piers, wharves and docks. Such areas are normally referred to as landing places.

b. Shorelines

(1) Relationship of Coastal Terrain to Shoreline. Although the discussion of coastal terrain is treated separately from shorelines, it is difficult to separate the two in practice. The terrain dictates the configuration of the shoreline and certain combinations are more common than others.

(2) General Relationships of Shorelines to Amphibious Operations. In land combat, where it is not a result of a meeting engagement, the defending force has a comparatively free hand in the selection of the battlefield. The defending commander may choose the most favorable ground to defend and has relative freedom in prescribing the FEBA. However, the defender of a beach is limited by the shoreline. The linear aspect of the forward positions is sharply defined. Likewise, the CLF must accommodate his attack to the configuration of the shoreline. A continuous shoreline, free from navigational hazards, is desirable for landing of forces. This type of configuration is more adaptable to the mobility, flexibility, and dispersal of forces in amphibious operations.

(3) Types. Shorelines have three primary forms: concave, convex, and straight. A shoreline should be considered with respect to the particular unit involved. For example, the overall shoreline considered for the landing force may be convex, but certain portions assigned to subordinate elements may be perfectly

straight or concave. Shorelines which are complex may possess the characteristics of all three types.

(a) Concave. A concave shoreline forms a reentrant into the coast. It is the most common type on which landings have been made or attempted. In general, the reason for this is because they are more common and usually have better hydrographic characteristics. The great hazard of landing over a concave beach lies in this threat of crossfire from the flanks of the beach. In such a landing, efforts must be directed at neutralizing and/or occupation of the flanking promontories. (See figs. 11-1 and 11-2.)

(b) Convex. The convex shoreline includes gently outcurving shores, points, capes, and peninsulas. Against this, the attack is similar the attack is similar to that of a salient in land warfare. Supporting fires may be placed on the defender from the flanks and often from the rear. His routes

Figure 11-1. Concave Beach.



Figure 11-2. Landing on Concave Beach.

of withdrawal or reinforcement are restricted and his position is in danger of being cut off by a landing at the base of the promontory.

The defender's fire plan is extremely difficult to organize; its pattern is divergent, efficiency is reduced, and flat trajectory weapons must be placed on tangents to the beach or inland, limiting coverage. If a peninsula with a relatively narrow neck is seized, it offers protection to the assault troops, but permits the defender to contain the landing with a minimum of effort. Although the balance of advantages of landing over a convex shoreline tends to favor the selection of such a beach, the concave type is usually more desirable because of hydrographic and meteorological conditions. Convex shorelines usually are more exposed to currents, winds, and surf and are apt to be steep and rocky. (See figs. 11-3 and 11-4.)

(c) Straight. A straight shoreline is one which possesses no prominent indentations or promontories. Insofar as positions for flanking fires are concerned, the straight shoreline offers no advantage to either the defender or attacker. Very few shorelines are so straight that they do not allow flanking fires to some extent. (See fig. 11-5.)

(4) Irregularities. There are certain irregularities and special formations of shorelines which are of military significance.

(a) Reefs. There are three types of reefs: barrier, fringing, and atoll. Barrier reefs may serve as offshore obstacles at a considerable distance from the landing beach. Barrier reefs pose a problem for the Navy. A fringing reef serves as an inshore obstacle, normally presenting a rough table-like surface which extends seaward of the shoreline at a level slightly above or below the water. A fringing reef of considerable width presents a flat area extending seaward and is well-suited to the organization of defensive fires. An atoll is a ring-shaped coral island or group of coral islands enclosing a lagoon. When an island is surrounded by a heavy coral growth in shallow waters, this coral may become encrusted and form what



Figure 11-3. Landing of Convex Beach.



Figure 11-4. Tactical Aspects of the Shoreline Configuration Relate to the Size of the Unit Concerned.

is actually a more substantial land mass than the island itself. If the island sinks beneath the sea because of geological upheavals, the coral formation may become fertile and assume all aspects of land mass. Usually the circular formation is cut at intervals along its circumference by channels through which the sea passes. The result is a circular chain of small flat islands. Occasionally, the central land mass may disappear only in part



Figure 11-5. Straight Beach.

leaving an island or a group of islands surrounded by a coral reef. An atoll may possess aspects of both concave and convex shorelines at the same time, depending upon the direction of attack.

(b) Fjords. A fjord is a narrow, deep, steep-walled arm of the sea formed by the drowning (flooding) of a glaciated valley. It often terminates in a passable beach at the inland extremity and usually constitutes an excellent protected anchorage, free from navigational hazards. However, a landing in a fjord against opposition is difficult. The lack of maneuver room for ships, high steep walls which prevent landing in any strength, excellent sites for coast defense installations, and artificial obstacles combine to favor the defender.

(c) Estuaries. An estuary is a long, narrow bay or inlet, tapering landward and commonly having numerous branches in tree-like patterns formed by the drowning (flooding) of the lower part of a stream valley by the sea. It differs from fjords by lesser depths of water, moderate shore slopes, tree-like patterns, and location in unglaciated areas. If it is necessary to land at an estuary, it is usually more desirable to land on only one bank. During the advance inland, it is inadvisable to have the force divided by a large river. When a landing is executed on one bank, it is necessary to neutralize the enemy positions on the opposite bank prior to and during the main landing. (See fig. 11-6.)

(d) Offshore Islands. Shorelines are often protected by groups of small islands which lie so close to the mainland that they create a complicated system of waterways and present problems to both the attacker and defender. If the defender occupies most of the important islands, he is able to bring fire to bear on the attacker from many directions as the attacking force threads its way to the coast of the mainland. Routes of approach through these islands may be tortuous and restricted. The main striking power of an amphibious assault should not be dissipated by the assault of offshore islands. The islands may be isolated and reduced in detail by successive minor landings. These islands may offer the attacker a series of favorable artillery positions from



Figure 11-6. Landing in an Estuary.

which to support the landing as well as a mask for the assembly positions of landing craft. Offshore islands may be difficult to defend if the attacker has command of the air and sea. (See figs. 11-7 and 11-8.)

(e) Frozen Shores. If the shoreline borders arctic or subarctic seas or is swept by cold currents, its tactical configuration is susceptible to alternation by freezing of the adjacent water. A level expanse of ice is well-suited to the organization of small arms fire. Such an expanse must be secured from enemy fire and observation as rapidly as possible.

11003. Tactical Aspects of Terrain.

Proper evaluation and use of terrain is another intelligence advantage that will help the commander reduce incomplete information of the enemy. Many battles are won or lost by the way the commander uses terrain to protect his force and to bring effective fire to bear on the enemy. For this information to be of value, it is essential that these facts be analyzed to determine their effect on tactical operations by either force. Terrain is usually described in terms of relief, drainage, surface materials, vegetation, and manmade features. Tactically, terrain forms the natural structure of the battlefield. The tactical aspects of terrain include key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, and HLZs.

a. Key Terrain

(1) A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage. Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and localities whose control is considered in formulating and selecting courses of action. The selection is based on the mission of the command. Terrain features selected are those which give a marked advantage in the accomplishment of the mission or which, if controlled by the enemy, will hinder materially the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) Terrain which permits or denies maneuver may be key terrain. Key terrain is also highly significant in applying combat power. Tactical use of terrain is often directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power



Figure 11-7. Coastal Islands in Possession of the Defender.



Figure 11-8. Coastal Islands Occupied by the Attacker.

and at the same time focusing the enemy into areas which result in the reduction of his ability. Control is not ensured by seizure and occupation, and physical occupancy of key terrain features may not be feasible. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and employment of effective fires.

(3) In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward of the friendly positions and are often assigned as objectives. However, terrain features in adjacent sectors may be key only if their control is necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. Key terrain may be selected based on its ability to help meet the mission; e.g., to destroy enemy forces, to seize or secure an area for control of that area, to prevent the enemy from having effective observation along an axis of advance that will be used by friendly forces. Key terrain within friendly territory is determined when its control is essential to the success of the mission.

(4) In the defense, key terrain features are usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive areas. Key features are—

- Terrain which gives good observation over avenues of approach to defensive positions.
- Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.
- Important communication center sites which affect command, control, and communications.

b. Observation and Fields of Fire

(1) Observation. Observation depends on conditions of terrain which permit a force to see the enemy. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the best observation. The use of equipment with line-of-sight characteristics requires the availability of suitable terrain. The employment of aerial platforms reduces such a requirement. Factors that limit or deny observation include concealment and cover.

(2) Fields of Fire. Fields of fires, as used in the analysis of the area of operations, include field of fire of weapons and characteristics of weapon delivery systems. A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively from given positions. Although observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire, an ideal field of fire for flat trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from the fire of such weapons.

c. Cover and Concealment.

Terrain is used to provide cover and concealment for forces in both the offense and the defense. Cover and concealment are desirable for both the attacker and defender. If troops can move forward under concealment, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from enemy fires, the attack will be more effective. A defender seeks to defend behind an area which has cover for the defending troops and concealment for ground organization but does not offer the enemy covered approaches. The mobility of the command is considered in determining available cover and concealment.

(1) Concealment. Concealment is protection from observation. Concealment can be woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, or any other feature which denies observation. Weather can also conceal through fog and rain. However, advanced vision equipment such as thermal devices will make concealment more difficult to achieve.

(2) Cover. Cover is protection from the effects of fires. Defiladed areas which provide protection against nonnuclear weapons do not necessarily provide protection against the effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain mass are very steep, blast will affect personnel and equipment on the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all but the most rugged terrain. Irregular terrain provides some protection from radiation. Few buildings are sufficiently strong to withstand nuclear weapons. Fighting holes, bunkers, and tunnel-type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective cover.

d. Obstacles. An obstacle is a natural or artificial terrain feature which stops or impedes movements. Obstacles, to be fully effective, must be covered by observation and fire. However, undefended obstacles may channelize an attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and are usually favorable to attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy and holding the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires. Obstacles parallel to an axis of attack may give the attack flank protection. However, parallel obstacles may interfere with lateral movement and coordination.

e. Avenues of Approach

(1) Ground Avenues of Approach. An avenue of approach is a relative easy route to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide ease of movement and enough width of dispersion, with considerations given to the deployment patterns, mobility, and area required for maneuver to prevent presenting a lucrative target. A valley approach gives the advancing force cover from enemy direct fire and concealment. A valley approach includes the floor, slopes, and military crest. The best axis may be along the slopes of a ridge below the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it. Control of the military crest is essential. The best axis of advance offers observation and fields of fire, cross-country trafficability, cover and concealment, and dispersion.

(2) Air Avenues of Approach

(a) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. An air avenue of approach is a route which provides a suitable flight path for a particular number of aircraft to reach an objective. To be considered an air avenue of approach, a flight path must afford some ease of movement for a force of sufficient size to produce significant effect on the operation.

(b) Helicopter. In selecting avenues of approach for tactical helicopter operations, the major concern is concealment. Routes selected provide defilade and are easy to follow; therefore, navigation at low altitudes is not a problem. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as possible to reduce exposure to radar detection. Steep defiles or canyons are avoided, especially when there is an appreciable amount of surface winds because the momentary loss of aircraft control occurs from downdrafts. Heavily forested and swampy areas provide good routes as ground troops have little opportunity to see or to take under fire the helicopters passing overhead. Low altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic wave from the aircraft and decrease the distance the sound can be detected. They also hamper determination of the direction of the noise source by ground observers. Aviation officers assist in evaluating the effect of air density, altitude, and visibility on selected avenues of approach.

f. Helicopter Landing Zones. There are a number of considerations that affect the selection of HLZs. Some of these are size, maximum absorption of aircraft, surface material, obstacles, slope, cultivated features, adjacent terrain, and exits.

11004. Emphasizing Terrain Features

a. Ridge and Stream Lining. This consists of emphasizing streams by drawing over them with a heavy blue pencil and ridges with brown or red pencils. Both can be used separately, if desired, but the combination of the two is more effective. This method emphasizes the compartmentation of an area but does not show relative elevations or slope. This method is applicable to aerial photographs. Compare figures 11-9 and 11-10, and 11-11 and 11-12 to see the effects of ridge and stream lining.

b. Layer-Tinting (Hypsometric Tinting). Layer-tinting consists of coloring or shading successive elevation of the ground. By selecting a series of colors ranging from yellow through



Figure 11-9. A Topographic Map Prior to Coloring.



Figure 11-10. A Topographic Map That Has Been Ridged and Streams Lined.

Figure 11-11. An Unmarked Aerial Photograph.

Figure 11-12. An Aerial Photograph That Has Been Ridged and Streams Lined.

orange, red and brown to color successive elevations a realistic three-dimensional effect is created. It is not necessary to color the entire map; uncolored portions may represent the lowest area. Coloring heavily or using crayons or ink may result in obliterating other terrain details. By using this method, the size, slope, and configuration of all the high ground and low ground are instantly apparent. A map or overlay of this type is a good manner to describe the relief of an area. (See fig. 11-13.)

c. Hill Topping. Hill topping is a method of accentuating the high ground in an area. It is done by selecting a critical elevation and then coloring or shading all areas higher than that elevation. This method shows only the size and location of the higher ground within an area. (See fig. 11-14.)

d. Lines of Communication. Lines of communication may be emphasized by marking overland routes in black and water routes in blue. Emphasis in this manner makes the general pattern of lines communication readily apparent. This method may be used with aerial photographs. (See fig. 11-15)

e. Trafficability Map. Trafficability may be indicated on a map or overlay by a system of cross-hatching in black, with an accompanying legend. A more effective method is to color a map or overlay. (See fig. 11-16.)

11005. Tactical Considerations

The restrictions imposed by an amphibious operation may lead to a terrain evaluation which differs from the same type terrain found in land warfare. For example, in an attack along the simple corridor shown in figure 11-17, no prudent commander would hazard the high ground at A and B before moving against. If such a compartment opens on the sea as in figure 11-18, it is traversed by troops in landing craft, exposed to fire from three sides, and unable to seek the natural protection peculiar to promontories. Rarely will it be possible to attack A and B frontally, as was possible in figure 11-17. In both cases, the military significance of the terrain is the same, but in the second case, the disadvantages may be considered so critical as to cause a rejection of the area as unsuitable for an amphibious landing. (See figs. 11-17 and 11-18.)



Figure 11-13. A Layer-Tinted Map.



Figure 11-14. A Map That Has Been Hill Topped.



Figure 11-15. A Map Where Routes of Communication Have Been Emphasized.



Figure 11-16. Trafficability Map.

a. Selection of the Landing Area. In the selection of a landing area, the most desirable ground is flat or gently rising. It is backed by a definite coastal range of such height as to form a suitable mask for the landing. Since the ideal terrain conditions seldom exists, the final choice of the landing area will be the result of conflicting considerations, balanced each against the other. Consideration will be given to general relief, compartments, routes of egress, obstacles, and effect of terrain on the employment of supporting arms, helicopterborne forces, and logistics.

(1) General Relief. The general relief of an area will usually be in the form of the following:

(a) Coastal Plain. If a landing is made on a wide coastal plain, the attacker is favored by the extensive flat terrain along the coast. It may not be dominated by enemy observation; less physical exertion is required of the attacking troops; unrestricted maneuver room is provided; and advance from the beach can be made in any direction. The coastal plain also has disadvantages. Supporting arms are hindered by the lack of prominent registration points, boundaries and objectives are difficult to locate, and the maintenance of unit direction may be difficult. Additionally, the flanks of the beachhead will not usually be located on good defensive terrain and more assets will be required to protect the flanks.

(b) Rising Terrain. Terrain which rises evenly to a considerable distance back from the beach gives the defender excellent observation and fields of fire which may dominate observation of the assault regardless of the depth of the initial penetration. The beachhead may be secured only by driving far enough inland to push enemy artillery out of range. This terrain is rarely found. The more common type is level for some distance inland and then rises with varying degrees of abruptness to a maximum elevation at the crest of a coastal ridge. Under



Figure 11-17. Terrain Favoring a Land Attack Along the Axis of a Well-Defined Corridor.



Figure 11-18. Same Terrain as Figure 11-17, Only Now Altered by Encroachment of the Sea.

such conditions, the assault troops must seize inland terrain, consisting of successive hill masses or perhaps the coastal ridge, in order to clear the beach of enemy artillery.

(c) Broken Terrain. Where the terrain is sharply broken, as in the base of extensive sand dunes or a low coastal plateau, the attacker has the advantage of partial freedom from observation. Also, a series of small compartments and corridors limit the extent of defensive fires. However, the defender is provided with a series of positions from which to slow the seizure of the beachhead. Direction and control may be extremely difficult.

(d) Coastal Mountains. Where mountains encroach directly upon the sea, the lack of beaches of sufficient size to accommodate a large force may require the rejection of an otherwise desirable landing area. However, there are other options for the assault force. The defender may neglect or only lightly defend a coastal mountainous area thinking extremely rugged terrain would be difficult to attack. The attacker may assault this area with a lightly equipped force and obtain tactical surprise. This type of terrain also may offer excellent opportunities for the use of helicopterborne or air-transported troops to rapidly seize key terrain and use it to protect the landing force, to ensure a rapid movement over terrain barriers, or to secure routes of egress.

(e) Terraces. Terracing is common along coasts which have intermittently risen from the sea. The tactical aspects of terraces will depend largely upon their size and steepness. If they are barriers to troops, their summits must be seized or neutralized while the main force moves laterally to a penetrable point. The characteristics of terraces will facilitate the use of supporting arms but will require careful planning to coordinate supporting fires with the successive seizures of escarpments.

(2) Compartmentation. The terrain should break down into compartments which permits a unit on an individual beach to establish a limited beachhead on defensible ground. It should also be possible to unite and expand them into successively larger terrain compartments until the beachhead is occupied.

(3) Routes of Egress. A landing area should be chosen which allows the LF to move out of the area. The force should not be required to advance through comparatively impassable terrain suitable for strong enemy defenses. In this respect, along many mountainous shores, good beaches exist of sufficient size to permit the landing of a large force; but beyond the landing area, there may be nothing but trackless mountains which are difficult or impossible to penetrate. In these cases, the use of helicopterborne or air-transported forces may offer an effective means to bypass natural barriers. The axis of advance must be examined critically with particular attention given to—

- Covered routes of advance.
- Terrain offering maximum protection from enemy fires.
- Observation points.
- Maneuver and dispersal room for the forces.
- Roads, bridges, and railroad networks.
- Landing fields that permit the early operation of aviation forces.
- Terrain suitable for logistics operations.

(4) Obstacles. The terrain in the landing area should permit a rapid movement of force inland to key terrain. Natural obstacles can be used to the advantage of the attacker, modified or avoided. If an obstacle can be used to protect a flank, it should be exploited. An obstacle may be included in the force beachhead line, thus eliminating the necessity of occupying the ground. (See fig. 11-19.) A beach which might otherwise be acceptable will be



Figure 11-19. A Straight Beach Backed With Natural Obstacles.

unsatisfactory if it is backed by a terrain barrier. Since detailed knowledge of the terrain in an amphibious operation is more limited than in land warfare, particular attention is given to the collection of information on obstacles which may be encountered.

(a) Relief. Relief offers the most common type of obstacle to an attacking force. Hydrographically excellent landing beaches may be backed up by cliffs and escarpments just inland. Where the climate is arid, terrain is apt to contain depressions, gullies, and cuts of such depth and steepness that they cannot be traversed without special equipment. In such regions, salt lakes are common and although passable in the driest season, they may be an obstacle in the form of a mucky salt flat at other times.

(b) Works of Man. Buildings, sea walls, piers, fences, dams, canals, dikes, and other construction by man, whether or not they have been intentionally constructed for

defensive purposes, may become obstacles. Obstructions and rubble created by the preinvasion bombardment may also constitute obstacles. Nuclear weapons detonated offshore, or in shallow harbors or rivers may produce a crater which will be an obstacle to navigation. Even if the lip is not an obstacle, the radiation produced in the water and on the adjoining land area probably will be an obstacle, at least for a few days.

(c) Ground as an Obstacle. Soil trafficability is the ability of soil to support military traffic of a given density. Trafficability varies with soil composition and weather conditions. When dry, most soils will support military traffic and when wet, certain soils will support military traffic. However, certain soils become impassable to military traffic when wet and thus constitute an obstacle. When the sand on a beach is loose, heavy vehicles and equipment move through it with great difficulty. The sand can also be an obstacle in other ways; e.g., causing malfunctions and stoppages of weapons and equipment when spread through mechanisms. In planning, trafficability charts can be prepared to indicate the soil trafficability under varying conditions. Soil trafficability is considered in the light of other obstacles to traffic such as rivers, mountains, and forests, and then combined in the chart to produce an overall trafficability map. (See fig. 11-20.)

(d) Permafrost. Permanently frozen ground (permafrost) is a thickness of soil, other superficial deposit, or bedrock at a variable depth below the surface of the earth in which a temperature below freezing exists continually. Permafrost, particularly the layer near the surface, can seriously impede an amphibious operation. The problems of field fortifications, projectile penetration, trafficability, construction, and water supply are entirely different from those of more temperate areas.

(e) Vegetation. Vegetation provides varying degrees of cover and concealment. Because of limited maneuver areas, vegetation may become a serious obstacle in amphibious landings.

1 Vegetation Which Presents Serious Obstacles. Depending upon the density of growth, the following vegetation can be expected to greatly restrict the movement of troops and equipment: deciduous and evergreen forests, mangrove swamps, nipa and sago palms (usually a dense undergrowth), hedgerows, and arctic vegetation.

2 Vegetation Which Presents Moderate Obstacles. Depending upon the density of growth, the following vegetation tends to restrict movement of troops and equipment: cane and grass, cultivated crops, cactus, vines, underbrush, and seaweed.

3 Tropical Climates. Characteristic of the tropics is a density of vegetation from the water's edge inland. Cleared areas are rare and these are almost invariably overgrown with tall grass. Mangrove swamps usually are barriers to all tracked vehicles. These features result in a channelization of movement and require special road building equipment.

4 Arctic and Subartic Climate. Characteristic of the arctic is a general lack of vegetation. Vegetation is low and provides no appreciable concealment. In the summer, swamps and marsh may present formidable obstacles. In many areas, the lack of significant vegetation requires an increased emphasis on camouflage discipline and the use of minor terrain features for concealment.

(5) Effects of Terrain on the Employment of Supporting Arms

(a) Naval Gunfire. The nature and effectiveness of naval gunfire in support of amphibious landings are dependent, in part, on the nature of the shoreline and the terrain



NOTE: The section at the bottom of the figure is a trafficability overlay for the map at the top.

Figure 11-20. A Trafficability Overlay.

inland. Coordination of fire support requires that a detailed study be made of the terrain features. The flat trajectories of naval gunfire tend to restrict overhead fire support for advancing infantry. This is especially the case when landing on an extensive coastal plain. Fire may be restricted to targets some distance inland and support ships may have to maneuver to provide flanking fire. If compartments are parallel to the coastline, then this terrain may present a series of defiladed areas which are not readily reached by naval gunfire. If the terrain is heavily wooded, observation will be limited and the woods will provide a cover for the enemy. Additionally, secondary fires that erupt as a result of naval gunfire may create hazards for the LF.

(b) Close Air Support. In planning air support, it is necessary to make a study of the ridge systems. If ridges run perpendicular to the direction of attack, planning may use CAS with maximum effectiveness to neutralize enemy positions on the reverse slopes. If the ridges are parallel to the direction of attack, the employment of CAS may be restricted. In the latter case, the direction of aircraft approach to the target may be limited to a run straight toward or away from the enemy's front. Careful considerations must be given to the nature of the ground itself. Different type soils and vegetation influence the types of fuzes and bombs employed. Terrain features that limit naval gunfire support, in most instances, will not limit CAS. However, very mountainous terrain and poor weather conditions will effect air operations.

(c) Field Artillery. Once ashore, the problems incident to the employment of field artillery are identical to those in land warfare. In planning the early employment of field artillery, careful consideration is given to the feasibility of placing artillery on outlying islands. The use of islands for this purpose is especially important when a study indicates that conditions are unfavorable for the early employment of artillery.

(d) Tank Support. Terrain is a major factor in tank warfare and only through a proper evaluation of terrain can a determination be made as to how and when to employ tanks. Good landing beaches backed by open terrain with gently rolling or rising ground offer unlimited possibilities for the effective employment of mechanized combined arms and should be exploited to the utmost.

(e) NBC Support. See FMFM 11 series.

(6) Effect on the Employment of Helicopter-borne Forces. See FMFM 5-3, *Assault Support Helicopter (ASH) Tactical Manual.*

(7) Effect of Terrain on Logistic Support

(a) Desirable Characteristics. All personnel, transportation, equipment, and supplies must pass over areas which are to become, as rapidly as possible, the sites for supply and logistics installations. From a logistics viewpoint, the terrain should be gently rising, relatively clear, and possess firm ground with adequate drainage. At the same time, the terrain immediately inland from the beach should provide cover and concealment.

(b) Obstacles. Terrain features which do not hinder the advance of the attacking forces may prove to be obstacles to logistic support. For example, bridges are congestion points which provide lucrative targets to enemy air and artillery. Conversely, obstacles which hinder attacking forces may be an aid to logistic support. For instance, if there are boats available, rivers and lakes may provide means of ferrying supplies to frontline units.

(c) Special Features. Improvement of the landing area requires special logistic support equipment. The character of the soil may require the use of a great quantity of dunnage, timber, and matting. Dense vegetation often requires that special cutting tools and machinery be provided. Water obstacles may

require the use of amphibious vehicles of all types, even though they may not have been used for the landing. Arctic and subarctic regions dictate the use of varying types of special equipment based on the season and the conditions of the ground.

b. Selection of Tactical Objectives. The objectives of the LF are not based on terrain. However, the proper exploitation of terrain is essential to the achievement of the objectives.

(1) Beachhead. The establishment of a secure and effective beachhead is the initial mission. Without it, nothing else is possible. Three major considerations in determination of the beachhead are sufficient space, freedom from enemy small arms fire and ground artillery, and defensibility.

(a) When terrain is analyzed to select a beachhead, it is necessary first to determine the compartments of terrain most suited to the size of the assault unit. Ideally, a compartment should approximate the size of the units normal operating area. If the terrain is very broken, several compartments may have to be grouped together; conversely, if the compartment is too big the force may have to operate with an open flank. (See figs. 11-21, 11-22, and 11-23.)

(b) The force beachhead lines establish the limits of the beachhead and have certain characteristics in relation to the terrain. Inasmuch as it is a tentative defensive line, it must be defensible. It connects the inland limits of high ground which masks the landing area and may be organized as strong points. The force beachhead line, at its extremities, ties into the shoreline to afford



Figure 11-21. A Large Landing Force May Include Several Major Compartments in Its Beachhead.



Figure 11-22. In Certain Types of Terrain, the Landing Force May Not be Able to Occupy All the Dominant Compartments.



Figure 11-23. Position of Successive Objectives in Relation to the Terrain of the Beachhead.

the maximum natural protection to vulnerable flanks. The force beachhead line should be easily identifiable by infantry and support arms and provide observation of enemy inland positions.

(2) Intermediate Objectives. Because a force seldom can seize enough ground immediately to constitute a beachhead, objectives are usually prescribed within the force beachhead for coordinating and ensuring seizure. The objectives should be such that, by occupying them, protection can be afforded activities near the beach and observation can be obtained over areas farther inland. They should be readily identifiable and defensible and should be separated by enough distance so that each successive seizure will be a definite tactical step forward. Initial objectives should be selected to free the beach from small arms fire and at the same time provide enough room for continued landing and deployment of support forces. The most desirable initial objective would be a low ridge parallel to the beach and inland about 500 meters. It would be clearly visible from the sea, and its seizure would permit landing to continue without loss from small arms.

(3) Control Lines. For control and coordination, various lines which do not necessarily coincide with objectives may be established on the ground. Though the lines tend to slow the advance, and consequently are undesirable, they may be necessary in certain operations. They may be designed for evaluating the speed of advance or to limit areas of operations. The lines must be identifiable. Roads, streams, and firebreaks serve such a purpose.

c. Selection of Landing Beaches. After the evaluation of the shoreline, coastal terrain, and applicable beaches, specific beaches are selected which best suit the LF scheme of maneuver. The selection is based on terrain factors previously detailed. An evaluation must be made of logistic requirements with respect to the various beaches. The beach must allow a rapid movement of supplies across it, and there should be accessible adjacent areas for the adequate dispersal of supplies and equipment accumulated during unloading operations. It is desirable **that beaches have a gentle to moderate underwater gradient and a hard surface which permits the beaching of all types of landing ships and craft, allows dry landings and rapid debarkation of troops and equipment, and movement inland. Such beaches do not require the time-consuming special beach surfacing to accommodate heavy equipment. The number of beaches required for an operation depends on the size of the attacking force and the scheme of maneuver. A landing area with numerous suitable beaches is desirable and permits the attacker to achieve dispersion more easily.

11006. Hydrography

Hydrography is the science of measuring and studying oceans, seas, rivers, and other water with their marginal land areas, inclusive of all the fundamental elements which have to be known for safe navigation of such areas, and the publication of such information in suitable form for the use of navigators.

a. Importance of Hydrography in the Selection of a Landing Area. Considerations of the hydrography of the landing area are of great importance, both in the planning and execution phases. A beach may be ideal for amphibious operations from the high water line inland, but it has no value unless landing craft can land the troops, equipment, and supplies required for operations ashore. Certain elements of hydrography exert critical influences on the success of amphibious operations: beach location, approaches, gradient, surf, tide, currents, obstacles, and nature of the bottom. Analysis of the target area must embody not only the conditions on land but also those seaward of the shoreline.

b. Hydrographic Factors in the Selection of a Landing Area. In planning an amphibious operation, the principal problems dependent on hydrographic factors are—

- Surf and inshore currents and their effects on landing craft.
- Beach gradient at various stages of the tide as related to the suitability of beaching landing craft of different types.
- Depth of water close inshore, as related to the determination of anchorages and to the maneuverability of supporting vessels.
- Composition of the beach, as to its influences on the beaching and retracting of landing craft and trafficability.
- Position of the waterline at various stages of the tide, with reference to obstacles and beach widths.
- Location of obstacles, as to their influence on the beaching of landing craft and the debarkation of personnel and equipment.
- Ranges and times of tides.

c. Sources of Energy Which Act on Beaches. Sources of energy which act directly upon the beach are winds, waves, and currents. These forces vary in intensity and direction and are responsible for the mobile character of a beach profile. An exposed beach will change seasonally and with each severe storm, although in nearly every case it will revert to its norm. The effect of energy components will be considered in detail since an understanding of their action is necessary to beach interpretation.

d. Ideal Beach for Amphibious Landing. The ideal beach for amphibious landing would be a beach with no obstruction or defenses; deep water close to shore; a firm but not rock bottom; minimum tide, current or surf; a gradient which will permit the beaching of all types of landing craft and ships under all conditions of load at any time desired; excellent trafficability; and a beach with adequate exits.

e. Hydrographic Conditions Which Cause Casualties to Landing Craft

(1) Casualties to landing craft and amphibious vehicles due to surf and beach features can be summarized as follows:

- Swamping by breakers when approaching or retracting.
- Hanging up on a bar or reef.
- Broaching on a bar or on the beach.

(2) The surf and beach conditions to which such casualties may be ascribed are—

- Character of the breakers, height, and period.
- Presence of bars or reefs.
- Beach gradient which, with a given breaker height, determines the width of the surf zone.
- Long shore currents.

f. Sources of Hydrographic Information

(1) Sources of hydrographic information are—

- MC&G materials.
- Photograph and imagery interpretation.
- Topographic platoon.
- Reconnaissance (SEAL team, force reconnaissance).
- Tourist guides and maps.
- Captured documents.
- Submarine reports and photographs.
- Prisoner interrogations.
- Aerial observation.
- National intelligence surveys.

(2) Limitations of Sources. Most of the above sources of information will seldom be adequate or complete within themselves. The existing MC&G materials cannot be relied on for the required detailed information because, in many cases, the information will be incomplete, out of date, or too small a scale. Photography is one of the more productive sources of information. It is usually complete and up-to-date. The value of photography is limited by effects of the weather and the capabilities of the interpreter. Much of the planning stage is based on photography. Physical reconnaissance is the most reliable and positive source of information, but may be limited by weather, enemy situation, and physical characteristics of the beach. Travel books and tourist guides are related usually to native habits and customs and not the pertinent facts required for a military study. It will take a dedicated effort to obtain and evaluate all sources of information in order to establish accurate beach information.

g. Sea And Swell

(1) Terminology. The term *sea* refers to an ocean, or alternatively, a large body of (usually) salt water less than the size of an ocean. The term *swell* are waves caused by wind at the place and time of observation; or state of the ocean, sea, or lake in regard to waves. Winds raise waves whenever they blow over water and an irregular sea develops with waves traveling with the wind. The size, length, and height of the waves depend on the wind speed, the stretch of water over which the wind has been blowing and the length of time the wind has been blowing. As long as waves still are in the stage of development, the combined phenomenon is known as *sea-state*. The shape of the waves undergoes wide alterations when the wind dies down or when the waves produced by a given wind advance to regions outside of the wind area. The wave train is then known as a *swell* and the individual waves are individual swells. The outstanding characteristics of a swell are its low rounded crests, comparative smoothness of its surface contours, and the great length from crest to crest. The condition of the sea is described by the height in feet from the crest to the preceding trough of swells or breakers.

(2) Information Required for Amphibious Operations. It is essential that the average state of the sea in the vicinity of the beaches be known. This is best determined by knowledge of the seasonal winds and storms because these are the factors that produce sea and swells.

(3) Ability to Forecast. When the relationship between wind speed, duration, and extent and size of waves has been established, the aerologist who has training in sea and swell forecasting can adequately describe the character of the sea in any given storm, provided he has adequate weather maps. If he can forecast the wind conditions, he can also forecast the sea. From this, a forecast can be made of the swells. The waves, which make up the sea and swell, are not regular and uniform but vary greatly in height and length over short distances. Only the major features can be forecasted, but this should be sufficient for most purposes.

(4) Types and Characteristics of Waves. There are two types of waves: the broad, rounded waves of deep water and the more choppy waves, which are frequently found in shallow water, in the confined areas of bays, and in the storm areas at sea.

(a) Trochoidal. Round-topped waves are called trochoidal waves. Although they may be of great size, they are not dangerous to power boats until they begin to break at the crest. This is likely to happen only in very heavy weather.

(b) Cycloidal. The more choppy or cycloidal waves may spring up quickly in even a fairly moderate breeze and break easily at the crest. They run close together, tend to bounce a boat in an uncomfortable fashion, and make steering difficult. If they are taken on the beam, they may be dangerous, especially to boats that are not decked over.

(c) Combinations. Particularly in coastal water, a sea may be made up of both type waves. Shoals, sand bars, tides, and currents, in various combinations, can produce a great variety of surface conditions.

(5) Character of Waves in Deep Water. Except in storm seas where waves are building, waves in deep water are in the form of swells. Wave motion is hardly felt below the depth of about one-wave length. In water deeper than this, the character of the wave is dependent on the depth of the bottom. The length and speed are determined by the period between successive crests passing a fixed point. Waves break when the height to length ratio reaches one-to-seven.

(6) Characteristics of Waves in Shallow Water. In water shallower than one-half wave length, the bottom interferes with the wave motion. The period remains constant, but the length and speed decreases and the form of the wave changes. Near shore, the speed depends on the depth alone; therefore, the depth can be computed if it is possible to determine the wave speed from successive photographs. The change in wave length also may be used if the period is accurately known. As the wave length decreases, the wave height increases until the crest becomes unstable and breaks. The changes in height and length are also accompanied by a change in form. The trough becomes long and flat and the crest short and steep, so that in the last few hundred yards before the wave breaks, the crest seems to peak up abruptly.

(7) Extent of Change in Wave. The extent of change in form and increase in height depend upon the wave steepness in deep water. If the steepness is greater than 1 to 20, there is little change in form and little increase in height. This is characteristic of waves which are still growing under the influence of wind. When the steepness is low, less than 1 to 100, the change in form is marked and the height may increase up to twice the deep water value. This is a characteristic of a swell which has travelled a long distance from the wind area.

(8) Effect on Ships. A violent storm can prevent the arrival of an ATF at its destination if ships are sunk or critically damaged. Strong winds which produce seas less than catastrophic may jeopardize an operation unless their actions are taken into account. The following are some of the more serious possibilities:

(a) Ships may be forced to slow down through high seas. This may result in the scattering of the convoy and several days may be required to reform with a consequent disruption of the time schedule.

(b) On board the ships, items such as boats, booms, topside gear, and deck-loaded cargo may be lost or damaged. The ship-to-shore movement may become impossible or may be limited as a consequence of damage to landing craft.

(9) Effect of Debarkation. In some operations, the assault may be placed in a precarious position by heavy seas which may limit or prevent debarkation. When transport is unsteady as a result of heavy seas or large swells, delay may be encountered in lowering boats and in keeping them along side, and any rolling of the ship will cause trouble in lifting heavy equipment. With inexperienced troops, casualties can be expected when descending into boats that are rising and falling. Heavy seas will also affect the capabilities of various amphibious ships and the discharging of amphibious vehicles may become very hazardous.

(10) Effect on Landing Craft. Rough seas will disrupt landing schedules and formations by restricting the speed and maneuver of landing craft. This must be anticipated in planning. Normal problems of control and coordination will become more complex. The effects of rough seas must be taken into account when establishing time tables, distances to be traveled and loads to be carried. With a poorly distributed or excessive load, boats may list severely and sink. In extreme situations, unseaworthy vehicles may be sunk in large numbers. The number lost may be so great as to render

the landing force impotent. When a rough sea is either expected or present, the detrimental effect may be minimized to a degree by reducing the ship-to-shore distance and prescribed loads for each type of craft. Since the unloading of equipment and supplies may be restricted by heavy seas or by a loss of boats during the assault, priorities among critical items must be given particular attention.

h. Underwater Gradient

(1) General

(a) Underwater gradient of a beach is the slope of the sea bottom. Gradient is most often written as a ratio of depth to horizontal distance; thus, the gradient of 1:50 indicates an increase of depth of 1 foot for every 50 feet of horizontal distance. For landing operations, it is usually necessary to find the gradient only from the water's edge to about the 3-fathom curve.

(b) The following is a gradient scale developed by the beach erosion board:

Steep	More than 1:15
Moderate	1:15 to 1:30
Gentle	1:30 to 1:60
Mild	1:60 to 1:120
Flat	Flatter than 1:120

(c) NATO designations and code letters for each gradient are as follows:

Steep	V
Moderate	W
Gentle	X
Mild	Y
Flat	Z

(d) When gradients may be more accurately determined, the precise slope is given. In amphibious operations, it is essential that the underwater gradient is known.

(2) Indications of Terrain Conditions. An examination of the terrain features gives some indication of what may be expected of the seabed. If the land behind the beach is flat and sandy, it is reasonable to assume that the sea bottom close inshore will also be fairly flat. If the beach is on a long stretch of regular coast, it often will have one or more sandbars offshore. If rock outcrops are present, the seabed will probably have rock outcrops, too. Beaches backed by cliffs or steeply rising hills usually will have a fairly steep underwater gradient. Coral forms standard patterns and its presence is not difficult to predict.

(3) Indications of Beach Conditions. The beach may supply clues to the underwater gradient. Beach form is determined in part by the waves which break on it and the topography of the sea bottom. In general, the coarser the beach material, the steeper the gradient. This generalization applies only to exposed beaches; coarse material may form a shallow gradient if the beach is sheltered.

(4) Indications of Hydrographic Conditions

(a) Tide Lines. The gradient may be approximated from the tide lines, specifically the high and low water marks. The range and interval of the tide and horizontal distance of rise and fall will provide data for determining the gradient of the high to low water zone.

(b) Surf and Waves. The surf zone will often indicate the gradient. If the surf is breaking near the shoreline and the surf band is narrow, the gradient will be steeper than when breakers are well offshore and the surf band is wide. The form of waves may indicate the gradient; waves which have advanced over a shoaling bottom will develop steep, sharply pointed crests and flattened troughs. The degree with which the uprush of a wave sinks is an indication of gradient. If all or most of the uprush washes back, the material is coarse. Those beaches which remain damp on a receding tide are usually of gentle gradient and of fine texture.

(5) Methods of Determining Gradient

(a) Charts. Accurate nearshore gradients can seldom be obtained from hydrographic charts. However, offshore gradients for most navigation purposes can be obtained from hydrographic charts and may be of assistance in computing nearshore gradient.

(b) Photography

1 **Stereoscopic Photographs.** The difference in depth between two points is determined stereoscopically by measuring the difference in parallax between the images on an overlapping pair of photographs. This method requires interpreters trained in stereocomparagraph methods. It also requires a condition of transparent water, undisturbed by swells or large waves, but with the surface ruffled by wind ripples and recognizable bottom features. Under ideal conditions, accuracy can be obtained to within plus or minus 1 foot.

2 **Imagery Interpretation of Waves.** A relationship exists between wave length, velocity, and depth of water; the distance between waves advancing into shallow water becomes smaller and the speed increases. This change is measurable. Waves tend to align themselves parallel to the contours; depths may be approximated from the change in angle of the waves to the shoreline. Under ideal conditions, depths determined from wave velocity and length will be accurate to within 3 feet. Depths obtained from measurements of wave lengths will be slightly less accurate.

3 **Imagery Interpretation of the Waterline.** The waterline establishes an approximate contour. A series of photographs at varying tide stages will provide information for contouring of the beach between high and low tide. Where tidal range exceeds 6 to 8 feet, an accuracy of 2 feet or less can be obtained.

(c) Physical Reconnaissance. When the need for underwater information is imperative, it may be necessary to send reconnaissance teams to the beach to make a survey.

(6) Effect on Surf. The importance of beach slope to the surf line lies in its effect on width of the surf zone. The breaker line, which represents the seaward border of the surf zone, is found where the bottom depth equals about 1.3 times the significant breaker height. Thus, with 6 foot breakers, the breaker line is located where the bottom depth is about 8 feet, regardless of beach slope. Off a steep beach with a slope of 1 to 10, the breaker line for 6-foot breakers is about 80 feet from the shoreline; whereas, off a beach with a slope of 1 to 50, the breaker line is about 400 feet from the shore line.

(7) Influence on Underwater Obstacle Defense. The beach gradient provides a basis for estimating the enemy capabilities for an obstacle defense of the beach. A long flat beach facilitates an underwater obstacle defense. Conversely, a steep beach limits the extent and effectiveness of obstacles.

i. Surf. For the planning and execution of an amphibious operation, knowledge is required of both surf conditions and beach slope. Studies of these features must be conducted together because the surf on a given beach depends on beach exposure and underwater topography. Furthermore, the profiles of sandy and gravel beaches are constantly altered by wave action.

(1) Information Required for Amphibious Operations. For amphibious operations, the information of surf conditions should include—

- Location offshore at which surf first breaks.
- Width of surf zone.
- Wave length.
- Period of breakers.

- Height of breakers.
- Type of breakers.
- Angle at which surf strikes the beach.
- Number of lines of breakers.

(2) Factors Which Influence Surf. The nature of the surf on a given day will be influenced by the—

- Nature of the bottom.
- Direction and velocity of wind.
- Wave length.
- Stage of the tide.
- Presence and nature of currents.

(3) Factors Which Reduce Surf. There are several factors which tend to dissipate or reduce surf. Refraction of the wave train lowers the average height of breakers. Offshore shoals, ledges, and rough bottom contours also reduce the surf. In particular, offshore islands completely disrupt the wave train, creating multiple intersecting patterns of smaller waves. Kelp, marsh, grass, or any variety of large or dense seaweed also disrupt and reduce the height of the waves. Swift currents, particularly if they are running with the wave advance, dissipate wave action, as do onshore winds. An abrupt break in the bottom, such as a reef face or steep shoal bar, may break up each crest into a series of lesser crests, thus reducing their size. If the swell does not break over the abrupt change in the bottom, harmonic crests may develop between regular crests, reducing the height of the latter.

(4) Types of Surf. Surf may be divided into two types: that caused by waves from local winds, and that caused by swells. Both may be found together, causing a mixed or irregular surf zone, or there may be intermediate types when the waves have traveled only a short distance from the wind area. However, it is usually possible to classify the surf into one of two categories.

(a) Caused by Local Winds. Surf caused by local winds is characterized by short irregular crests, spilling breakers, and a confused surf zone. The waves offshore are steep with white caps, and the crests do not increase in height before they break. The wave period is short, about 5 or 6 seconds.

(b) Caused by Swells. Surf caused by swells is characterized by smooth crests, plunging breakers, and a regular surf zone. The swells offshore are round-topped with no white caps and peak up in shallow water before they break. The wave period is 8 to 15 seconds.

(5) Types of Breakers. The type of breakers depends on the gradient, deep water wave steepness, backwash depth, and backwash velocity. There are three general types: plunging, spilling, and surging.

(a) Plunging. A plunging breaker is a breaker which tends to curl over and break with a crash. (See fig. 11-24.)



Figure 11-24. Plunging Breakers.

(b) Spilling. A spilling breaker is a breaker which breaks gradually over quite a distance. (See fig. 11-25.)



Figure 11-25. Spilling Breakers.

(c) **Surging.** Surging breaker is a breaker which peaks up but then instead of spilling or plunging, surges up on the beach. (See fig. 11-26.)

Figure 11-26. Surging Breakers.

(6) **Relationship Between Depth and Height of Breakers.** Waves of moderate steepness advancing over a shoaling bottom in calm weather break when they reach a point where the depth is no more than 1.3 times as great as their height. In shallow water, the period remains constant, but the speed and length decrease and the form of the wave changes. Near shore, the speed depends upon depth alone and depth can be computed if the wave period can be determined. The ratio between the height of the breaker and the depth of water where it breaks varies considerably under different conditions of wind, sea, and current.

(7) **Speed of Breakers.** The speed of a breaker depends on the depth of breaking. Since the depth of breaking is directly related to the breaker height, the speed of a breaker depends on its height only. (See fig. 11-27.)

(8) **Ability to Forecast.** Surf conditions on a beach can be forecasted if the nature of offshore waves is known and detailed information is available on the inshore bottom. When weather data is available, general seasonal character of the surf can be approximately determined, which permits determination of the months of lesser surf hazard. The results of forecasting from photographs depend on the weather data available, the quality of photographs, and the skill of the interpreter.

(9) **Effect on Beaching of Landing Craft.** The height of surf can be critical. It may result in a disruption of landing formation and cause landing craft casualties. Hazards to craft increase with increasing breaker height, but the difficulties encountered depend also on the width of the surf zone and the period and type of breakers.

(a) **Width of Surf Zone.** A wide surf zone offers less hazard to landing craft. If there is a narrow zone coupled with high surf, the coxswain may lose control of his craft and be unable to regain control before striking the beach. Broaching and swamping may result. Broaching frequently occurs when a powerful wave hits a beached craft. The power of the broken wave depends on the height of the breakers and their distance from the shore. On a steep beach, the breaking takes place at a short distance from the waterline and is followed by a violent uprush on the beach. The danger of broaching is



Figure 11-27. Curve Showing the Speed of Breakers for Breaker Heights From 2 to 15 Feet.

great unless the craft can be held firmly against the beach. When the surf zone is so narrow that the waves break directly on the beach, landing craft may be swamped by breakers which plunge over the stern or flood over the lowered bow ramp. The action of surf on swamped boats can cause them to fill with sand, thus impeding salvage operations. If there is a narrow violent surf, it may be possible to land the assault elements but impossible to land subsequent troops, equipment, and supplies because of initial losses among landing craft. With a wide surf zone, the broken crests expend their energy as they advance through shallow water; the uprush on the beach is gentle, and the risk of broaching is reduced. (See figs. 11-28 and 11-29.)

(b) Height of Surf. Swamping is rarely caused by surf conditions alone. Even with 10- to 12-foot breakers, an experienced coxswain can bring his craft safely through the breaker line. This requires great skill because breakers travel with a greater speed than the craft. The speed of a 10-foot breaker is 12 knots, and an LCVP or LCM about 10 knots. If a craft is overtaken by a plunging breaker, it is in danger of being swamped. If it is overtaken by a spilling breaker, it may surfboard which will cause the craft to be out of control and possibly cause it to collide with other craft. During retraction, there is great danger of the craft being swamped. Retraction through plunging breakers is more difficult than through spilling breakers but there is partial compensation in the longer periods of plunging breakers.

(10) Effect On Beaches and Approaches. The action of surf, coupled with changes of tide, may completely alter the character of the beach. The most important cause of change is the violent surf action which may alter the profile, narrow the beach, and remove bottom and beach material. Reconnaissance of the beach area is necessary between the time of planning and execution to keep abreast of changes in beach profile.

(11) Effect of Inshore Currents. When waves break at an angle to the beach, currents are formed in the surf zone. The velocity of these currents is increased as the height of the breakers increase and as the angle made by the waves with the coast becomes greater.

j. Tide. The tide is the periodic rise and fall of the water, caused by the gravitational attraction of the moon and the sun on the rotating earth.



NOTE: At high tide, the beach has the character of a steep beach with a narrow zone, whereas at low tide, it apperas as a flat beach with a wide surf zone.

Figure 11-28. Effect of Tide on Width of Surf.



NOTE: At high tide, there is a single line of breakers on the beach, whereas at low tide, there are two lines; one on the bar and one on the beach.

Figure 11-29. Effect of Tide on Character of surf Zone in the Presence of a Bar.

This rise and fall is in the vertical plane, but there is also a horizontal movement. The horizontal movement is designated tidal current. High tide, or high water, is a maximum height reached by the rising tide. Low tide, or low water, is the minimum height reached by the falling tide. The difference between them is called the *range of tide*. The *period of tide* is the interval between high and low tide. These intervals normally average 12 hours and 25 minutes. About every two weeks, when the moon is new, the highest high waters and lowest low waters occur, causing an unusually large range of tide. Tides during this time are known as *spring tides*. When the moon is in the first or third quarter, the range of tide will usually be small. Tides during this time are known as *neap tides*.

(1) Tidal Current. The tidal current is the flow of water that occurs as the tide rises or falls. When the tidal current flows shoreward, it is known as rising tide. Changes in the wind and barometric conditions cause variations in the tide from day to day.

(2) Information Required for Amphibious Operations. In amphibious operations, it is necessary to know the time of high and low tide and the range of tide. This is necessary because the stage of tide affects the width of the beach and, thereby, the type of surf, depth of water over sandbars and reefs, and the effects of underwater obstacles, stranding of craft, and requirements for special naval gear to facilitate debarkation.

(3) Effect on Beaching of Craft

(a) Flat Underwater Gradient. The tide level with reference to the beach gradient and its influence on landing craft is of vital importance. When a relatively large tide range occurs on a gently sloping beach, the flow of water or the speed with which it rises or descends on the beach may be rapid enough to strand landing craft before they are able to retract. Unless this possibility is calculated, a critical number of landing craft may be rendered inoperative until the next tide.

(b) Irregularities of Sea Floor. When the beach has considerable irregularities besides a flat surface, a dropping in tide may cause boats to ground far off the beach, thus compelling personnel to debark and wade ashore. If the pools are deeps, a considerable loss of equipment should be anticipated.

(c) Unloading of Stranded Craft. In some cases, the effect of the tide on beaching craft may indicate that special measures are necessary for the continuity of supply to the beach. Landing craft may be held near the beach as the tide recedes and discharge their cargo while they are resting high and dry on exposed beach, then retract on the following tide.

(4) Effects on Underwater Obstacles. A landing at high tide may be desirable to overcome the disadvantages of a gentle gradient, but the defender can use obstacles which are effective at high tide. Although the physical landing is more difficult at low tide on a gentle beach gradient, underwater obstacles usually are reduced more easily at low water when exposed. If the beach is wide and gentle, the relative merits of landing at high and low tide must be compared, and the hazard of water obstacles must be balanced against that of crossing an exposed beach. Therefore, an important consideration is the position of the waterline with reference to underwater obstacles at various stages of the tide. With beaching landing craft, conditions may be quite different at various stages of the tides. Shoals or obstacles which may be crossed successfully at high water may be obstacles at low water.

(5) Effect on Time of Landing. The day-by-day characteristics of tides on a beach vary; the range of tide, period of tide, and time of spring and neap tides are all considered in the selection of the day and time which presents the most favorable conditions for landing. In general, where defensive obstacles do not exist, it is preferable to make a landing on a flood tide to facilitate beaching and retraction of waves of landing craft. This is particularly true

if the tidal range is great and the gradient is very gentle. Maximum advantage may be taken of the rising tide to overcome the possible hazard of gradient and beach bottom if the time of landing is established at 2 or 3 hours prior to high tide.

(6) Effect of Surf Zone. The stage of tide can have profound effect on the width and character of the surf zone. This is the case on all beaches which have bars and on all beaches which have a steep upper slope and very gentle slope at or below the waterline.

k. Current. Currents are horizontal movements of water in one direction for an extended period of time. Currents may be classified as to location offshore (outside the surf zone) or inshore and may result from tide action, wave-wind action, gravity, gradients, and the temperature and salinity of the water. Currents may extend over large areas or be limited to small stretches of coasts or channels. Currents caused by tidal action generally extend to the bottom of the ocean or channel, while those caused by wind effect only the surface of the water. The frictional drag of a wind blowing in a constant direction soon sets a wide drift in motion, the velocity of which is proportional to the strength and duration of the wind. This effect is entirely separate from the waves that are set up by the wind. Wind drifts average only 1.5 to 2 percent of the velocity of the wind that created them. This speed is slow in comparison with that of the waves created by the wind. Currents which are caused by gravity are found near mouths of rivers and streams. In amphibious operations, it is essential to know the following in regard to currents:

- Location (offshore or inshore).
- Whether longshore or rip type (inshore only).
- Direction.
- Approximate speed.

(1) Offshore

(a) Nontidal. Nontidal currents are related to the density of the ocean and the effect of winds. Examples are the Japanese current and the Gulf Stream. They are not of importance with respect to amphibious landings.

(b) Tidal. Tidal currents are caused by the horizontal movement of the tide. The current is often weak near shore and stronger in narrow channels and in openings to lagoons. Sometimes it is difficult to enter a narrow channel against a falling tide. On the surface, tidal currents may be visible as *tide rips*, areas of broken water, and white caps. They are predictable if sufficient observations have been made, since they repeat themselves as regularly as the tides to which they are related.

(2) Inshore

(a) Longshore. Longshore currents flow parallel to the shoreline, inside the breakers, and generally found only along straight beaches. They are caused by waves breaking at an angle to the beach. The velocity increases with breaker height, larger angles of the breaker to the beach, and steep beach slopes. It decreases with increased wave periods. With 8-foot breakers, sustained velocities of 3 knots have been measured. Longshore currents are predictable but dependent on the accuracy of the wave forecasts. Strong longshore currents are capable of forming or modifying sandbars. They usually have the effect of making bars irregular or building bars of complex form. They appear during the season when the current is strong and disappear when currents weaken.

(b) Rip. Rip currents flow out from shore through the breaker line in narrow rips and are formed on almost all open coasts. They consist of three parts: the *feeder currents*, which flow parallel to the shore inside breakers; the *neck* where the feeder currents band or rip; and the *head* where the currents widen and slacken outside the breaker line. An observer can distinguish the neck

as a stretch of unbroken water in the breaker line. The outer line of the head is usually marked by patches of foam and broken water similar to tide rips, and the head itself is usually discolored by silt. Rip currents result from the water piled against the coast by waves. The water flows along the shore until it is deflected seaward, or it meets another current, and then flows out through the breakers. When feeder and rip currents have formed, they cut a trough in the sand and remain fairly constant until the wave conditions change. Common locations are at the heads of indentations in the coast. When waves break at an angle on an irregular coast, the rips are found opposite small headlands which deflect currents seaward. In this case, there is only feeder current.

(3) Effect on Ship-to Shore Navigation. Currents may prevent a landing when visibility is poor. When strong longshore currents are present, there must be a positive means of recognizing the beaches to compensate for the affects of the current.

(4) Effect on Beaching the Craft. The force of longshore current can broach landing craft approaching the shore when they are beached or as they are retracting. Broaching is dangerous in heavy surf and may lead to swamping. Heavy currents will make it difficult to meet the breakers to stern. The unloading of vehicles, heavy equipment, and supplies is especially difficult because it is hard to maintain landing craft perpendicular to the beach under these conditions. When the ramp is lowered under these conditions, the boat may fill with water and sink before it can be unloaded. Delay may result if cargo has to be unloaded or if unloaded over the side. If there are strong longshore currents, a landing beach is likely to become cluttered with boats which are broadside to the beach or are swamped.

I. Sandbars. The term *offshore bar* is used to define a sandbar lying a short distance from and usually parallel to the shore and is below the surface of the water at all times. An offshore bar is likely to develop along a sandy coast exposed to wave action and constitutes an obstacle. Information conceding sandbars should include—

- Distance offshore (to landward edge).
- Width.
- Length.
- Slope (seaward and landward).
- Depth of water at given tide stage.
- Passages for landing craft.
- Inshore water (depth, nature of bottom, and landward slope).

(1) Formation. Most sandbars are formed by wave action. When a wave enters shallow water, it creates a forward and backward motion in a horizontal plane along the bottom. The forward movement exceeds the backward movement, resulting in a transport shoreward. Thus, sand is moved to the point of breaking, where the waves lose transport strength. The result is that sand piles up at about the breaker point, and if the action continues long enough, a bar will be formed.

(2) Effect of Surf. When bars are present, the crest will peak up as the waves role over the bar. Whether breaking takes place is dependent on the depth of water over the bar. If the depth over the bar is more than twice the breaker height, nearly all the waves will pass over the bar without breaking. If the depth is between one and two times the breaker height, waves will break near the bar, on the bar, or on the shoreward side. Water depth less than breaker height will cause all waves to break on the seaward side. Frequently, more than one bar exists and the waves break and reform to break again on another bar or on the beach.

(3) Effect on Beaching Landing Craft. Bars are a serious menace to landings. They can impede movement of landing craft or create a breaker line which will endanger small craft. If troops debark a craft hung up on a bar, they

must cross a channel to the beach. The channel may be dangerous because of currents of the bottom may be so soft that troops and equipment will bog down. The channel may also be too deep for wading across. For general unloading, the difficulties introduced by troughs and channels may be overcome by transfer unloading or by waiting for a try at low tide.

(4) Artificially Created. Even when there are no bars in existence on a beach at time of assault, they may be created by the scouring action of propellers of a craft. After several days, a bar may build up which may be significant enough to prevent the satisfactory unloading of LSTs and similar vessels.

m. Rocks and Shoals. Information required for amphibious operations concerning rocks and shoals include—

- Location and extent.
- Size and nature.
- Height above the surface, or depth of water at given stages of tide if they are below the surface

(1) Methods of Locating. In photographs showing heavy seas, rocky patches on the bottom can be spotted by waves breaking over them. Care must be taken in determining which breakers are caused by obstructions on the seabed and which are caused by sudden gusts of wind. This can be done by inspecting isolated breakers on several successive photographs. Photographs which show breakers are useful for comparison with clear water photographs to help determine whether a doubtful area is rock or weed. If waves break over the spot in question, it will be rock. While the location of rock areas is possible in almost every instance, the determination of water depth over them is difficult.

(2) Effect of Beaching Landing Craft. Rocks on a beach will limit the inshore approaches so that only a few landing craft or vehicles may be able to gain access at one time. This makes the beach unfavorable for landing a large force and restricts operations on the beach. One or two rocky patches fronting a beach are not a serious obstacle. After initial waves have reached the beach, rock patches can be located and marked with buoys for the benefit of larger craft or ships.

n. Seaweed. Seaweed is an obstacle only when it is sufficiently thick and heavy to affect the screws of landing craft or interfere with the operations of amphibious vehicles. It will seldom be dense enough to interfere with wading troops. Information concerning seaweed need only include location. Seaweed is usually found in calm water, seldom within the influence of the surf zone. Large weeds, such as kelp, will grow in dense beds seaward of the breakers, while finer seaweed will be found only in lagoons and protected areas. Most seaweed appears as dark irregular patches on photographs and may be easily confused with rock, but a skilled photographic interpreter can distinguish the difference.

o. Nature and Composition of Beach and Approaches. The nature and composition of the beach and approaches concern the suitability for anchorages, effect on landing craft, and trafficability for personnel and vehicles. Materials may be silt, mud, sand, gravel, boulders, rock, coral, or any combination of these. In general, it may be said that materials will grade from coarse to fine extending seaward because of the sorting action of waves.

(1) Offshore. The gradient offshore will generally be milder than in the nearshore unless underwater shelves or banks exist. Holding for anchorages is the prime consideration. A bottom of silt, loose sand, rock, or coral provides poor holding ground.

(2) Nearshore. Considerations regarding the nearshore bottom concern the effect on landing craft. The gradient will generally be steeper

than offshore, and sand or gravel is subject to the formation of bars. Silt, mud, or fine sand may foul the cooling systems of landing craft. Rock coral or boulders may cause damage to the landing craft.

(3) Foreshore. Considerations regarding the nature and composition of the foreshore concerns the beaching of landing craft and trafficability of vehicles and personnel. The gradient is generally steeper than the nearshore, and the material is generally coarser. Sand and gravel are ideal for beaching. Firm sand will provide good trafficability. Above the size range of very fine sand, the coarser the material, the poorer the trafficability. Gravel has good bearing capacity but poor shear strength. Shear strength decreases with increased load and gradient. A beach that is eroding provides poorer trafficability than one where deposition is taking place.

(4) High Water Zone. The most critical area of trafficability on the beach is the high water zone due to the increased gradient and the looseness of material. Vehicles may stall, LVTs and tanks may belly up and lose traction, and loose material will slip and slide under personnel.

(5) Backshore. The nature and composition of the backshore presents a problem of trafficability. The gradient is generally mild; however, the material is usually soft, loose, and dry. Vehicles will usually need assistance, especially after the area has had constant use.

p. Miscellaneous Hydrographic Features

(1) Runnels

(a) Characteristics. Runnels are small sandbars which form within the tidal range of beaches with slight slopes. The crests are seldom more than 23 feet above the shoreward depression. They will trap water on an ebb tide to form pools and damp spots on the beach. Runnels are usually large enough to cause breakers and a decrease in wave length at high tide. The foreshore must have a very slight gradient to form runnels. The finest material which will form runnels is silty sand and the coarsest is pebble gravel. More often, they are formed of pebble at the crests and silt in the troughs.

(b) Effect of Beaching Landing Craft. Landing craft will beach on a runnel crest so that troops and equipment will have to traverse the deeper water of the trough. If the trough is silt, heavy equipment will bog down.

(2) Cusps

(a) Characteristics. Cusps are a succession of semicircular cutouts. They are usually all the same size on a single beach. Cusps vary in lengths from 30 feet to over 100 feet, and depths are from 1 to 2 feet. Cusps usually indicate a fine beach material, ranging from sand to pebbly gravel. Generally, the longer the cusp spacing, the finer the material.

(b) Effect on Beaching Landing Craft. After storms, gravel cusps seriously impede traffic along the beaches. Sand cusps present little or no problems. Usually, the cutout section presents an extension of the slope of the beach.

(3) Ripple Marks. Ripple marks are small, fairly regular ridges which form normal to the wind or current direction in sand or silt. Ripple marks indicate the presence and direction of currents or winds. The ripples point in the direction in which the wind or current moves, the steeper side being leeward.

(4) Beach Ridges and Scarps. Beach ridges occur either in the backshore or behind it, in areas of former beaches. They are continuous mounds one or more feet high and parallel to the shoreline. Beach ridges indicate a coarse material and a beach that is building. They provide good trafficability; however, the area between may be soft and wet. Beach scarps are

small, clifflike cuts, which often divide the backshore into a series of berms or broad steps. They are caused by the erosion of waves and may be several feet high. Prominent, recently formed beach scarps indicate an eroding beach, with corresponding surf action.

(5) Berms. A berm is a nearly horizontal portion of the beach or backshore which is formed by a deposit of material from the waves. The berm is flatter than other portions of the beach. Berms are not always present on beaches, yet when they are, more than one may be present.

(6) Dunes

(a) Characteristics. Dunes are ridges or mounds of sand which are usually found along the landward side of the berm. Under favorable conditions, dunes are subject to stabilization by the encroachment of vegetation. In the advance stages, contours are rounded and simplified, slopes are reduced, and hollows are filled. Dunes always indicate the presence of sandy beaches and an excess sand supply. The direction of prevailing winds may be determined from the dune forms.

(b) Effects on Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles. Dunes are difficult to traverse. The sand is soft and is often built up in a slope so that miniature landslides occur under applied weight. Dune grass does not improve movement over dunes. Not until the later stages of stabilization, when the soil is deep enough to support trees, will it be possible for tracked vehicles and most trucks to cross dunes without the use of matting. In general, the rough between dunes provides better trafficability unless wet or marshy.

q. Navy Considerations in Selection of Landing Areas. From a Navy point of view, it is desirable that the landing area have certain characteristics, which are—

- A maneuver area free of navigational hazards.
- Good anchorages.
- A beach free of obstacles.
- A sheltered anchorage.
- Sufficient water depth for fire support.

(1) Maneuver Area Free of Hazards. There must be a maneuver area which is free of navigational hazards. It is important that it be clear, both in the approaches to the landing area and in those areas adjacent to it. In an approach to a landing beach with a force the size of a MEF, it is almost essential that ships can approach without further maneuvering so that they will be stationed for the landing. Obstacles can endanger shipping and although currents will not damage ships, they can throw ships off course and thus cause them to run aground or collide with other vessels. In addition, currents can render certain areas undesirable for fire support vessels because of the difficulty in maintaining a correct position plot.

(2) Good Holding Ground in Anchorages. Good holding ground facilitates the ship-to-shore movement by allowing ships to maintain fixed positions. An anchorage which has poor properties would require ships to ride to an excessively long scope of chain, which means a very large swing circle and wider dispersal of individual anchorages. A moderately fresh breeze may cause ships to drag anchor which might cause collisions. Usually the deeper the water, the better the holding ground. Large ships can only anchor in waters of 90 fathoms or more.

(3) Beach Approaches Free of Obstacles. The beach approach is the area between the transport areas and the beach. The most important natural obstacles are sandbars, reefs, rocks, and seaweed. The location and nature of obstacles determine whether or not a given beach is accessible to certain types of landing craft and define limitations on the movement of personnel and vehicles.

(4) Sheltered Anchorages. In open roadsteads, a slight shift in the wind may bring about a halt in the unloading. One of the primary naval considerations is shelter from unfavorable weather conditions.

(5) Sufficient Water Depth for Fire Support Ships. Naval vessels of the fire support groups require deep water close inshore if they are to be able to render close support at short range.

11007. Climate and Weather

a. Definitions

(1) Climate. Climate is defined as the prevailing or average weather conditions of a place, as determined by the temperatures and meteorological changes over a period of time. Climate conditions are significant in the early planning stages of amphibious operations.

(2) Weather. Weather consists of the general conditions of the atmosphere at a particular time and place with regard to the temperature and meteorological conditions.

b. Weather Considerations in Amphibious Operations. Incorporation of the weather into the planning and execution of operations may be decisive. The accurate analysis of weather allows combat power to be delivered with maximum efficiency and minimum losses. Weather affects each component of an operation in different ways. For example, when sea conditions are favorable for surface craft, conditions aloft may be unsuitable for air operations. Weather as it affects operations may be divided into four categories:

(1) Winds. The direction and speed of winds at the surface and in the upper air, the likelihood of storms, and the nature of storms that are typical in a given area.

(2) Visibility. The distance at which objects can be seen in a horizontal direction at the surface, and in both a vertical and horizontal direction in the upper air; the restrictions imposed on visibility by fog, rain, sleet, snow, haze and other precipitation.

(3) Temperature. The effects of temperature on personnel and materiel.

(4) Precipitation. The effect of precipitation on personnel and materiel.

c. Influence of Weather on Amphibious Operations. Weather must be considered and its affects evaluated for every phase of the operation.

(1) Precipitation. Precipitation has a primary influence on the trafficability of soil. However, it will also have a direct impact on items of equipment, personnel, and visibility. Snow alters camouflage techniques and affects trafficability.

(2) Temperature. Extreme temperature will affect trafficability (especially freezing weather) and will directly affect the capabilities of personnel and equipment to function for extended periods of time.

(3) Visibility. Fog and precipitation will limit fields of fire, limit ground and aerial observation, provide concealment for movements, reduce the effectiveness of supporting arms, and greatly complicate the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent helicopter operations. Astronomical data will provide information on the sun, tides, and phases of the moon which will have a direct bearing on the approach of the planning and execution of the operations.

(4) Meteorological Conditions. Meteorological conditions in the Arctic Circle will affect compass readings and radio communications.

d. Forecasting Weather. A weather forecast is a prediction of the state of the atmosphere at a definite location at some future time or period of

time. In planning, weather can be forecasted with respect to general climatic conditions of an area with limited information on specific areas. For current weather, ship and land stations all over the world observe and report current conditions for the preparation of weather charts. After completion of the charts, forecasts are made and broadcasted. The accuracy of weather forecast are based on—

- Correlation of existing weather charts and data.
- Application of forecasting rules, theories, and hypotheses.
- Forecaster's experience, knowledge of terrain, and other external influencing factors.

(1) Weather Forecasts for Amphibious Operations. An aerology unit which is capable of forecasting weather can be requested to support operations from the nearest Navy or fleet weather central. Additionally, both the CATF and CLF have organic weather collection and forecasting capabilities which should be used in concert with information obtained from external sources.

(2) Types of Weather Forecasts. Weather forecasts fall into two general types:

(a) Synoptic. he synoptic method is used for day-to-day forecasting. It is developed from reports which are received from the network of reporting stations. The observations are transmitted to a weather central where an analysis is made and the results forwarded to operating units. A synoptic forecast depends primarily on two elements: a dependable means of communications and having observers located throughout a widespread area. Synoptic forecasts can be made from 1 to 2 days prior to the operation and are suitable for military operations.

(b) Statistical. Statistical weather forecasting is used for estimating conditions beyond the range of synoptic forecasting. It relies on weather observations which have been accumulated over the years and compared with the current prevailing weather patterns. It can give only a general description of expected climatic conditions and the limits of extreme conditions. A determination of actual conditions can be derived only by preparing a synoptic forecast.

e. Principles to be Observed in Formulating Weather Plans

(1) Aerological Officer Support. During a combat operation, a qualified aerological officer must be available. His services are essential to the preparation of an accurate weather forecast and the effects of the broad weather picture. Only a trained aerologist can properly evaluate the weather reports and determine the effects of local weather conditions.

(2) Overall Relationship of Weather. If other factors of the operation remain stable, weather should be a primary consideration in selection of D-Day. The problem of forecasting weather for each part of the amphibious operation is difficult, and weather requirements of each element participating in the landing must be carefully considered. The conditions chosen must contribute to the advantage of the force as a whole, rather than for the benefit of one unit.

(3) Approach to the Target Area. During the approach phase, weather should be used to the maximum for concealment. Should the approach be made in calm, clear weather, the enemy can easily locate the ATF and attack it, or possibly determine the location of the landing site. Bad weather, storms, fog, and winds will affect the movement to the target area, but will force the enemy to rely on more indirect and less dependable methods in order to locate and attack our forces, or to determine the target area.

(4) Unreliability of Average Weather. Average weather is used to determine climatic conditions that will be encountered, but the information required for the execution of an amphibious operation must be more specific. It should be

only hours old. The degree of reliance which can be placed on weather forecast decreases hourly and a 24- or 36-hour old forecast can be directly out of phase with present weather conditions.

(5) Dissemination of Weather Information. Priority must be assigned to weather traffic so that it may be promptly received and distributed. If any unusual weather conditions are anticipated, they should be given priority over almost any other traffic.

(6) Good Weather After Initial Assault. The success of an operation may depend on several favorable days after the initial assault. Supporting arms and trafficability are adversely affected by low visibility or precipitation. The most important consideration is the amount of sea and swell. Excessive sea and swell may end the movement ashore phase of later serials, thus placing the assault forces in a precarious position.

(7) Auxiliary Weather Observers. Weather reports should be obtained from all possible sources. In addition to the regularly established network, auxiliary weather observers normally are the only source of weather information in the target area, unless enemy weather reports can be obtained. Weather reconnaissance flights should be used, submarines can be invaluable, and underground forces and observers in enemy territory can provide information. In short, all avenues must be explored to obtain accurate weather information.

(8) Route to Target. The selection of the route to the target area primarily depends on tactical reasons but the selection should consider weather considerations.

(9) Effect of Topographic Features on Weather Conditions. Topographic features (e.g., mountains) have a marked effect on weather conditions such as fog and precipitation. These features must be taken into account in planning and execution phases.

(10) Alternate Plans. Alternate plans for amphibious operations provide for the various circumstances of weather. The plans take into account possible variations of weather conditions.

(1) Weather Information from Rear Echelon. A rear echelon aerological unit should be established at, or as near as possible to, the AO to provide the latest weather information to the operating force. This unit should be trained in the problems of the specific operation.

f. Effect of Wind. Wind force and direction are important elements to be considered, since they primarily determine the sea, swell, and surf conditions on the beach.

(1) Characteristics. Winds at or near the earth's surface have been classified and their characteristics are known and predictable. Some winds are very deep and may extend for miles into the air; some are shallow and extend only a few hundred feet above the surface. Winds aloft may blow in the opposite direction of surface winds, and velocity and direction may vary at different elevations.

(2) Descriptive Terminology. A precise knowledge of winds is unnecessary for the planner, but the planner will need to know the types of winds and how they can influence an operation. Horizontal winds fall into the following classifications:

(a) Zonal. Zonal winds are those which tend to be constant in a given belt of latitude.

(b) Monsoon Winds. Monsoon winds are due to a seasonal temperature difference between a continent and its adjacent oceans. A monsoon blows steadily in the same direction for many weeks and reverses between winter and summer. Summer monsoons blow from the sea to the land bringing rain. Winter monsoons blow from the land to the sea and are dry.

(c) Extra Tropical Cyclones. Extra tropical cyclones continually blow in the two temperate zones and are like great rotary waves. They generally move in an easterly direction. There is usually an *anticyclone*, a wind of opposite direction, intervening between two successive cyclones. Cyclones bring precipitation and poor visibility. Anticyclones bring fair, dry, weather. The strength and direction of cyclones are highly variable.

(d) Tropical Cyclones. Tropical cyclones are dangerous storms of rotating winds, scores of miles in extent, which always originate near the equator but can drift far from the equator before dying out.

(e) Winds in Thunderstorms. Thunderstorms are usually a local phenomenon, only a few miles across. A thunderstorm may occur in any latitude at any time of the year. On some occasions, the winds may reach hurricane force.

(f) Line Squalls. A line squall is a turbulent section of cloud that may stand miles high and extend for hundreds of miles along a front, forming a serious obstacle to air operations.

(g) Local Winds. Local winds are limited in influence and restricted to a particular area. The most common encountered by the ATF are land and sea breezes, which are like little monsoons gently blowing for hours instead of intensely for weeks.

(3) Effect on Sea Conditions. Size, height, and length of waves depend on the wind speed, stretch of water over which the wind has blown, and length of time the wind has been blowing. As such, the wind conditions will influence sea and swell conditions.

(4) Effect on Tide. The force of unusually strong winds on the tide may greatly alter beach topography. In conjunction with an ebb tide, a strong offshore wind may literally blow the water off the beach. On a gentle gradient, the water may recede to an extreme distance, necessitating the passage of personnel and material over a wide exposed beach. On the other hand, a powerful offshore wind can increase the advance of high tide to such an extent that beach installations and activities will be threatened or inundated.

(5) Effect on Air Operations

(a) Surface Winds. Surface winds affect takeoff and landing conditions and may also cause damage to aircraft parked on the ground. Operations from carriers requires a minimum wind.

(b) Winds Aloft. Winds aloft are an important consideration in the employment of aircraft. Wind direction and force will affect flight times, pay loads, and ranges of aircraft. Turbulent atmospheres, specifically ones which include crosscurrents and updrafts, may buffet and structurally damage aircraft. Aerial reconnaissance and support are influenced by wind conditions in the upper air.

(c) Helicopter Operations. Considerations in the employment of helicopterborne forces are the same as for fixed-wing operations; however, winds in excess of 25 knots must be considered in planning final approaches.

(6) Effects of Reduced Visibility. During the movement phase, conditions of reduced visibility aid in protecting the force from enemy observation and attack. At the target area, reduced visibility offers protection, to some extent, from enemy air attack and provides cover for transports and landing craft in the ship-to-shore movement. However, reduced visibility decreases the effectiveness of supporting arms. The movement to shore becomes more difficult due to landing craft being delayed, not coming in on schedule, or even landing in the wrong areas. The time of attack is frequently dictated by BMNT (beginning of morning nautical twilight).

(a) Clouds. The amount of cloud cover is described as sky cover. Sky cover is the degree of cloudiness as viewed from the surface. Types of cloud cover are—

- Clear. Less than one-tenth of the sky covered.
- Scattered. One-tenth to five-tenths of the sky covered.
- Broken. Five-tenths to nine-tenths of the sky covered.
- Overcast. More than nine-tenths of the sky covered.

(b) Effect on Close Air Support. Fog and low level clouds may prevent or restrict carrier operations. Reduced visibility also affects reconnaissance and CAS missions.

(c) Effect of Naval Gunfire Support. Reduced visibility obscures targets during pre-D-Day bombardments. Previously located and plotted targets can be fired on but newly identified and mobile targets will be difficult to fire on. During the landing phase, fire support depends on observation of fires and reduced visibility will reduce naval gunfire effectiveness. Reduced visibility may be desirable for harassing fire missions or to execute a feint, at which time it would provide protection from enemy observation.

(d) Effect of Poor Visibility on Ship-to-Shore Movement. In conditions of darkness and fog, it may be necessary to lead landing craft to the beach with larger vessels equipped with navigational instruments. Poor visibility can be exploited during the conduct of small scale landing or raids.

(e) Effect of Visibility on Time of Landing. A long period of daylight is ordinarily desirable for the execution of the assault. The approach may be made during darkness and debarkation begun during the morning twilight. During morning twilight, the identification of objects ashore is difficult because the color and definition of objects change rapidly. Therefore, the desired time of landing, with respect to visibility, may be from 1 to 3 hours after sunrise to obtain sufficient light for identification of beaches and supporting arms targets.

h. Effect of Extreme Temperatures on Personnel. When personnel are subject to tropical climates, physical endurance is reduced and heat casualties become an important factor. In cold weather operations, frostbite casualties have exceeded battle casualties. A cold climate demands special clothing, shelter, and training. The effects of temperature extremes primarily concerns logistics planning, but it also affect the capabilities of personnel. The exhausting and restricting influences of temperature extremes will limit the stamina of personnel.

i. Effects of Excessive Precipitation

(1) Effect on Personnel. Excessive precipitation has its greatest effect on morale since personnel may suffer acute physical discomfort and become reluctant to perform their duties or to leave shelters.

(2) Effects of Vehicular Movement. A period of prolonged precipitation will leave certain areas impassable to sustained traffic. A period of prolonged dryness will cause sandy beaches to become untrafficable, whereas a degree of precipitation will provide the best beach trafficability. In addition, the flood stage of rivers and streams are affected by precipitation causing them to become wider and deeper. Falling snow reduces visibility while fallen snow increases observation but obscures obstacles. Deep snow hampers the movement of vehicles and personnel.

(3) Effects on Supporting Arms. Precipitation affects supporting arms in several ways. Several feet of snow have the same smothering effect on munitions bursts as does soft sand. Heavy rain or snow will cause delay in the emplacement of artillery positions. Emergency airfields may become inoperable because of heavy rain or snow. Snow and sleet also have adverse effects on flight deck operations on carriers.

Chapter 12

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

12001. Introduction

a. General. The proper planning and execution of combat operations at all MAGTF levels is dependent on maps, charts, and geodetic products being available when needed. See FMFRP 3-28, *Tri-MEF Standing Operating Procedures for Field Intelligence Operations*, (chapter 9) for information and procedures for procurement and maintenance of maps, charts, and geodetic products. All intelligence officers should be able to—

- Plan for a unit's map and chart requirements.
- Rapidly requisition maps and charts from the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for both normal operations and during crisis situations.
- Task the MEF topographic (TOPO) platoon for mapping, charting, geodetic surveys, and terrain analysis support.

b. Supporting Documents. Knowledge of the following documents is essential to successfully plan and implement mapping, charting, geodetic operations within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF).

(1) General Publications

(a) CinCPacFltINST S3140.2A, *FMFPac MC&G Planning, War Reserve Stock and MEU/BLT Deployment Allowance Program.*

(b) FMFLant ForceO Poo3169.1A, *SOP for MC&G Program.*

(c) DMA Catalog, vol. II, pt. 6, *DOD Ordering Procedures and Crisis Support.*

(2) DMA Instructions

(a) DMAINST 8050.3, *Area Requirements and Product Status (ARAPS) System.*

(b) DMAINST 8050.4, *Submission and Validation of Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) Requirements.*

(c) DMAINST 8052.1, *Validation of Requirements for New or Modified Non-Crisis Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) Products and Services.*

(d) DMAINST 8052.6, *Procedures for Obtaining Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Products in Support of Crisis Situations.*

(e) DMAINST 8052.7, *Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Support for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*

(f) DMAINST 8052.9, *Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Support to Exercises.*

(g) DMAINST 8680.1, *Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) War Reserve Stocks (WRS).*

(3) DMA Map Production Publications

(a) DOD MC&G Area Requirements (U). Contains all area requirement submissions. Referred to as the *Grey Book.*

(b) DMA Aeronautical Charts and related Products Requirements, Status and Programs (U).

(c) DMA Nautical Charts and Related Products Requirements, Status and Programs.

(d) DMA Topographic Maps and Related Products Requirements, Status and Programs (U).

(e) DMA Missile and Target Material Support Requirements, Status and Programs (U).

12002. Responsibilities

a. Overall Responsibility. MC&G responsibility comes under the staff cognizance of the intelligence officer at all levels of command. This responsibility includes the identification of MC&G product requirements, procurement, and arrangement for transportation as well as distribution. The intelligence officer at each level of command will need to complete the following process to fulfill his MC&G responsibility:

(1) Needs to analyze the command's composition. This analysis identifies the types, scales, and number of MC&G products. These support the commander, his staff, and all elements within the command.

(2) Rreviews the command's area of interest, to include required training areas. The needs of the command establish the required MC&G area coverage.

(3) Reviews the DMA catalogues. This determines the availability of MC&G products to support the requirements established in the first two steps.

(4) Establishes available coverage and gaps in coverage and brings this to the attention of the commander, the staff, and subordinate elements. A basis for priority MC&G requests is then formed for when the command commits to combat operations. It also provides the basis for submitting the annual MC&G training and operational map requirements.

(5) Passes the listing containing the MC&G deficiencies and their relative priority up the chain of command for record and appropriate action.

b. Direct Responsibility. The following officers have direct responsibility for MC&G:

(1) The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) MC&G officer is responsible for—

(a) Acting as the senior Marine Corps MC&G representative to DMA.

(b) On a national level, supplying Marine Corps input to Joint Pub documents, prebriefing Joint Pub MC&G agenda items, providing official Marine Corps responses to requests for MC&G information, and representing the Marine Corps at official MC&G related meetings.

(c) Coordinating FMF MC&G requirements.

(d) Submitting Marine Corps MC&G requirements to DMA with respect to training areas.

(e) Monitoring the mapping needs of the Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center.

(2) The Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command MC&G project officer is responsible for—

(a) Coordinating with DMA on systems related matters.

(b) Overseeing Marine Corps Systems related MC&G efforts.

(c) Acting as MOS and equipment sponsor for the 14 occupation fields.

(3) The FMF MC&G officer is responsible for—

(a) Coordinating FMF MC&G requirements and submitting them to the fleet

MC&G officer or MCCDC MC&G officer as appropriate.

(b) With respect to the DMA ARAPS, submitting FMF MC&G requirements needed to support OPLANs/CONPLANs to the fleet MC&G officer.

(c) Keeping the FMF ACS G-2, informed on the availability of adequate DMA map coverage for each OPLAN/CONPLAN. This is critical as adequate map coverage is not available for the majority of geographical areas where Marine Corps units must implement OPLANs/CONPLANs.

(d) Planning FMF war reserve stock requirements and submitting them to the fleet MC&G officer.

(4) The MEF MC&G officer is responsible for—

(a) Acting as the MEF TOPO platoon commander. These duties include ensuring an ongoing training program within the MEF which covers the support available and how to obtain it.

(b) Coordinating MEF MC&G requirements and submitting them to the FMF MC&G officer.

(c) With respect to the DMA ARAPS, submitting MEF requirements to the FMF MC&G officer.

(d) Keeping the MEF ACS G-2 informed on the availability of adequate DMA map coverage for each OPLAN/CONPLAN that MEF units have a part in. This is critical as adequate map coverage is not available for the majority of the geographical areas.

(e) Planning for the use of the MEF TOPO platoon to counter the critical DMA map shortage.

(f) Planning MEF MC&G war reserve stock requirements and submitting them to the FMF MC&G officer.

(5) The MEB MC&G officer is responsible for—

(a) Coordinating MEB MC&G requirements and submitting them to the appropriate higher headquarters.

(b) With respect to the DMA ARAPS program, submitting MEB requirements to the appropriate higher headquarters.

(c) Keeping the MEB ACS G-2 informed on the availability of adequate DMA map coverage for each OPLAN/CONPLAN the MEB has a part in. This is critical as map coverage for many areas is not available.

(d) Planning for MEB war reserve stock requirements and submitting them to the appropriate higher headquarters.

(6) MEU intelligence officers are responsible for planning MEU (PAK) requirements.

(7) Division/wing MC&G officer is responsible for—

(a) Ensuring that all subordinate units have the required map catalogs on hand with all changes.

(b) Ensuring that all intelligence personnel within the command are thoroughly familiar with the map ordering procedures and crisis support procedures outlined in DMA catalog vol. 6, part 2, *Map Ordering Procedures and Crisis Support*.

(c) Ensuring that all intelligence personnel within the command know how to use the DMA Semiannual Bulletin Digest for each catalog to determine what is the latest edition of a particular map and what are the current maps in the DMA inventory.

12003. Topographic Platoon

a. Mission. Provide tailored mapping, charting, and geodetic products and services to the MEF and subordinate MAGTFs.

b. Tasking. To fulfill their missions, TOPO platoons work in the following areas and accomplish the following activities:

(1) Mapping. The platoon supplements normal mapping sources by preparing map substitutes, overlays, overprints, photomosaic map revisions, and multicolor products. Combat charts, coastal charts, port charts, and harbor charts are revised or produced in small quantities. Multisource terrain information is analyzed, photography is annotated, and terrain studies and related products are provided for the tactical commander. Products provided can include the following:

- Terrain models. Three dimensional terrain models.
- Line-of-sight studies.
- Fan range studies.
- Overlays of all sorts.
- Revise and create map sheets.
- Hydrographic charts.
- Landing zone studies, drop zone studies.

(2) Coastal Hydrographic Survey. The platoon conducts coastal hydrographic surveys from the six fathom depth curve or from where the Navy ocean survey ends, to the high water line. The survey is extended beyond the beach to the first line of communications that allows lateral movement behind the beach. Coastal data for hydrographic charts is collected for imminent and future amphibious operations, trafficability, routes of egress, and hydrographic data on inland water bodies.

(3) Geodetic/Topographic Survey. The TOPO platoon conducts timely and precise second order horizontal and vertical surveys, which encompass astronomic, geodetic, and satellite positioning and geodetic and magnetic azimuth surveys. Survey procedures include traversing, triangulation, trilateration, and precise leveling and distance measuring. Primary geodetic control stations are established for use by artillery, missile, air, and communication units, and positioning systems that require geodetic control. These surveys and computations support the mission objectives. The activities include:

- Providing 2d order/2d class survey points.
- The support of artillery, MAW, and radio battalion units.
- Support the establishment of airfields and ranges.
- Utilization of satellite resources for navigational purposes.
- Hydrographic surveying techniques/capabilities (H-Star system).

c. Organization. The TOPO platoon is organic to the intelligence company, SRIG and is organized into headquarters, cartographic/terrain analysis, and geodetic/hydrographic survey sections. Total strength is 2 officers and 45 enlisted personnel. (See fig. 12-1.)



Figure 12-1. Topographic Platoon, Intelligence Company, SRIG.

d. Concept of Employment. The platoon is intended to support any size MAGTF. Terrain analysis and survey teams may be employed simultaneously to fulfill the MC&G requirements of the MAGTF. The platoon is not capable of independent operations and will require support from the SRIG or from the unit to which attached.

e. Command and Control

(1) In garrison, the platoon is under the command of the SRIG which is resident within each MEF. When deployed, the platoon is under the command of the SRIG commander and under the staff cognizance of the MAGTF G-2/S-2.

(2) The platoon commander, acting as a special staff officer provides expertise to the supported commander concerning employment and operations of the TOPO platoon, and provides for planning, direction, and supervision of the platoon in accomplishing assigned missions.

(3) The platoon has organic communication equipment to support short-range communication requirements, but must be supported for long-range communications requirements.

f. Training. Topography/surveying is a challenging and difficult field to master. Those who hold the MOSs of 1431 and 1442 are the products of an extensive training cycle. Most of the members of the TOPO platoon are selected at the Belvoir Engineering School and introduced to the training pipeline at that location.

(1) MOS 1431-Cartographer

(a) Basic Cartographer School, 8 weeks.

(b) Basic Terrain Analysis, 13 weeks.

(c) Advance Terrain Analysis, 13 weeks.

(d) Autocat School, 1 week.

(e) APS Course, 2 weeks.

(f) MSI (Multispectral Imagery).

(2) MOS 1442-Surveyor

(a) Basic Geodetic Course, 13 weeks.

(b) Basic Hydrographic Survey Course, 8 weeks.

(c) Advanced Geodetic Survey Course.

(d) Instrument Maintenance Course, 6 weeks.

(e) APS Course, same as above for 1431.

(f) MSI Course, same as above for 1431.

(3) Cross training is very important and, by the time a Marine reaches staff sergeant in the TOPO platoon, he will normally have attended 6 or 7 schools.

g. Administrative Capabilities. The TOPO platoon is not capable of self-administration and will require support from the HQSVC Co, SRIG.

h. Firepower. The platoon has only individual weapons capable of providing local security and assisting in the defense of its installation against infiltration. Reinforcement is required from supported units to provide protection to the hydrographic/geodetic survey and terrain analysis teams during the execution of their missions.

i. Transportation. The platoon has only the motor transport required for movement of the command element, the survey teams, and its own internal supplies. Heavy motor transport from external sources is required to move its topographic mapping van, hydrographic survey platform, and operational and supporting equipment.

j. Supply. The TOPO platoon requires additional support from the SRIG or the supported unit to meet logistical requirements. It must at all times have external supply support when deployed in the field.

k. Maintenance. The TOPO platoon is capable of lst echelon maintenance on all equipment

assigned to the unit; 2d echelon maintenance on organic topographic peculiar items, motor transport equipment and generators; and 3d echelon maintenance on optical surveying instruments.

l. Messing. The TOPO platoon has no messing capability. It must be supported either by the SRIG or by the supported unit.

m. Medical. The TOPO platoon has no medical capability. It must be supported either by the SRIG or by the supported unit.

12004. MC&G Required Holdings

a. All Marine Corps units, organizations, and commands are required to hold (and know how to use) the current edition of the following DMA catalogs, with all changes, semiannual bulletin digests and monthly bulletins.

(1) Volume I, *Aeronautical Charts and Flight Information Publications*, part 1, *Aerospace Products.*

(2) Volumes I-XI, *Classified and Unclassified Hydrographic Products*, part 2, *Hydrographic Products.*

(3) Volumes I-IV, *Classified and Unclassified Topographic Products*, part 3, *Topographic Products.*

(4) Volume II, *DOD Ordering Procedures and Crisis Support*, part 6, *General Purpose Products.*

b. FMF MC&G officers will hold or have access to:

(1) All documents listed in paragraph 12001b.

(2) All DMA catalogs, except vol. II, part 4, for mine warfare; part 5 for submarine products; vols. I and III, part 6, for public sales; and vol. II, part 7, for strategic data. The entire listing of DMA catalogs is found in DMA catalog vol. II, part 6, *General Information*, page 1.

(3) A current computerized listing of all FMF mapping accounts.

c. FMF MC&G Officers will:

(1) Determine and promulgate in writing which commands, organizations, and units are required to hold:

- The specialized mapping catalogs referred to in paragraph 12004b(2).
- The documents listed in paragraph 12001b.

(2) Coordinate the determination of required contingency and war reserve stock map holding within commands, organizations, and units, and promulgate it in writing.

12005. Products and Services

The following miscellaneous DMA products and services are available.

a. Defense Mapping Agency Combat Support Center (DMACSC) Pentagon Map Depot. This depot provides rapid map and chart support to all Marines within the Washington DC and Quantico area.

b. DMACSC Customer Assistance Office. This office has a phone number listed on the front of all semiannual bulletin digests and monthly bulletins. The office provides answers to all DMA map and chart related questions. This includes questions related to map orders.

c. U.S. Geological Survey Maps. These maps cover the entire United States and are available for training purposes. Procedures for ordering them are found in DMA catalog vol. II, part 6, *General Information*, pages 5 and 6.

Part IV. Intelligence Cycle

Chapter 13

Intelligence and Staff Planning

13001. Introduction

Intelligence is a never ending process that is continually updating studies, evaluations, and estimates. The intelligence process begins with receipt of the warning order or initiating directive and continues beyond completion of the mission. To make knowledgeable decisions or begin an action, the commander must have intelligence and information. Throughout the process, the intelligence officer provides the commander with intelligence and information and anticipates and identifies future intelligence needs. The intelligence officer and the operations officer also interact continually to provide the commander with the latest intelligence and battle information in order for the commander to complete the mission.

The commanding officer and his staff should make decisions and take action based on the best available intelligence or information. The intelligence cycle is structured to support the commander and his staff so that under battle conditions they can make the best possible decision. Following the phases of the intelligence cycle, warning orders, concepts of operation, initiating directives, mission assignments, and planning requirements spur intelligence operations.

The methods by which the intelligence section manipulates the intelligence cycle will vary from unit to unit. This is a reflection of each intelligence section's unique characteristics. The intelligence section's experience, training, knowledge, resources (manpower, equipment, supplies), and time constraints all influence its selection of tools and processes. These range from workbooks, journals, matrixes, and templates to computerized data bases and automated displays.

13002. Phases of the Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle has five phases and through these phases information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence, and made available to users. (See fig. 13-1.) The intelligence cycle is continuous and even though the phases are conducted sequentially for any given intelligence requirement, the intelligence process begins with the receipt of the warning order or initiating directive and continues beyond completion of the mission. This sequence comprises the following five phases: Direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.



Figure 13-1. Intelligence Cycle.

13003. Direction

Direction is the determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02) Intelligence direction is a continuous process. (See fig. 13-2.) It begins on receipt of a warning order, initiating directive, or establishment of a planning objective and continues until termination of the mission. Intelligence direction has two objectives:

- The direction and planning of intelligence activities sufficiently in advance to produce intelligence that will be of use in the next battle.
- The direction and planning of intelligence activities to provide combat information to support operations in progress.



Figure 13-2. Intelligence Cycle (Direction).

a. Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence requirements not only give direction to the intelligence cycle but are one of the factors necessary to establish the initial appraisal of the required intelligence collection effort. (See par. 14002.) Prior to receipt of the mission, the intelligence officer should actively anticipate basic intelligence requirements and initiate actions to meet them. After the mission has been received, specific requirements (EEI/OIR) are also developed by the MAGTF commander, his staff, the GCE, ACE, and the CSSE. The initial intelligence estimates of the various components of the MAGTF will serve to identify intelligence gaps, which can also become requirements. Requirements will continue to be developed throughout the operation. Finite collection resources demand that the requirements be prioritized.

(1) Basic Requirements. Basic intelligence requirements are relatively unchanging aspects of the enemy and military geography. Existing intelligence products and encyclopedic data bases satisfy those basic requirements.

(2) Essential Elements of Information. The highest priority requirements are the commander's EEI. Providing answers to the commander's EEI is the first priority of the intelligence section. These EEI should be limited to the most critical items of information needed by the commander which relate directly to mission accomplishment. In almost all cases, EEI are limited to potential enemy courses of action. EEI of subordinate element commanders are submitted and may be incorporated in the MAGTF commander's EEI or stated as OIR.

(3) Other Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence requirements of less criticality than EEI are termed OIR. OIR are mainly questions from other staff officers. Answering these OIR is the second priority of the intelligence section. While not of the same priority as EEI, OIR are still of prime importance to the MAGTF as they fill in the overall intelligence picture.

In some cases, the MAGTF intelligence officer will have to assist the commander and the staff in developing EEI and OIR. Requirements are dynamic and will not always originate at the initiation of planning, but may be identified during subsequent staff planning, after the initial intelligence estimate has been disseminated, after courses of action have been clarified, or later.

The time available for planning, coupled with the fluidity of combat, may combine to force the production of incomplete combat intelligence. In such cases, the intelligence officer may only be able to initially provide partial information to meet planning/operational windows. More complete responses should be developed when time permits and priorities justify.

b. Collection Planning. (See par. 14004.)

(1) Collection planning revolves around the creation and maintenance of a plan. This plan identifies available and appropriate collection sources to fulfill established intelligence requirements.

(2) The collection plan translates the intelligence requirements into specific information requirements (SIR). Intelligence taskings and requests to collection sources are formulated by the collection section of the SRIG or SRIG detachment to answer the SIR. The intelligence plan may be a formal written plan or an informal workbook or mental process.

(3) The successful collection plan is completely dynamic when it responds to ever changing intelligence needs. The successful intelligence officer will be one who orchestrates his collection plan and assets to best fulfill the commander's intelligence needs.

c. Issuance of Orders and Requests. Information collection tasks must be communicated as orders to subordinate units and as requests to adjacent and higher headquarters. (See par. 14007.) The means of requesting specific intelligence collection missions are:

(1) Intelligence Collection Requirement (ICR). The ICR is an intelligence requirement of short term duration/one-time use which cannot be satisfied from existing intelligence holdings and can be best collected by human resources.

(2) Continuing Intelligence Requirement. The continuing intelligence requirement is a specific intelligence requirement which dictates continuous and repetitive reporting, which cannot be satisfied from existing intelligence holdings.

d. Supervision of the Collection Effort. The direction effort does not end with the issuance of orders and requests. The intelligence officer continually supervises the collection effort. Liaison must be maintained with the various collection agencies to monitor the collection activity and to identify problem areas at the earliest possible time. (See par. 14008.)

13004. Collection

a. General. Collection is the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) The collection phase of the intelligence cycle involves the gathering of information from all available sources. Collection planning involves matching the multitude of intelligence requirements with a finite pool of assets. (See fig. 13-3.)



Figure 13-3. Intelligence Cycle (Collection).

b. Basic Collection Principles. Basic collection principles include the following:

(1) The risk involved in employing an intelligence collection asset must be justified by the gain of intelligence/information.

(2) Organic MAGTF assets must always be considered first due to their advantages in responsiveness and control.

(3) Prior to arrival in the AOA, the MAGTF is dependent to a very large degree on external agencies and collection resources. After the MAGTF begins operations in the objective area, external means, in many cases, may be the only way certain requirements can be met.

(4) Higher headquarters will task collection agencies on behalf of MAGTF information requirements rather than MAGTF collection taskings. This frees the MAGTF collections officer from managing assets not controlled by the MAGTF.

(5) Collection planning must always address connectivity between collection means and the recipient. Plans should call for communications reliability, redundancy, and speed. The MAGTF communications-electronics officer must always be included when providing for communication support of the intelligence collection effort.

(6) Collection planning is an ongoing, dynamic process. The intelligence officer should strive to achieve overlap to provide enough data so the intelligence analyst can make a comparison to, and/or verify information and intelligence already known.

13005. Processing and Production

a. Processing. Processing is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) It is usually not a discrete function but rather is accomplished during collection or production. For example, the NATO intelligence cycle only has four steps: direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. It combines the U.S. steps of processing and production. (See fig. 13-4.)



Figure 13-4. Intelligence Cycle (Processing).

(1) **Recording.** Recording is the reduction of information to writing or some other graphical representation.

(2) **Converting.** Converting is the changing of raw data into a usable form suitable for recording and collating.

(3) **Collating.** Collating is the arranging of information into groups of related or like items.

b. Production. Production is the conversion of information into intelligence through evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.

(See fig. 13-5.) Production converts information into combat intelligence and entails much more than recycling combat information. The MAGTF intelligence section should be organized so as to maximize the production of combat intelligence to meet the stated requirements of the particular operation being conducted. Standard responses not keyed to the commander's needs fail to achieve the basic objective of providing him with the intelligence to exploit the environment and enemy vulnerabilities. Such standard responses are the result of an inflexible and mechanical approach to the steps of the intelligence process as stated above. Each operation is unique. This demands a unique approach to organizing the intelligence effort, keyed to the needs of the command as stated by his specific requirements. Production consists of evaluating the information, analyzing it to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and the operations of the command and integrating the information with other known information to form hypothesis. The information to form logical conclusions is then incorporated into the current intelligence estimate.



Figure 13-5. Intelligence Cycle (Production).

A number of valuable reference documents are available to assist the MAGTF intelligence section in building an order of battle data base. These include the Naval Intelligence Publication Register, DIA's Register of Intelligence Publications, and other references. In addition, the microfiche-based Naval Intelligence Processing System contains much valuable encyclopedic data. This microfiche data base in being replaced by an automated data base called the Tactical Intelligence Processing System. Marine Corps Order 3830.1 deals with intelligence dissemination, establishing DIA account numbers, and establishing standing requirements for recurring distribution.

The specific procedures used at the MAGTF for production will generally be a matter for unit standing operating procedures. These procedures include the development of recording means, order of battle information displays, and organizational techniques.

The following steps convert information into intelligence:

- Integrating information to combine elements isolated in analysis with other known information.
- Analyzing information to isolate significant elements with respect to mission and operations.
- Evaluating information as to pertinence, reliability of source, and accuracy.
- Intepreting information to form logical conclusions which bear directly on the command's mission and can be incorporated into the commander's decision-making process.

13006. Dissemination

a. Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it. (Joint Pub 1-02) Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle and is the goal in the production of intelligence. (See fig. 13-6.) The MAGTF intelligence effort is in vain unless the intelligence derived from



Figure 13-6. Intelligence Cycle (Dissemination).

processing can be effectively disseminated to, the commander and the subordinate elements of the MAGTF in time for decision makers to act on the intelligence. Dissemination will not occur automatically, but must be a result of simultaneous efforts at each unit in the MAGTF to push intelligence out and to pull intelligence in from every available source. There is no substitute for personal liaison by the MAGTF intelligence officer and the intelligence officers at each element of the MAGTF.

b. When determining dissemination requirements and the means of dissemination, the following principles should be considered.

(1) Timeliness. The product must reach the consumer in time for the product to be of use.

(2) Pertinence. Requirements and needs of the recipient determines intelligence dissemination.

(3) Usability of Form. The forms and transmittal means used must be the most responsive to the needs of the recipient.

(4) Security. The enemy must not notice the extent of friendly intelligence focused on him.

c. Redundant communications means are essential. A single dedicated intelligence net is inadequate to handle the volume of information that needs to be passed in the MAGTF. All nets can be used to pass intelligence.

d. INTSUMs can be passed when time permits. (See app. CC.) In exercises, INTSUMs tend to become historical summaries of little use to the commander. INTSUMs should not become an end in themselves for intelligence sections, but should be sent when convenient. Timely submission of intelligence spot reports precludes the requirement for formal intelligence summaries by allowing the interchange of information between the elements of the MAGTF. Dissemination is dynamic and continual.

e. ACE requirements for imagery, in addition to imagery reporting, is essential for accurate weapons delivery and assault support planning. The MAGTF intelligence officer should be attuned to the requirement for a viable means of imagery dissemination to certain MAGTF elements.

f. Alternate formats for dissemination can be effective, including the use of graphics such as overlays, target area replicas, terrain models and automated files, tapes, floppy disks, topographic products, and multisource imagery products.

g. In rapidly moving situations and when the elements of the MAGTF are widely separated, dissemination will become extremely difficult. In such cases, the intelligence officer will have to make use of less-than-complete data and must base estimates of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action on experience and judgement in addition to the incomplete data in hand. In any case, an aggressive and imaginative dissemination plan will in most cases overcome inertia and the confusion inherent in combat operations.

h. Lateral dissemination of intelligence among the major subordinate elements of the MAGTF is required to exploit the full potential of the air-ground-logistics team. Many units in the MAGTF such as low-altitude air defense teams and others will possess much information vital to the intelligence collection effort. The ACE, GCE, and CSSE must therefore carry out an active effort at lateral intelligence dissemination over and above exchanging INTSUMs and reporting the data to the MAGTF intelligence section. In certain operations, the GCE and ACE will have phased ashore when the MAGTF command element is still afloat. The GCE and ACE will then be very dependent on each other for valuable current intelligence data.

13007. Intelligence Support for Special Operations

The intelligence requirements for special operations are unique. A rapid planning process, the requirement for extremely detailed information, and the need for the dissemination of special products for special operations consumers demands that the MAGTF intelligence officer be prepared to respond accordingly. The following basic considerations apply:

a. Considerable organic and external collection and analytical intelligence resources will be dedicated to a relatively small force and objective area.

b. Support to the rapid planning process demands a rapid information turnaround.

c. Work done prior to mission receipt in anticipation of requirements saves valuable time. Use of generic intelligence requirements expedites and closely tailors promulgation of needs.

d. Rapid planning dictates a selective but comprehensive orientation on the target area for special operations planners. This must be followed by frequent and selective updates as required.

e. A great emphasis on graphical displays of intelligence and information on the target is essential. These include target area replicas, terrain models, building diagrams, and gridded photos. Such graphics increase consumer understanding and speed up the planning process while improving detailed comprehension of participants.

f. Tailored intelligence detachments must be provided to advance force elements and in raid forces when separated from the MAGTF command element.

g. A thorough knowledge of national and theater intelligence collection capabilities and planning factors is required of the MAGTF collections officer.

h. Successful and rapid support requires close and meaningful cooperation and coordination with other Service representatives.

Chapter 14

MAGTF Direction Effort and Collection Planning

14001. Purpose

This chapter addresses the connection between intelligence direction and collection planning. It also describes the structure of the MAGTF collections management system, defines responsibilities of each element, and sets forth procedures for defining/registering requirements for collection operations.

14002. Determination of Intelligence Requirements

Determination of intelligence requirements is the initiating step in the direction of the intelligence effort. These requirements provide the basis for collection plan and subsequent tasking of collection agencies. The early determination of intelligence requirements will ensure orderly, comprehensive intelligence collection planning to preclude the omission of essential intelligence required by the command. These intelligence requirements consist of basic requirements, EEI, and OIR. The two principal sources of intelligence requirements for the intelligence officer are basic requirements and EEI. A less critical source for intelligence requirements is OIR.

a. Early Determination. Early determination of intelligence requirements is essential because of these considerations:

(1) During the planning phase of an amphibious operation, the collection agencies subordinate to the LF and ATF have only a limited capability to acquire information on the AOA.

(2) The AOA and LF headquarters may be separated by great distances. Therefore the acquisition of information is dependent on other agencies based on requests submitted to higher and adjacent commands.

(3) The LF has only limited control over the means available to other headquarters to acquire requested information.

(4) Collection of information specifically for the LF may actually be secondary to the primary mission of a collection agency.

(5) Time lag between the request for and receipt of information may be extensive.

(6) Request for pre-D-Day reconnaissance to support the collection effort must be submitted. These requests must be timely to facilitate coordination with other operational activities.

b. Basic Requirements. The commander must have all pertinent intelligence on the weather, terrain, and hydrography within the objective area, and the enemy forces within or adjacent to it that may affect the amphibious operation. Beaches and HLZs receive special emphasis. Also, the commander needs intelligence concerning the people who live in the objective area, to include political, economic, and sociological conditions and scientific and technical developments.

c. Essential Elements of Information. EEI are defined as those critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed

by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. The EEI constitute the commander's priority intelligence requirements and, therefore, prescribe the intelligence mission of the command. The commander is responsible for formulating EEI. He may, if he desires, request staff officers to recommend EEI. However, he must personally approve them and direct their promulgation.

(1) The intelligence officer phrases the commander's EEI in the form of simple, concise directives consisting of three parts—a positive directive, qualifying questions, and statements directing special attention.

(2) Every tactical situation poses distinct problems and generally points up specific gaps in desired intelligence. For this reason, there is no standard list or hard and fast rule for determining EEI.

(3) One or more of the enemy capabilities enumerated in the current intelligence estimate could result in an EEI requiring determination of whether or not the enemy will actually adopt the enumerated courses of action.

(4) EEI are frequently pointed toward developing additional intelligence on known or suspected enemy vulnerabilities such as faulty dispositions, logistic inadequacies, or lack of aggressive reconnaissance.

(5) Knowledge of the enemy situation is often extremely vague, particularly during the early planning for an amphibious operation. In this and similar cases, EEI may be designated for acquiring enemy order of battle intelligence, particularly intelligence relative to enemy identifications, dispositions strength, and combat efficiency. See chapter 15 for example of processing information for OOB.

(6) Certain weather, terrain, and hydrographic information may not be available, thus requiring issuance of an EEI.

(7) The commander avoids the tendency to list every missing item of information as an EEI, regardless of its significance. Otherwise, the list of EEI will be so long that the *need to know* items will tend to be obscured by the *nice to know* items, thereby weakening and diffusing the collection effort.

(8) Once the list of EEI is published, it is kept current. When EEI are satisfied, they are canceled. New EEI are added to the list as required.

d. Other Intelligence Requirements. Other staff officers will have a great variety of questions which are not critical enough to be considered as EEI, but which must be answered in order for them to complete their staff coordination and eventually contribute to the collection plan. Close liaison is required between the intelligence officer and other members of the staff to ensure timely receipt of these requirements and their integration into the overall collection effort.

14003. MAGTF Collections Management

MAGTF collections management consists of the formulation of detailed collection requirements and the tasking of both internal and external assets/agencies to provide the respective information. The primary justification for the collections management effort is the satisfaction of approved EEI, OIR, and RFI. Overall responsibility for the execution, quality, and timeliness of the collection effort rests with the G-2/S-2.

a. Collection Unit. A permanent collection unit is maintained at the MAGTF intelligence section.

b. Collections Operations Officer. The collections operations officer, designated and provided by the SRIG, is responsible for formulating detailed collection requirements, tasking collection agencies for required information, and coordinating mission planning among internal collection

agencies. The collections operations officer receives EEI, OIR, and RFI from the intelligence operations officer and from these requirements then plans how best to employ organic collection assets (less VMAQ-W and VMO). The collection effort will be managed from the SARC and the collections operations officer is responsible for all activities within the SARC.

c. Collections Operations Chief/Assistant. The collections operations chief/assistant will aid the collections operations officer by assisting in developing, implementing, and monitoring the MAGTF organic assets collection plan.

14004. Collection Planning

a. General. The intelligence officer has staff responsibility for developing plans for his commander relative to the collection of intelligence information. The intelligence officer constantly anticipates the requirements of his commander and the requirements of subordinate units. He closely monitors the progress of the collection effort.

(1) Essential to collection planning is a continual study leading to extensive background knowledge of the enemy, area of operations, and collection resources available to the command. The intelligence officer must be well informed about the enemy, including his organizations, weapons and equipment, and tactical doctrine. Knowledge in these areas enables the intelligence officer to determine the various enemy activities that indicate the adoption or rejection of a particular capability. Similarly, he must continuously study the characteristics of the objective area with particular regard to the tactical effects of weather, terrain, and hydrography on operations of both enemy and friendly forces; he must also have information concerning the people located within the objective area. This includes the political, sociological, and economic conditions and the attitudes of the local populace toward the enemy and friendly forces. The intelligence officer must also be completely familiar with the availability, capabilities, and limitations of the sources and agencies available to the command for accomplishment of the collection effort.

(2) The collection effort is continually focused on acquiring essential information. At times, the commander takes calculated risks in the employment of collection means. Reconnaissance agencies may have to concentrate on particular areas while other areas of potential interest must be temporarily neglected. This calculated risk can be reduced to acceptable proportions only if the planning effort is meticulous, imaginative, purposeful, and based on current and anticipated requirements.

(3) The commander also provides for the particular intelligence which his subordinates need and which is beyond their capabilities to produce. In an amphibious operation, planning is based in a large measure on intelligence provided by higher echelons. The CLF anticipates the intelligence requirements of his subordinates, and he provides them with required intelligence in time for it to be used in their planning. Every command, within its capabilities, assists higher and adjacent commanders in their efforts to produce intelligence. At each echelon, intelligence collection planning reflects the announced or deduced intelligence requirements of the commander and higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

b. Indications. Indications consist of information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.

(1) To satisfy EEI and OIR, the intelligence officer must have adequate information from which to draw conclusions. The first step is to analyze a particular intelligence requirement to determine what evidence is needed to satisfy it. An indication is any evidence, positive or negative, which will assist in satisfying an intelligence requirement.

(2) EEI and OIR generally fall into one of two broad categories—those pertaining to characteristics of the AOA (e.g., weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions) and those pertaining to the enemy, his capabilities, vulnerabilities, and OOB. Indications, then, may be evidence concerning specific aspects of the AOA of evidence concerning the enemy.

(3) The analysis of an EEI relative to the AOA is generally relatively simple. For example, an EEI may be, "Determine locations suitable for HLZs within 5 miles of Objective 1." Indications which would be adequate to satisfy this particular EEI would be the presence of areas of appropriate size, having adequate approaches and exits, and with suitable soil conditions and topography.

(4) Analysis of intelligence requirements relative to enemy capabilities is a much more complex process. Essentially, the intelligence officer determines what evidence is likely to be forthcoming if the enemy prepared to adopt or has adopted a particular capability.

(5) Intelligence requirements concerning enemy vulnerabilities are analyzed by determining the indications which are likely to exist when any particular enemy vulnerability develops.

(6) At the initiation of planning for an amphibious operation, the intelligence officer depends largely on basic OOB studies prepared at national area and fleet levels for background information on enemy forces which is needed to develop indications. Once the assault commences, the intelligence officer at every echelon analyzes actual enemy operations which provide increasingly accurate lists of indications useful in analyzing particular enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. An analysis of these capabilities and vulnerabilities is disseminated to all interested units to augment the reliability and accuracy of interpretation at each echelon. Accurate analysis of the enemy to develop indications requires—

- Detailed knowledge of the characteristics of the AO as they affect military operations.
- Detailed knowledge of the organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistic methods of the enemy.
- Sound understanding of the enemy's use of terrain and of his probable knowledge of the terrain under our control.
- Information on the personalities of opposing enemy commanders and past performance of opposing enemy units.

c. Tactical Effects of Terrain, Hydrography, and Weather. The considerable influence that terrain, hydrography, and weather exert on military operations affects collection planning in two ways, First, certain key aspects of the terrain, hydrography and weather may be included in the list of EEI and OIR. Second, the enemy's knowledge and use of terrain are important considerations in determining indications of enemy action. The characteristics of the objective area are analyzed as to their effect on military operations of ground, air, and naval units, including both combat and service support units of both friendly and enemy forces. This analysis directs considerable attention to their effects on collection efforts.

d. Civilian Population

(1) Population Density. The population density within the objective area will affect the collection effort as well as influence many other aspects of a military operation. If the area is heavily populated, it will be extremely difficult for amphibious and deep reconnaissance agencies to enter or remain undetected. There may be occasions when the use of ground reconnaissance agencies would be unadvisable. If the enemy is using paramilitary forces, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish between **civilian and enemy forces when conducting visual and imagery reconnaissance and surveillance. Under these circumstances, far greater reliance than normal will have to be placed on reports from covert agents and unconventional

warfare forces which are normally controlled by area and external agencies.

(2) Attitudes. The attitude of the local population can range from enthusiastic support for friendly operations to open hostility against friendly operations. In the former case, the collection effort is greatly facilitated by the assistance and flow of information from friendly civilians. A hostile population makes collection more difficult. Local civilians frequently assist the enemy by concealing his activities. The intelligence officer, in preparing his collection plan, carefully analyzes the civilian population located within the objective area to exploit all available sources and to minimize interference with his collection effort.

(3) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations have a direct influence on the civilian population and must be closely coordinated with collection planning. Psychological operations units as well as other friendly informational agencies are important collection agencies because of their access to the civilian population and knowledge of the attitudes of the civilian population.

e. Intelligence Sources and Agencies

(1) Intelligence Sources. Intelligence sources refer to the actual origin (e.g., person, thing, or activity from which desired intelligence information is obtained).

(2) Collection Agencies. Collection agencies are any individuals, organizations, or units that have access to sources of information and the capability of collecting information.

f. Sources/Agencies of Information/Intelligence

(1) Sources of Information

- Maps, charts and terrain models.
- Imagery.
- Ground sensors
- Enemy activity
- Enemy military personnel
- Enemy documents
- Enemy materiel
- Indigenous personnel
- Friendly personnel
- Enemy signal communications
- Enemy electromagnetic emissions
- Effects and residue of enemy projectiles and chemical and biological agents
- Weather forecasts
- Surf forecasts
- Intelligence documents.

(2) Collection agencies

- Agencies at the national level. See chapter 6.
- Area agencies. See chapter 6.
- Component agencies. See chapter 6.
- Fleet Marine Force agencies
  - •• Force reconnaissance company, SRIG
  - •• Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division
  - •• Marine observation squadron, Marine aircraft wing.
  - •• Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron, Marine aircraft wing.
  - •• Unmanned aerial vehicle, SRIG.
  - •• Interrogation-translator platoon, SRIG.
  - •• Force imagery interpretation unit, SRIG.
  - •• Counterintelligence team, SRIG.
  - •• Sensor control and management platoon, SRIG.
  - •• Radio battalion, SRIG.
  - •• Topographic platoon, SRIG.
  - •• Surveillance and target acquisition platoon, Marine infantry battalion.

- •• Target acquisition battery, artillery regiment
- •• Troop units (infantry, artillery, tank, engineer, combat service support, communications, aviation, military police, etc).

14005. Intelligence Collection Plan

a. An intelligence collection plan is a plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement. Specifically, it is a logical plan for transforming the EEI into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. By its nature, it is constantly changing to reflect newly developed intelligence requirements, and to reflect success, partial success, and failures in particular collection efforts.

b. A collection plan must be prepared amd implemented early in the planning phase of an amphibious operation. Collection planning must provide for the continuous collection of information throughout all phases of the operation. The commander provides guidance to the collection effort by determining and announcing his EEI. Additionally, other staff officers and subordinate commanders provide guidance to the intelligence officer in his collection planning by informing him of their specific intelligence requirements.

c. During the planning phase for operations, the collection plan is consolidated and published in paragraph 3 to the intelligence annex. Subsequently, it will rarely be consolidated, but sill appear as a series of directives or requests for information.

14006. Intelligence Collection Worksheet

a. A valuable aid to the intelligence officer in the planning and supervision of the collection effort is the intelligence collection worksheet. See appendix E for example of MEF intelligence collection worksheet and instructions for completing it.

b. Whether or not a written collection worksheet is necessary depends on the complexity of the requirements and to some extent on the experience of the intelligence officer. For example, an experienced intelligence officer generally does not need to prepare a detailed written worksheet to satisfy intelligence requirements on location of suitable beaches or helicopter landing sites. His collection planning in such cases may be entirely mental or may consist of brief notes to assist him in preparing requests for information.

c. For many requirements, particularly those concerned with enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, a written collection worksheet is normally advisable. The detail in which it is prepared, however, depends again on the particular requirements to be satisfied and the extent to which coordination of the overall collection effort must be effected. Thus, at regiment, group, squadron, and battalion level, the written collection worksheet need not be elaborate. It may consist only of a listing of available collection means, plus brief notes or reminders to the intelligence officer on current intelligence requirements and specific information that must be collected.

d. At higher levels (i.e., division or aircraft wing), collection planning is a more complex process. Intelligence requirements of a division commander, for example, quite often require painstaking analysis. Coordination and direction of the overall collection efforts of the MAGTF of division/wing size is a major undertaking. Accordingly, written collection worksheets prepared at these echelons are generally detailed and extensive.

e. Nevertheless, whether done mentally or reduced to writing, collection planning at either the infantry battalion or MAGTF level follows the same logical sequence.

(1) Each particular intelligence requirement is analyzed to determine what indications or

what evidence would satisfy the particular requirement.

(2) Determination of the time by which information is needed is also an essential part of the analysis.

(3) Each indication is analyzed to determine what specific information is required to affirm or negate the particular indication. Specific information requirements must be related to particular activities, localities, characteristics, or conditions. These requirements provide the basis for orders and requests for the collection of information.

(4) Collection agencies are selected to gather the particular information desired.

f. The end results of the worksheet are the actual orders and requests which are prepared and issued by, or in the name of, the comamnder in order to gather information.

g. Collection Worksheet Format. There is no prescribed form for a written collection worksheet. An example of a worksheet can be found in appendix E of this manual.

14007. Issuance of Orders and Requests

Implementing the direction effort requires preparing and issuing suitable orders to subordinate units and requests to higher and adjacent commands for specific information collection tasks.

a. Orders to Subordinate Units

(1) Orders for the collection of intelligence information are disseminated in paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex and as fragmentary orders and requests. An intelligence annex is published infrequently. Orders set forth in the annex are ordinarily those of a continuing nature or which require operations over a considerable period of time. Orders previously issued are frequently summarized in the annex so that all units may be made aware of major reconnaissance, observation, and similar information collection tasks that are to be undertaken. Maximum lead time should be provided to collection agencies so that they can properly plan and prepare for the accomplishment of assigned tasks.

(2) Regardless of the method of dissemination, orders for collection tasks must embody the form of any good order. They must set forth the who, when, what, where, and why as necessary for complete understanding.

(3) The intelligence officer has primary staff responsibility for the preparation of orders for information collection tasks. He coordinates closely with other staff officers in the preparation of such orders for the commander. The operations officer may prepare detailed orders for information collection missions. This occurs when the activities of the unit conducting the mission must be carefully coordinated with operations of other combat units or integrated with plans for the employment of supporting arms. The intelligence officer participates directly in the preparation of such orders. Close liaison is maintained with the collection agencies to obtain advice on the feasibility of tasks and to alert them to possible missions.

(4) Economical use of available collection means requires that, where possible, separate requirements for information be consolidated into specific collection tasks. All collection agencies must be considered as a single collection system that possesses a variety of capabilities. To accomplish this, the intelligence officer continually reviews his collection plan. For example, he may have selected aerial imagery as the best means of collecting information applicable to several indications or intelligence requirements. The final order for an imagery mission may result in one or two sorties satisfying many information requirements.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Commands.

(1) The intelligence officer coordinates and prepares requests to higher, adjacent, and supporting commands for collection of information. These are disseminated in whatever form is most convenient—letter, message, or oral requests. Such requests must state what is desired and by what time. Requests relative to varying intelligence requirements are consolidated whenever possible. An example of this is a consolidated request for aerial electronic reconnaissance submitted to a CATF.

(2) The extent to which the commander can place requests for intelligence support directly on adjacent and supporting commands is dependent on instructions issued by the common commander. Normally, requests for information are submitted directly when they do not require the adjacent or supporting command to commit units specifically to acquire information. For example, an adjacent command may be directly requested to report information, as obtained, on identification of new units in its zone or to report information, as obtained, on enemy movements within its zone. On the other hand, the senior commander will generally prescribe how requests for aerial reconnaissance should be submitted by a ground unit to a supporting air unit.

14008. Supervision of the Collection Effort

a. Direction effort does not end with the issuance of orders and requests. The intelligence officer continually supervises the collection effort. He ascertains that the orders and requests have been received by the collection agencies and that they are clearly understood. Frequent checks are made on the progress of collection agencies, modifying or assigning tasks as necessary, and canceling orders and requests when the requirement has been satisfied. The intelligence officer also ensures that collection agencies report information expeditiously to proper addressees in the correct format.

b. The total intelligence information received in a headquarters is not solely the result of the collection plan and directed collection efforts. All units and higher and adjacent commands report information of interest on a continuing basis. Seldom is any information received which does not suggest additional lines of search in some manner. For example, an air observer may notice what appears to be a command post. If the command post is large enough to be identified from the air, it probably serves a sizable enemy unit. Immediately the efforts of other collection agencies, photographic and electronic reconnaissance units, prisoner-of-war interrogators, etc., are focused not only on the possible command post but on developing information on enemy forces that might be in the general area.

c. Quick reaction to information received from a higher and adjacent command is important. For example, a higher command may report that communications intelligence has established the presence of certain enemy units in a general location. This information should immediately trigger a collection effort to develop the exact location of these units so that they might be attacked. An aggressive and systematic followup is fundamental to success in the collection effort.

14009. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center

a. Mission. The mission of the SARC is to plan and implement the execution of the collection plan from the MAGTF collections officer of the intelligence operations section. This will provide intelligence information required to satisfy the MAGTF commander's requirements.

b. Location. The SARC will be located within the MAGTF CP in close proximity to the COC and the S/EWCC. Aboard ship it will be located in the JIC.

c. Organization of Subordinate Elements. The collection unit consists of the following elements.

(1) **Control Section.** At levels above the MEU, the control element will be a collections officer and a collections chief. At the MEU level, control will be conducted by the MEU S-2. The control element mission is to formulate a detailed collection plan based on the commander's intelligence requirements and available assets to satisfy those requirements. Once the plan is initiated, the control element will ensure that it is successfully implemented.

(2) **Forces Reconnaissance.** Force reconnaissance detachment consists of the appropriately-sized force reconnaissance unit with sufficient officers, SNCOs, and communications personnel to provide for the successful planning, coordination, and execution of ground reconnaissance operations at the MAGTF level.

(3) **Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.** UAV detachment consists of the appropriately-sized UAV unit with sufficient equipment and personnel to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of UAV operations in support of the MAGTF.

(4) **SCAMP.** SCAMP detachment consists of the appropriately-sized SCAMP unit with sufficient personnel and equipment to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of sensor operations in support of the MAGTF.

(5) **Radio Battalion.** Radio battalion detachment consists of the appropriately-sized unit with sufficient personnel and equipment to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of SIGINT operations in support of the MAGTF.

(6) **HUMINT Section.** HUMINT detachment consists of the appropriately sized CIT and ITT detachments with sufficient personnel and equipment to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of HUMINT collection in support of the MAGTF.

(7) **FIIU.** FIIU detachment consists of the appropriately-sized FIIU detachment with sufficient personnel and equipment to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of imagery interpretation operations in support of the MAGTF.

(8) **TOPO Platoon.** TOPO platoon consists of the appropriately-sized topographic detachment with sufficient personnel and equipment to conduct successful planning, coordination, and execution of MC&G operations in support of the MAGTF.

d. Subordinate Unit Tasks

(1) Control Section

(a) Formulate a detailed collection plan based on approved EEI, OIR and RII. Ensure that the elements understand the collection plan and are able to carry out their responsibilities under the plan.

(b) Ensure coordination with the G-6/CEO for the assignment of frequencies and communications equipment and .personnel requirements.

(c) Ensure coordination with the G-4/S-4 regarding embarkation and logistics support.

(d) Ensure coordination with the air officer for air support requirements.

(e) Ensure coordination with the fire support officer on all matters concerning fire support coordination for collection assets operating beyond the FEBA.

(f) Ensure coordination with the G-3/S-3 on employment of collection assets.

(g) Ensure coordination with other elements within the G-2/S-2 regarding new and ongoing collection requirements.

(2) **Force Reconnaissance Unit**

(a) Conduct detailed planning and coordination for the employment of force reconnaissance assets. This will require extensive coordination with the G-3/S-3. Air officer, fire support officer, G-4/S-4. and G-6/S-6/CEO regarding team missions, insertions, routes, fire support measures, communications requirements, embarkation requirements, etc.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of all force reconnaissance assets, The status will include—

- Missions of all teams.
- Locations and times of RFA/RAO.
- Time and method of team insert and extract.
- Time of last contact with teams.
- Time of next contact with teams.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all team reports in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the command and control element of the force reconnaissance detachment within the SARC.

(3) **UAV Unit**

(a) Conduct detailed planning and coordination for the employment of UAV. This will require extensive coordination with the air officer, G-6/S-6/CEO, and G-4/S-4 regarding flight profiles and clearances, embarkation requirements, communications requirements, etc.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of all UAVs. The status will included—

- Missions of all UAVs.
- Area/targets of current and planned missions.
- Time of all current and planned missions.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all UAV reports in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the command and control element of the UAV element within the SARC.

(4) **SCAMP Unit**

(a) Conduct detailed planning and coordination for the employment of sensors. This will require extensive coordination with the air officer, G-6/S-6/CEO, and G-4/S-4 regarding aerial sensor insertion, communications frequencies and requirements, embarkation requirements, etc.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of all sensor strings. The status will include—

- Location and type of all sensors and relays employ.
- Time and method of implantation for all sensors/relays.
- Time of last activation for each string.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all sensor reports in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the command and control element of the SCAMP detachment within the SARC.

(5) **Radio Battalion Unit**

(a) Conduct detailed planning and coordination for SIGINT collection. This will require extensive coordination with G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6/CEO, and G-4/S-4 regarding radio recon team employment, communications frequencies and requirements, embarkations requirements, etc.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of radio reconnaissance teams. The status will include—

- Missions of all teams.
- Locations and times of RAO/RFA

- Time and method of team insert and extract.
- Time of last contact with team.
- Time of next contact with team.

(c) Ensure that the S/EWCC receives all SIGINT reporting in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the command and control element of ther radio battalion detachment within the OCAC but ensure constant coordination with the SARC.

(6) HUMINT Section

(a) Conduct detailed HUMINT planning and coordination. This will require extensive coordination with the G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6/CEO and G-4/S-4 regarding attachment of ITT/CIT subteams, communications requirements, embarkations and logistics requirements, etc.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of HUMINT assets. The status will include—

- Missions of assets.
- Composition of assets.
- Location and time of RFA.
- Subteam locations.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all HUMINT reports in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the HUMINT command and control element within the SARC.

(7) FIIU

(a) Conduct detailed imagery and imagery interpretation planning, coordination and activities. This will require extensive coordination with the G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6/CEO the MAGTF air officer, the MAW, and the G-4/S-4 regarding attachment of FIIU detachments, communications requirements, embarkation and logistic requirements.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of FIIU assets. The status will include mission of assets and composition of assets.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all imagery products and reports in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the FIIU command and control element within the SARC.

(8) TOPO Unit

(a) Conduct detailed MC&G planning, coordination and activities. This will require extensive coordination with the G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and G-4/S-4 regarding requirements, embarkation and logistics requirements.

(b) Provide the collections officer with the updated status of TOPO assets and MC&G products. The status will include mission of the assets, status of MC&G requirements, and projects and products on hand.

(c) Ensure that the collections officer receives all TOPO reports and products in a timely manner.

(d) Maintain the TOPO command and control section within the SARC.

14010. Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Coordination Center

The S/EWCC, when activated, is a staff agency established only at the MAGTF command element to facilitate the coordination among the G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the CEO, with respect to their staff responsibilities in the area of SIGINT, EW, and communications-electronics operations. Since S/EWCC personnel must have access to SI and are

required to operate in a facility/space authorized for the storage and handling of SCI, the G-2/S-2 is responsible for its establishment and operation. Joint U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps S/EWCC functioning in amphibious operations is described in NWP 10-1-40, (S) *Electronic Warfare* (U).

a. Mission. The mission of the S/EWCC is to coordinate the signals intelligence, electronic warfare, and communications-electronics activities of the force in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts. This coordination includes certain functions in the areas of planning, execution, and evaluation of these activities.

b. Functions

(1) Planning. The S/EWCC coordinates the MAGTF signals intelligence, electronic warfare, and communications-electronic efforts during planning by reviewing the SIGINT appendix, the EW appendix and communications-electronics annex of plans and orders which have a direct impact of MAGTF operations in order to identify potential conflicts among them and to determine their compatibility. The S/EWCC provides the forum for resolution of conflicts and recommends improvements in plans and orders to ensure compatibility. Conflicts not resolved in the S/EWCC will be referred to the primary staff officer (G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, CEO) affected, for resolution through normal staff action.

(2) Execution. The S/EWCC coordinates the MAGTF SIGINT, EW and communications-electronics efforts during execution by monitoring on-going operations to identify and resolve operational conflicts. It provides the focal point for coordination of requests for EW support from MAGTF units and external agencies or activities. It also provides for the coordination of meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference (MIJI) program activities.

(3) Evaluation. Evaluation is a continuous, on-going effort where any incidents of mutual interferences and SIGINT and EW support are reviewed in conjunction with combat operations to determine effectiveness and procedural changes needed in future operations. The S/EWCC coordinates the MAGTF SIGINT, EW, and communications-electronics efforts during evaluation by reviewing recent SIGINT, EW, and communications-electronics plans, procedures, and actions to determine their compatibility and effectiveness and to identify the adjustments necessary to enhance operational support.

c. Establishment. At the direction of the commander, the S/EWCC will be established by the G-2/S-2 to support MAGTF operations, field exercises, and training. Normally it will be established at the MEB or MEF level whenever SIGINT and EW units are involved, or when SIGINT and EW objectives or activities are included in plans and orders. When the S/EWCC is formally established, it will require sufficient dedicated personnel, communications, and equipment to perform the functions specified in the preceding paragraphs. During the planning phase of an operation, S/EWCC functions may be performed by a nucleus of personnel rather than by a formally established agency. These personnel are representatives from the MAGTF G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the CEO staffs. Normally, these representatives are the special intelligence officer (SIO), the EWO, and a representative for the force frequency coordinator.

d. Organization. The organization of the S/EWCC is determined by the level of SIGINT and EW operations to be conducted. It may consist of a few Marines and possess minimal capability, or it may consist of sufficient personnel and capabilities to perform all the functions addressed in the preceding paragraphs on a continuous 24-hour per day basis.

(1) S/EWCC Officer in Charge. The S/EWCC officer in charge is designated by the G-2/S-2 when the S/EWCC is formally established. This officer, normally the SIO, is responsible

to the G-2/S-2 for the day-to-day routine functioning of the S/EWCC to support the coordinating activities of the designated representatives.

(2) MAGTF Staff Representatives. Each representative coordinates the planned activities of his staff section with each of the other representatives of the S/EWCC to identify and resolve, at the lowest level possible, conflicts between these plans. During the execution of these coordinated plans, each representative monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the plans and maintains coordination with other representatives to identify any adjustments necessary to enhance operations support. All personnel designated as representatives to the S/EWCC must be appropriately cleared for access to special compartmented information and must understand the purpose and functioning of the S/EWCC.

(a) Special Intelligence Officer. The special intelligence officer (SIO) provides for intelligence input to the S/EWCC as necessary to support the coordinating functions of the S/EWCC in regards to the SIGINT activities of the force. The SIO coordinates with the G-2/S-2 to ensure the following inputs to the S/EWCC.

- Current intelligence estimates and intelligence summaries (INTSUM's).
- Enemy Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)information.
- Collection Plan.
- Signals Intelligence Appendix.
- Any specific intelligence collection requirements.
- Current guarded circuit/frequency list.

(b) Electronic Warfare Officer. The electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) provides imput concerning the electronic warfare threat and the capabilities and limitations of force electronic units. The EWO coordinates with the G-3/S-3 on the current tactical situation and requirements for EW support of tactical operations. The EWO input to the S/EWCC includes but is not limited to—

- Electronic warfare appendix to Annex C to the operation order and the electronic countermeasure (ECM) plan.
- Current electronic countermeasures requests.

(c) CEO Representative. The CEO representative to the S/EWCC provides for input of information on current and planned friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum for command, control, and communications to support the coordination functions of the other S/EWCC representatives. This input includes but is not limited to—

- Annex K to the operations order.
- A current copy of the communications-electronics operating instructions
- Current information on communications and noncommunications equipment and frequencies.
- Taboo circuit/frequency list.
- Protected circuit/frequency list.

(3) Liaison Officers. The MAGTF SIGINT/EW units provide the commander with the capability for conducting SIGINT and EW operations. Ensuring coordination between these units and the MAGTF staff requires the assignment of a liaison officer by these units to the S/EWCC.

(a) MAGTF SIGINT/EW Unit Liaison Officers

1 Radio Battalion Liaison Officer. The radio battalion provides a liaison officer to the S/EWCC to advise the MAGTF

staff representatives on the current status and capabilities of the radio battalion and to assist them in coordinating their support requirements. The liaison officer maybe located in the S/EWCC or may be located in the radio battalion operations control and analysis center. In either case, the liaison officer will serve as the point of contact between the S/EWCC representatives and the radio battalion.

2 **VMAQ Liaison Officer.** When VMAQ assets are included as part of the force aviation combat element (ACE), the VMAQ squadron or detachment must designate a liaison officer to the S/EWCC. The VMAQ liaison officer will provide advice to the S/EWCC representatives on the capabilities and status of squadron assets and assist staff members in their coordinating responsibilities as they pertain to the squadron. Although this liaison officer need not be in the S/EWCC, he must be available for immediate contact by the S/EWCC representatives.

(b) Other Liaison Personnel. When the MAGTF is part of a joint or combined operation, other liaison personnel may be assigned to the S/EWCC from the joint or combined force headquarters and/or components.

e. Manning. The G-2/S-2 is responsible to the force commander for manning of the S/EWCC. He must ensure that all personnel who work in the S/EWCC, or will act as points of contact to it, are appropriately cleared and understand S/EWCC purposes and functions.

Chapter 15

Processing and Production of Information

15001. General

Processing and production are the phases in the intelligence cycle where information becomes intelligence. The two steps of processing and production occur by implementing—

Step One: Processing of Information

a. Record information systematically for ease of study and comparison.

b. Covert raw data into a usable form suitable for recording and collating.

c. Collate information into groups of related or like items.

Step Two: Converting Information Into Intelligence

d. Integrate information to combine elements isolated in analysis with other known information to form a logical picture of hypothesis of enemy activities which might influence the mission of the command.

e. Analyze information to isolate significant elements ith respect to mission and operations.

f. Evaluate information as to pertinence, reliability of source, and accuracy.

g. Interpret information to form logical conclusions which bear directly on the command's mission and can be incorporated into the commander's decision- making process.

15002. Recording

Recording is the systematic arrangement of all items of information so that they can be observed as an integrated picture and studied in relation to each other. It immediately facilitates processing and dissemination. It also provides a record of events for postoperation study concerning the enemy and the area of operations. Recording is not an end in itself and should be kept as simple as possible. It should never be permitted to interfere with the timely production, dissemination, and use of intelligence.

a. Recording Media. Recording media consists of the enemy situation map, the intelligence journal, the journal file, and the intelligence workbooks. The journal and journal file may be automated or manually generated paper documents.

(1) Enemy Situation Map. The enemy situation map is used to show enemy dispositions and other information graphically. By presenting elements of information in relation to each other, it helps with the interpretation step. See paragraph 15006. It also helps with the dissemination step, since it permits the ready transfer of information concerning any and all enemy forces which are capable of interfering with the mission of the unit concerned. The enemy situation map should include for a given echelon enough of the area to facilitate not only the conduct of current operations but the planning of projected or anticipated operations. Larger air-ground task forces will normally require three enemy situation maps of different scales:

(a) A large scale tactical map (approximately 1:50,000) which generally covers the GCE AOR to a possible depth of 25 to 30 miles. This situation map is used in the conduct of ground operations.

(b) An operational map of an intermediate scale (approximately 1:250,000) which covers the MAGTF AOR to a depth of about 250 miles. This situation map is used to record those deep enemy installations, such as airfields and missile sites, that can affect friendly operations.

(c) A strategic map or aeronautical chart of small scale (approximately 1:1,000,000 or smaller) which covers the entire MAGTF AOI and beyond to distances of about 450 miles. This situation map is used to record those deep enemy installations, such as airfields and missile sites, that can affect friendly operations.

Enemy situation maps should show information concerning all hostile units, regardless of size, which can significantly interfere with the mission of the unit concerned. However, while the enemy situation map of a division would not ordinarily show hostile infantry units smaller than battalions, it should show known or suspected locations of even single artillery pieces capable of nuclear projectiles into the division's operating area. Information is posted on the enemy situation map as it is received and removed promptly when no longer current, since omissions or outdated information may result in erroneous evaluation and interpretation. Separate flaps of acetate can be used to record different types of intelligence, reducing overcrowding.

(2) **Intelligence Journal and Journal File.** The intelligence journal is a record in which briefs of messages and events pertinent to the intelligence section are entered in chronological order. For each item entered, the journal normally contains a journal entry number; the time the information was sent, received, or noted; the date/time group of message sent or received; originating agency or addressee; a brief of the item; and disposition of the information. The journal entry number assigned to an incoming message is entered on the message itself, and messages are filed in the journal file in the numerical order of journal entries. The journal, besides providing a brief chronological account of events, serves as an index to the journal file. The journal covers a stated period, normally 24 hours.

(3) **Intelligence Workbook.** The intelligence workbook is used to record incoming information by subject for ready reference and comparison. It primarily aids the intelligence officer in determining the meaning and significance of related items of information. This facilitates further processing and dissemination. See appendix F.

b. Other Media. Other media which may be employed include target information list boards; OOB files; maps and charts for the recording of meterological, hydrographic, or topographic information; and similar systems. Recording reflects the current situation about a particular aspect of the enemy or the AO. Overlays may be used in lieu of separate maps for showing particular aspects of the enemy situation or area.

c. Automatic Data Processing

(1) With the inception of tactical data processing support, the retrieval of intelligence material is greatly facilitated. Aboard the LHA and LCC and within the three automated subsystems of the MAGIS, the intelligence officer has access to the NIPS data. Data base files are divided into the following five functional groups:

(a) **Land Area Environment.** Land area environment files encompass both OOB and installation data. OOB data are primarily used in the ground and air situation analysis and threat estimation tasks. Installation data describe an installation's physical characteristics and its capabilities in support of military operations.

(b) **Lines of Communication.** The files in this group describe highways, railways, and waterways usable for the transportation of personnel and materiel.

(c) **Technical.** The technical file group contains operating characteristics and performance data on foreign-held equipment which could be used in a military contingency.

(d) **Basic Reference Data.** The basic reference group is used to provide a digital subject index to the basic reference publications in either hard copy or miniaturized form. Also included in the index may be references to publications obtained locally.

(e) **Other.** Files contained in this group pertain to subjects which do not specifically fit into any of the other major functional file categories. The files in this group contain relatively static data and generally will be maintained off-line (on magnetic tape).

(2) The NIPS/MAGIS data base support the intelligence function and operations planning and provide complete and accurate intelligence on which the commander's decisions can be made. To accomplish this requires the exploitation of all source data at each echelon of deployment. Each echelon is responsible for its own locally generated files and file records. The initial tactical data base will be generated by the intelligence analysis center segment of MAGIS from the hemispheric data base provided by the FIC.

15003. Integration

a. Combining Elements. Integration involves the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information. This combining of elements forms a logical picture of hypothesis of enemy activities or the influence of the characteristics of the AO on the mission of the command.

b. Formulation of Hypotheses. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based on existing intelligence. Integration, particularly in the development of hypothesis, requires the same good judgement and thorough background knowledge essential to making a good analysis. In formulating hypothesis, the intelligence officer must avoid preconceived opinions and hypothesis based solely on personal experience or preference. He must attempt to place himself in the role of the enemy commander in the development of these hypotheses.

c. Analyses and Testing of Hypotheses. After they are formulated, all hypothesis are analyzed and tested. Analysis of a hypothesis includes determining the indications that should exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the existence or nonexistence of these indications within the available time and means.

d. Mental or Detailed Process. Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments or it may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of additional information.

15004. Analysis

Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operation of the command. Analysis requires judgement and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the AO, and the enemy situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices. Individuals who analyze information must relate their efforts to the mission of the command to avoid the needless expenditure of time and effort.

15005. Evaluation

In evaluating information, the intelligence officer determines its pertinence, reliability of its source, and its accuracy.

a. Pertinence. As each item of information is received, it is examined immediately to determine whether it is of an intelligence nature, its urgency, and by whom it is needed. Information which is not pertinent is not processed further. Urgent information is disseminated immediately to those agencies who need it; it may then be further processed and the results disseminated on a followup basis. Information which is not of an urgent nature is usually fully evaluated and interpreted. The resulting intelligence is then disseminated.

b. Accuracy. An indication of accuracy of an item of information may be revealed by considering the degree that the information appears to be true, based purely on logic. Its accuracy is evaluated based on the consistency of the information within itself and with other information, particularly information known to be true; and whether the information is confirmed or corroborated by reports from other sources or agencies. The most reliable method of judging accuracy is comparison with other information. Where possible, the collection effort seeks to obtain the same information through several sources and agencies.

c. Evaluation Rating System.

(1) The evaluation of each item of information is determined by using a standard system; a letter is used to show the evaluation of reliability and a numeral is used to show the evaluation of accuracy. This system is in accordance with STANAG 2022.

(2) Evaluation of the reliability of the source is shown as follows:

A—Completely reliable
B—Usually reliable
C—Fairly reliable
D—Not usually reliable
E—Unreliable
F—Unreliability cannot be judged

(a) If the source is a friendly informed person, an evaluation of **A** will be assigned only when he is known to have long experience and extensive background with the type of information reported. A rating of **B** is assigned to friendly informed persons who lack the background experience, but are of known integrity. An **F** rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source. This is true of captured enemy personnel and documents, particulary in the early days of an operation.

(b) Agencies are ordinarily rated **A**, **B** or **C**, depending on their state of training and experience.

(c) When the source of an item and a collecting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree of reliability is indicated.

(d) The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the best judge of reliability. Consequently, higher headquarters normally accept the reliability evaluation of the lower headquarters, and will consider only the reliability of the reporting headquarters.

(3) Evaluation of the accuracy of an item of information is rated as follows:

1—Confirmed by other sources
2—Probably true
3—Possibly true
4—Doubtful
5—Improbable
6—Truth cannot be judged

(a) If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from a source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it is classified as confirmed by other sources and is rated **1**.

(b) If no proof, in the above sense, can be established, and if no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information

already available on this subject, it is classified as probably true and is rated **2**. If the contents of the report are confirmed, in essential parts, by information already available, the above rating will also apply to unconfirmed information contained in the report.

(c) If the investigation reveals that the reported facts, on which no further information is yet available, comply with behavior of the enemy as observed up to now, the information received is classified as possibly true and is rated **3**.

(d) Reported but unconfirmed information, the contents of which contradict the estimate of the development or the known behavior of the enemy up to this point, is classified as doubtful and is rated **4**, as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.

(e) Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which contradicts the experience assumed to be reliable up to this point is classified as improbable and is rated in category **5**. The same classification is given to reported information that contradicts existing data on subjects originally rated **1** or **2**.

(f) If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings **1** to **5** is not present, the reported information is classified as truth cannot be judged and is rated **6**. The statement that a report cannot be judged as to accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings **1** to **5**. However, the possibility of a rating of **1** or **2** should always be tested. If such a rating is not possible because of lack of other information on the same target, the rating **6** has to be given.

(4) Both a letter and a numeral are used to show the evaluation placed on a given item of information. The evaluation as to reliability and accuracy, however, are completely independent of each other, For instance, a highly reliable source may report an item which, when related to other information known to be true, appears to be improbable. The evaluation would thus be **A-5**. Conversely, an evaluation of **E-1** would be given in a case where a source of known unreliability reported an item which, through confirmation by other sources, was of proven accuracy. A report disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units contains the evaluation for each item of information.

(5) Although the above represents the formally accepted evaluation rating system, many intelligence production agencies now provide a textual evaluation of source reliability and information accuracy on evaluated reports. This verbal evaluation may provide a clearer understanding of the value of an individual report.

15006. Interpretation

Intepretation is the last step in the processing of information. It determines the significance and meaning of the information and its effect on the current intelligence estimate.

a. Determination of Significance. To determine the significance of information, each item is carefully studied to determine the following:

(1) The meaning of the information in relation to current enemy capabilities and the possible effect on the mission and operations of the command.

(2) Whether, and to what extent, the information alters or adds significantly to previous intelligence.

(3) Whether, and to what extent, it tends to confirm or to refute existing estimates of the enemy situation.

b. Effect on Current Intelligence Estimate. Correct interpretation leads to accurate conclusions concerning the enemy's capabilities. The interpretation placed on each new item of information usually affects the current intelligence estimate. Conclusions previously drawn, particularly those made prior to initiation of the landing assault, may be altered, confirmed, or discarded. However, new enemy capabilities may be revealed and certain previously estimated enemy capabilities may be eliminated from further consideration as the relative probability of adoption of the hostile courses of action becomes more clear.

15007. Order of Battle

a. General. OOB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. OOB, along with enemy, terrain, and weather, contributes evaluated information for the processing of information into intelligence. In this chapter, OOB will be used as an example in the processing of the information phase. After the processing phase has taken place, the following information on the enemy OOB would be available for dissemination. It consists of evaluated information regarding the following elements:

(1) Composition. Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands, as opposed to type units. Unit identification is often called the key to OOB intelligence because it leads to the answers of many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification consists of the complete designation of a specific unit. It identifies the unit, indicates what type unit it is, and gives its relative size or strength. Through identification, the OOB analyst is able to develop a basic picture of the enemy. The identification of a specific unit alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization.

(2) Disposition. Disposition is the location of enemy units and the manner in which they are tactically deployed. Disposition also includes the recent, current, and proposed, or probable movements of the enemy. Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied by a unit. It is important primarily because it answers the commander's question, "Where is the enemy?" Without this information, the commander and his staff are hindered in performing effective operational planning and are unable to make acceptable estimates to the situation or arrive at sound decisions for the employment of friendly troops.

(3) Strength. The term *strength* covers the description of a unit in terms of numbers of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

(4) Tactics. Tactics include both doctrine and tactics. Doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of organization and employment of forces for the conduct of operations. Tactics describe the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the OOB analyst deducts how the enemy may employ his forces under various conditions or in certain types of situations or special operations. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, armor, and artillery in both offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and enemy action or reaction is extremely important in both the planning and execution phases of an operation.

(5) Training. Individual and unit training can significantly contribute to the combat effectiveness of any military force. The thoroughness, degree, and quality training of individuals and units determine the overall efficiency and capabilities of a force.

(6) Logistics. Logistics is also closely related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is dependent on the logistical system that supports the action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics provides a more accurate evaluation of his capabilities, strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistics information that interest the OOB analyst may include—

- All classes and types of supply.
- Requirements.
- Procurement.
- Distribution.
- Transportation.
- Installations.
- Terminals.
- Evacuation and salvage.
- Maintenance.

(7) Combat Effectiveness. Combat effectiveness is the term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit and may be predicted by analyzing the following:

- Personnel strength.
- Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.
- Status of training.
- Efficiency of the officer and NCO corps.
- Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.
- Traditions and past performance.
- Personality traits of the commander.
- Geographic area in which committed.
- Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability within the unit.
- Status of logistical and technical support.
- Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
- National characteristics of the people.

(8) Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of OOB.

(a) Personalities. Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy force.

(b) Unit History. Unit history includes information and intelligence on component elements of a specific unit; on present and past parent units; personalities who have commanded the unit; and other details such as past performance and activities which describe, limit, or clarify the unit concerned. **NOTE:** Some foreign armed forces use systems of code numbers or names to conceal the true designation of units.

(c) Uniforms and Insignia. Information on uniforms and insignia assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

(d) Weapons and Equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons, equipment, and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.

b. Integration of the OOB. The OOB is an integral part of combat and strategic intelligence. The OOB together with other intelligence about the enemy, terrain, and weather must be considered when determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action at the strategic and operational level. OOB personnel are responsible for all information concerning foreign military forces. A major problem for the OOB personnel is the difficulty in locating and identifying the enemy. This problem is compounded by the tendency of some military and paramilitary forces to make frequent changes in unit identification and location.

While intelligence is developed in many fields outside the scope of OOB, all intelligence is ultimately related to it. For example, the evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information produces intelligence on the capabilities and characteristics of a weapon, but OOB information determines the effect of the weapon's capabilities and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and organization. Enemy military intelligence organizations are of

primary interest to CI, but as part of a military organization they are also of interest to OOB, because they concern enemy composition, strength, and personalities.

c. Processing OOB Information. Intelligence and information received and processed by an OOB section normally becomes voluminous in a short period of time. In organizing this information, OOB personnel maintain extensive and systematic compilations and filing systems. Specific items of intelligence and information must be located on short notice and incorporated into comprehensive reports or analyses. Due to these requirements, there must be efficient organization and processing of the data received. Typical OOB documents published are—

- Military intelligence studies.
- Naval intelligence studies.
- Air Forces intelligence studies.
- DIA OOB publications.
- DIA register of intelligence publications.
- Naval intelligence productions register.

d. OOB Records and Files. OOB records and files are consulted continually for producing new intelligence. Files are established for cataloging incoming information for easy reference and for use as a basis for comparison and contrast in the production of new intelligence. Because of this, OOB files must be simple, yet complete. One or more of the typical aids discussed below may be used; the type used depends on the existing situation and the echelon maintaining the files.

(1) Unit Workbook. The format of the unit workbook depends entirely on the structure of the foreign force being monitored. The unit workbook consists of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence. Analysts, with OOB books at their disposal, may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received. Generally, the parent unit listed on the unit.worksheet is of division size or larger. Unit, postal, and vehicle numbers are noted on the worksheet and are used in determining OOB changes or as confirmation of current data. Details which may reveal any facet of the unit's OOB are noted in the remarks column. Items such as reports of branch insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents are entered in this column in abbreviated form. The data and the source of information are entered for each entry.

(2) OOB Situation Overlay. This is a graphic portrayal of current enemy OOB, either confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and disposition of enemy units and any other information which will assist in developing the enemy OOB. Enemy units down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command are plotted by using the appropriate symbols contained in FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols*. For example, at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; at the MAGTF level, enemy divisions and higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and what will be omitted on OOB maps. The time and date of the information are entered below each symbol or plotting. A caption box on the OOB situation map is an annotation containing information which helps to explain the OOB situation. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary—strength, unlocated units, and legend caption boxes.

(3) OOB Card (Stanag 2078)

(a) OOB card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on units. OOB cards will be maintained at all echelons as necessary. Normally one card will be maintained on each enemy division or any other unit in a position to affect current operations. The OOB card contains the following minimum information, numbered as follows:

1 Title (number and designation of unit/formation).

2 Code name (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience).

3 Nickname (unofficial popular name).

4 Parent unit formation.

5 Subordinate formations/units.

6 Field post number.

7 Insignia (personnel and equipment).

8 Commander.

9 Unit history.

10 Miscellaneous.

11 Location.

12 Table of personnel and major items of equipment (to include initial and effective strengths and casualties). (See STANAG 2076).

13 Combat efficiency.

(b) Data contained in items 11, 12, and 13 are subject to frequent change and are listed on the back of the card.

(c) OOB card file may be manual or automated.

(4) **Personality File.** Personality data on designated categories of individuals are recorded in a personality file. The file is to provide reference material used in the development of other OOB intelligence. Information on key military figures can be of significant value in the establishment of unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness.

(5) **Military Installation File.** This file is normally maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A collation or exploratory sheet contains all information that has been collected on each installation to include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of equipment. Maps, town plans, or sketches supplement this file by showing the location of each installation within the city.

(6) **Organizational Chart.** Organizational charts depict the complete organization of all units, from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit, including personnel and major weapons strengths. Since this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for each of its subordinate units is prepared. Principal weapons and equipment charts may be prepared to supplement organizational charts.

(7) **Strength Worksheet.** This worksheet is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths. This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements. This may be combined with OOB cards or other unit files.

Chapter 16

Intelligence Dissemination

16001. General

After the processing and production cycle, dissemination becomes the most important phase in the intelligence cycle. Oral briefings, liaison visits, and intelligence documents such as intelligence annexes, intelligence summaries, and periodic intelligence summaries are just a few of the means available to intelligence sections for disseminating intelligence. The decision on what means to use for dissemination depends on the nature and urgency of the intelligence and the means available. For intelligence that is not of immediate tactical importance or value, courier service provided by the G-1/S-1 is an acceptable and secure means of transmission. However, if the intelligence information is of immediate tactical value, use of radio, phone, or teletype is preferred. It is essential that only secure means of communication be used.

16002. Intelligence Information Flow

Intelligence information must flow to all levels of the MAGTF. At the lower commands, the need for large reports does not always satisfy the unit's needs. At the lower levels, the need to fill the commander's EEI are most important when the unit is engaging the enemy. This information will normally answer the who, what, when, where, and why questions. Use of combat information at the lower level does not relieve the S-2 of that unit from the responsibility of completing his reports to higher headquarters. Though the information has been used, it may still provide indicators as to enemy courses of action at the higher level of command. Intelligence information must flow in both directions at once. Intelligence from the MAGTF SRIG, or SRIG detachment, must be presented to the lower commands in a usable and timely manner for them to effectively act on the intelligence. Combat information from the lower units on the same hand must reach the SRIG in a usable and timely manner for inclusion in the analysis process.

16003. Requirements for Dissemination

The principal requirements for dissemination are timeliness, usability of form, pertinence, and security.

a. Timeliness. Intelligence must be disseminated in time to the prospective using elements of the landing force. These elements use this intelligence as a basis to formulate plans and initiate action. Certain items of information, such as a report of an immediately impending hostile helicopterborne counterattack, must be disseminated to the affected units at once to permit maximum reaction time. A report of this nature is evaluated as quickly as possible; however, there may not be enough time to evaluate the report completely. The results of the report are then disseminated promptly. It is then interpreted for further significance; e.g., an impending hostile helicopterborne counterattack may be an indication of an imminent all-out hostile counteroffensive effort against our lodgment ashore. The resulting intelligence is disseminated as rapidly as possible. Timeliness in the dissemination of intelligence is affected by the means employed.

b. Usability of Form. Intelligence must be disseminated in a form which will permit its ready use by the prospective agency. The form will vary according to the nature and location of the prospective user, the urgency and nature of the intelligence, and the available means of dissemination. Oral intelligence estimates or briefings presented with the situation map may be the means used to disseminate intelligence to the commander, the unit staff, and commanders and staffs of unengaged subordinate units located near the CP. Urgent information and intelligence should be disseminated in brief messages, devoid of any nonessential details, to permit its prompt understanding and use by the recipient. Graphic information should be disseminated in overlays so that it can be readily applied to situation maps or receiving units. Written intelligence estimates, intelligence annexes, and intelligence reports are effective for use when the requirement is for general dissemination of a large amount of intelligence throughout a division, wing, or unit of similar size.

c. Pertinence. Due caution is exercised to ensure that all intelligence is disseminated to all agencies who have a need for it. In this connection, broad dissemination which results in the occasional dissemination of intelligence to a unit to which it is not pertinent is preferable to selective dissemination in which units may fail to receive available intelligence when they need it. However, units should not frequently receive irrelevant intelligence or voluminous information which tie up their communications channels. This is especially valid in the case of dissemination to units of the regiment/group level and below, whose capabilities for the processing and production of information are relatively limited. Generally, dissemination downward should be selective, based on the pertinence of the intelligence to the unit concerned. Conversely, virtually all intelligence should be disseminated upward. Consideration must be given to the fact that the pertinence of intelligence to a particular unit may be altered by a change in the situation. An item of intelligence which is not needed by a unit at a given time may be pertinent to it later. Pertinent intelligence is disseminated to adjacent units on the same basis, without going through the chain of command.

d. Security. The enemy's awareness that friendly forces have certain intelligence concerning his situation may cause him either to alter his actions so that the intelligence is no longer valid, or to strenthen his counterintelligence effort which will make the subsequent collection of information by friendly agencies more difficult. Accordingly, dissemination should be accomplished, in each case, by a means which provides adequate transmission security. Classified messages that may be susceptible to enemy interception should be encrypted. However, if time does not permit encrypting due to the urgency of the information, and circumstances are such that the enemy cannot intercept the information in time to act on it, it may be more expedient to send the message in the clear, if classified lower that TOP SECRET. Such transmission of classified information in the clear obviously should be confined to urgent tactical messages of local and transient significance. Transmission of messages in the clear is not resorted to in the case of classified information which would be of value to the enemy in other areas or during subsequent operations against our forces.

16004. Means of Dissemination

a. Means Available. Intelligence may be disseminated by messages, which are in turn transmitted by any available communication means; by direct contact such as conferences, briefings, and liaison visits; or by issuance of intelligence documents such as intelligence annexes, INTSUMs, and PERINTSUMs. See FMFM 3-30, *Communications*, for intelligence communications net available to intelligence staffs.

b. Selection of Means. The most suitable means to be used for dissemination depends primarily on the nature and urgency of the intelligence and the means available. When the wide dissemination of a comparatively large amount of intelligence is required, it is usually disseminated by issuing appropriate intelligence documents. As examples, written intelligence estimates and intelligence annexes to operation plans are used during the planning phase of an amphibious operation.

INTSUMs and PERINTREPs are also used similarly during the current phase. Electrical communication means are effective for the dissemination of intelligence messages. However, such dissemination may be subject to delay due to requirements for transmission of other messages of higher priority and for the encrypting of classified messages. The imposition of radio silence during the movement to the objective phase may require that messages be delivered by visual means, by aidrop, or by helicopter messenger between ships of the ATF. Graphic materials, such as sketches, overlays, and beach survey reports, can be disseminated by means of facsimile equipment. Availability of data processing equipment will permit rapid dissemination of urgent items.

The intelligence officer maintains close liaison with the communications officer at all times to keep himself informed of the availability of communications means. Frequent intelligence liaison visits between units, especially from higher to lower units, should be emphasized, particularly after the LF is engaged in operations ashore. A LF intelligence net is essential for dissemination of intelligence throughout the LF. However, experience has shown that the voice radio net is inherently time-consuming. The intelligence officer should identify and use any means of communication which could result in the rapid transfer of information such as facsimile and other means of digital communications, teletype, helicopter, etc. Also, there may be a need to pass combat information expeditiously from the collector to the user, bypassing normal chain of command channels.

16005. Intelligence Documents

Intelligence documents generally used within the LF include the written intelligence estimate, intelligence annex, INTSUM, PERINTSUM, INTREP, and miscellaneous intelligence studies.

a. Written Intelligence Estimate. Although a complete written intelligence estimate is seldom prepared by an echelon of the LF during the assault phase, a written intelligence estimate is normally prepared by all echelons of battalion/squadron size and larger during the planning phase. This written estimate is frequently disseminated to other units to keep them current on intelligence. (See app. C.)

b. Intelligence Annex. The intelligence annex to the operation plan or order is a medium through which information and intelligence may be disseminated, reconnaissance and observation missions assigned, and other intelligence tasks and procedures stated. It summarizes the enemy situation. At LF level, this is normally done by reference to current intelligence estimates and summaries, special reports, and studies on the enemy and AO, particularly those concerned with weather, terrain, hydrography, sociology, economics, and politics. If not previously distributed, such studies are included as appendixes to the intelligence annex. (See app. D.)

c. Intelligence Summary. The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a specific period which will normally be prescribed by the unit SOP for intelligence or the intelligence annex to the operation order. It contains information/intelligence on enemy ground, air, and naval activity; losses; movements; equipment; new units and personalities; obstacles; administrative activities; weather and terrain conditions; capabilities and vulnerabilities; and a conclusion concerning the meaning of enemy activities about the overall situation. It will normally be prepared at battalion, squadron, and higher echelon. (See app. CC.)

d. Periodic Intelligence Summary. The PERINTSUM is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a longer period than the INTSUM which will normally be prescribed by the unit SOP for intelligence or the intelligence annex to the operation order. It is a means of disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation and enemy operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; characteristics of the AO; and CI. Other intelligence documents and weather climate summaries may be disseminated as appendixes

to the PERINTSUM. The PERINTSUM is concise, but complete, and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, annotated maps, and annexes. Distribution of PERINTSUMs should extend to squadrons and battalions as a minimum and may extend to companies. The CLF prescribes the time to be covered by PERINTSUMs of his subordinates. Usually the period 1800 to 1800 is established so that current detailed intelligence will be available to all commanders in time to facilitate planning for the following day's operations. (See app. DD.)

e. Daily Intelligence Summary. The DISUM is prepared in message form at the joint force component command headquarters and provides higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters with a summary of all significant intelligence produced during the preceeding 24-hour period. The *as of* time for information content and submission time for the report will be as specified by the joint force commander. (See app. EE.)

f. Intelligence Report. The INTREP is the primary means of reporting information/intelligence. It is prepared by the first intelligence processing and production element acquiring the information (unit or agency possessing the capability to produce intelligence, normally not below battalion or squadron level). It may be prepared on any item of intelligence, regardless of source; generally, each report will concern only a single item. The report will always contain an identification code, time and date, the agency or intelligence processing and production element originating the report, and a paragraph describing the target, occurrence, or event. This paragraph will include a description, location, time, status, and an evaluation of the report. A final paragraph may be included for remarks. The INTREP will be submitted at battalion level and higher and will be given lateral as well as vertical dissemination. The value of the report is in direct proportion to the timeliness of submission and dissemination. The INTREP is not prepared on a periodic basis, but as information is acquired. The required speed of handling, consistent with the perishability and importance of information/intelligence, will dictate the choice of precedence. (See app. BB.)

g. Miscellaneous Intelligence Studies, Reports, and Imagery Interpretation Reports. Other studies and reports cover particular aspects of the enemy situation or the AO. Examples are beach studies; OOB studies; tactical studies of weather, terrain, and hydrography (see app. P); flak charts and maps; (shell) (mortar) (bomb) reports (see app. LL); spot (hot report—NATO) reports, mission report, initial photographic interpretation report, supplemental photographic report (see app. TT), and hot photo report (see app. SS).

h. Intelligence Documents Found at MEF and Division/Wing Level. The following intelligence documents are normally held at MEF and division/wing level. The MAGTFs will normally be provided pertinent copies of these publications. Subordinate air and ground units may hold some of these publications and should make arrangements to use those held by higher commands as required.

(1) National Intelligence Estimates. NIE are produced by the intelligence community at the seat of the government and are used for planning at the national level, to include long-range planning.

(2) National Intelligence Surveys (NIS). NIS are prepared by various intelligence agencies at the national level under coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence. Each survey deals with a specific country or area and covers such matters as military geography, transportation and telecommunications, sociology, politics, economics, science, and armed forces. Supplements to a given NIS may be prepared in detail such special aspects as ports and naval facilities, air facilities, etc. As concise digests of basic intelligence, supplements are useful for strategic planning and for very high level operationl planning.

(3) Amphibious Objective Study (AOS)

(a) AOS, prepared by the DIA, provides basic intelligence data of a permanent or semipermanent nature required for planning amphibious operations. Each AOS deals

with a specific area, the selection of which is based on strategic location, susceptibility to seizure by amphibious means, and other considerations. The selected area is discussed comprehensively in terms of the following:

- Land.
- Landing beaches and landing places
- HLZs.
- Oceanography
- Weather, climate, and astronomical conditions
- Transportation and telecommunications
- Sociological, political, and economic conditions.
- Population centers and ports
- Military forces
- Pertinent maps, charts, and other graphics available

(b) Additionally, each AOS contains selected maps, charts, and photographs of the areas as available and required. The studies are prepared in a form which is reproducible by the operating forces. Studies similar in purpose and scope to the AOS are prepared occasionally by the operating forces, normally at the Fleet Marine Force/amphibious force level or higher.

(4) Naval Intelligence Processing System Mini Data Base. The mini data base is a means of storing and rapidly retrieving hardbound documents, by miniaturization on photo aperture cards or microfiche, in a relatively small space. The mini data base is transportable, and it contains a wide range of reference material in miniaturized form. The six files in the mini data base that are available for intelligence analyst research are—

(a) Basic Reference File. This file contains reference material such as NIS studies, NIS summaries, area studies, and technical intelligence.

(b) Amphibious File. This file contains beach studies, port and harbor studies, HLZ studies, urban area studies, and lines of communication studies (highways, bridges, railways, etc.).

(c) Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World (ASSOTW) File. This file contains information on military and civilian airfields.

(d) Biographic File. This file contains information about high ranking personnel, both military and civilian, of a particular country.

(e) Tactical Targets Material File. This file contains graphics and information on predesignated targets around the world.

(f) Photo File. This file contains graphic illustrations and should be used with the basic reference file.

(5) Naval Intelligence Processing System Automated Data Base. Marines embarked aboard command-configured shipping, within the automated system of MAGIS (TERPES, II, and IAC) or possessing PC—NIPS will have access to information stored in NIPS hemisphere and/or tactical area files.

(6) Tactical Commanders' Terrain Analyses (TacCTA). TacCTA, prepared by the Department of the Army, cover requirements for terrain intelligence during the first 4 weeks of an operation for the objective area concerned. These requirements include data on topography, avenues of movement and lines of communication, military aspects of the terrain, possible zones of entry to the objective area, key installations, and other features of the objective area. The TacCTA consists of four basic parts—an orientation map, an objective area map, a terrain analysis map, and supporting data (diagrams, photographs, tables, etc.). The entire analysis for a given objective area is normally presented on two map sheets.

(7) **Order of Battle Studies.** OOB studies are normally prepared at the DOD level. They contain lists, histories, code names, and other data on foreign units; biographical data on foreign military personalities; and political structures, military system and organization, and tactical doctrines of foreign nations.

(8) **Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World.** ASSOTW, prepared by the DIA, provides information on all airfields and seaplane stations of the world. It is published in several volumes by geographic regions and includes detailed information on the location, size, construction, and available facilities of each airfield. Photographs are used where available.

(9) **Tactical Target Materials Program.** These programs are prepared by DIA. Potential targets are categorized and described in sufficient detail to permit target analysis and weapons selection.

(10) **Basic Encyclopedia.** The basic encyclopedia is an annual compilation by DIA of identified installations and physical areas of potential significance as objectives for attack, arranged by certain categories, and within those countries listed on the inside front cover of each volume.

(11) **Port Intelligence Studies.** These studies are prepared by DIA and contain detailed information concerning ports, such as depths, anchorages, dock capacities, facilities, and storage areas.

(12) **Monthly, Weekly, and Daily Intelligence Publications.** There are a variety of monthly, weekly, and daily national level and area weekly and daily command level intelligence publications which are distributed to various commands. They contain current articles about enemy or potential enemy forces, and the intelligence officer can use them to update his existing studies with regard to strength, disposition, OOB, tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, key figures, and political developments.

(13) **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations – National Intelligence Support Handbook.** Specifically tailored for evacuation of U.S. and friendly personnel. Normally consists of materials concerning the local embassy and surrounding terrain/population.

(14) **Contingency Support Packages.** Provides a variety of material to include MC&G products, imagery, and terrain studies to support whatever contingency to which the contingency support package is dedicated.

16006. MAGTF Intelligence Nets

Dissemination provides the MAGTF commander with the intelligence and combat information that he needs to make effective decisions to defeat the enemy. Communications must be considered one of the most important elements in planning intelligence support to the MAGTF. The most important principle in intelligence communications is that of timeliness. The information that is collected in response to taskings from the MAGTF intelligence section must be transmitted rapidly and accurately in order for the information to be disseminated to all echelons within the MAGTF. This dissemination may be accomplished through the use of the established MAGTF intelligence nets.

a. MAGTF Command Intelligence Net (HF/UHF-SATCOM/VHF). This net provides for rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence information between the MAGTF commander (via the MAFC located in the SRIG) and the major combat elements of the MAGTF. The composition of this net may consist as a minimum of the following organizations.

- CE (to include the SRIG).
- GCE(s).
- ACE(s).
- Separate combat and combat support units under operational control of the CLF.
- CSSE.

b. Division/GCE Intelligence Net (HF/VHF). This net provides a means for the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence between the GCE elements. As a minimum, the composition of this net consist of the following organizations.

- GCE headquarters (main and alternate CPs).
- Infantry regiments.
- Artillery regiments.
- Reconnaissance battalion.
- Light armored vehicle battalion.
- Tank battalion.
- Assault amphibian battalion.
- Combat engineer battalion.
- Attached combat and combat support units.

c. Infantry Regiment Intelligence Net (VHF/HF). This net provides a means for rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence information both to higher headquarters and lower elements to include all supporting and attached units. As a minimum, it should include the following:

- Infantry regiment headquarters.
- Infantry battalions.
- Supporting and attached units.
- Regimental observation post.

d. Marine Air Wing (ACE) Intelligence Net (HF/UHF/VHF). This net provides a means for the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence information between the ACE elements. The composition of this net consist as a minimum of the following organizations.

- ACE headquarters (main and alternate CPs).
- Marine air groups.
- All individual squadrons, both flying squadrons and support squadrons.
- FIIU.
- Air defense elements.
- Other support organizations/activities such as meteorological units.

e. FSSG/CSS Element Intelligence Net. This net provides a means for the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence information between the CSS elements. The composition of this net consist as a minimum of the following organizations.

- CSSE headquarters (main and alternate CPs).
- Landing support battalion/company.
- Supply battalion/company.
- Maintenance battalion/company.
- Engineer support battalion/company.
- Motor transport battalion.
- Medical battalion/company.
- Dental battalion/company.

f. MAGTF DSSCS Entry. This net provides the MAGTF commander with SCI/TTY communications with external agencies via the DSSCS. The following nets are provided via the DSSCS:

- MAGTF SPINTCOM Net (external).
- MAGTF CRITICOMM Net (VHF).
- MAGTF Internal SPINTCOM Net. This net provides the MAGTF commander with SCI/TTY communications with subordinate commanders through their organic special security communications teams.

16007. Standardization of Intelligence Reports

If possible, intelligence reports must be standard in nature. This is best accomplished through the use of

the U.S. MESSAGE TEXT FORMATS. This standardization allows for all recipients of intelligence information to use this information is a more timely manner. Also, it allows for communications systems currently on line to process these reports faster.

16008. Communications Support to JIC

Intelligence sources to the JIC include national assets, available joint and combined assets, and internal force assets already deployed in advance of assault operations. Shipboard assets include—

a. Tactical intelligence subsystem entry for SI information.

b. NTS entry for general service record traffic information.

c. Entry into allied communications record traffic systems.

d. Single channel secure radio.

Part V. Elements of Intelligence Management

Chapter 17

Intelligence Administration

17001. General

This chapter describes the basic intelligence-related administration responsibilities of MAGTF intelligence organizations. The responsibilities detailed here are in addition to the basic administration responsibilities of correspondence preparation and handling and file maintenance. The intelligence unit is responsible for publication and revision of the intelligence SOP, maintenance of the intelligence reference library, maintenance, storage, and distribution of MC&G products (see chapter 12), and, when present, maintenance of the NIPS database. The preceding responsibilities are not all-inclusive and change dynamically with the current tasking of intelligence.

17002. Inspections

Inspections are formal evaluations of command capabilities. Intelligence inspections ensure that—

- Commands have been properly trained.
- Training can be practically applied.
- Reference libraries are maintained in accordance with current directives.
- Intelligence personnel and the intelligence section as a whole can satisfy the minimum intelligence requirements necessary to support combat operations.

17003. Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures

Intelligence SOPs prescribe the intelligence procedures to be followed as a matter of routine without reference to a specific operation and are published as a command directive. A general requirement exists for each level of command within the FMF to produce intelligence SOPs. The intelligence officer is responsible for the preparation, publication, and updating of the intelligence SOP. It serves to—

- Provide a basis for intelligence training.
- Promote efficiency in intelligence functioning by providing uniformity of routine procedures and techniques.
- Eliminate the need for voluminous instructions on intelligence procedures in plans and orders.

a. Content. Content of the intelligence SOP should be routine procedures peculiar to the command. The duplication of materials contained in higher headquarters SOPs is not required. However, the intelligence SOP can reference higher headquarters directives and SOPs to keep volume and redundancy to a minimum.

b. Format. There is no prescribed format for an intelligence SOP. Each command's SOP format should be based on operational requirements and requirements established by higher headquarters. (See app. B.)

17004. Intelligence Reference Library

a. General. Every intelligence section has a requirement for a basic intelligence library to support command and intelligence functioning. Included in the library should be publications needed to support day-to-day intelligence operations, contingency operations, and planning and operations. Publications contained in libraries can be divided into two categories: required and nonrequired.

(1) Required Publications. Required publications are those material that the command has been directed to maintain as minimum holding by higher headquarters. Required holdings represent the minimum required material needed to support intelligence and command functioning. Listings of required holdings are contained in part B or the Naval Intelligence Publications Register (NIPR) (NIC-2600-001-YR), table of authorized material (TAM), and as directed by higher headquarters. The allowance listing will detail the number and form (hard copy or microfiche) of publications that each command is required to maintain. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to review and validate the command's, and subordinate command's required holdings to ensure that they meet the minimum requirements to support intelligence operations. If it is determined that changes are needed, either to delete or to add publications, a request will be submitted via the chain of command in accordance with the guidance contained in the NIPR and current directives.

(2) Nonrequired Publications. Nonrequired publications are all publications that do not fall under the category of required publications. These publications are used by the intelligence section to supplement minimum required holdings, to conduct planning and training, or to be used as reference material. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to ensure that nonrequired publications are available to support the command intelligence requirements.

b. Procurement. Procurement of publications falls into several categories. Each category establishes different procedures and requirements. Basic categories include intelligence publications, doctrinal and tactical publications, directives, and other publications.

(1) Intelligence Publications. Intelligence publications are produced by national, Service, or unified and specified commands which provide intelligence or guidance for intelligence functioning. Procurement procedures are contained in the NIPR, current directives, and local SOPs. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to ensure that the procurement of these publications is in accordance with current requirements.

(2) Doctrinal and Tactical Publications and Directives. Procurement of doctrinal and tactical publications (e.g., FMFMs, and FMs) is a G-1/S-1 responsibility. The intelligence officer is responsible for presenting requirements for these publications to the G-1/S-1. For basic reference, one-time issue FMs and directives can be procured on an as needed basis in accordance with current administrative and supply directives. TAMs establish basic allowance lists and automatic distributions for FMFMs and FMs for commands. To procure additional copies of an FMFM, or to delete or add FMFMs or FMs to a TAM, the command will need to submit a request for change to the TAM.

(3) Other Publications. Other publications are those which do not fall into either of the above categories. Procurement will be in accordance with the producers requirements and those established by current directives.

c. DIA Statement of Intelligence Interest. DIA statement of intelligence interest (SII) is prepared by the command to establish automatic distribution of intelligence publications to support command requirements. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to ensure that the

command's SSI is up to date. The DIA SII (RST-2C Doc No. 05991) for the Defense Intelligence Thesaurus (DIAM 59-2) is the vehicle by which commands register requirements for—

- Intelligence information reports.
- All-source nonrecurring finished intelligence.
- First issuances of all-source finished intelligence.

SIIs are submitted by regiment/MAG and MAGTF headquarters. Battalion/squadron SIIs are included in the regiment/MAG SIIs.

d. DIA Collateral Review Documents Listing. Annually DIA provides a listing of documents on automatic distribution to each command with a DIA account number. The listing allows commands to review current distribution and to add or delete publications as deemed appropriate. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to validate and make changes to the listing and return it via the chain of command in sufficient time to meet the deadlines established by DIA.

17005. Automatic Data Processing Support

A problem area within intelligence is how to handle the large volume of information available. Many agencies have addressed this problem by developing ADP systems to suit their needs. Consequently, there are many different systems available to support intelligence operations at various levels. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to be aware of them and to use them to support operations. Basically, the type of available support can be broken down by level of command from which the support is available: national, theater, Navy, and Marine.

a. National. National level agencies had developed several data bases to support intelligence operations. Subsequently, these data bases were united into a single source data base that can be accessed through standard terminals. Developments in computer technology will continue to be incorporated into systems, creating an ever changing system. The important point is that national ADP support is available to support operational commanders, and its application to intelligence problems should be considered by the intelligence officer. Support is usually available through the naval theater commander and, in some instances, at MEF level. The intelligence officer must determine where it is available and how it can support the command's needs. In discharging this responsibility, the intelligence officer will be guided by local directives and policy.

b. Theater. Within theaters of operations, various ADP support systems have been applied to intelligence operations. When a command has been tasked with the responsibility to conduct operations or planning in concert with a theater commander, it is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to determine the availability of theater ADP support and its applicability to the command's requirements. Procurement will require liaison, coordination, granting of direct liaison authorization, and establishment of procedures for obtaining support.

c. Navy. NIPS automated data base is the primary ADP support supplied by the Navy. It is available on most amphibious command ships and in senior naval headquarters. Additionally, Navy counterparts can provide valuable assistance concerning availability and procurement of other national and theater ADP support. Again obtaining desired support will require liaison, coordination, granting of direct liaison authority, and establishing procedures for obtaining desired support.

d. Marine Corps. Marine Corps ADP support for intelligence can be divided into two major areas: MAGIS and other.

(1) MAGIS. MAGIS is an integrated intelligence support system designed to support Marine Corps tactical intelligence requirements. Its major segments include intelligence analysis center, imagery interpretation, imagery processing, and Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES). The system is designed to support MAGTF operations by providing ADP and imagery support. MAGIS is compatible with the NIPS ADP system. Employment concepts and tasking procedures for MAGIS will be contained in current directives and SOPs.

(2) Other. This category includes all other types of ADP that can be applied to intelligence. This includes word processors, the *green machine*, or force automated support center capabilities that can be applied to intelligence functioning. In this area, the imagination of the intelligence officer is the only limiting factor.

Chapter 18

Intelligence Management

18001. General

Management addresses those aspects required to keep the command's intelligence program materially supported and manned with sufficient personnel. If an intelligence structure does not have the personnel and material assets needed to function, even the best and most detailed intelligence planning will fail to meet the needs of the commander. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to meet these material and personnel needs required by the intelligence effort. To fulfill this responsibility, a detailed analysis of the intelligence structure will have to be conducted to determine its current assets and those required to support intelligence operations. Requirements fall into two basic categories: garrison and operational. Both are directed toward the ultimate goal of efficiency and excellence in support of the command's operational requirements. This process is never complete and the intelligence officer should continually reappraise the intelligence structure's capabilities and deficiencies. The following suggestions are recommended to fulfill these requirements.

a. Analysis of the Intelligence Structure. Analysis of the intelligence structure identifies the current intelligence structure's capacity and determines its desired capacity. From the finding, all that may be required is continuance of the current capabilities, but more often than not deficiencies can be identified. The analysis should include an evaluation of the current T/O to ensure personnel needs meet garrison and operational requirements. Particular attention should be given to augmentation for combat operations. In conducting this evaluation, the number, rank, and MOS of personnel should be noted as they relate to the functional requirements of the intelligence structure. When addressing the material requirements, the intelligence officer should evaluate the T/E to determine if allocated equipment meets the needs of the intelligence structure. Finally, an evaluation of the supplies required to support both equipment and personnel functioning need to be analyzed. At this point, the intelligence officer has determined the current and desired capacity. The intelligence officer then evaluates those capabilities that are essential or nice to have. The essential capabilities must be the focus of the intelligence officer's efforts.

b. Recommending Changes/Increasing Budgets. The next process is to satisfy the deficiencies identified by the intelligence officer's analysis of the intelligence structure. Changes will fall into two general categories which sometimes overlap: budgeting and T/O and T/E requirements. The intelligence officer must determine under which category or to what extent both categories cover the identified deficiencies. When this has been completed, actions can be initiated to alleviate deficiencies. Each category will require different actions and procedures which are established in available directives.

c. Supervision. Once actions have been initiated to correct deficiencies, the intelligence officer must continue to be apprised of their status in order to determine whether they are being approved or disapproved. If approved, preparations must be made to accommodate the changes. If disapproved, then necessary modifications to the intelligence structure must be made to minimize the effects of identified deficiencies.

18002. Garrison

Garrison actions provide for the day-to-day garrison functioning and form the basis for operational capabilities and smooth transition to combat operations. Special attention should be given to the planning and preparation for combat operations. Emphasis is placed here because it requires detailed analysis and foresight to determine requirements. If requirements are not identified, satisfied, and planned for in garrison, they will become problem areas in the conduct of intelligence operations. In garrison planning, several areas should be considered.

a. Personnel. In cooperation with higher headquarters, ensure that the T/O is adequate for the tasks assigned. In addition, constant attention is needed to ensure that the personnel with the proper MOSs and skills are available to fill the T/O. In addition, the T/E must be satisfied and must be responsive to the intelligence needs of the command.

b. Budgeting. Budgeting is essential because it provides the funds required to support intelligence operations. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to plan, prepare, submit, and control the budgeting needs of the intelligence structure. Budgeting responsibilities are even more significant in light of reforms in fraud, waste, and abuse, and national budget constraints.

(1) Planning. Planning is the most important step and incorporates the process described earlier in the analysis of the intelligence structure capabilities. Next, the planned budget is submitted up the chain of command for consolidation and eventual submission as part of the DOD budget. The planning, programming, and budgeting system establishes requirements for time-phased submission of planned budgeting requirements. If the time frames are not met, the planners have two options. First, planners at higher headquarters take last year figures, make adjustments, and submit the figures for the next year or, second, they can omit them for a saving. In the former case, if all essential requirements are satisfied there are no problems. But if deficiencies have been identified and they are not programmed for, the intelligence officer will have to do without for the next fiscal year or substitute funds programmed for other purposes. In the later case, the intelligence officer may be left with little or no funds with which to operate. On a narrower scale, this shows the significance of planning and submitting budget requirements within the time constraints established by the comptroller.

(2) Programming. Programming is the step by which all planning is consolidated for submission to Congress for approval. Congress allocates funds as it deems necessary for DOD operations. Programmed funds are cited for specific purposes. Therefore, if funds have not been programmed for increases in personnel strengths, then personnel end strengths cannot be increased. Funds programmed for specific purposes cannot be reprogrammed without congressional authority. Hence, how funds are programmed depend entirely on the planning step. If planning is faulty, excess funds may be available for operational supplies and limited funds for equipment procurement.

(3) Budgeting. Budgeting is the final step. Budgeting encompasses the obligation and purchase of goods and services. The obligations of funds include the establishment of agreements for purchasing goods or services. Purchasing is the actual payment of funds. It must be ensured that funds are being spent in accordance with the programming and spending is frugal to maintain sufficient resources to last the entire fiscal year.

(4) General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The GDIP is a portion of DOD budgeting that includes all defense intelligence activities except SIGINT. This is opposed to the normal funding of Marine Corps intelligence functions, except SIGINT, which are sited under general operating funds. The GDIP funds the national and major theater collection capabilities which consequently can be

used to support Marine commanders under TENCAP. The responsibility involved with the GDIP will rarely affect the budgeting process in the FMFs, but can be used to the FMF's advantage in obtaining valuable support of both materials and personnel support planning and operations.

c. Training. The intelligence officer continuously endeavors to improve the proficiency of unit intelligence personnel and intelligence capabilities of the unit as a whold. To do this extensive in-house training for intelligence personnel, classes for nonintelligence personnel and resident schools are planned for and quotas established for the intelligence community.

d. Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence officer continually oversees the intelligence process. He ensures that the results of these efforts always support the unit's mission, whether it be in preparation for an operation or for contingency planning.

e. Staff Liaison. The intelligence process cannot be effective unless requirements are formulated with other staff officers/sections. The process must be continuous and the relationship with the operations officer should be particularly close.

f. Keep the Commander Informed. A periodic update of the intelligence section's efforts will ensure the commander's confidence in the unit's intelligence posture when a contingency arises.

18003. Operational

Issuance of the warning order marks the change from garrison to operational intelligence mode. At this point, all assets focus on a particular contingency area and an assigned mission. Budgetary and training concerns are set aside. Staff liaison becomes a continuous function and the flow of information to the commander increases. Personnel are allocated to the collection, processing and production, and dissemination of intelligence. Although these individual functions are accomplished by subordinates, the G-2/S-2 must oversee the entire process. As the intelligence representative to the commander and staff, he is in the best position to gauge the success of the effort. He must determine if the intelligence being produced is responsive to the commander's needs and be prepared to shift the emphasis if required. Items requiring the G-2/S-2 attention during operations include but are not limited to the following:

a. Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence officer acts as the coordinator of the individual portions of the process, ensuring a coherent and complete effort.

b. Staff Liaison. The intelligence officer must stay apprised of the commander's intentions through frequent contact with the operations officer.

c. Liaison with Subordinate Units. An effective intelligence effort fulfills the requirements of subordinate units. The intelligence officer constantly gauges the effectiveness of this liaison as well as the liaison with higher and adjacent commands.

d. Intelligence Communications. In the planning phase, the intelligence officer ensures coordination with the CEO to establish paths for the dissemination process. He also monitors the status of the dissemination means throughout the operation. Periodically, contact is made to intended recipients of intelligence to compare notes on what has been sent and what has been received to ensure the completeness of the dissemination system.

e. Briefing. The primary means of intelligence dissemination to the commander and the staff is the oral brief. The manager must pay particular attention to content, form, and delivery.

f. Logistics. Logistics support required for intelligence functions includes the procurement, stowage, transportation, and distribution of supplies required to support intelligence operations. This responsibility has two main aspects: internal and external.

(1) Internal. Internal aspects involve preparing the intelligence structure to deploy and function operationally. This includes planning material consumption and ues during operations. Here the intelligence officer in concerned with planning and implementing the internal functions and establishing requirements and procedures that can be conducted within the intelligence structure.

(2) External. External aspects involve intelligence functioning that requires support outside the intelligence structure. The major portion of this function requires coordination with the logistics officer and subordinate commands. Areas include embarkation, deployments, and support of major end items of equipment and supplies required for intelligence operations. Examples would include segments of the MAGIS, MC&G, and BASS (battlefield area surveillance system) van.

g. Personnel Augmentation. During the conduct of combat operations, the intelligence structure will be augmented by personnel to flush out T/Os and attachment of intelligence collection assets. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to plan for augmentation and subsequent operations. Problem areas will include the smooth transition of operations with new personnel, with particular attention towards familiarizing new personnel with procedures and functions of the intelligence structure. It will also include providing for human needs. The augmentation of personnel and attached units may also require consideration for communications and logistics as listed. The primary goal is efficient intelligence operations through the reduction of minor problem areas, which invariably occur with the provision of augmentees to a deploying unit.

Chapter 19

Intelligence Training

19001. Introduction

a. Objective. Every individual Marine regardless of MOS has occasion to observe significant facts concerning the enemy and the area of operations. This fact supports the ultimate objective of intelligence training. The objective is to be sure all personnel know how to contribute effectively to the intelligence and counterintelligence effort in support of the mission. Intelligence training must not only be directed at intelligence personnel, but at the entire unit with various groups being trained uniquely for their intelligence functions within the unit.

b. Responsibility. Training is the overall responsibility of the commander. He delegates to the intelligence officer responsibiity for the planning and supervision of training of the intelligence section. The intelligence officer, in conjunction with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision over the intelligence training of the entire command. He prepares the intelligence training program for inclusion in the command training program. Once established, he supervises the program by making staff visits and conducting tests and inspections of subordinate units. The intelligence officer also ensures that there are qualified instructors and appropriate training material to support the program.

19002. Training Requirements

a. Intelligence training, as with many other intelligence functions, is a never ending process. It runs the gamut from individual professional military education/unit level training to several levels of formal schools.

b. Intelligence training must be a blend of individual training, unit training, and formal schools. All training, to the extent practical, must be performance-oriented rather than classroom-oriented. The individual Marine responds well to short classes on a given subject, with extensive practical application to demonstrate mastery of skills taught in the classroom environment.

c. Training methods should be a blend of the more traditional techniques supported by computer-aided instruction. For some more technical-oriented subjects, computer-based training should be considered.

d. Unit level training must be designed to support the unit mission and the intelligence functions at the level being given. All training is subject to individual training standards, published in MCO 1510 series.

19003. Types of Intelligence Training

Intelligence training is grouped into several categories to provide some level of training to all personnel.

a. Basic Intelligence Training. Basic intelligence training is given to all personnel. Included in this category are intelligence subjects and other related subjects.

(1) **Intelligence Subjects**

(a) Nature and purpose of combat intelligence.

(b) Secrecy discipline.

(c) Defense against espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

(d) Handling of prisoners of war, enemy deserters, civilians, evaders and escapees, and captured documents and materials.

(e) Use of countersigns.

(f) Shell reports.

(g) Enemy identifications: uniforms, insignia, and recognition of mechanical vehicles, aircraft, and ships.

(h) Action in event of possible sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(i) Characteristics and methods of operations of the enemy armed forces.

(j) Characteristics of the projected area of operation; nature and attitude of the civilian populace.

(k) Sensors equipment capabilities/limitations/employment concepts.

(2) **Related Subjects**

(a) Map, chart, and photo reading.

(b) Use of available means of communication.

(c) Observation and reporting: emphasis on objective reporting of facts rather than subjective reporting of interpretation of facts.

(d) Camouflage.

(e) Survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, escape, and U.S. Code of Conduct.

b. Training of Nonintelligence Personnel of Combat and Combat Support Units. Personnel of combat and combat support units may be employed as members of security patrols, observation posts, and listening posts. All aircrews have a secondary mission of observation of the enemy, terrain, and significant weather conditions. Normal combat employment of friendly forces provides ample opportunity to come in direct observation and/or contact with the enemy. Accordingly, they become a valuable source of intelligence information. In addition to the subjects previously listed, the following should be included in intelligence training for these personnel.

(1) **Intelligence Subjects**

(a) **Ground Units**

1 Scouting and patrolling, day and night.

2 Observation post techniques, procedures, and equipment.

3 Techniques of employment of remote sensors, ground surveillance radars, and night observation devices.

(b) **Air Units.** Techniques of aerial visual observation.

(c) **Air and Ground Units**

1 Indoctrination in intelligence collection, processing and production, and dissemination.

2 Detailed training in the organization, tactics and techniques, and equipment of hostile units of the type likely to be encountered or observed by them.

(2) **Related Subjects**

(a) Reporting of information to include the importance of timeliness, security, clarity; and, for ground units, the preparation of field messages, overlays, and elementary sketches.

(b) Elementary terminology used in describing topographic and hydrographic features.

c. Training of Personnel in Units and Agencies Whose Primary Mission Includes Observation or Reconnaissance. Included in this category of units and agencies are the SRIG, reconnaissance battalion, Marine aviation squadrons having an aerial imagery capability, Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron, observation squadrons, air observers, forward air controllers, artillery and naval gunfire spotters, and regularly assigned observation personnel. Personnel in this category should receive the above training. However this training should proportionally increase in view of the normal combat environment of these personnel. Additional training is given to personnel and units in this category based on their primary missions as follows:

(1) Division reconnaissance battalion is given extensive training in motorized and helicopter reconnaissance, as well as training in amphibious reconnaissance.

(2) Force reconnaissance company receives, in addition to conventional reconnaissance training, such subjects as hydrographic reconnaissance and surveying, beach reconnaissance, and other subjects pertinent to the types of reconnaissance conducted prior to the assault phase of a MAGTF operation.

19004. Training for Intelligence Personnel

Training for intelligence personnel must be designed to support the unit mission and intelligence functions, intelligence specialty teams, and individual specialty assignments.

a. Training for personnel assigned to the intelligence section, regardless of intelligence MOS, includes the following subjects:

(1) Intelligence agencies to include their organization, functions, capabilities, and limitations.

(2) Intelligence documents and materials (to include ADPs and access methods) available, their function, and applicability.

(3) Information sources.

(4) Methods of collecting and reporting information.

(5) Recording and filing information to include preparing overlays and posting situation maps.

(6) Examination of personnel, documents, and material.

(7) Organization, tactics and techniques, and equipment of the enemy.

(8) CI and security measures.

(9) Observation and reporting.

(10) Map and imagery reading; military sketching.

(11) Remote sensors/ground surveillance radar planning consideration and equipment capabilities/limitations.

(12) Use of ADP support systems to include the various data bases available for use by the intelligence section/agencies.

(13) OOB analysis, both in an automated and nonautomated environment.

(14) Evaluation of information.

(15) Interpretation of information.

(16) Estimation of the enemy situation to include determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

(17) Dissemination of information and intelligence.

(18) Capabilities and limitations of reconnaissance and observation units and agencies.

(19) Terrain evaluation.

(20) Hydrographic evaluation.

(21) Organization, functions, capabilities, and limitations of intelligence specialist teams.

(22) Briefing and debriefing of combat air personnel and ground patrols.

b. In addition, officers and selected enlisted personnel should be trained in the following subjects as required by their duties.

(1) Imagery interpretation and imagery interpretation reports.

(2) Flak and target analysis.

(3) Intelligence planning to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterintelligence planning.

(4) Intelligence SOPs.

19005. Intelligence Specialty Teams

Personnel assigned to intelligence specialists teams receive specialized training in preparation to perform their assigned duties within the team. They should receive MOS qualification training and unit training listed in paragraph 12003. Detailed discussion of such training, which is usually accomplished at a formal school and follow-on team training, is not in the scope of this manual. When these personnel are attached to the MAGTF for a given purpose, they should join early enough to train with the unit that they are going to support.

19006. Schools

Formal schools vary from basic MOS producing courses to courses designed to provide advance study. Generally all intelligence personnel will attend an MOS producing course, intermediate and advanced level MOS training, and some type of leadership/professional military training. MCO P1500.12 contains a list of formal schools available to intelligence personnel. MCO 3800.42 contains career development guideline for enlisted personnel and officers to include various schools and optimal grade and time in service to attend.

Chapter 20

Special Security Office and Special Security Communications

20001. Special Security Office/Officer

a. General. Certain commands within the Marine Corps are accredited for and authorized to receive, process, and store sensitive compartmented information (SCI). These commands have a designated sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) and a SSO responsible for the operation of the SCIF and the security, control, and use of SCI. All matters relating to SCI or SSO requirements are referred to the SSO. DOD Regulation 5210.17 (M) with Naval Supplement (NavSup) provides the basic guidance for SSO and SCIF functioning. It will be found in the SCIF since it contains SCI. FMFM 3-23, *Signals Intelligence*, provides additional information and reference material.

b. Responsibilities. Any command authorized to receive SCI will have a designated SSO. If an SSO has not been designated, no one else in the command may assume the function. The senior intelligence officer of the command is assigned the SSO responsibilities, unless otherwise assigned in writing as prescribed by DOD 5200.17 (M) w/NavSup. The command security manager is not responsible for handling or control of SCI. Although the SSO runs the SCI program independently of the security manager, there is a great need for cooperation and coordination between the two, especially regarding investigations and clearances. The SSO is responsible for initiating investigations for SCI access. The SSO must advise the security manager that an investigation has been initiated and provide a copy of the investigation request as a tickler for the official personnel record. The SSO must also advise the security manager when the results have been finally adjudicated by COMNAVINTCOM or COMNAVSECGRU so the security manager can have the investigation and clearance data entered in personnel records. The security manager, in turn, must keep the SSO advised of any information developed about an individual in the SCI program or of changes to security policy and procedures as they may impact on the SCI program.

20002. Special Security Communications Center

A special security communications center (SSCC) is normally established by the LF headquarters of MEF or MEB size and by division and wing headquarters. It operates under the staff cognizance of the intelligence officer and provides terminal facilities for special security record communications required by the command in support of its assigned mission. Signal paths to meet the SSCC requirements are provided by the supported command. An SSCC is organized on a functional basis to provide continuity in its operations. Although the type and scope of the operation may vary, it is similar to that of a normal communications center. At the MAGTF headquarters level, the organization of the SSCC is based on the resources provided by a radio battalion. Each division and wing headquarters is supported by a special security communications team (SSCT).

a. Functions. The operations of an SSCC essentially include the same function outlined under the elements of a normal communication center outlined in FMFM 3-30, *Communications*

b. Communication Requirements. The communication requirements of an SSCC are similar at each headquarters. For effective operations, it will normally require both electrical and physical communications with—

(1) The commander, intelligence officer, and other designated members of the staff; the COC and other appropriate agencies and facilities located in the command post.

(2) The S/EWCC.

(3) Activities served by the SSCCs.

(4) Senior, subordinate, and adjacent SSCCs.

(5) Communication relay facilities, when specified.

(6) Facilities providing entry into the worldwide special intelligence communications/critical communications network, when specified.

(7) Designated systems control center, technical control center, and switching center(s).

(8) Other organizations concerned with services performed by the SSCC, when specified.

20003. Special Security Communications Team

a. Mission. The SSCT provides SPINTCOMM and CRITICOMM via the DSSCS for the commanding generals of each Marine division/MAW and/or designated elements.

b. Tasks. Under the staff cognizance of the ACS, G-2/SSO at the division/MAW headquarters to which attached, the SSCT performs the following tasks.

(1) Provides SI/SSO record communications and cryptologic guard for the division/MAW headquarters.

(2) While in garrison, operates a fixed plant, full-duplex, on-line, secure record SI/SSO communications terminal facility as provided by the host base/station.

(3) Deploys, installs, operates, and maintains ground-based tactical SI/SSO record communications facilities in support of the tactical commander.

(4) Provides off-line cryptologic SI/SSO communications support for the supported commander.

(5) Coordinates all matters pertaining to SI/SSO communications circuit path and equipment maintenance (less 1st echelon) with the division/MAW CEO.

(6) Provides 1st echelon maintenance on all assigned fixed plant and tactical equipment.

(7) Receives, processes, and stows SI/SSO materials.

(8) Maintains and exercises ground-mobile, tactical on-line, and off-line SI/SSO communications terminals.

(9) Identifies requirements for access to SI/SSO terminal facilities in ship's signals exploitation spaces (SSES), as necessary.

(10) Provides augmentation personnel to man SSES communications facilities while afloat.

(11) Assists the special intelligence support section within the division/MAW G-2 section as directed by the ACS, G-2.

(12) Conducts military, special, and technical training, as required.

c. Organization. The SSCTs are composed of an OIC, an NCOIC, and Marine special intelligence communicators with field equipment to establish a SPINTCOMM/ CRITICOMM terminal for the commanding general. The SSCT commander plans, directs, and supervises the activities of the team.

d. Concept of Operation/Concept of Employment. Considerations for the operations and employment of an SSCT are essentially the same as those for a general service communications center (i.e., AUTODIN). They include transmitting, receiving, and processing electrical messages, particularly by teleprinters. The differences between the communications systems include security, format, and processing requirements, in addition to the differences inherent in the missions of the SSCT and those of general service communications center. The general communication principles and techniques contained in FMFM 3-30, are applicable to SSCT operations and employment. The following considerations are repeated for emphasis.

(1) When in garrison, the SSCT accesses DSSCS as a remote subscriber.

(2) When deployed, the SSCT operates as a point-to-point subscriber in the LF special intelligence/special security communications system and may be a subscriber to DSSCS in accordance with the LF communications plan.

(a) The supported commander provides the communications circuit path.

(b) The SSCT performs all off-line cryptologic operations in accordance with existing instructions.

(c) The SSCT must be manned at all times by two appropriately cleared Marines on a 24-hour, continuous basis.

(d) The SSCT must maintain close coordination with the communications systems control center and technical control center to ensure the SSCT receives adequate support and circuit priority.

(3) During afloat operations, the SSCT, or a subelement of the SSCT, is embarked with the division/MAW commander and may augment the SSES to provide SI/SSO communications service, as required.

e. Logistics and Administrative Capabilities. The SSCT is vehicular transportable using organic equipment. The SSCT is also helicopter transportable. Logistics and administrative support is provided by the supported commander.

Appendix A

Checklist For Intelligence Officer's Responsibilities

1. Specific Intelligence Responsibilities

a. Advise and assist the commander and his staff regarding the requirements for intelligence relative to operational decisions.

b. Assist the commander in forming his intelligence requirements for the planning and execution of operations. Ensure that those requirements developed by other staff officers and subordinate commanders are included.

c. Compile, prioritize, and recommend essential elements of information (EEI) to the commander and his staff.

d. Prepare plans, orders, and requests to support the command's intelligence collection requirements. Ensure those applicable requirements of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders are included.

e. Supervise and coordinate all information collection activities.

f. Determine requirements for and recommend allocation of intelligence specialists to subordinate units.

g. Plan and supervise the exploitation of information from all available sources and process it into intelligence.

h. Coordinate with the unit NBC officer in providing information to the operations officer concerning enemy special weapons (nuclear, biological, and chemical) capabilities, and probability of use and terrain and weather conditions affecting both enemy and friendly employment of such weapons.

i. Provide information concerning specific enemy weapons systems, capabilities, doctrine, weather, and terrain.

j. Coordinate the collection of weather data in areas not under friendly control.

k. Coordinate signals intelligence operations and activities.

l. Coordinate the conduct of special intelligence operations and activities to include the establishment and maintenance of a special security office and the required communications capability.

m. Disseminate intelligence and information to all who have a requirement. This includes—

(1) Preparing and continually updating the intelligence estimate.

(2) Preparing the Intelligence Annex to the operation plan/order.

(3) Preparing and disseminating any other intelligence analyses, studies, and reports as required by the commander, the staff, higher headquarters, or as directed by the situation.

(4) In coordination with the operations officer and the communications officer, planning and supervising the timeliness and physical dissemination of intelligence and information.

n. Direct the counterintelligence effort to include:

(1) Preparing the counterintelligence estimate.

(2) Planning, coordinating, and supervising all active and passive counterintelligence measures.

(3) Coordinating all counterintelligence measures, operations, and activities with higher and adjacent headquarters.

o. Determine the map, chart, imagery, and geodetic requirements for the command and supervise the procurement and distribution of such information and material.

p. Plan and supervise the intelligence training of the command.

q. Plan, direct, and supervise the intelligence training of the intelligence section to include attached intelligence specialist teams.

r. Prepare and update intelligence standing operating procedures and intelligence related directives as required by the commander.

s. Plan, direct, and supervise the administrative requirements needed for intelligence functions.

2. Other Intelligence Responsibilities

The intelligence officer supervises and coordinates other aspects in coordination with cognizant staff officers. Specific responsibilities include the intelligence aspects of—

a. Tactical deception (the G-3/S-3).

b. Civil affairs (the G-3/S-3).

c. Employment of special weapons (nuclear and chemical) to include enemy capability to employ such weapons and enemy reaction to friendly employment (the G-3/S-3/NBC officer).

d. Psychological operations to include estimating the conditions and vulnerabilities of prospective target groups; estimating the effectiveness of friendly psychological operations, as well as the enemy's; and assisting in the planning and supervising of training activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda (the G-3/S-3).

e. Barrier and denial operations (the G-3/S-3).

f. Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (the G-3/S-3).

g. Electronic warfare (the G-3/S-3 or EWO when assigned).

h. Operations security (the G-3/S/3).

i. Handling of prisoners of war and detainees, and captured documents and material (the G-1/S-1 and G-4/S-4).

j. Terrorism counteraction (the G-3/S-3/PMO).

k. Communications security (COMSEC) (the G-3/S-3/CEO).

l. Information security program (ISP) as it relates to counterintelligence and censorship (the G-1/S-1).

m. Language capabilities (the G-1/S-1/Marine Corps Base).

n. Assistant security manager (the COS, XO, G-1/S-1).

o. Ground surveillance reconnaissance officer (the G-3/S-3/FSC).

3. Duties Which Will Not Be Assigned to Intelligence Personnel Due to Conflicts of Interest

a. Communication material security (CMS) officer.

b. Classified material control center (CMCC) officer.

c. Top secret control officer (TSCO).

d. Guard officer.

e. Automatic data processing (ADP) security officer.

f. Security Manager/Asst. Security Manager*.

(* When intelligence officer must also be SSO.)

Appendix B

Outline for Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures

CLASSIFICATION

Ref: (a) Reference applicable directives and SOPs as needed.

1. GENERAL

   Provide guidance concerning the applicability of higher authority directives, SOPs, and doctrinal publications.

2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

   a. Purpose

   b. Applicability of EEI of Higher Headquarters and Adjacent Commands

   c. Specific Types of Information to Be Reported on a Continuing Basis

4. INTELLIGENCE TASKS

   a. Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Subordinate unit responsibilities and reporting of locations of observation posts and patrols.

   b. Amphibious Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Subordinate unit responsibilities, procedures for requesting, communications, and reports.

   c. Airspace Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Subordinate unit responsibilities, reporting of locations and coverage.

   d. Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Responsibilities procedures for requesting and controlling, communications and reports.

   e. Briefing and Debriefing

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5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL

a. Enemy Prisoners. Searching, segregation, initial and subsequent interrogation, and special handling of certain categories.

b. Escapees and Evaders. Handling and interrogation.

c. Captured Documents. Reporting and disposition, responsibility of unit intelligence officers, and handling of documents found on prisoners or civilians.

d. Captured Materials. Guarding, reporting, disposition, and particular types desired.

e. Souvenirs

6. SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND ESCAPE

Provide information concerning command, subordinate commands, and individual responsibilities, training, and procedures with regard to SERE.

7. MAPPING, CHARTING, GEODESY, MODELS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

a. Standard Distribution

b. Stock Levels

c. Contingency Support

d. Requisitions

e. Procurement

8. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Security of Information. Restrictions on transport of documents and on personnel with certain knowledge.

b. Security Clearances

c. Counterintelligence Personnel. Responsibilities, authority, and credentials.

d. Military Security

e. Civil Security

f. Embarkation Security

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g. Counterterrorism

h. Censorship

i. Special Operations

9. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Routine Reports. Period covered, time of submission, and distribution.

b. Special Reports

c. Weather Forecasts and Current Weather Data

10. AUXILIARY AGENCIES

a. Agencies Coordinated and Supervised by Intelligence Section. Location of agencies, support they can provide, and methods of requesting support.

b. Agencies Coordinated and Supervised by Other Sections. Locations of agencies, support they can provide and methods of requesting support.

11. TARGET INFORMATION

a. System Used in the Designation of Targets, Target Locations, and Target Classification

b. Promulgation of Target List

c. Target Bulletins

12. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Training

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix C

Sample Format for an Intelligence Estimate

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no._____ of_____ copies
Issuing Headquarters
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (Number)

Ref: (a) Maps and charts
(b) Other pertinent documents

1. MISSION

(State the assigned task and its purpose.)

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

(State conditions which exist and indicate the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission.)

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military geography.

(a) Topography.

(b) Hydrography.

(c) Climate and weather.

(2) Transportation.

(3) Telecommunications.

(4) Politics.

(5) Economics.

(6) Sociology.

(7) Science and technology.

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b. Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air Services)

(1) Strength.

(a) Committed forces.

(b) Reinforcements.

(2) Composition.

(3) Location and disposition.

(4) Movement and activities.

(5) Availability of information.

(6) Logistics.

(7) Operational capability to launch missiles.

(8) Serviceability and operational rates of aircraft.

(9) Operational capabilities of combatant vessels.

(10) Technical characteristics of equipment.

(11) Electronics intelligence.

(12) Nuclear and CBR weapons.

(13) Air defense.

(14) Significant strengths and weaknesses.

(15) Recent and present significant activities.

c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Guerilla.

(2) Psychological.

(3) Subversion.

(4) Sabotage.

d. Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

(Page number)

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3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(List separately each enemy capability which can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission.)

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the enemy. State the effect the enemy adoption of each capability will have on the accomplishment of the mission.)

5. CONCLUSIONS

(Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4, and including, when possible:

a. Enemy courses of action beginning with the most probable and continuing down the list in order of relative probability.

b. Enemy vulnerabilities where applicable.)

/s/ _____

_____

ANNEXES: (As appropriate)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix D

Intelligence Annex

(JOPS Format)

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters
Address
Date/time of issue

ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
INTELLIGENCE

Ref: (a) Documents that provide intelligence required for planning, include SOPs and other guidance documents. When references are listed, the originator should ensure that commands implementing the order have copies of the cited references.

1. MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

a. Mission. State concisely the intelligence mission as it relates to the planned operation. The mission should be based upon the command mission statement in the basic plan.

b. Concept of Intelligence Operations. Outline the purpose of intelligence operations and summarize the means and agencies to be employed during normal and crisis periods before, as well as during, the execution of the PLAN. Refer to unit SOPs and other directives as applicable.

2. SITUATION. Information contained in the subparagraphs of this heading is general in nature, directed toward informing decision makers, and refers to appropriate appendixes and documents for detailed information.

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Summarize the conditions of the area of operations as they may influence the concept of the plan. Do not repeat detailed information contained in appendixes. Refer to appendixes 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as appropriate.

b. Weather and Terrain. Summarize the existing terrain as it pertains to the operation. Do not repeat detailed information contained in appendixes. Refer to appendixes 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as appropriate.

c. Estimate of Enemy Capabilities. Summarize the enemy capabilities and possible courses of action in relation to paragraph 2a and 2b. Do not repeat detailed information contained in appendixes. Refer to appendixes 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as appropriate.

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3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Identify intelligence resources not detailed in appendixes and the intelligence efforts required to support the operation plan. Identify required intelligence support to satisfy the command's needs. Identify specific aspects of the intelligence that must be amplified to support the operation (e.g., reporting, dissemination, collection, direction, etc.) Do not repeat detailed information contained in appendixes. Refer to appendixes 1, 2, 3, 11, and 13, as appropriate.

4. ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS. Identify intelligence tasks and amplifying instructions that are not identified in the appendixes. Refer to appendixes 2, 3, 11, and 13, as appropriate.

a. Orders to Subordinate Commands and Attached Units

b. Requests to Higher and Adjacent Units

c. Coordinating Instructions

5. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. List, under separate subparagraphs, necessary items not covered above or in SOPs, or which require action different from that detailed in SOPs. Examples include—

a. Augmentation. Address personnel augmentation required to support operations.

b. Weather Service Plan. State instructions concerning weather forecast support, publications, and responsibilities.

c. Additional as Required

SIGNATURE

Name
Rank and Service
Title

APPENDIXES: (As required: indicate if omitted, published under separate cover or other remarks as necessary)

1—Essential Elements of Information
2—Signals Intelligence
3—Counterintelligence
4—Target Intelligence
5—Maps, Charts, and Geodesy
6—Human Intelligence
7—Intelligence Estimate
8—Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain
9—Beach Studies
10—Helicopter Landing Zone Studies
11—Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan
12—Interrogation-Translator Platoon Team Employment Plan
13—Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
b) FMFM3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. GENERAL. Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, essential to preexecution and execution phases of the planned operations. Orient intelligence efforts toward answering the question contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 below. All agencies participating in the collection effort and all elements within the command are requested to report information pertinent to these questions.

2. BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN. List those essential elements of information (EEI) to which answers are needed for further planning and as a basis for decision on plan implementation.

3. UPON IMPLEMENTATION. List additional EEI and other intelligence requirements (OIR) that become relevant upon the decision to implement the plan. Use additional paragraphs to detail identifiable EEI and OIR required through the various phases of the operation.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-23, (C) *Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations*

1. GENERAL. The appendix provides information and direction pertaining to signals intelligence (SIGINT). It is deliberately brief due to classification restrictions. See reference (a) for detailed guidance. This appendix is generally prepared only by MAGTF Headquarters or division/wing.

2. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

b. Responsibilities

(1) NSA/CSS

(2) NSA/CSS Representative XXX

(3) CTF XXX (CATF)

c. Tasks for Subordinate Commanders

(1) Division

(2) Wing

(3) Radio Battalion

d. Coordinating Instructions

3. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

4. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

TABS:

A—Allocation of SIGINT units and resources (omitted)
B—Special Intelligence Communications Support (omitted)
C—SIGINT Reporting Instructions (omitted)

(NOTE: This appendix and tabs are usually classified when filled in.)

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Ref: (a) FM 30-15, *Intelligence Interrogation*
(b) FMFM 0-1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine*
(c) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(d) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(e) FMFM 2-4, *Counterintelligence*
(f) FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*
(g) FMFM 3-30, *Communications*
(h) OPNAVINST 5510.1H, *Information and Personnel Security Program Regulation*
(i) MCO 3850.1F, *Policy and Guidance for Counterintelligence (CI) Activities*

1. GENERAL. General objectives and guidance necessary to accomplish the mission. Include a general statement of command responsibilities, reporting, coordination, and liaison in support of counterintelligence operations. General statement of the effect of U.S. Statutes, Executive Orders, DOD Directives and Status-of-Forces Agreements on counterintelligence activities. This appendix is usually producsed by counterintelligence specialists at MAGTF Headquarters, or division/wing level. Reference (a) provides detailed guidance.

2. HOSTILE THREAT. Summarize the enemy situation regarding their intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive efforts and discuss it in light of the current enemy activities and capabilities which stem from known enemy training and doctrine.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS. Identify the available counterintelligence organizations and their approximate strengths. Identify specific requirements for language and technical skills.

4. SECURITY. Provide guidance concerning procedures and responsibility for the following:

a. Force of Unit Headquarters

b. Military Security

c. Civil Security

d. Port, Frontier, and Travel Security

e. Safeguarding Classified Information and Codes

f. Security Discipline and Security Education

g. Protection of Critical Installations

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h. Special Weapons Security

i. Counterintelligence Measures

5. WARTIME INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

a. Catagories. Identify type of wartime information security program (WISP) to be implemented.

b. Implementation. Identify conditions for implementation of each category.

c. Responsibilities. Identify the staff or other element that will initiate the implementation.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS, ACTIVITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

a. Defensive. Identify the staff or commands that have supporting counterintelligence assets and provide guidance concerning procedures, priorities, and channels for handling POWs, defectors, indigenous refugees, displaced persons, detained suspects, debriefing of U.S. or friendly escapees and evaders, and exploitation of captured documents and materials.

b. Offensive. Establish guidance for approval of counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, double agent, counterterrorist, deception, or other special operations.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TARGETS AND REQUIREMENTS. Provide guidance to subordinate commands for developing counterintelligence targets. Designate priorities that emphasize categories: personalities, installations, organizations and groups, and documents and material. Identify special counterintelligence collection requirements and priorities. Identify any other command information required.

8. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION. Provide guidance for the analysis, production, and dissemination of counterintelligence from all sources.

9. COORDINATION. Identify coordination requirements peculiar to activities listed in paragraphs 6 through 8. Identify coordination requirements for counterintelligence support from other commands or agencies.

10. MISCELLANEOUS. Include any necessary guidance not provided (e.g., intelligence contingency fund accounting, reporting, and restrictions).

TABS:

A—Counterintelligence Estimate
B—Password and Countersign (omitted)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(b) FMFM 3-25, *Counterintelligence* (under development)

1. MISSION. State the assigned or assumed mission. The counterintelligence estimate, like the intelligence estimate, is incorporated into Annex B for administrative purposes. It should be developed in support of the commander's decision-making process and used in his estimate of the situation.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS. This paragraph discusses characteristics of the area and their effect on enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist activities, and on our counterintelligence operations and measures. Reference should be made to detailed information contained in reference documents, the intelligence estimate, or other annexes of the OPLAN.

3. INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST SITUATION. Discuss the enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist activities as to the current situation.

4. INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST CAPABILITIES. List all enemy capabilities to conduct intelligence, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist activities. Analyze and discuss these capabilities and present a judgment as to probability of adoption.

5. CONCLUSION. Discuss the probability of adoption of enemy courses of action based on capabilities. Discuss the effects of enemy capabilities on the command's courses of action. Discuss the effectiveness of the command's counterintelligence measures and additional requirements or emphasis needed.

ENCLOSURES: (as needed)

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Address
Date/time of issue

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TARGETING

Ref: (a) Joint Pub 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
(b) FM 30-10, *Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain)*
(c) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(d) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(e) FMFM 7-1, *Fire Support Coordination*

1. PURPOSE. To nominate potential targets suitable for attack by naval gunfire and aircraft and artillery strikes within the amphibious objective area (AOA), and to provide a brief overview of targeting principles to be used by this headquarters.

2. TARGETING PRINCIPLES

a. General

(1) Any element with the ACE may nominate a potential target for inclusion on the ACE list of targets. When nominating potential targets, use the format contained in Tab A (List of Targets) to this appendix. The request should be expeditiously forwarded to this headquarters. This headquarters will then consolidate all nominations, provide a recommended priority, and then forward the consolidated list to the MAGTF for futher consolidation and/or nomination of applicable targets to the CATF's official target list.

(a) These targeting principles should not be confused with intelligence targets as referred to by intelligence personnel. They refer to intelligence targets as a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence activities are directed. Target acquisition of these targets will be determined by the MAGTF, if they are to be engaged.

(b) All ACE personnel should ensure that they designate whether their nominations of potential targets are either for targeting or intelligence usage.

(2) The principle concern when nominating potential targets is to neutralize a particular target before it jeopardizes the accomplishment of the LF mission.

b. Definitions of Targeting Related Terms

(1) Target Intelligence. Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. It is the result of target information being analyzed.

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(2) Target Information. That function by which fire support is applied to target intelligence. As such, it is a key element in the proper deployment of air, artillery, and naval gunfire to support the operational plan (landing plan, scheme of maneuver, or plan of defense) with scheduling fires. It includes unevaluated data of every description concerning targets that, when processed, may produce target intelligence. This data may be accurate enough for use by supporting arms and may be received from higher, adjacent, and subordinate levels of command.

(3) Potential Target. An object, installation, or unit that will yield a military advantage if destroyed, damaged, neutralized, or captured.

(4) Target. A geographic area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. An area designated and numbered for future firing.

(5) Target of Opportunity. A target visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or requested.

(6) Target Acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

(7) Targeting. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.

(8) Deliberate Targeting. The methodical identification, compilation, and analysis of potential fixed or semi-fixed targets followed by the decision of which potential attacks will be attacked, when, and/or by what weapons and ordnance. It is practiced primarily during the planning phase of an operation, when planning for an attack, or when the tempo of combat is slow.

(9) Reactive Targeting. The method used for targeting targets of opportunity. It is used when time and situation do not allow for deliberate targeting.

(10) List of Targets. A list of confirmed, suspected, or possible targets maintained by any echelon of command for information or planning purposes. It is used to nominate potential targets to a central targeting agency for possible inclusion on a consolidated target list or to list targets previously identified or selected by the maintaining organization.

(11) Target List. A listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command. It contains those targets which are to be engaged by supporting arms.

(12) Target Bulletin. A bulletin in message format published to keep the target list current and issued by the commander who has control of the target list at that particular time. The commander in control of the target list adds new targets, cancels inactive or destroyed targets, reactivates canceled targets, if required, and promulgates damage assessment of targets on completion of attacks. When control of the target list has been passed to the CLF, the LF target information officer will prepare and disseminate this message once:

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(a) LF has taken control of the target list.

(b) Control has been passed ashore.

(c) Fire support coordination center has been established.

(13) Target Number. The reference number given to the target by the fire control unit.

(14) Target Precedence List. A command's list of primarily mobile potential targets arranged in the order in which they are to be attacked by type. It is used as guidance for reactive targeting.

c. Targeting Sequence. To explain the concept or process of targeting, a targeting sequence is used to divide he concept or process into a cycle or sequence of actions. The steps of the sequence are—

(1) Target Detection and Identification

(2) Recording

(3) Target Analysis

(4) Decision to Attack

The distinction or detail that these steps are carried out depends on whether the targeting is either deliberate or reactive.

3. TARGET ANALYSIS. Potential targets should be carefully examined to determine military importance, priority of attack, vulnerability to attack, and the desired results (i.e., destruction, damage, neutralization, or capture), as well as numerous other factors pertinent in determining whether targets should be nominated for attack or placed on a restrictive listing. Target analysis is determined in the detail permitted by the situation and the time available. When used, Tab B (Target Analysis) ensures a logical examination of all factors to determine the most effective means of attacking a target.

4. TARGET IDENTIFICATION

a. When conducting deliberate targeting, the following potential targets should be identified:

(1) Bridges

(2) Observation Towers

(3) Pier and Port Facilities

(4) Built-up Areas

(5) Power Lines

(Page number)

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(6) Churches

(7) Schools

(8) Cemeteries

(9) Shrines/Memorials

(10) Water Tanks/Towers

(11) Radio Towers/Antennae

(12) Airfields

b. Refer to the MAGTF OPLAN to locate the following:

(1) Beaches

(2) Helicopter Landing Zones

(3) Reconnaissance Observation Areas

(4) Reconnaissance Insert Points

(5) Reconnaissance Extract Points

(6) Sensor String Locations

(7) LF Objectives

5. TARGET NUMBER, CLASSIFICATION, PRIORITY, AND PARTS. Target number, classification, priority, and parts will be assigned by the command responsible for maintaining the target list.

6. TARGET PRECEDENCE. When conducting reactive targeting, the following targets of opportunity should be considered:

a. Surface-to-Air Missiles

b. Early Warning Radar

c. Jammers

d. Fire Control Radar.

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e. Shore Batteries

f. Artillery Positions

g. Antiaircraft Artillery Sites

h. Counterbattery Radar

i. Tank/Armor Assembly Areas

j. POL/Refueling Points

k. Ammunition Rearming Points

l. Troop Assembly Areas

m. Battalion or Larger Command Posts

The decision to engage targets of opportunity rests with the commanding officer.

7. MISSION BRIEFINGS. During premission aircrew briefings, the ACE S-2 will provide current target intelligence, to include target folders if practical, for target acquisition of ACE objectives. The ACE S-2 will conduct aircrew debriefings to obtain information concerning a particular target which has been engaged or attacked. The S-2 will also report information on newly identified potential targets and forward that information using the mission report (MISREP) format prescribed by reference (d).

8. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

a. General. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) will be conducted to obtain information on the following:

(1) Need for re-attack.

(2) Estimate of effects of attack on the enemy.

(3) Analysis of weapons effectiveness.

(4) Ability to continue the war.

b. Types of BDA

(1) Initial BDA. Initial BDA is BDA derived during the debriefing of aircrews. It is normally given in the form of two numbers—the percentage of bombs on target over the percentage of the target destroyed.

(2) Direct BDA. Direct BDA is derived from detailed reports on visible damage following an air strike. It is a result of imagery interpretation of strike or poststrike imagery coverage.

CLASSIFICATION

c. Briefing/Debriefing. All aircrews will observe BDA inflicted on designated targets and report that BDA during aircrew debriefings. BDA information will be disseminated to the appropriate agency, as well as during subsequent aircrew briefings.

9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING

a. CARVER System. Target analysis for special operations can best be accomplished using the CARVER System. This system is applied using a 1:10 scale matrix that assigns a numerical value to each of the CARVER System factors. The assigned value is left to the discretion of the analyst. The acronym in CARVER Systems represents the following:

(1) Criticality—based on possession and location of the target and the timing of the strike.

(2) Accessability—based on the current weather, enemy weapons, technology, and alliances, including the development or depletion of their natural resources and the duration of the conflict.

(3) Recuperability—based on the amount of time the target will need to return to operation.

(4) Vulnerability—based on our ability to destroy or damage the target using available assets/materials.

(5) Effect on the Populace—based on both positive and negative effects on the populace in the vicinity of the target.

(6) Recognizability—based on the ease or degree of difficulty in detection of the target.

(7) Survivability—based on the survivability of the team tasked to accomplish the mission.

b. Statement of Requirements. A statement of requirements (SOR) is the basis from which target analysis for special operations should begin. All six of the following questions must be answered before beginning target analysis.

(1) What is desired?

(2) In what manner must it be accomplished?

(3) What is the purpose?

(4) What is the amount of damage desired?

(5) What is the strategic/tactical importance?

(6) What is the timeframe guidance?

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c. Flow. For target analysis to provide its full effect, the following six steps must be completed.

(1) Commander receives an SOR from higher authority.

(2) Commander issues an SOR to the intelligence section to conduct target analysis.

(3) Intelligence section completes target analysis and presents options to the commander.

(4) Commander selects an option and tasks the intelligence section for additional details.

(5) Commander reviews additional details.

(6) Commander tasks operations section for a plan of attack based on the target analysis.

d. Potential Targets. To identify potential targets for planning special operations, see Tab C (Special Operations Targeting) to this appendix.

TABS:

A—Target List
B—Target Analysis
C—Special Operations Targeting

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters
Address
Date/time of issue

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TARGET LIST

ICOC of Installation Data Source

LN NO	TGT NO	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION	ATTITUDE	SIZE	SOURCE ACCURACY	REMARKS

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Headquarters
Address
Date/time of issue

TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TARGET ANALYSIS

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-21, MAGTF *Intelligence Operations*
(b) FMFM 7-1, *Fire Support Coordination*

1. SITUATION AND COURSE OF ACTION

a. Situation of Opposing Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Include information that will aid in target analysis.

(2) Friendly Situation. Include information that will aid in attacking the target and provide as much safety to friendly troops as tactically possible.

b. Target Characteristics

(1) Target Description. Include the type of personnel, materiel and terrain features, number of personnel, quantity of materiel, and activity in the target area.

(2) Vulnerability. Include the type and amount of cover, type of materiel, type of construction, mobility, and the density of personnel and materiel in the target area.

(3) Physical Location and Altitude. Include the grid reference and altitude of the target, location with respect to supporting units and terrain features, and proximity to friendly troops.

(4) Accuracy of Location. Give an estimated accuracy of the target location.

(5) Size and Shape of Target Area. Give the dimensions and shape of the target area and the distribution of personnel and materiel within the area.

(6) Terrain and Weather. Include a brief analysis of the weather and terrain in the target area; include any terrain features affecting the means or method of attack.

c. Target Capabilities. Discuss the capabilities of the target as they affect the accomplishment of the mission of the supported unit. If it is a terrain feature(s), show how it affects enemy capabilities.

d. Other Factors. List and discuss any or all of the following factors and any additional ones that will affect the choice of firepower, delivery means, or the method of attack.

(1) Urgency of Attack. Usually determined by the type of target (static or fleeing) and its capabilities.

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(2) Enemy Countermeasures. State the enemy's ability to minimize the effects of firepower; consider the enemy's capability to prevent effective weapons delivery and to bring countermeasures against delivery means after an attack.

(3) Enemy Discipline and Morale. State factors which will aid in determining the amount of firepower required to neutralize personnel targets.

(4) Creation of Obstacles. Discuss any considerations concerning desirability or undesirability of creating obstacles by attacking the target.

(5) Civilian Causalties. Show the approximate number of civilians in the target area and the estimated effect of causing excessive casualties.

(6) Surprise. Discuss any particular methods desired to obtain surprise, including least expected time of attack, means of delivery, and restrictions on registration.

e. Means of Attack. Note all available types of firepower and required amounts with which it would be practical to attack the target; show the most practicable delivery means in each case.

2. ANALYSIS OF MEANS OF ATTACK. Discuss the effect of each means of attack on the target characteristics (paragraph 1.b), target capabilities (paragraph 1.c) and other factors (paragraph 1.d). For each means of attack include—

a. Location of center impact which will obtain greatest effect (include optimum height of burst for nuclear weapons).

b. Effect of available supply rate.

c. Estimate of enemy casualties and materiel damage.

d. Estimate of civilian casualties.

e. Estimate of obstacles created.

f. Precautions required for friendly troops.

3. COMPARISON OF MEANS OF ATTACK. Summarize the outstanding advantages and disadvantages of each means of attack and determine which one offers the greatest promise of success.

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4. DECISION OR RECOMMENDATION

a. Type and amount of firepower and delivery means.

b. Unit(s) to fire.

c. Grid reference and altitude of desired center of impact; height of burst when applicable.

d. Time of attack.

e. Safety precautions, special coordination, and warnings required.

f. Method for determining poststrike analysis.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FM 30-10, *Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain)*

1. PETROLEUM, OIL AND LUBRICANT (POL) TARGETS

a. Pipeline Components

(1) Well Heads

(2) Pipelines (for scorched earth attacks only)

(3) Separators

(4) Manifolds

(5) Pumping Stations

(6) Storage Tanks

b. Refinery Components

(1) Power Source

(2) Control House

(3) Fractionators or Fractionating Columns

(4) Firefighting Equipment

c. Distribution Components

(1) Filling Bays

(2) Pier Loading

(3) Single Point Mooring Buoy

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2. ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM TARGETS

a. Transmission Lines

b. Insulators

c. Towers/Poles

d. Substation Transformers (must include spares)

e. Circuit Breaker

f. Coal Conveyors (for conventional steam plants)

g. Fuel Supplies (for conventional power plants)

h. Diesel Engines (for internal combustion power plants)

i. Gas Turbine Engines/Air Compressors (for internal combustion power plants)

j. Boilers (for conventional steam power plants)

k. Steam Turbine (for conventional steam and nuclear power plants)

l. Condensors (for conventional steam and nuclear power plants)

m. Circulation Pumps (for conventional steam and nuclear power plants)

n. Electric Generations/Exciters (for all power plants)

o. Containment Buildings (for nuclear power plants)

p. Overhead Cranes (for all power plants)

q. Controls (for all power plants)

r. Penstock Pipe/Valves (for some hydroelectric power plants)

s. Water Intakes (for hydroelectric and nuclear power plants)

3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS TARGETS

a. Radio Oriented Targets

(1) Primary Power Source

(2) Standby Power Units

(3) Broadcast Studio

(4) Transmitter

(5) Station Supply Stores

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b. Telephone Oriented Targets

(1) Power Source

(2) Principle Exchange

(3) Branch Exchanges

(4) Poles

(5) Land Lines

(6) Coaxial Cables

(7) Unmanned Repeaters

(8) Manned Repeaters

(9) Microwave Towers

c. Telegraph Oriented Targets

(1) Telephone Exchange

(2) Telegraph Lines

(3) Repeater Stations

d. TV Oriented Targets

(1) Primary Power

(2) Backup Power

(3) Broadcast Studio

(4) Transmitter

(5) Antenna

e. Data Oriented Transmission Targets

(1) Power Source (backup lines)

(2) Microwave Towers

(3) Control Towers

(4) Air Conditioners

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4. RAILROAD TARGETS

   a. Passenger Terminals

   b. Yards

      (1) Freight Yards

      (2) Classification Yards

   c. Repair Facilities

      (1) Roadhouse

      (2) Turntable

      (3) Repair Sheds or Shops

   d. Fuel Facilities

   e. Train Control

   f. Other Targets (choke points, tunnels)

5. MARITIME TARGETS

   a. Storage Facility Tankage (volatile fuels/chemicals only)

   b. Warehouses/Buildings (used or vacant)

   c. Forklift Park (if grouped together)

   d. Conveyor Belts

   e. Loading Racks/Fuel Loading Arms

   f. Rail Tips/Bottom Dumps

   g. Cranes (all types)

   h. Ramps

   i. Straddle & Top Deck Carriers

   j. Half Tide Basin (doors)

   k. Piers (T-head, L-head, oil bunkering)

   l. Wharves (marginal, offshore, pontoon)

   m. Platforms (breasting, mooring)

   n. Fixed Mooring Berths (dolphins)

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o. Offshore Pipeline Berths/Terminal Buoys

p. Vessels (all types)

q. Dry Docks/Graving Yards

r. Heavy Lift Transporter

s. Machine Shops/Fabricating Shops

6. AIR FACILITY TARGETS

a. Runways

b. Taxiways and Parking Aprons

c. Hangers/Maintenance Shops

d. Control Towers. Control towers may be circumvented through direct conversations between aircraft.

e. Cargo Terminals

f. Passenger Terminals. These are frequently packed with people and should not be considered as a potential target for humanitarian reasons, unless command guidance requests such a move.

g. Operations/Administration Buildings

h. Power Facilities. If local utilities are present, power may be diverted from an adjacent grid system within 24 to 72 hours.

i. Lighting. Interruptions of different lights will have varying effects on incoming aircraft.

j. Navigation

k. Communications

l. Meteorological Facilities

m. Fuel Facilities. Temporary replacements can be obtained from bladders or numerous refueler-type trucks.

n. Crash, Fire, Rescue Facilities/Equipment. Local communities or bases may provide temporary assistance if available.

o. Police/Security. Local communities or bases may provide assistance if available.

p. Ground Equipment

q. Ordnance Storage

r. Defenses

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY

Ref: (a) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(b) FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*
(c) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(d) DMA Catalog Part 1, Vol. 1 (Aerospace Products, Aeronautical Charts and Flight Information Publications)
(e) DMA Catalog Part 1, Vol. 3 (Classified Special Supplement)
(f) DMA Catalog Part 2, All Vols. (Hydrographic Products)
(g) DMA Catalog Part 3, Vols. 1 to 4 (Topographic Products)
(h) DMA Catalog Part 3, Vol. 5 (Topographic Products, Terrain Analysis Non-lithographic Products)

1. SITUATION

a. MC&G Requirements. List type of MC&G products required to support this plan. Show desired area of coverage and quantitative requirements in Tab A in the prescribed format or portray them graphically using standard indexes.

b. Available Products. Provide a general statement regarding the availability and adequacy of MC&G materials required to support the plan.

c. Capabilities. List those MC&G forces assigned or attached.

d. Supporting Capabilities. List those MC&G forces or agencies that are not assigned or attached but will be required to provide MC&G support.

e. Assumptions. List the assumptions on which this annex is based. The assumptions should state expected conditions over which the commander has no control.

2. MISSION. Provide a clear, concise statement of the MC&G mission.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of MC&G Operations

(1) General. Provide a statement of how the command will provide MC&G support. Include the forces involved: time-phasing of the operation, the general nature and scope of operations to be conducted, the interrelated or cross-service support, support provided by agreements, and coordination and cooperation necessary for the successful implementation of the plan.

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(2) Deployment. Summarize the requirements or deploying MC&G forces. Particular attention should be given to the timephasing of these deployments in order to effect an orderly transition from current to planned organizational configurations.

(3) Employment. Describe in general terms how deployed MC&G forces are to be employed.

b. Tasks. List the MC&G tasks assigned to each element of the command and to those agencies that provide support. Ensure that responsibilities are assigned to establish, validate, and submit MC&G requirements. Specify MC&G material stowage and distribution responsibilities.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List those coordinating instructions necessary for proper MC&G support. Specify points of contact that can authorize the release of MC&G stocks or that can resolve MC&G problems.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply and Storage. Provide instructions regarding MC&G supply and storage procedures and responsibilities. Include planned locations of storage sites and facilities. Specify the type and quantity of products and the time frame (e.g., days of maps) required to be held by subordinate elements. Include requirements relative to classified MC&G materials.

b. Transportation. Provide general instructions regarding MC&G material transportation requirements. If required, a separate tab will be used to list detailed transportation requirements and procedures.

c. Support. Provide instructions for obtaining support.

d. Reports. Provide information regarding reporting formats and submission requirements.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

a. Priorities. Provide guidance for establishing component MC&G support priorities.

b. Command Relationships. Include the primary and alternate locations of all MC&G elements. Specify the command and control relationships between the command, its elements, and external units or agencies, if not previously addressed.

c. Communications. Provide a statement describing the scope and type of any communications required to support MC&G operations.

TABS:

A—Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Requirements List
B—Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Transportation Requirements
C—Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Reports (omitted)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY REQUIREMENTS LIST

Ref: (a) DMA Catalog Part 1, Vol. 1 (Aerospace Products, Aeronautical Charts, and Flight Information Publications)
(b) DMA Catalog Part 1, Vol. 3 (Classified Special Supplement)
(c) DMA Catalog Part 2, All Vols. (Hydrographic Products)
(d) DMA Catalog Part 3, Vols. 1 to 4 (Topographic Products)
(e) DMA Catalog Part 3, Vol. 5 (Topographic Products, Terrain Analysis Non-lithographic Products)

1. AEROSPACE PRODUCTS

a. Required Items. List maps required to support the plan by series, scale, and sheet.

b. Area to be Covered. Describe area to be covered by giving coordinate, political boundaries, or recognizable geographic area.

c. Coverage Available. Reflect as a percentage of required coverage.

d. Adequacy. Percentage of coverage considered adequate to meet requirements. List that coverage which is not available but essential to operations and the actions taken to acquire it.

e. Quantity. Number of copies of each sheet or items needed to support the implementation of the basic plan and for reserve. Provide total quantities and volumes of MC&G materials required to be used in planning.

2. HYDROGRAPHIC PRODUCTS. Use the same subparagraph contained in paragraph 1.

3. TOPOGRAPHIC. Use the same subparagraph contained in paragraph 1.

4. AIR TARGET MATERIALS. Use the same subparagraphs contained in paragraph 1.

5. SPECIAL PRODUCTS. Use the same subparagraphs contained in paragraph 1.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

Ref: (a) As applicable

1. List all transportation requirements for support of MC&G operations to include the total volume of materials to be moved. Specific attention is directed toward the movement of classified stocks.

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B TO OPLANXXX
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Ref: (a) DIAM 58-11 (S)
(b) DIAM 58-2 (S)
(c) FM 30-15, *Intelligence Interrogation*
(d) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(e) FMFM 3-25, *Counterintelligence* (under development)

1. GENERAL

a. To provide planning guidance and general coordinating instructions for the conduct of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations within the amphibious objective area (AOA). References (a) through (e) apply.

b. Command responsibility for HUMINT rests with the MAGTF. Reports will be forwarded to the MAGTF G-2 via the appropriate chain of command.

2. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. The FMF area commander, as the jurisdictional national level intelligence agency, will provide coordination for HUMINT operations within the AOA.

3. COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FUNCTIONS, AND PLANS

a. Interview of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel who Escape from Enemy Control or Evade Enemy Captivity. These personnel will be debriefed for perishable information of positive intelligence value by counterintelligence personnel.

b. Acquisition and Exploitation of HUMINT Sources and Information. Within the AOA, these activities will be carried out unilaterally by MAGTF counterintelligence and interrogator translator personnel.

4. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

a. See Appendix 1 (Essential Elements of Information) to Annex B (Intelligence) to the MAGTF OPLAN.

b. Targets and other collection requirements to be fulfilled by HUMINT operations will be directed by Appendix 6 (Human Intelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to the MAGTF OPLAN.

5. COORDINATION

a. HUMINT operations will be coordinated through the MAGTF G-2 as set forth in paragraph 3 above, and paragraph 8 of Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to this OPLAN and the MAGTF OPLAN.

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b. Coordination requirements for support from other units or agencies will be directed by the MAGTF G-2.

(1) Support requirements from other U.S. government agencies. See Appendix 6 (Human Intelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to the MAGTF OPLAN.

(2) Counterintelligence coordination

(a) To obtain technical and security support.

(b) To provide mutual support to satisfy collection requirements, see paragraph 3 above.

(3) Communications support required for the conduct of HUMINT operations. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics) to this OPLAN, and Appendix 6 (Human Intelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence), and Annex K (Communications-Electronics) to the MAGTF OPLAN.

c. Coordinate HUMINT operations with those procedures established in Appendix 4 (Psychological Operations), Appendix 5 (Unconventional Warfare), Appendix 6 (Search and Rescue), and Appendix 7 (Deception) to Annex C (Operations); Appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to Annex E (Personnel); and Appendix 6 (Search and Rescue) to Annex M (Air Operations) to this OPLAN and the MAGTF OPLAN.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Accounting, reporting, and restrictions will be coordinated through the MAGTF G-2 (Attn: SCIO).

b. Reports will be submitted, as required, using the formats prescribed in reference (c) through (e), via the chain of command.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Ref: (a) FM 100-2-1, *Operations and Tactics*
(b) FM 100-2-2, *Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*
(c) FM 100-2-3, *Troops, Organization, and Equipment*
(d) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(e) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(f) MCM 3-1, *Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics, Volume II (S)*

1. MISSION. State the assigned or deduced mission.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. The characteristics included are based on the purpose for which the estimate is intended and the degree to which they affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission.

(1) Military Geography. Terrain features or other factors of military geography in the area of operations that affect the enemy or the accomplishment of the mission. This portion of the estimate, or parts of it, may be treated as a separate tab.

(a) Topography

(b) Hydrography

(c) Climate and Weather

(2) Transportation. All forms of civil transportation are discussed in as much detail as necessary to present a clear picture of their effects on enemy capabilities or the accomplishment of the mission.

(3) Politics. Politics are discussed if they have a bearing on enemy capability or on the friendly mission.

(4) Economics. Economics are included to the extent demanded by the operations to be conducted.

(5) Sociology. Sociology deals with the people of the area, their psychology, customs, religions, allegiance, and other items which may indicate military requirements or necessitate troop indoctrination.

(6) Science and Technology. Science and technology are discussed to provide comparison of weapons and equipment, as well as the possibility of the enemy employing new weapons and equipment during the course of the operation.

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b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Ground Forces

(a) Composition

(b) Disposition. To include committed forces and reinforcements.

(c) Strength

(d) Tactics

(e) Training

(f) Logistics

(g) Combat Effectiveness

(h) Miscellaneous

(2) Air Forces. Refer to paragraph (1)

(3) Naval Forces. Refer to paragraph (1)

(4) Paramilitary Forces. Refer to paragraph (1)

(5) Special Purpose Forces. Refer to paragraph (1)

(6) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles

(7) Electronic Warfare

(8) NBC Warfare

(9) Serviceability and Operational Rates for Aircraft, Vehicles, and Equipment

(10) Air Defenses

(11) Strengths and Weaknesses

(12) Recent Significant Activities

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c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Guerrilla

(2) Psychological

(3) Subversion

(4) Sabotage

d. Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. List separately each capability which can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2. Attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the enemy.

5. CONCLUSIONS. State conclusions resulting from the discussion in paragraph 4 and include, when possible—

a. Enemy courses of action, beginning with the most probable and continuing down in order of relative probability.

b. Enemy vulnerabilities, where applicable.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)

1. GENERAL

a. Mission. A statement of the assigned or deduced mission.

b. Objectives. A statement of the purpose for which the analysis is being prepared. Normally, this will summarize the projected uses of the analysis.

2. INFLUENCE OF WEATHER UPON TERRAIN. An analysis of the manner in which the terrain will be affected by anticipated weather conditions. Presented as an assessment of the manner in which weather will directly or indirectly affect military operations. The terrain and climatic studies provide the materials from which these determinations are made.

3. ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION

a. Course of Action #1

(1) Advantages. Describe any advantages offered by weather and terrain which would affect the course of action.

(2) Disadvantages. Describe any disadvantages created by weather and terrain which would affect the course of action.

(3) Conclusions. Present the manner in which the course of action would be enhanced or hindered by the conditions previously described.

b. Course of Action #2. Each succeeding course of action is addressed in the same manner as above.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Conducted as per paragraph 3.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS. Recommends the preferred courses of action as an assessment of paragraphs 3 and 4. Presents a rationale in support.

TABS:

A—Terrain Study
B—Climatic Study

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TERRAIN STUDY

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Purpose. Describe the purpose and the boundaries the study is based on.

b. Limiting Considerations. State those conditions that would place limitations on the accuracy and detail of the study, such as dates, limitations of reference materials, degree of reconnaissance use or availability, and the limitations of other sources of information.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRAIN

a. Synopsis. A summary of the general conditions of terrain within the operating area.

b. Topography. A description of the topographic features in the area of operations relevant to military operations.

c. Drainage. A description of drainage patterns in the area of operations relevant to military operations.

d. Vegetation. A description of the types, locations, quantity, and height of vegetation in the operating area relevant to military operations.

e. Surface Materials. A description of the types, locations, and different sectors of surface materials in the area of operations relevant to military operations.

f. Manmade Features. A description of the number, types, and locations of manmade features relevant to military operations.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN

a. Tactical Aspects

(1) Key Terrain Features. A description of key terrain features within the area of operations relevant to military operations.

(2) Observation. A description of the terrain and vegetation in the area of operations with respect to observation in military operations.

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(3) Fields of Fire. A description of fields of fire within the area of operations with respect to the command's capabilities.

(4) Cover. A description of available cover within the area of operations relevant to military operations.

(5) Concealment. A description of available concealment within the area of operations relevant to military operations.

(6) Obstacles. A description of obstacles in the area of operations relevant to military operations.

(7) Movement. A description of the trafficability within the area of operations relevant to movement in military operations.

b. Engineering Aspects

(1) Construction. A description of the area of operations with respect to capability to construct facilities, roads, airfields, and other military structures. Consideration should be given to availability of materials and the conditions of surface materials to support construction.

(2) Water Supply. A description of availability of water, both above and below ground, in the area of operations.

ENCLOSURES: (as required)

1—Trafficability Overlay (Omitted)
2—Road and Bridge Overlay (Omitted)
3—Vegetation Overlay (Omitted)
4—Drainage Overlay (Omitted)
5—Key Terrain Overlay (Omitted)

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
CLIMATIC STUDY

Ref: (a) As applicable

1. INFORMATION SOURCES. List the sources of information used for this study, the area covered, and the time frame covered.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CLIMATE. Details and data elements should be included as enclosures to this tab for the following subparagraphs.

a. Synopsis. Provide a summary of the climate conditions prevalent in the area of operations.

b. Temperature. Provide a description of temperature ranges to be expected during the time frame of the operation.

c. Winds. Provide a description of winds at all levels during the time frame of the operation.

d. Precipitation. Provide a description of precipitation projections during the time frame of the operation.

e. Humidity. Provide a description of ranges of humidity during the time frame of the operation.

f. Visibility. Provide a description of conditions of visibility during the time frame of the operation, to include percentages of cloud cover.

3. CLIMATIC DATA

a. Temperatures

Mean Daily Maximum
Mean Daily Minimum
Extremes Maximum/Minimum

b. Precipitation

Total Precipitation
Number of Days

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c. Ephemeris, Period of

BMNT BMCT SUNRISE SUNSET EECT EENT MOONRISE MOONSET %ILLUM

Phases of the Moon: First Quarter, Full Moon, Second Quarter, New Moon

ENCLOSURES

1—Wind Rose (Omitted)

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
BEACH STUDIES

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(c) FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action Operations*
(d) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. NAME/IDENTIFICATION. Name or other reference to be associated with the beach.

a. Beach Description. Length and shape.

(1) Length

(a) Total Length

(b) Usable Length

(c) Beach Interruptions and Obstacles

(2) Center Beach

(3) Right Flank

(4) Left Flank

b. Type Coastline. Description of the coastline.

c. Foreshore. The part of the shoreline between high water and low water.

(1) Width

(2) Gradient

(3) Composition

(4) Interruptions or Obstacles

(5) Trafficability

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d. Backshore. From the highwater mark to beach exits.

(1) Width

(2) Gradient

(3) Composition

(4) Vegetation

(5) Interruptions and Obstacles

(6) Exit

(7) Trafficabililty

e. Hydrography

(1) Sea and Swell

(2) Approaches

(a) Farshore

(b) Nearshore

(3) Underwater Gradient

(4) Surf

(a) Location That Surf Breaks

(b) Surf Zone

(c) Wave Length

(d) Period of Breakers

(e) Height of Breakers

(f) Angle at Which Surf Strikes the Beach

(g) Number of Lines of Breakers

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f. Remarks and Comments

2. Succeeding paragraphs should be written to cover each beach considered applicable to the operation.

TABS: (As needed)

A—Hydrographic Surveys (Omitted)
B—Beach Diagram/Photographs (Omitted)

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(c) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. NAME/IDENTIFICATION. Name or other reference to be associated with the helicopter landing zone (HLZ).

a. Location. Give coordinates of HLZ.

b. Size and Shapes. Describe the size and shaped of the HLZ; give boundaries with specific coordinates or physical references.

c. Slope

d. Azimuth of the Main Axis

e. Altitude

f. Obstacles and Hazards

(1) Hazards and Obstacle to Air Operations

(2) Obstacles to Movement of Personnel and Equipment

g. Navigation Aids

h. Vegetation

i. Trafficability

j. Exits

k. Remarks and Comments

2. Succeeding paragraphs should be written as needed to address HLZs applicable to the operation.

TABS:

A—HLZ Diagrams/Photographs (Omitted)

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(c) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(d) FMFM 2-2, *Amphibious Reconnaissance*
(e) FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*
(f) FMFM 5-6, *Air Reconnaissance*

1. SITUATION. State the enemy and friendly situations.

2. MISSION. State the mission for the reconnaissance and surveillance elements of the friendly forces.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

b. Ground Combat Element

c. Aviation Combat Element

d. Combat Service Support Element

e. Ground Reconnaissance Assets

f. Force Imagery Interpretation Unit

g. Sensor Control and Management Platoon

h. Coordinating Instructions

4. LOGISTICS

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

a. Command

(1) Command Relationships

(2) Reporting

(3) Requesting and Tasking Procedures

b. Communications

TABS:

A—Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
B—Visual Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
C—Aerial Imagery Plan
D—Sensor Surveillance Plan
E—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Plan

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Address
Date/time of issue

TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 0-3, *Doctrinal Publications Guide*
(c) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(d) FMFM 2-2, *Amphibious Reconnaissance*

1. MISSION

2. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

b. Reconnaissance Team Employment Sequence

c. First Mission. State the mission and collection objectives and team assignments.

(1) Reconnaissance Operation Area (ROA). Describe and give the boundaries of the reconnaissance operating area. If a route reconnaissance, provide a general description of routes to be taken.

(2) Insertion and Extraction. Provide details required for team insertions and extraction. Include dates, times, places, and means.

(3) SERE

(4) Coordinating Instructions. List any coordinating instructions required to support the mission. Include times and places for debriefing.

d. Second Mission. As needed for each planned mission.

3. LOGISTICS

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

ENCLOSURES:

1—Employment Plan (Omitted)
2—Overlay of ROAs (Omitted)

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
VISUAL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. The following visual imagery missions have been preplanned.

MSN	AREA/ROUTE OF SEARCH	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	FREQUENCY/ DURATION	REMARKS
1.	Area: From _____ To _____ To _____	VMO	D–Day, BNMT to 0900L	Report activity as obtained
2.	Area: From _____ To _____ To _____	VMO	D+1, 1700L to 1900L	Report enemy movements
3.	Specific (Middletown)	High Performance	D+1, 1800L to 1900	Report enemy activity, emphasis on HQ, 8th MRD

ENCLOSURES:

1–Employment Plan (Omitted)
2–Overlay (Omitted)

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
AERIAL IMAGERY PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. The following aerial imagery missions have been preplanned.

MSN NO.	COORD	PHOTO			SLR	IR/	DATE OF	
		VERT OR OBL	OVER LAP	FILM SCALE	MODE	ALT	MSN	REMARKS
1.	XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX	VERT	60% FOR 40%	B&W 1:20k	Low ALT Mode 10B	N/A	D-30	Basic Coverage
2.	XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX	VERT	60% for 40% side	B&W Color & CD 1:5K	Low alt MTIR or MTIR	D-3 only	D-1	Beach Study Survey
3.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	D+1	On call

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SENSOR SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. SITUATION. State enemy and friendly situation. Include under friendly forces any elements not included in the task organization that will employ remote sensors, fly air delivery missions, provide airborne relay services, or implant sensors. Include attachment and detachment assignments of SCAMP or other sensor unit personnel.

2. MISSION. State the remote sensor mission as precisely as possible.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Provide an overview of remote sensor employment for the operations. It may be subdivided to include sections of control, monitoring, and sensor information flow. It must include specific information, responsibilities, and control during each phase of the operation.

b. Ground Combat Element. Tasking to the GCE must include requirements for sensor implant and requirements and support from sensor monitoring sites.

c. Aviation Combat Elements. Include the assignment of air delivery mission, airborne relay flights, and on-order missions for storage/interrogation.

d. Ground Reconnaissance Elements. Include assignment of sensor implants, responsibility for monitoring, requirements for preparation and delivery of sketch maps, and coordination for attachments of specially trained SCAMP personnel.

e. SCAMP. Include assignments of monitor site locations, on-order helicopter delivery missions, instructions for control and issue of sensors, any particular arrangements for storage control and assembly of sensors, any special reporting procedures, and plans for employment of sensor personnel with ground reconnaissance elements.

f. Reverse. May be assigned responsibility for recovery of sensors or relays.

g. Coordinating Instructions. One subparagraph must detail passage of monitoring responsibility from CATF to CLF, including radio contact requirements. One subparagraph must require all implant units to submit implant reports and state correct message routing instructions.

CLASSIFICATION

4. LOGISTICS

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

ENCLOSURES:

1—Sensor Employment Plan
2—Sensor Resources
3—Sensor Reports and Reporting Procedures (Omitted)

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SENSOR EMPLOYMENT PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. GENERAL. General explanation of sensor string and relay employment.

2. EMPLOYMENT PLAN

a. Sensor Strings

STRING NUMBER	TYPE SENSOR	COORD	CHAN ID	RECOVERY CODE	CALL CHAN	NOTES
NN101P	S	XXXX	0442/31	N/A	N/A	Recon
	S	XXXX	0124/27	A/3	N/A	Implant
	SM	XXXX	0442/39	B/7	N/A	D-2
	S	XXXX	0124/01	N/A	N/A	

b. Relay Employment

TYPE	LOCATION	REC CHAN	XMIT CHAN	NOTES
EXRAY	XXXXXX	O124	0370	Recon Implant D-2

c. Storage Units

STORAGE UNITS	LOCATION	REC CHAN	XMIT CHAN	NOTES
ADSU or HESU	XXXXXXX	0124 0442	0484 0984	1. Storage Unit ID 2. IU/RU cmd ch (A, B, or C) 3. 3d MAW Implant

ADDENDUMS:

A—Sensor Employment Overlay

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ADDENDUM A TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX SENSOR EMPLOYMENT OVERLAY

This addendum(s) is usually an overlay(s) but for the purposes of this manual it is being used to provide those symbols to be used for overlays. Symbols should be 1½ to 2 inches in size.

a. Sensor

Type

Chan/ID

c. Monitor

Special Designator

b. Relay

Rec/XTRM
Chan

d. Storage Unit

Rec/Rec Chan
VHF XTRM
Cmd Chan

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ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SENSOR RESOURCES

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*

1. COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE. List CATF assets available but not used in preplanned strings and relays.

2. SENSOR CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT PLATOON. List SCAMP assets available but not used in preplanned strings and relays.

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TAB E TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps (See Appendix 5)
(b) FMFM 3-21, *MAGTF Intelligence Operations*
(c) FMFM 5-6, *Air Reconnaissance*

1. MISSION. Conduct real-time surveillance, target acquisition, and optical intelligence throughout the MAGTF area of responsibility (AOR) until termination of hostilities, per Annex B (Intelligence) and Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the MAGTF OPLAN, and references (a) through (d).

2. EXECUTION. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) company will provide UAVs and control crews in support of ground operations ashore within the MAGTF AOR. The MAGTF G-3 will exercise operational control of all tactical surveillance UAVs within the AO, unless otherwise directed, or delegated to the GCE.

3. TASKS. Detachment _____, _____ UAV Company will—

a. Prepare a UAV Employment Plan and Overlay to depict the UAV's concept of employment supporting combat operations ashore and submit the Plan and Overlay to the MAGTF.

b. Assign surveillance UAVs, equipment, and personnel to provide real-time video intelligence in support of GCE, ACE, and CSSE operations as directed by Annex B (Intelligence), and Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the MAGTF OPLAN, daily air tasking orders (ATOs), and other fragmentary orders.

c. Provide remote receiving stations at designated locations afloat and ashore.

d. Initiate action to obtain approved frequencies for UAV support, per Annex K (Communications-Electronics) to the MAGTF OPLAN.

e. Coordinate flight operations through appropriate air control agencies as assigned in Annex A (Task Organization) to this OPLAN and the MAGTF OPLAN.

4. MARINE FORCES UAV SURVEILLANCE SECTORS/ROUTES. To facilitate the assignment and coordination of tactical surveillance missions, UAV loiter areas and surveillance routes are designated in Enclosure 1 (UAV Employment Plan) to this tab.

ENCLOSURES:

1—UAV Employment Plan
2—UAV Employment Overlay (TBI)

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB E TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
UAV EMPLOYMENT PLAN

Ref: (a) Maps: DMA stock no. _____

1. The following UAV loiter areas and surveillance routes have been preplanned:

MSN NUMBER	COORDINATES	ALT	TOT	FOOTNOTES
	_____ to	TBD	TBD	
	_____ to			
	_____ to			
	_____ to			
	close			
	_____ to	TBD	TBD	
	_____ to			
	_____ to			
	_____ to			
	close			

NOTES: (1) Determine enemy activity and defensive positions.
(2) Determine enemy activity along route.
(3) To be flown 90 minutes after sunrise to 90 minutes before sunset.

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Date/time of issue

APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
INTERROGATION-TRANSLATOR PLATOON EMPLOYMENT PLAN

Ref: (a) As applicable

1. MISSION. A concise statement of the interrogation-translator platoon's (ITP) mission and objectives.

2. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Describe the procedures, responsibilities, and means of accomplishing the mission.

b. Interrogation-Translator Platoon. Describe the planned employment of ITP.

(1) Sub Team #1. Provide information and tasking required of the team, to include the headquarters they are to be attached to, collection assignments, and special procedures to be followed.

(2) Additional subparagraphs as required to detail all the subassignments.

c. Interrogation Compound. Provide those coordinating instructions required to support the mission.

d. Coordinating Instructions. Provide those coordinating instructions required to support the mission.

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APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND ESCAPE (SERE)

Ref: (a) As applicable.

1. MISSION. A concise statement of the SERE mission.

2. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Provide an overview of the SERE objectives and the means to accomplish them for the operation.

b. MAGTF Headquarters. Provide guidance, procedures, and responsibilities for SERE as applicable to the headquarters, elements, and attachments during the operations. Subparagraphs may be omitted if not applicable. For the succeeding subparagraphs c through e provide the same information headings contained in this subparagraph.

(1) Survival

(2) Evasion

(3) Resistance

(4) Escape

c. Ground Combat Element

d. Aviation Combat Element

e. Combat Service Support Element

f. Coordinating Instructions

3. LOGISTICS

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

ENCLOSURES:

1—Safe Areas (Omitted)

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Appendix E

Example of a MEF Intelligence Collection Worksheet

Period Covered: From 25 Apr 19____ to Seizure of FBHL

Essentials Elements of Information and Other Intelligence Requirements	Indications	Specific Information to be Sought	Agencies to be Employed									Place and Time to Report	Remarks
			3d MarDiv	3d MAW	3d FA Group	3d ForRcnCo	CI Team	Inter-Trans Team	Interp Team	CATF	Other		
1. Determine if the enemy will defend landing beaches against our assault. If so, in what strength? How will he organize his defenses?	a. Location and strength of: (1) Infantry units. (2) Artillery units. (3) Tank units. (4) Antitank units.	(1) Report location, identification, strength, and activities of enemy in vicinity of landing beaches.	⊗	⊗	X	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		(1) To this HQ as obtained. CATF submit negative reports H-12 and H-4.	Request CATF establish contact with friendly agents. Cancel EEI after H-4.
		(2) Report the location of all artillery, AA mortar, and AT positions within 10,000 meters of landing beaches, and the number of pieces. Also, report unoccupied positions.	⊗	⊗	⊗	X		⊗	⊗	⊗			
		(3) Report the deployment of rifle units on good defensive terrain in the vicinity of landing beaches.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗		(2) Same as above.	Same as 1.
		(4) Report the location of large tank units in assembly areas behind landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		"	"
		(5) Report the preparation and occupation of successive defense lines on and behind landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		X		⊗		⊗		"	"
	b. Extensive preparation of field fortifications.	(6) Report preparation of field fortifications in the vicinity of the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗		⊗		"	"
		(7) Report erection of wire on and behind the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		X		⊗		⊗		"	"
	c. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment.	(8) Report dumping of ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment in the vicinity of the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		X		⊗	⊗	⊗		"	"
	d. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, and minefields.	(9) Report location of demolition, gassed areas, obstacles, and minefields in the vicinity of the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		"	"
	e. Location of command posts, and supply and evacuation installations.	(10) Report location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations behind the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		X		⊗		⊗		"	"
	f. Improvement of routes and protection of communications bottlenecks to the rear.	(11) Report improvements to roads and protection of traffic bottlenecks in the vicinity of the landing beaches.	⊗	⊗		X		⊗	⊗	⊗		"	"

Period Covered (From 25 Apr 19____ to Seizure of FBHL)

Collection planning for a particular operation commences with the receipt or deduction of a mission by the commander and is continuous until the mission is accomplished. The collection worksheet, then, covers the period from inception of planning until accomplishment of the mission. However, in an amphibious operation, certain intelligence requirements may be directly related to various phases of the operation or must be satisfied as a prerequisite to other planning. For example, intelligence requirements about location of suitable beaches or helicopter landing zones must be satisfied long before the actual assault. Therefore, the period which is entered at the top of the form may be less than that of the plan as a whole. The worksheet must be revised as intelligence requirements develop or no longer apply, as available collection agencies change in number and type, and as specific collection missions become obsolete. To accommodate the revisions, a collection worksheet should be maintained in looseleaf form.

1. Column (1). Column (1) lists the intelligence requirements which must be satisfied. These include the essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR).

2. Column (2). In column (2), for each EEI and OIR, the intelligence officer lists the indications which he has derived from an analysis of the enemy and the characteristics of the objective area. Indications are positive or negative evidence. When available, they will satisfy the particular requirement. Indications form the basis for developing specific information requirements (EEI and OIR) and actual orders and requests for the collection of information. For examples of indications, see appendix J.

3. Column (3). Column (3) contains an outline or brief of specific information to be sought which will substantiate or refute each indication listed in column (2).

(a) Having determined what indications point to the solution of a particular intelligence requirement, the intelligence officer next determines what information is needed to substantiate or refute each indication. For example, if removal of mines and obstacles is an indication of an enemy attack, then the information needed is whether or not the enemy is actually removing mines and obstacles. Reluctance of prisoners to remain in forward areas may be an indication of enemy preparations to employ nuclear weapons. The information needed is whether or not prisoners demonstrate any marked eagerness to be evacuated from the combat area. Improvement of enemy positions may be an indication of defense. Information needed is whether or not the enemy is actually improving his positions.

(b) Information to be sought then becomes the basis for specific orders and request for collection of information. A collection agency in most cases is not assigned full responsibility for establishing that any particular indication exits. For example, increased patrolling may be an indication that an enemy is preparing to attack. A rifle company would not be asked if there was an increase in enemy patrol activity in its sector. Instead, the specific information to be sought that forms the basis for an order to the company would be the frequency of enemy patrols encountered in its sector. Another indication of attack might be forward echeloning of artillery. The specific information to be sought by a collection agency is not whether artillery is being echeloned forward but rather the location of artillery in certain areas.

(c) In these two examples, the intelligence officer is the one in the best position to make proper deductions. From the information he receives and after comparison with information already available, the intelligence officer can deduce whether in fact there has been an increase in enemy patrolling and whether in fact the enemy artillery is being echeloned forward to support the attack.

(d) The intelligence officer carefully studies the AO and the known enemy situation to focus the information collection effort on a specific area. For example, in developing specific information to be sought on possible enemy reinforcement, he studies the road nets and suitable avenues of approach to determine logical routes over which enemy reinforcements would move. The specific information to be sought then becomes the volume and type of traffic along a particular road or in a particular area. He now has a basis for developing plans for aerial reconnaissance or for establishing observation posts.

(e) Focusing of the information collection effort through development of specific information requirements on particular areas can be of great benefit in developing nuclear targets. For example, an indication of an enemy attack might be the occupation of assembly areas and attack positions by enemy infantry and armor. The intelligence officer studies the terrain and enemy situation as he knows it and selects those areas suitable for the enemy to use. Specific

information to be sought is whether or not the enemy forces are located in these specific areas. Should initial search reveal the presence of enemy units, the effort can be directed to that locality until sufficient information for nuclear planning is developed.

4. Column (4). All currently available collection agencies are listed in column (4). The listing includes subordinate units of the command and higher and adjacent commands which can gather information of value. In addition to troop units, the list of agencies includes intelligence specialists such as counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and interrogation-translator personnel. The listing of troop units is not restricted to combat elements.

X – tasked
X – has capabilities
No X – insufficient capabilities

(a) Following his determination of the specific information to be sought, the intelligence officer selects the collection agencies which will be tasked to furnish information. In making his selections, he is guided by considerations of capability, suitability, multiplicity, and balance.

(b) Orders and requests for information are issued only to those agencies which are physically capable of providing it in time to be of use. The intelligence officer must be cognizant of the location, status, and current and projected missions of all available agencies.

(c) Agencies selected to gather information are those best suited for the task. For example, a trained force reconnaissance unit is normally better suited for amphibious reconnaissance than is a patrol from a rifle company. An information collection mission is consistent with the tactical or logistical mission assigned a unit. The intelligence officer, therefore, coordinates many collection missions with the operations officer and logistics officer. Suitability also includes consideration of economy of means. So, before an agency is selected for a particular task, the intelligence officer considers what other collection tasks might be accomplished by it at the same time.

(d) Information is evaluated and interpreted to derive intelligence. Accurate evaluation requires comparison of information obtained from several sources and agencies. Whenever possible, the intelligence officer selects more that one agency to collect information.

(e) Finally, the intelligence officer endeavors to balance the collection workload among available agencies. Although desirable, balance is the least important consideration in the selection of agencies, and more often than not, careful consideration of capabilities and suitability results in adequate distribution of the workload.

5. Column (5). Column (5) reflects the place and time at which information is to be reported. Information which arrives too late is of no value. The intelligence office ensures that times specified in the collection worksheet meet the needs of the commander, other staff officers, and higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. In determining when information is to be reported, the intelligence officer considers the time necessary for a collecting agency to carry out a specific mission. Entries in this column may specify an exact time for reporting, periodic times such as every 4 hours, or at such times information is obtained. Negative reports, if desired, are also indicated. Normally, the place to which information is to be reported is the headquarters. However, the intelligence officer also determines and indicates in his worksheet other headquarters or agencies to which information should be reported directly.

6. Column (6). Miscellaneous remarks on the progress of the collection are recorded in column (6) of the worksheet. The intelligence officer develops a simple code to indicate which collection missions are proceeding satisfactorily, which require revision, and which should be canceled. Prompt cancellation of orders and requests for collection of information, including EEI, is mandatory if the efforts of collection agencies are to be focused properly. A unit SOP for intelligence functioning normally provides for routine reporting of certain types of information. A note is made in the collection worksheet when certain information requirements are covered by the SOP. For example, the reporting of minefields may be prescribed by the unit SOP. A requirement for information on the enemy's use of mines can be handled by placing SOP in column (6), and responsibility need not be indicated under agencies. However, a requirement for reporting the location of minefields in the vicinity of a specific area is not treated as an SOP item. Finally, the intelligence officer notes those specific information requirements which can be combined into a single order or request to an agency.

Appendix F

Format for Intelligence Workbook

The intelligence workbook is used to record information systematically arranged by subject for ready reference and comparison. Its primary purpose is to aid the intelligence officer in determining the meaning and significance of related items of information. Additionally, the workbook usually takes the form of a file or folder with tabbed separators dividing the contents into sections. Entries in each section normally include the time of occurrence of a particular incident or observation and time of receipt, its journal number, the originator and addresses, and a summary of the information. It also includes the intelligence officer evaluation and, where applicable, deductions derived from the information.

The page of the workbook may be any size which facilitates clarity and ease in handling. Each subject is normally handled as a separate section of the workbook and is tabbed accordingly.

Entries which have served their purpose are lined out. Periodically, remaining items which continue to be of significance are consolidated in summary form. When this has been accomplished, a double line is usually entered above the summary, thus indicating the start of a new series of entries.

Units responsible for submitting the intelligence summary use the following format:

1. HEADING

   Precedence

   Originating Agency

   Action Addresses

   Information Addresses

   Security Classifications/Code Word or Nickname

   INTSUM (Number) for Period Ending Date/Time Group

2. BODY

Paragraph 1—SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY FOR THE PERIOD

   a. Ground Activity

   b. Trace of Forward Elements

      (1) Operations Involving Ground Forces

      (2) Operations Not Involving Ground Forces

      (3) For Close Air Support of Ground Forces

      (4) For Joint Amphibious Operations

(5) For Joint Air Defense Operations

(6) In joint operations not using procedures specified in the above paragraphs, latitude and longitude will be used.

c. Potential Targets for Nuclear Weapons

d. Nuclear Activity

e. CBR Activity

f. Air Activity

g. Naval Activity

h. Other (New Tactics, Counterintelligence, Etc.)

Paragraph 2—ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES

a. Personnel

b. Equipment and Materiel

Paragraph 3—NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS

Paragraph 4—ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

Paragraph 5—NEW IDENTIFICATIONS

a. Units

b. Personalities

Paragraph 6—ENEMY MOVEMENTS

Paragraph 7—ESTIMATED NUMBER AND TYPES OF VEHICLES, SHIPS, AND AIRCRAFT

Paragraph 8—WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS

Paragraph 9—BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES (Always included)

Paragraph 10—CONCLUSIONS (Always included.)

Units responsible for submitting the periodic intelligence summary use the following format:

3. HEADING

Precedence

Originating Agency

Action Addresses

Information Addresses

Security Classification/Code Word or Nickname

PERINTSUM (Number) for Period Ending Date/Time Group

4. BODY

Item 1—AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Topography

b. Hydrography

c. Climate and Weather

d. Transportation

e. Electronic and Telecommunications

f. Politics

g. Economics

h. Sociology

i. Science and Technology

Item 2—ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD

a. Ground Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions

(2) Committed Forces

(3) Reinforcements

(4) Activity

(5) Other Order of Battle Factors

(6) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

(7) Nuclear Capable Artillery and Launchers

(8) CBR and Nuclear Activity

b. Air Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions

(2) Order of Battle

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

c. Naval Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions

(2) Order of Battle

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

d. Missile Forces (Excluding SAM)

(1) Strength and Dispositions

(2) Order of Battle

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

e. Antiaircraft Defenses (Including SAM)

(1) Strength and Dispositions

(2) Order of Battle

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment

Item 3—ENEMY MILITARY SITUATION

a. Identification of Committed Ground Forces

(1) Movements and Locations

(2) Reinforcement

(3) Logistics

(4) Equipment

(5) Personalities

(6) Morale

(7) Personnel and Materiel Losses

(8) Analysis of Capabilities

(a) KIA

1 Confirmed

2 Estimated

(b) WIA

1 Confirmed

2 Estimated

(c) Captured

(d) Materiel Losses

b. Identification of Air Forces

(1) Operational Capability (Aircraft and Airfields)

(2) Movements and Locations

(3) Materiel and Personnel Losses

(a) Aircraft

1 Confirmed Destroyed in the Air

2 Confirmed Destroyed on the Ground

3 Confirmed Damaged in the Air

4 Confirmed Damaged on the Ground

5 Probable Destroyed

6 Probable Damaged

(b) Ground Equipment

1 Destroyed

2 Damaged

(c) Personnel

1 KIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

2 WIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

(4) Morale

(5) Electronic Capability

(6) Nuclear Capability

(7) Analysis of Capabilities

c. Identification of Naval Forces

(1) Operational Capability

(2) Movements and Locations

(3) Ship, Materiel, and Personnel Losses

(a) Ships (Identification by Name, Class, Type)

1 Confirmed Sunk

2 Probable Sunk

3 Damaged

(b) Shore-Based Equipment and Facilities

1 Destroyed

2 Damaged

(c) Personnel

1 KIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

2 WIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

3 Captured

(4) Morale

(5) Electronic Capability

(6) Analysis of Capabilities

Item 4—ENEMY UNCONVENTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

a. Identification of Guerilla Forces

b. Psychological Warfare

Item 5—COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Sabotage

b. Espionage

Item 6—CONCLUSIONS

Appendix G

Guide for Determination of Intelligence Requirements for Amphibious Operations

This appendix provides a checklist for intelligence and information requirements that may be appropriate for operational planning. This list may be used in its entirety or by section as required.

1. Maps, Charts, and Geodesy (MC&G)

a. MC&G coverage of all required scales for each of the following types of coverage.

(1) Topographic. (Include city plans.)

(2) Hydrographic. (Include combat charts.)

(3) Aeronautical

(4) Air Target Materials

(5) Geodetic Materials. (Include positioning data base.)

b. Gazetteers for use as geographical dictionaries.

c. Photographs needed to supplement MC&G products and to support planning and operations.

2. Meteorology

a. Climate

(1) General Effect on Operations. (Include supplies, camouflage, health, and movement.)

(2) Climatological monthly averages.

(3) Typical weather for particular seasons.

b. Winds (direction and velocity)

c. Flying Conditions

(1) General

(2) Ceiling and Visibility

(3) Icing

d. Miscellaneous

(1) Sunrise, Sunset, Moonrise, Moonset, Twilight, and Phase of the Moon.

(2) Magnetic Deviations

(3) Other

3. Hydrography

a. Tides

(1) General

(2) Range and Duration

(3) Hourly Tide Data

(4) Meteorological Effects

b. Seas and Swell

c. Obstacles, Reefs, Shoals, Bars, Rocks

d. Inshore and Offshore Currents

(1) Strength and Direction

(2) Current Tables and Charts

e. Mean Water Temperature

4. Topography

a. General

(1) Characteristics and Landmarks of Landing Area

(2) Coastal Description

b. Terrain

(1) Key Terrain

(2) Avenues of Approach

(3) Cover and Concealment

(4) Observation and Fields of Fire

(5) Obstacles

(6) Vegetation

(7) Relief and Drainage

(8) Trafficability

5. Helicopter Landing Zones

a. Designation and Location

b. Altitude

c. Orientation

d. Navigation Aids

e. Obstacles

(1) Hazard to Air Operations

(2) Obstacles to Movement of Troops and Equipment

f. Size and Shape

g. Slope

h. Relief and Drainage

i. Trafficability

j. Exits

6. Beaches

a. Designation and Location

b. Characteristics

(1) Length and Width

(2) Low and High Water Marks

(3) Trafficability

(4) Obstacle and Interruptions

(5) Tides and Currents

(6) Surf

c. Landmarks

d. Approaches. General information shoreward from 10 fathom depth and detailed information inside the 5-fathom curve.

e. Currents

f. Gradient

g. Tides

h. Exits

i. Distance to Inland Lines of Communications

7. Ports and Air Facilities

a. Ports and Harbors

(1) Designation, Location, and Importance

(2) Landing Points Within the Port

(3) Provisioning

(4) Materials and Equipment Available for Repair and Construction

(5) Water Supply

(6) Communications

(7) Terminal Facilities Such as Piers, Wharves, Storage, and Support Equipment Available

(8) Capacities and Related Statistics

(9) Quartering Facilities

b. Air Facilities

(1) Name, Location

(2) Dimensions and Characteristics of the Runway, Runway Markings, Aprons, Dispersal Areas, Etc.

(3) Navigational Aids

(4) Drainage

(5) Expendability

(6) Lighting

(7) Hanger

(8) Workshops

(9) Administration Building

(10) Repair Facility

(11) POL Storage and Availability

(12) Communications

(13) Electric Power

(14) Water Supply

c. Seaplane Stations. (Same information as required for airfields.)

8. Politics

(As they apply to the mission and planning.)

a. Form and Exercise of Government

b. Organizations and Functions of National and Local Governments

c. Political and Civil Rights (Rights and Restrictions, Secret Police and Security)

d. Domestic Affairs

e. Foreign Affairs

f. Government Stability

9. Economics

(As they apply to planning and conduct of the mission.)

a. Structure

(1) Cost of Living

(2) Imports and Exports

(3) Economic Effects Caused by Enemy Activity

b. POL

(1) Present Availability

(2) Assessment of Sabotage, Bombing, and Other Damages on Future Availability

c. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

(1) Food Crops

(2) Animal Husbandry, Diseases, and Domestic Consumption

(3) Processed Food

(4) Fishing and Fish Products

(5) Forest Resources

d. Building Materials

e. General Public Service Facilities

(1) Electric Power

(2) Fuels and Natural Gas

(3) Water Supply System

(4) Warehouse and Storage Facilities

f. Transportation

(1) Adequacy for Military Roads

(2) Railroads

(3) Roads. Status, Characteristics, Vulnerable Points

(4) Waterways

(5) Commercial Air Transportation

(6) Bridges (Physical size and load capabilities)

g. Telecommunications

(1) Telephone Networks

(2) Telegraph Networks

(3) Radio and Television Stations

h. Finance

(1) Currency and inflationary trends

(2) Exchange

i. Economic Vulnerabilities

10. Sociology

(As it applies to the mission and planning)

a. Languages

b. Social Structure Including Leaders of Groups

c. Religion

d. Population

e. Health and Sanitation

f. Labor

g. Public Opinion and Morale

h. Public Order and Safety

11. Armed Forces

a. Ground/Air/Naval/Unconventional Warfare Forces

(1) Composition

(2) Disposition

(3) Strength

(4) Tactics and Doctrine

(5) Training

(6) Combat Effectiveness

(7) Logistics

(8) Miscellaneous

b. NBC Warfare Capability

c. Ability to Conduct Special Operations, Sabotage, Espionage, Subversion, Terrorism, and Other

d. Facilities and Defensive Position Construction

e. Recognition Materials (Visual, Pictorial, Audio, and Written)

12. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

a. Safe Areas

b. Routes to Friendly Areas

c. Navigation Aids

d. Medical Aspects (to include dangerous plants and animals and diseases)

e. SERE Aids

f. Conduct, if captured

13. Medical

a. Diseases

b. Health and Sanitation

c. Medical Facilities

d. Other

Appendix H

Intelligence Requirements for Counterguerrilla Operations

The guerrilla force, the civil population, and the terrain are inseparable factors in guerilla warfare. To destroy the guerrilla movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required on all three.

1. Guerrilla Force

The following intelligence is sought concerning the guerrilla force:

a. Factors which caused the development of the guerrilla force.

b. Relationship between guerrilla forces and civil population.

c. Relationship with and support from any external sponsoring power.

d. Capability of the guerrilla force to provide its own food by growing, seizure, or civilian support.

e. Identify all other pertinent information concerning guerrilla force leaders.

f. Capability of guerrilla forces to attack installations and disrupt lines of communications.

g. Strength and combat efficiency of the guerrilla force, to include status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

h. Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points, and trails.

i. Guerrilla force arms and armament.

2. Civil Populace

Because of the inseparable tie between the guerrilla force and the civil populace which usually exists, much of the intelligence developed concerning one is applicable to the other. Required intelligence concerning the civil populace includes the following:

a. Identification of hostile and friendly elements.

b. Motivation and loyalties of various segments.

c. Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.

d. Effect of local authorities and police on civil populace.

e. Ability of the local populace to furnish food to guerrilla and/or friendly forces.

f. Availability of water and fuel.

g. Vulnerability of friendly civil populace to terror tactics.

h. Potential effect of civil population control measures such as relocation, search and seizure, movement restrictions, food control, and curfews.

i. Psychological warfare vulnerabilities.

3. Terrain

An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counterguerrilla operations. Terrain information is continuously collected concerning the following:

a. Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or hideouts. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

(1) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

(2) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

(3) Covered entry and withdrawal routes.

(4) Located within 1 day's foot movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

(5) Adequate water supply.

b. Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

c. Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communications.

d. Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on the seasons of the year when the streams are at flood stage.

e. Areas where drinking water is not available.

f. Areas where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

g. Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

h. Location of likely guerrilla or counterguerrilla ambush sites.

i. Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

j. Location of areas suitable for airdrops, boat or submarine rendezvous, when guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power.

k. All roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas.

Appendix I

Insurgent Activity Indicators

1. General

Anything that insurgents can do to influence and direct a society toward overthrowing its government will be reflected by some action or indication, no matter how subtle. These occurrences are referred to as insurgent activity indicators. By recognizing these indicators, it is possible to obtain the first clues to insurgent existence and then evidence of the growth of the insurgent movement. Because there is a great deal of legitimate activity, there is a requirement to determine which of the various sociological, economic, political, and other activities represent insurgent activity.

It is not possible to provide an all-inclusive listing of insurgency indicators because there are too many possibilities existing in the many nations of the world. The following indicators, however, do provide a beginning framework for a detailed analysis of any particular country. The greater the perception of an insurgency situation within a particular country and the greater the knowledge of the insurgent involved, the easier it will be to identify the insurgent activity indicators.

These indicators will serve as a guide for intelligence officers and analysts in developing appropriate clues to insurgent activity in a particular area. Isolated actions of seemingly little significance in one area may show a pattern of emerging insurgency when coordinated with reports of indicators from other areas. In developing indicators or using these suggested ones, it is important to remember that insurgent strategy can suddenly change. The insurgent threat can unfold along altogether different lines simultaneously or can suddenly switch from use of military force, for example, to a political offensive. Such a development can be dangerous if it makes the general situation appear to be much less critical than it really is. The development of appropriate indicators can not only indicate that an insurgency or potential insurgent situation exists, but can also identify any problems and dissatisfaction of the people. The elimination or effective control of insurgency is based on coordinated internal defense and development (IDAD) programs which address identified problem or potential problems. Before these programs can be developed, the threat must be defined. To define the threat, you must first establish insurgent activity indicators.

2. Rural Insurgent Activity

A rural area includes all farming areas, any town or village up to 5,000 people, and any town or village up to 20,000 people with a farm-based economy where the townspeople, if not engaged in farming, earn their livelihood in agricultural service industries. In such areas where the interests are so interdependent, insurgency indicators would be similar in both the town and countryside. This is not to say that rural insurgency may not be directed by urban insurgents and coordinated with urban insurgency; however, some theorists emphasize that the key to success is the countryside and the rural population. In such cases, early insurgency indicators will be found in the rural areas where the subversive insurgents are concentrating their initial efforts.

During the developments of a subversive insurgency, some of the first indicators of latent or incipient insurgency will appear in the rural areas. While some of these indicators are rather obvious, some are not. For the sake of simplicity, these indicators of insurgency have been placed into four categories: population, propaganda, commodity, and environmental.

a. Population. Population indicators may be broken down into subcategories of general activity, insurgent-promoted activity, and activity directed against the government.

(1) General Activity. This includes—

- Identification of insurgents, their supporters, and sympathizers who suddenly appear in or move out of an area.
- New faces in the community.
- Unusual gatherings among the population.
- Disruption of normal social patterns.

(2) Insurgent-Promoted Activities. These include—

- Refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes, or loan payments or unusual difficulty in the collection of same.
- Trends of demonstrated hostility on the part of the local population toward government forces.
- Occurrence of actions previously considered taboo by the populace.
- Disappearance of the population from or avoidance by the people of certain areas.
- Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.

(3) Activity Directed Against the Government. This includes—

- Strangers attempting to join local security forces.
- Reports of the people being approached for purposes of intelligence recruitment.
- Unusual short absences of government employees.
- Failure of police and informant nets to report properly.
- Growth of general hostility toward the government.
- Unexplained destruction or loss of government identification papers or passports and increased forgeries thereof.
- Closing of rural schools.
- Murder and kidnapping of local government officials.

b. Propaganda. Propaganda indicators may be broken down further into subcategories of general activity and activity directed against the established government, national military forces, and education system:

(1) General Activity. This includes—

- Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.
- Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.
- Increased religious unrest.
- Increased agitation on issues for which there is no identified movement or organization.
- Renewed activity by insurgent organizations thought to be dormant.
- Circulation of petitions advocating usual insurgent demands.
- Reports from other countries that the country is ready for revolution.

(2) Activity Directed Against the Established Government. This includes—

- Attempts to discredit and ridicule national or public officials.
- Attempts to discredit the judicial system and police organizations.
- Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of a foreign government.
- Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders.
- Agitation against government projects and plans.
- Rumors designed to gain public acceptance of untruths about the government or governmental leaders.
- Advocacy of popular front government.

(3) Activity Directed Against the National Military Forces. This includes—

- Attacks which embarrass or ridicule military officials.

- Characterization of military leaders as puppets and tools of a foreign policy.
- Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders from the military.
- Propaganda preventing youth from joining the military service or propaganda encouraging soldiers to desert.
- Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people.
- Civilian avoidance of and reluctance to cooperate with the military.

(4) Activity Directed Against the Educational System. This includes—

- Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.
- Charges by students and others that the educational system is not adequate and is only training the youth of the nation to do the government's bidding.

c. Commodity. Commodity indicators may be broken down into crops, animals, arms and ammunition, clothing, drugs and medicine, and communication activity subcategories.

(1) Crops. This includes—

- Diversion of crops from the market.
- Unexplained decrease in the marketing of a given crop.
- Increased reports of pilfering foodstuffs.
- Strangers attempting to purchase crops or produce.
- Farmers marketing a crop that is smaller than usual, yet showing no signs of subsequent financial difficulty.
- Discovery of caches of staple foodstuffs.
- Increase in crop prices indicating the existence of an insurgent taxing authority in the area.

(2) Animals. This includes—

- Diversion of animals or meat from the market.
- Reports of loss of hides or diversion of hides from the market.
- Disappearance of wild game from an area in which it was previously plentiful.
- Disappearance of pack animals or the appearance of unusual numbers of pack animals in certain areas.

(3) Arms and Ammunition. This includes—

- Increased loss of weapons by military and police forces.
- Increased thefts of weapons.
- Discovery of arms caches.
- Attacks on patrols resulting in loss of weapons and ammunition. The above factors could be applied not only to weapons but also to any similarly essential military goods.

(4) Clothing. This includes—

- Unusual scarcity of any type of material that could be used for footwear, such items as hides of animals and old tires in addition to manufactured footwear.
- Discovery of caches of clothing or of materials which may be used in the manufacture of clothing or uniforms.

(5) Drugs and Medicines. This includes—

- Scarcity of herbs and plants used in or for drugs and medicine.
- Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and medicine or the herbs used in their manufacture.

(6) Communications. This includes—

- Increases in purchase and use of radios.
- Discovery of caches of communications equipment.
- Unusual increase in communication traffic in amateur radio operations.

d. Environmental. This includes—

- Evidence of increased foot traffic in the area.
- Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.
- Unexplained trails and cold campsites.
- Establishment on new, unexplained agricultural areas, or recently cleared fields.
- Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or a form of communication.
- Concentration of dead foliage in an area, possibly indicating use of camouflage.
- Presence of foot traps, spikes, and the like.
- Presence of obstacles such as those used in roadblocks and canal blocks.

3. Urban Insurgent Activity

Indicators of urban insurgent activity also have been placed in four subcategories. They are population, propaganda, commodity, and environmental indicators. Many of the same or similar indicators will appear for both rural and urban areas.

a. Population. Population indicators may be broken down further into categories of general activity, insurgent promoted activity, and activity directed against the government.

(1) General Activity. This includes—

- Increase in size of embassy or consulate staffs from a country or countries which support insurgent groups.
- Increase in staff and activities in proinsurgency-oriented embassies or consulates in neighboring countries, including unusual patterns in nature and volume of external communications (both in-country and out-of-country).
- Increased travel by suspected subversives to proinsurgency-oriented countries or to countries notably under insurgent influence.
- Influx of insurgent leaders, both foreign and domestic, into the urban area.
- Reports of locals being trained in proinsurgency-oriented countries.
- Increase in visitors from proinsurgency-oriented countries (tourists, technicians, businessmen, officials).
- Close connections between the diplomatic representatives of proinsurgency-oriented countries and the insurgents.
- Increase in insurgent youth gatherings.
- Hosting of trade fairs or similar activities by proinsurgency-oriented countries.
- Return of nationals from travel or study in proinsurgency-oriented countries.
- Increase in visits to urban centers by rural officials and leaders from areas of unrest.
- Establishment of organizations (even very small) of unexplained origin and of unclear or nebulous aims.
- Establishment of a new organization to replace an existing organizational structure with identical aims.
- Appearance of many new members in established organizations like labor unions.
- Attempts by new groups to obtain control of established organizations.
- Infiltration of student organizations and unions by known agitators.
- Appearance of new organizations with titles stressing patriotism, grievances, or interests of underprivileged or minority groups.
- Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.
- Reports of payments to locals for engaging in subversive activities.
- Reports of the formation of subversive paramilitary organizations.
- Use of grenades or other explosives in terrorist acts.
- Reports of insurgent lists of targets for planned terrorist acts.

- Appearance of professional agitators in demonstrations that result in violence.
- Evidence of the participation of paid and armed demonstrators in riots.

(2) Insurgent-Promoted Activities. This includes—

- Reported incidents of attempted recruitment of people to join new movements or underground organizations.
- Unexplained unavailability or disappearance of doctors, printers, and other specialists who may be working with and for the insurgents.
- Habitual criminals and unruly youths who seem to be acting with and for the insurgents.
- Increased unrest and agitation among laborers.
- Inability or refusal of people to pay taxes.
- Reports of extortion and other coercion by the insurgents to obtain financial *donations* from the people.
- Disappearance of young men from the city.

(3) Activity Directed Against the Government. This includes—

- Failure of police and informant nets to report properly, indicating sources are supporting the insurgents or are afraid of them.
- Decreasing success of government agents in infiltrating subversive organizations.
- Assassination or disappearance of government agents.
- Reports of increased attempts by insurgent representatives or suspected subversives to make contacts with local leaders or government officials.
- Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government and law enforcement employees.
- Reports of attempts to get classified information from government officials or documents from government offices.
- Leakage of classified information to news media.
- Sudden improvement in financial status of certain government and law enforcement employees.
- Failure of government raids on suspected subversive meetings headquarters apparently because of forewarning.
- Increased activity against the government and its police, minority groups, foreigners, or similar groups.
- Demonstrations against government forces, scapegoat minority groups, or foreigners that are designed to goad government forces into acting against crowds.
- More articles or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the government.
- Growth of general hostility toward the government and law enforcement agencies.
- Occurrence of strikes in critical areas casting doubt upon the ability of the government to maintain order and provide for the needs of the people.
- Unusual and unsatisfactorily explained absences of government employees from their offices.
- Sporadic, unexplained destruction, loss, or forgery of government identification cards and passports.
- Unexplained disruptions of public utilities.
- Reports of extortion attempt on local leaders and businessmen.
- Terrorist acts and threats against government and business leaders.
- Murder or kidnapping of government officials.

b. Propaganda. Propaganda categories may be broken down into categories of general activity and activity directed against the established government, military and police, and educational systems:

(1) General Activity. This includes—

- Worldwide propaganda by proinsurgency-oriented countries denouncing conditions and blaming the government of the targeted country.

- Appearance in-country of antigovernment slogans and pronouncements by word of mouth, wall scribblings, posters, and leaflets.
- Letterwriting campaigns to newspapers and government officials deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power.
- Increased use of slogans pinpointing specific grievances.
- Increased use of petitions and pamphlets which appear to follow the beliefs and policies of a foreign power.
- More rumors, publications, or leaders from areas occupied by migrants which focus on lack of official concern about poor conditions.
- More agitation and unrest within the urban population for which there is no logical explanation.
- Appearance of committees and organizations whose leaders do not seem to be from the urban area, yet who purport to speak for the citizens of that area.
- Increased appeals directed at intensifying general religious unrest in countries where religious competition exists.
- Mass demonstrations where participants voice standard communist demands.
- Announcements by foreign countries that the concerned country is ripe for *war of national liberation,* or words to that effect.
- Propaganda linking local ethnic groups with those in neighboring countries.
- Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other sophisticated equipment in *spontaneous* demonstrations.
- Presence of photographers other than newsmen among demonstrators.
- Widespread propaganda which appeals for sympathetic reception or participation in strikes or demonstrations.
- Rallies to honor *martyred* insurgents. Mass demonstrations honoring revolutionary heroes or dates significant to insurgency.
- Nationwide strikes called to demonstrate the strength of the insurgent movement.
- Sympathy strikes or demonstrations taking place outside the country concerned.

(2) Activity Directed Against the Established Government. This includes—

- Radio propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target country, accusing its government of failure to meet the needs and desires of its people.
- Propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target country, denouncing imperialism.
- Demonstrations and violence in foreign countries against embassies, offices, and consulates of the target country or countries which support its government.
- Spreading accusations that the government is corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.
- Agitation against existing or proposed government projects and plans.
- Accusations that the government is a pawn of a foreign government.
- Calls for a popular front government, including new parties.
- Character assassinations of top government officials.
- Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders from office.
- Strikes or work stoppages called to protest government actions.

(3) Activity Directed Against the Military and Police. This includes—

- Spreading accusations that the military and police are corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.
- Character assassinations of military and police officials.
- Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency military and police leaders from office.

- Calling on the people to stop cooperating with the military and police.
- Deliberate acts to provoke police reprisals during demonstrations or strikes.
- Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that government forces initiated violence when demonstrations end in riots.
- Publication of photographs purporting to show repressive police practices.

(4) Activity Directed Against the Educational System. This includes—

- Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations, and strikes against authority.
- Charges by students and others that the educational system is not adequate and is only training youth to do the government bidding.
- Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.
- Clamor for personnel changes in the educational system.

c. Commodity. Commodity indicators may be broken down into subcategories of foods, arms and ammunition, clothing and drugs.

(1) Foods. This includes—

- Scarce food supplies when there is no report of natural impediments to agriculture.
- Decline of foodstuffs in a country or province where there is a tolerated black market, which indicates that the food is being diverted.
- Sudden shortages of preserved foods or items of food requiring minimal storage facilities.
- Failure of farmers to transport their products to the city, indicating a fear of travel on the highways.
- Large-scale purchasing of foodstuffs which may be by purchasing agents for an insurgent movement.

(2) Arms and Ammunition. This includes—

- Increase in assaults on police and military personnel which result in thefts of weapons.
- Increase in thefts and purchases of arms, ammunition, and explosives.
- Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely manufactured, transported, or cached.
- Increased purchase and theft from salvage yards of metal products like pipe, casings, wire, spikes and nails.
- Increased purchase of surplus military goods.
- Increase in demand for small arms and ammunition on the open market.
- Reports of large-scale purchasing of weapons, ammunition, and material used in their manufacture.
- Increase in the number of armed robberies.
- Increase in pilfering of arms and ammunition from the government.
- Reports of theft or sudden shortages of chemicals which could be used in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.
- Appearance of arms manufactured in proinsurgency-oriented countries.

(3) Clothing. This includes—

- Unusual systematic purchase of clothing materials which could be used for the manufacture of insurgent uniforms or footwear.
- Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture of clothing and footwear.
- Distribution of clothing to underprivileged classes by organizations of recent or suspect origin.
- Discovery of caches of uniform clothing.

(4) Drugs. This includes—

- Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the market or black market.
- Large-scale purchase or theft of drugs and other medical supplies.
- Diversion of shipments of drugs.

d. Environmental. This includes—

- Apartments and housing being rented, but not lived in as homes.
- Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.
- Defacement of government and police information signs.
- Disappearance of electrical lines. Pollution of the urban area's water supply.
- Terrorist acts against physical targets like bridges, dams, airports, or buildings.
- Changes in residence of suspected subversives.
- Discovery of message drops.
- Apartments and houses being used for purchases other than residences.
- Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical supplies, and arms into urban centers.
- Reports that local currency is being bought up in world markets by proinsurgency-oriented countries.
- Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency.
- Increase in bank robberies.
- Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.
- Marked increases in equipment failures in essential industries.
- Mass strikes and sympathy strikes in essential industries.
- Appearance of known agitators or suspected subversives in picket lines.
- Escalation of peaceful strikes to violence against property and nonstriking personnel.
- Explosions in essential utilities and industries.
- Roadblocks and mines on main lines of communication.
- Malicious damage to industrial products or factory machinery.

Appendix J

Indicators of Enemy Courses of Action

1. ATTACK (Ground Activity)

Observation	Explanation
Massing of mechanized elements (tanks, artillery, and logistic support.)	Areas of secondary importance are to provide maximum strength to main effort.
Deployment of combat elements in echelon.	Normal attack formations provide for the second echelon of a regiment to be located 3-6 km in rear of the first echelon; and Army second echelon 15-25 km in rear of the first.
Concentration of mass toward either or both flanks.	Single or double envelopment is normally attempted in the offense. Mechanized units on either or both flanks may indicate single or double envelopment.
Extensive artillery preparation.	Offensive is built around the striking power and shock of massed artillery. Preparations of 30 minutes to 1 hour normally precede offensive.
Artillery positions well forward and concentrated.	Artillery positions for the attack are well forward with direct fire weapons, artillery pieces, and large numbers of mortars concentrated.
Dispersal of tanks and self-propelled guns to forward units.	Tanks accompany leading waves of assault mechanized units. Self-propelled guns follow tanks closely by bounds.
Medium antiaircraft weapons located in forward areas.	Medium antiaircraft weapons displaced forward areas prior to attack to protect assault forces and to facilitate forward displacement during the attack.
Clearing lanes through obstacles within own positions.	Lanes are cleared and marked through mined areas, and ramps and bridges prepared over ditches and trenches within enemy's own position. This is done prior to attack to facilitate forward movement, particularly at night.
Reconnaissance and destruction of obstacles that are part of enemy defenses.	Usually on the night preceding attack, enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly obstacles to determine plan for clearing lanes. Patrols destroy only such obstacles which will not disclose direction of main effort.
Demonstrations and feints.	Local, small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving mechanized units, tanks, and artillery frequently precede a general attack.

Conducting drills and rehearsal in rear area.	Major attacks may be preceded by rehearsal. This is particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or strongly defended river lines.
Establishing and strengthening counterreconnaissance screen.	Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in the attack.
Movement of units forward.	Prior to launching an attack, troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.
Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.	Troops are assembled in areas from which they launch the attack.
Incsreased activity in rear areas.	Before an attack, supply and admin activities increase in the rear areas.
Location of supply and evacuation installations well forward.	Supply and evacuation installations are usually located well forward for attack.
Systematic air reconnaissance.	Air reconnaissance is usually more active before an attack.
Systematic air bombardment.	Before the attack, the enemy may engage in systematic *softening up* of positions.

2. DEFENSE (Ground)

Observation	Explanation
Preparation of battalion and company defensive areas and strongpoints.	Defense is based on stubborn defense of battalion defensive areas and counterattacks by heavy tank forces.
Extensive preparation of field fortifications.	Defense calls for extensive use of trenches, prepared positions, and overhead cover.
Formation of antitank strongpoints.	Antitank strongpoints are formed along logical avenues of approach for armor. These are composed of mechanized, engineer, and antitank gun units with positions strengthened by mines, ditches, and other obstacles.
Attachment of additional antitank units to frontline defensive positions.	In areas where there is a serious armor threat, the enemy will concentrate as many as 25 antitank guns for every 1,000 m of frontage.
Artillery positions in depth disposed laterally.	In the defense, artillery and position areas are in depth from about 3-8 km behind the forward edge of the main defense zone and are laterally disposed.
Preparation of alternate artillery positions.	In normal defensive positions, three positions are prepared for each firing piece.
Employment of roving artillery.	Roving guns are part of normal defensive operations.

Forward rifle battalions disposed for all-around protection.	Rifle battalion defensive areas are organized for all-around protection.
Large tank units located in assembly areas.	Tank units are held in assembly areas for employment in counterattack roles.
Preparation and occupation of successive defensive lines.	In the defense, separate and distinct defensive lines are prepared and occupied.
Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, and minefields.	Demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles are placed to cover avenues of approach.
Deployment of mechanized units on good defensive terrain.	Terrain that has good fields of fire and relatively inaccessible to tanks is usually selected for a defensive position.
Presence of ammunition and engineer dumps, and fortification of buildings.	Engineer tools and equipment may be used to dig trenches and to erect obstacles.
Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	Digging trenches and erection of wire indicates preparation to hold a position.

3. DELAYING ACTION (Ground)

Observation	Explanation
Withdraw from defensive positions before becoming heavily engaged.	In delaying actions, units avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Successive local counterattacks with limited objectives.	Counterattacks are employed to assist in disengaging first echelon units rather than to restore positions.
Counterattacks broken off before position restored.	Same as previous explanation.
Maximum firepower positioned forward; firing initiated at long range.	Long-range fires facilitate the delaying action.
Frontages up to four times those normally assigned to units on the defense.	Forces conducting a delaying action are normally assigned frontages in excess of that normal for enemy units on the defense.

4. WITHDRAWAL (Ground)

Indications for withdrawal are the same as those for delaying actions with the addition of the following:

Observation	Explanation
Rearward movement of long-range artillery and supply echelons.	During withdrawal, the first units to be withdrawn are long-range artillery and supply echelons that move back under cover of darkness 1 or 2 days before the main withdrawal.
Systematic destruction of communications facilities, bridges, and other military assets in enemy held territory.	Deliberate demolition and scorched earth tactics may be employed in general withdrawal.

5. REINFORCEMENT (Ground)

Observation	Explanation
Increased traffic toward present positions.	Increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies.
Movement of additional troops toward the front.	This action would increase the enemy's present strength.
Identification of new units in combat zone.	The addition of new units to those already present will increase the enemy's strength.
Additional command posts and supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units would cause an increase in number of these installations.

6. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) WEAPONS

a. The presence of NBC weapons is indicated by:

Observation	Explanation
Heavily guarded movement of supplies, equipment, and materiel.	Movement of supplies, equipment, and materiel of NBC nature requires special security.
Heavily guarded installations.	Sites for storage of NBC supplies and the locations of delivery units are heavily guarded.
Preparation of very heavy artillery positions.	Primary and alternate positions for nuclear delivery are prepared prior to movement of the units.
Movement or detection of self-propelled launchers.	FROGs and SSMs are mobile.
Presence of radars and other electronic equipment.	Enemy NBC delivery units are equipped with radios and electronic devices.
Sudden increase in communications-electronics activities.	Enemy NBC delivery units are equipped with radios and electronic devices.
Movement of small groups of heavily armed helicopters escorted by tactical fighters.	NBC warheads may be moved by helicopter, with guards and armed helicopters as escorts. Tactical aircraft may provide air cover.
Movement of pole trailers with rockets or missile bodies.	These are used to resupply FROG and SSM units.

Identification of tall slender objects, such as towers, chimneys, and trees.	Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as towers, chimneys, and trees.
Large, well guarded complexes including tank trucks, radar, generators, and maintenance facilities.	SSM units require extensive ground handling equipment.
Heavily guarded closed vans.	NBC warheads are normally carried in closed vans that are heavily guarded.
Evacuation or exclusion of civilians from specific areas suitable for NBC storage or delivery sites.	Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected for NBC storage or delivery sites.

b. Intended use of NBC weapons is indicated by:

Observation	Explanation
Location of SSM, FROG, and artillery units within striking range.	SSM and FROG units are located within one-third of their maximum range from the line of contact in the offense and one-half in defense.
Registration of artillery fire.	Registration may be required prior to firing a nuclear projectile.
Special or unusual activity by frontline troops.	Frontline troops may construct special positions, usually deep covered fighting holes, prior to firing a nuclear projectile.
Limited withdrawal of frontline units without apparent tactical reason.	Frontline units may withdraw for a limited distance to avoid casualties from close-in NBC weapons.
Sudden and energetic digging.	Prior to use of NBC weapons, frontline units may be ordered to dig deeper fighting holes or take other individual protective measures.
Large concentrations of electronic gear located in the vicinity of suitable sites for SSM launching.	Concentration of electronic equipment is necessary to guide and control SSMs and must be located in proximity to launching sites.
Sudden increase in communications and electronics activity.	Increase may be incident to a delivery of an NBC weapon.
Use of smoke cover on frontline troops.	Smoke may be used to protect troops against the thermal effect of nuclear weapons.
Disappearance of known enemy agents from specified areas.	Prior to attack, agents may be ordered to leave the area.
Increased or unusual air activity.	Delivery by air may require a temporary degree of air superiority, photo mission, and/or practice flight patterns.
Increased maintenance and inspection of tactical vehicles and equipment.	Prior to the use of NBC weapons, tactical vehicles and equipment of the NBC defense systems will be inspected and appropriate maintenance performed.

Increased activity and dispersal of NBC units.	Prior to the use of NBC weapons, detection and decontamination units will be deployed to support the tactical commanders.
Preparation of decontamination facilities and sites and the deployment of equipment.	Prior to the use of NBC weapons, facilities and sites will have to be established and equipment deployed.

7. ATTACK (Air)

Observation	Explanation
Deployment of fighter/attack and bomber aircraft to airfields within range of the FBH.	Fighter/attack and bomber aircraft units occupy airfields from which they can attack our forces and support enemy ground forces.
Construction of airfields and/or improvements on existing airfields within range of the FBH.	The extent of air attacks will depend on the size, number, and capability of available airfields.
Stockpiling of aviation POL, munitions, and maintenance supplies at airfields within range of the FBH.	Extended air attack operations will require a considerable logistics backup.
Positioning of EW/GCI radar to provide coverage of the FBH.	EW/GCI radar are used to guide and control aircraft during periods of reduced visibility.
Increased air reconnaissance.	Air reconnaissance is usually more active before an attack.
Increase in fighter aircraft over the FBH.	Fighter aircraft are used to gain and maintain air superiority.
Modification of fighter and trainer aircraft to carry munitions.	Many fighter and trainer aircraft can be employed in an attack role.

8. DEFEND (Air)

Observation	Explanation
Deployment of fighter aircraft to airfields within range of the AOA.	Fighter aircraft units occupy airfields from which they can attack our aircraft.
Construction of airfields and/or improvement of existing airfields within the AOA.	The extent of air defense operations will depend on the size, number, and capability of available airfields.
Stockpiling of POL, munitions, and maintenance supplies at airfields within the AOA.	Extended air defense operations will require a considerable logistics backup.

Positioning of EW/GCI radar within range of the AOA.	The enemy must detect our aircraft and control intercept of them to obtain air superiority.
Positioning of AAA and SAM within range of the AOA.	Flak areas are part of the air defense.
Positioning of antiaircraft fire control radar within range of the AOA.	Control of antiaircraft fires is necessary.
Modification of attack aircraft to carry AAMs.	Many attack aircraft can be used in a fighter role.
Increase in air attacks on our airfields and aircraft.	Enemy air strikes reduce our air attack capability.

9. REINFORCEMENT (Air)

Observation	Explanation
Positioning of aviation units at airfields beyond range.	These units may move within range in extremely short periods of time.
Identification of new units within range.	The presence of new units will increase the enemy's strength.
Movement of aviation units towards the AOA.	This action increases the enemy's strength.
Construction of airfields and/or improvement of existing airfields within range.	This activity provides the capacity to handle increased numbers of aircraft.

Appendix K

Enemy Strength Computation

1. General

a. Enemy strength undergoes continuous fluctuation through casualties and replacements. This fluctuation results in approximated enemy strength figures. Computing the troop strength of insurgent or guerrilla forces is difficult since these units often form, disband, and reform in another area of operations.

b. Enemy strength is computed in terms of committed forces, reinforcements, air components, and nuclear weapons and CB agents capabilities. Since doctrinal differences allow for the holding of specific units in reserve and reinforcement roles, it is extremely important to study a country's doctrine prior to computing strength. Enemy strength is normally presented in terms of numerical strength by type of unit. Nuclear weapons capabilities are expressed in terms of the number of weapons, delivery systems, and yields. CB capabilities are expressed in terms of the type, persistency, lethality, and delivery system.

2. Explanation of Terms

a. Numerical strength is the expression of a unit in terms of numbers of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

b. Initial strength of an enemy unit comprises the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment authorized by established and approved tables of organization and equipment.

c. Effective strength of an enemy unit consists of that part, including logistics components, of its initial strength which is currently capable of combat employment.

d. Strength by type unit is the expression of unit or forces in terms of numbers of units by type, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and air.

3. Initial Compilation of Effective Strength

a. Prior to and at the onset of hostilities, effective strength is compiled from intelligence estimates based on the initial strength. It is also based on circumstances such as—

(1) The degree to which the enemy unit is up to initial strength at the time.

(2) Whether the enemy maintained large standing forces before the outbreak of hostilities.

(3) Whether war was premeditated.

(4) Whether any warning of war was (or would be) received.

(5) Movement facilities and lines of communication (adequacy of land, sea, air; whether interior or exterior).

b. Basic Considerations

(1) A consideration of the previous estimates of effective strength, as well as more recent reliable intelligence.

(2) The incidents of casualties, reinforcements, and replacements.

c. The following calculations are to be expressed as percentages of the initial strength. Where it is apparent

that a percentage does not accurately reflect the fighting ability of a unit, it may be necessary to elaborate on this figure. These calculations are computed as follows:

(1) A percentage attrition rate is deducted when experience has enabled this to be established for the circumstances. This rate is based on those men, weapons, and equipment temporarily not available to a unit for reasons other than battle casualties or losses.

(2) Subtractions or additions are made in the light of reliable intelligence. Any items having only a temporary significance should have their time-lapse noted on the estimate.

(3) The following, which should be physically counted where possible, but which, in nuclear war, is more often based on statistical estimates, is then deducted:

(a) Personnel

1 Killed

2 Prisoners of war

3 Wounded noneffectives

(b) Weapons and Equipment

1 Destroyed

2 Captured

3 Damaged to extent requiring work shop repair

(4) Personnel reinforcements and replacements of weapons and equipment is then added in accordance with the scale estimated, or the scale justified by reliable intelligence, where there is a difference. In the absence of other guidance and where the enemy has secure lines of communications to the main base, it is to be assumed that—

(a) Personnel reinforcements can be completed within 72 hours.

(b) Small weapons and light equipment can be replaced within 72 hours. Other weapons and equipment can be replaced within 6 days.

d. The resulting calculations are expressed as percentages of table of organization strength where possible; however, numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability of a force and to provide the commander with a basis for comparison.

e. The compilation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities when accurate intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate and the initial strength figure is only an approximation.

4. Numerical Strength Computation Formulas

a. Effective Strength. Table of organization strength, minus losses, plus replacements.

b. Percentage

$$\text{T/O strength} = \frac{\text{Effective Strength} \times 100}{\text{T/O strength}}$$

c. In time of peace, strength generally can be computed by annual induction quota times term of conscription, plus cadre.

5. Combat Readiness Rating

a. Based on the discussion of numerical strength computations, a combat readiness rating can be established. A suggested rating system is as follows:

C-1: Combat effective—Any unit at 80-100% T/O strength in a high state of training.

C-2: Marginally combat effective—Any unit at 70-80% T/O strength in an acceptable state of training.

C-3: Limited combat effective—Any unit at 50-70% T/O strength in an only partially trained state.

C-4: Noneffective—Any unit below 50% T/O strength and seriously lacking in training.

b. The rating system does not take into account unit leadership and morale which are both important factors in determining a unit's combat effectiveness. Generally, however, the higher ratings employ good leadership and morale both in peacetime and at the initiation of hostilities. The two lower ratings may reflect poor leadership and morale but may also reflect the status of a unit after repeated engagements and obvious combat ineffectiveness due to losses.

c. The C ratings apply most readily to conventional warfare employment. This rating scheme may be expanded to include nuclear (N), chemical (CH), or biological (B) delivery capability:

NUCLEAR

N-1: Possesses strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

N-2: Possesses tactical nuclear weapons.

N-3: Maintains a nuclear weapons delivery capability but is not believed to possess a nuclear weapons inventory.

N-4: Unit is nuclear noncapable and is not a nuclear threat.

CHEMICAL

CH-1: Possesses the total spectrum of chemical weapons and delivery means.

CH-2: Possesses limited chemical weapons and delivery means (specify which type).

CH-3: Possesses means of chemical weapons delivery but is not believed to possess a chemical weapons inventory.

CH-4: Unit is not a chemical warfare threat.

BIOLOGICAL

B-1: Possesses the total spectrum of biological weapons and delivery means.

B-2: Possesses limited biological weapons and delivery means (specify which type).

B-3: Possesses means of delivering biological weapons but is not believed to possess a biological weapons inventory.

B-4: Unit is not a biological warfare threat.

d. By combining the rating systems, a total rating of unit capability can be achieved. This system provides the analyst with an additional tool in determining the strength of combat readiness and capability.

Appendix L

Handling of Captured Enemy Personnel, Documents, and Materials

1. Captured Enemy Personnel

a. One of the most valuable sources of tactical intelligence is captured enemy personnel. Because tactical information is of a perishable nature, it must be extracted by a competent interrogator as fast and as accurately as possible. Crucial to that exploitation process is the proper handling of the enemy source. Properly done, it preserves the source's state of mind at capture and ensures the integrity of any captured documents and material, thus optimizing the exploitation process. Conversely, the mishandling of a source and those documents and/or material pertaining to that source could severely jeopardize the exploitation process.

b. The *silent partner* in source handling is the capturing unit. Enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and/or detainees will be delivered to the MAGTF EPW compound (or collection point, as appropriate) by the capturing unit. Immediately upon capture, enemy personnel will be disarmed and searched for concealed weapons and documents by the capturing unit, except when the number of prisoners captured, hostile action, or other circumstances of capture make this impractical. When immediate search is prevented for any reason, it will be made as soon as practical.

(1) Seriously wounded EPWs are searched, taken to the nearest aid station for treatment, and then evacuated through medical channels. Slightly wounded prisoners are disarmed and searched by capturing troops and evacuated to the nearest collecting point. In the course of their evacuation, unwounded prisoners of war are often used as litter bearers for our own and enemy severely wounded. Our slightly wounded are used, when possible, as escorts.

(2) When a prisoner is searched, all documents and articles required for intelligence purposes are removed from the prisoner and tagged so that they may be identified with the prisoner on whom they were found. No markings should be made on the documents or articles themselves. Money may not be taken from the prisoner except on the order of an officer. Itemized receipts must be given for money and personal items. The itemized receipts must be legibly inscribed with name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. Personal effects will not be taken as souvenirs or loot. Property which a prisoner may retain in his possession include badges of rank and nationality, decorations, helmet and gas mask, articles used for feeding and clothing, and all other articles of personal use except arms, horses, military equipment, military documents, and articles withdrawn for reasons of security. Identity documents will not be removed.

c. Silence must be enforced among prisoners at all times. This measure prevents such ruses as story collaboration, escape planning, or promotion of security consciousness in subordinates by their leaders. Any requests made by sources to members of the capturing unit or other escorts should be related to interrogation facility personnel as soon as possible after the EPWs delivery to the EPW compound. Silencing also entails preventing unauthorized personnel from speaking with EPWs.

d. As soon as possible after capture, segregate prisoners into the following categories: officers, noncommissioned officers, nonrated men, deserters, civilians, females, political indoctrination personnel, and suspected enemy agents (actually, the number of possible segregation categories will depend on the number

of capturing unit personnel available as EPW escorts). Furthermore, within each category, should any prisoners appear to be willing to talk, these individuals will be segregated until after interrogation at the MAGTF level. Segregation of wounded prisoners is made and maintained as for other prisoners of war. Examination of wounded prisoners of war by interrogation personnel is necessary and may take place at any time during evacuation if, in the opinion of the surgeon, such examination will not endanger the life of the prisoners.

e. The captured enemy source must be properly safeguarded. Measures of reprisal against EPWs are prohibited, as are other acts of violence or intimidation, insults, and subjection to public curiosity. Wherever applicable and practical during the evacuation process, the capturing unit should return to the source, protective items such as helmets and gas masks, but only after searching these items. Capturing unit personnel should also be alert to any EPW/detainee attempting to take his own life. No one should be allowed to give prisoners food, drink, tobacco, or other comfort items prior to interrogation, so far as such treatment does not violate the existing policy laid down by higher headquarters concerning the treatment of prisoners.

f. Expeditious exploitation of captured personnel and subsequent dissemination of tactical information is dependent on the rapid evacuation of the enemy source to the nearest EPW compound/ facility. Sufficient troops from reserve units, whenever possible, are detailed to escort prisoners to the rear. Evacuation will be effected humanely. At least one escort should be familiar with the sources and circumstances of capture.

(1) High level prisoners, whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specifically qualified interrogators at the highest level, include—

(a) General officers, chiefs of staff of divisions or larger units, and heads of staff sections at field army and above.

(b) Scientific and technical personnel with current knowledge of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons or new types of equipment.

(c) Political officers and psychological warfare personnel.

(d) Officials, war correspondents, contractors, etc., who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistics capabilities or political and economic factors.

(e) Persons with detailed knowledge of enemy communications, particularly ciphers and cryptographic equipment.

(f) Persons in intelligence units of staff positions.

(2) EPWs/detainees sent to higher headquarters for interrogation must be accompanied by the documents pertaining to them, together with copies of previous interrogation reports.

(3) If prisoner of war tags are available to the capturing unit, a tag is filled out for each prisoner and fastened to some part of his clothing. If no tags are available, one should be fashioned, including as a minimum the following information:

(a) Date and time of capture.

(b) Place of capture (map coordinates and/or reference point).

(c) Unit affecting capture.

(d) Circumstances of the source's capture (what the source was doing at the time of capture).

(e) Documents and equipment captured with the source.

2. Handling of Captured Enemy Documents

a. Captured enemy documents (CEDs) include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession of a foreign nation and comes into U.S. possession. Types of CEDs include typed, handwritten, printed, painted, engraved, or drawn materials; sound or voice recordings; imagery such as videotapes, movies, or photographs; computer storage media,

including, but not limited to floppy disks; and reproductions of any of the items listed above. This includes U.S. documents which the foreign nation may have possessed. There are numerous ways to acquire a document. Some of the most common being found in the possession of human sources on enemy dead or on the battlefield. There are two types of documents: (1) Official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes; (2) Personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters, diaries, newspapers, and books.

b. Captured documents will not be given security classifications in forward areas. Captured documents will be given security classifications after detailed examination by document specialists. Although no security classification is given in forward areas, captured documents will be handled as secret material. Cryptographic documents are the exception. They are given a security classification immediately and forwarded to the nearest communications-electronics officer.

c. Documents will be classified by division and higher headquarters into four groups as follows:

(1) Type A. Document(s) contains information of immediate tactical or strategic value.

(2) Type B. Document(s) contains cryptographic items and information relative to enemy communications-electronics systems.

(3) Type C. Document(s) contains information of lesser value to intelligence staffs.

(4) Type D. Documents contains no information of apparent value to intelligence staffs.

d. Documents will be tagged showing the nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059 (to be used by MAGTFs operating within NATO). Typical information on the document tag includes—

(1) Designation of the capturing unit. This will include the service to which the unit belongs.

(2) Serial number. Units will give each document a serial number and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary.

(3) Date/time of capture. The date and time of capture of the document should be given.

(4) Place of capture. The place of capture with map coordinates is given. Narrative descriptions of the place of capture are helpful accompanying items.

(5) Summary. Give a summary of the circumstances under which the document was found. Always include the identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if applicable. If there are obvious highlights (e.g., the enemy source associated with the document attempted to destroy it rather than surrender it), include them in the summary to assist interrogation personnel.

e. Documents will be tied together and properly tagged to identify them with the prisoner from whom taken. The documents are then handed to the escort for delivery with the prisoner throughout his journey to the rear area or, when desired are transmitted through intelligence channels in advance of the prisoner. Thus, the documents will be available to interrogators at higher headquarters and will correspond with the prisoners on whom they were found.

f. The initial intelligence examination of documents will take place at the lowest level at which interrogator-translator personnel are attached. This examination will be brief and will be to obtain information of local tactical interest only. Normally, a complete translation of a document will not be made at this level unless it contains extensive information relating to the local tactical situation. Translation reports will follow the format provided in the appendixes.

3. Handling of Captured Enemy Materials

a. An often overlooked source of intelligence is enemy material. Handling of captured enemy materials falls under the staff cognizance of the assistant chiefs of staff, G-1, and G-4, as well as the assistant chief of staff, G-2. The assistant chief of staff, G-2, is responsible for determining what captured material will be maintained for technical intelligence exploitation. The assistant chief of staff, G-4, provides for transportation and disposition, when necessary.

b. Units locating enemy equipment of potential intelligence value submit a preliminary technical report concerning it. Those containing information which could have an immediate effect on the current situation are transmitted by the quickest alternative means available. The precedence is determined by the commander submitting the report.

c. Unit commanders will be responsible for placing the captured enemy equipment under guard to prevent looting, misuse, marring, altering, or destruction prior to the arrival of technical personnel.

d. All technical documents should be tagged *Tech Doc*, or otherwise identified to avoid defacing by capturing units or appropriate agencies. This is done so that in the normal exploitation of captured documents, the command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of technical personnel in their examination. All such copies accompany captured material.

e. A preliminary technical report is submitted by each unit which captures any significant item of enemy equipment. The report is submitted as soon as possible after the acquisition of the equipment and is directed to the designated technical intelligence element through appropriate channels. The report consists of the following information:

(1) Date found, location (coordinates).

(2) Type of equipment and quantity.

(3) Origin or apparent source of item, if known.

(4) Brief description with distinguishing marks.

(5) Technical characteristics with an immediate value.

(6) Signature of the commander of the capturing unit.

(7) Time and origin of the message.

4. Staff Cognizance and Coordination

a. The G-1/S-1 retains overall staff cognizance for the handling of captured enemy personnel. This includes collecting, safeguarding, administrative processing, evacuation, utilization, treatment, discipline, and feeding.

b. The provost marshal supervises the collecting, guarding, and evacuation of captured personnel and recommends the location of collection points and cages. In the absence of a provost marshal representative, supervision relegates to the G-1/S-1.

c. The G-4/S-4 retains staff cognizance over the evacuation of wounded captured enemy personnel.

d. The G-2/S-2 retains staff cognizance for obtaining information through the interrogation of captured enemy personnel. The G-2/S-2 coordinates with the other staff officers to ensure maximum exploitation of captured enemy personnel as a source. He coordinates with the G-1/S-1 and provost marshal to make sure that there is sufficient time and adequate facilities to interrogate prisoners and that the processing, treatment, and segregation of prisoners is conducted in a manner that will enhance the interrogation results. He also coordinates with the G-4/S-4 to be certain that there are adequate opportunities to interrogate wounded prisoners before they are evacuated. The appendixes include sample interrogation and translation report formats.

Appendix M

Movement Data

1. General

This appendix outlines procedures for determining opposing forces movement capabilities. Included is a listing of applicable definitions and terminology, a discussion of foot and vehicle marches, and general considerations for the movement of military units.

2. Definitions and Terminology

The following terms are defined as a basis for understanding march planning computations.

a. Arrival Time. The time the head of a column or element thereof reaches a designated point, line, or objective.

b. Column. A formation in which elements are placed one directly behind the other.

c. Column Gap. The space between two organized march elements following each other on the same route. It can be calculated in units of length or in units of time as measured from the rear of one element to the front of the following element. Column gap may also be expressed as time gap.

d. Completion Time. The time the tail of a column passes the release point.

e. Types of Marches.

(1) Foot Marches. Foot marches are characterized by combat readiness, ease of control, adaptability to terrain, slow rate of movement, and increased fatigue to personnel. Foot marches do not depend on the existence of roads. Foot marches may be necessitated by—

- Lack of vehicles.
- Inadequate road networks.
- Desire for secrecy.
- The need to move only short distances.
- Enemy air superiority, or limitations imposed on vehicular movement by weather and terrain.

(2) Motor Marches. A motor march is a controlled movement of troops in motor vehicles. Motor marches are characterized by flexibility of employment, ability to deliver large numbers of troops over long distances in relatively short periods of time, increased logistical requirements, dependence on roads, and vulnerability to enemy action. Troops move by motor march to expedite movement and conserve combat effectiveness whenever the tactical situation permits and vehicles are available. For more, see FMFM 4-9, *Motor Transport*.

(3) Shuttle Marches. This method alternates riding and marching during a troop movement, usually because of insufficient vehicles to carry the entire unit. Shuttling is transporting troops, equipment, and supplies by the same vehicles. It may be done by hauling a load the entire distance and then returning for another load, or it may be done by carrying successive elements of the marching force for short distances while the remaining elements continue on foot.

(4) Night Marches. Night marches may be required to provide concealment from air and ground observation and security from air attack. They may also be made for avoiding excessive heat during the day.

(a) Night marches are characterized by closed formations, more difficult control and reconnaissance, and a slower rate of march than in day marches.

(b) Night marches must be carefully planned. Prior reconnaissance of routes and assembly areas is especially important. Special precautions are taken to ensure direction and the maintenance of contact within the column. Guides and connecting files usually are necessary.

(c) When troops are moved by night marches for concealment, movement before dark should be restricted, and daybreak should find the force in concealed positions. Measures to maintain security must be rigidly enforced.

(5) **Forced Marches.** A forced march requires the expenditure of more than normal effort in speed, exertion, hours marched, or a combination of these. Forced marches are undertaken only in cases of necessity because they decrease the combat effectiveness of troops. Forced marches normally are accomplished by increasing the marching hours per day rather than by increasing the rate of march. To ensure maximum effort, it is advisable to keep Marines informed of the reason and necessity for ordering a forced march.

f. Length of Column. The length of roadway occupied by a column in movement, including the gaps inside the column, measured from front to rear inclusive.

g. March Unit. Unit that moves and halts at the command of a single commander. Normally corresponds to smaller tactical troop units.

h. Pass Time. Actual time between the movement when the first element passes a given point and the movement when the last element passes the same point.

i. Rate of March. The average number of kilometers traveled in a given period of time, including short periodic halts and short delays, expressed as kilometers per hour (km/h).

j. Release Point. A well-defined point on a route at which elements composing a column revert to control of their respective commander and are no longer a part of the march formation.

k. Start Point. An unidentified point at which a movement comes under march formation control.

l. Time Distance. The time required for the head of a column, or any single element thereof, to move from one point to another at a given rate of speed.

m. Vehicle Distance. The space between two consecutive vehicles of an organized element of a column. It is measured from the rear of one vehicle to the front of the following vehicle.

n. Vehicle Length. The average length of vehicles in a column. The average length of opposing forces vehicles is 5 meters.

o. Closing Time. The time elapsed between the arrival of the first element of a column at the release point and the arrival of the last element at the same point. This will be equal to pass time.

3. Foot Marches

a. Organizations. Units march in tactical groupings to facilitate adoption of combat formations. Tactical integrity is maintained to ensure forces are ready for action on arrival at the objective.

b. Formations. March formations are varied to include movement in multiple columns. Column gaps vary at each tactical echelon and are influenced by terrain and threats from opposing supporting arms. A minimum of 20 meters between platoon-sized elements of a march unit and 100 meters between company-sized march units is standard.

c. Computations

(1) **Length of Column.** To determine the length of a column occupied by a dismounted unit, multiply the estimated or known number of personnel by the applicable factor.

(2) **Pass Time.** To determine the pass time in minutes for a dismounted unit, multiply the length of column (as determined above) by the appropriate factor for the estimated or known rate of march.

Basic Data Table, Foot Marches

	Visibility	*Rate of March	Normal March (8 Hours)	Forced March (12 Hours)
Roads	Day	4 km/h	32 km	48 km
	Night	3 km/h	24 km	36 km
Cross Country	Day	2 km/h	16 km	24 km
	Night	1 km/h	8 km	12 km

* NOTE: Opposing forces foot marches will vary with the tactical situation. Normal formation is a column of twos with a file on either side of the road and staggered. However, columns of threes and fours may be employed where conditions permit.

Length of Column, Factor Table Foot Marches

* Formation	2m/man distances	5m/man distances
Single File	2.4	5.4
Column of Twos	1.2	2.7

Pass Time Factors, Foot March

Rate (km/h)	Factor
4	.015
3	.018
2	.020
1	.023

4. Vehicle Marches

a. Organization. In all but purely peacetime moves, formations march tactically grouped and ready for rapid movement into battle. Whenever possible, moves take place at night or in conditions of poor visibility. Dimmed lights or infrared driving aids are generally used.

b. Formations. A division in an advance to contact will deploy in the following components and in the following order:

- Motorized reconnaissance elements
- Forward detachment (not always formed, could precede motorized reconnaissance)
- Advanced guard or advanced detachment
- Main body
- Rear guard

c. Routes. Ideally, an opposing force division is allocated a march sector of 20 to 30 kilometers wide within which it will have at least 2, perhaps 3 or 4, main routes. When an encounter with the enemy is expected, there will be at least one route for each first echelon regiment. Routes usually avoid large towns and defiles but will use major roads whenever possible. It is normal for an opposing force division to select and prepare reserve and lateral routes for use in an emergency.

d. Rate of March. The average unopposed rate of advance for a division, including halts, is about 15 km/h. Crossing of contaminated zones may be done at speeds up to 40 km/h. Opposing forces doctrine anticipates up to 7 km/h forward movement after contact has been made.

e. Halts. Short halts of 20 to 30 minutes are made every 2 to 3 hours of marching. Vehicles will halt in

Basic Data Table, Vehicle Marches

	Mixed Column	Wheels Only
Road by day	20 to 30 km/h	30 to 40 km/h
Road by Night	15 to 20 km/h	25 to 30 km/h
Cross Country	10 to 15 km/h	10 to 15 km/h

column at the roadside without breaking formation. Normally, longer halts are only arranged during forced marches of 24 hours duration or more, or in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment when partial decontamination is ordered.

f. Separation Distances. Separation distances will depend upon convoy speed and the tactical situation.

Between vehicles	15 to 60 meters
Between battalions on the same route	3 to 5 kilometers
Between regiments or brigades on the same route	5 to 10 kilometers.

g. Length of Tactical March Columns. The division consists of some 2,300 to 2,500 vehicles of which about one in five is tracked. Road space requirements are:

Regiment: 28 to 41 kilometers (with inter-battalion gaps, add 9 to 15 kilometers)
Division: 60 to 150 kilometers (with inter-battalion gaps, add 51 to 90 kilometers)

5. General Considerations for the Movement of Military Units

a. Time Distance. Time distance (TD) is determined by dividing the distance (D) (kilometers) by the rate of march (R) (kilometers per hour); or TD = D/R.

Divide a triangle as shown. Cover the unknown facts. The uncovered portion of the triangle gives you the formula for finding the unknown.

D
R T

b. Ready for Combat. In calculating opposing forces combat capabilities, they are considered ready for action as of the movement completion time.

c. Strength. Consider units as being at full strength unless specific information states otherwise.

d. The starting time and place are the time and place the unit was last reported.

e. Release Point. Select as the destination of the unit a logical point the unit must reach to start a particular action.

f. Completion Time. To determine completion time, add pass time of the column and time distance from start point to release point.

g. Force Marches. During forced marches, the rate of march is not changed. Forced marches are 12 hours in duration, whereas normal marches are 8 hours in duration.

h. Mixed Movement. Variations in visibility or transition from road to cross country conditions require the use of applicable tables and factors in problem solving.

i. Rounding Rules. Computations in minutes resulting in a fraction are rounded to the nearest full minute. Computations in kilometers resulting in a fraction are rounded to the nearest tenth.

Appendix N

Suggested Form for Target Analysis

NOTE: The following form for target analysis ensures a logical and orderly examination of all factors to determine the most effective means of attacking the target. A target analysis is determined in the detail permitted by the situation and the time available.

CLASSIFICATION

1. SITUATION AND COURSE OF ACTION

a. Situation of Opposing Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Include information that will aid in target analysis.

(2) Friendly Situation. Include information that will aid in attacking the target.

b. Target Characteristics

(1) Target Description. Include type (personnel, materiel, terrain features), number of personnel, quantity of materiel, and activity.

(2) Vulnerability. Include type and amount of cover, type of materiel, type of construction, mobility, and density of personnel and materiel.

(3) Physical Location and Altitude. Include grid reference and altitude of target, location with respect to supported unit and terrain features, and proximity to friendly troops.

(4) Accuracy of Location. Give estimated accuracy of target location.

(5) Size and Shape of Target Area. Give the dimensions and shape of the target area and distribution of personnel and materiel within the area.

(6) Terrain and Weather. Include brief analysis of weather and terrain in the target area; include any terrain features affecting the means and methods of attack.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

c. Target Capabilities. Discuss the capabilities of the target as they affect the accomplishment of the mission of the supported unit; if a terrain feature(s), show how it affects enemy capabilities.

d. Other Factors. List and discuss any or all of the following factors and any additional ones that will affect the choice of firepower, delivery means, and method of attack.

(1) Urgency of Attack. Usually determined by the type of target (static or fleeting) and its capabilities.

(2) Enemy Countermeasures. State ability of the enemy to minimize the effects of firepower; consider capabilities of the enemy to prevent effective delivery and to bring countermeasures against delivery means after attack.

(3) Enemy Discipline and Morale. State factors which will aid in determining the amount of firepower required to neutralize personnel targets.

(4) Creation of Obstacles. Discuss any consideration concerning desirability or undesirability of creating obstacles by attacking the target.

(5) Civilian Casualties. Show approximate number of civilians in the target area and the estimated effect of causing excessive casualties.

(6) Surprise. Discuss any particular methods desired to obtain surprise, including least expected time of attack, means of delivery, and restrictions on registration.

e. Means of Attack. Note all available types of firepower and required amounts with which it would be practical to attack the target; show most practical delivery means in each case.

2. ANALYSIS OF MEANS OF ATTACK

(Discuss the effect of each means of attack on the target characteristics [par. 1b], target capabilities [par. 1c]), and other factors [par. 1d]. For each means of attack, include—)

a. Location of center of impact which will obtain greatest effect; include optimum height of burst for nuclear weapons.

b. Effect of available supply rate.

c. Estimate of enemy casualties and materiel damage.

d. Estimate of civilian casualties.

e. Estimate of obstacles created.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

f. Precautions required for friendly troops.

NOTE: The analysts of each means of attack may be shown in an annex.

3. COMPARISON OF MEANS OF ATTACK

(Summarize the outstanding advantages and disadvantages of each means of attack and determine which offers the greatest promise of success.)

4. DECISION OR RECOMMENDATION

a. Type and amount of firepower and delivery means.

b. Unit(s) to fire.

c. Grid reference and altitude of desired center of impact; height of bust when applicable.

d. Time of attack.

e. Safety precautions, special coordination, and warnings required.

f. Method for determining poststrike analysis.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix O

Intelligence Estimate for Stability Operations

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. _____ of _____ copies
Issuing headquarters
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue
Message reference number

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (Number)

Ref: Maps, charts, or other documents

1. MISSION

(States the current or proposed mission of the force designated for stability operations.)

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

(This paragraph discusses characteristics of the host country, the area, and their probable effect upon both insurgent and government courses of action.)

a. Geography (Includes climate and topography.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect of insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

b. Politics (Includes governmental organization, political parties, and interest groups.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

c. Economy (Includes private enterprise and public facilities.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

d. Sociology (Includes minority groups and social programs.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

e. Psychology (Includes behavior patterns and motivating factors.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

3. INSURGENT SITUATION

(This paragraph discusses the insurgent organaization and its activities.)

a. Organization and Leadership (Includes composition.)

(1) Nonmilitary. (Includes the underground.)

(2) Military. (Includes all insurgent armed elements.)

b. Strength and disposition

(1) Nonmilitary.

(2) Military.

c. Recent and Present Significant Activities

(1) Nonviolent action. (Includes political, economic, sociological, and psychological action.)

(2) Terrorist action. (Includes murder, torture, extortion, kidnapping, and sabotage.)

CLASSIFICATION

(3) Guerrilla operations. (Includes harassment, destruction, interdiction, and dispersion.)

(4) Conventional tactical operations. (Includes attack, defense, delay, and withdrawal.)

d. Strengths and Weaknesses

(1) Recruitment and retention.

(2) Intelligence and security.

(3) Organization and training.

(4) Finance and logistics.

(5) Communications.

4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES

(This paragraph lists current insurgent capabilities and discusses them in regard to probability of adoption.)

a. Enumeration (Includes what, where, when, and how for each capability.)

(1) Basic capabilities.

(a) Nonviolent action.

(b) Terrorist action.

(c) Guerrilla operations.

(d) Conventional tactical operations.

(e) Employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

(2) Supporting capabilities.

(a) Intelligence and security.

(b) Recruitment and retention.

(c) Organization and training.

(d) Finance and logistics.

(e) Reinforcement capabilities.

CLASSIFICATION

b. Analysis and Discussion (Includes all evidence supporting or rejecting the adoption of each capability.)

5. CONCLUSION

(This paragaph draws conclusions from the content of the preceding paragraphs and furnishes a basis for selection of courses of action to accomplish the assigned mission.)

a. Effects of the Operational Environment (States the total effect of the area of operations upon courses of action.)

b. Probable Insurgent Courses of Action (Lists probable insurgent courses of action in order of relative probability of adoption.)

c. Insurgent Vulnerabilities (Lists exploitable insurgent vulnerabilities.)

/s/ _____

G-2/S-2
(Commander if distributed outside headquarters)

ANNEXES: (As appropriate)

Distribution: (If distributed only)

Authentication: (G-2/S-2 authenticates if commander signs estimate)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix P

Outline to Terrain Studies

1. Responsibility

The engineer officer has staff responsibility for preparation of a terrain study. Terrain studies and engineer reconnaissance reports are important intelligence sources which the intelligence officer may use to prepare the intelligence estimate of the situation (paragraph 2a, *Characteristics of the Area of Operations*, and paragraph 4, *Analysis of Enemy Capabilities*). For further information, see FMFM 4-4, *Engineer Operations*, and FM 30-10, *Terrain Intelligence*.

2. Checklist for Terrain Studies

a. Purpose and limiting considerations.

b. General description of the terrain.

(1) Topography

(a) Relief and drainage systems.

(b) Vegetation.

(c) Surface materials.

(d) Manmade features.

(e) Special features.

(2) Hydrography

(a) Sea approaches.

(b) Beaches.

(c) Tides and currents.

(d) Sea and surf.

(3) Climatic Conditions

(a) Temperatures.

(b) Precipitation.

(c) Winds.

(d) Visibility.

(e) Cloudiness.

(f) Humidity.

(g) Electrical disturbances (where applicable).

3. Military Aspects of the Terrain

a. Tactical aspects of the terrain.

(1) Key terrain feature.

(2) Observation.

(3) Fields of fire.

(4) Cover and concealment.

(5) Obstacles.

(6) Avenues of approach.

(7) Movement.

(8) Helicopter landing zones.

b. Engineering aspects of the terrain.

(1) Construction.

(2) Construction materials.

(3) Water supply.

4. Maps and Charts

Appendix Q

Format for Tactical Analysis of Weather and Terrain

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no._____ of_____ copies
Issuing Headquarters
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue
Message Reference Number

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN)

Ref: (a) Maps, charts, and relevant documents

Time Zone:

1. ( ) MISSION

(A verbatim statement of the assigned or deduced mission. This is a necessity in every case in order to provide a defined basis for predictive analysis.)

a. ( ) Objective. (A statement of the purpose for which the analysis is being prepared. Normally this will summarize the projected uses of the analysis.)

2. ( ) INFLUENCE OF WEATHER UPON TERRAIN

(An analysis of the manner in which the terrain in the objective area will be affected by anticipated weather conditions. Presents an assessment of the manner in which weather will directly and indirectly affect military operations. The terrain study and the climatic study provide the primary materials from which these determinations are made.)

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION

a. ( ) Course of Action #1

(1) ( ) Advantages. (Describes any advantages offered by weather and terrain which would affect the course of action.)

CLASSIFICATION

(2) ( ) Disadvantages. (Describes any disadvantages created by weather and terrain which would affect the course of action.)

(3) ( ) Conclusions. (Presents the manner in which the course of action would be enhanced or hindered by the conditions described in the preceding subparagraphs.)

b. ( ) Course of Action #2. (Each succeeding course of action is addressed in the same manner.)

4. ( ) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(Conducted as per paragraph 3.)

5. ( ) RECOMMENDATION

(Recommends the preferred course of action as an outgrowth of the assessment of paragraphs 3 and 4. Presents rationale in support.)

/s/_____

_____

TABS:

A—Terrain Study
B—Climatic Study

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix R

Format for Visual Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of Issue

TAB B TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXX
VISUAL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) As applicable

1. The following visual aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions have been preplanned.

MSN NO.	AREA/ROUTE OF SEARCH	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	FREQUENCY/ DURATION	REMARKS
1.	Area: From_____ To_____ To_____	VMO	D-Day, BMNT to 9000L	Report activity as obtained
2.	Area: From_____ To_____ To_____	VMO	D+1, 1700L to 1900L	Report enemy movements
3.	Specific (Middletown)	High Performance	D+1, 1800L to 1900	Report enemy activity, emphasis on HQ, 8th MRD

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

Signature

Name
Rank and Service
Commanding

(Or) BY COMMAND OF. . . .Rank and Name

Signature

Name
Rank and Service
Chief of Staff
or
Exeutive Officer

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix S

Joint Tactical Air Reconnaissance/Surveillance (JTARS) Request Format

---

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: JTARS REQ

L. REQUEST NO._____ PREPLANNED A. PRIORITY B: PRECEDENCE_____
IMMEDIATE C. PRIORITY

M. DATE-TIME FACTORS
1. DATE MISSION DESIRED 2. TOT (IF REQ)
3. LTIOV 4. PRIOR COVERAGE ACCEPTABLE (DAYS PRIOR)

N. TYPE RECON REQUESTED
1. TYPE MISSION: A. VISUAL B. IMAGERY C. ELECTRONIC D.WX
2. TYPE COVERAGE: A. PINPT B. STRIP/LOC C. RT RECCE
D. AREA SEARCH E. AREA COVERAGE F. AFLOAT
* 3. SENSOR TYPE: A. OPTICAL B. IR C. SLAR D. ELECTRONIC
E. LASER F. OTHER
* 4. TYPE PHOTO: A. VER B. OBLIQUE C. PAN
* 5. TYPE FILM: A. BLACK AND WHITE B. COLOR C. CAMFLG DET
6. STEREO PHOTO: A. NOT REQUIRED B. REQUIRED

O. MAP REFERENCE: TYPE AND SCALE_____
SERIES_____SHEET_____EDITION_____DATE_____

P. TARGET COORDINATES: A. UTM B. LAT/LONG C. OTHER (SPECIFY)

Q. TARGET CATEGORY/EEI (SEE DETAILED INSTRUCTION)
1. AIRFIELD
2. ARMOR/ARTY/TROOPS/VEH
3. BRIDGE
4. DEF POS/STRONG PT/GUN
5. ELECTRONIC SITE
6. HARBOR SITE
7. INDUSTRIAL
8. LOC

9. MIL INST/STORAGE AREA
10. MISSILE SITE
11. POWER PRODUCTION FACILITY
12. RAILROAD YARD
13. SHIPS
14. OTHER (SPECIFY)

R. REPORTS: 1. INFLT (CS/FREQ)_____VALID FM_____Z TO_____Z
(CS/FREQ)_____VALID FM_____Z TO_____Z
2. MISREP 3. HOTPHOTOREP 4. IPIR 5. SUPIR

S. IMAGERY PRODUCTS (IF REQUIRED)

T. DELIVERY ADDRESS: 1. UNIT_____
2. AIR DROP (IF REQ): COORDS:_____
CALL SIGN/FREQ_____
RUN HEADING (MAG) (OPTIONAL)_____

U. REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: 1. TARGET AREA CONTROL (CALL SIGN/FREQ)_____
2. OTHER (SPECIFY)_____

NOTES:
1. Designate minimum mandatory items for immediate requests.
2. * Indicates use as applicable or when known.
3. The format provided has been published as STANAG 3277 and has been approved by NATO as a standard format for aerial requests. The letters A to K have special significance for certain organizations and are purposely omitted.
4. When submitting message JTARS, the paragraph headings are not required, but the alpha-numeric paragraphs will not be changed.
5. Instructions for completing a JTARS are as follows:

PARA LTR

L. REQUEST NUMBER: As directed

A&C Priority: Use numerical designation below to define the tactical urgency for preplanned and immediate requests.

PRIORITY: It is the responsibility of the requestor to establish the priority.

Priority No.	Definition
1	Takes precedence over all other requests except previously assigned Priority 1 requests. The results of these requests are of paramount importance to the immediate battle situation or objective.
2	The results of these requirements are in support of the general battle situation and will be accomplished as soon as possible after Priority 1 requests. These are requested to gain current battle information.
3	The results of these requests update the intelligence data base but do not effect the immediate battle situation.
4	The results of these requests are of a routine nature and will be fulfilled when the reconnaissance effort permits.

M. DATE/TIME FACTORS

1. Self-explanatory.

2. a. State the Time on Target only when required.
   b. Justify U2.

3. Latest Time Information of Value (LTIOV). Indicate, if it is a factor, the LTIOV. Deliver prior to this date/time.

4. Self-explanatory.

N. TYPE RECON REQUESTED

1. Type Mission—Self-explanatory.
2. Type Coverage
   a. Pinpoint—Self-explanatory.
   b. Strip/LOC (Lines of Communication) Search Continuous photography of a route of LOC.
   c. Route Recce—Visual reconnaissance of a route of LOC with photo of targets of military significance.
   d. Area Search—Visual search of a specified area with photos of targets of military significance.
   e. Area Coverage—Photographic coverage of a specified area.
   f. Afloat—Reconnaissance of vessels afloat.

3, 4, and 5. Self-explanatory. These lines should be left blank unless it is fully understood what the selected sensor, photo, and film can accomplish.

O. MAP REFERENCE. Self-explanatory.

P. TARGET COORDINATES. Provide reference system used and indicate actual coordinates.

Q. TARGET CATEGORY/EEI. Provide the appropriate category and indicate the desired EEI by selecting the number(s) from the target list category below.

CATEGORY 1—AIRFIELD

A. Activity: Number, type, and location of aircraft.
B. Runways: Number, orientation, and surface type.
C. Taxiway and parking areas: Location and shape.
D. POL: Number, size, and location.
E. Ammunition storage areas: Number and location.
F. Hangars: Number, size, and type construction.
G. Electronic facilities: Number, type, and location.
H. Defenses: Number, type, and location.
I. Other: (specify).

CATEGORY 2—ARMOR/ARTY/TROOPS/VEHICLES

A. Type: Infantry, armor, engineering, artillery, etc.
B. Number and type of vehicles.
C. Number and type of armor.
D. Number and type of artillery.
E. Activity: Direction of movement, dug in, etc.
F. Terrain: Description.
G. Other: (specify).

CATEGORY 3—BRIDGE

A. Purpose: Flood, rail, over road, etc.
B. Type: Railroad, vehicular, agricultural, etc.
C. Construction: Wood, steel, concrete, etc.
D. Construction: Piers, abutments, approaches, stringers, beam, truss, etc.
E. Number of spans.
F. Length and width (height if significant).
G. Number of lanes/tracks.
H. Bypass in vicinity of bridge.
I. Activity.
J. Other: (specify).

CATEGORY 4—DEFENSIVE POSITIONS/STRONG POINTS/GUNS

A. Type and size of position or fortification.
B. Type weapons: Number.
C. Fire control system.
D. Supporting positions.
E. Transportation access.
F. Routes of ingress and egress.
G. Nature of surrounding terrain and foliage barriers.
H. Activity.
I. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 5—ELECTRONIC SITE

A. Type site: Microwave relay, EW/GCT, etc.
B. Antennas: Number and type.
C. Mobile or permanent.
D. Primary buildings and support equipment.
E. Activity.
F. Security measures.
G. Size of area.
H. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 6—HARBOR/PORT FACILITIES

A. Type port: Maritime or inland waterway.
B. Activity.
C. Berthing and cargo handling facilities.
D. POL facilities: Type, number, and locations.
E. Storage facilities.
F. Shipbuilding and repair facilities.
G. Transportation.
H. Defenses.
I. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 7—INDUSTRIAL SITE

A. Type of industry.
B. Size of area.
C. Buildings: Number, size, and construction.
D. Open storage: Quantity by type.
E. Activity.
F. Transportation facilities.
G. Source of power.
H. Defenses.
I. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 8—LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOC)

A. Type: Road, rail, canal, etc.
B. Description of the route.
C. Chokepoints.
D. Significant activity.
E. Significant static targets.
F. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 9—MILITARY INSTALLATIONS/STORAGE AREAS

A. Function: Assembly, admin, barracks, depot, etc.
B. Activity: Number of vehicles and/or personnel.
C. Size of the area.
D. Number of buildings: Predominant construction only.
E. Storage: type and location.
F. Transportation.
G. Defenses.
H. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 10—MISSILE SITE

A. Type.
B. Launch site: Mobile/fixed, number of pads, etc.
C. Number and orientation of launchers/number loaded.
D. Control center: Location and construction.
E. Number, type and location antenna(s).
F. Auxiliary equipment.
G. Activity.
H. Defenses.
I. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 11—POWER PRODUCTION FACILITY

A. Type: Nuclear, coal, oil, hydroelectric, etc.
B. Size and construction.

C. Boiler/generators: Number and location.
D. Transformer yard: Size and location.
E. Cooling towers: Number and location.
F. Penstock/turbine outlet (hydroelectric).
G. Activity.
H. Defenses.
I. Other.

CATEGORY 12—RAILROAD YARD

A. Type: Classification, repair, other.
B. Length and width: Chokepoint to chokepoint.
C. Number of tracks.
D. Facilities: Repair shops, roundhouses, other.
E. Rolling stock.
F. Defenses.
G. Other (specify).

CATEGORY 13—SHIPS

A. Class/type/number.
B. Heading/movement.
C. Nationality.
D. Identification.
E. Cargo.
F. Activity.
G. Other.

CATEGORY 14—OTHER

Narrative report is rendered under this heading in sufficient detail to ensure that the request or purpose of the mission is satisfied.

R. REPORTS

1. INFLT—An inflight report to friendly units.
2. MISREP—A mission report of the results and significant sightings gathered.
3. HOTPHOTOREP—A brief, concise, high priority report on time-sensitive targets of significant tactical importance of a perishable nature.
4. IPIR—An initial photo interpretation report which contains intelligence on mission objectives and additional significant intelligence.
5. SUPIR—A supplemental photo interpretation report which provides detailed intelligence acquired through a comprehensive study of imagery.

S. IMAGERY PRODUCTS—Specify type and number of imagery products required. Only mission essential imagery products should be requested.

T. DELIVERY ADDRESS

1. Unit—Delivery address for mission essential imagery products.
2. Air Drop—Coordinates, call sign, frequency, and run in heading for aerial delivery of imagery products.

U. REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Target Area Control—Indicate, when applicable, the call and radio frequency of the control element. Control of the mission will require close coordination with ground forces.
2. Other—Self-explanatory (use this space to specify scale if required and to request specific TOT).

Appendix T

Sample Intelligence Briefing Format

1. ENEMY SITUATION

   a. Ground Forces

      (1) Forces

         (a) Committed

         (b) Reinforcements

      (2) Dispositions

      (3) Recent Activity and Its Implications

      (4) New or Current Tactics

      (5) Strength

         (a) Personnel Losses and Replacements

         (b) Materiel Losses and Replacements

      (6) New Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment Identified

      (7) Miscellaneous

      (8) Effects of Weather and Terrain

         (a) Avenues of Approach

         (b) Key Terrain

         (c) Effects of Weather

            1 Effects on Terrain

            2 Effects on Enemy Capabilities

      (9) Ground Force Conclusions

         (a) Capabilities

         (b) Probable Courses of Action

b. Air Forces

(1) Forces

(a) Committed

(b) Reinforcements

(2) Dispositions

(3) Recent Activity and Its Implications

(4) New or Current Tactics

(5) Strength

(a) Personnel Losses and Replacements

(b) Materiel Losses and Replacements

(6) New or Current Aircraft and Antiaircraft Weapons

(7) Miscellaneous

(8) Effects of Weather and Terrain

(a) Navigation Hazards

(b) Effects of Terrain on Enemy Air Operations

(c) Effects of Weather on Terrain and Enemy Air Operations.

(9) Air Force Conclusion

(a) Capabilities

(b) Probable Courses of Action

c. Naval Forces (as applicable to Landing Force Operations)

(1) Forces

(a) Committed

(b) Reinforcements

(2) Disposition

(3) Recent Activity and Its Implications

(4) New or Current Tactics

(5) Strength

(6) New or Current Ships or Craft

(7) Miscellaneous

(8) Effects of Weather and Terrain on Enemy Naval Operations With Respect to Landing Force Operations.

(9) Naval Force Conclusions

(a) Capabilities

(b) Probable Courses of Action

d. Special Operations (e.g., Unconventional Warfare, Terrorism)

(1) Forces

(a) Committed

(b) Reinforcements

(2) Dispositions

(3) Recent Activity and Its Implications

(4) New or Current Tactics

(5) Strength (Personnel and Materiel)

(6) New or Current Equipment

(7) Miscellaneous

(8) Effects of Weather and Terrain on Special Operations

(9) Special Operations Conclusions

(a) Capability

(b) Probable Courses of Action

e. Conclusion for Total Enemy Force

(1) Capabilities

(2) Probable Courses of Action

2. CURRENT WEATHER FORECAST

a. Temperature

b. Winds Direction and Velocity, to Include Winds Aloft

c. Precipitation

d. Humidity

e. Visibility

f. Astronomical Data: Sunrise, Sunset, Sunset, BMNT, EENT, Moonrise, Moonset, Percent of Lunar Illumination, Tides, etc.

g. Effects on Friendly Operations

h. Effects on Enemy Operations

3. TERRAIN

a. Key Terrain

b. Observation

c. Fields of Fire

d. Cover and Concealment

e. Obstacles

f. Avenues of Approach

g. Effects on Friendly Operations

h. Effects on Enemy Operations

Appendix U

Sample Aircrew Mission Briefing Format

1. ENEMY

   a. Air Defenses

      (1) Ground Based Threat

         (a) Nature of Threat

         (b) Current Location and Activities

         (c) System Characteristics

            1 Minimum/Maximum Effective Ranges and Altitude

            2 Target Acquisition and Tracking Capability

         (d) New or Current Tactics

      (2) Air Threat

         (a) Nature of the Threat

         (b) Current Locations and Activities

         (c) Reaction Times from Threat Identification

         (d) Characteristics of Systems

            1 Aircraft Performance

            2 Armament Characteristics

         (e) New or Current Tactics

   b. Ground Forces

      (1) General Description of Ground Force Threat

      (2) Current Location and Activities

      (3) Effect on Air Operations

c. Naval Forces

(1) Nature of the Threat

(2) Current Location and Activities

(3) Systems Characteristics

(a) Air Defense Capability

(b) Target Acquisition and Tracking

(4) New or Current Tactics

d. Enemy Electronic Warfare Capability

e. Enemy Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Warfare Capability

2. WEATHER

a. Temperatures: Minimum and Maximum

b. Wind Direction and Velocity, to Include Winds Aloft

c. Precipitation

d. Humidity

e. Atmospheric Pressure

f. Ceilings

g. Icing Condition

h. Visibility, to Include Percent of Cloud Cover, Fog, Haze, etc.

i. Effects of Weather on Enemy Air Defense Capabilities

j. Astronomical Data

3. TERRAIN

a. Navigation Hazards

b. Prominent Terrain Features

c. Terrain Masking

d. Helicopter Landing Zones (as applicable)

e. Effects of Terrain on Enemy Air Defense Capabilities

4. SURVIVAL, EVASION, ESCAPE, AND RESISTANCE (SERE)

a. Safe Areas

b. SERE Aids

c. Authentication

d. Procedures and Activities to be Undertaken

e. Characteristics of AOA: Flora and Fauna

5. MISSION DEBRIEFING: (Place and Time)

Appendix V

Sample Aircrew Mission Debriefing Format

Debriefer: _____

Debrief: _____ DTG _____ Mission # _____

Call Sign _____ Flight Leader _____

Takeoff Time _____

TOT (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____

Land _____ Model and Aircraft _____

Ordnance Carried (Cumulative) _____

Ordnance Expended _____

Tgt Coord (1) _____ Description (1) _____

(2) _____ Description (2) _____

(3) _____ Description (3) _____

Weather _____

_____

1. RESULTS OF MISSION

   a. Bomb Damage Assessment

   b. Results of Air-to-Air Engagements

   c. Results of Reconnaissance/Surveillance Mission

   d. Others as Needed

2. ENEMY OBSERVATIONS

   a. Air Defense Threats Encountered

      (1) Type (ground, air, SAM, AAA)

(2) Locations/Site of Activity

(3) Tactics

(4) Radar and Homing Warning Gear

(a) Type Indication

(b) Bearing

(c) Strength

(5) Observation and Comments from Aircrew

b. Ground Force Activity

(1) Type Activity Observed

(2) Estimated Number and Types of Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment

(3) Location of Activity

(4) Observation and Comments from Aircrew

c. Air Force Activity

(1) Type Activity Observed

(2) Location

(3) New or Current Tactics

(4) Observations and Comments From Aircrew

d. Naval Activity

(1) Type Activity Observed

(2) Location

(3) Number and Types of Ships/Craft Observed

(4) New or Current Tactics

(5) Observations and Comments of Aircrew

e. Miscellaneous. Any other observations/comments that the aircrew have on enemy situation; to include unconventional warfare, intelligence collection, reconnaissance/surveillance, etc.

3. WEATHER

   a. Discrepancies Between Weather Briefed and Weather Encountered

   b. Effect on Air Operations

   c. Estimated Effect on Enemy Operations

   d. Observations and Comments From Aircrew

4. TERRAIN

   a. New Navigational Hazards

   b. Discrepancies Between Terrain Briefed and Terrain Encountered

   c. Effect on Air Operations

   d. Estimated Effect on Enemy Operations

   e. Observations and Comments From Aircrew

5. ELECTRONIC WARFARE

   a. EW Activity Encountered, to Include MIJI

   b. Location, to Include Bearing and Strength of Signal

   c. Effect on Air Operations

   d. Effect on Air Operations

   e. Observations and Comments From Aircrew

6. SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND ESCAPE

   a. Observations and Information on Downed Friendly Aircrews

   b. Aircrew Comments and Observations Concerning SERE

Appendix W

Reconnaissance/Surveillance Patrol Intelligence Briefing Format

1. MISSION

(A concise statement of the assigned mission and objectives of the Reconnaissance/Surveillance Patrol.)

2. SITUATION

a. Ground Forces

(1) Disposition. (To include known observation posts and listening posts.)

(2) Recent or Known Activities

(3) Tactics

(4) Target Acquisition Capabilities

b. Available Supporting Arms

(1) Artillery

(2) Close Air Support

3. WEATHER

a. Temperatures

b. Precipitation

c. Winds

d. Visibility

e. Astronomical Data

4. TERRAIN

a. Avenues of Approach

b. Key Terrain

c. Observation and Fields of Fire

d. Cover and Concealment

e. Obstacles

5. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Potential Civilian Threat or Aid

b. Unconventional Warfare

c. SERE

6. REPORTING AND DEBRIEFING PROCEDURES

Appendix X

Integration of Intelligence Training

PRINCIPLE SUBJECT	WHAT TO INTEGRATE	HOW TO INTEGRATE
Character Guidance and the Code of Conduct	Security	Stress the moral obligation of all military personnel to report violations of security.
Rules of Land Warfare and Geneva Convention	Handling of POWs	Correct treatment of enemy POWs means more than interrogations.
Troop Information	Orientation in foreign armies. Aggressor, maneuver enemy.	Use foreign armies as a topic, if possible. Otherwise integrate as is possible considering the primary topic scheduled.
Concealment and Camouflage	Counterintelligence. Patrolling.	Good concealment and camouflage denies the enemy information about our disposition of both troops and supplies. Discussion of light and sound discipline should be included.
Field Sanitation	Counterintelligence	Clean bivouac areas mean less information for the enemy.
First Aid	Survival	Troops on patrol or evading capture must often treat injuries without professional aid or medical supplies.
Guard Duty	Counterintelligence. Use of aggressor.	Use challenge and pass word in the field as well as in garrison. Maintain bivouac security guard against infiltration and guerrilla activities. Practice camouflage and concealment. Use aggressors to add to realism in demonstrations and practical exercises.

PRINCIPLE SUBJECT	WHAT TO INTEGRATE	HOW TO INTEGRATE
Individual Protective Measures Against NBC Attack	Reporting. Necessity for speed in reporting.	Report NBC equipment whenever observed. Each person detecting use of NBC must report– 1) Location 2) Time of attack 3) Method of release (if known).
Evasion and Escape	Collecting and reporting information. Camouflage and concealment Scouting and patrolling. Observation. Map and compass reading. Survival.	Remember and report information of intelligence value. Practice camouflage and concealment techniques during escape and evasion training. Apply the principles of scouting and patrolling as insurance for successful evasion. Weather may be used as a cover for evaders and escapees, but may complicate the escape.
Map and Aerial Photos	Reporting information. Coordinates in reporting information. Patrolling. Counterintelligence.	Learn how to use coordinates in reporting information. The aerial photo is valuable both for obtaining and verifying information. Use map and aerial photo to select patrol routes that afford maximum cover and concealment. All patrol members must be versed in map and aerial photo reading.
Mines and Boobytraps	Collecting and reporting information. Patrolling.	Importance of reporting and marking enemy mines and boobytraps. Patrols must be proficient in detecting and skirting or passing through enemy minefields. Knowledge of the pattern used by both friendly and enemy forces is very important, as well as methods by which mines and boobytraps may be disarmed.

Appendix Y

Intelligence Schools

There are a host of intelligence schools available to either the formal 2 or the collateral duty holder. The majority of such schools are contained in MCO P1500.12 (Marine Corps Formal Schools Catalog). In addition, many others are taught locally or on special subjects. Availability or quota findings, course duration, and other prerequisites should be determined at the time of your request, via your chain of command.

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar Interpretation (Officer) (Enlisted)
Nellis AFB, Nevada, USAF

Advanced Tactical Intelligence Course (Air) (Officer) (Enlisted)
Nellis AFB, Nevada, USAF

Air Intelligence Officer
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Air Intelligence Process I (Officer) (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Air Intelligence Process II (Officer) (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Amphibious Combat Intelligence (Entry Level) (Enlisted)
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Amphibious Intelligence (Intermediate Level) (Officer) (Enlisted)
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Amphibious Intelligence Officer (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Amphibious Intelligence Resource Management (Officer)
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Amphibious Intelligence Specialist (Advanced) (Officer) (Enlisted)
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (Officer) (Enlisted)
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, USA

Basic Amphibious Officer Course
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Basic DIAOL/COINS (Officer) (Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Basic Photographic Interpretation (Officer) (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Circ II Advance (Officer) (Enlisted)
Dayton, Ohio, USAF

Circ II Basic (Officer) (Enlisted)
Dayton, Ohio, USAF

Collection Management (Officer) (Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Counterintelligence Agent (Enlisted)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Defense Sensor Interpretation and Applications (Officer) (Enlisted)
Offutt AFB, Nebraska, USAF

Dynamics Of International Terrorism (Officer) (Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Florida, USAF

Electronic Warfare Course (Officer)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Enlisted Intelligence Assistant (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Foreign Internal Affairs Course (Officer) (Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Florida, USAF

Foreign Language Training (Officer) (Enlisted)
DLI, Monterey, California

Image Interpretation (Officer) (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Image Interpretation Specialist (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Imagery Intelligence Officer
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Intelligence-Imagery Interpretation—Basic (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Intelligence Indications and Warning (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Intelligence Man (Air/Ground) (Enlisted)
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Intelligence Operations Specialist (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Intelligence Photography-Basic (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Intelligence Research Officer Technician Course
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Intelligence Specialist (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Intelligence Tactical Sensors-Basic (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Intelligence Targeting Officer
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Interrogation Course (Enlisted)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Introduction to ADP As Applied to Intelligence
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Joint Intelligence Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Joint Intelligence Orientation (Officer)
DIA, U.S. Naval Station, Anacostia Annex, Washington, D.C.

Marine Amphibious Intelligence Officer Course
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Mid-Career Naval Intelligence Training Program (Officer) (Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course Phase II (Tactical)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Military Intelligence Officer Course Phase II
(Counterintelligence/Counterintelligence Assistant)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

National Senior Intelligence Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D. C., DIA

National Security Affairs (Officer)
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California

National Systems Users Executive Curriculum (Officer)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Naval Intelligence Officer
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USAF

Naval Postgraduate School National Security and Intelligence Program
Monterey, California, USN

Photo Miniaturized Intelligence Data Base (NIPS) (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Physical Security (Enlisted)
Ft. McClellan, Alabama, USA

Post Graduate Intelligence Course (Officer)
DIC, Anacostia Annex, Washington, D.C., DIA

Reconnaissance Sensor Systems (Officer) (Enlisted)
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, USA

Remote Sensor Specialist Course (Officer) (Enlisted)
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Reserve Officer Amphibious Intelligence Orientation
Dam Neck, Virginia, USMC

Security Management (Officer) (Enlisted)
Ft. McClellan, Alabama, USA

Senior Enlisted Intelligence Curriculum (Enlisted)
Washington, D.C., DIA

Shipboard Intelligence Officer (Officer) (Enlisted)
San Diego, California, FITCPac

Soviet Threat Awareness (Officer) (Enlisted)
Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C., USAF

Tactical Intelligence Staff Officers Course
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, USA

Terrain Analysis (Officer)
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, USA

Unconventional Warfare Course (Officer) (Enlisted)
Hurlburt Field, Florida, USAF

Appendix Z

Formats for Training Reports

3800
XX
Date

FROM:
TO:

SUBJ: QUARTERLY TRAINING REPORT

Ref: (a) WgO P3800.2__

Encl: (1) Intelligence Training for Intelligence Personnel
(2) Intelligence Training for Nonintelligence Personnel

1. Per the procedures established in the reference, enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted for the quarter.

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Date	Subject	Duration	#Attendees	Unit	Instructor

Encl (1)

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR NONINTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Date	Subject	Duration	#Attendees	Unit	Instructor

QUARTERLY LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND TESTING REPORT

3800
XX
Date

FROM:
TO:

SUBJ: QUARTERLY LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND TESTING REPORT

Ref: (a) WgO P3800.2__

1. Per the reference, the following information is submitted:

   a. Language Proficiency

      Unit (Squadron)

Name/Rank	SSN/MOS	Language	Date	Score

   b. Language Proficiency Testing

Name/Rank	SSN/MOS	Language	Date	Score

Appendix AA

STANAG 2022 – Intelligence Reports (Edition No. 6) Details of Agreement

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ANNEX A (Evaluation)

Related documents: STANAG 2020 (OP) – Operational Situation Reports
STANAG 3689 (MC) – Place/Name/Spelling on Maps and Charts

AIM

1. The aim of this agreement is to standardize certain intelligence reports used by NATO forces.

AGREEMENT

2. Participating nations agree that NATO forces at all levels are to use standard titles and guidance detailed in the subsequent paragraphs in the preparation of the intelligence reports considered herein.

3. This agreement does not impose any limitations on nations wishing to use additional nonstandard reports within their forces.

GENERAL

4. Intelligence reports transmit facts. The distinction between fact and interpretation must always be clearly indicated.

5. To prevent confusion, transliteration of place names and other terms or words from non-Roman alphabets should be made in accordance with the tables given in STANAG 3689.

6. The facts contained in intelligence reports must be accurately reported and in addition must have the four basic qualities of relevance, conciseness, clarity, and timeliness.

7. Whenever appropriate, an evaluation should be made of each separate item of information included in an intelligence report and not merely of the contents of the report as a whole. This evaluation should be based on the alphanumeric system described in Annex A which takes into account both the degree of reliability of the source and the credibility of the information.

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8. The intelligence reports covered by this agreement are:

a. Current intelligence report which is to be transmitted by the fastest available means and which comprises:

(1) Intelligence Report (short title INTREP) (Note 1)

(2) Intelligence Summary (short title INTSUM) (Note 1)

b. Supplementary intelligence report (short title SUPINTREP) which is normally a document providing detailed reviews and analysis.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

9. Current Intelligence Reports

a. Intelligence Reports. The short title INTREP is always to be used in messages. INTREPs may be originated at any level.

(1) Description. An INTREP is a report which is sent spontaneously, without regard to a specific time schedule, whenever the information it contains is considered likely to require the urgent attention of the receiving commander. The INTREP should include any relevant deductions that can be made in the time available.

(2) Dissemination. The distribution of an INTREP will conform to explicit instructions laid down at each level of command. These will normally limit distribution to the next higher, lower, and flanking (adjacent) command echelons, but depending on content a wider distribution will sometimes be necessary.

(3) Format. The format of an INTREP must accord with agreed NATO reporting procedures (Note 2).

b. Intelligence Summaries. The short title INTSUM is always to be used in messages. INTSUMs may be originated at any level, although they are usually originated by PSCs, MSCs, MNCs, and MODs.

(1) Description. The INTSUM is a periodic summary of the current enemy situation within a commander's area of intelligence responsibility. It should therefore include any information which may be relevant to the intelligence requirements—whether strategic or tactical—of any commander to whom it is disseminated. It should also contain an appraisal based on evaluation and interpretation of that information. At the higher echelons, emphasis should be placed on appraisal and not on detail.

(2) Dissemination. The INTSUM is disseminated to higher, lower, and flanking (adjacent) command echelons at the discretion of the originating commander or according to directions received from higher headquarters. Its distribution must include all those whose responsibilities and interests may be affected by the contents.

(3) Format. The format of an INTSUM must be in accord with agreed NATO reporting procedures (Note 2).

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10. Supplementary Intelligence Reports

a. Description. These reports may be produced periodically, on special request, or in preparation for particular operations. They are designed to provide detailed reviews and analysis of all the intelligence data on one or more specific subjects which have been collected over a period of time.

b. Dissemination. The content of each SUPINTREP will determine its distribution.

c. Format. No set format is prescribed for the SUPINTREP, except that the word SUPINTREP is to appear at the beginning of the report.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

11. All intelligence reports are to be classified and handled in accordance with existing security regulations. The originator must bear in mind that the content of intelligence reports will always be useful to the enemy. In spite of the general ruling above, there may be times when for operational reasons the need to disseminate a report immediately will override the strict application of security regulations.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

12. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions have been issued directing the forces concerned to put the content of the agreement into effect.

NOTE 1: In ATP-1(B) Volume I—*Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures* uses the Rainform Reporting System, the equivalent form to the INTREP is known as FORM RED and the equivalent form to INTSUM is known as FORM BLACK.

NOTE 2: INTSUMs and INTREPs with specific format. In order to create messages in a form which can be read by man or machine, a NATO standard message text formatting system has been developed. It is specified in the publication ADAT P-3 (INTERIM). Of necessity, the formatting system adopts a fairly rigid structure for each message type. The technique used has been to extract from narrative reports (INTSUM/INTREP) those numeric or factual data that are formattable to create separate functional area messages for land, air, and maritime reports. Such INTSUMs and INTREPs which conform to a specific format will be prefixed by the term land, air or maritime.

ANNEX A TO STANAG 2022 (Edition No. 6)

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EVALUATION

AIM

1. The aim of evaluation is to indicate the degree of confidence that may be placed in any item of information which has been obtained for intelligence purposes. This is achieved by adopting an alpha-numeric system of rating which combines a measurement of the reliability of the source of the information with a measurement of the credibility of that information when examined in the light of existing knowledge.

RELIABILITY

2. Reliability of the source is designated by a letter between A and F signifying various degrees of confidence as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I—RELIABILITY OF SOURCE

A. Completely reliable.	D. Not usually reliable.
B. Usually reliable.	E. Unreliable.
C. Fairly reliable.	F. Reliability cannot be judged.

3. Completely reliable (A) refers to a tried and trusted source which can be depended upon with confidence.

4. Usually reliable (B) refers to a source which has been successful in the past but for which there is still some element of doubt in a particular case.

5. Fairly reliable (C) refers to a source which has occasionally been used in the past and upon which some degree of confidence can be based.

6. Not usually reliable (D) refers to a source which has been used in the past but has proved more often than not unreliable.

7. Unreliable (E) refers to a source which has been used in the past and has proved unworthy of any confidence.

8. Reliability cannot be judged (F) refers to a source which has not been used in the past.

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CREDIBILITY

9. Credibility of information is designated by a numeral between 1 and 6 signifying varying degrees of confidence as indicated in Table II.

TABLE II—CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION

1. Confirmed by other sources
2. Probably True.
3. Possibly True.
4. Doubtful.
5. Improbable.
6. Truth cannot be judged.

10. Confirmed by other sources (1). If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from another source other than the already existing information on the same subject, it is classified as *confirmed by other sources* and is rated 1.

11. Probably true (2). If the independence of the source of any item of information cannot be guaranteed, but if, from the quantity and quality of previous reports its likelihood is nevertheless regarded as sufficiently established, then the information should be classified as *probably true* and given a rating of 2.

12. Possibly true (3). If, despite there being insufficient confirmation to establish any higher degree of likelihood and a freshly reported item of information does not conflict with the previously reported behavior pattern of the target, the item may be classified as *possibly true* and given a rating of 3.

13. Doubtful (4). An item of information which tends to conflict with the previously reported or established behavior pattern of an intelligence target should be classified as *doubtful* and given a rating of 4.

14. Improbable (5). An item of information which positively contradicts previously reported information or conflicts with the established behavior pattern of an intelligence target in a marked degree should be classified as *improbable* and given a rating of 5.

15. Truth cannot be judged (6). Any freshly reported item of information which provided no basis for comparison with any known behavior pattern of a target must be classified as *truth cannot be judged* and given a rating of 6. Such a rating should be given only when the accurate use of a higher rating is impossible.

EVALUATION RATING

16. Reliability and credibility, the two aspect of evaluation, must be considered independently of each other. The resultant rating will be expressed in whatever combination of letter and number is appropriate. Thus, information received from a *usually reliable* source which is adjudged as *probably true* will be rated as B2. Information from the same source of which the *truth cannot be judged* will be rated as B6.

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Appendix BB

Intelligence Report (INTREP) Sample Format

HEADING

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CODE WORD OR NICKNAME

INTREP (Number) AS OF DATE/TIME GROUP (GMT)

BODY. Two types of formats are provided: (1) Installations/Events/Sightings; (2) Interrogation.

1. Installation/Event/Sighting Format

REFERENCE/RESPONSE. Refer to previous reports and indicate request number, if applicable.

SOURCE. Give source of information being reported and evaluation of information and reliability of source.

NATURE OF INSTALLATION/EVENT/SIGHTING

a. When reporting installation intelligence, refer to specific tactical essential elements of information developed by the joint force commander or component commander to meet the requirements of DIAM 58-2, *Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual.*

b. When reporting a significant event or sighting information, give a concise narrative description.

LOCATION OF THE INSTALLATION/EVENT/SIGHTING. The location may be expressed in a pinpoint position, area boundary, linear segment, basic encyclopedia number, or target number (if available). The location reference procedures to be used in joint operations are as follows:

Operations Involving Ground Forces—General. The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system will be used. When the use of a UTM grid system is impractical, latitude and longitude will be used.

Operations Not Involving Ground Forces. The World Geographic Reference System (GEOREF) may be used. When the use of GEOREF is impractical, latitude and longitude will be used.

Joint Amphibious Operations. The UTM grid system will be used when supporting landing force operations.

Date/Time Group. The date and time of the information will be reported in GMT unless otherwise directed, e.g., 210625Z.

Quantity/Size. The number of items sighted and/or the size of the area involved in the item being reported should be as accurately stated as possible, e.g., 40 heavy tanks located along a 2-mile stretch of road.

Speed/Direction/Status. Report the last known direction of travel for fleeting-type targets and the estimated speed for them. For fixed installations, report the observed status.

Remarks. All information known about the installation, event, or sighting not covered by the above formatted items will be written in narrative form in this section of the report.

2. Interrogation Information Format

SOURCE. Give name, rank, service number (if military), date of birth, place of birth, nationality, address (if civilian).

DETECTION/ARREST/CAPTURE. Identify date-time group, place, circumstances, identification of detaining/arresting/capturing unit.

DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT. Give identification of documents and/or equipment captured.

PRIORITY INFORMATION. Identify information on impending attacks, ambushes, EEIs, or any information of immediate tactical significance.

LOCATION OF MILITARY UNITS. Report significant changes in enemy order of battle obtained from initial interrogation.

LOCATION OF GUERRILLA UNITS. Report who, where, methods of operations, arms, supplies.

EVALUATION. Give evaluation of information and source.

Appendix CC

Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)
Sample Format

CLASSIFICATION

HEADING

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CODE WORD OR NICKNAME

INTSUM (Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE/TIME GROUP

BODY

Paragraph 1—SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY FOR THE PERIOD. Will be a summary of those major or significant enemy activities that occurred during the period of the report. It will contain but not be limited to the following:

a. Ground Activity. Summarize major movements and activities of enemy ground forces. Indicate estimated strength, composition, disposition, and any other items of significance.

b. Trace of Forward Elements. The most forward location or main location of the enemy force will be shown as a pinpoint position, area boundary, or a series of connected points, as applicable. The following methods for reporting locations will be used and will be stated in the intelligence annex.

(1) Operations Involving Ground Forces. For unified or point operations in which ground forces are directly participating, not specifically provided for in the subparagraphs below, the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) system prescribed for the area concerned will be used to the maximum extent practical in communications between ground forces and other forces jointly engaged. When the use of the UTM system is impractical, latitude and longitude will be used.

(2) Operations Not Involving Ground Forces. The World Geographic Reference System (GEOREF) may be used in unified or joint operations which do not directly involve ground forces.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

(3) For Close Air Support of Ground Forces. When air forces (including naval aviation) are acting in close air support of ground forces, the UTM system prescribed for use by ground forces in the area will be used.

(4) For Joint Amphibious Operations. The UTM system prescribed for use by landing forces within the objective area will be used for support of landing force operations by all supporting forces.

(5) For Joint Air Defense Operations. GEOREF will be used in joint air defense operations. NOTE: When there is a possibility of confusion as to which system is being used in reporting positions, the reference system used should be indicated in the report. GEOREF will not be used by air forces (including naval aviation) when reporting positions

(6) Other Operations. In joint operations not using procedures specified in the above paragraph, latitude and longitude will be used.

c. Potential Targets for Nuclear Weapons. List all potential nuclear targets, such as concentrations of troops or equipment observed during period. Include locations and date/time (ZULU) of observation.

d. Nuclear Activity. Enemy nuclear capability observed during the period will be reported. Include any changes to previously reported capabilities. Indicate location and date/time (ZULU) of observation.

e. CBR Activity. Indicate chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (agents) employed or their capability by types, location, and date/time (ZULU) of occurrence.

f. Air Activity. All enemy air activity that has occurred during the period (close air support, air interdiction, air defence, and reconnaissance) affecting the operation will be summarized including location, date/time (ZULU), and types of ships and craft.

g. Naval Activity. Summarize all enemy naval activity that has occurred during the period. Include location, date/time (ZULU), and types of ships and craft.

h. Other (New Tactics, Counterintelligence, Etc.). New tactics observed will be summarized. Counterintelligence measures of significance, to include active and passive measures, will be listed. Any item of interest not properly reported in any other paragraph may also be included.

Paragraph 2—ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES

a. Personnel. List in separate categories: confirmed KIA (body count), estimated KIA, estimated WIA, and captured.

b. Equipment and Materiel. List by number and type the enemy equipment and materiel losses during the period. Include damaged enemy equipment separately.

Paragraph 3—NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS. List those identified during the period by type and location.

(Page number)

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Paragraph 4—ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES. Summarize enemy activities pertaining to personnel replacements, supply buildup, or other unusual logistics activity but not information/intelligence reported elsewhere in the INTSUM.

Paragraph 5—NEW IDENTIFICATIONS

a. Units. List new units identified during the period. Include location, date/time (ZULU), and unit making the identification.

b. Personalities. List significant individuals identified during the period by name, rank or title, and organization.

Paragraph 6—ENEMY MOVEMENTS. Summarize significant enemy movements by type, activity, location, and unit designation, if known.

Paragraph 7—ESTIMATED NUMBER AND TYPES OF VEHICLES, SHIPS, AND AIRCRAFT. Summarize by type the estimated number of vehicles, ships, and aircraft available to the enemy.

Paragraph 8—WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS. Summarize weather and terrain conditions during the period that would have an effect on subsequent operations.

Paragraph 9—BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. (Always Included.) Analyze each enemy capability in light of all applicable factors. Discuss enemy vulnerabilities.

Paragraph 10—CONCLUSIONS. (Always included.) State courses(s) of action which the enemy most probably will adopt.

NOTE: Paragraphs and subparagraphs for which no information has been obtained will be omitted in the preparation of the INTSUM. Each topic reported upon will retain the numerical (and letter) designation outlined above.

Appendix DD

Periodic Intelligence Summary (PERINTSUM) Sample Format

CLASSIFICATION

HEADING

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CODE WORD OR NICKNAME

PERINTSUM (Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE/TIME GROUP

BODY

Item 1—AREA OF OPERATIONS. State conditions which exist and indicate the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. The characteristics of the area are based on the facts and conclusions of an analysis of the area of operation, as follows:

a. Topography. Include information available on key terrain features, observation, fields of fire, cover and and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, nuclear fires, biological and chemical agents, etc. Graphic representation may be included, if necessary.

b. Hydrography. Include general relief of beaches, beach approaches and surf conditions, tides and currents, navigational aids, identifying features, channels, water depths, rocks and shoals, obstacles, anchorages, beach trafficability, coastline, contiguous islands, and compartmentation, as each affects the operation.

c. Climate and Weather. Discuss weather during the period which will affect operations.

d. Transportation. Include status of beaches, beach airways, pipelines, and inland waterways. The following would be included: capacities, surface conditions, bridges, amount and condition of rolling stock, motor and air transport, barges, freighters, and other inland waterways craft. Vulnerabilities will be reported in as much detail as possible.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

e. Electronic and Telecommunications. Report existing electronic and telecommunications systems and equipment, both military and civil.

f. Politics. The extent of civil control of the region, the amenability of the civilian population to political control, the political organizations, and the key political figures.

g. Economics. Includes only that specific economic information which may be necessary for conduct of the current operation.

h. Sociology. The sociological factors dealing with customs, characteristics, religions, minority or dissident groups, and allegiance of the population.

i. Science and Technology. Scientific and technical information on enemy weapons, equipment, and techniques as well as the employment of new capabilities during the course of the operation.

Item 2—ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD

a. Ground Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions. (By overlay, if possible) Summary of enemy units and locations.

(2) Committed Forces. Report those enemy ground units, including guerrillas, together with their supporting ground fire units which are within the area of operation.

(3) Reinforcements. Include the designation and location of reinforcements which may or may not be employed.

(4) Activity. (Discuss by arm of Service.) Include a description of all significant enemy movements which may affect the friendly mission.

(5) Other Order of Battle Factors. References may be made to overlays, enemy situation maps, or previously published documents.

(6) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

(7) Nuclear Capable Artillery and Launchers. Describe the operational capability to launch missiles by numbers and types of missiles; guidance systems, ranges; types of warheads; type of launch sites (fixed, whether hardened or not) for mobile launchers mobility, rate of fire, and readiness.

(8) CBR and Nuclear Activity. Report CBR and nuclear activity. These weapons should be reported by type, yield, number, method of delivery or application, and enemy doctrine concerning their use.

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b. Air Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics, weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

c. Naval Forces

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and location.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy forces that can affect accomplishment of the mission.

(3) New Tactic, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics, weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

d. Missile Forces (Excluding SAM)

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and location.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces that can affect accomplishment of the mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics, weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

e. Antiaircraft Defenses (Including SAM)

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and location.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy forces that can affect accomplishment of the mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics, weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

Item 3—ENEMY MILITARY SITUATION

a. Identification of Committed Ground Forces.

(1) Movements and Locations. Report disposition, location, and echelon of control of enemy ground forces.

(Page number)

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CLASSIFICATION

(2) Reinforcements. Report disposition, location, and echelon of control of enemy ground force reinforcements.

(3) Logistics. Report the following elements of the enemy's logistics system: transportation, storage, distribution, levels of supply, and critical shortages.

(4) Equipment. Report weapons systems and equipment used by committed enemy ground forces.

(5) Personalities. Report significant individuals operating for the enemy.

(6) Morale. Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy morale.

(7) Personnel and Materiel Losses

(a) KIA
1 Confirmed
2 Estimated

(b) WIA
1 Confirmed
2 Estimated

(c) Captured

(d) Materiel Losses

(8) Analysis of Capabilities. Analyze each capability of enemy committed ground forces considering all applicable factors in item 3a.

b. Identification of Air Forces

(1) Operational Capability (Aircraft and Airfields). Report observed aircraft operational capability, including number of aircraft, fuel status, weapons, and status of the airfield.

(2) Movements and Locations. Report movements and locations of all observed aircraft or airfields.

(3) Materiel and Personnel Losses

(a) Aircraft
1 Confirmed Destroyed in the Air
2 Confirmed Destroyed on the Ground
3 Confirmed Damaged in the Air
4 Confirmed Damaged on the Ground
5 Probable Destroyed
6 Probable Damaged

(Page number)

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(b) Ground Equipment
1 Destroyed
2 Damaged
(c) Personnel
1 KIA
a Confirmed
b Estimated
2 WIA
a Confirmed
b Estimated
3 Captured

(4) Morale. Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy morale.

(5) Electronic Capability. Report enemy electronic and counterelectronic capabilities, including electronic countermeasures.

(6) Nuclear Capability. Report nuclear weapons observed, including type, yield, numbers, method of delivery, and enemy doctrine concerning their use, if the information is available.

(7) Analysis of Capabilities. Analyze each capability of enemy air forces considering all applicable factors in paragraph 3b.

c. Identification of Naval Forces

(1) Operational Capability. Report observed naval forces operational capability, including numbers of ships, operational weapons, and problems which could affect their successful employment.

(2) Movements and Locations. Report movements and location of all observed naval forces.

(3) Ship, Materiel, and Personnel Losses

(a) Ships (Identification by Name, Class, Type)
1 Confirmed Sunk
2 Probable Sunk
3 Damaged
(b) Shore-Based Equipment and Facilities
1 Destroyed
2 Damaged

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

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(c) Personnel

1 KIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

2 WIA

a Confirmed

b Estimated

3 Captured

(4) Morale. Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy morale.

(5) Electronic Capability. Report enemy electronic and counterelectronic capabilities, including electronic countermeasures.

(6) Analysis of Capabilities. Analyze each capability of enemy naval forces considering all applicable factors in paragraph 3c.

Item 4—ENEMY UNCONVENTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

a. Identification of Guerrilla Forces. Identify guerrilla forces being used against the friendly forces and in friendly area or areas newly seized from the enemy.

b. Psychological Warfare. Discuss psychological warfare, including enemy methods and facilities observed for the conduct of propaganda, the susceptibility of the population of the target area, and the major or main line of the enemy's psychological warfare effect.

Item 5—COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Sabotage. Report enemy sabotage effort observed, including information concerning his methods, targets, sensitive targets in the area of operations, and successes and failures.

b. Espionage. Report enemy effort to collect information by types of espionage: designation (trained agents) and/or saturation (mass utilization of citizenry), concerning his methods of pressure, coercion, and enforcing saturation-type espionage.

Item 6—CONCLUSIONS. State conclusions derived from paragraph 3, including, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. State enemy vulnerabilities where possible.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix EE

Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) Sample Format

CLASSIFICATION

HEADING

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/CODE WORD OR NICKNAME

DISUM (Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE/TIME GROUP

BODY. This report will contain a summary of all significant operational intelligence generated in the 24-hour period preceding the *as of* time report. The report is prepared in narrative form and should, as a minimum, address the following areas:

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS. Pertinent items not otherwise covered (e.g., significant order of battle changes, introduction of new weapons or tactics, etc.).

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix FF

Laser Incident Report Format (LIR)

CLASSIFICATION

Laser Incident Report Format (LIRF) (U)
Incident # _____
(Incident Number/Julian Date/Local Time/Year)

1. (U) Aircraft data:
   Type: _____ Modex: _____ Call sign: _____
   Route: _____
   Magnetic course: _____ Ground speed: _____
   Alt (MSL): _____ Equipment affected: _____
   Local time: _____ Location: _____
   If ground unit, unit designator: _____
   Local time: _____ Location (4 digit UTM): _____
2. (U) Weather conditions: _____
3. (C) Color of illumination: _____
4. (C) Duration of incident: _____
5. (C) Did illumination pulse? YES NO Circle one
6. (C) Frequency of pulse: Continuous or _____ times per second.
7. (C) Device(s) the beam(s) emanated from: The location (4 digit) UTM or LAT/LONG and relative bearing/distance from observer. _____
8. (U) Did device appear to track your unit? YES NO Circle one
9. (C) Did tracking appear to be optical or radar guided? Radar Optical Circle one

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

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10. (C) Were any other devices tracking/surveilling your unit? YES NO

If yes, state type of tracking/surveillance device. _____

11. (C) Effect, if any, on you and your unit's operational capability _____

_____

_____

12. (U) Atmospheric conditions at the time of the incident:

Temperature: _____ (Fahrenheit) Humidity: _____ %

Cloud conditions: _____

Light conditions: _____

13. (C) Positions on your platform or observation post from which the illumination was observed:

Relative bearing: _____ UTM/LAT/LONG: _____

14. (C) Location of device on platform emanating the laser (i.e., bow, stern, wing tips, nose, turret, etc.): _____

15. (U) Type of platform (i.e., ship, tracked prime mover): _____

_____

16. (C) If IR equipped, what were the effects of the illumination on the IR system? (i.e., spotting on optics, burning out circuits): _____

17. (U) Did you get a video record of the incident? _____

18. (U) Did those illuminated have an eye exam after the event? YES NO Circle One

If yes, how soon? _____

By whom? _____ Prognosis: _____

19. (C) Was eye protection available? YES NO Circle One

20. (U) What type of protection was used? _____

21. (C) What was the effectiveness? _____

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

22. (U) Individual(s) submitting report:

Name
Rank
SSN
Unit

23. (U) Individual(s) affected by the incident:

Name
Rank
SSN
Unit

Copy to:
S-2
S-3
Medical

CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN

Appendix GG

Spot Report (SPOTREP) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

1. Short narrative of information to be reported. Include who observed it, what was observes, when it was observed, where it was observed, and in what strength. Additional paragraphs may be included as deemed necessary.

NOTE: Usually disseminated over field telephones and radios to report pertinent incidents.

Appendix HH

Patrol Report Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: PATROL REPORT NO. _____

REF: (a) Maps or other, as applicable.

A. Size and Composition of Patrol

B. Task

C. Time of Departure

D. Time of Return

E. Routes (Out and Back)

F. Terrain

G. Enemy

H. Any Map Corrections

I. Miscellaneous Information

J. Results of Encounters With the Enemy

K. Conditions of Patrol. Include disposition of any dead or wounded.

L. Conclusions and Recommendations. Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics. Provided by patrol leader.

M. Additional Remarks by Interrogator

N. Distribution

NOTES:
1. Usually submitted in message format. If submitted as a written report, make administrative changes.
2. Paragraphs may be omitted if no information is given, but paragraphs always retain the same numbering.
3. This format is in consonance with STANAG 2003.

Appendix II

Tactical Interrogation Report Format (Sample Format)

CLASSIFICATION

Reference Data

FROM:

TO:

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Ref: (a) As applicable.

Name of Source: _____
Category: _____
Interrogation Serial No: _____

Report No: _____
Interrogator: _____
Date/Time: _____
Language Used: _____
Interpreter: _____
Maps Used: _____

Part I: Administrative

A. Personal Particulars of Source
   1. Rank, Full Name, SSN/Ser No., and Job
   2. Date and Place of Birth
   3. Nationality
   4. Languages and Proficiency

B. Captured Data
   1. Date/Time
   2. Place
   3. Capturing Unit
   4. Circumstances of Capture

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

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C. Documents/Equipment

1. List of Documents
2. Details of Money and Valuables
3. Personal Equipment
4. Weapons

Part II: Information Obtained

Part III: Remarks

A. Assessment of Source

B. Discussion of Interrogation Techniques

C. Recommendations for Further Interrogation

Signed

Name _____

Rank, Branch of Service _____

Position/Title _____

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix JJ

Detailed Interrogation Report Format

_____ INT Team

Unit: (Place and Coordinates) _____

Date/Time: (ZULU) _____

Detailed Interrogation Report No. _____

Maps: _____

Part I

1. Rank: _____ Name: _____ Ser No: _____

Unit: (Interrogees' parent unit listed completely.) _____

Circumstances of Capture: (Summary of details of capture, including date-time, location and/or coordinates, and capturing unit.) _____

Assessment: (Intelligence, experience, reliability; concise statement of the interrogator's assessment of the prisoner, NOT of the information acquired.) _____

Category: A B C D

(Circle one to describe prisoner's intelligence potential.)

A—High-level prisoner whose broad and specific knowledge of the war effort makes it necessary for him to be interrogated without delay by specifically qualified interrogators at the highest level; i.e., general officers, scientists, political and intelligence officers, etc.

B—Prisoner who has enough information about the enemy or any subject of value to intelligence, in addition to information of tactical value to warrant a second interrogation.

C—Prisoner with information of immediate tactical value who will not warrant further interrogation.

D—Prisoner of no intelligence value.

Documents: (List documents of intelligence value taken from the prisoner.) _____

Equipment: (List equipment of intelligence value taken from the prisoner.) _____

Part II

2. Organization, Strength, and Disposition

a. Organization: (Summarize the enemy organization as stated by the prisoner, including equipment authorized and on hand.)

b. Strength: (Personnel strength, officer and enlisted, authorized and on hand.)

c. Disposition: (Location of enemy units known to the prisoner.)

3. Mission: (Statement of enemy missions, beginning with the lowest unit.)

4. Other Enemy Forces: (Information of enemy forces other than the prisoner's own immediate organization; include and annotate fact and rumor.)

5. Supply, Losses, Replacements

a. Supply: (Information concerning status of supplies, known shortages, and rumor.)

b. Losses: (Statement of personnel and equipment losses known to prisoner.)

c. Replacements: (Number and date received, sufficiency, etc.)

6. Personalities: (List by name, rank, organization, duties, and characteristics.)

7. Miscellaneous

a. Morale:

b. Tactics: (New or unusual tactics.)

c. Obstacles: (Location, coordinates, and type.)

d. Other Information: (Other information of intelligence value not covered above.)

8. Remarks

Name

Grade

Interrogator

Appendix KK

Document Translation Report Format

Reference Block

HEADING

FROM:

TO:

SUBJ: DOCUMENT TRANSLATION REPORT

Ref: (a) As applicable.

1. Control Data

   a. Item No.

   b. Description of Document

   c. Circumstances of Acquisition

   d. Acquiring Unit

   e. Received

   f. Type of Translation (State whether extract or complete.)

   g. Translator

2. Text of Translation

Appendix LL

Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring Location Report

CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: BOMBING, SHELLING, MORTARING LOCATION REPORT

A. Unit or Origin. Use current call sign, address group, or code name.

B. Position of Observer. Grid reference preferred, encode if this discloses the location of a headquarters or important or important observation post.

C. Direction (Flash, Sound, or Groove) and Angle of Fall/Descent. (Omit for aircraft.) Grid bearing of flash, sound, or groove of shell (state which) in mils, unless otherwise specified. The angle of fall or descent may be determined by placing a stick/rod in the fuze tunnel and measuring in mils, unless otherwise specified, the angle formed by the stock/rod in relation to the horizontal plane.

D. Time From

E. Time To

F. Area Bombed, Shelled, or Mortared

1. Location to be sent as:

   a. Grid reference (clear reference is to be used) or—

   b. Grid bearing to impact points in mils, unless otherwise specified, and distance in meters from observer. This information must be encoded if paragraph B is encoded. (When this method is used, maximum accuracy possible is essential.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

2. Dimensions of the area bombed, shelled, or mortared to be given by:
   a. The radius (in meters) or –
   b. The length and width (in meters).

G. Number and Nature of Guns, Mortars, Rocket Launchers, Aircraft, or Other Methods of Delivery

H. Nature of Fire. Adjustment, fire for effect, harassing, etc. (May be omitted for aircraft.)

I. Number, Type, and Caliber (state whether measured or assumed) of Shells, Rockets (or Missiles), Bombs, etc.

J. Time of Flash to Bang. (Omit for aircraft.)

K. Damage. Encode if required.

L. Remarks

M. Serial Number. Each location which is produced by a locating unit is given a serial number.

N. Target Number. If the weapon/activity has previously been given a target number, it will be entered in this column by the locating units.

O. Position of Target. The grid reference or grid bearing and distance of the located weapon/activity.

P. Accuracy. The accuracy to which the weapon/activity is located. CEP in meters and the means of location if possible.

Q. Time of Location. The actual time the location was made.

R. Target Description. Dimensions, if possible.

1. Radius of target in meters or –
2. Target length and width in meters.

S. Time Fired. Against hostile target.

T. Fired by

U. Number of Rounds–Type of Fuze and Projectiles

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix MM

Joint Remote Sensor Report/Request (JRSR/R) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: JRSR/R NO._____

Line
No.

1. TITLE SENDER–ID SEQ–NO CL REL DOR ENVIR/OPNAME
   JRSR/R BBBBBBBBBBB NNNN A AA NNNNNN BBBBBBBBBBBBB

2. TYPE–REP/REQ MAP–REFERENCE
   AAABBBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

3. MSG–REFERENCE

4. TITLE SENDER–ID SEQ–NO DOR
   AAABBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBB NNNN NNNNNN

5. SENSOR–STRING–DATA

6. DE STR–NO TYPE–SN CHAN–ID STR–LOC IMPLDAT
   NN AANNNA AA NNNBNN ABBBBBBBBBBBBBBA NNNNNNN

7. DE BATLIF RECVRY CALL–CHAN REMDAT RELY–REQ SN–STR–DATA–RMK
   NN NNNN AN NNNNNNNNN NNNNN A BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

8. SUPPORT–REQUIREMENTS

9. TGT–TYP TGT–LOC DEST–DT
   AAAAAAA ABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB NNNNNNNA

10. COMMENTS

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

The Joint Remote Sensor Report/Request (JRSR/R) is used to request remote sensor support, to coordinate the usage, and to assist in the management of sensor operations. Depending on the data fields used, the JRSR/R can be used variously, as shown below:

1. Notification Report (NOTREP)
2. Implant Report (IMPREP)
3. Support Request (SUPREQ)
4. Monitoring Termination Report (MONTERMREP)
5. Monitoring Change Report (MONCHANGREP)
6. Removal Report (REMREP)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1, TYP—REP/REQ. Indicate which JRSR/R is being sent (e.g., NOTREP).

Field 2, MAP—REFERENCE. Indicate maps used to plan sensor/relay locations.

Line 4: Field 1, TITLE. Title of message referenced (e.g., NOTREP).

Field 2, SENDER—ID. Sender ID of message referenced.

Field 3, SEQ—NO. Sequence number of message referenced. JRSR/R are numbered sequentially from 0001, regardless of message type, from the beginning of the operation.

Field 4, DOR. Date of report/request of message referenced.

Line 6: Field 1, DE. Used to correlate data between information given in lines 6 and 7.

Field 2, STR—NO. Number assigned within a unit's block of numbers. String numbers entered according to the following conventions:

	Sensor String Identification	String Data
Sample:	MM101P	(1) Monitoring unit (see below left)
		(2) Emplacing unit (see below left)
	$M_{(1)}M_{(2)}1_{(3)}01_{(4)}P_{(5)}$	(3) Sensor field number
		(4) Sensor string number
		(5) Status of sensor (see below right)

Monitoring/Emplacement Unit	Status of Sensor
A (Army)	P (Planned)
N (Navy)	A (Active)
T (Air Force)	S (Simulated)
M (Marine)	D (Abandoned)

Field 3, TYP–SEN. Type of sensor emplaced or requested:

S (Seismic)	A (Acoustic)
IR (Infrared Passive)	M (Magnetic)
C (Commandable)	EM (Electromagnetic)

Field 4, CHAN–ID. Channel and ID of sensor.

Field 5, STR–LOC. Coordinates of sensor from MAP–REFERENCE.

Field 6, IMPLDAT. Date sensor will be/has been implanted.

Line 7: Field 1, DE. See line 6, field 1.

Field 2, BATLIF. Programmed battery life of sensors (given in hours).

Field 3, RECRY. Programmed recovery code (e.g., A1) of recoverable sensors.

Field 4, CALL–CHAN. Programmed channel for commandable sensors.

Field 5, REMDAT. Date sensor is to be/has been recovered.

Field 6, RLY–REQ. Indicates relay required/not required.

Field 7, SENSOR–STRING–DATA–REMARKS. Enter data which may be necessary to make message recipient fully aware of additional requirements.

Line 9: Field 1, TGT–TYPE. Anticipated target description to be detected by the sensor.

Field 2, TGT–LOC. Desired location of sensor implant (pursuant to MAP–REFERENCE).

Field 3, DES–DT. Date desired for sensor implant.

Line 10: Field 1, Comments.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL MESSAGE TYPES

Notification Report. Submitted when remote sensor assets are planned for emplacement. Applicable lines and fields are as follows:

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1: NOTREP (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Standard

Line 4: Standard

Line 5: Standard

Line 6: Standard

Line 7: Standard

Line 8: Not used

Line 9: Not used

Line 10: Standard

Implant Report. Submitted by the emplacement unit after sensors have been emplaced.

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1, IMPREP (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Standard

Line 4: Standard

Line 5: This line provides the location and characteristics of the implanted sensor. If there are no changes from the referenced NOTREP, this line may be omitted.

Line 6: Standard (if line 5 is omitted, line 6 is also omitted).

Line 7: Standard (if line 5 and 6 are omitted, line 7 is also omitted).

Line 8: Not used

Line 9: Not used

Line 10: If line 5 is omitted, then NO CHANGE FROM NOTREP must be entered here.

Support Request. Submitted when one service/unit requires sensor support from another.

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1, SUPREQ (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Standard

Line 4: Standard

Line 5: Not used

Line 6: Not used

Line 7: Not used

Line 8: Field 1, SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. This section is used to identify the type of targets anticipated, the approximate sensor locations required, and the desired date of their emplacement.

Line 9: Standard

Line 10: Standard

Monitoring Termination Report. Submitted when information or data from a sensor is no longer required.

Line 1: Standard.

Line 2: Field 1, MONTERMREP (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Not used

Line 4: Not used

Line 5: Field 1, This section will be used to describe the sensor assets for which monitoring is no longer required.

Line 6: Standard

Line 7: Not used

Line 8: Not used

Line 9: Not used

Line 10: Standard

Monitor Change Report. Submitted by sensor monitoring unit when partial or complete control of monitoring responsibilities are transferred to another monitoring unit.

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1, MONCHANGREP (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Not used

Line 4: Not used

Line 5: This section used to describe sensor assets for which monitoring responsibility is being transferred.

Line 6: Standard

Line 7: Standard

Line 8: Not used

Line 9: Not used

Line 10: Standard

Removal Report. Submitted when previously emplaced remote sensor assets are removed, destroyed, or become inoperable.

Line 1: Standard

Line 2: Field 1, REMREP (other fields remain standard)

Line 3: Not used

Line 4: Not used

Line 5: This section used to describe remote sensor assets that have been recovered, destroyed, or become inoperable.

Line 6: Standard

Line 7: Standard

Line 8: Not used

Line 9: Not used

Line 10: Standard

Appendix NN

Sample Sensor Plan

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
FPO, Address
Date

TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXXX
SENSOR SURVEILLANCE PLAN

Ref: (a) Include appropriate maps, higher command operation orders, etc.

1. ( ) SITUATION

Include under friendly forces any units/commands not included in the task organization that will employ remote sensors, fly air delivery missions, provide airborne relay services, implant sensors, etc. Include under attachments and detachments any projected change in assignment of SCAMP or other sensor unit personnel.

2. ( ) MISSION

Define the mission as precisely as possible. It may be as simple as *employ remote sensors in support of evacuation operations.* If support is to be provided to the CATF in any form, such as issuing sensors to force reconnaissance units or providing backup monitor capability, these missions must be included.

3. ( ) EXECUTION

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. This subparagraph is a general overview of remote sensor employment for the operation. The subparagraph may be further subdivided so that one section details the control, monitor responsibility, and sensor information flow for each phase of the exercise. It must include specific information about each phase of the operation, such as what unit has the responsibility for monitoring during each phase and when that responsibility is planned to be transferred to another unit. It must also indicate who actually controls remote sensor employment at each stage of the exercise. In all amphibious operations, particular care must be exercised to define control, monitoring, and reporting during advance force operations, and during the assault phase in order that the SCAMP monitoring elements can make proper liaison prior to assuming monitoring responsibility for CLF.

b. ( ) Division, MEB/RLT, or MEU/BLT. Tasking to the ground element must include any requirements for sensor implant, any support required for monitor sites, and the requirement to establish central monitor sites when they are to be located with the designated unit rather than the headquarters issuing the operation order.

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) Wing, MAG. Include assignment of air delivery missions, airborne relay flights, and on-order missions for storage unit interrogation.

d. ( ) Reconnaissance Unit. Include assignment of sensor and relay implants, responsibility for monitoring if assigned, and requirements for preparation and delivery of string sketch maps.

e. ( ) SCAMP. Include assignment of monitor site locations; on-order helicopter delivery missions; instructions for control and issue of sensors; any peculiar arrangements for storage, control, assembly, and issue of air delivered sensors at or near air facilities; and any special information reporting procedures.

f. ( ) Reserve. May be assigned responsibility for recovery of sensors and relays in areas under friendly control.

g. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. One subparagraph must detail passage of monitor responsibility from CATF elements to CLF elements, including radio contact requirements. One subparagraph must require all implant units to submit implant reports and state correct message routing instructions.

4. ( ) SERVICE SUPPORT

Include any particular administrative/logistics information not covered in the appropriate administrative/logistics plan.

5. ( ) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Include instruction for use of sensor control net and sensor management net if not covered in Annex K, and any instruction for channel and ID coordination.

ENCLOSURES

(1) Sensor Employment Plan
(2) Sensor Resources
(3) Sensor Reports and Reporting Procedures

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
FPO, Address
Date

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXXX
SENSOR EMPLOYMENT PLAN

1. This enclosure contains details on planned sensors and relays. A general explanation paragraph is followed by paragraphs listing pre-D-Day sensor string, post-D-Day strings, and relays.

2. The general format for sensor string information is as follows:

STRING NUMBER	TYPE SENSOR	COORD	CHAN/ID	RECOVERY CODE	CALL CHAN	NOTES
NN101P	S	TP90053240	0442/31	N/A	N/A	Force Recon
	S	TP90303140	0124/27	A-3	N/A	Implant D-2
	SM	TP89753330	0442/39	B-7	N/A	
	S	TP89453435	0124/01N/A	N/A	N/A	

3. The general format for relay information is as follows:

TYPE	LOCATION	REC CHAN	XMIT CHAN	NOTES
EXRAY	TP71202620	0124	0370	Force Recon Implant D-2

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
FPO, Address
Date

ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXXX
SENSOR RESOURCES

1. This enclosure contains two paragraphs—one listing CATF assets available but not used in preplanned strings and relays, and the second listing the same information for SCAMP assets.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
FPO, Address
Date

ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO OPLAN XXXX
SENSOR REPORTS AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. This enclosure contains two parts. The first part contains formats for required reports and instructions or samples for use. (See appendixes V and W.) The second part must include reporting procedures such as message routing.

Appendix OO

Sensor Report (SENREP) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SENREP NO. _____

1. TITLE	SENDER–ID	SEQ No	CLASS	REL	DOR	ENVIR/OPNAME
SENREP	BBBBBBBBBB	NNN	A	AA	NNNNNN	BBBBBBBBBBB

2. STR–NO	TIME	QTY	TGT–TYP	SUB–TYP	SPD	DIR	CLO–LGTH
AANNNA	NNNN	NNN	AAAA	AAAAA	NNNAAA	AAA	NNNNA

3. ETS–LOC	ETA
AANNNNNNNN	NNNN

4. Comments

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

The SENREP is used to disseminate sensor derived information.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Line 1: Field 1, SENREP

Line 2: Field 2, SENDER-ID. Monitoring/reporting unit.

Field 3, SEQ-NO. SENREPs are numbered sequentially, beginning at 0001 hours of each day; and starting with SENREP number 001.

Field 4, CLASS. Security classification level of the SENREP.

Field 5, RELEASBLY. Releasability remarks.

Field 6, DOR. Date of report (e.g., 910621).

Field 7, ENVIR/OPNAME. Name of operation (e.g., Gallant Knight).

Line 2: Field 1, STR-NO. (see Special Instructions page MM-2.)

Field 2, TIME. Time sensors detected target (e.g., 0535).

Field 3, QTY. Number of targets detected.

Field 4, TGT–TYP. Type of target detected; i.e., vehicles or personnel.

Field 5, SUB–TYP. Specific type of target; i.e., wheel or track.

Field 6, SPD. Speed of target, given in kilometers per hour.

Field 7, DIR. Direction of travel (e.g., South).

Field 8, COL–LGTH. Length of detected column targets are traveling in.

Line 3: Field 1, ETA–LOC. Coordinate, or target number given as location reference.

Field 2, ETA. Approximate time detected targets will arrive at the location given in line 3, field 1.

Line 4: Field 1, Comments; i.e., basis of sensor derived information.

Appendix PP

Joint Tactical Air Reconnaissance/Surveillance Inflight Report (FLIGHTREP) Format

---

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: FLIGHTREP NO._____

1. Mission Call Sign

2. Originator's Request Number

3. Target Identification

4. Target Location

5. Time on Target/Time of Sighting

6. Results

NOTES: 1. The above format is to be used by command/units receiving inflight reports and transmitting them to higher, adjacent, and lower commands.

2. Paragraphs 1 through 4 should be the standard format whereby air reconnaissance/surveillance pilots/aircrews report mission results while in flight. This report is also used to report any other tactical information collected.

3. Paragraph 6 is always given when the request is for visual reconnaissance/surveillance. It will also be used for reporting such items as the aircrews evaluation of anticipated results or a significant sighting.

Appendix QQ

Reconnaissance Exploitation Report (RECCEXREP)

PAGE 1 EXREP 15TH 102 CLASSIFICATION:_____831122 O3346

UNCLASSIFIED EXERCISE NEVERLAND

MSG ID/RECCEEXREP/15TH/NO2222/3456

EFDT238442Z DEC 90

NARR: REF ITMOOS, LG ACTY NOTED THROUGHOUT TGT AREA.

ITEM P6

ITM: 001 0380EX0000 CTY: MS 363219M1263214E

A. 52SDR46118324

B. 230422Z DEC 90

C. CAT: 06 Command Post

1. Mobile Command Post
2. Static, Camouflaged
3. 10 T-62 Tanks, 3 M-1979 SP Guns, 5 UAZ69As, 5 LG Tents, 2 Spoon Rests, 50 PERS (count approx)
4. No defense noted.
5. Terrain is flat with little vegetation, approx 13 km SE of post, A AAA site was noted.

NO REPORT TO FOLLOW

D. 1. ACFT was fired upon by AAA site.

2. 0081X
3. Yes

PAGE 1 EXREP 15TH 102 CLASSIFICATION:_____831122 03346

Appendix RR

Mission Report (MISREP) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: MISREP NO._____/_____Z/MONTH/YEAR

REF: (a) As applicable.

BODY

1. Air Task/Mission Number or Nickname. Reference the request number, FRAGO number, or directive causing initiation of the mission.

2. Location Identifier. Target number, line number, approved target designator/identifier, or coordinates of the target or sighting being reported.

3. Time of Target/Time of Sighting. Report at all times by date/time group, using GMT unless otherwise directed.

4. Results/Sighting Information. This item should contain the pilot/aircrew evaluation of expected results (e.g., percent destroyed, number and type destroyed, or percent of coverage) and concise narrative information on significant sightings (e.g., unusual or new enemy equipment or concentrations of enemy forces observed to include number, speed, and direction. if applicable).

5. Remarks. Includes information not specifically mentioned in above items (e.g., enemy defenses encountered; weather data; hostile meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI) attempts; etc.).

Appendix SS

Hot Photo Report (HOTPHOTOREP)

PRECEDENCE

TO:

FROM:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: HOTPHOTOREP NO._____/_____Z/MONTH/YEAR

REF: (a) As applicable.

1. Air Task/Mission Number of Nickname. Reference the request number, FRAGO number, or directive causing initiation of the mission.

2. Location Identifier. Target number, line number, approved target designator/identifier or coordinates of the target or sightings being reported.

3. Time Photo/Imagery Taken. Report all times by date/time group using GMT unless otherwise directed.

4. Results. This item should contain a concise statement about the activity or object that appears on the imagery.

5. Type of Coverage and Exposure Numbers. State the type of imagery obtained (e.g., optical photo, infrared, sidelooking radar) and frame exposure numbers, if applicable.

6. Percentage of Target Coverage. State approximate percent of coverage (e.g., 75 percent, etc.). If coverage is 100 percent, so state.

NOTE: Items 5, 6, and 7 are optional items.

Appendix TT

Initial Photo Interpretation Report (IPIR)
Supplemental Photo Interpretation Report (SUPIR)
and
Multimission Imagery Photo Interpretation Report (MIPIR)

PRECEDENCE

FROM: IIIC

TO: REQUESTOR

INFO:

REF: (a) As applicable.

(A) CLASSIFICATION

(B) SECTION 01 OF 01 SECTION

(C) IPIR: FIRST FIIU SER: UVO157 PRJ: RD MSN: Z198A DTZ: 75022W

(D) IMAGE QUALITY RANGE WAS GOOD TO EXCELLENT. EIGHT OF TWELVE OF THE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS WERE SATISFIED.

(E) PART I. MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

(F) NO EVIDENCE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OR RELATED ACTIVITY WAS NOTED. VEHICULAR AND TROOP MOVEMENT ACTIVITY IS VERY LIGHT. NO ANTIAIR ACTIVITY OR REACTIONS TO THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORM WERE OBSERVED.

(G) PART II. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS

(H) A. PERISHABLE ITEMS

(I) ITMOOA: 0213-OOOOO CAT: 80000 AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT

(J) REQ: CTY: LA211929N1061934E UTM: MRG:

(K) STA: TRM AI NRG:

(L) AOB:
0001 CONF PA-23 INFLIGHT HDG NORTHEAST

(M) IMR: PAN FRM: 1011,1012 URG
AID: E AO CL BB FRM TOT: 1035Z

(H) B. NEW ITEMS

(I) ITM002: 0213UV0006 CAT: 87200 PURTEE SAM SITE

(J) REQ: CTY: LA210815N1055619E UTM: MRG:

(K) STA: UCO

(L) DES: SA-O SITE IS BEING ESTABLISHED APROX ONE-HALF KM FROM THE RED RIVER. SITE CONSISTS OF SIX RVTD PSNS IN A STAR FORMATION. FULL DESCRIPTION NOT YET POSSIBLE. NO EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR CONSTRUCTION AND GROUND FORCE RELATED WAS IN THE AREA.

GFW:
0008 CONF DUMP TRUCK
0001 CONF ZAZ-7 CRANE
0001 PROB A-2 TRACTOR URG:

(O) IMR PAN FRM: 976-980 TOT: 1039Z
AID: G AO SC SH BB

(H) C. CHANGE AND OB ITEMS

(I) ITM OO02: 0213-02351 CAT: 09100 WATERTON BARRACKS AREA

(J) REQ: 4A02316 CTY: LA 221600N1053012E UTM MTG:

(K) STA: OPR AI NAC DQ B1236 750102 NRG: NDA04/0014/5

(L) RMK: PREVIOUSLY REPORTED U/I ARMORED EQUIPMENT HAVE NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SWG-99 TANKS.

GFW: AREA A-REGT A
0103 CONF SWG-99 TANK
0092 CONF DTR-12 TRUCK
0002 CONF MT-3 CRANE

GFW: AREA B-REGT AREA
GFW: AREA C-REGT AREA
GFW: AREA C-AAA BN

NAC DQ B1236 750102
NAC UP 298A 741209
NAC UP 208A 741209

(M) IMR:

PAN FRM: 500.490-516

URG: 234118

AID: G AO CL BB
IDC: 221615N1053045E

FRM: 135-138
MPR:

TOT: 1025Z

(N) EQM

(O) PART III. OTHER RESULTS

(P) A. Mission Requirements

(Q) Categorization of Target Entries. An introductory statement which categorizes a set of like items to increase readability. DIAM 57-5 contains more detailed information on the structure of part III.

(R) PART IV. COLLECTION OBJECTIVES SATISFIED AND NOT SATISFIED

Explanatory Notes

1. ( ) Shown for explanation only. Line identification is not shown on an actual message.

2. The IPIR/SUPIR/MIPIR format has been revised to accommodate the growth of automated intelligence systems. Detailed definitions and instructions for completing them are included in DIAM 57-05. However, as a user's guide to understanding the reports, the following definitions are provided.

Cable Line

Ref

(A) Self-explanatory

(B) Self-explanatory

(C) Report Type

Reporting Organization

Report Number

Reports will be numbered sequentially by the producing unit. A two-character alpha unit identifier as listed in DIAM 57-5 will be used followed by a four-digit sequential number.

Reconnaissance Project Identification

Two characters indicating the project of which this mission is part. This stands for mission independent. Project identifiers may be derived from DIA reconnaissance program directives or DIAM 57-5-1.

Mission Number

Date/Time Zone

(D) General Mission Statement

Free text reporting of information applying to the entire mission such as graphic reference, sensors, sensor on/off times and coordinates, overall image quality, overall image scale range, other general mission data, or any other information deemed useful. If the objectives of the mission and the requesting authority can be given (consider length and classification), these will be included. The general mission statement will be written as the interpreted mission and appropriate data will be reported.

(E) Part I. MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

Title for major division of the report.

(F) Textual Data for Mission Highlights.

Part I, Mission Highlights allows for a concise free text statement of the significant information derived from the mission. It may be used to highlight individual items reported elsewhere in the message and to summarize information relative to a category of targets. Mission Highlights may also be utilized for summations of trends of individual categories such as logistics studies or combat information of a significant nature.

(G) Part II. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS

Title for second major division of the report.

(H) Categories of Items Which May be Reported

A – Perishable Items. This section is for items of perishable intelligence value, including transitory targets.

B – New Items. This section is for items upon which the reporting organization has no previous image-derived data.

C – Change and OB Items. This section is for items which reflect significant changes since the last available interpretation and targets for which OB is required. For DOD combat reconnaissance programs, this section will include mission requirement objectives. A mission objective could also be reported under Perishable Items of Damage Assessment.

D – Bonus Items. This section includes significant changes to any known installation which is not a specified mission requirement objective.

E – Damage Assessment. This section is for the description of damage to targets from nonnuclear attacks. This section will also include known strike objectives which are not damaged.

(I) Identification Data

Item Number

Basic Encyclopedia (BE) Number or Imagery Basic Encyclopedia Number

Functional Classification Code. See DIAM 65-3-1.

Installation Name or Description of Object Imaged

(J) Other Identification Data

Requirement Number

Country Code

Geographic Coordinates

Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinates

Military District. Entered when applicable.

(K) Status/Activity Data

NEG. Negated (nonexistent). Target/installation does not exist at or near the coordinates given in the requirement.

UCO. Under Construction.

COM. Complete. The target/installation appears to be externally complete. Appears capable of operating but operational status cannot be determined.

UNK. Unknown. Status of the target cannot be determined.

MOP. Not Operational. Essential elements of a target/installation are observed not to be in operation; equipment essential to the operation of the installation is either missing or observed as not to be operational.

OPR. Operational.

OCC. Occupied.

DEC. Deception.

UNP. Unoccupied.

ABN. Abandoned.

RMV. Removed. Target/Installation has been razed, dismantled, or moved.

TRN. Transitory. Fleeting targets or targets which appear to be only temporarily situated.

DMG. Damaged. Target is damaged to some extent, but it may be restored to usable condition.

DST. Destroyed. Target is so damaged that it cannot function as intended or be restored to usable condition.

CNA. Coverage not available.

Exploitation Level

AI – IPIR

AS – SUPIR

MI – MIPIR

Significance

The significance code indicates the interpreter's assessment of the degree of change in the installation status, capabilitiy, or function since previous mission coverage. If a significance code in entered, the reference mission number and ate will be entered. Codes are as follows:

NEW. Newly detected activity.

SIG. Significant change has occurred.

UNK. Significance of change is not known or changed, if any, cannot be determined.

NAC. No apparent change.

Reference Graphic

When a National Basic Reference Graphic (NBRG) exists, the number may be required for certain specific programs. In all other cases, it will be left blank.

(L) Additional Interpretation Data

Additional photo interpretation data will be organized under one of the following codes.

DES. Physical description. A DES will be accomplished when an installation is covered for the first time, a basic description of the installation has not been previously written, the installation reflects a significant physical change, or first reporting an installation as abandoned or destroyed.

RMK. Remarks. This prefix will be used when providing less than a complete description of a known target and/or additional explanatory comments relating to status/activity.

Only a DES or RMK will be used for each entry, not both. If NAC is entered on the status line, a DES will not be used.

The remark will include the project code and mission numbers of the coverages used to prepare the report in those cases where more than one mission is used.

For multiple reporting (MIPIR), the actual OB count will be taken from a representative mission flown during the reporting period.

Order of Battle Designations

MIS. Missile and missile related equipment.

AOB. Air order of battle

NVL. Naval and merchant vessels.

GFW. Ground force weapons and equipment.

ELC. Electronic order of battle.

AAA. Antiaircraft order of battle.

DMY. Dummy.

OBJ. Associated objects. Information relative to objects and equipment not reported under order of battle entries.

Area Delineation

Refers to area delineation of the National Basic Reference Graphic or other descriptive location data. When NBGRs are not available, locational reporting is permitted (e.g., assembly area). Multicoverage dates may be included following each locational entry or as unique entries.

(M) Imagery Reference Data

IMR. Imagery Reference. A minimum of one IMR line is required: however, more lines may be required to indicate different coverage. For multimission reporting (MIPIR), only those missions which contributed to a specific degree are entered on the IMR line. Initial information in the IMR line may include date of coverage, project code, mission number, and camera station. The following coded items may then be used.

IMR. Frame number.

SLR. Side-looking radar.

INF. Thermal.

URG. Universal reference grid. Six position URG coordinates (see DIAM 57-23).

AID. Additional imagery data. AID is used to provide interpretability data. Interpretability codes are as follows:

E—Excellent

G—Good

F—Fair

P—Poor

Extent of coverage and mode

A—Complete coverage/stereo

B—Complete coverage/partial stereo

C—Complete coverage/mono

D—Partial coverage/stereo

E—Partial coverage/partial stereo

F—Partial coverage/mono

Type of coverage

O—Oblique

V—Vertical

Weather conditions

CL—Clear

SC—Scattered

HC—Heavy Clouds

HA—Haze

Other conditions

SN—Snow

SH—Shadow

OL—Degrading obliquity

SD—Semidarkness

BL—Blurred image

TR—Terrain masking

HD—Heavy smoke/dust

Type of film

B—Black and white

C—Natural color

G—Green record

I—Color rear infrared

R—Red record

T—Thermal

S—Radar

N—Nonstandard

(Note for stereo or partial stereo, two letters will be used, one for the first frame and one for the second frame; e.g., BB, black and white on both frames.)

FRM. Additional frame reference for a given target.

TOT. Time over target

IDC. Imagery derived coordinates, derived from comparing imagery with a map or chart.

MPR. Map reference

PPC. Precision photo derived coordinates

(O) Part III. OTHER RESULTS. Third major division of the report, as indicated by the sample; Part III may be omitted.

(P) A. Mission Requirements. Provides for reporting items/targets not properly placed in Part II.

(Q) Categorization of Target Entries. The format in part IV will contain collection objectives satisfied and not satisfied, plus a textual statement indicating any reasons for nonsatisfaction. Items contained in part IV can be understood from the codes listed earlier.

(R) Part IV. COLLECTION OBJECTIVES SATISFIED AND NOT SATISFIED. Part IV of the format will contain collection objectives satisfied and not satisfied, plus a textual statement indicating any reasons for nonsatisfaction. Items contained in part IV can be understood from the codes listed earlier.

Appendix UU

Joint Tactical ELINT Report (JTER) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: JTER No._____/_____Z/MONTH/YEAR

REF: (a) As applicable.

1. Unit Designation

2. Mission Description
   A. Mission Number
   B. Originator's Request Number
   C. Mission Date
   D. Reference
   E. Site Location (ground only)

3. Flight Profile (list in three columns: position/time/altitude)

4. Location Identifier
   A. Location
   B. True Bearing
   C. Accuracy

5. Time of Intercept

6. Type of Emitter

7. Emitter Employment

8. Emitter Characteristics

A. RF

B. PRF

C. PD

D. SCAN

E. SP

NOTE: 1. The JTER form will be used by all units engaged in tactical ELINT collection. Those units which usually report in standardized formats (e.g., SEDSCAF) under the provisions of the National ELINT Plan (NEP) will continue to do so unless otherwise directed.

2. Report the locations of known sites by using pin numbers. Report the location in geographic minutes north, south, east, or west or a known pin number, which is a reference point, if the location is unlisted. When reporting an emitter location, report the probable accuracy of the location.

Category A. Within a 1-nautical mile radius.

Category B. Within a 3-nautical mile radius.

Category C. Within a 5-nautical mile radius.

Category D. Within a 10-nautical mile radius.

Category E. Cannot be reliably located and may be beyond a 10-nautical mile radius.

3. Report Joint Tactical ELINT Inflight Report number(s) to which this report relates.

4. More than one electronic intercept may be included in one report. Report all information pertaining to one intercept before reporting the information on the next one.

Appendix VV

Joint Tactical ELINT Inflight Report (JTEIR) Format

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ: JTEIR NO._____/_____Z/MONTH/YEAR

REF: (a) As applicable.

1. Call Sign
2. Originator's Request Number
3. Target Location
4. Time of Sighting/Intercept
5. Target Identification
   - A. RF
   - B. PRF
   - C. PF
   - D. SCAN
   - E. SP
   - F. Reliability
6. Weather
7. Amplifying Remarks

NOTE: 1. The above format is to be used by commands and units transmitting JTEIRs to higher, adjacent, and lower commands.

2. Paragraphs 1 through 7 should be used by pilots and aircrews to report information while in flight.

3. See the Joint Tactical ELINT Report format for details on information contained in the report.

Glossary

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA ..... antiaircraft
AAA ..... antiaircraft artillery
AAW ..... antiair warfare
ACE ..... aviation combat element
ACOUSTINT ..... acoustical intelligence
ACS/I ..... Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Air Force)
ADP ..... automatic data processing
AEW ..... airborne early warning
AFCSC ..... Air Force Cryptologic Support Center
AFEWC ..... Air Force Electronic Warfare Center
AFOSI ..... Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFSAC ..... Air Force Special Activities Center
AFSC ..... Air Force Systems Command
ANGLICO ..... air/naval gunfire liaison company
AO ..... area of operations
AOA ..... amphibious objective area
AOB ..... air order of battle
AOI ..... area of influence
AOR ..... area of responsibility
ARAPS ..... Area Requirements and Product Status
ASSO ..... assistant special security officer
ATF ..... amphibious task force
ATO ..... air tasking order

BASS ..... battlefield area surveillance system
BDA ..... bomb damage assessment
BLT ..... battalion landing team
BMNT ..... beginning of morning nautical twilight

C^3 ..... command, control, and communications
C^3CM ..... command, control, communications countermeasures
C^3I ..... command, control, communications, and intelligence
C^4I^2 ..... command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence interoperability

C&CI ..... collection and classification of information
CA ..... cryptanalysis
CAG ..... civil affairs group
CAI ..... computer aided instruction
CAS ..... close air support
CATF ..... commander, amphibious task force
CBR ..... chemical, biological, and radiological
CC ..... command center
CCP ..... combined cryptologic program
CDEC ..... captured document exploitation center
CE ..... command element
CED ..... captured enemy documents
CEO ..... communications-electronics officer
CEOI ..... communications-electronics operating instructions
CI ..... counterintelligence
CIA ..... Central Intelligence Agency
CIC ..... combat information center
CinC ..... commander in chief
CIT ..... counterintelligence team
CLF ..... commander, landing force
CMC ..... Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMCC ..... classified material control center
CMEC ..... captured material exploitation center
CMO ..... collections management office
COB ..... communications order of battle
COC ..... combat operations center
COMINT ..... communications intelligence
Comm Bn ..... communications battalion
COMNAVINTCOM ..... Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
COMSEC ..... communications security
CONUS ..... continental United States
CP ..... command post
CRITICOM ..... critical communications
CSS ..... central security service
CSSA ..... combat service support area
CSSE ..... combat service support element

DASC ..... direct air support center
DCI ..... Director of Central Intelligence
DEA ..... Drug Enforcement Agency
det ..... detachment
DIA ..... Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAM ..... DIA manual
DICRM ..... Defense Intelligence Collections Requirement manual
DIE ..... defense intelligence estimate
DIO ..... defense intelligence officer
DIR ..... defense intelligence report
DIS ..... defense investigative service
DISUM ..... daily intelligence summary
DMA ..... Defense Mapping Agency
DMACSC ..... Defense Mapping Agency Combat Support Center
DNI ..... Director of Naval Intelligence
DOD ..... Department of Defense
DODIIS ..... Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DSSCS ..... Defense Special Security Communications System
DTZ ..... date/time zone
DZ ..... drop zone

EC ..... electronic combat
ECCM ..... electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM ..... electronic warfare countermeasures
EEI ..... essential elements of information
EENT ..... ending of evening nautical twilight
ELINT ..... electronics intelligence
ELSEC ..... electronics security
EMCON ..... emissions control
EMI ..... electromagnetic interference
EMSEC ..... emissions security
EOB ..... electronic order of battle
EPW ..... enemy prisoner of war
ESC ..... Electronic Security Command (Air Force)
ESM ..... electronic warfare support measures
EW ..... electronic warfare
EWO ..... electronic warfare officer

FBH ..... force beachhead
FBHL ..... force beachhead line
FBI ..... Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCI ..... foreign counterintelligence
FEBA ..... forward edge of the battle area
FI ..... foreign intelligence
FIC ..... fleet intelligence center
FIIU ..... force imagery interpretation unit
FISINT ..... foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
FLIR ..... forward-looking infrared
FMF ..... Fleet Marine Force
Force Recon Co ..... force reconnaissance company
FR ..... force reconnaissance
FRAGO ..... fragmentary order
FSCC ..... fire support coordination center
FSSG ..... force service support group
FTD ..... Foreign Technology Division
FTSC ..... Foreign Technology and Science Center

GCE ..... ground combat element
GDIP ..... General Defense Intelligence Program
GENSER ..... general service
GEOREF ..... world geographic reference system
GEW ..... ground electronic warfare
GMI ..... general medical intelligence
GMT ..... Greenwich mean time
GOB ..... ground order of battle

HIB ..... human resource intelligence branch
HIBCOORD ..... HUMINT branch coordinator
HLA ..... helicopter landing area
HLZ ..... helicopter landing zone
HOTPHOTOREP ..... hot photo report
HQ Co ..... headquarters company
HQSVC Co ..... headquarters and service company
HRC ..... human resources center
HUMINT ..... human resources intelligence

IAC ..... intelligence analysis center
IAS ..... intelligence analysis station
IC ..... intelligence community
ICR ..... intelligence collection requirement
IF ..... interrogation facility
IMINT ..... imagery intelligence
INFLT ..... inflight report
INSCOM ..... U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTEL Co ..... intelligence company
INTREP ..... intelligence report
INTSUM ..... intelligence summary
IOC ..... initial operational capability
IP ..... imagery processing
IPB ..... intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPIR ..... initial photo interpretation report
IR ..... infrared radiation

ISSAF ..... intelligence support to strike and amphibious forces
ITAC ..... Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
ITOA ..... interrogator-translator operations advisor
ITOC ..... interrogation-translation operations center
ITP ..... interrogation-translator platoon
ITT ..... interrogator-translator team

JAEIC ..... Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JCS ..... Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC ..... joint intelligence center
JMTF ..... joint message transmission format
JOPS ..... Joint Operation Planning System
J/SSES ..... joint ship's signals exploitation space
JTARS ..... joint tactical air reconnaissance/surveillance request forms
JTEIR ..... joint tactical ELINT inflight report
J-TENS ..... Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems
JTF ..... joint task force
JWO ..... JIC watch officer

KIA ..... killed in action

LF ..... landing force
LFOC ..... landing force operations center
LIR ..... laser incident report
LOC ..... lines of communication
LZ ..... landing zone

MAFC ..... MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center
MAG ..... Marine aircraft group
MAGIS .... Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System
MAGTF ..... Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MarDiv ..... Marine division
MAW ..... Marine aircraft wing
MC&G ..... mapping, charting, and geodesy
MCCDC ..... Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MEB ..... Marine expeditionary brigade
MEDINT ..... medical intelligence
MEF ..... Marine expeditionary force
MEU ..... Marine expeditionary unit
MGI ..... military geographic information
MIIDS ..... Military Intelligence Integrated Data System
MIJI ..... meaconing, interference, jamming, intrusion
MIPIR ..... multimission imagery photo interpretation report
MISREP ..... mission report
MOS ..... military occupational specialty
MSC ..... major subordinate command
MSI ..... multispectral imagery
MSPF ..... maritime special purpose force
MSR ..... main supply route
MSSG ..... MEU service support group

NAI ..... named areas of influence
NASA ..... National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO ..... North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVINTCOM ..... Naval Intelligence Command
NAVOCEANO ..... Navy Oceanographic Office
NCA ..... National Command Authorities
NCOIC ..... noncommissioned officer in charge
NFIB ..... National Foreign Intelligence Board
NFIC ..... National Foreign Intelligence Council; National Foreign Intelligence Community
NFIP ..... National Foreign Intelligence Program
NHCP ..... National HUMINT Collection Plan
NIE ..... National Intelligence Estimate
NIPR ..... Naval Intelligence Publication Register
NIPS ..... Naval Intelligence Processing System
NIPSSA ..... Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity
NIS ..... Naval Investigative Service
NMIC ..... National Military Intelligence Center
NOB ..... naval order of battle
NOIC ..... naval operational intelligence center
NPIC ..... National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA ..... National Security Agency
NSC ..... National Security Council
NSG ..... naval security group
NTDS ..... Navy tactical data system
NTIC ..... Naval Technical Intelligence Center

OCAC ..... operations control and analysis center
ODCSINT .... Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OIC ..... officer in charge
OICR ..... other intelligence collection requirements
OIR ..... other intelligence requirements
OOB ..... order of battle

OPCON ..... operational control
OPINTEL ..... operational intelligence
OPLAN ..... operation plan
OPSEC ..... operations security
OSD ..... Office of Security Defense
OSIS ..... Ocean Surveillance Information System

PERINTREP ..... periodic intelligence report
PERINTSUM ..... periodic intelligence summary
PHIBGRU ..... amphibious group
PHOTINT ..... photographic intelligence
POL ..... petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POST ..... Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal
PPBS ..... planning, programming, and budgeting system

R&D ..... research and development
Rad Bn ..... radio battalion
RADINT ..... radar intelligence
RAO .....restricted area of operation
RDT&E ..... research, development, training, and education
RECCEXREP ... reconnaissance exploitation report
recon ..... reconnaissance
RFA ..... restricted fire area
RFI ..... request for information
RLT ..... regimental landing team
ROA ..... reconnaissance operations area
RRII ..... responses to request for intelligence information

SACC ..... supporting arms coordination center
SAM ..... surface-to-air missiles
SAO ..... special activities office
SARC ..... surveillance and reconnaissance center
SCAMP ..... sensor control and management platoon
SCCP ..... subcustody control point
SCE ..... service cryptologic element
SCI ..... sensitive compartmented information
SEAL ..... sea-air-land
SENREP ..... sensor report
SERE ..... survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
S/EWCC ..... signals intelligence/electronic warfare coordination center
SI ..... special intelligence
SIGINT ..... signals intelligence
SIGINT/GEW/SSO ..... signals intelligence/ground electronic warfare/special security office
SIGSEC ..... signals security
SII ..... statement of intelligence interest
SIR ..... specific information requirements
SNIE ..... special National Intelligence Estimate
SNOC ..... staff noncommissioned officer
SOP ..... standing operating procedure
SOR ..... statement of requirements
SPECWARGRU ..... special warfare group
SPF ..... special purpose force
SPINTCOMM .. special intelligence communications
SPOTREP ..... spot report
SRIG ..... surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group
SSES ..... ship's signals exploitation spaces
SSO ..... special security officer/office
SUPIR .... supplemental photo interpretation report

TACC ..... tactical air command center
TACINTEL ..... tactical intelligence
TACP ..... tactical air control party
TAD ..... temporary additional duty
TAI ..... target areas of interest
TAM ..... table of authorized material
TAO ..... tactical action officer
TAOC ..... tactical air operations center
TARBUL ..... target bulletin
T/E ..... table of equipment
TECHINTEL ..... technical intelligence
TELINT ..... telemetry intelligence
TENCAP ..... Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TERPES ..... Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System
TGO ..... target officer
TgtIntelO ..... target intelligence officer
TIC ..... target information center
TIO ..... target information officer
TIPS ..... Tactical Intelligence Processing System
T/O ..... table of organization
TOPO ..... topographic

UAV ..... unmanned aerial vehicle
UAV Co ..... unmanned aerial vehicle company
UTM ..... universal transverse mercator

VMAQ ..... Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron
VMO ..... Marine observation squadron

WISP ..... Wartime Information Security Program

ZOA ..... zone of action

Section II. Definitions

A

acoustic intelligence – Intelligence derived from the collection and processing of acoustic phenomena. (Joint Pub 1-02)

agent – In intelligence usage, one who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

agent of influence – A person who is manipulated by an intelligence organization to use his position to influence public opinion or decision making in a manner which will advance the objective of the country for which that organization operates.

analysis – In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. See also **intelligence cycle**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Armed Forces Intelligence – The integrated study of the organized land, sea, and air forces, both actual and potential, of foreign nations.

assessment – **1.** Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. **2.** Judgement of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (Joint Pub 1-02)

automatic data processing system security – All of the technological safeguards and managerial procedures established and applied to computer hardware, software, and data in order to ensure the protection of organizational assets and individual privacy; it includes: all hardware/software functions, characteristics, and features; operational procedures, accountability procedures, and access controls at the central computer facility; remote computer and terminal facilities, management constraints, physical structures and devices; and the personnel and communication controls needed to provide an acceptable level of protection for classified material to be contained in the computer system.

B

basic intelligence – Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject. (Joint Pub 102)

biographical intelligence – That component of intelligence which deals with individual foreign personalities of actual or potential importance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

black list – An official counter-intelligence listing of actual or potential enemy collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

C

capability – The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention). (Joint Pub 1-02)

cartographic intelligence – Intelligence primarily manifested in maps and charts of areas outside the United States and its territorial waters.

case officer – A professional employee of an intelligence organization who is responsible for providing direction for an agent operation.

cipher – Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or groups of symbols, represent units of plain text of regular length, usually single letters, or in which units of plain text are rearranged, or both, in accordance with certain predetermined rules. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civilian internee – **1.** A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. **2.** A term used to refer to persons interned and protected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention). See also **prisoner of war**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

clandestine – Secret or hidden; conducted with secrecy by design.

clandestine activity – Secret or hidden activity conducted with secrecy by design. (The phrase clandestine operation is preferred. Operations are preplanned activities.)

clandestine communication – Any type of communication or signal originated in support of clandestine operations.

clandestine operation – An activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (Joint Pub 1-02) (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identify of sponsor.)

clandestine services – That portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that engages in clandestine operations; sometimes used as synonymous with the CIA Operations Directorate.

classification – The determination that official information requires, in the interests of national security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection plan – A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection requirement – An established intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of a commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat information – Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat intelligence – That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support area – A forward support installation which provides minimum essential support to the elements of the MAGTF in any one, all, or any combination of the six functional areas of combat service support. Also called **CSSA**. See also **beach support area; force combat service support area; forward arming and refueling point; landing zone support area; repair and replenishment point.**

counterintelligence – Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

countersabotage – That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent sabotage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting sabotage activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

countersign – A secret challenge and its reply. (Joint Pub 1-02)

countersubversion – That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent subversive activities through the identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting subversive activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action – **1.** Any sequence of activities which an individual or a unit may follow. **2.** A possible plan open to an individual or command which would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of his mission. **3.** The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission.

cover – **1.** The action by land, air, or sea forces to protect by offense, defense, or threat of either or both. **2.** Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation or installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information. **3.** The act of maintaining a continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and available, but not necessarily available for immediate use. **4.** Shelter or protection, either natural or artificial. **(DOD) 5.** Photographs

or other recorded images which show a particular area of ground. **6.** A code meaning, "Keep fighters between force/base and contact designated at distance stated from force/base" (e.g., "cover bogey twenty-seven to thirty miles). (Joint Pub 1-02).

covert – See **clandestine.**

covert action – A secret operation designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of United States foreign policy; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities. (See **special activities.**)

covert operations – Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical intelligence – Intelligence which is crucial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. It is required to enable the commander to make decisions that will provide a timely and appropriate response to actions by the potential/actual enemy. It includes but is not limited to the following: **a.** strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of any type (warning of attack); **b.** aggression of any nature against a friendly country; **c.** indications or use of nuclear-biological-chemical weapons (targets); and **d.** significant events within potential enemy countries that may lead to modification of nuclear strike plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

current intelligence – Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or interpretation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

customer – An authorized person who uses intelligence or information either to produce other intelligence or directly in the decision-making process; it is synonymous with consumer and user.

D

defector – National of a country who has escaped from the control of such country or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, is unwilling to return thereto and is of special value to another country. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Intelligence Community – Refers to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the military Services' intelligence offices including Department of Defense collectors of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs.

departmental intelligence – Intelligence that any department or agency of the Federal Government requires to execute its own mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direction finding – A procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Director of Central Intelligence – The President's principal foreign intelligence adviser appointed by him with the consent of the Senate to be the head of the intelligence community and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to discharge those authorities and responsibilities as they are prescribed by law and by Presidential and National Security Council directives.

Director of Central Intelligence Committee – Any one of several committees established by the Director of Central Intelligence to advise him and to perform whatever functions he shall determine; DCI committees usually deal with intelligence community concerns, and their terms of reference ordinarily are specified in DCI directives; members may be drawn from all components of the intelligence community.

displaced person – A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his country. See also **evacuee; evacuees; refugee; refugees.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

dissemination – See **intelligence cycle.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

distribution system – That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

domestic collection – The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United States from governmental or nongovernmental organizations or individuals who are willing sources and choose to cooperate by sharing such information.

domestic intelligence – Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States that threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Department of Defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)

double agent – Agent in contact with two opposing intelligence services, only one of which is aware of the double contact or quasi-intelligence services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

E

economic intelligence – Intelligence which deals with the extent and use of natural and human resources and the economic potential of nations.

electronic countermeasures – See **electronic warfare**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic counter-countermeasures – See **electronic warfare**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic emission security – Those measures taken to protect all transmissions from interception and electronic analysis.

electronic order of battle – A listing on noncommunications electronic devices including site designation, nomenclature, location, site function, and any other pertinent information obtained from any source and which has military significance when related to the devices.

electronic surveillance – Acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.

electronic warfare – Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Also called EW. There are three divisions within electronic warfare:

a. **electronic countermeasures** – That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Also called ECM. Electronic countermeasures include:
   (1) **electronic jamming** – The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting enemy use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems. See also **jamming**.
   (2) **electronic deception** – The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid information to an enemy or to enemy electronics-dependent weapons. Among the types of electronic deception are: (a) **manipulative electronic deception** – Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces. (b) **simulative electronic deception** – Actions to represent friendly notional or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces. (c) **imitative electronic deception** – The introduction of electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions.

b. **electronic counter-countermeasures** – That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electronic warfare. Also called **ECCM.**

c. **electronic warfare support measures** – That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken under direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support measures (ESM) provide a source of information required for immediate decisions involving electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), avoidance, targeting, and other tactical employment of forces. Electronic warfare support measures data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronics intelligence (ELINT). Also called **ESM**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

emanations security – The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived

from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from other than cryptographic equipment and telecommunications systems.

emigre – A person who departs from his country for any lawful reason with the intention of permanently resettling elsewhere.

encipher – To convert plain text into unintelligible form by means of a cipher system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

encrypt – To convert plain text into unintelligible forms by means of a cryptosystem. (**Note:** The term encrypt covers the meanings of encipher and encode.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

enemy capabilities – Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives in peace or war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

espionage – Actions directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information – The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (Joint Pub 1-02)

estimative intelligence – A category of intelligence which attempts to project probable future foreign courses of action and developments and their implications for U.S. interest; it may or may not be coordinated and may be either national or departmental intelligence.

evaluation – In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy. Appraisal is accomplished at several stages within the intelligence cycle with progressively different contexts. Initial evaluations, made by case officers and report officers, are focused upon the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the information as judged by data available at or close to their operational levels. Later evaluations, by intelligence analysts, are primarily concerned with verifying accuracy of information and may, in effect, convert information into intelligence. Appraisal or evaluation of items of information or intelligence is indicated by a standard letter-number system. The evaluation of the reliability of sources is designated by a letter from A through F, and the accuracy of the information is designated by numeral 1 through 6. These are two entirely independent appraisals, and these separate appraisals are indicated in accordance with the system indicated below. Thus, information adjudged to be "probably true" received from a "usually reliable source" is designated "B-2" or "B2," while information of which the "truth cannot be judged" received from a "usually reliable source" is designated "B-6" or "B6."

Reliability of Source	Accuracy of Information
A – Completely reliable	1 – Confirmed by other Sources
B – Usually reliable	2 – Probably true
C – Fairly reliable	3 – Possibly true
D – Not usually reliable	4 – Doubtful
E – Unreliable	5 – Improbable
F – Reliability cannot be judged.	6 – Truth cannot be judged.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape – The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

F

finished intelligence – The result of the production step of the intelligence cycle; the intelligence product.

foreign intelligence – See **intelligence**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fusion – The blending of intelligence information from multiple sources to produce a single intelligence product. (**Note:** Joint Pub 1-02 defines fusion as a nuclear process.)

fusion center – A term used within the Department of Defense referring to an organization having the

responsibility of blending both compartmented intelligence with all other available information in order to support military operations.

G

geographic(al) intelligence – Foreign intelligence dealing with the location, description, and analysis of physical and cultural factors of the world, (e.g., terrain, climate, natural resources, transportation, boundaries, population distribution) and their changes through time.

guidance – 1. Policy, direction, decision, or instruction having the effect of an order when promulgated by a higher echelon. (Part one of two-part definition.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

H

helicopter landing zone – A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. (Joint Pub 1-02) A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. Also called **HLZ**.

helicopter retirement route – The track or series of tracks along which helicopters move from a specific landing site or landing zone. See also **helicopter approach route; helicopter lane**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human resources intelligence – The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called **HUMINT**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

HUMINT – See **human resources intelligence**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hydrographic reconnaissance – Reconnaissance of an area of water to determine depths, beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, and the location of coral reefs, rocks, shoals, and manmade obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

I

imagery intelligence – Intelligence information derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, laser, electro-optics and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices or other media. Also called **IMINT**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery interpretation – The process of location, recognition, identification and description of objects, activities, and terrain represented on imagery. (Joint Pub 1-02) It includes photographic interpretation.

indications (intelligence) – Information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bears on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

indications and warning – Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information – 1. In intelligence usage, unevaluated material of every description that may be used in the production of intelligence. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information security – Safeguarding knowledge against unauthorized disclosure; or, the result of any system of administrative policies and procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure or release to the public, information the protection of which is authorized by executive order or statute.

intelligence – The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence collection plan – A plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement. Specifically, a logical plan for transforming the essential elements of information into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence community – A term which, in the aggregate, refers to the following Executive Branch organizations and activities: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National

Security Agency; offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the military services; intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury; intelligence elements of the Department of Energy; intelligence elements of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (also commonly referred to as the National Foreign Intelligence Community).

intelligence cycle — The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle:

a. **planning and direction** — Determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies.
b. **collection** — Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements.
c. **processing** — Conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence.
d. **production** — Conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipataed user requirements.
e. **dissemination** — Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence estimate — The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence requirement — Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of intelligence information, or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intention — An aim or design (as distinct from capability) to execute a specified course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intercept(ion) — Acquisition for intelligence purposes of electromagnetic signals (such as radio communications) by electronic collection equipment without the consent of the signalers.

intercept station — A station which intercepts communications or noncommunications transmissions for intelligence purposes.

international terrorist activities — The calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence, to attain political goals through fear, intimidation or coercion; usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature, and is intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims. Intentional terrorism transcends national boundaries in the carrying out of the act, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the incident; such an act is usually designed to attract wide publicity in order to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the perpetrators.

interpretation — A stage in the intelligence cycle in which the significance of information is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interrogation (intelligence) — Systematic effort to procure information by direct questioning of a person under the control of the questioner. (Joint Pub 1-02)

J

joint intelligence — Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the same nation.

L

landing beach — That portion of a shoreline usually required for the landing of a battalion landing team. However, it may also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical locality (such as the shore of a bay) over which a force larger or smaller than a battalion landing team may be landed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of communications — All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (Joint Pub 1-02)

list of targets – A list of confirmed, suspected, or possible targets maintained by any echelon of command for information or planning purposes.

M

main supply route – The route or routes designated within an area of operations upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also called **MSR**.

Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System – MAGIS consists of four individual and independent Marine Corps intelligence assets – Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC), Imagery Interpretation Facility (IIF), Imagery Processing (IP), and the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES).

medical intelligence – That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military load class – The class number of a bridge representing the safe load-carrying capacity of a single-lane bridge or a single lane of a multilane bridge under normal crossing conditions. (FM 5-34)

N

National Foreign Intelligence Board – A body to provide the Director of Central Intelligence with advice concerning: production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the protection of intelligence sources or methods; activities of common concern; and such other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. It is composed of the DCI (chairman), and other appropriate officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the DCI, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, the offices within the Department of Defense for reconnaissance programs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force participate as observers; a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may also attend meetings as an observer.

national intelligence – Integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national intelligence asset – An intelligence asset funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the primary purpose of which is the collection or processing of intelligence or the production of national intelligence.

national intelligence estimate – A strategic estimate of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations which is produced at the national level as a composite of the views of the intelligence community. (Joint Pub 1-02

National Intelligence Officer – The senior staff officer of the Director of Central Intelligence and the DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence for an assigned area of substantive responsibility. He manages estimative and interagency intelligence production on behalf of the DCI; he is the principal point of contact between the DCI and intelligence consumers below the cabinet level; he is charged with monitoring and coordinating that portion of the National Foreign Assessment Center's production that involves more than one office or that is interdisciplinary in character; and is a primary source of national-level substantive guidance to intelligence community planners, collectors, and resource managers.

O

open source information – Information of potential intelligence value (i.e., intelligence information) which is available to the general public. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security – A process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Also called **OPSEC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

order of battle – The identification, strength, command structure and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

overt – Open; done without attempt to concealment.

overt collection – The acquisition of information from public media, observation, government-to-government dialogue, elicitation, and from the sharing of data openly acquired; the process may be classified or unclassified; the target and host governments as well as the sources involved normally are aware of the general collection activity although the specific acquisition, sites, and processes may be successfully concealed.

P

petroleum, oils, and lubricants – A broad term which includes all petroleum and associated products used by the armed forces. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also called **POL**.

port – A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term "port" should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. See also **control port; indoctrination port; major port; minor port; secondary port; water terminal**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

potential target – An object, installation, or unit that will yield a military advantage if destroyed, damaged, neutralized, or captured.

prisoner of war – A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

prisoner of war camp (DOD) – An installation established for the internment and administration of prisoners of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

prisoner of war camp (NATO) – A camp of a semi-permanent nature established in the communication zone or zone of interior (home country) for the internment and complete administration of prisoners of war. It may be located on, or independent of, other military installations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

prisoner of war collecting point – A designated locality in a forward battle area where prisoners are assembled pending local examination for information of immediate tactical value and subsequent evacuation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

prisoner of war compound – A subdivision of a prisoner of war enclosure. (Joint Pub 1-02)

prisoner of war enclosure – A subdivision of a prisoner of war camp. (Joint Pub 1-02)

product – **1.** An intelligence report disseminated to customers by an intelligence agency. **2.** In SIGINT usage, intelligence derived from analysis of SIGINT materials and published as a report of translation for dissemination to customers.

production (intelligence) – The process by which raw information is transformed into finished intelligence. The integral steps of this process are:

a. **evaluation** – The considered judgement of the accuracy, completeness, and meaning of an item of information or a report.
b. **interpretation** – The result of critical judgement involving analysis, integration, and deduction.

1. Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. 2. Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in an analysis with other known information to form a logical picture, of hypothesis, or enemy activities command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based on existing intelligence. 3. Deduction is the last step in processing which results in the deduction of meaning from the hypothesis developed, tested, and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction answers the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the enemy situation and the area of operations?"

R

refugee (DOD) — A civilian who by reason of real or imagined danger has left home to seek safety elsewhere. See also **displaced person; evacuee; expellee.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

refugees (NATO) — Persons who, because of real or imagined danger, move of their own volition, spontaneously or in violation of stay-put policy, irrespective of whether they move within their own country (national refugees) or across international boundaries (international refugees). (Joint Pub 1-20)

S

sabotage — An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

safe house — An innocent-appearing house or premises established by an organization for the purpose of conducting clandestine or covert activity in relative security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sanitize — Revise a report or other document in such a fashion as to prevent identification of sources, or of the actual persons and places with which it is concerned, or of the means by which it was acquired. Usually involves deletion or substitution of names and other key details. (Joint Pub 1-02)

scientific and technical intelligence — The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: **a.** foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and **b.** scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapons systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security intelligence — Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence — A category of intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. Also called **SIGINT.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals security — A term which includes communications security and electronics security and which encompasses measures intended to deny or counter hostile exploitation of electronic emissions.

source — **1.** A person, thing, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained. (Joint Pub 1-02) (Part one of a three-part definition.)

special activities — As defined in Executive Order No. 12333, activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.

special activities office — A control point for certain categories of compartmented information. (The acronym SAO is often used to refer to the compartmented information itself.)

strategic intelligence — Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national

and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may vary in terms of scope and detail. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustaining stocks – Stocks to support the execution of approved operational plans beyond the initial predetermined period covered by basic stocks until resupply is available for support of continued operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

T

tactical intelligence – Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. See also **combat intelligence; intelligence; strategic intelligence**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence asset – An intelligence asset funded in Department of Defense programs, the primary purpose of which is the collection or processing of information or the production of tactical intelligence.

target – 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. (Joint Pub 1-02) (Part two of a four-part definition.)

target acquisition – The detection, identification and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target analysis – An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target bulletin – A bulletin in message format published to keep the target list current and issued by the commander who has control of the target list at that particular time.

target information – That function by which fire support is applied to target intelligence.

target intelligence – Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target list – A listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command. It contains those targets which are to be engaged by supporting arms and those targets on which firing restrictions have been placed. It is not a list of targets which may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspect, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes; nor is it a vehicle for dissemination of intelligence in general. In selecting targets for inclusion in the target list for amphibious operations, the following criteria must be met: **1.** Be fixed or semi-fixed. Transient targets are not suitable for inclusion in the target list. **2.** Be suitable for attack by air, artillery, or naval gunfire. **3.** Be of sufficient importance to the operations to warrant a preplanned attack. A permanently emplaced coastal defense gun that is remoted and cannot fire into the landing area may be ignored rather than attacked. **4.** Restricted targets (to be used in the future). Included here are targets that are to be used in the future, such as bridges or tunnels, and those which are restricted for humanitarian reasons, such as churches, hospitals, and schools.

target materials – Graphic, textual, tabular, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapons systems. Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating such operations.

target number – The reference number given to the target by the fire control unit.

target of opportunity – A target visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or requested.

target precedence list – A command's list of primarily mobile potential targets arranged by type in the order in which they are to be attacked. It is used as guidance for reactive targeting.

targeting – The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

a. **deliberate targeting** – The methodical identification, compilation, and analysis of potential fixed or semi-fixed targets followed by the decision of which potential targets will be attacked, when, and/or by

what weapon and ordnance. It is practiced primarily during the planning phase of an operation, when planning for an attack or when the tempo of combat is slow. (NWP 22-2)

b. **reactive targeting** – The method used for targeting targets of opportunity. It is used when time and situation do not alllow for deliberate targeting. (OH 7-5)

technical intelligence – See **scientific and technical intelligence.**

terrain intelligence – Processed information on the military significance of natural and manmade characteristics of an area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrain study – An analysis and interpretation of natural and manmade features of an area, their effects on military operations, and the effect of weather and climate on these features. (Joint Pub 1-02)

traffic analysis – The cryptologic discipline which develops information from communications about the composition and operation of communications structure and the organizations they serve. The process involves the study of traffic and related materials and the reconstruction of communication plans to produce signals intelligence.

trafficability – Capability of terrain to bear traffic. It refers to the extent to which the terrain will permit continued movement of any and/or all types of traffic. (Joint Pub 1-02)

transmission security – The component of communications security which results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and from exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. (Joint Pub 1-02)

V

validation – A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence information which provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not previously been satisfied.

vulnerabilities:

1. **enemy vulnerabilities** – An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat.
2. **national vulnerabilities** – National vulnerabilities are those susceptibilities of a nation to any action, by any means, in peace or war through which its war potential may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.

Appendix XX

References

1. Joint Publications

Joint Pub 1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Pub 1-03.15	JRS (Joint Reporting Structure), Intelligence
Joint Pub 1-03.16	JRS Joint Operations Planning System
Joint Pub 3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
Joint Pub 3-02.1	Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations
Joint Pub 3-51	(C) Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations (U)
Joint Pub 3-51.1	(S) Electronic Warfare Procedures for Joint Tactical Operations (U)
Joint Pub 3-56 series	Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance Procedures for Joint Operations (Information Exchange Planning Guidance)
	Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual
NAVMC 2800	Joint User's Handbook for Message Text Formats (JUH-MTF)

2. Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals

DIAM 50-3	Physical Security Standard for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)
DIAM 57 series	Intelligence Processing
DIAM 58 series	Intelligence Collection
DIAM 59-1	Intelligence Dissemination/Reference Services
DIAM 65-3-1	Standard Coding System, Functional Classification Handbook

3. Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 0-3	Doctrinal Publications Guide
FMFM 1-3B	Sniping
FMFM 3-1	Command and Staff Action
FMFM 3-20	Commander's Guide to Intelligence
FMFM 3-23	(C) Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U)
FMFM 3-24	Amphibious Reconnaissance (under development)
FMFM 3-25	Counterintelligence (under development)
FMFM 4	Combat Service Support
FMFM 5-1	Marine Aviation
FMFM 6-1	Marine Division
FMFM 6-2	Marine Infantry Regiment

FMFM 6-3	Marine Infantry Battalion
FMFM 7-1	Fire Support Coordination
FMFM 7-5	Doctrine for Navy/Marine Joint Riverine Operations
FMFM 8-1	Special Operations
FMFM 8-2	Counterinsurgency Operations
FMFM 8-3	Advanced Naval Base Defense

4. U.S. Navy Publications

NWP 10-1-41	(S) Naval Operational Deception and Counterdeception (U)
NWP 11	Naval Operational Planning
NWP 12-4(5)	Societ Ocean Surveillance Threat
NWP 12-6	(S) Tactical Electronic Warfare Planning Guide (U)
NWP 12-7, 1-4	Recognition Guide Series
NWP 12-9	(S) Naval Tactical Intelligence (U)
NWP 15-1	(C) SEAL Team in Naval Special Warfare (U)
NWP 19-1	Navy Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual
NWP 22-1	The Amphibious Task Force Plan
NWP 22-2	Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations
NWP 22-4	(C) Underwater Demolition Teams in Amphibious Operations (U)
NWP 43	(S) Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape (U)
Navair 10-35-685	Image Interpretation Handbook, Vol. II

5. U.S. Army Field Manuals and Training Circulars

FM 5-30	Engineer Intelligence
FM 5-33	Terrain Analysis
FM 19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons
FM 21-26	Map Reading and Land Navigation
FM 21-31	Topographic Symbols
FM 21-76	Survival, Evasion, and Escape
FM 21-78	Prisoner of War Resistance
FM 30-10A	(C) Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U)
FM 30-16	Technical Intelligence
FM 33-1	Psychological Operations
FM 34-1	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-2	(S) Collection Management (U)
FM 34-3	Intelligence Analysis
FM 34-52	Intelligence Interrogation
FM 34-60	Counterintelligence Operations
FM 34-62	Counter-Signals Intelligence (C-SIGINT)
FM 34-82	Military Intelligence Unit Exercise Development Guide
FM 41-5	Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
FM 100-2-1, 2, 3	The Soviet Army Series
TC 34-5	(S) Human Intelligenge Operations (U)

6. U.S. Air Force Regulations

AFR 105-3	Meteorological Support for the U.S. Army
AFR 200-3	The Medical Intelligence Program
AFR 200-15	Air Force Intelligence Functional Doctrine
AFR 200-16	Air Force Targeting
AFR 200-18	(S) USAF Intelligence Targeting Handbook (U)
AFR 200-19	Conduct of Intelligence Activities

7. Department of Defense Directive

DOD Directive S-5200.17 (D)	Security Use and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence (C^3I)

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