VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Speaking before the Forty-Sixth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham called for an international conference to address the threat posed by the potential misuse of radiological materials to construct Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), often referred to as “dirty bombs.” </p />
A dirty bomb contains radioactive material, but does not use that material to produce a nuclear explosion, as is the case with a nuclear weapon. Dirty bombs are constructed of conventional explosives and radioactive material and are designed to disperse that radioactive material. Such weapons are ideal for terrorists because of their relative simplicity and the widespread availability of suitable radioactive material in medical isotopes, radiography sources, and power sources used in remote areas.
“Although these dirty bombs are not comparable to nuclear weapons in destructiveness, they are far easier to assemble and employ,” said Abraham. “While the physical destruction they would cause is comparable to conventional explosives, the disruption caused by widespread contamination is far greater. And it is disruption that terrorists seek.” In addition to the psychological disruption, use of a dirty bomb could have significant economic consequences.
Abraham’s call for an international conference builds on several earlier U.S. initiatives, some taken jointly with the Russian Federation and the IAEA. In May 2002, Secretary Abraham and his Russian counterpart, Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, agreed to work cooperatively to secure radioactive sources in Russia. Under this agreement the United States has worked with Russia to identify the specific sources of greatest concern, has committed $1 million for security upgrades at the largest radiological repository in Russia, reached agreement on upgrades at several other high priority sites, and began discussion on material consolidation.
Building on this agreement, in June 2002, the United States, Russia, and the IAEA established a tripartite working group on “Securing and Managing Radioactive Sources.” This working group will “develop a coordinated and proactive strategy to locate, recover, secure and recycle orphan sources throughout the Former Soviet Union.” It represents the first concerted international response to the threat posed by vulnerable radioactive sources in the non-Russian states of the Former Soviet Union. Under this initiative contracts were signed in August with Georgia for upgrading security for at-risk sources. In parallel with these foreign efforts, the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are examining areas in which Federal resources should be directed to improve protection against radiological dispersal devices.
Plans found in Afghan bunkers revealed in detail the interest of al Qaeda in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs, or “dirty bombs”). The discovery of these plans demonstrates the importance of incorporating radiological dispersal devices into the world’s nonproliferation and counterterrorism strategy.
Under Abraham’s proposal, the United States would work closely with the IAEA to make the proposed conference a reality. As Abraham has noted elsewhere, “Safeguarding weapons usable material should always be the highest priority of the IAEA. But the organization also needs to seek ways to formally expand its scope to deal with dangers posed by lower grade nuclear materials. The international community must do more, and the IAEA is the best and most appropriate vehicle for marshalling our collective resources.”
The IAEA has the technical expertise to help states respond appropriately to this problem. The conference the United States proposes would help states understand the need to draw on that expertise to develop appropriate national standards for accounting for and tracking radiological materials.
Secretary Abraham's speech given at the IAEA Conference
Media Contact:
