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LECTURE No. 5.

Subject: The Cavalry on the Offensive.

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## CAVALRY ON THE OFFENSIVE.

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### *Lecture No. 5.*

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#### DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART.

During the days of knights in armor, and up to the time of Gustavus Adolphus, cavalry consisted merely of mounted men, heavily weighted, using it is true, shock action, but dependent rather on individual combat than on that of masses, for decisive results.

Gustavus Adolphus first organized his cavalry as such, but it remained for Charles XII to understand its true role. A further advance was made during the reign of Louis XV, and based upon this advance as well as his own experience, Marshal Saxe made rapid strides in the efficient use of cavalry,—he first recognized that shock action was the paramount function of cavalry.

Frederick the Great understood, probably better than any other general of ancient or modern times, how to use his cavalry decisively on the field of battle. This he was able to do as a result of perfect training of men and horses, under leaders possessing the highest qualifications. Frederick's cavalry was, however, deficient in the principles of Security and Information to such an extent that the troops of Austria, unable to cope with it in action, were able to elude it at will, while rendering most important ser-

vices in the gaining of information regarding Frederick's movements and dispositions, and leaving him in the dark as far as any knowledge of their own forces was concerned.

Napoleon had a perfect knowledge of the uses and value of his cavalry, which he utilized effectively against all arms as well as in screening and reconnoitering; but even this marvelous man permitted the weighting down of his cavalymen and their horses to such an extent that the charge could not be delivered at a faster gait than the slow gallop or trot. As a consequence, when the Cossacks with their extreme mobility and expert horsemanship were to be reckoned with, a factor appeared which as much as any other, contributed to Napoleon's downfall—he had no light cavalry to counteract this factor, and it could not be created in a moment.

Cavalry tactics and cavalry strategy underwent a complete revolution during the Civil War; raiding was brought to its complete development for the first time, under such contributors as Morgan and Forrest, the latter in particular having caused his enemy more trouble than was caused by any other single cavalryman in history.

The cavalry of this period was divided into regular and partisan and guerrillas; the characteristics of the two last mentioned being extreme mobility, habitual reliance on fire action and dismounted tactics.

General J. E. B. Stuart, ignoring old methods, evolved entirely new ideas on the subject of handling his regular cavalry, he was more formidable in battle than was Forrest, and his rival in detached action. Stuart is very justly called "The Father of Modern Cavalry Tactics."

The Union cavalry, at first inferior and for a long time deficient, profited by experience, and became the superior. It relied on the saber, but all the while it

cultivated the carbine to such an extent that its superiority was mainly due to its equal expertness in the use of either arm.

There was no advance made during the Austro-Prussian war; there were no raids, no fire arms,—cavalry actually fell back to the methods of the Napoleonic era.

During the Franco-Prussian war, the German showed that they had profited by our Civil War experiences; they so far outclassed their opponents that no comparison can well be drawn, their detached action was particularly fine, but they were opposed by distinctly inferior cavalry whose poor handling made them appear in even a worse light than would have been the case under efficient leaders.

During the Turko-Russian conflict, Gourko alone used his cavalry according to the experience of the past; his Cossacks were used most admirably, in screening, in raiding and in the various phases of detached action.

No further use of large bodies of cavalry occurred until the Boer war, where the English learned by the most bitter and humiliating experience, to heed the lessons that we learned in 1861-2-and '3, and applied in '63 and '64.

Much has appeared by continental writers on the necessity of reformation and reorganization in the cavalry branch of the service, new arms are recommended, some advocate the saber and carbine, some still cling to the lance, etc., etc., some dilate on the new field of action for cavalry—independent, detached action; and yet there is a tinge of absurdity in all this when we stop a moment and reflect that modern cavalry the world over is but approaching the type of our own American cavalry as it has existed since the close of the Civil War. We have given our troopers an up-to-date firearm, no other change

except of minor importance has yet been found necessary.

In foreign armies, details of organization differ for political reasons, and also on account of national adaptability and resources; aside from such details, cavalry as far as its real use and value are concerned, has not materially changed from the days of the close of the civil war. Our successes, and the reasons for them, were patent to the whole world, and the whole world with the possible exception of the Germans, was unaccountably unwilling to profit by the experience,—doubly cheap for them, gained as it was at our expense. Screening, raiding, all sorts of detached action, action dismounted, and the fleeting opportunities of the charge—all occurred time after time. Surely we need not now look to foreigners for the instruction we gave them forty years ago.

The following axioms are worthy of note regarding cavalry:

1. Success lies with that cavalry which unites greatest mobility with highest power of cohesion in the charge, and supplements the effect with effective use of its weapons during the melee.
2. Mounted fire action is often successful during the pursuit, occasionally so, before the delivery of the charge, but rarely is cavalry depending on such action alone, able to accomplish anything of importance on the field of battle.
3. Extreme mobility under all conditions is an essential.
4. Cavalry which cannot fight dismounted is an essentially dependent arm, incapable of assuming the tactical defensive.

Summing up, the American cavalryman—the dragoon—with his ability to fight mounted or dismounted, possesses all the requirements for success in battle or in detached action; his use on the actual field of bat-

tle has been to a certain extent curtailed due to the increased range and precision of modern fire arms; this diminution of his usefulness is, however, more than compensated for by the strategical advantages secured by the widely increased range of the sphere and duties of independent action which he now enjoys. To-day, armed with the very same rifle as is the infantryman, he should be as formidable on the ground in attack or defense as the latter can possibly be—when in addition you arm him with the sabre and the revolver, and train him in their efficient intelligent use, and then mount him and make of him an expert horseman, surely no army in the world can produce a more formidable fighting machine.

The efficiency of cavalry depends almost entirely upon the way in which it is used, no arm is so quickly ruined or so difficult to replace.

It is upon the training of the individual trooper in the duties of a scout that the efficiency of a patrol depends, upon the patrol hinges the efficiency of a troop, and so on in regular gradations up to the highest units.

Taking first in order cavalry in close order, it may be stated as a general rule that cavalry maneuvers in columns, the smaller the better, as accidents of the ground are thus utilized to better advantage for cover, the target presented to the hostile artillery is smaller, obstacles are more easily passed, and above all superior mobility is obtained. The charge may be delivered either in line or in column. In line, in close order, the troopers are boot to boot, the forward movement increasing in rapidity by gradations, until it finally terminates in the shock delivered at full speed. The higher the speed, and the greater the cohesion and weight of the charging force, the greater the effects of the shock. The greater the skill of the individual troopers in the use of their weapons, the greater the

results in the melee. The immediate result of the shock, either in victory or defeat, is disorder, which varies directly with the size of the force employed.

In order then, to prevent a charging body from being defeated by a fresh hostile force held in hand for the purpose, during the moments of disorder due to success, as well as to guard against a counter charge, it is necessary to have a support close at hand. As the flanks are dangerously weak points in cavalry, this support must be so posted that it can be readily thrown forward to protect its own attacking line, or diverted to attack the enemy's flank if opportunity offers. It is therefore usually echeloned on the outer, or more exposed flank, from which position it is more readily launched against the flank of the hostile cavalry.

In the case of large forces, and varying with the conditions of terrain and numerical strength of the enemy, the support may be posted with wide intervals, in rear of the attacking line, or even echeloned on the less exposed flank.

If in rear of the attacking line, the intervals are necessary to prevent its being run down by troopers who in case of a retreat generally break straight to the rear in disorder.

The support is as a rule drawn into the melee for one reason or another, hence a reserve is necessary to decide the victory and conduct the pursuit, or cover the retreat in case of defeat.

The reserve is usually echeloned on the flank opposite to that of the support.

In general, the support and the reserve relieve the forces in front of them of all anxiety about the flanks.

In a cavalry combat, that force which is last able to bring a formed reserve into action, is as a rule victorious.

Where the force is small, the duties of the support and the reserve are generally combined in a single body, part being kept well in hand and unbroken, while the remainder is launched into the fight.

As a general rule, however, cavalry attacks in three bodies,—an attacking line,—a support—and a reserve.

The attacking line must be relatively strong, for in case of failure the rest can do little beyond preventing a complete reverse; if it is too strong, it may fail while it is in the disorder following the shock, due to the lack of an adequate support.

While no definite rule can be given, it is suggested that the attacking line may consist of one-half the force, with a support varying from one-fourth to one-third, and a reserve of from one-fourth to one-sixth of the entire force.

Organizations should always if possible be preserved intact, though in small bodies the same troops may furnish the reserve and the support.

Distances between subdivisions of the attacking force vary with its size, and depend to a great extent on the natural cover afforded by the terrain.

In the case of a troop, the distance from the attacking line to the support is about 80 to 90 yards, from the latter to the reserve from 150 to 175 yards—in the case of a Brigade or a Division, the former distance is from 275 to 300 yards, the latter from 175 to 225 yards.

In case the flank of the attacking line is seriously threatened, the support may be closed to not less than 100 yards.

When the support is echeloned on the flank, its inner flank should be from 75 to 100 yards beyond the outer flank of the attacking line; the reserve in such a case is similarly posted with respect to the flank on which it is placed.



In moving forward to the attack, the attacking line should be formed either in line of troops in columns of fours at full intervals, or in line of platoon columns; the deployment into line must be made at the right moment—if delayed too long, the attacking line may itself be attacked while it is in an unfavorable formation—if made too soon, the chances of surprise are less, and of exposure to loss greater, while any change of direction while in line notoriously destroys the cohesion and weakens the effects of the shock.

The support should be maneuvered in small columns at deploying intervals, its movements conforming to those of the attacking line. Similarly, the reserve.

In any case, when a body is in the midst of taking up a formation, and time does not admit of its completion, each troop or squadron may advance to the attack as soon as it is formed.

The advantages of the charge in single rank have been derived from experience—some advocate the double rank, but it suffices to say that we have found the single rank to be better.

In moving to the attack, the slow trot is taken until the zone of effective artillery fire is entered, when the speed is increased to that of the full trot, which is maintained until arrival of the line within about 600 yards of the hostile position.

The columns then deploy into line at the gallop, which at a distance of 100 yards from the enemy is increased to the maximum speed of the slowest horse. Cohesion must not be lost, and the more excited the men and horses can be made to become by the addition of yelling and the blasts of the trumpet to the heat of the charge, the more desirable the effect on the wavering morale of the enemy, while the reverse obtains with respect to that of the attacking force.

The long ranges and the accuracy and power of the

guns and rifles of today, render it imperative for the cavalry of any army to be able to pass at a fast gait over a minimum distance of from 4 to 5 miles, and then be able to deliver a charge and follow it up, with the requisite energy.

If the ground is open, the charge must be begun at a greater distance than when the sheltering features of the terrain can be utilized as a protection from the enemy's fire.

As the attacking line charges, the support takes the full gallop, charging at the proper time against intact organizations of the enemy, or at an exposed flank—the support may on occasion be detached either entirely or in part to deliver a distinct but simultaneous charge on the enemy's flank in conjunction with the main attack.

This may constitute a surprise if conditions admit, or it may be merely a feint with a view to causing a division of the forces of the enemy, keeping him bewildered as to the direction from which to expect the main attack.

The reserve is not habitually thrown into action in the attack except to guard against a sudden, unexpected flank attack, or to take prompt advantage of an opportunity to do damage.

It should not fall so far to the rear as to be unable to respond promptly to the orders of the commander. Its own commander, however, is not deprived of a certain initiative, and lack of orders would not excuse him from failure to take advantage of any opportunity to deliver a decisive blow.

The reserve, if in column, forms line of columns at deploying intervals as soon as the attacking line charges; when the support charges, it assumes the functions of the latter.

In the saber charge, the officers lead; when the revolver is used, they take station in the ranks opposite their habitual positions, or else on the flanks.

All unoccupied bodies of cavalry in the vicinity of the charging line should, without orders, form a part of the reserve, unless they are stationed at a particular place, with a definite object in view.

In all cases and particularly when infantry is the object of the attack, the enemy should be well shaken by artillery fire which should be continued until the charging force masks the guns.

After a successful charge, the enemy should be pursued by the troopers engaged in the melee, until they can be relieved by the support and the reserve; no time should be allowed the enemy for rallying, but from the moment that he breaks he should be driven off the field under the protection of his infantry and guns.

If the charge should fail, the attacking line withdraws in such a manner as to avoid collision with the support and reserve, both of which should endeavor to strike the pursuer in flank.

The attacking line then rallies and acts as a support to its former support and reserve.

The conditions of terrain have a far greater effect upon the action of cavalry than upon that of any other arm; open, level ground is by no means the best for the delivery of a cavalry charge, or for cavalry action; no surprise is here possible, and artillery has an unbroken sweep.

Undulating ground, if not too broken by serious obstacles, is the best inasmuch as it affords shelter and does not impede the force of the attack.

A combination of open and enclosed ground is favorable for an attack, provided there are passages from one clearing to another, and that an opening exists suitable for a charge, immediately in front of the place of collision.

The worst possible combination is that ground which

impedes the progress of the attack, and in addition affords no shelter.

For the charge in line, there should be room enough for lateral deployment, and for a flank attack, otherwise the charge must be delivered in some other formation.

There should always be room enough to gain full headway to the front, and for the melee and the rally—above all, there should be no serious obstacle left in rear on which the cavalry in case of reverse might be forced back.

A charge over unknown ground frequently ends in disaster, without any effort on the part of the enemy, hence the necessity for always sending out ground scouts to reconnoiter the ground.

These men should be selected for their ability as reliable scouts, especially quick in observation; they move well to the front and communicate by signal. When the charge begins, they clear the front at a run and take position on the flanks of the attacking line.

Whenever cavalry halts in the presence of the enemy, ground scouts and flank patrols should be at once sent out.

Cavalry in large or small bodies should always be ready to move out for independent action—which faculty is not a prerogative of any other arm.

The charge may also be delivered in column of subdivisions, distances being regulated by the necessity for successive units being able to support promptly and not being compromised in the defeat of those in front.

Until the time of deployment, the subdivisions in rear should be held in small columns, so as to leave openings for the preceding lines in case of defeat; each subdivision, after charging and when it is temporarily the leading unit, if repulsed or broken up by the shock, should endeavor to clear the flanks of the main column and form in its rear.

The various columns prescribed in the Drill Regulations, or a line of such columns may be used, depending upon circumstances, the idea being to deliver a succession of shocks falling on the same place.

This method is preferable to the attack in line, unless the latter offers opportunities for flank attacks either direct or in conjunction with the front attack.

It is of vital importance that the subdivisions be not too close in rear of each other.

The charge may also be delivered in column of fours, each four taking the extended gallop when the one next preceding it has gained a distance of three yards. If the front is limited, the double column of fours may be practicable, when the front of a single set of fours is inadequate, in this case it may be possible to use the sabre on the right flank, and the revolver on the left. These formations are especially applicable to street fighting.

In charging as foragers, the troopers may take up the formation from either extended or close order. The revolver is always used, unless there are specific orders otherwise.

The troopers charge in couples with an interval of about six yards, while a reserve consisting of from one-fourth to one-third of the force should be kept well in hand in close order.

This method is especially adapted to broken and wooded ground, to charging a battery or a skirmish line, or to diminish the target exposed to hostile artillery or infantry fire. It may be used effectually in annoying the enemy and compelling him to lose time in deploying, as well as in his pursuit when broken and defeated.

The charge proper may be checked as such, and the order as foragers taken, as in the case when the enemy's cavalry breaks and turns prior to the shock.

Cavalry will frequently be called upon to attack

positions, as for instance to drive out a rear guard which is hanging on to a hill; or it may in reconnaissance run on to a position the immediate possession of which may be of the highest importance. In this latter case, it is probable that horses must be left behind as soon as the fire becomes destructive.

General Rimington, with true cavalry spirit believes that a cavalry charge on anything like even terms, should, as a rule, be successful. "The fact is," he says, "only the leading charging men and horses are hit—the others meanwhile get in." They do not see each other fall, they do not know their own casualties. If in addition the riflemen charged on, are well sprinkled with shell fire, they are apt to keep their heads and bodies low, and direct their line of fire upward, enabling successive supports of the charging line to come close and not be so much subject to the usual conditions of a flat trajectory.

Cavalry may occasion delays and damage in conjunction with a main attack by infantry and artillery, by merely threatening to attack the flanks, or different exposed portions of the opposing line.

#### CAVALRY VS. CAVALRY.

It is probable that every great battle of the future will open with a cavalry engagement.

In the first place, the screens of the opposing armies are charged with reconnoitering, and with the prevention of reconnaissance by the enemy's cavalry.

In the performance of these duties, constant attempts to break through an opposing screen, and to thwart the enemy who is trying to do the same thing, will lead to continual encounters between the screening forces of cavalry.

When the armies are within the presence of each other, the screens uncover the fronts, and each endeavors to reconnoiter and strike the flanks of the

main body of the other. Local cavalry combats of greater or less magnitude are bound to occur.

Similarly, it being the duty of the cavalry of a retreating or a defeated army, to cover the retreat, and that of the victorious army to conduct the pursuit, it would seem that as a general rule, all the great battles of the future must close with a cavalry battle.

The best opportunities for a cavalry attack upon the opposing cavalry may be summed up as follows:

1. When the latter is issuing from a defile, in a narrow front.
2. When it can be surprised in column formation.
3. When it can be taken in flank while it is charging another body.
4. When it is exhausted.
5. When it is changing formation.
6. When it is on ground unfavorable to its deployment, but which presents no obstacle to the attacking force.

The cavalry combats will in general be conducted by the cavalry divisions—Corps cavalry may be employed in unison with the cavalry divisions, in screening, in pursuit, in covering a retreat, or in defense of divisional artillery.

As a rule it will rarely be used in a purely cavalry fight.

#### AGAINST INFANTRY.

It may be accepted as an axiom, that infantry which is *good, intact, well supplied with ammunition, and not surprised*, cannot be broken by a cavalry charge. It may be also accepted as a fact that all infantry does not combine the above qualifications—at least not at all times. The absence of any one of them gives cavalry the opportunity it is looking for, and under the following circumstances, cavalry may be effectively used against infantry:—

1. When the infantry is demoralized or of poor quality.
2. When the infantry can be taken by surprise.
3. When the infantry is out of ammunition.
4. When the infantry is broken by the fire of the opposing infantry or artillery.
5. When the infantry is engaged with opposing infantry.
6. To compel the infantry to take up such a formation as to present a good target to the fire of the opposing artillery.
7. To check an attack of the enemy's infantry and gain time for the arrival of reinforcements.
8. When infantry is exhausted by a prolonged contest with infantry.
9. When infantry is disordered in retreat.
10. In covering a retreat.
11. To cut through a surrounding force of hostile infantry.

And in one more case cavalry will be used in the future as it has been in the past—as an act of complete self-sacrifice, to cover the arrival and posting of reinforcements to cause diversion and delay until an important position can be occupied, or to permit the withdrawal of infantry and artillery in case of defeat.

If the opposing infantry is in masses or in line in close order, the attack should be made in column of subdivisions as previously explained. If the infantry is extended, the charge as foragers should be used with close order supports whose strength should be from one-third to one-half that of the entire cavalry force.

In the charge, the shortest route should always be taken, and a flank should in general be the objective. There is an advantage in charging up a slight slope, and in approaching from the right front of the infantry.



In attacking infantry, the lessening of the time of exposure to fire is of paramount importance, hence the gallop must be taken much sooner than in the case of attacking cavalry.

In such an attack, the charging cavalry must not mask the fire of its own infantry and artillery, otherwise it plays into the hands of the enemy who having for the moment nothing to fear except from the attacking cavalry, can give it his undivided attention.

There are no grounds for believing that cavalry will not be used against infantry in future wars, nor that such use will not be frequent and effectual.

It must be granted that cavalry attacks from the front—against infantry with the qualifications mentioned, will be a hazardous proceeding. Such criticism applies to a certain extent to the infantry, too. In addition, there are twelve distinct cases in which cavalry can be effectively used against infantry under conditions which are bound to arise in every battle of the future. Cavalry leaders must be men who are capable of embracing the opportunities as they occur, and every war brings out such men when they are needed.

Naturally the losses will be great, but no greater than will be sustained by other branches of the service on equally numerous occasions.

Both infantry and cavalry can profit, the latter to a lesser degree, by the covering features of the terrain; the target presented by the infantry is not so large, but a stable target is far more easy to hit than a moving one.

There are many other considerations, not the least of which are those comprising the morale, which like all questions may be considered from more than one point of view.

The future of the cavalry depends to a very great extent on its leaders who are born with the necessary qualifications.

Some requisites of cavalry leadership may be acquired, but the more important ones can not. Brave men on horseback may accomplish all that entitles them to the name of mounted infantry, beyond this one enters the unique realm of real cavalry.

#### AGAINST ARTILLERY.

If the artillery, as has been said of the infantry, is good, unbroken, well supplied with ammunition, unsurprised and well supported, it should have no fear of a front attack by cavalry. But again in this case, a combination of these qualifications does not always, or nearly always, exist. Cavalry is not going to make front attacks under such conditions. Secrecy and celerity in moving introduce the feature of surprise, which gives the cavalryman the opportunity he may to a great extent create.

The following opportunities will be offered in battle for effective use of cavalry against artillery:

1. When artillery, hurried into action, is unsupported by the other arms.

2. When in the course of the battle the infantry supports have been driven back, or have exhausted their ammunition, and the artillery stands alone.

3. When the artillery can be surprised, especially while limbering up or in the act of unlimbering.

The tendency of the times seems to be for the use of artillery in masses, or at least in positions mutually supporting each other, consequently the element of surprise is of more importance than formerly, and the necessity for rapidity of action far greater.

In the attack upon a battery, the cavalry must be divided into at least three parts—the attacking line as foragers divides near the center as it advances, and endeavors to strike the flanks (escort and cannoneers). The support advances to secure the battery, while the reserve advances in close order to deliver a concluding

blow if necessary, as well as to repel a counter charge.

In the case of a cavalry escort, the guns are charged as indicated, but the escort must be charged in close order.

The flanks of artillery in position offer the greatest chances of success.

Batteries are attacked, (1) for the purpose of capture; (2) to disable; (3) to cause so much annoyance that they will change positions. A battery once gained possession of should, if possible, be carried off. If this cannot be done, the horses should be killed and the traces cut—this latter only in case it is impracticable to run off the horses and limbers.

The shooting of team horses, preferably wheelers, will delay a battery and facilitate capture.

If cavalry of the enemy can be found standing on the local defensive, a prompt attack should be made. Such cavalry ought to be at the mercy of a well handled attack.

#### DISMOUNTED.

Cavalry may be used on the offensive, dismounted:

1. To drive out small parties of infantry or partisans well posted for the purpose of delaying or checking the reconnaissance or raid they are making.

In such cases the horse holders keep their charges under cover—a mounted reserve is left to prevent the horses from being surprised and run off by the enemy. The dismounted troopers proceed to the attack as in the case of infantry.

2. To force a defile which blocks an advance and thus avoid delay for the troops in rear.

3. To hold important localities they have seized, until infantry arrives to relieve them.

4. To reinforce infantry in emergencies.

5. To fill a gap in the line of battle.

6. In any country where the thickness of the woods, fences, ditches, etc; makes mounted action impracticable.

7. Whenever through force of circumstances loss of mounts makes dismounted action imperative.

8. In conjunction with cavalry mounted.

Some of these cases apply as well to the defense, which is not within our province. The value of dismounted action lies principally in the fact that with the long-range fire arms of today, the enemy may be subjected to a destructive fire, and a prompt withdrawal effected, before any damage can be done in return.

The formation for dismounted action is found in the Drill Regulations; led horses should always be brought up to the line (or remain standing) in the same formation as when the troopers left them. Otherwise, confusion will reign at a critical time, when haste is of greatest urgency.

A mounted reserve is retained in addition to the reserve of the dismounted attacking force.

In a thick country when scouting, guarding convoys, or in savage warfare and against partisans, it is frequently advisable to advance dismounted, as skirmishers, with the horses on the lariat. Such action is, however, best confined to the cases where it is of importance to fight a delaying action, or to keep at a distance an annoying and insignificant enemy. Any real work which may come up, is performed by regularly dismounting the men to fight on foot, where mounted action is not considered desirable.

The enemy should be approached as closely as possible before dismounting, and there should usually be no occasion demanding dismounting before artillery fire is encountered.

As many carbines as possible should be placed in the firing line from the very first, and no delay should be permitted in closing with the enemy.

If the attack is successful, the mounted reserve pursues while the attacking line holds the position until

its mounts are brought up, when it is assembled and follows the reserve in pursuit, or prepares to defend the position against a counter attack, according to circumstances.

In conjunction with such an attack, whenever men are available, an attempt should be made against the flank or rear of the enemy.

Ground scouts and combat patrols (mounted when ever possible) are invariably sent out. The change from action dismounted to action mounted should always be prepared for. On charging, the ground scouts are drawn in, the combat patrols remain out.

#### MOUNTED FIRE ACTION.

Mounted fire action may be used on the offensive:

1. In the charge, using the revolver in shock action instead of the saber.
2. In the pursuit, a mounted charge being impracticable.
3. When the opposing cavalry is charging over unfavorable (heavy) ground.

It is habitually used in extended order only. It may be used as above stated in close order; it constitutes the least effective use of cavalry, and should not be used when shock action or dismounted fire action are practicable.

As a matter of fact, it is believed that troops and squadrons of cavalry can be trained to deliver a very effective fire mounted. Individuals shoot very accurately from a moving horse. Masses can be taught to do it, too.

#### RAIDS.

From a strategic point of view, a well timed and properly conducted raid by cavalry, may be undertaken for the purpose of accomplishing one or more of the following objects:

1. To threaten or destroy the communications of

the enemy (thus compelling him to weaken himself for their protection), or delay his advance.

2. To check an invading army, by operations against its communications, and the capture of its immediate base of supplies. (An excellent example of this, is the raid made by General Van Dorn against Holly Springs, Mississippi, in 1862.)

This raid decided a campaign just as effectively as the most decisive sort of a battle could have done. Such far reaching results warrant the sacrifice of every man and horse taking part.

3. To make a diversion in favor of the main body, by drawing off troops in pursuit of the raiding forces.

4. To gain information.

5. To cause alarm in the enemy's country and thus destroy confidence in the enemy's commanding general, or create a sentiment unfavorable to the prosecution of the war.

6. To interfere with the mobilization and concentration of the enemy's forces at the beginning of a campaign. In this case more effective results can often be accomplished by small raiding parties than by large ones.

7. To devastate the enemy's country and destroy his resources.

8. To effect the release of prisoners.

When raids are undertaken for this purpose, it is necessary to avoid embarrassing the raiding column with a mass of unarmed men on foot. The raid will result in failure unless the liberated prisoners can be quickly conducted to some point of safety near at hand, or can be provided with arms and thus form a reinforcement, capable of enabling the raiding party to repulse any attack that is likely to be made upon it.

Raids are rarely practicable in the enemy's country: information is hard to obtain, and a hostile population may not only render foraging difficult in the extreme,

but may also so annoy and obstruct the advancing raiders, that the latter, operating in the dark, will be at every disadvantage against their well informed and previously prepared foes.

The various opportunities offered by a raid, furnish a sore temptation to every true cavalryman, but this temptation should be resisted unless the object to be attained justifies the raid.

The peril of capture is always imminent, but may be avoided by courage and skill, the great danger lies in almost certain demoralization of the command by a spirit of depredation, or of its being for a considerable period of time rendered unserviceable by the extreme fatigue and exhaustion incident to such service; above all is the risk of absence from the army when a decisive engagement is fought.

A raiding column should consist of well mounted men, who are in addition well disciplined and self-reliant. They should also be so thoroughly toughened by service as to be able to bear the severest hardships.

Organizations should be complete, and the total force should not be less than 800 troopers, or exceed 3,000.

The quickest work, requiring secrecy, is demanded, the smaller the force, the better; on the other hand when a region is to be devastated or the enemy's resources are to be destroyed, a large force is necessary.

As the force must be strong enough to brush away the hostile bodies which may be in its path, and small enough to comply with the requirements of mobility, the resistance to be encountered should be carefully figured out in advance and the strength of the column regulated accordingly.

There is no place for infantry in a raiding column, unless there are mounts, impressed or otherwise, available. Wheels of any description are a nuisance to such an extent that even artillery should not be

taken, unless it is capable of being carried on mules. Two guns to 1,000 horsemen is about the proper proportion.

Horse artillery may be used when there are no more mobile batteries available.

The raiding forces must expect to live on the country, but in order to meet emergencies, a reserve supply of forage and rations ought to be carried.

Half rations and half forage should be taken to cover the whole number of days computed in advance by the commanding officer, as not available for foraging.

Each trooper must be provided with extra ammunition and spare shoes for his horse; pioneer tools and explosives must be provided and carried on pack animals for use in the various demolitions which may be required.\*

There should be a fixed object in view before starting, and in case of failure from any cause, the commanding officer should have a secondary objective available, in order to avoid a fruitless raid with its consequent vicious effects on the morale of his own troops, and the contrary as regards the forces of the enemy.

Each expedition presents its own peculiar feature to which operations must be conformed, hence no definite rules for the conduct of raids can be laid down.

Unless the raiding force is very large, it will usually be advisable to march in a single column in order to hold the men in hand; parallel columns can not be depended upon for junction at critical moments, and delays are generally fatal.

The front and flanks are covered by individual scouts and small patrols; small parties whose total strength should not exceed one-third the strength of the entire command should be kept out to acquire for-

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\*See Beach's Manual Field Engineering.



age and seize horses to replace those of the raiding column when they are broken down.

Receipts should invariably be given for everything that is taken, and no family should be left destitute.

These receipts permit of remuneration when properly presented, together with proofs of loyalty, in the meantime they serve as a protection from further requisition except in cases of imperative necessity.

Whenever circumstances render it necessary to detach any portion of the command, the Commanding Officer of the force to be detached should be clearly instructed both in regard to what is expected of him, as well as what he must do in case he finds it impossible to rejoin his command.

The duties of the Cavalry Screen are so well covered in Security and Information that it is not necessary for us to dwell on that very important duty of Cavalry.

To sum up:—

Cavalry tactics comprises more variations than does that of any other arm. It embraces shock action in line and in column mounted, and in line dismounted.

Fire action is used both mounted and on foot; a combination of fire and shock action either mounted or dismounted, as well as the simultaneous fire action dismounted and shock action mounted or the reverse, can be brought into play by different parts of the same command.

The horse can follow wherever man can lead at the same rate of speed the latter is capable of maintaining.

The arms, training and tactical formations of modern cavalry adapt it to use on every sort of ground, and in every phase of action, and thus is sustained the famous apothegm of General Kilpatrick "Cavalry can fight anywhere except at sea."

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## QUESTION SHEET

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### *Lecture No. 5.*

1. State how cavalry should habitually be maneuvered, and give reasons therefor.
2. Describe briefly the charge in close order.
3. Upon what do the effects of the shock depend?
4. Why is a support necessary for an attacking line, and where is it posted with respect to that line under various conditions?
5. How is a body of cavalry divided preparatory to the attack in line?
6. Give the general proportion of the entire force, assigned to (a) the attacking line; (b) the support; (c) the reserve.
7. What governs the distances between subdivisions in attack, and give these distance in the case of a brigade?
8. What would be the results of deploying too soon? too late?
9. In moving out to the attack, describe the gaits from the moment of moving forward up to the moment of contact.
10. What is the chief function of the reserve in attack?
11. After a successful attack, what are the duties which devolve on the different subdivisions?
12. What are the effects of the following kinds of terrain upon a cavalry charge--(a) open, level ground; (b) undulating ground; (c) a combination of enclosed and open ground?
13. What is the most essential condition regarding the ground over which a charge is to be delivered?
14. What considerations make it necessary to send out ground scouts and combat patrols, and what are the qualifications of each?
15. When is the attack in line preferable to the charge in columns of subdivisions?
16. In the charge as foragers, what is the strength of the reserve and what is its formation?
17. To what kind of ground, and for what purposes, is the charge as foragers especially adapted?

18. Why will the great battles of the future probably begin and end with cavalry engagements?

19. What opportunities are most favorable for cavalry to attack cavalry?

20. Name the cases in which cavalry can effectively charge infantry.

21. Under what circumstances can cavalry effectively charge artillery?

22. Describe the formation of a cavalry force, in charging a battery.

23. With what objects in view may a battery be attacked by cavalry?

24. Name the cases in which cavalry can be used on the offensive, dismounted.

25. Describe, briefly, the attack dismounted.

26. What is done in case a dismounted attack is successful?

27. When may mounted fire action be used on the offensive and what formation is habitually taken by the troops using it?

28. For what purposes may cavalry raids be undertaken?

29. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of a raid in friendly and hostile theaters?

30. What undesirable effects, as far as the troops themselves are concerned, result from a raid?

31. What should be the qualifications of the individuals composing the raiding force?

32. What should be the composition of a raiding force (including supplies etc, to be carried.)

33. What is the usual formation during a raid, of a column of ordinary strength? (not unusually strong)

34. What instructions should be given to the commander of a force detached from the raiding column? Why are they necessary?

35. Mention the varieties of action embraced by cavalry tactics.

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