## Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan



#### FOREWORD '

In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars.

Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801—59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839—81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918—33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979—89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.

In particular, these cases illustrate the problems commonly confronted by conventional military powers when fighting unconventional foes in undeveloped theaters. Such problems include not only adjustment to the tactics of an unfamiliar enemy but the adaptation of one's own tactics and equipment to constraints imposed on them by terrain, climate, and distance. Political and economic considerations also played a central role and contributed to important shifts in Russian and Soviet strategic designs. Thus, a common thread running through each of these studies is the challenge armies face in conceptualizing and implementing changes after combat operations have begun.

Finally, Dr. Baumann considers broad patterns of conduct apparent in these wars and even compares them with the American experience in similar conflicts. This study will be of broad interest to military professionals and historians alike.

April 1993

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# Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan

by Dr. Robert F. Baumann



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#### Preface



Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, Russians adhered to the old Julian calendar, which during the nineteenth century was twelve days behind the modern Gregorian calendar that is in general use today. Nineteenth-century dates cited in this study are in accordance with the custom of that period. For twentieth-century dates, this study, of course, employs the modern calendar.

With regard to transliteration, this manuscript adheres to the Library of Congress system with a couple of exceptions. First, Russian "hard signs" are not transliterated into English. Second, for spellings of names and places, this manuscript uses accepted English spellings where applicable.

I would like to acknowledge the contributions of many individuals to the production of this manuscript. Special thanks are due to Robert H. Berlin, E. Willis Brooks, Jerry M. Cooper, Lester W. Grau, Jim Holbrook, Jacob W. Kipp, Bruce W. Menning, Roger J. Spiller, Colonel Richard M. Swain, Graham H. Turbiville, and Lawrence A. Yates for their suggestions and assistance in the research and writing of this study. The author also appreciates the thoughtful observations of colleagues in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), as well as numerous USACGSC students who read draft versions of this book as part of their course work. Don Gilmore of CSI provided invaluable help in the editing of this manuscropt. Carolyn Conway and Marilyn Edwards also played important roles in guiding this Leavenworth Paper through the publication process. Robin Inojos and Al Dulin provided skillful assistance with graphics and maps. Librarians Mary Jo Nelson and Timothy L. Sanz again and again helped obtain difficult-tolocate materials. Cooperation from the Slavic Reference Service at the University of Illinois was also most appreciated.