APPENDIX A

Training and Doctrine

> My order of march hitherto had been similar to that used by General Wayne. . . .[1]
>
> —General Harrison, *Postbattle Report*

Raising Armies

U.S. Forces

During the years between the American Revolution and the War of 1812, various mixtures of regular, militia, and volunteer units conducted the major campaigns of the United States. Units from the Regular Army, Indiana, and Kentucky fought at Tippecanoe.[2] To ensure that there were adequate forces available for military duties, Congress had enacted several pieces of legislation regarding national defense. These acts dictated the organization and strength of the military.

The post-Revolutionary War years saw an emphasis on establishing an efficient navy as the primary military tool to support American policy. Meanwhile, ground combat operations were to rely on militias. In light of this policy, it is understandable why militia units from Indiana and Kentucky provided the bulk of forces during the Tippecanoe campaign.[3]

After the American Revolution, Congress placed so little emphasis on maintaining a Continental Army that the army was disbanded, with the exception of one artillery battery to guard the stores at West Point. For several reasons, Congress felt that the United States could afford to rely on a well-regulated militia for defense. One reason was that the oceans provided the country with a measure of protection. Another was that the country was too poor to maintain a large standing army.[4]

Eventually, Congress began to see the need for some type of regular force to protect the frontier. The Constitution gave Congress the authority to raise and appropriate funds for the maintenance of an army for two-year periods. The first post-Revolutionary War army was composed of men on detached service from militias. Congress requested that several states provide men from their militias for a one-year period of service. The army was eventually organized, and Josiah Harmar was appointed commander.[5] This general practice of raising an army for

specific emergencies and for a limited duration continued until the first decade of the nineteenth century.

The Regular Army eventually grew in size, but it still remained extremely small. Even so, it was entrusted with a large territorial responsibility. Prior to the War of 1812, army units garrisoned posts along the Canadian border. Army units had the further responsibility of protecting the American coastline as far as the mouth of the Mississippi. In addition, Army units were responsible for patrolling the borders along Spanish Florida and the Indian frontier. But the 1808 act of Congress allowed the Regular Army fewer than 10,000 men to accomplish all of these various tasks.[6]

Militias, on their part, were designed to provide for local defense, so local governments organized and recruited militia units. The Militia Act of 1792 provided the guidance for forming, organizing, and equipping citizen militias in the states. The Militia Act required free white male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to serve in state militias. The act also provided guidance on the weapons and equipment used by members of the militias and how the states should organize their militias into battalions, regiments, and divisions. The act also authorized the president to call up the militia for federal service—but not in excess of three months in any year. The general principles of the Militia Act prevailed without major revision until 1903.[7]

Several traditional limitations, dating to Colonial America, applied to the employment of militia units. For instance, militias were used for short periods of service (generally three months) and did not serve outside of the boundaries of their home areas without special consent. Volunteer organizations also were developed to supplement the militia system. These units usually equipped themselves and paid dues to maintain meeting places. Some of these units were independent of the militia system, but most were incorporated into the system with special privileges. The services of volunteers remained relevant and important after the Revolutionary War because volunteers provided the federal government with manpower that could be used for longer periods and without regard to geographic limitations.[8]

The Militia Act directed that members of the militia were required to provide themselves with certain minimum items of equipment. One problem was that members of militia units often refused to bring their personal weapons for drill and training. An extremely practical reason for

this attitude existed among the frontiersmen; if a militia soldier damaged his weapon during training, no compensation was promised to replace his broken firearm. In 1798, the Militia Act was amended to allow the federal government to sell or loan weapons to volunteer companies and to set aside 30,000 weapons for sale to the states. This amendment, however, did not achieve the desired result because the states were somewhat reluctant to purchase weapons. Thus, in 1808, Congress appropriated $200,000 to arm militias with muskets.[9]

Congress also had the duty of authorizing payment of militias for active service. There was no authorization, however, allowing payment of Harrison's militia when that general started his march to secure the new purchase. Letters between Harrison and Eustis addressed the problem of paying the militias. In the summer of 1811, Eustis informed Harrison that the act authorizing payment of the militia had expired; consequently, militia called out the previous year could not be paid. Nonetheless, eventually Eustis authorized Harrison to employ Boyd's regulars and a few militia units in the new purchase—even though there were no funds to pay them. Eustis was confident, however, that Congress would authorize payment of the militia in the next session.[10]

Indian Confederacy

Indians organized war parties for various reasons, but no formal procedure, in a legislative sense, existed for such an undertaking. Several fairly common cultural traditions, however, were invoked by the Woodland Indians to organize combat forces after the Revolutionary War in order to fight white encroachments in the Old Northwest. Indian combat elements, once formed, varied in size from small raiding parties to large formations of over 1,000. Many of the confederacies that were organized by the Indians were loose, ad hoc associations. The fighting elements of these coalitions often consisted of various war parties from allied villages that joined the confederacy.

One tradition related to the organizing of Indians was the use of wampum belts, which were a form of record keeping used to commemorate important public occasions. The message on the belt was contained in the shapes and colors of the design. The belts often accompanied important agreements, such as treaties. A wampum belt with a primarily black design was often used to indicate war or the intention to go to war.[11] Wampum belts were one possible communication tool between tribes attempting to organize coalitions. An organizer of a confederacy could dispatch

messengers to potential allies with war wampum belts to request their support during future combat operations. The recipient who accepted the invitation could organize a war party and join his new ally in council.

The act of burying a tomahawk in the village war post was a common sign indicating that a member of the community wanted to form a war party. The act was more than symbolic because it announced a specific intention, and it opened membership in the war party to anyone who wished to join. Another method of organizing a war party was to send messengers to outlying villages to solicit volunteers. Once the decision was made to conduct the expedition, ceremonial war dances preceded the war party's departure.[12] Any warrior who wanted to join a particular coalition could organize a war party to accompany him.

Council meetings, which could be single-village or multivillage conclaves, were often the forum used to address collective issues. Lighting a council fire signified that the negotiations or deliberations were in session. Although the council might determine a course of action for the tribe (such as peace with the United States), warriors could still form war parties outside the aegis of tribal policy and conduct combat operations. War dancing and ritual purification, such as fasting, might accompany a war council. The council held by the Indian confederacy before the attack on St. Clair's army consisted of more than 3,000 Indians.[13]

Equipping Armies

U.S. Forces

The type of uniforms and equipment used by American soldiers during the years between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 is difficult to determine because the army was small, few examples of uniforms and equipment remain, and local contractors often produced uniforms and equipment that might or might not be in accordance with government regulations. Another drawback in attempting to reconstruct uniforms of the period is that the uniform regulations prior to 1821 were vague.[14] Because the War of 1812 followed the Battle of Tippecanoe so quickly, one may draw some general conclusions about uniforms and equipment from that conflict and apply them to the uniforms and equipment worn in the fall of 1811.

The regular infantry probably wore high-collared waist-length uniform coats, with red facings on the cuffs and collars. Whitened buff-leather belts and pantaloons were also probably worn. Black cylindrical caps, each with

an oblong silver plate that identified the soldier's unit, were authorized in 1810. A wooden canteen, bayonet, musket, M1808 cartridge box, and knapsack completed the infantryman's standard load of equipment. The M1808 contract musket was in service at the time of the Tippecanoe fight, and the Lherbette patent model knapsack was adopted in 1808.[15]

Rifle Regiment regulars were authorized a different uniform—leather caps with cap devices specifying "U.S.R.R." that reflected their unit of service. The rifleman's winter uniform was green cloth faced with black. The summer uniform consisted of a green hunting shirt and pantaloons edged with buff fringe. Since the regulars deployed to the Indiana Territory in late summer, the soldiers might have been clad in their summer-issue uniforms. A three-inch-wide black waist belt, scalping knife, tomahawk, and M1803 rifle completed the standard uniform and equipment for the rifleman.[16]

Little standardization of equipment existed among militias, and they used whatever was available, even personal items or equipment from government stocks. Uniform requirements were up to the individual. Harrison, for example, wore a uniform that included a fringed hunting shirt made of calico.[17] Volunteers, such as Daviess' Dragoons, supplied their own mounts in addition to other items of equipment. Joseph Daviess told his volunteers that they should have a brace of pistols and clothes that "ought to be a blue coatee and pantaloons without any scarlet, a hat or leather cap covered with bear skin, boots, spurs and a pair of tanned leather moccasins to spare."[18] The recruits apparently equipped themselves in accordance with Daviess' desires. Adam Walker, a Regular Army soldier, wrote, "The Dragoons, commanded by Major Daviess, consisting of about 120 men, were well mounted and handsomely equipped, and composed of some of the most respectable citizens from Kentucky and Indiana."[19]

The unit that Daviess sponsored was a volunteer unit and composed of members who were probably wealthy or substantially more financially secure than the average frontiersman who composed the majority of the militia units. Not surprisingly, Daviess and his volunteers maintained a higher standard of equipment than the normal militia troops. The average militia soldier, however, was a hardy frontiersman that looked the part. Adam Walker was shocked at the appearance of the militiamen when he first encountered them, remarking, "... their appearance caused us to doubt whether we had not actually landed among the savages themselves. Many of these militia spoke the French language; —their dress was a short frock of deer skin, a belt around their bodies with a tomahawk and a scalping knife

attached to it. and were nearly as destitute of discipline as the savages themselves."[20]

Although initially not impressed with the militiamen's appearance, Walker gave them credit for their ability to use a particular piece of equipment to live off of the land: "The hatchet, however, was found to be a very useful article on the march—they had no tents; but with their hatchets would in a short time form themselves a secure shelter from the weather, on encamping at night."[21]

The hatchet also performed a role as a weapon for the American militiaman, and a British officer that served in North America during the War of 1812 wrote: "In fact, the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and Ohio . . . differ very immaterially from the natives in their appearance . . . and the knife and hatchet are as formidable weapons with them as they are with the Indians. . . ."[22]

The types of firearms employed by the armed forces of the time varied with the types of units employed. Regulars carried standard service arms, and militia soldiers who were not equipped from government stores carried personal weapons.[23] The type of personal rifle that a militia soldier was likely to use was often called the long, or Kentucky, rifle. The Kentucky rifle of this period was a flintlock, between .32 and .38 caliber, and had varying barrel lengths up to about forty-eight inches long. Even though the rifle was an accurate weapon in excess of 200 yards, it was generally not suitable for military service because it did not accept a bayonet, and, because of the rifling, it took about twice as long to load as a musket. The regulars from the Rifle Regiment were equipped with the Model 1803 rifle, a weapon similar in design to the Kentucky rifle. The fact that this rifle has the same limitations as its civilian counterpart is probably the reason that the riflemen were equipped with muskets during the Battle of Tippecanoe.[24] Muskets, on the other hand, while only effective between eighty and one hundred yards, allowed massed ranks to fire more rapidly and attack the enemy with bayonets. There were also various types of ammunition employed during this period. The standard "one ounce ball" of ammunition could be supplemented with three buckshot. This configuration was called "buck and ball." During the Tippecanoe battle, the soldiers used a load of twelve buckshot rather than the standard ball.[25]

Indian Confederacy

Indian warriors relied on their traditional weapons as well as firearms. Their traditional weapons included scalping knives, traditional tomahawks, war clubs, and bows and arrows. Trade with Europeans and Americans significantly improved the quality of Indian weapons, and tomahawks with stone blades were being replaced by ones with steel or iron. Trade also ensured that rifles and muskets were available to the Indians. British government agents from Canada often supplied the Indians with firearms, lead, and powder.

The war club used by the Indians was a heavy weapon, about two feet in length, and made of ironwood or maple, with a large ball or knot at the end. Indian bows were usually of one-piece construction and made from ash, hickory, or oak. The traditional tomahawk was replaced with one of European or American manufacture. These improved hatchets, called trade tomahawks, were often a combination tomahawk and pipe.[26]

Indian flintlock muskets, acquired through trade with Europeans, were called trade fusils or trade guns. The Hudson Bay Company and Northwest Company produced large numbers of these weapons. These Northwest guns, as later model trade fusils are often called, probably derive their name from the association with the Northwest Company in lower Canada or because of their widespread employment on the American frontier. During the 1790s, Great Britain began to issue firearms of the trade fusil pattern to North American Indians. The weapons, known as presentation fusils because they were gifts to the Indians, served as a method to maintain Indian loyalty. The presentation fusils were generally .60 caliber with thirty-six-inch barrels and were produced under crown contract until around 1815. The presentation fusil is probably one of the more common firearms used by the Indians during the Battle of Tippecanoe.[27]

A warrior's personal equipment might consist of a blanket and extra moccasins or the materials to repair or make new moccasins. Warriors also carried cord to bind prisoners, personal weapons, a powder horn, and bullet bag. In addition, the individual warrior often carried a pouch containing medicine to treat wounds. Rations were usually carried in a bearskin bag. Parched corn mixed with maple sugar was one of the more common individual rations. Most Indians commonly carried a device of spiritual significance for them: a sacred war bundle containing charms that represented ones ancestry, symbolized past victories, and had magical powers to protect the owner.[28]

Training Doctrine

U.S. Forces

Doctrine during the nineteenth century consisted of a few regulations about drill and formations and how to establish encampments and post guards. In 1811, the U.S. Army still used the same drill and field service regulation developed by Baron Von Steuben during the Revolutionary War.[29] Much of what a commander did in the field depended on his personal experience. Harrison's concept of military doctrine evolved from personal study and what he had learned from General Anthony Wayne. The latter consisted of two important lessons concerning the importance of training and the maintaining of security while in the field.

On their part, the regulations developed by Baron Von Steuben focused on procedures for drilling individuals and formations. Although the major emphasis of the regulations was drill, they also addressed tactical movements through defiles and prescribed procedures for establishing an encampment and posting guards. During the initial stages of his army's organization, Harrison made efforts to train the force properly by conducting several combat training exercises. *Tipton's Journal*, for example, makes several references to training events or "sham battles." The army's headquarters also published orders that directed training exercises prior to the army's departure from Fort Harrison.[30]

Harrison significantly modified many of the procedures in Von Steuben's regulations to fit the Indian threat. For example, the governor modified standards for camp organization, reveille, and guard duty during the campaign. According to the regulation, commanders positioned units in an encampment in a square or rectangular manner with specified areas for officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and the logistical wagons. Guards patrolled the outside of the camp on avenues of approach and on the interior of the camp near the wagons and mess areas. At reveille, troops paraded without weapons for roll call.[31] The following figure (see figure 1) shows an example of a camp layout in accordance with the regulations of the era.

Harrison modified all of these procedures and had units sleep in the immediate vicinity of their battle positions with their weapons and equipment worn. Guards formed a tight ring around the camp, and Harrison directed that the command be alert and at their posts before reveille. Although Von Steuben does not discuss the use of breastworks, it seems



Figure 1. Regulation camp organization. Specifications for a regulation camp organization are from Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben, *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985), 75-79, 91-95.

that this was an accepted practice if the threat dictated it, and, in any case, it was a procedure that Harrison knew.[32]

There was another uniquely American aspect of training that Harrison probably emphasized—marksmanship. Europeans emphasized volume of fire during infantry combat and trained accordingly. In fact, some armies did not bother to teach their soldiers to aim their muskets. American's emphasized marksmanship training to reinforce the American practice of firing aimed shots in battle.[33] The effect of this American practice was often devastating. Shabonee saw the effects of American marksmanship while on a scouting mission for the Prophet and commented: "I saw some of the men shoot squirrels, as they rode along, and I said, the Indians have no such guns. These men will kill us as far as they can see."[34] A British officer that fought against U.S. troops during the War of 1812 remarked, " . . . the English soldier, in particular, has but little chance with American riflemen, who conscious of his advantage, and taking a deliberate aim, seldom fails to attain his object. . . ."[35]

Indian Confederacy

The Indian confederacy does not appear to have had a systematic training program, although it does seem that Prophet's Town was a type of training center for the Indian confederacy. The types of daily life and training events that occurred in the village were probably not significantly different from events experienced during routine village life. Woodland Indian forces did not fight in the same disciplined and organized style that an American or European professional force used. Consequently, to train in the regimented style associated with professional armies held little utility for the Indians.

Prophet's Town was a large village and was probably organized in the traditional style of the Woodland Indians. Large villages of the period often had streets and a number of living areas called wigwams. The wigwams were bark-covered structures with hides hung over the entrances as doors. Although the village had a variable population over the years, it was probably large enough to house about 1,000 warriors and 300 family members.[36]

The training regime at Prophet's Town was martial and religious in nature. The Prophet was the spiritual leader of the confederacy (while it was under the political-military guidance of Tecumseh). The Prophet provided the Indians spiritual direction through his lectures, prophecies, and prayers. He oriented his discussions on values that included a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle and separation of white and Indian cultures. The martial aspect of the training focused on hunting, manufacturing equipment needed for battle, and athletic contests. The athletics ran the gamut of activities from running and wrestling contests to sports that required the use of weapon skills such as the bow and arrow and war clubs.[37]

Tactical Doctrine

U.S. Forces

Several different types of maneuver forces were employed during the campaign. Harrison's army consisted of units designated as infantry, riflemen, mounted riflemen, and dragoons. Although there was not a great deal of written doctrine about how to employ each type of unit, general principles were practiced.

The employment of mounted elements was an area significantly lacking in American military doctrinal development. The American army had not

developed a complex set of tactical doctrine and drills for cavalry as European armies had. Rather, during the Revolutionary War, horses were mainly used as mounts for officers and messengers. Mounted units were usually assembled for emergencies and then disbanded. Although the American tactical experience with mounted troops was limited, some cavalry units were used during the Revolutionary War, and General Wayne's Legion included a troop of dragoons in every sublegion and a complement of mounted volunteers.[38]

The general principles of the age divided mounted troops into units of dragoons and cavalry. Dragoons were soldiers trained to fight either mounted or on foot and usually carried pistols, light swords, and carbines. Cavalry, on the other hand, were trained to fight exclusively on horseback, and their equipment consisted of heavy sabers and pistols. Mounted troops were employed to scout, protect flanks, and pursue or flank an enemy. The shock effect of a cavalry charge was also designed to break up an enemy formation. The American distinction between cavalry and dragoons was hazy at best. To confuse doctrinal matters more, the American militia on the frontier added another mounted arm, the mounted riflemen, who used his mount for transportation and dismounted to engage the enemy with rifle fire.[39]

American Infantry formations were similar to European formations and imitated European tactical doctrine to a large degree. Linear formations that deployed into ranks were commonplace. Units moved to the battle area in open platoon columns and then deployed into line. Infantry formations relied on the line because it was the battle formation that brought the most weapons to bear on the enemy and produced the greatest volume of fire. Unlike their European counterparts who used three ranks, American infantry used two ranks, allowing it to cover more ground. To increase the lethality and effectiveness of their formations, the Americans also relied on aimed rifle and musket fires.[40]

Artillery was another important arm that complemented infantry and cavalry formations, but it played no role at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Some of the literature indicates that Harrison took a few small cannon as part of his expeditionary force; however, there are no references regarding its actual employment during the battle. It is unlikely that cannon fires were employed during most of the battle because of the potential for fratricide, since any cannon would probably have been positioned on the inside of the perimeter and would have had to fire over the heads of the soldiers on the line of battle, a difficult task for a direct-fire weapon system

(eighteenth-century artillery was a direct-fire weapon unlike today's artillery, which is an indirect-fire weapon).

An important combat multiplier for Harrison's army was the intelligence function. Nineteenth-century armies did not have doctrinal methods to conduct intelligence operations. The scope and success of any intelligence operation was almost completely left to the proficiency of the commander in gathering and interpreting data. Harrison developed an intelligence network that included government agents, traders, whites that had lived among the Indians, and Indian informants. Part of the reason that Harrison's intelligence-gathering operations were successful was because he relied on people who were familiar with Indian culture and customs. In this way, he was able to interpret properly indicators of hostility, such as the exchange of war wampum belts or war dancing at councils. Harrison also developed sources that could help him confirm information. After Tecumseh told Harrison that he was going south to recruit additional members for the confederacy, Harrison immediately dispatched spies to find out when Tecumseh actually departed.[41]

Harrison also maintained a small tactical intelligence-gathering capability with the Spies and Guides, a detachment that conducted reconnaissance for the main body during the march. The various detached mounted elements, such as Spencer's Yellow Jackets, were also used by Harrison to increase his reconnaissance and security capability. The Yellow Jackets conducted such tasks as finding fords or screening to the flanks or in front of the main body.

A unique force protection measure of the era was to take hostages. To ensure that each side honored truces, hostages could be exchanged between the hostile factions. Eustis addressed the idea of taking hostages in his 18 September 1811 letter to Harrison. Harrison's officers also encouraged him to take hostages before the battle.[42] Harrison apparently did not feel that the measure was needed and declined to take Indian hostages. In any case, there were no guarantees that the measure would prove successful or that Harrison could ensure the safety of the hostages and protect them from members of his own command.

Indian Confederacy

Indian warfare was decentralized, although Indians did wage war to achieve operational or strategic goals. Indians might go to war for several reasons, such as honor and prestige, dreams, or revenge, which is why a brave might form his own war party. The Indian confederacies of the

post-Revolutionary war period were not the first to try to achieve operational or strategic objectives. The Iroquois Indians provide an example of an intertribal war at the operational level. Near the end of the seventeenth century, Iroquois war parties attacked south into Virginia, east to the Atlantic coast, north to the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, and almost as far west as the Mississippi River. The Iroquois began the war because they wanted to eliminate their competitors in the fur trade with the Europeans, clearly an operational goal.[43]

Indian war parties usually employed ambushes or raids as their primary offensive tactics. Woodland Indian operations were normally dismounted, and some war parties traveled twenty-five miles a day. Indians usually organized into three groups while on the march: scouts, a main body, and hunters to sustain the force. War parties usually moved during the day, until they were within two or three days of the enemy; once they were within a few days of the enemy they moved at night. War parties made their final preparations for an attack close to the objective area. These final preparations included a rudimentary sand-table style rehearsal, the singing of medicine songs, and the building of litters to assist in the recovery of wounded personnel. Individuals within the war party were also designated to carry extra supplies of medicine, corn, and water. Another brave was usually designated to beat a drum to inspire the war party as it conducted the assault.[44] The last collective action was to move into ambush, battle, or attack positions.

The war party attacked on signal. After the initial contact, the preliminary battle plan was often discarded, and the skirmish became a series of personal fights. Examples of individual courage were valued in Indian society, so warriors normally fought as individuals rather than as part of a team that conducted coordinated movements to achieve an overall objective. After an attack, some war parties might remain on the battlefield for a cannibalistic feast (this, however, was not a common practice among most Woodland Indian cultures). Normally, a war party looted as quickly as possible and began moving back to their home territory. Taking prisoners as well as scalps was a prestigious event, and prisoners were often tortured to death once the war party returned home. Although there was a great deal of distinction associated with capturing enemy personnel, war parties did not hesitate to kill prisoners that impeded their march back to safe territory.[45]

The triumph of an Indian attack over an adversary relied on individual effort rather than on collective discipline. The difference between victory

and defeat for a war party might also rely on how quickly it exfiltrated from enemy territory and returned to a relatively safe region. These factors made it extremely difficult for Indian armies to conduct complex operations such as pursuits. Indians did not have the command and control capability for that type of operation, since collective discipline was lost as soon as an attack began, and actions immediately following an attack often focused on looting, cultural rituals, or exfiltration. Successful Indian attacks usually culminated in the immediate area of the objective.

The Indian forces at Tippecanoe organized into three basic attacking elements. Three war chiefs led the attack, while the Prophet observed the battle from a hillside about 500 yards from the encampment. Estimates on the size of the Indian force at Tippecanoe range from 300 to 900 Indians. Groups from several tribes participated in the attack, and bands of Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Winnebago, and Sacs are reported to have been present. Individuals whose tribes were not part of the confederacy also fought at Tippecanoe. Two of the assault leaders, White Loon and Stone Eater, were members of the Miami tribe, which was not part of the confederacy.[46]

The Indian confederacy also conducted extensive intelligence operations. Most of the Indian intelligence-gathering relating to the Tippecanoe campaign seemed to be tactical in nature. The confederacy began collecting intelligence as the army assembled at Vincennes. Meanwhile, the Indians met Harrison at Vincennes, ostensibly to reassure him that the Prophet was not a threat. The real purpose for their trips to Vincennes, however, was to gather intelligence on the army. The Prophet continued to employ scouts to conduct reconnaissance while the army was at Fort Harrison. Overall, the Prophet's intelligence operations were not successful during the campaign. The confederacy lost contact with the army after it crossed the Wabash River, and the loss of contact contributed to the Prophet's failure to delay Harrison's approach through negotiation.

NOTES

1. From Harrison's report on the campaign to Secretary of War Eustis on18 November 1811, in Draper MSS. 1X41.

2. In addition to the 4th U.S., 7th U.S., and Rifle Regiment, the 2d U.S. was represented at the battle. Captain Piatt was assigned to the 2d U.S. and served as Harrison's quartermaster.

3. Weigley, 97-105.

4. William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 11; and John K. Mahon, *The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), 6-7 (hereafter referred to as Decade).

5. Urwin, 30; and *U.S. Constitution*, art. 1, sect. 8.

6. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from Its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903), 570-71; Matloff, 115; and Weigley, 109, 115-16. The 1808 act authorized seven infantry regiments, one rifle regiment, one light dragoon regiment, one light artillery regiment, one artillery regiment, and an engineer corps. Total authorized strength was 9,921 officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers.

7. Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1964), 9; Steuben, "Appendix: United States Militia Act," *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, 1985) no pagination; and Weigley, 94. The Militia Act required members to have a musket or firelock, bayonet and belt, two spare flints, knapsack, a pouch with a box that contained not fewer than twenty-four cartridges; or a good rifle, knapsack, shot pouch, powder horn, twenty balls, and one-quarter pound of powder.

8. Mahon, Decade, 1-2; and Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 18, 67 (hereafter referred to as History). During the War of 1812, the governors of Connecticut

and Massachusetts initially refused to release their militias for federal service. In 1813, both states relented but would only allow their militias to be used to guard their own state coasts. Shortly before the War of 1812, Congress authorized the formation of several volunteer units. Volunteer units could be used generally without restriction regarding geographic location. This was important since part of the theater of war included a foreign country (Canada).

9. Mahon, *History*, 58, 66; and Riker, 21-22. A member of a militia unit that damaged his rifle would have to pay about $13.00 for a new one, a large sum at the time.

10. Carter, 126, 130-31; and Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 547-48. The letters are dated 11 July 1811, 21 August 1811, and 22 August 1811. The letters authorized Harrison to move into the new purchase with a respectable force that would consist of regulars and militia. When Eustis wrote the letters, he believed that problems with the Indians at Prophet's Town could be solved without violence. The pattern of letters between the secretary of war, Harrison, and the president prior to August 1811 indicate a desire to resolve the situation peacefully. In March 1811, Eustis told Harrison to defer his plans for establishing a post in the new purchase because the president wanted to avoid any "uneasiness" with the area tribes (Carter, 113-14). In May 1811, the government issued a proclamation of public sale for the lands gained by the Treaty of Fort Wayne (Carter, 119). This indicates that the government meant to settle the area, which would probably not help to resolve the issue peacefully. Finally, in September 1811, Eustis authorized Harrison to compel the Prophet to disperse, by force if necessary. The letter also authorizes Harrison to establish a post in the new purchase (Carter, 133-34). Regarding the issues of calling out and paying militia and volunteers, governors had the authority to call out militia and raise volunteer units during an emergency, but Congress was the agency that authorized the payment of these units. A local merchant, Charles Smith, who was also a lieutenant in the militia, covered the government's earlier debt for the militia soldiers who were called up the previous year. Soldiers that served during the Tippecanoe campaign were eventually paid after the campaign. Pay receipts for some of the militiamen that served at Tippecanoe can be found in the *Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served From 1784-1811* (Microfilm, copy number M905, roll numbers 22 and 32). A private was paid $6.66 per month, a sergeant, $8.00 per month. The foragemaster, Lieutenant Bunting, was paid $25.00 per month for his duties.

Lieutenant Berry (killed in action, 7 November 1811) earned $33.33 per month. Soldiers were able to petition the government for pensions because of injury or for compensation for equipment and horses that were damaged by battle or killed as a result of hostile action. Dependents could also petition the government for pensions due to the death of a service member during the campaign.

11. Eckert, *Gateway*, 227-29; Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 35; and Maxwell, 130-31. Geometric shapes or stick figures were incorporated into the design of the wampum belts, and each had special significance. A row of white diamond shapes connected together might represent a chain of friendship, a black bird in the design might represent bad news, and a raised hatchet might represent war.

12. Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20; Maxwell, 126; and Raymond Scheele, "Warfare of the Iroquois and their Northern Neighbors" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1950), 30.

13. Eckert, *Gateway*, 187-89, 226, 229; Maxwell, 129; and Scheele, 29-30. Lighting the council fire signified that the council was in session. No duration was set for council meetings, and councils could last days or weeks. Americans often adopted this practice of councils when treating with Indians. After the Battle of Fallen Timbers, General Wayne invited the Indian leaders to a council at Greenville. The council fire for the Treaty of Greenville negotiations was lit on 15 June 1795. Some 1,100 Indians representing twelve tribes were present at the negotiations. The negotiations lasted more than six weeks, and the council officially closed on 10 August 1795. Wayne also issued peace wampum belts to each group of Indians as they arrived at Greenville.

14. Duncan J. Campbell and Edgar M. Howell, *American Military Insignia 1800-1851* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), 7.

15. Campbell and Howell, 11-12; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 658; and Philip Katcher, *U.S. Infantry Equipments 1775-1910* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1989), Plate B, 46. Pants or pantaloons were part of the authorized uniform during the Battle of Tippecanoe. On 6 December 1811, the 4th U.S. issued an order that forbid soldiers from cutting off their pantaloons, which indicates that at least some of the soldiers were issued pantaloons.

16. Campbell and Howell, 11-12; and John R. Elting, ed., *Military Uniforms in America Volume II: Years of Growth 1796-1851* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 40-41.

17. Bacon, 26-27.

18. As cited in Green, 120.

19. Walker, 13.

20. Ibid., 12-13.

21. Ibid., 13.

22. Klinck, 199.

23. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 484, 585. A 10 November 1810 letter from Harrison to Eustis indicates that pistols and horsemen's swords were ordered for the mounted militia. The equipment was to be deposited at Newport, Kentucky. Any deficiencies in arms and equipment were to be made up from these public stores. Soldiers armed with muskets were to be issued twenty-four rounds of ammunition, and riflemen were to receive one-half pound of powder and one pound of lead.

24. Beard, 61; M. L. Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America: The Impact on History and Technology 1492-1792* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980), 264-67, 272-73; Draper 1X42; Elting, 40-41; G. W. P. Swenson, *Pictorial History of the Rifle* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1972), 19; and Urwin, 26. The original Kentucky rifles were actually made by German and Swiss gunsmiths in the Pennsylvania colony before the Revolutionary War. The Kentucky rifle is also called the Pennsylvania rifle or Pennsylvania-Kentucky rifle.

25. Draper MSS. 1X44; Urwin, 25; and Walker, 24.

26. Johnson, *American Indians of the Southeast* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1995), 18; Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 22; and Maxwell, 127.

27. Brown, 366-68.

28. Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20, 23; and Maxwell, 126, 149.

29. Friederick Wilhelm Steuben, "Publisher's Note" no pagination; and Urwin, 25. Steuben's manual was the official army regulation from 1779-1812.

30. Cleaves, 88, 93; and Cockrum, 254. Tipton notes sham battles on 8, 26, and 27 October 1811. Cleaves discusses a training exercise conducted on 22 October 1811. Cockrum has copies of the orders published by Harrison's headquarters directing training on 23 October 1811. Cleaves notes that at the end of October 1811, Harrison wrote to the secretary of war that "I have used every exertion in my power to perfect them in the maneuvers which they are to perform."

31. Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94; and Walker, 21, 34-35. The procedure used throughout the campaign to form a line of battle was for the soldiers to step five paces in front of their tents. Harrison also directed that the units form in single ranks. These procedures allowed units to form quickly with minimum confusion. As lessons were learned during the campaign, procedures were modified. After the Indian attack, fires were still used, but they were built outside of the line of sentinels. Any fires in camp were extinguished when the soldiers went to sleep. This put an attacking enemy between the line of battle and the fires. The sentry procedures were also modified after the battle. The sentries put a stake in the ground at a man's height and then draped a blanket and hat on the stake. The sentry then moved to cover behind a log or tree to watch his post. Prior to the battle the sentries walked their posts.

32. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-5; Pirtle, 52; and Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94. Harrison's written order published 27 September 1811 established the SOP for camp guards and the order of march.

33. Gifford, 319-20; and Urwin, 26, 34. General Wayne was noted for his emphasis on marksmanship training while organizing and training the American Legion.

34. Whickar, 355.

35. Klinck, 199-200.

36. James A. Maxwell, ed., *America's Fascinating Indian Heritage* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1978), 112; and McCollough, 25.

37. Drake, 105; McCollough, 25; and Scheele, 51.

38. Swafford Johnson, *History of the U. S. Cavalry* (Greenwich, CT: Crescent Books, 1985), 12-14, 22, 26, 32; and Matloff, 112-13. There were four sublegions in the Legion. The first cavalry manual for the U.S. Army was written by Phil Kearny in the 1830s.

39. Elting, 50; and Swafford Johnson, 12-14; 22.

40. Steven Ross, *From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866* (Cranbury: Associated University Press, Inc., 1979), 25-27, 179; and Urwin, 26.

41. Eckert, *Gateway*, 427-28.

42. Cleaves, 96.

43. Scheele, 17-20.

44. Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20, 24; and Scheele, 17, 34, 53.

45. Scheele, 36, 39-41.

46. See Cockrum, 269, for a list of the tribes in the attack. Eckert, *Gateway*, 438; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159; and Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-5, 628. Accurate figures for the Indian confederacy's strength during the attack have never been determined. Eckert believes that there were just over 300 Indians in the attack, while Edmunds reports Indian strength as between 600 and 700. Harrison was not sure of the numbers of Indians in the attack and received varying reports on Indian strength throughout the campaign. Harrison's 8 November 1811 report remarks that Indian strength must have been considerable. On 18 November 1811, Harrison wrote that "I am possessed of no data by which I can form a correct statement. It must have been considerable and perhaps not much inferior to our own." See Draper MSS. 1X40, 1X44. A few weeks before the attack, Harrison was fairly certain that the Prophet had at least 350 of his own warriors and revised this to 450 later on. As the army moved toward Prophet's Town, it encountered several large trails leading from the Illinois River area toward Prophet's Town; Harrison began to believe that the Prophet was joined by a substantial number of additional Indians and revised his estimate to about 600 Indians.

APPENDIX B

U.S. Order of Battle

> . . . should you defeat the American army, you have not done. Another will come; and if you defeat that, still another—one like waves of the Greatwater, overwhelming and sweeping you from the face of the earth.[1]
>
> —Chief Little Turtle, *remark to Tecumseh*

William Henry Harrison published his order assuming command of the expeditionary force on 16 September 1811. Harrison also published a series of orders that described the organization of the army. The infantry formed one brigade, commanded by Colonel Boyd. Regular Army infantry units were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Miller (4th U.S.) and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Miller became ill and remained at Fort Harrison, and Major Floyd assumed his duties. Captain Baen was appointed as acting major.[2] A figure below (see figure 2) shows the infantry task organization.

The same series of orders (and subsequent guidance when additional mounted units arrived) established the organizational structure for the various mounted units. Joseph Daviess from Kentucky was commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of the Dragoons. General Samuel Wells of the Kentucky militia was also commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of a mounted battalion. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were designated as a detached corps that would report to General Harrison and his staff.[3] A figure below (see figure three) shows the task organization for mounted units.

In addition to his duties as the infantry brigade commander, Colonel Boyd served as Harrison's second in command with the rank of "acting brigadier general." To fulfill his duties, the order of battle shows that Boyd had two staffs supporting him in his dual role. Boyd was Harrison's second in command and commander of troops (Harrison was the commander in chief and the expedition commander), and as such, Harrison authorized Boyd an aide-de-camp and an adjutant. As the infantry brigade commander, Boyd had his normal staff from the 4th U.S. available. Boyd was not the only soldier with multiple duties, however; some members of his 4th U.S. staff also filled dual roles and worked on Harrison's staff as well as Boyd's.



Figure 2. Infantry task organization, 6-7 November 1811. Lieutenant Colonel Miller is not reflected as part of this organizational chart because he remained behind at Fort Harrison. Major Floyd assumed Miller's field duties and responsibilities after the army departed from Fort Harrison.



Figure 3. Mounted elements task organization, 6-7 November 1811.

U.S. Order of Battle

Harrison's companies varied in size during the campaign. The 4th U.S. deployed to the Indiana Territory under strength because of troop illness and desertions. The elements from the 7th U.S. and the Rifle Regiment were both small detachments rather than full strength companies. The size of militia and volunteer companies, morever, varied from region to region, the unit size depending upon the number of eligible men and the recruiting ability of the man organizing the unit. Officers were commissioned into the state militia by the governor. Volunteer organizations elected their officers.

The following list is the U.S. order of battle for the Tippecanoe campaign, 16 September 1811 to 18 November 1811. Unit strengths, when known, are listed next to the unit as (officer/NCO/privates). Any soldier that was promoted during the campaign is only counted once and counted in the strength of his original grade. For example, John Tipton was promoted from private to ensign on 21 October 1811 and to captain on 7 November 1811. Rather that count Tipton several times, he is counted once as a private for strength purposes. Soldiers with special duties, such as musicians, saddlers, and trumpeters, are counted in the NCO end strength.[4] A table (see table 4) showing U.S. casualties in the Tippecanoe campaign follows this order of battle.

Commander

Governor William Henry Harrison, commander in chief

General Staff

Lieutenant Colonel William McFarland, adjutant general

Colonel Abraham Owen, aide-de-camp (killed in action [KIA], 7 Nov 1811)

Major Henry Hurst, aide-de-camp

Major Waller Taylor, aide-de-camp

Major Marston G. Clark, aide-de-camp

Thomas Randolph (civilian), acting aide-de-camp (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Captain Piatt, chief quartermaster

Captain Robert Buntin, quartermaster of the militia

Dr. Josiah Foster, chief surgeon

Dr. Hosea Blood, surgeon's mate

Second Lieutenant Robert Bunting Jr., Indiana militia forage master

The Troops

Colonel Boyd, brigade commander (with the rank of brigadier general)

George Croghan, aide-de-camp

Lieutenant Nathan Adams, adjutant

Field and Staff of Indiana Militia

Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew (wounded in action [WIA], 7 Nov 1811)

Major Regin Redman, aide-de-camp

Sergeant Major Chapman Dunslow

Field and Staff of Indiana Infantry Militia

Lieutenant Colonel Luke Decker (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Sergeant Major William Ready

Field and Staff of Dragoons of Indiana Militia

Major Joseph H. Daviess (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Major Benjamin Parke (promoted, 7 Nov 1811)

Sergeant Major William Prince

Captain Spier Spencer's Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (4/10/46)[5]

Captain Spier Spencer (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Captain John Tipton (promoted, 7 Nov 1811)

Spies and Guides of the Indiana Militia (1/0/18)[6]

Captain Toussant Dubois

Company of Indiana Militia (4/7/48)

Captain Jacob Warrick (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery (commander from 7 to 9 Nov 1811)

Captain James Smith (assumed command on 9 Nov 1811)

Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (3/5/69)

Captain David Robb

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/11/57)

Captain John Norris (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/6/59)

Captain William Hargrove

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (8/4/66)

Captain Thomas Scott

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/37)

Captain Walter Wilson

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/6)

Captain Andrew Wilkins

Company of Riflemen of Indiana Militia (3/10/56)

Captain John Bigger

Detachment of Mounted Riflemen of Indiana Militia (1/1/20)

Lieutenant Thomas Berry (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (4/9/70)

Captain Benjamin Parke (promoted to major, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (5/9/20)

Captain Charles Beggs

Field and Staff of a Battalion of Kentucky Light Dragoons

Major Samuel Wells

Company of Kentucky Mounted Militia (3/7/18)

Captain Peter Funk

Company of Mounted Riflemen of Kentucky Militia (3/9/50)

Captain Frederick Geiger (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Field and Staff of the 4th U.S. Infantry[7]

Colonel John Boyd

Lieutenant Colonel James Miller[8]

Lieutenant Colonel Zebulon Pike[9]

Major G. R. C. Floyd

Sergeant Major Winthrop Ayre

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)

Captain Josiah Snelling

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)

George W. Prescott

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/7/38)

Captain William C. Baen (acting major, DOW, 9 Nov 1811)

First Lieutenant Charles Larrabee (commander, 7 Nov 1811)

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/9/42)

Captain Joel Cook

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/8/35)

Captain Return B. Brown

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/5/21)

Captain Robert C. Barton

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (4/9/61)[10]

First Lieutenant Charles Fuller

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/8/21)[11]

First Lieutenant O. G. Burton

Infantry Company, 7th U.S. (25 total)[12]

Lieutenant Albright

Company of Riflemen, The Rifle Regiment (2/8/28)[13]

Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins

	KIA	DOW	WIA
AIDE-DE-CAMP	1		
LIEUTENANT COLONELS			2
MAJORS		1	
ADJUTANT			1
SURGEON'S MATE			1
CAPTAINS	1	2	2
SUBALTERNS	2		3
SERGEANTS	1		9
CORPORALS	2		5
MUSICIANS			1
PRIVATES	30	22	102
TOTAL	37	25	126

Table 4. U.S. casualties, Tippecanoe battle. The report was copied from war department records. The report only shows one aide killed in action. Randolph was a civilian aide and may not be reflected in military records. This table does not include the four soldiers that died prior to 7 November 1811. Source: Draper MSS. 1X4.

NOTES

1. Jennings C. Wise, *The Red Man in the New World Drama: A Politico-Legal Study, with a Pageantry of American Indian History* (Washington D.C.: W. F. Roberts Co., 1931), 325.

2. Beard, 47-49; Draper MSS. 1X41-44; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 597, 604. Brigade order dated 25 October 1811.

3. Beard, 47-49; and Draper MSS. 1X41-44.

4. Beard, 102-33; Cockrum, 279-308; Draper MSS. 1X43; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 569-70, 632; Heitman, 391; Pirtle, 35; Reid, 16-30; and Walker, 84-85. The dates of the campaign are based on two orders issued by Harrison's headquarters. In the first order, a "Military Order" dated 16 September 1811, Harrison assumes command of the military expedition. A brigade order, dated 18 November 1811, dissolves the brigade. If an officer was KIA or WIA, and his replacement is known, the replacement is listed along with other relevant data. This order of battle lists key personnel. More complete rosters are available in Beard, Cockrum, and Pirtle; however, even these rosters are not complete since unit strengths for the 7th U.S. are missing and all of Harrison's personal staff are not reflected. At least two black men accompanied the army, one of whom was Harrison's personal servant (probably a slave). Several sources, including Harrison's correspondence and reports, refer to the two men. One of the main reasons to maintain an army roster was to record an individual's campaign participation for pay purposes; since slaves and other types of servants were not eligible for militia service, and hence were not compensated financially, there was no reason to include them on these types of documents.

5. This company was called Spencer's Yellow Jackets. The Yellow Jackets were under the direct control of Harrison's headquarters for reporting purposes and taskings.

6. This company reported directly to General Harrison.

7. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 646. A regimental order dated 23 November 1811 assigned Lieutenants Burton (Welch's company), Fuller (Wentworth's company), and Larrabee (Baen's company) to permanent command of their respective companies. The same regimental order promoted several enlisted

soldiers, most of whom were recognized for their good conduct in action at Tippecanoe.

8. Alec R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in he Old Northwest* (East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1958), 20, 21-22 (Note 16). Miller assumed command of the 4th U.S. after Boyd was reassigned in the Spring of 1812. Although serving in the 4th U.S., Miller was carried on the rolls of the 5th U.S. since Zebulon Pike filled the 4th U.S. lieutenant colonel vacancy. Miller resigned from the Army in 1819 and later served as territorial governor of Arkansas.

9. Trevor Dupuy, et. al., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography* (New York: Castle Books, 1995), 598; Gilpin, 22 (Note 16); *Zebulon Pike, Zebulon Pike's Arkansaw Journal: In Search of the Southern Louisiana Purchase Boundary Line*, eds. Stephen Hart and Archer Butler (Colorado Springs, CO: Stewart Commission of Colorado and the Denver Public Library, 1932), xivi; and John Terrell, *Zebulon Pike: The Life and Times of an Adventurer* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), 46-149. Zebulon Pike was probably not at the Battle of Tippecanoe since he was carried on paper as a lieutenant colonel in the 4th U.S. but served in another organization. This is the same Pike who led the expedition credited with the discovery of Pike's Peak (the mountain is named in his honor). During the War of 1812, then Brigadier General Pike led the American attack on York, Upper Canada (Toronto). Pike was wounded in a powder magazine explosion after the initial assault on York and died of his wounds on 27 April 1813 shortly after being informed that the British forces had surrendered.

10. Beard, 119; and Cockrum, 267. This company, formerly commanded by Captain Paul Wentworth, is often referred to as "Wentworth's company." Wentworth resigned from the service on 29 October 1811. It is not clear who actually commanded this company during the battle. Harrison, in his report to the secretary of war, mentions eight of the ten Regular Army company commanders by name—Burton and Fuller are the two omissions. One officer who is not listed as a company commander in the official roll of the army is mentioned as a company commander in Harrison's report. This officer is Lieutenant Peters. Harrison, in his report, said that "the companies commanded by . . . Lieutenants Larrabee, Peters . . . ." Second Lieutenant Peters is reflected on the roll of the army as serving in the company commanded by Lieutenant Fuller.

Although Peters was apparently fourth in the company chain of command, it appears that he commanded the company during the battle. The only Regular Army company that is not listed in the roll of the army is the small company from the 7th U.S.; however, Harrison also mentions the commander of this company (Albright) by name in his report. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Lieutenant Peters that Harrison refers to came from Albright's company. Additionally, several maps from secondary sources show a company commanded by a Lieutenant Peters in the rear line. Therefore, through a process of elimination, it is likely that the company commanded by Peters on 7 November 1811 was Fuller's company. Map 3 and 6 show a company commanded by Peters in the rear line, even though the roll of the army shows Fuller as a company commander, and a subsequent order, dated 23 November 1811, gave Fuller permanent company command.

11. Beard, 120. This company was formerly commanded by Captain Welch and is sometimes referred to as "Welch's company."

12. Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 646. In May 1810, Secretary Eustis informed Governor Harrison that Captain Posey and a company (7th U.S.) would move from the detachment at Newport, Kentucky, to Vincennes and report to Harrison for further instructions. The company was actually about twenty-five soldiers that were attached to the 4th U.S. Albright commanded the company during the battle of Tippecanoe. Harrison refers to the company as "Posey's company of the 7th Regt. headed by Lieut. Albright." See Draper MSS. 1X43, and Carter, 20.

13. Beard, 119, 121; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 646; and Walker, 5. There were about sixteen soldiers from this company at the battle. The difference between Esarey's figures and those on the army roll might be because of illness or the performance of details or duties elsewhere (the blockhouse, Fort Harrison, etc.). This is the company formerly commanded by Captain Whitney. There is also another Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins in the 4th U.S.; Second Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins was assigned to Captain Burton's company.

APPENDIX C

Chronology

. . . we took a north Cours[e] up the East side of the Wabash and Crosst [sic] to the west with orders to kill all the Indians we saw. fine news.[1]

—John Tipton, *31 October 1811, diary entry*

Date	*Event*
1754	French and Indian War begins (called the Seven Years' War in Europe).
1763	French and Indian War ends. England gains Canada and French possessions east of the Mississippi River.
1763	Proclamation of 1763. Great Britain issues a proclamation that restricts the authority of colonial governments to administer territory and establish settlements west of the Allegheny Mountains. The interior region west of the Allegheny Mountains is set aside for Indian use and administered by the royal government in England. The purpose of the proclamation is to separate Indian and colonial settlements.
1775	American Revolution begins. Almost all Indian tribes in the American northwest are allied with Great Britain.
1776	Declaration of Independence.
1779	Americans seize Vincennes from the British.
1781	Articles of Confederation adopted by the United States. Cornwallis surrenders to Washington at Yorktown.
1783	Treaty of Paris ends the American Revolution. The United States gains possession of all British territory east of the Mississippi and south of Canada. The new American territory includes the IndianTerritory protected by the Proclamation of 1763.
1787	Constitution adopted by the United States. Northwest Ordinance adopted. The ordinance established the Northwest Territory (present-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota) The ordinance stated the conditions for

statehood and directed that the area would be divided into no less than three and no more than five states.

1789 The U.S. Constitution becomes effective. George Washington becomes first president of the United States. Washington establishes a policy of settling the area that would become the Northwest Territory by giving land grants to ex-soldiers or offering the land for sale at extremely inexpensive prices.

1790 Harmar's expedition. Indian forces led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket defeat American forces led by General Josiah Harmar.

1791 St. Clair's defeat. Indian forces led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket defeat American forces led by General Arthur St. Clair. The defeat is the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars. Only twenty-four Americans are not wounded or killed; over nine hundred Americans are engaged.

1792 Kentucky becomes a state.

1793 War between Britain and France begins; the United States declares neutrality.

1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers. American forces led by General Anthony "Mad Anthony" Wayne defeat Indian forces led by Chief Blue Jacket.

1795 Treaty of Greenville, a result of the American victory at Fallen Timbers. The United States cedes much of the Northwest Territory to the Indians. The United States retains the right, however, to establish several administrative areas (and routes between them) in Indian Territory. The treaty also stipulates that the Indians in the territory are under the protection of the United States. The Indians have the right to sell the land ceded to them by the United States, but they can only sell it to the United States.

1795 The Jay treaty between the United States and Great Britain is signed. The treaty requires Great Britain to turn over its military posts in the United States no later than 1796.

1796 John Adams elected president. Great Britain turns over British forts on U.S. territory to the United States. As a consequence of the turnover, the United States gains unrestricted access to the American side of the Great Lakes.

1800 Spain cedes Louisiana to France. The Indiana territory is established (present-day Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota). William Henry Harrison is appointed the first governor.

1801 Thomas Jefferson becomes president.

1803 Ohio becomes a state. The United States buys the Louisiana territory from France. The Louisiana Purchase greatly expands the territory of the United States. Jefferson declares his unofficial policy to Harrison: extinguish Indian title to territory by forcing the Indians into a state of indebtedness to the United States or by forcing them across the Mississippi River.

1807 Embargo act closes U.S. ports to trade. Britain and France generate maritime policies during the Napoleonic Wars that had a negative impact on U.S. trade. Britain also has a policy of impressing sailors. The Embargo act was a response to these British and French actions. The act restricted any international trade in United States ports.

1808 James Madison is elected president. Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) establish Prophet's Town near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers, Indiana Territory.

1809 Illinois Territory is established. The area of present-day Michigan becomes a separate territory. Harrison concludes the Treaty of Fort Wayne. The Embargo act is repealed.

1810 A company from the 7th U.S. is ordered to Vincennes. Harrison is informed that Congress has ratified several treaties made with the Indians. Congress passes an act approving sale of the land gained in the Treaty of Fort Wayne. Tecumseh and Harrison have their first meeting, which is held at Vincennes.

1811

May Proclamation of sale is issued for public lands gained as a result of the Treaty of Fort Wayne.

Jul The 4th U.S. in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is attached to Governor Harrison. The regiment arrives in Vincennes in September 1811.

Jul Harrison and Tecumseh conduct their second meeting at Vincennes. After the conference, Tecumseh departs on a trip

through the American south to recruit more Indian tribes into his confederacy.

Aug The secretary of war informs Harrison that Congress has not appropriated funds to pay the militia. The secretary advises Harrison that he expects the appropriations and to organize the militia needed for a campaign against the Prophet.

Sep The 4th U.S. and a company of the Rifle Regiment arrive at Vincennes. Harrison organizes and trains forces for the upcoming campaign at Vincennes and Fort Knox. Once organized, the army moves north and establishes Fort Harrison (near present-day Terre Haute, Indiana).

Sep The secretary of war authorizes General Harrison to approach Prophet's Town and order the Indians there to disperse. If they refuse, Harrison is authorized to attack and compel them to disperse by force.

10 Oct A sentry is shot and wounded by Indians at Fort Harrison.

29 Oct The army departs Fort Harrison.

31 Oct The army crosses to the west side of the Wabash River as part of a deception.

1-2 Nov The army builds Boyd's Blockhouse at the mouth of the Vermillion River (on the west side of the Wabash River).

3 Nov The army crosses the Vermillion River and enters Indian Territory.

6 Nov The army arrives outside of Prophet's Town and agrees to meet with Indian representatives the next day to discuss peace terms. The army establishes its camp on Burnett Creek.

7 Nov Battle of Tippecanoe. American forces repulse an Indian attack.

8 Nov General Harrison's forces destroy Prophet's Town.

9 Nov The army departs the Prophet's Town area.

12 Nov The army reaches Boyd's Blockhouse. The army is resupplied, and casualties are evacuated by boat down the Wabash River to Vincennes.

18 Nov The army arrives in Vincennes.

1812 The United States declares war on Great Britain. Anti-British sentiment caused by British maritime policies and the belief that

the British are providing aid to the northwestern Indians (particularly Tecumseh's confederation) cause the War of 1812. Combined British-Indian forces operate in the American northwest throughout the summer. The Indian forces are commanded by Tecumseh, and the British forces are commanded by General Brock (and later General Proctor). Americans surrender Fort Macinac and Detroit. Fort Dearborn (Chicago, Illinois) is seized by the British and Indians.

1813 An American fleet commanded by Oliver Hazard Perry defeats the British fleet on Lake Erie. General Harrison's force defeats a British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh is killed during the battle.

1814 Treaty of Ghent ends the War of 1812.

1816 Indiana becomes a state.

1.Tipton, 179. 142

APPENDIX D

Biographical Sketches

> . . . one of the most important results of Tippecanoe was that it established Harrison as the one man in the West to block Tecumseh during the war that was to follow.[1]
>
> —Alec R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest*

There was an unofficial policy for many years in Indiana that resulted in the naming of new counties after participants in the Battle of Tippecanoe: Spencer, Tipton, Bartholomew, Daviess, Floyd, Parke, Randolph, Warrick, Dubois, and Harrison (Harrison county was organized before the battle).[2]

The characters, groups, and events that are central to this part of Indiana history continue to be commemorated in other ways. Streets (Tecumseh Street), schools (Shawnee Middle School), and geographical areas (Tippecanoe County; Battle Ground, Indiana; and Winamac, Indiana) provide reminders, throughout daily life, of an important part of the state's history.

The following sketches are designed to familiarize the reader with the lives of the individuals that participated in the campaign. The sketches may provide insight into how the perspectives of these characters developed. They may also be used to enhance role playing during the staff ride. Participants may become familiar with a particular character and discuss that person's actions during the engagement.

During any discussion of a character as part of the staff ride, the role player should discuss what the person did, his actions' impact on the battle, and why the role player thinks the person acted that way. Characters can be addressed at a stand where the event happened, at the beginning of the field study phase to set the stage for the campaign, or throughout the staff ride. For example, the role players assigned to Harrison and Tecumseh can discuss how their characters' actions set the stage for the campaign; role players can also analyze the impact of Harrison's subsequent actions on the battlefield. Role players assigned to Wells and Daviess can discuss their battlefield actions as well as how these men might have influenced Kentucky to support the campaign with troops.

United States

Joseph Bartholomew (1766-1840) was born in New Jersey and lived in Pennsylvania and Kentucky before moving to the Indiana Territory in 1798, where he was commander of the Clark County militia. During the Tippecanoe campaign, the infantry was organized into a provisional brigade, with Colonel Boyd as the commander and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew as commander of all militia infantry (Bartholomew reported directly to Boyd). The morning of the battle, Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry in the front line. Bartholomew, an experienced Indian fighter, may have been the officer that wisely recommended that the men sleep on their arms. He was also the field officer of the day and was wounded during the engagement. In the 1790s, Bartholomew helped to survey the boundaries designated by the Treaty of Greenville. His military service included combat in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812, and he was granted a pension for his 1812 war service. He was active in state politics, eventually serving in the Indiana state legislature. Bartholomew County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1821.[3]

John Parker Boyd (1764-1830), Harrison's second in command and commander of the provisional infantry brigade and all Regular Army troops during the Tippecanoe campaign, was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Army in 1786. He resigned his commission in 1789 and departed for India, where he was a mercenary until his return to the United States in 1808. Boyd subsequently was promoted to colonel and assumed command of the 4th U.S. on 7 October 1808. He was promoted to brigadier general during the War of 1812 and honorably discharged from the army in 1815. Boyd employed unpopular and severe disciplinary measures during the Tippecanoe campaign that caused problems with the militia units. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, he was the center of controversy, claiming that the militia would have been routed were it not for the efforts of the Regular Army units. The resulting debate also included discussions about Harrison's fitness as commander at Tippecanoe. Apparently, Boyd's officers did not agree with him; several of his company grade officers, to include three of his company commanders, wrote statements reflecting their confidence in Harrison as a battlefield commander. A group of field grade officers from the militia and 4th U.S. wrote similar statements.[4]

Joseph Hamilton Daviess [Daveiss, Davis] (1774-1811) was a major commanding a battalion of dragoons of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. Daviess was born in Virginia and moved to Kentucky in 1779. Later, he became a U.S. district attorney in Kentucky

and a well-known orator. Daviess, active in recruiting volunteers from Kentucky for service in the Tippecanoe campaign, joined the campaign as a volunteer private and was promoted to major by Harrison and placed in command of the dragoon battalion (three troops). Daviess, as well as Isaac White, was killed in action leading a charge of dragoons on 7 November 1811. Daviess County, Indiana, was organized in 1817 in his honor. Counties in Kentucky and Illinois also have been named for Daviess.[5]

Toussant Dubois [Toussaint] (d. 1816) was the captain who commanded the Company of Spies and Guides of Indiana militia during the campaign. Dubois was believed to be either French or French Creole. He was a merchant and Indian trader who frequently served as one of Harrison's messengers to Tecumseh, his brother, and other Indian leaders in the territory. He was the dispatch rider that Harrison sent to Vincennes immediately after the battle with news of the engagement. Two of Dubois' sons fought at the Battle of Tippecanoe as members of Parke's Dragoons (IN militia). In 1812, Dubois was commissioned major commandant of all spies in Indiana. He was a wealthy and respected member of the community and a member of the Board of Trustees of Vincennes University. Dubois County, Indiana, was organized in 1818 in his honor.[6]

William Henry Harrison (1773-1841), known as "Old Tippecanoe," was commander in chief of the Indiana militia and overall commander of all military forces engaged at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Born in Virginia, he attended Hampden-Sidney College and later studied medicine at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Philadelphia. Commissioned as an ensign in 1791 and promoted to lieutenant in 1792, he served as Major General Anthony Wayne's aide-de-camp at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and was a signatory to the Treaty of Greenville (1795). Promoted to captain in 1797, he commanded Fort Washington (near present-day Cincinnati, Ohio) until he resigned from the army in 1798. Appointed as the first secretary to the Northwest Territory in 1798, he became the territory's representative to Congress (1799). Appointed governor of the Indiana Territory in 1800, he served as the commander in chief of the Indiana militia while governor. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Harrison was the commander in chief in the Old Northwest during the War of 1812; a major general of Kentucky militia (1812); brigadier general, Regular Army (1812); and major general, Regular Army (1813). During the War of 1812, forces led by Harrison recaptured Detroit and defeated British-Indian forces at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada) in 1813. Tecumseh was allied with the British during the War of 1812 and subsequently killed by

Harrison's forces during the Battle of the Thames. Harrison resigned from the army in 1814 and settled in Ohio. His wartime service was recognized by an 1818 resolution in Congress for his actions at the Battle of the Thames. After his army service, Harrison served in the House of Representatives, the state senate, and the U.S. Senate. He also served for a short time as the U.S. minister to Columbia and ran unsuccessfully for president of the United States in 1836. Harrison's political career culminated in his winning the 1840 presidential election. Harrison was president from 4 March 1841 to 4 April 1841, when he died in office. Harrison County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1808.[7]

Charles Larrabee (1782-1862) was commissioned on 13 June 1808 and served as a company commander in the 4th U.S. during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Larrabee commanded Captain Baen's company because Baen served as an acting major and battalion commander during the battle. Baen was killed at Tippecanoe, and Larrabee retained command of the company after the campaign. Larrabee was promoted to captain in 1812 and breveted a major on 9 August 1812 for gallant conduct. He resigned from the army in 1825.[8]

Isaac Naylor (1790-1873), born in Virginia, moved to Kentucky in 1793 and thence to Indiana Territory in 1805. Naylor was a sergeant in a company of riflemen of Indiana militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe (a battle in which his brother also participated). Naylor also fought in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812 and, after his military service, became a circuit court judge, serving in that capacity for twenty years.[9]

Benjamin Parke was commander of a company of light dragoons of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. He was promoted to major and assumed command of Daviess' battalion of dragoons on 7 November 1811 after Daviess was killed. After the campaign, Parke served as a territorial congressman and a judge. Parke County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1821.[10]

Thomas Randolph (d. 1811) was Indiana attorney general and Harrison's acting aide-de-camp (as a civilian) during the Battle of Tippecanoe. He was killed in action on 7 November 1811. Randolph County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1818.[11]

Spier Spencer (d. 1811) was a captain and commander of a company of mounted riflemen of Indiana militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Spencer was killed in action on 7 November 1811. His twelve-year-old son accompanied him on the campaign and fought as a rifleman during the

engagement. Spencer, the acting sheriff of Harrison County, Indiana Territory, organized the company known as Spencer's Yellow Jackets. The company was called the Yellow Jackets because of the light-colored buckskin hunting shirts worn by members of the company. Spencer County, Indiana, was organized in 1818 in honor of Spencer.[12]

John Tipton (1786-1839) was an enlisted soldier assigned to Spencer's Yellow Jackets during the Tippecanoe campaign. He had been promoted to ensign on 21 October 1811 and to captain on 7 November 1811. He assumed command of his company after all of the other officers were killed. Tipton was born in Tennessee, where his father was killed by Indians in 1793. Tipton and his family moved to Indiana Territory in 1807. His military service after Tippecanoe included promotion to major, service in a frontier ranger company, and combat in engagements with Indians during the War of 1812. Later, he was a justice of the peace and Indian agent for Logansport and Fort Wayne, Indiana. He was active in politics and eventually served as a U.S. senator from Indiana, 1831-39. While in the U.S. Senate, Tipton was the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs. In 1829, he bought the land that encompassed the Tippecanoe battlefield and donated the area to the state in 1836. Tipton County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1844.[13]

Jacob Warrick (d. 1811), a captain and commander of a company of infantry of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign, was killed in action on 7 November 1811. Warrick County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1813.[14]

Samuel Wells, a major and commander of a battalion of Kentucky light dragoons, was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private during the Tippecanoe campaign. Harrison promoted Wells to major in the Indiana militia and placed him in command of two companies of mounted riflemen.[15]

Isaac White (ca. 1776-1811) was born in Virginia and moved to the Indiana Territory in 1800. A colonel and commander of the Knox County militia, White's unit was not called up for the campaign. White, nonetheless, enlisted as a private in the dragoons and was killed in action on 7 November 1811. He died in the dragoon assault led by Major Daviess. White County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1834. A county in Illinois is also named for Isaac White.[16]

Indian Confederacy

Shabonee (1775-1859), an Ottawa Indian and grand nephew of Pontiac, lived for many years in what is now Illinois and eventually became a "Peace Chief" of the Potawatomi Indian tribe. Shabonee was an Indian scout for the Prophet's forces during the Tippecanoe campaign and participated in the attack on the encampment on 7 November 1811. He was one of Tecumseh's trusted lieutenants and fought with Tecumseh throughout the War of 1812 and at the Battle of the Thames. Disgusted with the way the British treated their Indian allies during the War of 1812, Shabonee transferred his allegiance to the Americans. Later, during the Black Hawk Wars (1832), he warned settlers of impending Indian raids. He was awarded land in Illinois as a reward for his services, but he eventually left the state to join his tribe, which had moved to Mississippi. Later, he returned to Illinois to find his land had been purchased by land speculators at public auction. American citizens, grateful for Shabonee's prior service, purchased a farm for him in Illinois, where he spent the remainder of his life. He is buried in Morris, Illinois.[17]

Stone Eater was a Miami and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811.

Tecumseh [Techumthe, Tecumtha] (ca. 1768-1813) was the Shawnee warrior that organized the Indian confederacy engaged by General Harrison's forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tecumseh was not at the battle; at the time, he was traveling in the area that is now the southern United States attempting to recruit Creek Indians and other tribes for his confederacy. He returned to Tippecanoe in February or March 1812, where he discovered that his brother, the Prophet, against his express orders, had attacked Harrison's force. Tecumseh's father was Shawnee and his mother reportedly Creek. The father was killed at the Battle of Point Pleasant (present-day West Virginia) in 1774. Tecumseh's older brother was killed during a raid in Kentucky with Tecumseh, Shabonee, and a war party of Cherokee Indians. In the Indian victory over General Arthur St. Clair's forces, Tecumseh had fought as a member of the Indian confederacy led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket. During the campaign, Tecumseh served as a spy and scout for the confederacy. Later, he led a war party against General Wayne's forces at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. After the Indian defeat at Fallen Timbers, he refused to attend the peace council at Greenville. He allied himself with the British after the Battle of Tippecanoe and led Indian forces in Canada and the American northwest during the War of 1812. He was killed at the Battle of the Thames by forces under the command of

Harrison. Throughout his adult life, he was well-known and respected as an orator, political organizer, and war leader by both Indians and whites. Tecumseh also was celebrated for his refusal to allow torture or the killing of prisoners; torture and killing prisoners were practices not uncommon among all warring sides during the Indian wars.[18]

Tenskwatawa (ca. 1774-1834), known as "The Prophet," led the Indian forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tenskwatawa was not a war chief or leader but a spiritual leader for the members of the confederacy organized and led by his brother, Tecumseh. Tenskwatawa authorized the attack at Tippecanoe against the express orders of his brother, who was away recruiting other tribes for the confederacy. Tenskwatawa's original name was Laulewasika, or "He-makes-a-loud-noise." He later changed his name to Elkswatawa, which means "The Prophet," and finally changed his name to Tenskwatawa or "Open Door." To Americans, Tenskwatawa was known as "The Prophet" or "The Shawnee Prophet." He lost his right eye as a youth while practicing with a bow and arrow. As a young man, he was known as a drunk. He eventually reformed himself and created a religious cult. He rose to prominence among Indians after the death of an old Shawnee prophet in 1805. He assumed the older prophet's former role in the community and gained fame because of the accuracy of his predictions. Many believed that Tecumseh provided his brother with accurate predictions and that Tenskwatawa did not have any significant powers of prophecy. Tenskwatawa's teachings emphasized a return to the Indians' traditional lifestyle. Disavowed by Tecumseh after the defeat at Tippecanoe, Tenskwatawa allied himself with the British and wandered throughout the American northwest and Canada. In 1815, he and a small band of his followers moved to Missouri and then to Wyandotte County, Kansas, in 1828. He was a pensioner of the British government as a reward for his loyalty during the War of 1812.[19]

White Loon, whose Indian name was Wawpawwawqua, was a Wea Indian chief. The Wea Indians were a subtribe of the Miami Indian tribe. White Loon was one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811.[20]

Winnemac (d. 1812), a Potawatomi Indian chief and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811, had been an ally of the governor prior to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Winnemac eventually changed his allegiance to Tecumseh and was the leader of a large party of Potawatomi warriors at Prophet's Town. He was also the leader of the war party that intercepted the Delaware Chiefs en route

to join Harrison and forced the chiefs to accompany him, Winnemac, to Prophet's Town. Winamac, Indiana, was founded in 1835 and named in honor of Chief Winnemac.[21]

NOTES

1. Gilpin, 20.

2. Ronald L. Baker and Marvin Carmony, *Indiana Place Names* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), xii; McCollough, 4; Pirtle, 78; and Watts, 225.

3. Baker and Carmony, 9; Pence, 287-303; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.

4. Cleaves, 86-91; Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 634-35; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 2, 5-11; Heitman, vol. 1, 236; *Presidential Papers*, Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug., Reel 1; and Watts, 228. Bartholomew (Indiana militia), Decker (4th U.S.), Floyd (4th U.S.), Wells (Kentucky militia), Parke (Kentucky militia), and Purcell (4th U.S.) were the field grade officers that wrote the statement on Harrison's conduct. The statement, in part, reads "That the victory was obtained by his [Harrison's] vigilance and activity." Snelling, Cook, and Barton were the three 4th U.S. company commanders that completed a similar statement. Several other officers completed similar statements.

5. Baker and Carmony, 39; Cleaves, 93; Cockrum, 280; Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Green, 120-22; Pirtle, 80-86; and White 335-38.

6. Baker and Carmony, 43; Cockrum, 282; Eckert, *Sorrow*, 620-21; and Alameda McCollough, *The Battle of Tippecanoe: Conflict of Cultures* (The Research and Publications Committee of the Tippecanoe County Historical Association, 1991), 21; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, 29 November 1811; George R. Wilson, *History of Dubois County: From Its Primitive Days to 1910* (Jasper, IN: George R. Wilson, 1910), 397-99, 404-5, 412.

7. Baker and Carmony, 67; Trevor Dupuy, et. al., 317; Green, 12-16, 34-44, 47-55; and Heitman, vol. 1, 505-6.

8. Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Heitman, vol. 1, 616; and Watts, 225-47.

9. Cockrum, 292; and Naylor, 163-69.

10. Baker and Carmony, 126; Cockrum, 268, 280, 294; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.

11. Baker and Carmony, 137; Cleaves, 88; and Cockrum, 279.

12. Bacon, 32; Baker and Carmony, 156; Cockrum, 280-81; George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point N.Y. from Its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890*, 3d ed., vol. 1 (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 156; DeHart, 126; Draper MSS. 1X142-44, and Heitman, vol. 2, 910. Spencer's brother, George, was wounded during the battle. George died of his wounds as the army reached Boyd's Blockhouse. Harrison took care of Spencer's son, James, for the remainder of the campaign. Harrison also secured an appointment to West Point for James. James Spencer was officially appointed to West Point from Indiana for "his gallant conduct in the Battle of Tippecanoe." He entered West Point 1 January 1812 and graduated 17 July 1817. He graduated second out of nineteen graduates in the class of 1817.

13. Baker and Carmony, 165; Cockrum, 281; DeHart, 119; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 521; Green, 122, 126; McCollough, 23; Pirtle, 90; and Tipton, 170-84. Tipton is often referred to as "General Tipton," and his gravestone identifies him as such. To date, my research has not been able to determine if the title is honorary or if Tipton performed any duties commensurate with the grade.

14. Baker and Carmony, 173; and Cockrum, 282.

15. Cockrum, 296; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.

16. Baker and Carmony, 179; and George Fauntleroy White, "Memoir of Colonel Isaac White," *Indiana Magazine of History* 15, no. 4 (1919): 327-41.

17. McCollough, 8; and Whickar, 353-54.

18. Dupuy, 735-36; Eckert, *Gateway*, 148, 184-87; and McCollough, 17-18.

19. Eckert, *Gateway*, 19, 96, 343-49; McCollough, 19-20; and Pirtle, 2.

20. Eckert, *Sorrow*, 345, 652. The Miami tribe was the principal tribe and had three subtribes: Weas, Eel Rivers, and Piankeshaws

21. Baker and Carmony, 93, 181; Cockrum, 269; Drake, 57-59; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 651; Eckert, *Gateway*, 30, 281-82; and Eckert, *Sorrow*, 742-43, 954. Winnemac was killed in 1812 by Tecumseh's nephew, Johnny Logan. Logan was a Shawnee Indian scout for the U.S. Army during the War of 1812. He was fatally wounded in the engagement with Winnemac and died of his wounds

several days later, on 25 November 1812. Johnny Logan was captured, while a youth, by an American expeditionary force raiding Shawnee villages. He was adopted into the family of one of his captors and remained with the family until he returned to the Shawnees during a prisoner exchange. Logan, whose Indian name was Spemica Lawba, or "Big Horn," took the name of his adopted white father and remained a staunch ally of the United States until his death in 1812. Logan is the only Indian in Ohio history to be buried with full military honors. Logansport, Indiana, was named in honor of Johnny Logan.

APPENDIX E

Meteorological Data

. . . it stopt Raining and Began to Snow and Blow hard . . . it was the Disagreeablest night I ever saw . . . .[1]

—John Tipton, *19 October 1811, diary entry*

The weather during the Tippecanoe campaign was relatively severe for troops operating without proper environmental protection. It is likely that the precipitation and low temperatures had an impact on the health and combat effectiveness of the force as well as on the overall mobility of the march units and supply trains.

Generally, the weather consisted of rain and cold temperatures for much of the campaign. The soldiers, many of whom did not have tents to provide environmental protection or changes of clothing (as well as opportunities to clean their clothes), suffered from illness and fatigue during the campaign. At least seventy to eighty members of Harrison's command did not fight at the battle because of illness.[2]

The areas through which the army traveled to the battlefield varied from open prairie to heavy forests. The effects of weather on the terrain probably had an impact on the mobility of mounted and dismounted elements of Harrison's force and the supply trains (which consisted of wagons and livestock). The army conducted frequent river and stream-crossing operations because of Harrison's wish to prevent compromising his force (accomplished by crossing the Wabash and taking an unexpected route). Several streams and creeks crosscut his route of march. Despite the challenges weather posed to mobility, his command managed to maintain rates of march of over ten miles per day after they departed Fort Harrison. The following table (see table 5) details weather observations for October and November 1811.

October 1811

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9 heavy rain a.m. and p.m.	10 rain early a.m.	11	12
13	14 cloudy, showers p.m.	15 cloudy, rain p.m., windy	16	17 frost a.m.	18 cloudy, windy	19 rain, snow, windy
20 cold, cloudy	21 clear, cold	22	23 cold, cloudy, windy	24 cold a.m.	25 cold a.m.	26
27 clear, warm	28	29	30 rain a.m., cold, cloudy, windy	31		

November 1811

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3 cloudy	4 cold, cloudy, windy, rain	5 cloudy	6 cold, rain p.m.	7 rain a.m. and p.m., cold	8 rain, cold early a.m., cloudy	9 cold, cloudy
10 cold, cloudy	11 cold, cloudy	12 clear, cold, water freezes	13 warm	14 cold	15 cold	16 cold
17 cold	18 cold	19 cold, rain, cloudy	20 cloudy	21 cloudy	22 cold.a.m.	23 cloudy
24 cloudy, rain a.m.						

Table 5. Meteorological data, Tippecanoe campaign (October and November 1811)

Daylight and moonlight data for the week of the engagement indicate that the percentage of illumination was seemingly sufficient for night operations. The last quarter moon was on 7 November 1811. On 6 November 1811, the percentage of illumination was 68 percent and decreasing thereafter. At the time of the Indian attack, the illumination was about 58 percent. The illumination degraded to 39 percent by the time that the army began its retirement to Boyd's Blockhouse on 9 November 1811.[3] However, cloud cover that normally accompanies rain probably reduced any advantage gained because of the illumination (it rained almost daily during the week of the attack).

NOTES

1. Tipton, 176.

2. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 597-98; and Reid, 15. There were various reasons for a soldier's absence. A few of the categories and statistics for absences from the army's 12 October 1811 strength report are 69 sick, 60 extra duty, and 126 absent for various reasons. On 12 October 1811, the army was authorized 1,225 soldiers and had 762 present for duty.

3. All of the light data are from the U.S. Naval Observatory, Astronomical Applications Department [on-line]; available from http://www.usno.navy.mil/cgi-bin/aa_pap; Internet; accessed 5 February 1998.