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Congressional Outreach Highlights July 27, 2004 - Senate Recognizes Institute of Peace as National Resource on Its 20th Anniversary Resolution sponsored by Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), John Warner (R-Virginia), and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) honors the Institute on the 20th anniversary of its establishment. May 12, 2004 - Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Congressional Testimony by Robert M. Perito, Coordinator, Iraq Experience Project, Professional Training Program, U.S. Institute of Peace. April 21, 2004 - The Iraqi Shi'i Community: Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC, and the CPA Congressional Testimony by Amatzia Baram, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace. April 21, 2004 - Mosque & State: Religion & Politics in Iraq A Special Discussion on Capitol Hill sponsored by The Faith & Politics Institute and the United States Institute of Peace. March 17, 2004 - The Current Situation in Serbia and Montenegro Congressional Testimony by Dan Serwer, director of the Balkans Initiative and Peace and Stability Operations.

Congressional Testimony

Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan

The same sources of conflict and instability that allowed the Taliban to seize power and fueled the growth of Al Qaeda’s terrorist network continue to threaten the future of Afghanistan. On May 12, 2004, Robert M. Perito, coordinator for the Iraq Experience Project in the Institute's Professional Training Program and former special adviser to the Institute's Rule of Law Program, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the challenges of establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan.

The following is a summary of his statement made before the committee. The views expressed below are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.

"Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan"

Testimony by Robert M. Perito, coordinator for the Iraq Experience Project with the Professional Training Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

May 12, 2004

Two and one half years after the defeat of the Taliban, security remains the primary concern in Afghanistan. During 24 years of war, the rule of the gun long ago replaced the rule of law. Today, Afghanistan faces the combined threat of resurgent terrorism, fractional conflict, and dependence on narcotics.

In the south, U.S.-led coalition forces are engaged in a running fight with a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda. From sanctuaries in Pakistan, bands of terrorists stage cross-border raids, targeting foreign aid workers, Afghan security forces, and coalition troops.

In the north, warlords and militia commanders maintain private armies and engage in armed clashes over territory, border crossings, and transportation routes. They use intimidation and violence to control the local population and rely upon narcotics trafficking and extortion to finance their operations. The United States provided money to the northern warlords in 2001 and continues to work with them in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Some of the most powerful warlords hold positions as provincial governors, but ignore the central government and refuse to turnover tax revenues. Other warlords hold key positions in the central government. Mohammed Fahim, an ethnic-Tajik leader with a northern power base, for example, serves as vice president and defense minister.

More than terrorists or warlords, however, growing dependence on narcotics poses the greatest threat to Afghanistan's future. Since the fall of the Taliban, there has been an explosion in poppy cultivation, opium production, and narcotics trafficking. According to the annual report of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium production has spread from traditional growing areas in the south to 28 of 32 Afghanistan's provinces. Today, Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium.

In 2003, Afghans earned $2.3 billion from opium production. This amount was equal to half the country's legitimate GDP and five times the government's annual budget. According the United Nations, the international trade in Afghan opiates generated a total of turnover of $30 billion worldwide.

Narcotics Problem

In Afghanistan, the narcotics problem is exacerbated by the fact that growers, brokers, and traffickers enjoy the protection of police chiefs, militia commanders, provincial governors, and even cabinet ministers. These officials use the proceeds from drugs to fund personal armies and to maintain their independence from the central government. Profits from narcotics trafficking find their way through supporters to the Taliban and al Qaeda and are used to finance local and international terrorism.

In a situation where there are few disincentives and no equally lucrative alternatives, the country's rural population has turned to opium production. Afghanistan's renowned orchards and vineyards were sown with landmines and withered during the conflict. In contrast, opium grows well in arid terrain.

Opium brokers and traffickers provide a highly organized "agricultural extension service." Farmers are provided with seed, fertilizer, advance payments, technical training, and an assured market for their product. Opium is easy to package, store, and transport and does not spoil. Growing poppies also enables farmers to earn ten times the income from other crops. Opium production is particularly attractive to returning refugees who find ready work and good pay helping farmers grow poppies.

International Assistance

With the assistance of the United Nations and United Kingdom (UK), the Afghan government has put in place the institutional framework to begin a counter narcotics program. Afghanistan now has a Counter-Narcotics Directorate, a national drug control strategy, and a modern narcotics control law.

The Karzai government is incapable, however, of implementing its counter-narcotics program. Afghanistan does not have a national police force. Some 50,000 men work as police, but they generally are untrained, ill-equipped, poorly paid (or unpaid), and loyal to local warlords or militia commanders.

International efforts to create a national police force, including a drug enforcement capacity, are just beginning. The United States is spending $110 million to provide training to 50,000 currently serving police. Training is taking place in Kabul and at seven regional training centers co-located with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Initial training is focused on basic skills and election security. It will take time before newly trained police can be counted on for effective law enforcement.

Germany, which is the lead donor nation for police training, has spent $70 million on new equipment and on rebuilding the police academy in Kabul. Under the German program, 1,500 new police officers and 1,000 non-commissioned officers are enrolled in a five-year study-work program. The Germans are also working to create a 12,000-member border guard force. This effort is well intentioned, but the benefits are years in the future.

The UK, which is the lead donor nation for counter narcotics programs, will spend $12 million over the next three years to create an anti-narcotics task force to conduct eradication. The UK has promoted crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs for Afghan farmers. Again, the benefits will not be felt for some time.

Judicial Reform

An Afghan police force will be ineffective, however, if there is no functioning criminal justice system to support it. Unfortunately, little has been done to aid courts and prisons. There is no master strategy or even consensus on priorities for judicial reform. Italy, the lead donor nation, has failed to promote cooperation among the relevant Afghan institutions. There is a critical shortage of trained personnel, buildings, equipment, and financial resources. International funding for judicial projects has been minimal.

There is also an ongoing debate about which law to enforce and about the role of religion in the legal process. The new Afghan constitution concentrates the power to appoint judges in hands of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The current chief justice, a conservative cleric, has packed the court system with mullahs with no legal education.

Corrections

The critical area of corrections—jails and prisons—has been almost entirely ignored. Prison conditions in Afghanistan are routinely described as inhumane, lacking adequate food, sanitation, trained personnel, and space. Outside of Kabul, warlords control detention facilities and conditions are even more deplorable.

International assistance for corrections has been severely limited. Other than a few NGO projects, UNODC is working alone on jail and prison improvement. The United Nations is currently spending only $2 million over two years on very basic renovation of the detention center in Kabul and three cellblocks of the infamous Pul-e-Charki prison. The United Nations is also providing limited training to administrative staff.

Recommendations

The interrelated problems of terrorism, warlords, and narcotics are extremely serious, but the situation may still be reversible. Afghan farmers are reluctant to engage in activities that are illegal and viewed as immoral by Islam. Any hopeful scenario, however, involves a race against time. The United Nations has warned that Afghanistan is in critical danger of becoming a narco-state and a haven for narco-terrorists.

To prevent this from happening, the United States should make counter-narcotics its top priority. Curtailing the narcotics trade will deny terrorists and warlords funds for recruiting followers and conducting operations. The United States is currently training four teams of Afghan police in crop eradication, but this and other law enforcement programs must be coupled with projects for creating alternative livelihoods and imaginative programs for crop substitution. The United States now has the financial resources. The emphasis should be on vigorous implementation.

The U.S.-led coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must join in the fight against narcotics. Military forces must begin pro-actively performing at least a limited number of counter-narcotics enforcement functions. These would include intelligence sharing, destruction of drug warehouses and heroin laboratories, and drug seizures. At present, U.S. military forces only seize drugs if they encounter them in the course of their operations.

The United States must make good on Secretary Powell's statement that warlords have no place in Afghanistan and private armies must be disbanded. Warlords and militia commanders are a source of insecurity and a threat to the central government. U.S. military payments to "regional influentials" conflict with our overall policy of promoting national unity. Stopping payments would correct the impression of many Afghans that the U.S. military condones the warlords' participation in the drug trade.

There must also be a vigorous effort to curtail corruption. We should assist the Afghan government to start paying adequate salaries to police, judicial, and prison personnel. It is impossible to have judicial reform when judges earn only $36.00 per month and are often not even paid.

The United States should insure that equal attention and resources are paid to police, the judicial system, and prisons. Emphasis on police training at the expense of the other parts of the justice triad will produce the kind of failures seen in Haiti and Iraq. Without effective courts and humane prisons, there can be no rule of law. As events in Iraq demonstrate, we cannot ignore conditions and practices in Afghan detention facilities.

At this point, the United States should not be constrained by the lead donor nation approach and should do what is needed to provide training and technical assistance. The effort to promote burden sharing has not worked and the United States can no longer wait for other donors to take action.

The United States has both the most experience and the most at stake. The missing ingredient in international assistance to Afghanistan is leadership. Afghans realize they need help. Americans are looked to for guidance. We need to move quickly, however, before it is too late.

The views above reflect the testimony at the hearing; they do not represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.