Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

By David Little
Senior Scholar, Special Initiative on Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights
United States Institute of Peace

Note: This paper was originally published in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (March-April 1995). It is based on the continuing work sponsored by the United States Instate of Peace on the role of religious and related forms of belief in the formation and mobilization of ethnic identity and nationalism. It is particularly concerned with the relationship of ethnic conflict to intolerance and discrimination, as defined by human rights standards. Drawing upon the work of Max Weber, and giving examples from case studies of Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tibet, the essay proposes a partial explanation of the sources of intolerance.

Contents
Introduction
Max Weber on Ethnicity and Nationalism
Causal Complexities: Some Examples
Conclusion

Introduction

It is frequently asserted that terms like "religious nationalism" or "religious-ethnic conflict," however much in vogue they may be, are quite misleading. They are so, it is said, because they mistakenly suggest something inseparable and essential about the connection between religion, ethnicity and nationalism, as though religious belief were the source of these things. But far from being the source, the argument runs, religion is in actuality usually a "tool" or "veil" for prior and ulterior ethnic or nationalist interests. According to Walker Connor, national and religious identity ought not be confused; in fact, in regard to what makes for intense and enduring social loyalty, "the well-springs of national identity are more profound than are those associated with religion...."¹

It is true the role of religion can be overstated and misunderstood. Ethnicity and nationalism are highly complicated and variable phenomena that resist simple diagnoses of any kind, including those involving religion. Moreover, on any reasonable accounting, religious belief and practice as it bears on ethnic and national identity is itself typically shaped and influenced in a powerful way by particular historical circumstances. Sensitivity to such complexity is urgently required in studying the subject.

Still, in face of exaggeration and superficiality, it is possible to overreact by oversimplifying in the opposite direction. However careful we must be in drawing conclusions about it, there is something interesting and worth examining about the recurring correlation of religious belief with ethnicity and nationalism. If religion is all that incidental a factor, why does ethnic conflict and the struggle over national identity in so many places-in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tibet and China, Israel, India, Nigeria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, etc.-have such a conspicuous and enduring religious component? Even if religion is used or manipulated for ulterior purposes, why, exactly, is it religion that repeatedly gets used for ethnic and nationalist purposes?

To put it another way, why does the assertion of ethnic and national identity so frequently involve, as it obviously does, intolerance and discrimination in regard to religious and other forms of fundamental belief? Why, for example, are nationalists so readily inclined to favor a "repressive ideology demanding strict adherence to the authority of the official embodiments of national tradition,"² and thereby to try to compel and control not only behavior but also belief? In short, what, precisely, is the connection between belief, ethnicity, and nationalism?

The particular perspective from which these questions will be addressed is developed in a series of reports being published under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). When completed, the series will consist of studies of seven countries or regions-Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Sudan, Nigeria, Tibet,³ and Israel, studies organized under the general title, "Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance." These particular cases were selected out of many possible examples of religiously-related ethnic conflict because of the cultural, religious, political, and geographical diversity they represent. Reports on Ukraine, Sri Lanka and Tibet⁴ have already been published, and the study on Sudan⁵ is nearing completion.

The focus of the USIP study (Intolerance Project) is the set of human rights norms that guarantee "the freedom of religion or belief." They are of two sorts: There are the articles enshrined in the international instruments that protect legitimate religious interests, such as freedom of belief and conscience, as well as the freedom to manifest belief in "teaching, practice, worship, and observance."⁶ In addition, there are the articles that prohibit discrimination based on religious belief or affiliation.⁷

The human rights to free exercise and to freedom from discrimination are elaborated in the first two articles of the of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.⁸ The remaining six articles of that declaration further specify the protections and prohibitions that follow from these two fundamental rights.⁹ The Declaration against Intolerance defines the rights of free exercise and freedom from discrimination as follows:

The general idea of the USIP Intolerance Project is to examine and elaborate upon, by means of case study, the twin premises of the declaration: that "the disregard and infringement...of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to [human]kind," and, conversely, that respect for and encouragement of "freedom of religion and belief should...contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace, social justice and friendship among peoples..."¹⁰

More precisely, the Intolerance Project has two basic and related objectives: One is to establish the degree to which forms of intolerance that violate existing human rights standards contribute to conflict, as well as how efforts to modify or eliminate those violations contribute to peace. The second is, to clarify the sources or causes of tolerance and intolerance, including, in particular, the role of religion and similar beliefs.

In respect to the first objective, it is not difficult to establish that violations of the rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination intensify conflict in divided multiethnic societies, nor to project with reasonable confidence that the observance and implementation of those norms will serve to reduce conflict.

In the cases of Sudan and Tibet—cases of severe civil conflict—large numbers of religious believers have been systematically interfered with and frequently persecuted. In Sudan and Tibet, as well as in Sri Lanka—another example of ongoing civil strife-minority populations have been seriously discriminated against because of majority attitudes and beliefs that have tended, respectively, to dominate the governments of those places. At the same time, in all three of these cases, respectable proposals for resolving conflict prominently include references to respect for the rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination. In short, intolerance is quite obviously a significant part of the conflict in these (and many other) cases, and its elimination is widely and reasonably regarded as an important ingredient of peace.

None of this is particularly problematic. Things get more complicated, however, when it comes to considering the question of the sources or causes of intolerance (and tolerance), including the role of belief and its connection to religion.

Max Weber on Ethnicity and Nationalism

The first part of an answer to the sources or causes of intolerance follows from an examination of the meaning of the terms, "ethnicity" and "nationalism." Max Weber's discussion remains among the most penetrating we have.¹¹ For him, the definitions of "ethnic group" and "nation" are very close, though not quite equivalent. An ethnic group is, at bottom, a "people"¹² that holds "a subjective belief in their common descent." Their identity is "presumed," which means that it is "artificially" or "accidentally" associated with a set of characteristics such as physical appearance, customs, common memories, language, religion, etc.¹³ "Almost any kind of similarity or contrast of physical type and of habits," says Weber, "can induce the belief that affinity or disaffinity exists between groups that attract or repel each other."¹⁴ This way of putting it, underscores the fact that the discourse of ethnicity at once homogenizes and differentiates.¹⁵ The very artificially selected ethnic indicators that create "affinities" among insiders simultaneously create "disaffinities" with outsiders.

Likewise, the idea of "nation,"¹⁶ says Weber, "is apt to include the notions of common descent and of an essential, though frequently indefinite, homogeneity."¹⁷ The concept also "belongs in the sphere of values,"¹⁸ and is artificially constructed or invented, with the same consolidating and differentiating effects that ethnicity involves. Nations are self-defining¹⁹ "peoples" in the way ethnic groups are. In these respects, a nation is like an ethnic group.

Yet, Weber goes on, "the sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by itself make a 'nation.'"²⁰ There are two distinguishing features. Nations are culturally more self-conscious and assertive, more concerned with "cultural prestige" than ethnic groups. "The significance of a 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group." It is in that sense that nations are typically associated with legends of a "providential mission,"²¹ and, no doubt, with an intensified image of themselves as a "chosen people."²² Second, nations are more self-conscious and assertive politically: They naturally want an "autonomous polity," thereby exercising what they regard as their legitimate right of self-rule.²³

These last comments about the impulse to create a "nation-state" hint at Weber's understanding of nationalism. On Weber's view, nations in general are naturally disposed toward forming autonomous polities. However, under modern conditions, a nation fulfills its political aspirations by fashioning itself as a "modern state." A modern state, in turn, is to be understood as a political community that possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory and its inhabitants,²⁶ and whose legitimacy rests on "legal-rational" or formal, universalistic norms, rather than on rules associated with "sacred tradition" or other forms of particularistic authority that tend to favor one racial, religious, or kin group over others.²⁷

The fact that nationalism is the impulse of a nation to form itself into a modern state explains why nationalism is necessarily a modern phenomenon.²⁸ The very conditions that made the modern state possible have affected the idea of national identity in a profound way. Those conditions include the capacity to consolidate and standardize a population into a mass society through new, expansive patterns of commerce, industry, transportation, communication, education, and the like that are associated with the rise of modern capitalism. These developments are themselves accompanied by a new idea of the individual as someone no longer defined primarily by local membership in family, clan, or town, but rather as an "equivalent member" of a potentially vast "imagined community," which is the modern nation.²⁹

This idea of equivalent membership, or what Anderson refers to as "a deep, horizontal comradeship"³⁰ in an extended national community, is, in Weber's mind, directly tied to the formal, impersonal legal and political system that characterizes the modern state. Thus, linked as it is with the modern state, nationalism must cope in one way or another with the universalistic demands of "mass democracy" and "the equal rights of the governed" that are implicit in a legal-rational political system.³¹

At this point, a crucial distinction suggested in Weber's writings and recently elaborated by contemporary scholars needs to be introduced.³² It is the distinction between "liberal" and "illiberal nationalism," alternatively typified as "civic" versus "ethnic nationalism,"³³ or as "nonaggressive versus aggressive nationalism."³⁴

Eric Hobsbawm characterizes the distinction this way:³⁵ On the one hand, there is the version of nationalism expressed in the French or American revolutions that rested fundamentally on the ideals of citizenship, and involved a commitment to common "civic" participation in accord with constitutional norms. This type of nationalism inclines toward Weber's "legal-rational" or formal, universalistic norms and the associated ideas of mass democracy and "the equal rights of the governed" that he identifies with the modern state. What is more, these ideas are obviously compatible with the human rights norms identified earlier. Particularly in the American case, for example, the national ideal is in part a multiethnic and nondiscriminatory one, expressed inclusively in terms of a "people of peoples." We shall label this type, "liberal nationalism."

On the other hand, there is a different version of nationalism manifested, for example, in the German campaign, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for political unification that rested its aspirations for a state upon a belief in "the prior existence of [a] community [that distinguished] itself from foreigners" according to its special history and culture.³⁶ While German nationalists took some account of the democratic and universalistic norms associated with the modern state, their emphasis upon the priority and preeminence of one particular racial and cultural community over others, particularly during the fascist period, obviously pulled against the legal-rational norms and in the direction of an ethnically discriminatory and preferential political and legal system. This type we designate as "illiberal."

In a Weberian spirit, we stress that however useful these types may be, they are, nevertheless, artificial. They indicate "tendencies" and "options" available to nationalists under modern conditions. Numerous intermediate types are no doubt imaginable. We may assume that all cases of nationalism experience pressure in both directions, inclining toward one type of nationalism or the other depending on circumstances. Indeed, it is perhaps correct to suggest that nationalism is best understood as fundamentally ambivalent as between the liberal and the illiberal types, and that the individual "story" of each case of nationalism may best be described as a dynamic response to the countervailing tendencies represented by the two types.

For however committed to "civic," "universalistic," "liberal" norms a given form of nationalism may be, nationalism is at bottom, as Weber saw, both an homogenizing and a differentiating mode of discourse. Nationalist discourse—even of the liberal sort—drives toward cultural standardization within the nation, which makes it hard to sustain genuinely multiethnic and multinational expression. At the same time, a nation favors clear territorial boundaries that distinguish it from "foreigners" and "aliens." In fact, sovereignty over a sharply circumscribed community of inhabitants and a sharply circumscribed territory is one of the hallmarks of the modern "nation-state."

Moreover, the subjective belief in common descent that is characteristic of liberal nationalism is typically ambivalent with respect to how total its commitment to universalistic norms really is. In the American case, for example, there is a notorious ambiguity in the thought of the "founding fathers," from whom American citizens believe themselves, in a spiritual sense, to be descended.³⁷ On the one hand, there is a strong and frequently heralded commitment to the universalistic principles of equal rights for all, tolerance and nondiscrimination, and government by the consent of every citizen. On the other hand, there is the familiar and unmistakable evidence of racism and sexism in both the utterances and the laws of the founding period. This deep national schizophrenia—appropriately called "the American dilemma"—obviously underlies many of the major tensions and conflicts that have appeared throughout American history.

By the same token, however "illiberal" a given case of nationalism may be, however committed it may be to the political priority and preeminence of one racial, religious, or linguistic group over other groups in the same society, illiberal nationalism is still, as we saw, a "modern" phenomenon, and in its own way, as much a product of the universalizing tendencies of modern economic, political and cultural life, as is liberal nationalism. Even Hitler's Germany possessed a constitution, and sought legitimacy—at least in the early 30s—through democratic elections and parliamentary procedures.

It is of course true that the Nazi version of a subjective belief in common descent—the myths about racial superiority and so on—were relentlessly illiberal. But that only proves, in a negative way, how potent and inescapable a threat liberal beliefs are perceived to be by proponents of illiberal nationalism. Similarly, contemporary examples of illiberal nationalism in places like Sri Lanka and Sudan give strong evidence of a continuing struggle between the imperatives of constitutional democracy and the deep and abiding pressure for policies of cultural and ethnic preference and discrimination.

Illiberal forms of nationalism appear, then, to be parasitic upon modern legal-rational organization, and they are required to work out some kind of compromise with those organizational norms, however much their beliefs may contradict the ideals of modern liberalism. In that respect, it can perhaps be said that the requirements of the modern state dictate the basic terms of nationalist discourse.

Accordingly, Weber's analysis suggests two connections between belief, ethnicity and nationalism. One is the obvious point that ethnic and nationalist identity rests, after all, upon nothing more than "subjective belief." If it is, as Weber says, finally belief and not "objective factors" that provides the foundations for group identity, then it is clear why the belief held in common would itself become the special, even "sacred," focus of group attention and consciousness, and why considerable effort would be expended in shoring up that belief and in protecting it against threats of pervasive doubt and disaffection. If, as a matter of fact, the feeling of solidarity, the feeling of belongingness, that undergirds ethnic and national identity, as well as the spirit of nationalism, expresses, at bottom, a deep emotional attachment,³⁸ then it is easy to understand why challenges to the fundamental beliefs associated with ethnicity and nationalism would be resisted in such an intense and passionate way.

Second, nationalism (and, incipiently, ethnicity) are related to belief insofar as nationalism constitutes a theory of political legitimacy. For Weber, political legitimacy, as an example of social authority, involves a "belief" in the existence of a valid or justified political order.³⁹ Presumably, the nationalist, in justifying a claim to state authority, would advance basic national beliefs as worthy of political expression and enforcement.

Now the implication of this for the study of intolerance is that insofar as all nationalists—liberal and illiberal—are loyal to particular cultural and territorial communities, they will have a certain problem complying consistently with universalistic norms, such as are expressed in international human rights documents.

At the same time, liberal nationalists will do relatively better than the illiberal nationalists accommodating and respecting diverse beliefs, and thus promoting tolerance and peace. That is because liberal nationalism is, by definition, more committed to protecting the rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination than illiberal nationalism. A multiethnic political setting where prevailing nationalist beliefs exclude or demean minority populations and their beliefs is a setting liable for serious conflict, especially where the dominant beliefs are translated into law. In that sense, illiberal forms of ethnicity and nationalism constitute a special source or cause of intolerance.

Religion and Nationalism. While Weber's emphasis on the "artificial" and "accidental" character of beliefs about ethnic and nationalist identity is warranted and important, that emphasis must not be allowed to obscure some special affinities between religion and nationalism, affinities that are also relevant to other forms of fundamental belief.

The point by now should be obvious: If ethnonational groups are at bottom constituted by "a subjective belief in their common descent," a belief that naturally becomes "the special, even 'sacred' focus of group attention," then we have already begun to describe something very close to "religious belief." The connection between religion and myths of human origin is well-known. As the anthropologist, Malinowski, and others have shown, such myths encourage and support cultural and social self-consciousness by validating and affirming what are believed to be the primordial terms of human identity.

Add to that, the strong religious ring of ideas associated with ethnicity and nationalism: a "chosen people" with a "providential mission," a belief in "the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the [group's peculiar] culture values," and the right to form an autonomous polity in the name of advancing a holy mission. Hebrew Scripture, whether interpreted by Jews or Christians, the Qur'an, and some significant Buddhists doctrines and texts, for example, all provide the foundation and the inspiration for enlisting political and military power in the cause of defending and advancing certain sacred values and ways of life.

And these natural affinities make understandable why, as Benedict Anderson and others have argued,⁴⁰ the modern nation-state, even in its more liberal forms, readily takes on some sacral attributes and functions. Its memorials for fallen heroes, its ceremonies commemorating past glories and woes, its rhetoric of obligation and sacrifice 'for God and country,' all give meaning to the suffering and death of those defending the nation, and provide the nation a certain 'transcendent' continuity among its members, living, dead, and yet unborn.

Causal Complexities: Some Examples

These observations might lead us to conclude that since religion is so deeply interconnected with ethnic and nationalist identity, religion determines nationalism. But, of course, things are more complicated than that. Weber's general comment about causation in social life is highly pertinent:

On the one hand, it is the tentative conclusion of the studies so far produced by the Intolerance Project that "fundamental belief," of either a religious or ideological sort, plays an important role in shaping the forms of nationalism that exist, for example, in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tibet.

The specific role of religion and related cultural factor in the Sri Lankan conflict is clearly significant.⁴² While nationalism is a relatively modern invention in Sri Lanka, it nevertheless draws on and puts to use traditional religious warrants. Sinhala Buddhist "revivalists" of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries have artfully manipulated ancient legends concerning Buddha's alleged associations with Sri Lanka, as well as the patterns of cooperation and mutual support between king and monastery that are part of the island's history. These appeals have done much to mobilize support for Sinhala nationalism among the monks and laity, and to provide the movement with sacred authority. The appropriation by Tamil nationalists of religious and cultural appeals is also important, though the subject has not been as fully investigated as has the Sinhala side.

What is most menacing about the type of religious and ethnic nationalism that has appeared in Sri Lanka is precisely its more or less systematic incompatibility with the right of nondiscrimination. The eminent Sri Lankan historian, K.M. de Silva has pointed out that the Sinhala Buddhist revivalists had no time for such norms: "In the Sinhala language, the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous, and a multiethnic or multicommunal nation or state is incomprehensible to the popular mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala Buddhists carried an emotional popular appeal, compared with which the concept of a multiethnic polity was a meaningless abstraction."⁴³ The same could be said for the more radical forms of Tamil nationalism.

As in the Sri Lanka example, the internal strife that has divided Sudan since its independence in 1956 has deep religious roots. The ascension to power of the National Islamic Front in 1989 reflects both the influence of Islam on the political culture in Sudan and the ability of Islamic conservatives to shape the debate in Sudan, despite the deleterious effects on the country.

Islam has long played a key role in forming the northern Sudanese identity and in providing political legitimacy to opposition parties and governments alike. The Mahdist revolution in the late nineteenth century solidified the link between religion and politics, and defined an identity in northern Sudan that transcended traditional loyalties. The post-independence era saw a continuation of these trends. The withdrawal of British colonial rule after 1956 provided an opportunity for the Muslim majority in the north to establish some form of Islamic rule.⁴⁴ Fearing domination by the northerners, the southern Sudanese opposed Islamic rule.

Southern fears are aroused by the prospect of discriminatory treatment imposed on minorities under strict Islamic rule. "The attempt by the north not only to define the identity [of Sudan] as Arab and Islamic, but to structure and stratify the life and role of citizens along those lines [has been an underlying cause of the civil war]."⁴⁵ While northerners see themselves as Muslims, southerners—though divided along tribal lines—share a common identity of being non-Muslims. The south's introduction to Islam was associated with an extensive slave trade during the nineteenth century, an era characterized by economic exploitation and military domination. Appeals by northern politicians for an Islamic constitution at the time of independence evoked fears among southerners of a return to this earlier stage of relations.

The actions of the north since independence have done little to alleviate these fears. Some northerners sincerely feel that Sudan can only be united through religious and cultural uniformity, and have therefore supported efforts to Islamize the south. The military offensives conducted by Major General Ibrahim Abboud in the late fifties and early sixties,⁴⁶ and the implementation of the shari'a-based "September laws" under the regime of Colonel Ja'far Muhammad Numairi (which led to a resumption of the civil war after a brief reprieve based upon the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972) are examples of the recurring attempts to unify Sudan through enforced Islamization. Far from achieving the desired unity, however, the result has been continued civil war.

Religious revivalism, whether in Sri Lanka or Sudan, then, has provided the resources for mobilizing a strong form of illiberal nationalism that has from time to time inspired intolerance and discrimination "based on religion or belief."

The relation between religious belief and ethnonationalism in the case of Tibet is somewhat different. The Tibetan people have for a long time identified strongly with their religious tradition. Buddhism permeated Tibetan culture and society to such an extent that "the history of Tibet . . . is almost the same as the history of the importation of Buddhism into Tibet."⁴⁷ The centrality of Tibetan Buddhist identity remained strong in the face of the initial Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1949-50. An aggressive campaign to eradicate Buddhist culture was undertaken largely because "the Chinese authorities viewed religion as the principal obstacle to their control of Tibet." Over 6000 monasteries were destroyed, approximately 1.2 million Tibetans were killed, many others were forced into exile (including the Dalai Lama), and an influx of Chinese soldiers, administrators and settlers transformed the region.

The Chinese campaign was inspired by a combination of Maoist ideology and Han Chinese nationalism. Convinced of its mission as the agent of progress and of the liberation of "backward" Tibetans, the Chinese government considered itself justified in controlling and reconstructing Tibetan society. Resistance was based on the Tibetans' "desire to protect their religious and cultural traditions,"⁴⁹ and religion came to represent for the Tibetans the principal expression of nationalist sentiment.⁵⁰

In reaction to Chinese nationalism, which is distinctly illiberal, Tibetan nationalism has, for the most part, taken a nonviolent form, and has expressed itself in liberal terms. Tibet's noted leader and principal spokesperson, the Dalai Lama, has repeatedly called for a liberated Tibet dedicated to parliamentary democracy and to the principles of human rights, including the rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination. Indeed, the Dalai Lama has gone so far as to advocate the separation of church and state. Such a system, he says, is duly respectful of the rights of religious and other minorities in a way that has not occurred under Chinese rule, nor, for that matter, under the traditional pattern of Tibetan government.⁵¹

But if religion plays an important role in such cases, questions still remain. Why, exactly, has religion taken the shape it has in modern Sri Lanka or Sudan or Tibet, and yet has not taken the same shape elsewhere? Why does religious or ideological belief go together with such a hostile form of nationalism in Sri Lanka or Sudan or among the Han Chinese leadership, and not everywhere? More precisely, why does Buddhism take the shape it does in Sri Lanka or Tibet, and Islam take the shape it does in Sudan? To raise the questions is to suggest that the causal connections are not all in one direction.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the chauvinistic character of Buddhist revivalism itself demands explanation. The basic tenets and doctrines of Buddhism would not seem to affirm ethnic favoritism. Such attitudes apparently resulted from a combination of historical pressures on the Theravada sangha around the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. and certain colonial and other experiences, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were attitudes of racism and anti-Buddhist intolerance fostered by Christian missionaries and British colonial authorities, a sense of threat among the Sinhala represented by the combined strength of the Tamil communities in Sri Lanka and south India, and the imperatives of modern nationalism, including the intensification of ethnic identity because of political and economic developments.

So far as Sudan goes, it has been difficult for northern political-and military-leaders to move away from the appeal to Islam as the basis for political support, although that emphasis has so alienated the south. Efforts by northern leaders to deal constructively with southern grievances by supporting more moderate and nondiscriminatory polices have produced strong counterreactions among other parts of the Sudanese political elite, frequently stimulating a reversion to religious militancy. In that way a process of "religious-one-upsmanship" characterized political life in the north during successive post-independence governments. This process, coupled with bitter sectarian political divisions, led to the failure of Sudan's experiments in parliamentary rule, further discrediting moderate policies. The instability created by sectarian divisions and by alternating military regimes did little to provide the kind of environment necessary for the peaceful and enduring resolution of north-south differences. The result has been an environment conducive to an interpretation of Islam that is deeply intolerant of diversity.

As for Tibet, we have already mentioned how the Chinese campaign for domination had the effect of intensifying Tibetan allegiance to Buddhism, and strengthening the role of religion in rallying the people to the nationalist cause. While much of the explanation for the nonviolent emphasis of Tibetan nationalism undoubtedly rests with the character of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition and, more especially, with the direction and style of leadership provided by the Dalai Lama, it is possible that a realization of the futility of violence against overwhelming Chinese military advantage has also contributed to the commitment to nonviolence. Finally, there can be little doubt that the experience of intolerance and discrimination at the hands of Chinese authorities has importantly influenced the conviction that a future Tibet, once liberated, must be a Tibet reformed in keeping with liberal norms.

Conclusion

The perspective on questions involving the connections among belief, ethnicity and nationalism adopted in this paper derives from the USIP project on Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance. As befits the work of an institution dedicated to the study of peace, the project traces the connections between tolerance and peace, or, putting it negatively, between intolerance and conflict. The study concludes, tentatively, that the connection is important: Intolerance, defined, essentially, as the violation of the human rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination, undermines peace, while respect for those rights undergirds and promotes peace.

When it comes to the more theoretical questions of the sources or causes of intolerance, the project gives special attention to the role of ethnicity and nationalism. Those forms of nationalism, such as are manifest in the policies of the Chinese government toward Tibetans, or in the treatment by the Sudanese government of citizens not in sympathy with its sectarian objectives, or in Sri Lankan policies, now thankfully in retreat, favoring the Sinhala majority over the Tamil minority, are essentially illiberal in character.

Under illiberal forms of nationalism, the requirements of nondiscrimination are systematically disregarded: Civil identity, or citizenship, is deeply conditioned by ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological, and other indicators. It would be difficult to conclude that this kind of "ethnonationalism" does not directly contribute to antagonism, hostility, and instability, especially in multiethnic, multireligious societies.

We acknowledged that not all nationalism is of the illiberal variety. Though never entirely free of countervailing tendencies, liberal nationalism inclines to support and institutionalize universalistic norms of nondiscrimination and free exercise. It is more in accord with human rights imperatives. The implication is that, on balance, liberal nationalism contributes to the conditions of peace by cultivating ethnic and religious respect and harmony.

One urgent question emerging from the Intolerance Project concerns why nationalism takes one form rather than another. Our tentative answer is complicated. One part suggests that "fundamental belief" plays a distinctive role because, by its nature, nationalism attracts and thrives on "subjective belief" of the most fervent and primary sort. The affiliation between nationalism and religious "revivalism" of a Sudanese or Sri Lankan kind, or between nationalism and an ideology of cultural superiority of the Han Chinese variety, is, accordingly, not surprising.

We speculate, based on the evidence produced so far by the Intolerance Project, that the relevant religious or cultural beliefs place their own peculiar stamp on the form and shape of nationalism. There are, one would assume, certain dispositions in Buddhism, Islam, or Christianity, or in the Han Chinese cultural tradition that, under conducive circumstances, can be readily appropriated in the service of an illiberal kind of nationalism.

By the same token, of course, one may just as well speculate that there are contrary dispositions in these and other religious and cultural traditions that, under conducive circumstance, favor liberal nationalism. The example of the influence of Buddhism in the Tibetan case springs to mind. One thing about the Tibetan nationalist movement that is, so far, significantly different from comparable movements in Sudan and Sri Lanka is the reliance, in general, upon nonviolent means. This emphasis upon nonviolence has given special authenticity to another theme of equal importance to the Tibetan cause: the urgency of observing human rights norms as a basis for just and peaceful relations between the Tibetans and the Chinese.

In the same vein, one could also point to certain manifestations within the Ukrainian Christian churches, especially among the Ukrainian Catholics, but also among certain elements within the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox, of strong support for the rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination.⁵² That support is accompanied by a desire to reverse the dominant tradition in Ukraine which, effectively, effaces the distinction between public and private when it comes to religion, and invests direct religious control in hands of public authorities.

So, religion is a significant factor in the emergence and expression of nationalism. It can, it would seem, be a force for tolerance or intolerance, and needs to be so analysed. At the same time, there is more to the answer than that. The causal factors do not, as Weber said, run all in one direction. We must be as attentive to the conditioning effects of politics, economics, historical accidents, etc. on religion and culture, as we are to the contribution religion and culture make to the formation of nationalism, and thence to the incidence of tolerance and intolerance.

The views expressed in this essay are the author's alone and are not to be taken as necessarily representing the outlook of the United States Institute of Peace.

1) Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 107. Cf. Ted Robert Gurr et al., Minorities At Risk (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1993), p. 317: "Our comparative evidence and cases suggest that religious cleavages are at best a contributing factor in [ethnic] conflict, and seldom the root cause."

2) Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination," International Sociology 8,4 (December 1993), p. 405.

3) Tibet is at present regarded by the Chinese government, and by the large majority of the international community, as an "autonomous region," rather than as an independent state or country.

4) David Little, Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1991); David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1994); David Little and Scott W. Hibbard, Sino-Tibetan Co-Existence: Creating Space for Tibetan Self-Direction (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1994).

5) David Little and Scott W. Hibbard, "Sudan: Plural Society in Distress" (in preparation). Two other studies in the series, one on Lebanon to be written by John Kelsay and one on Nigeria, to be written by Rosalind Hackett, are in the early stages of preparation. A study of Israel is contemplated, and, finally, there will be a summary volume reviewing the general findings of the case studies.

6) Article 18 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

7) Article 2 of the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the general provisions against discrimination, and Article 7 of the Universal Declaration and Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantee
equal protection of the law. (There are similar articles in all other major international human rights instruments).

8) Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on November 25, 1981 [on the Report of the Third Committee (A/36/684)] 36/54).

9) The remaining articles deal, among other things, with the obligations of states to enforce religious human rights, as well as with rights to religious education, and they enumerate some of the types of protected religious activity.

10) Preamble to the Declaration against Intolerance.

11) Weber's seminal discussion of "ethnic groups," "nationality," and "the nation" is to be found in Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 385-398 and vol. 2, pp. 921-926. Weber's approach to the terms has been kept alive by Walker Connor (see Ethnonationalism, e.g., pp. 102-104), and fits closely with the dominant emphasis these days among social scientists and historians concerning the partially artifical or "invented" character of ethnic and nationalist identity. (See also, Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), for an illuminating approach explicitly indebted to Weber.)

12) The Greek word, "ethnos," rather open-endedly means "people," "race," or "tribe."

13) Economy and Society, vol. 1, p. 387, 389; emphasis added. 14) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 388.

15) Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" Daedalus 122,3 (Summer 1993), p. 38. I am assuming that Verdery's terms, which she applies here to 'nationalism,' also apply in a similar way to 'ethnicity,' even though these ideas, while related, are not the same thing for her.

16) "The word nation comes from the Latin and, when first coined, clearly conveyed the idea of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the verb nasci, meaning to be born. And hence the Latin noun, nationem, connoting breed or race." Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 94.

17) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 923.

18) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 922.

19) Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 104.

20) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 923: "Undoubtedly, even the White Russians in the face of the Great Russians have always had a sentiment of ethnic solidarity, yet even at the present time they would hardly claim to qualify as a separate 'nation.' The Poles of Upper Silesia, until recently, had hardly any feeling of solidarity with the 'Polish Nation.' They felt themselves to be a separate ethnic group in the face of the Germans, but for the rest they were Prussian subjects and nothing else."

21) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 925.

22) Weber links the notion of "chosen people" to ethnic groups rather than nations (ibid., vol. 1, p. 391). By speaking of nations as having "an intensified image of themselves as a 'chosen people,'" I am simply extrapolating from Weber's suggestion that nations are ethnic groups that are more self-conscious and assertive.

23) Ibid., vol. 1. p. 395.

24) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 397.

25) H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 176.

26) Ibid., p. 78. For Weber, this definition distinguishes the modern state from premodern forms of political organization, which were typically much less preoccupied with precise territorial borders, and much less capable of achieving a monopoly of legitimate force.

27) Economy and Society, vol. 1, pp. 33-38; vol 2, pp. 901-4; vol 3, pp. 956-1005.

28) "[T]he word nationalism is itself of very recent creation. G. de Bertier de Sauvigny believes it first appeared in literature in 1798 and did not reappear until 1830. Moreover, its absence from lexographies until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests that its use was not extensive until much more recently. Furthermore, all of the examples of its early use convey the idea of identification not with the state, but with the nation as properly understood [as a 'people']. While unable to pinpoint nationalism's subsequent association with the state, it indubitably followed and flowed from the tendency to equate state and nation. It also unquestionably received strong impetus from the great body of literature occasioned by the growth of militant nationalism in Germany and Japan during the 1930s and early 1940s." Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 98. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) for similar conclusions.

29) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 6-7. Cf. Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," Annual Sociological Review 19 (1993), pp. 229-233.

30) Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7.

31) See, for example, "The Levelling of Social Differences," Economy and Society, vol. 3, pp. 983-987.

32) E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism," The New York Review (November 21, 1991). Cf. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

33) Greenfeld, Nationalism.

34) Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism," p. 19.

35) Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 22.

36) Ibid., p. 22.

37) "From my own primary school education, a century or so ago, I recall how we students-many, probably most, of whom were first-, second-, or third-generation Americans from highly diverse national backgrounds-were told we shared a common ancestry. We were programmed to consider Washington, Jefferson, et al. as our common 'founding fathers.' We memorialized Lincoln's reminder in the Gettysburg Address that four score and seven years earlier, it was 'our Fathers [who had] brought forth upon this continent a new nation.' We repetitively sang that very short song-'America'-one of whose seven lines read 'land where my fathers died.'" Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 207-208. 38) Though Connor never quite uses the term, "emotional apriori" to describe the need for a feeling of solidarity that appears to underlie ethnic and national identity, he comes close. The term captures his emphasis, clearly in line with Weber's, on the fundamentally affectional or nonrational character of ethnic and national identity. See Ethnonationalism, p. 94.

39) "All ruling powers, profane and religious, political and apolitical, may be considered as variations of, or approximations to, certain pure types [legal-rational, charismatic and traditional]. These types are constructed by searching for the basis of legitimacy, which the ruling power claims." Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 294. Cf. Economy and Society, vol. 1, p. 31: "Action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief [Vorstellung] in the existence of a legitimate order." It should be noted, that even though Weber's "affectional"-"charismatic"and his "traditional" types of legitimacy are considered by him to be nonrational, he does, nevertheless employ "belief" in regard to both; see From Max Weber, p. 295 and Economy and Society, vol. 1, p.

40) Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 17-25.

41) Cited in Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics, p. 254.

42) See Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity.

43) K.M. de Silva, Religion, Nationalism, and the State . USF Monographs in Religion and Public Policy, no. 1 (Tampa, Fla.: University of South Florida, 1986), p. 31.

44) At independence, all but one political party supported some form of Islamic rule. The inspiration for such rule is rooted in the
revivalist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. Reacting to the experience of colonial domination, Islamic reformers have consistently sought to establish a society based on the Qur'an, the traditions of the prophet and shari'a. Recognizing Muslim society to be in a state of decline-economic, political, and social-and attributing that decline directly to the deviation of the community from the "straight path" of Islam, the logical "cure" is a return to Islam. This entails a reshaping of society in accord with Islamic principles, eliminating any distinction between politics and religion, and, most importantly, the implementation of Islamic law (shari'a).

45) Francis Deng, Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1994, p. 47.

46) "Abboud believed that the way to unify the Sudan was to homogenize its people, which, in his view, meant transforming the south into an Islamic society." Ann Mosley Lesch, "The Republic of Sudan," Ta'eq and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa (Miami, FL: International University Press, 1991), p. 365.

47) Robert Thurman, "Religious Intolerance/Tolerance in the Future of Tibet and China," unpublished paper, p. 1.

48) International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), Forbidden Freedoms: Beijing's Control of Religion in Tibet (Washington: ICT, 1990), p. 7.

49) Ibid., p. 7.

50) It needs to be noted that efforts by the Chinese authorities to eradicate Buddhist practice greatly diminished traditional Buddhist influence on the subsequent generations who grew up in Communist Tibet with little or no religious teaching. However, in recent years, there has been a revival of Buddhist practice in no small part because it represents for many Tibetans an effective form of dissent.

51) Lodi G. Gyari, "Religion and the Future of Tibet," presented at the USIP conference, "Tibet: Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation" (September 28, 1993), p.3: "The most recent formal proclamation by His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, was the "Guidelines for Future Tibet's Policy and the Basic Features of its Constitution" in which His Holiness restates his decision not to play any role in the future government of Tibet. For religion, this is a significant development as it clears the way for the head of state to be a secular leader....Whereas the Guidelines say that the 'Tibetan polity should be founded on spiritual values," nowhere does it refer to a "Buddhist nation"...or say that government would have the duty to safeguard and develop religion...." "On the contrary, the Guidelines provide explanatory language on many areas, but not on religion, envisioning a full separation of church and state....The only mention of religion is found in the section, 'Fundamental Rights,' which simply says all Tibetan citizens shall be equal before the law without discrimination on the grounds of religion and other classifications" (emphasis added).

52) See Little, Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance, pp. 25-27, 67-74.

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