Human Rights, East and West

By David Little, United States Institute of Peace

We are all, by now, familiar with the challenges posed by Asian governments and others to what are thought to be prevailing "Western" interpretations of human rights. The Bangkok Governmental Statement, issued in 1993 by forty or so Asian and Pacific states, summarizes some of the features of "Asia's Different Standard," as it has been called.1 The statement emphasizes "the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds," a phrase that found its way into the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (art. 5). The statement also speaks of "the principles of respect for national sovereignty...and noninterference in the internal affairs of States"; it "discourages" "any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development assistance," and it gives special weight to collective (as opposed to individual) rights, such as the "right to development."

These concerns are meant to oppose what is regarded as Western cultural imperialism, according to which a certain version of individual freedom, especially in civil and political life, is held up as the mandatory standard for all peoples and states, regardless of their special cultural "particularities," or their circumstantial needs. A white paper published by the Singapore government in 1991 focuses what it claims is the sharp difference between Asian and Western values. Unlike the West, says the white paper, Asian societies weight the interests of the community above those of the individual. For Singapore, this "balance has strengthened social cohesion, and enabled Singaporeans to pull together to surmount difficult challenges collectively, more successively than other societies. An emphasis on community has been a key survival value for Singapore,"2 where survival, as the Singapore government sees it, has depended particularly on political stability and economic growth.

These challenges raise three different sorts of problem about human rights and human rights policy. The problems are 1) normative and theoretical, 2) factual, and 3) practical or policy-related. Let us consider and respond in order to some representative examples of these problems.

1) Normative and Theoretical Problems. The claims about the pertinence of "national and regional particularities," "historical, cultural and religious backgrounds," and the priority of "national sovereignty" raise the question of the universal validity or justifiability of human rights. If I may say so, discussions of this issue too often proceed without sufficient attention to the formative historical setting of human rights language, as well as of its peculiar "logic." My suggestion is, that when the setting and the logic of human rights language is taken into account, the force of the Asian challenge to the universality of human rights is reduced.

Above all, it must be remembered that universal protection of the individual against abuses like torture, extrajudicial killing, enslavement, racial, ethnic and religious discrimination became the foundation of the human rights movement after World War II in reaction to rampant theories of national, cultural, and racial superiority associated with fascism. What the 1948 Universal Declaration calls "barbarous acts," shocking to the human conscience, followed from the fascist doctrine of communal domination. Individuals are subordinate to collective ends. Racial, religious, ethnic and national identity take priority over the conscience and well-being of the individual.

The self-evident lesson of World War II is how unspeakable are the consequences of leaving individuals defenseless before the doctrine of communal domination. That doctrine, of course, rests precisely on claims about "national and regional particularities" and about the special authority of "historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds." It rests, also, on a conviction about the priority of "national sovereignty," and the attendant right of governments to treat their citizens as they see fit, and to exempt their policies regarding economic development or anything else from international inspection and regulation.

The historical setting of human rights language, then, gives reason for deep and legitimate apprehension in face of assertions about the superiority of collective ends and identity above the physical and moral integrity of the individual.

The same is true of the "logic" of human rights language. If it is correct, as it surely is, that "the principle of non-discrimination is fundamental to the concept of human rights"3-that human rights, by definition, are applicable and available to every human being, "without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion,...national or social origin,...birth," etc.-then any suggestion that race, religion, ethnic identity, place of birth, etc. may acceptably be used as a basis for interpreting and applying human rights directly contradicts the principle of nondiscrimination.

Nor will familiar appeals to emergency or to special provisions for protecting public order, health and safety do very much to alleviate legitimate worry. In the human rights instruments, claims of emergency are subject to objective standards of proof and to international review.4 The same applies, increasingly, to the clauses that permit special consideration for public order, etc.5

It is of course inevitable that human rights will be interpreted and applied in specific historical and cultural circumstances, and that allowance will undoubtedly have to be made for severe threats to the public welfare. But in making the appropriate adjustments, governments submitting to human rights instruments assume two ineradicable obligations. One, they bear a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that they are not violating in gross and systematic ways the essential objective of human rights norms, namely the protection of the individual against collective domination of the sort exemplified by fascist governments in the second quarter of the twentieth century. This condition would, obviously, also govern the application of any collective rights, such as the right of development or the right of self-determination. Two, governments committing themselves to human rights must agree to the principle of international supervision in determining whether or not they are in violation.

2) Factual Problems. There are several aspects of the Asian case, as well as assertions bearing on the Asian case, that are empirically doubtful. We shall deal with two of them.

a) Cultural unanimity and consistency. It is improbable that there is, in fact, anything like a monolithic "Asian perspective" that has one thing to say about human rights. Asia is a big place, encompassing a vast range of religious and cultural outlooks, including Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, etc.. These not only differ in some important ways among themselves, but they also express themselves individually in varied ways. The political and social implications of Buddhism in Sri Lanka are not the same as they are in Tibet, nor, again, in Cambodia. Singapore and Taiwan may both be heavily influenced by Confucianism, but there are substantial social and political differences.

Moreover, there are significant constituencies in all Asian countries-NGOs, intellectuals, middle classes, religious and ethnic minorities-who frequently stand in strong opposition to the "official view" of their governments. For example, many NGO members, often at considerable cost to themselves, "part company from their governments in their assessment of the state of human rights, which they find marked by massive and terrible violations and pervasive lawlessness on the part of state authorities. They deplore the militarization of their governments and societies which is a primary cause of these violations."6 Is it self-evident that these opposition forces are not a bonafide part of the Asian perspective?

Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the policies and objectives of existing Asian governments reflect, unambiguously, traditional cultural values and ideals. As Yosh Ghai points out, there is nothing "particularly Confucian" about the "tight regulation of society in China and Singapore. Confucius argued against reliance on law or coercion, and advocated a government of limited powers and functions."7 There is, also, impressive evidence, particularly in the neo-Confucian tradition, of strong affinities to an idea of individual rights, understood both in civil-political and in social-economic terms.8

Actually, it appears that Asian governments have been shaped as much by modern imperatives and global institutions, such as nationalism and market capitalism, as by traditional values and procedures. In fact, these international conditions themselves have a highly destabilizing effect on traditional ideals of communal life and responsibility. It appears, for example, that the inevitable social disruption that markets cause wherever they go has, as often as not, prompted the rise of what is best described as "statism," or the recurring reliance on emergency legislation and extensive state interference. By systematically suppressing opposition, statism, therefore, not only tends to violate established human rights norms, it also contradicts indigenous communal values and processes.

b) Human Rights and Economic Development. It is frequently asserted that, as an empirical matter, economic development produces greater human rights compliance. One hears that argument not so much from the proponents of the "official Asian view" (since they would presumably consider the advancement of too many individual rights a threat to public order) as from businesspeople and others. Still, whether it is part of the official Asian case or not, the argument importantly bears on the subject of human rights implementation. If business is, afterall, good for human rights, then all that is needed is more marketization. The argument was important in the debate in the United States, last year, over the renewal of MFN status for the Chinese, and the connection between economic weapons (like withholding MFN) and human rights.

In fact, the claim about the connection between economic development and human rights is both controversial and complicated. The opinions of John Kamm, a man with long experience in China both in business and human rights, are compelling.

• [T]he relationship between business and human rights is far more complicated than what [business] lobbyists would have us believe. There are plenty of examples of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes which have, in this century, enjoyed impressive rates of economic growth-some based on expansion of the foreign trade and investment sectors-and which have also successfully resisted political and legal reform. If we look at China, we notice two other facts as well. 1) The economic boom has brought in its wake a host of new human rights abuses like exploitation of child labor and the proliferation of unsafe sweatshops. 2) While most US companies do their best not to exploit their workers or cooperate with repressive security forces in harrassing dissidents and their families, it is unfortunately the case that some companies and their executives act in ways that sustain human rights abuses.10

Kamm's observations regarding the negative human rights effects of much business activity are abundantly confirmed in human rights reports such as those issued recently by Human Rights Watch/Asia.11

Kamm goes on to argue, plausibly, that if the proposition that economic growth is good for human rights is dubious, a stronger case can be made that human rights compliance goes together with good business practice, at least in the long-run. Three examples are as follows:

1) Respecting human rights enhances worker productivity and management creativity; in short, it raises enterprise profitability.
2) Promoting rights opens markets. He points out that "the Chinese government's acknowledgement of a human right has always preceded the opening of a specific market." Loosening restrictions on travel opened the aircraft market in China, and modifying restraints on information exchange via, for example, the use of faxes has opened that market.
3) Promoting respect for human rights goes hand in hand with development of rule of law, and thus guarantees that contracts will be honored, investments and property protected.

Kamm's suggestions indicate reasons for thinking that if there is nothing automatic about the relation between economic activity and human rights, there may nevertheless be some interesting affinities. Above all, it appears that the subject needs the most thorough and careful empirical investigation before we will be able to arrive at secure generalizations. We need, for example, to look carefully at cases like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore to better understand just how much sacrifice in human rights compliance was (and is!) necessary for economic advancement.

3) Practical or Policy-Related Problems. In my view, the debate in the U.S. over the renewal of MFN for China, and the continuing debates over U.S. human rights policy toward China involve judgments about the normative-theoretical problems, as well as the factual problems we have mentioned.

If you agree with the gist of my comments on the universality of human rights, as well as with my comments about the rather fragmented and diffuse character of the "Asian perspective," you will not be inclined, I would think, to favor "particularlist" or "relativist" arguments concerning human rights. You would wish to stand firm for a common, international perspective on the subject, complete with robust procedures for international supervision and enforcement.

If, similarly, you agree with my observations about the complicated and as yet rather indeterminate nature of the connections between economic development and human rights, you will look very cautiously and critically at all policy proposals that relate the two in one way or another. For example, I was never convinced that withholding MFN from China would really do much good for the promotion of human rights because of the substantial opportunities China had to substitute other partners for the U.S. By the same token, I am still not persuaded that untrammelled economic growth will lead, without assistance, to political and civil liberalization. That speaks to the need to generate, if possible, alternative means for promoting human rights in a place like China. Perhaps John Kamm's proposals regarding the responsibility of business, is one place to start.

The views expressed in this essay are the author's alone and are not to be taken as necessarily representing the outlook of the United States Institute of Peace.

1) Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1993), pp. 24-41.
2) Singapore Government, Shared Values (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, Ltd., 1991), p. 1, cited in Yosh Ghai, Human Rights and Governance, (Center for Asian Pacific Affairs, Occasional Paper, No. 1, November 1994), p. 7.
3) Paul Siegart,
4) Art. 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
5) Professor Louis Henkin writes, for example, that the derogation clauses in the Chinese constitution are inconsistent with international standards: "Rights may not be limited for just any state interest, nor can a state insist that what is required by socialism is required by 'public order' in a socialist state, for that would destroy the very idea of rights [emphasis added]." Cited in Eric Koldner, "Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of International Human Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation," Human Rights Quarterly 16 (1994), p. 485.
6) Ghai, Human Rights and Governance, pp. 8-9.
7) Ibid., p. 10. Cf. Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," Foreign Affairs 73/6 (November/December 1994), pp. 189-194.
8) W. Theodore de Bary, "Neo-Confucianism and Human Rights," in Leroy Rouner, ed., Human Rights and the World's Religions (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
9) Ghai, Human Rights and Governance, pp. 10-11.
10) John Kamm, "The Role of Business in Promoting Respect for Human Rights" (Statement to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Seminar "OSCE at 20: Relevance to Other Regions, Washington, DC, November 13-14, 1995), p. 3.
11) Human Rights in the APEC Region. 1994. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 6,13 (November 1994); Human Rights in the APEC Region: 1995. Human Rights Watch/Asia 7,15 (November 1995).

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