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TOPOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY
THE TOPOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY
by Jean-Marie Guehenno
Transcript of a presentation at the
1997 Virtual Diplomacy Conference.
April 1, 1997.
Traditional diplomacy is about territory. It works
on the assumption that human communities are organized in sovereign
nation-states with clearly defined borders. Such diplomacy is much more
comfortable with geography than with anything else. Diplomats love to
work with maps.
So in a way there is something strange about a diplomat
addressing the concept of virtual diplomacy, of going beyond traditional
diplomacy. Territory has been the currency of diplomacy. Traditional
diplomacy may be ill equipped to look at a world where territory is
no longer the defining principle.
We are witnessing today an event of a magnitude
similar to that surrounding the invention of the printing press by Johann
Gutenberg. The invention of the printing press destroyed the pretense
of the Latin language to universality. It fundamentally changed the
relationship between a universal learned class of clerics and the people
at large. It changed the relationship between religion and power. One
could even say that the eventual birth of the modern nation-state was
in some ways a consequence of that event.
What will be the impact of this new revolution in
information and communications technologies? Just as Gutenberg's contemporaries,
we are not yet fully aware of all its long-term implications. We are
too immersed in it to really understand this revolution. I will, however,
characterize what might be the implications of this revolution.
I will make three points. The first point is that
this revolution in a way is the opposite of the Gutenberg revolution
in the sense that it is going to build a new universalism, while Gutenberg's
invention destroyed a certain universalism. This revolution has an impact
on sovereignty; it destroys the idea of territorial sovereignty.
My second point is that this revolution changes
the nature of power.
And my third point will explore some of the implications
of this revolution for political institutions.
Regarding sovereignty, we are witnessing today the
opposite of what happened a few centuries ago. The printed page shifted
power from the hands of the literati to the people, and the idea of
the sovereignty of the people eventually replaced the reality of the
sovereignty of popes, emperors, and kings.
That shift strengthened the link between sovereignty
and territory. Modern states are defined by a common language, which
is promoted by a national education. Modern states are also defined
by national characteristics. Both are reinforced by the mass production
of the first industrial item -- the book. The first industrial product
changed the political shape of communities.
Today we are experiencing the exact opposite. Our
very concept of sovereignty is being challenged. Let me explain.
The challenge is most visible in the economic sphere,
where territorial nation-states find it increasingly difficult to keep
up with multinational enterprises that take a global rather than a territorial
view of their activities.
Globalization is made possible not only by the falling
cost of transportation, but by progress in information and communication
technologies that allow for an increased degree of decentralization
and of decentralized management, and that make services as tradable
as manufactured goods.
The multinational enterprise, which was once a predominantly
American phenomenon, is now a global reality. For example, in ten years,
between 1985 and 1995, the global stock of foreign direct investments
has been multiplied by four and is now nearly $3 trillion.
What does this mean for states? The distinction
between domestic issues and international issues is becoming less relevant
every day. The ability of nation-states to conduct an independent monetary
and fiscal policy is constrained by the fluidity of capital markets.
The ability of nation-states to tax, which is the basis of the power
of a state, is constrained by the decisions of multinational enterprises
and by the worldwide competition for capital.
Also, the ability of nation-states to distinguish
between domestic regulation and international trade is constrained by
the growing connection between trade and direct investments.
Tariff negotiations are no longer the most important
issue in trade negotiation as multinational enterprises, which have
to think globally, ask for what they call a "level playing field," requiring
not only lower tariffs, but harmonization of domestic regulation.
And so in the economic sphere, it is clear that
the sovereignty of states has been eroded by the necessity to enter
into multilateral arrangements, as we have seen with the creation of
the World Trade Organization, and by the emergence of non-state actors
that produce their own norms. Such norms are sanctioned by the marketplace,
and are particularly relevant when states fail to keep up with the pace
of change.
Many people would still argue that what I have said
about the economy is not valid for security. Security, they would argue,
is still very much about territory. They can point to a Saddam Hussein
who grabbed neighboring Kuwait's territory, and they can point to the
various groups fighting for territory in former Yugoslavia. Control
of territory is still, indeed, perceived as the first requirement of
security.
Yet I would suggest that it would be wrong to assume
that the sovereignty of states can remain immune to the revolution in
information and communications technologies. Wealth and power are increasingly
detached from the possession of territory. When China regains political
control of Hong Kong, it will only control an empty shell if it does
not resist the temptation to meddle with the rules and regulation that
have defined the Hong Kong economy.
Territory is no longer the basis of power, nor is
it a sufficient guarantee of security. In an age of globalization, characterized
by the migration of global capital markets, territorial security can
only be achieved if states could transform themselves into large gated
communities -- an unrealistic and dangerous goal that could only lead
to the impoverishment of the state implementing such a policy.
Actually, the security of our nation-states requires
us to look beyond our borders. Of course, we feel that more strongly
in Europe because we live in smaller countries, but I think this is
a worldwide phenomenon. We have to accept the fact that other states
will look into our own borders.
We have to accept the idea that globally accepted
norms and regulations of behavior are, in a way, our first line of defense.
Upholding them is as important as protecting our territorial borders,
requiring a degree of international cooperation and even integration
that civilly constrains state sovereignty.
Are we witnessing a change of scale? From the city-state
to the nation-state, and now to the continental state? Some in Europe
would like to think that way and to believe that the fundamental framework
of the state is not being challenged by what we are witnessing, that
we are just building sizeable structures to confront expansive issues.
I suggest that this is not true; that what is happening
is actually quite different; that globalization and the information
revolution destroy the sovereignty of states as we have known them;
that a universalism of efficiency predominates as was the case with
a universalism of religion before Gutenberg's invention; that we are
witnessing changes the very nature of power. This is my second point.
We have lived in the two-dimensional world of territorial
power, and we are entering what one could call the three-dimensional
world of network power. Let me explain what I mean.
Territorial power is hierarchical and pyramidal.
Small subgroups deal with small issues that are sub-issues of bigger
issues. Our political institutions reflect that approach in the allocation
of power, as well as in the legal system. Laws are expected to set general
principles that are then detailed in particular administrative decisions.
Small decisions are expected to flow from big decisions, and the more
you concentrate power, the more powerful you are supposed to be.
Particular institutions are still built on this
assumption. The emerging information and communications technologies
are often used by political institutions as tools that enhance their
territorial power.
Such an approach does not work. In the case of totalitarian
regimes, it can lead to the illusion of a sort of omniscient, omnipotent,
Orwellian center in which big computers will simulate human interactions.
In the case of democratic societies, it leads to
democratic gridlock, as concentration of power in the executive branch
is matched by concentration of power in parliament, making fully informed
decisions increasingly difficult to reach. Concentration of power makes
the big decisions increasingly difficult, if not almost impossible,
to make.
So I suggest that network power should not be an
additional tool of traditional hierarchical power. It is something different,
and the implications of network power for organizations and decision
making can be more easily observed in corporations than in political
institutions.
The increased speed at which information can be
transferred and processed changes the nature of the tradeoff that we
always face between big, but slow, decisions and quick, but sometimes
mistaken small decisions.
I think that we will experience that it will be
more effective to make quick decisions that can be rectified if necessary,
rather than to wait to make the perfect, but increasingly difficult,
big decision.
Middle layers, which in the traditional hierarchical
model serve as filters protecting the higher echelon from an overflow
of unprocessed information, are eliminated in corporations. Horizontal
links are encouraged. Power is defined less by the number of people
you control than by the number of people you are in contact with. Influence
replaces control. The boss is not defined by the command of the various
specialized knowledge sets of his subordinates, but rather by his ability
to establish links between them. His role is less to give orders than
to promote a set of norms and to provide a sense of direction.
This kind of power cannot be territorially defined.
Territories on which this kind of power is exercised keep shifting as
connections change, as rules and norms change in a sort of open-ended
competition of rules and regulation.
What does network power mean for our political world,
for the resolutions of conflict, for our political management of human
communities? I will identify five directions.
First, I think we have to go beyond the reaction
we had at the time of the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia. At that
time there was a feeling that big is good and small is ugly. The issue
today is not whether to create other super states-as we see in Europe
where integration will continue, but not toward building a super state.
People do not want this. People do not want to see power going away
from them toward a big bureaucracy that will either be arbitrary or
face the kind of democratic gridlock that I mentioned earlier.
And the alternative is neither to move toward a
myriad of mini-states pretending that mini-states are insulated from
globalization. The real issue is to distribute power. The real issue
is not to be unidimensional, but to become multidimensional.
The second point is that political institutions
have to become increasingly nimble. They have to accept complexity.
We have lived with the idea of pyramidal structures of certain uniformity,
with various levels and a symmetrical distribution of power. I think
we are witnessing here the end of uniformity. We have to accept overlapping
structures. We have to accept some degree of messiness, so to speak,
in political institutions.
There is a risk, however, that such messiness will
destroy transparency, and transparency is an important element of democratic
control. We have to accept that political institutions are going to
become much more complex than they currently are.
For example, as we move toward a sort of multi-speed
Europe, there will have to be more institutional flexibility. Some see
that as a setback from the ideal of a super state; but I see it as progress.
My third point is that the divide between public
and private organizations, government and non-governmental business,
has to be bridged. I think that we are entering a world of competition
where the division between public institutions that have had a monopoly
over the management of territories, and private institutions that were
functionally defined, will erode. In-house private institutions will
have a growing role in the management of public affairs.
Thus, public and private organizations will have
to work together. The most effective international organizations are
the ones that can combine the input of states with the input of non-governmental
and sometimes private businesses. Here again, the issue is transparency
so that the public interest is not highjacked in the joint process.
My fourth point is that we are going to have an
increased need for institutions that build a common ground. I think
this information revolution makes it possible to have much smaller communities
than we have today, to have many virtual communities. Such communities
would not have been feasible before now. In this sense, fragmentation
may occur. How will communities connect with each other? We will need
institutions to foster those connections. I think this is going to be
very important.
I will precede my last point with the caveat that
traditionally, Europeans are expected to be pessimists, in contrast
with the cheerfulness of citizenry in the United States. So I will introduce
a downside to my last point.
I think that as we move into that imperial world
in which power is going to be increasingly diffused, in which a big
decision will be much more the product of small decisions rather than
the opposite, there will still exist a world of hierarchical power,
of territorial power, of people who perceive power in very traditional
terms. The management of the interface between these two worlds is going
to be very difficult because the pace and way in which decisions are
made in this networked world that we are entering, pose constraints.
Building consensus is slow. Small decisions are
made quickly, but big decisions, as I said, are difficult to make. Some
of those operating in the traditional world may challenge the networked
world. For example, an event such as the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam
Hussein would stunt the networked world. Such an event requires an elaborate
leadership to build consenus for a collective response. The networked
world we are entering is not very adept at reacting to such events.
We will need a very elaborate way of managing political leadership,
level by level, so as to build a broader consensus.
At this point I have more questions than answers,
and, so as to be truly European, I will leave you with that worry.
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