How to Rebuild Iraq: June 2004 Issue: Peace Watch: U.S. Institute of Peace

Phebe Marr, a leading Arabist and the author of The Modern History of Iraq, spoke at the Institute in mid-December on the likely impact of ethnic and sectarian factionalism on the viability of the Iraqi state following the American occupation. The meeting, titled "Iraq: E Pluribus Unum?", was chaired by Daniel Serwer, Peace and Stability Operations director.

The challenges to rebuilding a sense of national identity in Iraq are daunting, said Marr. In a country held together for decades by the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis' sense of national—as opposed to ethnic and sectarian—identity has eroded as severely as the country's infrastructure. For the long-oppressed Kurds, who have enjoyed a de facto autonomy in the decade since the Gulf War, the prospect of reintegrating into the Iraqi state is bound to be unappealing. "You have an intensified sense of Kurdishness," said Marr, "with textbooks laying the basis for an independent Kurdistan." On the other hand, she said, most Kurds understand that true independence is not really viable, given the geopolitical constraints of the region. "If we can put forth an attractive vision of a modern Iraq, this would mollify Kurdish sentiment," she said.

The Shiites' position became increasingly difficult after 1991, said Marr, as Hussein surrounded himself with Sunni loyalists. Despite constituting some 60 percent of Iraq's population, the Shiites were a marginalized and oppressed minority. The predictable consequence was an intensified sense of Shiite identity, and they now seek a predominant role in the new Iraqi government, corresponding to their numerical superiority. However, they are divided into secular, moderate, and clerical/fundamentalist elements, and it remains to be seen which faction will prevail in a new Shia-dominated government.

The Sunnis will almost inevitably be the losers in the new dispensation. Long the privileged elite of Iraq, they have come to feel entitled to run things, said Marr. "It's this group Hussein drew on for his leadership, and it's fair to say that his Baath party was progressively 'Sunni-ized' in recent years. With the U.S. engaged in a de-Baathification of Iraq, it is the Sunnis who will feel left out." The key to co-opting them, said Marr, is to seek out and incorporate the Sunni middle class, which is less sectarian and clerical.

Cars try to make their way through Baghdad's al-Jumhurriyah street, which has become the capital's busiest thoroughfare.

Given these fissiparous divisions within Iraqi society, three possible scenarios exist for the future, said Marr. First, there could be a resurgence of pan-Arab nationalist identity of the sort that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. But Hussein himself discredited this ideology, having evoked it to such disastrous effect during the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the Iraqi War. In addition, events elsewhere in the Arab world have left most Iraqis profoundly skeptical about the promise of a unified Arab political bloc.

Second, the country could develop a new religious Iraqi identity; indeed, it is a given that Iraq will identify itself culturally and politically as an Islamic society. But how fundamentalist this identity will be and whether it will be able to reconcile its Sunni and Shiite divisions remain to be seen. "There could be civil war between the two factions, or they could paper over their differences long enough to evict us from the country," said Marr.

The third scenario—in many ways the most promising—is that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will build on the once-flourishing, now greatly diminished middle class to create something approaching a modern western state. "This middle class, which flourished from the 1950s through the 1970s, is greatly weakened and suffered a massive exodus of talent during Hussein's rule. But it cuts across sectarian religious lines and in many ways represents the interests of the silent majority of Iraqis," said Marr. One challenge to building up the middle class is the fact that Iraq has an oil-based economy—Marr cautioned that national economies based on extractive industries tend to create pronounced economic divisions. "The backbone of any society is an independent middle class and civil society, which is very difficult to build up in an oil-dominated economy," she said.

Marr concluded with a few recommendations for a long-term strategy for the country. First, she said, it is important to move Iraqis away from a politics based on cultural identity to one focused on programs and policies. Second, the CPA should keep its eye on revitalizing the middle class. Third, it should focus on civic education, particularly the social sciences and humanities. Fourth, it should develop broad-based civic institutions—raising the standards and capacities of journalists, judges, political activists, and so on; teaching people how to mobilize and develop constituencies; and making sure these constituencies cut across sectarian lines. Fifth, it should give the Kurds a major role in the central government—some key cabinet positions, for example—to increase their stake in the government and lessen their enthusiasm for independence. Finally, said Marr, we should remember that you get what you pay for: "If you put a lot of time and effort in, you'll get a lot out."

Other Institute Resources:

Report: Postconflict Iraq

United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone) -- (202) 429-6063 (fax)
Send Feedback