Joint Pub 3-07.3

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations

12 February 1999

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the planning and execution of peace operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



V. E. CLARK
Vice Admiral, US Navy
Director, Joint Staff

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Introduction to Peace Operations

Peace operations (PO) are a type of military operations other than war.

US doctrine is consistent with the doctrine of many nations in recognizing the important but limited role of military forces in the creation of peace in today's turbulent world — that peace is a product of the will of the parties to a conflict. **Influencing that will requires the concurrent application of all the instruments of national and international power** — military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. These instruments are closely linked with the conduct of peace operations (PO). **There are no standard PO**, each having a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. All US military PO support **strategic and policy objectives** and their implementing **diplomatic activities**. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.

The United Nations Charter provides several means for the international community to address threats to peace and security.

Chapter VI of the **United Nations (UN) Charter addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace** through conciliation, mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy. Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council with a wide range of enforcement actions, from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force. Although the terms **peacekeeping** and **peace**

enforcement are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken under Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively. The US Constitution, the UN Charter, and US law and policy provide the legal underpinnings for US participation in PO.

Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Enforcement Operations

PO encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Although peace operations are guided by the **six principles of military operations other than war** (objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint), the **principles of war** should also be considered in those peace operations where combat actions are possible. **Peacekeeping operations** (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, and other related agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. **Peace enforcement operations (PEO)** are the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Although the United States will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the UN or other multinational organization, it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.

Transitions will occur in PO requiring planning for changes to rules of engagement (ROE), force structure, and other aspects of these missions. **Posthostilities activities** may also occur, requiring early consideration and interagency and multinational planning concerning responsibilities, activities to take place, and any need for agreements. Because of the dynamic nature of the PO mission, **changes** may occur and **gray areas** can develop requiring close political-military communication and coordination, assessments of the situation and threat, and prior contingency planning for practical requirements. PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances characterized by **three critical factors**: **consent**, **impartiality**, and **use of force**. Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. The United States may participate in PO under **various command and control (C2) arrangements**. These arrangements might include a unilateral US operation, a multinational operation with the United States as the lead nation, or a multinational operation

with the United States as a participant or in support. **Key documents** in PO include the mandate, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), terms of reference (TOR), and ROE.

Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PKO

PKO support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.

The peacekeepers' main function is to establish a presence which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKO support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve **long-term political settlements** and **normalized peaceful relations**. The United States may participate in PKO as a **lead nation**, as a **contingent**, or by **providing military observers**. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. **Fundamentals of PKO** include firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration, and freedom of movement. Coordination between peacekeeping (PK) military forces and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is an important feature of PKO. **US military personnel may perform a wide variety of functions in support of PKO.** They may be detailed to serve on a **multinational staff** or in an observer group as **military observers**. The United States may also participate in PKO by **providing PK forces**. These may include ground, air, maritime, space, and special operations forces. The force size, contribution, and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate, and threat in the operational area. PK missions will usually involve observing, monitoring or supervising, and assisting parties to a dispute.

Commanders have responsibility for the command and control (C2) of the forces assigned to them.

The **organization of a PK force headquarters** will generally be structured around common military staff functions such as administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and civil affairs. The **commander** will also have a **personal staff** and **civilian staff**. In UN-sponsored operations, national contingents perform under operational control of the UN force commander. The **geographic combatant commander** exercises combatant command (command authority) over US forces assigned to PKO, and operational control over US forces attached for PKO in the combatant commander's area of responsibility. The **US contingent commander**, who is the senior US officer, provides the command link between US PK units and the geographic combatant commander.

The **force commander's directives** provide numerous details about C2, responsibilities, tasks, methods, force identification, media relations, and other details of PK force operations.

The **mandate, TOR, and SOFA** are important sources of information for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing **lessons learned** from previous PKO or training exercises. In PKO, just as in any other military operation, **logistics considerations** are as important as operational considerations. **Intelligence** is critically important to a PK force, not only for mission success but to protect the force. The methodology for collecting intelligence is generally the same as that for any other military operation. **Force protection** is a high priority for a deployed PK force. Coordination between the PK military organizations and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is essential to providing a secure PK environment within which these organizations can operate. **ROE** are also an essential element of force protection and will provide for appropriate action to protect the force. Although the UN utilizes multinational reserves, **the US contingent commander will also designate a US reserve**. The US contingent reserve should be sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located, and mobile. **Technologically advanced equipment** can improve the ability of the PK force to perform its mission. PKO will require **contingency planning** for disasters, evacuation and handling of displaced persons and refugees, and hostile action. **PK employment** includes separating parties to a dispute, observing and reporting, patrolling, and the operation of checkpoints.

Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PEO

The goal of PEO is to enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain peace and order.

In PEO, **the enemy is the dispute**, not the belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Although PEO may require combat, **they are not wars and may have more restrictive ROE than wars**. Conflict, violence, disorder, a high level of mistrust, and possibly even chaos, rather than peace, describe the environment surrounding PEO. PEO may be conducted in interstate conflicts, but increasingly have involved intrastate conflicts. In PEO, **consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement**, although some parties may extend it. Although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting, peace enforcers generally have **full**

combat capabilities, depending on the mandate, ROE, and tactical situation. **Fundamentals** that help guide the conduct of successful PEO include impartiality, restraint in the use of force, a goal of settlement rather than victory, the use of methods of coercion, and the presence of civilians. **Accurate intelligence** and **comprehensive mission analysis** will be the basis for determining the **structure and composition of the force**. The US commander will have the authority to employ the force's **full range of combat capabilities** to achieve mission objectives and protect the force. Peace enforcement (PE) missions may include enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian assistance, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

In most cases, PEO mirror conventional military operations and possess many of the same C2 characteristics.

For both unilateral and multinational operations, **US forces will probably be structured as a joint task force (JTF)**. The composition of the JTF will depend on the mission, political objectives, and the threat. For multinational operations, PE forces may operate under either a **lead nation** or a **parallel C2 arrangement**. US PE forces are normally employed in accordance with a **detailed campaign or operation plan**, which includes the desired end state and a plan to transition responsibilities. A corresponding **political-military interagency plan** supports successful mission achievement and smooth transition. **Mission-termination objectives**, determined by political objectives and desired end state and found in a mandate in UN operations, ideally aim for conditions that will provide the basis for maintaining or restoring peace and order and a long-term settlement of the dispute or conditions that led to the operation in the first place. **Intelligence** is developed to support PEO using the same process used in war, but it will also seek information similar to that which is required in PKO. In PEO, **fire support** is constrained by more restrictive ROE, and a prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage. **Logistics planning and support** in PEO are the same as in war but include the considerations for PKO. The combination of **information operations** with other **advanced and nonlethal technologies** that are integrated into an overall campaign or operation plan can help to support PEO. Use of **special equipment** requires special consideration for the capabilities of allies and coalition members. Well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated **ROE** can make the difference between success and failure in PO. ROE in PEO are usually less restrictive than in

PKO, but more restrictive than in war. To ensure a mobile, survivable force, both **engineer and chemical protection forces** provide essential support during peace operations. **Employment planning** for PEO is the same as for combat operations, since these may occur. **Establishing phases** for PEO provides an execution framework for staff planning.

Education and Training

Readying forces to successfully conduct PO requires an approach based on both education and training.

Readying forces for PO requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States — to fight and win the nation's wars. In PO, military personnel adapt their **warfighting skills** to the situation. Credible warfighting skills are the foundation for successful performance in PO. **Professional military education** and the **training of individuals, units, and staff** before, during, and after operations are essential considerations in planning PO. Members of a deploying force require **knowledge and proficiency in a wide variety of basic military skills** as well as specific aspects of the mission and operational area. **Negotiation, mediation, and other nonstandard skills will also be required. Situational training exercises** to enhance the use of ROE have proven especially helpful.

CONCLUSION

This Executive Summary provided an introduction to peace operations, along with key considerations for the planning and conduct of these operations. The subsequent chapters elaborate on this basis by providing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CHAPTER I
PRIMER FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

"We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous threats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace. Americans must understand . . that a number of small challenges, year after year, can add up to a more serious challenge to our interests. The time to act, to help our friends by adding our strength to the equation, is not when the threat is at our doorstep, when the stakes are highest and the needed resources enormous. We must be prepared to commit our political, economic, and if necessary, military power when the threat is still manageable and when its prudent use can prevent the threat from growing."

George Shultz
Secretary of State, 1986

1. US and Multinational Doctrine Development and Terminology

During the Cold War, the military doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies focused on deterrence and preparation to fight and win wars. Given changes in the political-military and strategic environment of the post-Cold War era, the US military and others began to develop new doctrine. This doctrine addressed a broad range of missions to include those short of war, called **military operations other than war** (MOOTW). Some MOOTW came to be called **peace operations** (PO) in the US and other militaries, and **peace-support operations** in other quarters, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The difference is not significant. Early drafts of a US approach to these operations used the term "peace support operations" as a way to highlight the important but limited role of military forces in the creation of peace in today's turbulent world. This publication maintains that approach, but does not use the term "support," in order to preserve its usage for other purposes.

Common to most military doctrine is the recognition that **peace is a product of the will of parties to a conflict and the concurrent application of all the instruments of national and international power** — military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. NATO doctrine for peace support operations, in fact, includes humanitarian efforts as part of the doctrine, while US doctrine does not. Again, the difference is not significant since US doctrine addresses such efforts separately, but in a manner that closely links those humanitarian efforts with the conduct of PO. (See Joint Pub 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," and Part III of the glossary of this publication, "UN and NATO Terminology.") **For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO).** Since World War II, the United States has participated in and supported several types of these operations, ranging from the more **traditional peacekeeping missions,** like the multinational force and observers (MFO) in the Sinai, to more **complex and multidimensional operations,** like the United Nations (UN) transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) or the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). These included missions under the legal authority of mandates promulgated by the UN and other multinational organizations. Also included

While there is no standard peacekeeping operation, monitoring and observing events in the area is a common task for joint forces.

were tasks that ranged from monitoring and observing cease-fires and separation of former belligerents to more complex tasks of supporting civilian efforts to assist in elections, rehabilitation of civic institutions, establishment and support of civilian police, and the reintegration of former combatants to normal life. There is no standard peace operation. As in other types of military operations, **PO will have a unique setting with their own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.**

2. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and US Policy

US military participation in PO **supports the national security strategy (NSS), national military strategy (NMS), and US policy.** The US approach is to apply **effective policies and strategies which combine the four instruments of national power** (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military). With the careful orchestration of these instruments, in conjunction with other international resources, the peace process may be effective. **The nature of each situation,** coupled with the desired end state, as related to US national strategies and interests, **guides the National Command Authorities (NCA) in the selection and balance of the instruments of national power.** The resulting US policy is then implemented preferably through diplomatic activities, supported by military, economic, and informational efforts designed to achieve US objectives.

"The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice. It is also true that if we move early in dealing with these conflicts, and if we have an effective method for carrying out international peace enforcement, especially in a preventative way, we have a new tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations that could well offset our national interest and our future."

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
Remarks to an NDU Conference

3. Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities

All US military PO support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success in the peace process by **lending credibility** to diplomatic actions and **demonstrating resolve** to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO (PKO and PEO), the military may conduct **operations in support of diplomatic efforts** to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These are listed in Figure I-1 and described below.

- **Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive diplomacy consists of **diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.** An example of military support to preventive diplomacy is the preventive deployment Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US forces deployed in 1993 in

Figure I-1. Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

support of the UN effort to limit the spread of fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. If preventive diplomacy is successful and conflict is averted, the military may conduct PKO to help ensure agreements are followed by the parties to the dispute.

- **Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is the process of **diplomacy**, **mediation**, **negotiation**, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an **end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to conflict.** Military support to the peacemaking process may include provision of military expertise to the peacemaking process, military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities to influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

"Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe."

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.
US Army, Retired

- **Peace Building.** Peace building consists of **postconflict actions,** predominately diplomatic, economic, and security-related, that **strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions** in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Peace building in the geographic confines of failed states may require a much longer and more robust presence. Initially, intervening forces may have to assume governing functions and rebuild absent government institutions prior to transitioning to traditional peace building actions. Military support to peace building may include PKO, nation assistance, or other activities which establish an environment conducive to continuing the postconflict political process. The PO force may facilitate demobilization, arms limitation, referenda, national reconciliation, elections, or creation of new governments.

See JP 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)," and JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

4. Legal Basis of Peace Operations

The **UN Charter** (see extracts in Appendix C, "United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations," Figure C-3) provides several means for the international community to address threats to peace and security. Although the terms "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement" are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken under the Charter's Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively. **Chapter VI addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace** through conciliation, mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy. **Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council with a wide range of enforcement actions** — from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force by the air, sea, and land forces of member nations. The range of potential actions in Chapter VII is so broad that operations such as the UN operations in Korea (1950-1953) and in Kuwait and Iraq (1990-1991) are often referred to as PEO. However, these operations were considered wars, with an aggressor being defined and military victory sought. They are not operations within the scope of this publication.

a. The domestic legal authority for US forces to participate in peace operations (either UN authorized or UN directed) is founded in

the US Constitution, the UN Charter, and US statutes.

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

- **The US Constitution.** The Constitution affords the President independent legal authority to order the deployment of US forces to support peace operations. Under Article II, the President is exclusively responsible for the "conduct of diplomatic affairs." (Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 [1950]). Further, as Commander in Chief, the President has the "power to dispose of troops and equipment in such a manner and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the country." (Training of British Flying Students in the United States, Op. Att'y Gen 58, 62 [1941]). A recognized limitation on this constitutional authority is that such a deployment must be to protect US national security interests or to protect US nationals abroad.

- **The UN Charter.** In addition to providing international legal authority for the conduct of peace operations, the UN Charter is a treaty ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate under the treaty clause of the US Constitution. As such, it constitutes Federal law and provides domestic legal authority for US support to peace operations authorized or directed by the UN. Specifically, Art. 2, Section 5, of the UN Charter calls upon all members to give the UN "every assistance" in any action it takes under the Charter. In addition, Art. 25 calls upon all member States to agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the UN Security Council.

- **Statutory Authorization.** The President also has statutory authorization to support peace operations. The UN Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) are the two primary statutory enactments which provide legal authority for US support to peace operations. For example, Section 7 of the UNPA (22 US Code (USC) Section 287d-l) authorizes the President to provide support, including the formal detail of up to 1,000 US military personnel worldwide, to UN directed peace operations dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes (e.g., Chapter VI peacekeeping operations). For Chapter VII, peace enforcement operations, Sections 628 and 630 of the FAA have in the past served as legal authority for the formal detail of US forces to such UN directed operations (e.g., UNOSOM II).

b. Although the UN has been the most frequent sponsor of international PO, **regional organizations** such as NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West Africa States, and the Arab League **have also acted to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.** Regional arrangements to maintain peace and security are the focus of **Chapter VIII of the UN Charter**.

c. Similarly, some nations have negotiated **multilateral agreements to create PKO independent of any permanent international forum.** An example is the MFO mission established in 1982 on the basis of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords to Protocol to 1979 Egyptian Israeli Treaty. There have also been instances of other types of operations such as the **loose coalition of**

national units known as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. However, such operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN.

d. Although the United States will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the UN or other multinational organization, **it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.**

5. Peace Operations

PO encompass PKO and PEO conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (see Figure I-2). PO are **tailored to each situation** and may be conducted in support of diplomatic peace activities **before, during,** or **after** conflict. PO are guided by the **six principles of MOOTW** which are listed in Figure I-3. **The principles of war should also be considered in those PO where combat actions are possible.** These principles are discussed fully in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War." The latter includes a discussion of the application of the principles of MOOTW to a PO.

a. **Peacekeeping Operations.** PKO are **military operations** undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to **monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement** (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and **support diplomatic efforts** to reach a long-term political settlement. PKO are conducted by peacekeeping (PK) forces that are impartial. Chapter II, "Peacekeeping Operations," provides a detailed discussion of PKO.



Figure I-2. US Peace Operations

Figure I-3. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

b. **Peace Enforcement Operations.** PEO are the application of **military force or the threat of its use,** normally pursuant to international authorization, **to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions** designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Chapter III, "Peace Enforcement Operations," provides a detailed discussion of PEO.

c. **Transitions.** Optimally PK forces should not transition to PEO or vice versa unless there is the **requisite mandate** or **political decision** and appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and other important aspects of the mission. Nevertheless, just as in war, it is crucial that commanders and their staffs continually analyze the mission. In PO, this translates into **planning for a possibly unavoidable transition from PKO to PEO or for other transitions, such as from PEO to PKO**. In the former cases especially, rapid and unpredictable events may occur. By contrast, the shift from PEO to PKO might be more deliberate and predictable as the operation unfolds successfully. **Examples of types of transitions include the following.**

- **From a US unilateral operation or a multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition.** The transition in Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an example of this type of transition. The US unilateral effort expanded to a US-led coalition. This coalition then came under UN leadership.

- **From combat to noncombat operations.** In this type of transition, a peace enforcement (PE) force, for example, might be prepared by virtue of its force structure to engage in active combat operations but, due to its size and capabilities, serves as a deterrent to opposition. Initial stages of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, conducted under the auspices of a UN Chapter VII Peace Enforcement Security Council Resolution, is an example. Versatile US forces were able to transition swiftly to a preplanned noncombat course of action (COA). Again, continuous mission analysis is key.

- **From military to civilian control.** Transitions may involve the transfer of certain or most responsibilities to local government and civil agencies as the requirement for some form of military presence diminishes. This may occur during termination of the peace operation. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), for example, may be responsible for a major contribution to the overall success of the peace operation. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the desired end state involved such a transition.

d. **Posthostilities Activities.** Related to transitions, **these activities require interagency and multinational planning.** Joint forces involved in PK or PE may conduct posthostilities operations concurrent with or

following the primary peace operation activity. These activities may include military support to relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development, negotiation and mediation, management of arms, or human rights investigations conducted by other agencies. In some cases, joint forces will provide direct support to a recovering host nation (HN) or population. Specific types of support may include but are not limited to demobilization of belligerent parties, training for demining, temporary support to or repatriation of refugees or return of displaced persons to their original homes, electoral assistance, maintenance of public order and security, or maintaining a deterrent presence. (Note: Authority for US forces to conduct what is called "humanitarian demining" is found in Title 10, USC, Section 401. As a matter of policy, US forces shall not engage in physically detecting, lifting, or destroying land mines. The Department of Defense (DOD) has the expertise to establish training programs to assist foreign countries with a land mine problem.) An example which involves the continuing presence of some US forces is the US Support Group Haiti, formed following Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY by US Southern Command. The mission of this force is to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) and exercise command and control (C2) of deployed-for-training units conducting humanitarian and civic assistance operations approved by the government of Haiti. Some **guidelines for planning posthostilities activities,** which should commence prior to the introduction of forces, may include the following.

- Achievement of the end state, as determined by the mandate or other instructions.

- Determination of correct players such as local government agencies, US agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional powers, representatives of parties to the conflict, and other military forces.

- Types of activities required, such as security assistance, demobilization, and electoral assistance.

- Funding and other responsibilities.

- The acceptable size, location, types of units, and equipment that may be required in a remaining military element from the PO force or its national or multinational sponsor.

- Any need for bilateral agreements for follow-on US presence and activity.

- Establishing appropriate ROE and rules concerning treatment of inhabitants and property to include procurement, claims, souvenirs, trophies, and adoptions. Ill conceived actions or rules can become a source of new disputes, cause parties to renege on agreements, or result in renewed resolve to further repudiated objectives on the part of some of the parties to the conflict. Rules and procedures should also balance the necessities of the military situation against infrastructure degradation and civilian casualties. For example, neutralizing a city's electrical power supply may appear militarily advantageous in some PEO, but may also disrupt water and sewage treatment facilities, which could lead to cholera and dysentery epidemics, thus complicating posthostilities activities and requirements.

- **Security Requirements for the US Force and Others.** The transition from hostilities to posthostilities is a volatile and uncertain process. The effectiveness of military operations will often be

determined by the force's ability to provide for its security and ensure the safety of the civilian population.

- **Intelligence Requirements.** Timely and accurate intelligence will aid the force and other agencies in identifying and marginalizing potential threats and will provide information on the needs of the population, the condition of the infrastructure, and other areas critical to aiding recovery from hostilities. Intelligence support can also assess the effects politics, history, and culture may have on COAs.

- **Information Activities.** The media may have a significant influence on the eventual outcome of the conflict. A supportive portrayal of military operations during posthostilities activities can further the desired end state by enhancing local public support. Effective psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) can also positively impact posthostilities efforts by influencing attitudes and behaviors of a variety of important audiences. Information operations (IO) may contribute to thwarting activities counterproductive to the goals of posthostilities operations.

See JP 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)," especially Chapter IV, for a host of matters related to posthostilities activities. See also JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," and DA Training Circular 31-34, "Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook," for related material. See also the section on Civil Aspects of the Dayton Accords in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

e. **Mission Creep.** This occurs when the mission assigned to a PO force changes in response to new events or circumstances. In most cases, mission creep is undesirable.

- **Mission creep may develop from inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, or unrealistic development of implied tasks in planning.** It can also derive from well-meaning but erroneous interpretation of law or regulation. One example would be direction to execute civil action projects that fall outside the authority of the force commander. Mission creep can be avoided by paying special attention to specified and implied tasks in planning, and to the desired end state during both planning and execution. Implied tasks especially are subject to interpretation and require thorough examination to conform to higher level intent and the mission or mandate provided by higher authorities.

- Mission creep does **not** include activities that: are consistent with the mandate; are within the legal authority of the commander; contribute to the legitimacy of the force; or enhance force protection, even if not specified tasks.

- **Circumstances may arise from rapid and unpredictable changes in the operational environment unrelated to the activities of the PO force that threaten US or indigenous lives or property.** In such cases, commanders should apply sufficient force to address the threat. **ROE should be tailored accordingly.** Similarly, natural disasters may require the PO force to support underdeveloped or degraded indigenous capabilities. Continuous **political-military assessments** of the situation and threat and **prior contingency planning** for practical requirements for mission changes will confront commanders. Proposed mission changes raise questions about the commander's legal

authority to act, reimbursement, and on the impact on readiness due to the increased tempo of operations. **Legal support** will be important in answering many of these questions.

6. Distinction Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

a. A clear distinction between PKO and PEO is important. Although both are PO, they are not part of a continuum. **A distinct demarcation separates these operations.** PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances, characterized by three critical factors — **consent**, **impartiality**, and the **use of force.** Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. **Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation.** These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation. **Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim.** This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties. During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties — employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. The French Army has called this notion **active impartiality.** Parties may believe they are being treated unfairly and will accuse the PO force of favoring the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. But impartiality does not imply that a PO will affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict. This standard does not preclude the **use of force** in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for **self-defense.** In the latter, force is used to **compel or coerce compliance with established rules.** Moreover the central "goal" of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission.

b. **The Gray Areas.** PKO and PEO are **distinct operations,** the dividing line being determined by the variables of **consent, impartiality,** the **use of force,** and **decisions by the NCA.** The existence of a cease-fire to the conflict among the parties and a demonstrated willingness to negotiate on their part are indicators of the presence of consent. Other variables are more clearly within the control of outside actors. However, **because of the dynamic environment in which these operations take place, gray areas can develop.** Such operations foist on commanders and policymakers the potential for uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity, which requires extremely close political-military communication.

- For example, during PKO conducted under the general provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, **cease-fires may break down, factions may withdraw their consent, some elements may operate outside the authority of existing leadership structures,** or **new political entities may emerge** that had no part in the original granting of consent to the PKO. Therefore, the assigned force will be capable of defending itself as appropriate to the threat level in its operational area. **Force augmentation may be necessary,** and the commander

of the PKO force will monitor the situation to ensure the force is capable of self-protection. **Commanders also should be prepared for transition to a PEO,** if a change of mission is directed, or for withdrawal if a higher authority decides the mission is not achievable. At the same time, **geographic differences in the nature of the operation may develop** or the conflict may spread to different geographic areas. Certain sectors of the operational area may assume different characteristics in terms of threat, consent, perceptions of impartiality, and other factors. In this case, **commanders may need to be flexible** and prepared to adjust the activity of the force in terms of composition, threat posture, and use of force to account for these differences and new or emerging guidance from higher authorities. In these cases, **close political-military coordination and communication are essential.** Many of these circumstances arose during the conduct of operations by the UN Protection Force in the Balkans in 1995.

- During PEO conducted with the authority granted for the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, **the deployment of a robust force,** with flexibility in its authority to use force, **may serve as a deterrent to unacceptable behavior by parties to the conflict and others.** Such a force may encounter a degree of cooperation and consent. It may build on and foster this cooperation. In this case, such a force **may conduct itself in most circumstances as if performing PKO, and be prepared to use force** to implement the mandate by virtue of its size, composition, and authority. Again, close political-military communication is essential to ensure that all military actions support the overall political objectives. Many of these circumstances apply to the conduct of operations by the peace implementation force in the Balkans during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

7. The Peace Operations Environment

PKO are dramatically different than PEO and military operations in support of the diplomatic activities of peace building, peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy. However, **the environments of these**

The presence of a robust force may serve as an effective deterrent in peace operations.

operations and activities share some common characteristics which are listed in Figure I-4 and described below.

a. **Primacy of Political Objectives.** In PO and in war, **political objectives** derived from the NSS, NMS, and US policy **drive military decisions at every level, from the strategic to the tactical.** As in war, commanders should adopt COAs and **plans** that support political objectives. While applicable throughout the range of military operations, two important factors are particularly sensitive in PO.

- **First, military personnel at all levels should understand the objectives of the operation and the potential impact of inappropriate military actions.** Having such an understanding helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects on the force or the mission at the tactical or operational level, and catastrophic effects on US policy at the strategic level. Junior personnel could make decisions which may have significant strategic implications.

- **Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes in objectives, the situation, or the players which demand an adjustment of the military operations.** These changes may be subtle, yet failure to recognize them and adjust may lead to operations that do not support the attainment of objectives and may cause needless casualties.

b. **Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty.** PO often take place in **political, military, and cultural situations which are highly fluid and dynamic.** Ambiguity may be caused by unresolved political issues, an unclear understanding or description of a desired end state, or difficulty in gaining international consensus. Additionally, the deploying PO forces may have little or no familiarity with the operational area or the complex ethnic and cultural issues which, in

Figure I-4. Common Characteristics of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

some cases, led to the dispute. Complexity in PO may derive from:

- Difficulty in identifying the disputing parties;
- Absence of basic law and order;
- Widespread destruction of physical and social infrastructure and institutions;
- Tenuous cease fire arrangements;
- Environmental damage;
- Threats of disease or epidemics; and
- Emigration (flight) of indigenous population.

Consequently, **commanders strive to provide clear guidelines** for military support of political objectives even when the situation is constantly changing.

c. **Parties to the Dispute or Belligerents.** The parties to the dispute or the belligerents **may or may not have professional armies or organized groups responding reliably to a chain of command.** Operations may take place within a functioning state or within a failing or failed state. Rogue, undisciplined elements or paramilitary units may be present. **Decisions by the leaders may not bind the subordinate elements.** Loosely organized groups of irregulars, criminal syndicates, or other hostile elements of the population may be present. **Multiple parties, each having a different agenda or view of participant's motives, may have to be considered.** Disputing or belligerent forces may range from insurgent forces to large military forces with ground, air, and maritime capabilities. **Weapons may range from** conventional munitions and mines to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) devices. Modern weapons systems may include surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles as well as long-range mortars.

d. **The Planning Process. The planning process for PO is the same as for any other military operation.** Planners need to ensure they have a complete understanding of the implied and specified tasks and the desired end state before planning begins. However, the wide-spread availability of data and its broad dissemination in time-urgent fashion, to civilian and military alike, requires **simultaneous planning for each level of a political-military operation.** This process will address as early as possible factors related to the location and duration of operations and force structure.

- **Location of Operations.** Frequently, PO take place in **austere or highly populated urban environments.** Logistics may become a major challenge when PO are conducted in **remote areas** with poor air and sea ports, over rugged and broad spans of terrain with poor transportation networks, or in cities with underdeveloped infrastructure. Therefore, deploying forces require **careful time-phasing with the appropriate resources** to accomplish the mission and compensate for unanticipated shortfalls. **Carefully planned and executed reconnaissance surveys** of anticipated operating areas carried out by key members and specialists of the force are essential to the later efficient and effective deployment of the force and associated resources. Logistics and health service references and lessons learned found in Appendix E, "References," will contribute to the skills, knowledge, and training required for successfully meeting these challenges.

- **Duration of Operations.** PO are often conducted on short notice, yet **may require long-term commitments** to

resolve the issues that led to the escalation of tension or conflict. Years of problems may have preceded the situation, and the disputing parties may have determined that violence is justified and inevitable. Therefore, **long-term solutions that are primarily political in nature should not be assumed to be achievable by short-term military actions.** The process of reconciliation may take years. However, PO can help establish stable and secure conditions for progress towards long-term political settlements. **Time constraints for the duration of the operation are high-level political-military decisions.** On the one hand, the **declaration of an operational timescale** can cede the initiative to the parties to the conflict. They can then wait out the departure of the PO force. On the other hand, **establishing a fixed date for the participation of the PO force** serves notice that parties must also work diligently to resolve their differences, unless they are willing to forgo the support of the PO. In either case **establishing criteria and conditions which define a successful end state in as timely a fashion as possible and directing efforts to that end state are important.**

e. **Force Structure and Composition.** Force selection for PO must consider the role of units in Major Theater War plans. Plan to mitigate risk and maintain flexibility to execute other aspects of the National Security Strategy. Close political-military communication is essential to assure that the composition of the force is based on the mission, the threat, and possible no-notice operational permutations. Force composition should be robust enough to respond to threats to force security. Use of **air, space, ground, maritime,** and **special operation forces** is discussed in more detail in later chapters. **Each capability has advantages and disadvantages to employment.** Use of Joint Pub 3-33, "Joint Force Capabilities," will provide commanders with a resource to review and align their mission needs with available capabilities. See also "Wings for Peace" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- **Force Caps.** These **establish limits** on the number of military personnel, number and type of weapons, or the type of units (such as light infantry) **to be deployed in support of PO.** To be avoided are force caps that may result in a force structure that is not appropriate to the mission or the threat and may cause an otherwise avoidable increase in risk. Within the limits of the cap, commanders should posture to protect the force.

- **Unit Integrity.** Another important issue in planning force structure is **maintaining unit integrity whenever possible.** Units that have trained together and operate within normal chains of command and under established procedures are more likely to be successful in any mission to include PO. **Unit integrity may be especially important for US units assigned to a multinational formation.** Flexibility, modularity, and tailorability, however, are also important considerations, along with a reduced footprint for US forces. Many units train to be flexible and tailorable. A commander seeking the capacity of a bulldozer, for example, may need to weigh its usefulness without the complete complement of its structure, leadership, and sustainment.

f. **Interagency Coordination.** In PO, other agencies including the Department of State (DOS) will be involved. Therefore, **commanders should ensure military activities are closely integrated at all levels** — strategic, operational, and tactical — **with**

the activities of other agencies to optimize the effectiveness of the total effort and prevent military actions which may be counterproductive to achieving the end state. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," is designed to improve interagency planning of future complex contingency operations. The PDD's intent is to establish management practices to achieve unity of effort among US Government (USG) agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. A detailed discussion of other USG agencies is in Appendix B, "US Government Involvement in Peace Operations." Emphasis should be placed on **early establishment of liaison** among the various agencies. The establishment of **interagency coordinating centers,** such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), is one means of fostering unity of effort in achieving objectives of the operation. If available, a **Country Team** may facilitate coordination at the HN level.

For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."

g. **Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations.** In many cases, adverse humanitarian conditions arising from natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, violations of human rights, civil wars, or privation that presents a serious threat to life or loss of property will characterize the PO environment. **Commanders, therefore, coordinate their efforts** not only with the sponsoring organization, other militaries, and HN, but also **with a myriad of NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies** involved in relieving adverse humanitarian conditions. Structures like the CMOC are specifically designed to facilitate this process. Only through concerted cooperation and coordinated efforts can the human tragedy that led to or resulted from the conflict be adequately addressed. Therefore, **it is desirable for all participants to understand the intent, methods, and in-country disposition of the NGOs and PVOs** and to foster a spirit of cooperation and mutuality of interest. It is in the military's interest to allow NGOs/PVOs to take over the humanitarian assistance (HA) role. By cooperating, both organizations help facilitate a transition to a desired end state. **These organizations can be an important source of information.** They may help PO force commanders and staffs to better accomplish the mission because of their familiarity with the **culture, language,** and **sensitivities of a populace. However, caution is necessary to prevent any perception by the populace or the parties to the dispute that these organizations are part of an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Their purpose is to address humanitarian requirements, and their primary source of security is their neutrality.** Commanders will also find that the cultures of some of these organizations differ markedly from military culture, and there may be a strong desire on their part to maintain a wide distance from military activities.

For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."

h. **Multinational Cooperation.** Several factors are essential for success when operations are conducted in cooperation with other nations.

- **Respect and Professionalism.** Mutual respect for multinational partners' ideas, culture, religion and customs, and a demeanor of military professionalism helps establish a basis for cooperation and unity of effort.

- **Mission Assignment.** Missions assigned by the force commander will be appropriate to each multinational

partner's capabilities and national direction. Multinational partners should be integrated into the planning process, thus assuring both the perception and the reality of unity of effort. Language requirements and linguistic support will be an important consideration. Special operations forces (SOF) capabilities, such as liaison elements, may assist commanders in the employment of multinational forces.

- **Management of Resources.** Multinational partners may seek assistance with logistic support. Agreements need to be established for exchangeable or transferable commodities before operations begin and are further developed and refined throughout the operation. Legal support will be important in formulating and interpreting these agreements.

- **Harmony.** Personal relationships and an effective rapport established among members of a multinational force at all command levels can contribute significantly to the success of the operation.

i. **Information Intensity. All military operations are information intensive.** In PO, this is further complicated by the multiplicity of parties and other actors involved. The scope and scale of required coordination and communication is another major information challenge. The cascading effects of events and their magnification globally through the media further exacerbate the complexity of this characteristic of the PO environment. **The PO force can master this environment by gaining and maintaining information superiority** through effective employment of IO and/or warfare. Activities such as public affairs (PA), CA, and interagency and multinational cooperation and coordination can assist in this effort. In the PO environment, the centerpiece of IO is the **ability to use information to focus engagements to control the situation.** The commander knows that information superiority has been gained when the staff senses and acts more quickly, using information to forestall potential hostile acts and convince parties to the conflict to act in a manner supportive of the peace process. The payoff from information superiority is that it increases survivability and potential lethality of the force and its ability to control the tempo of operations. See "Information Dominance for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- **Liaison.** Liaison officers (LNOs) are **critical to the successful conduct of all PO,** but **particularly in multinational operations.** In some situations, LNOs may be the only means for the commander to communicate with some members of the force. **LNOs help coordinate a myriad of details** within a joint task force (JTF) or PO headquarters and among the multinational contingents, the sponsoring organization, USG agencies, international agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies. LNOs are well-qualified and speak with the authority of the commander they represent. **Many intelligence linguists and SOF personnel are well-suited to serve as LNOs** because of their language abilities, training, and experience. The importance of LNOs in PO cannot be overemphasized.

"From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. The American and world publics, families of Service members, the news media, and the government have an insatiable demand for information that must be made readily and immediately available."

Joint Universal Lessons Learned
No. 70344-88264 (06186)

- **Public Affairs.** In PO, **news media coverage generally plays a major role in quickly framing public debate and shaping public opinion.** Consequently, the media serve as a forum for the analysis and critique of PO. **US and international public opinion affect political, strategic, and operational decisions, and ultimately the perceived success or failure of a mission.** The key issue is that the legitimacy and support for a PO can be lost if PA does not receive the proper level of attention. Commanders will also be aware that the parties to a dispute may find it advantageous to release information which is slanted to support their position. These activities may grow into a fully orchestrated media operation, making it difficult, if not impossible, for US PA personnel to set the record straight. Consequently, **a close working relationship between the PO force and the media can be mutually beneficial.** Providing journalists and other members of the media with releasable information on a timely basis can help reduce the level of speculation in the news.

For additional information about PA, refer to JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations." See also the "Public Affairs Update" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

> *"The media gives you a chance to tell your story. You never get a second chance to create a first impression."*
>
> **Colonel G. Anderson, USMC**
> **Marine Warfighting Center**

j. **Force Protection. Force protection considerations are central to all aspects of PO planning and execution,** particularly when the mission is a PEO or a PKO that involves interposition between former belligerent forces. Even in relatively benign environments, **force protection measures will be employed commensurate with the security risks to the force.** These risks may include conventional military threats and a wide range of nonconventional threats such as terrorism, exotic diseases, criminal enterprises, environmental hazards, computer hackers, and so forth. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace will prepare the PO force for adequate force protection. The impartiality of the force may also serve as a measure of force protection. **ROE and weapons control policies are also an aspect of force protection.** In developing these policies planners take into account the capabilities of the PO force. This will avoid a situation where policies and capabilities do not match. Measures taken to identify and plan for possible hostile acts against a PO force can only be successful if the force is given the commensurate ROE to protect itself. If a weapons-control policy is in effect, as is in most POs, capability and ROE have to match the tasking. See Appendix E, "References," for details and reference material related to logistics, IO, engineering, risk management, safety, security, health service support, morale, and welfare aspects of force protection.

> *"My initial concern for the task force deploying to Operation ABLE SENTRY was force protection. Some UN military commanders don't understand our preoccupation with this issue because they are not faced with the same threat as US forces. They don't understand that because we are the American Army, we are an isolated target of opportunity."*
>
> **MG W.H. Yates, USA**
> **CDR, Berlin Brigade**

k. **Measures of Success.** A common understanding of the **desired end state** and the **conditions that will constitute success** is important to commanders at all levels.

Ultimately, **settlement, not victory, is the key measure of success in PO.** Settlement is not achieved through military operations alone, but through a combination of actions that may include all the elements of national power and various international factors. **A resolution reached by conciliation among the disputing parties is preferable to termination by force.** PO are conducted to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military operations will complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and perhaps humanitarian efforts in the pursuit of the overarching political objective. **The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is not an appropriate measure of success in PO.** It is also important to recognize when the mission is not achievable. This may stem from such factors as a breakdown in political resolve by the parties to the dispute or the international community. In these cases, close political-military communications again remains important.

l. **Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).** Measures of success may be difficult to determine at the operational and tactical level of action, because they require higher level, strategic political-military assessments. Nevertheless, at the military operational and tactical levels, **MOE may assist commanders and political decision makers in gauging progress in the accomplishment of the mission.** The key question is whether the military effort is doing what it is expected to do in terms of the mission or mandate. MOE focus on whether military efforts are having the desired result in achieving the mandate or mission specifically assigned to the force. These measures will provide commanders and higher authorities with a means to **evaluate the contribution of military efforts** to the more encompassing and overarching desired end state. More importantly, these measures will provide a **baseline of indicators** of how well the military effort is achieving its specific, possibly limited goals in accordance with the mission statement provided by higher authorities. Such measures will be situationally dependent, often requiring readjustment as the situation changes and higher level political-military guidance develops. MOE are normally discrete, quantifiable, and helpful in understanding and measuring progress.

- **Constructs.** A variety of **constructs may prove suitable to the development of MOE,** depending on the mission or mandate provided to military forces. These may include the constructs listed in Figure I-5 or combinations thereof.

- **Caveats.** MOE are only limited by the imagination of commanders and their staffs. However, **they should exercise a certain degree of caution and judgment when using statistical indicators alone.** These may vary widely in interpretation, may be valid only for a specific time, place, or group of people, and may not have a direct correlation to effectiveness. Such indicators as enemy unit-effectiveness status, weapons seized or confiscated, and the like may have limited applicability in MOE for PO.

m. **Civil Disturbances.** PKO and PEO inherently include the likelihood of encountering civil disturbances. Success in handling these disturbances will have an effect on operations. A poorly handled civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potentially long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation can lead to both an enhanced view of the professionalism and strength of the PO force, instill confidence in democratic and law enforcement institutions involved, and result in fewer disturbances in future operations. **Controlling civil disturbances includes the following actions.**

Figure I-5. Constructs Suitable to the Development of Measures of Effectiveness

- Isolate in time and space the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Use a system of checkpoints to limit and control access together with the use of helicopters and other monitoring technologies to screen the flanks. Attack helicopters may also overwatch nearby sites that may pose a threat and as a deterrent to outside intervention.

- Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. An overwhelming show of force at checkpoints, coupled with

helicopter overflights, may dissuade entry into the area by potentially destabilizing elements. Unmanned aerial vehicle platforms and helicopters may provide real-time situation reports, ensuring that units know the "ground truth" at all times. This situational awareness gives commanders a decisive advantage in both negotiations with potentially hostile elements and during tactical operations.

- Maintaining common situational awareness by requiring timely, accurate, complete, multi-source reporting and effective information dissemination. A broad spectrum of sources will assist this effort.

- Multi-dimensional, multi-echeloned actions. One element may provide local security while another focuses its efforts on the larger strategic or political spectrum. Use all available resources to influence the outcome, including convincing local media to avoid inflammatory broadcasts or to make broadcasts designed to quell and disperse the crowds. Multi-dimensional responses include the use of civil and military nonlethal assets. Nonlethal assets will be considered and applied to avoid overwhelming military responses that could escalate tensions or cause unnecessary injury or death.

n. **Other Factors.** Other factors which characterize the PO environment and demand careful analysis include, but are not limited to the following:

- Geopolitical situation;

- Prevailing social conditions and indigenous cultures;

- Level of conflict or the effectiveness of the cease fire;

- The number, discipline, and accountability of disputing parties;

- Effectiveness of the governments involved; and

- The degree of law and order that exists.

8. Command and Control

The United States may participate in PO under various C2 arrangements. These arrangements might include a:

- Unilateral US operation;

- Multinational operation with the United States as the lead nation; and/or

- Multinational operation with the United States as a participant or in support.

See JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," Chapter VI, "Multinational Operations."

In any of these arrangements, **US forces will report to the US NCA.** However, **in multinational PO, US forces may also report to the sponsoring organization** such as the UN, NATO, OAU, and/or OAS. In PKO, the United States will normally be a contingent; in PEO, the United States should ordinarily be the lead nation, in accordance with the policy of PDD-25, "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

Although US forces may be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of non-US commanders in certain circumstances, **the command line from the NCA will remain inviolate, running from the NCA to the combatant commander (and other supported combatant commanders, as appropriate) to subordinate US commanders.**

For additional information, refer to JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),"

and PDD-25, "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

9. Key Documents in Peace Operations

The political objectives of a particular operation guide the development of **key documents that provide legal authority and define the parameters for a PO.** Key documents include the mandate, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) (often called status of mission agreement [SOMA] in UN operations), terms of reference (TOR), and ROE (see Figure I-6).

a. **Mandate.** In PO, the force generally conducts operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations. UN PO conduct operations in accordance with mandates established by the UN Security Council. Operations sponsored by organizations other than the UN may also be based on mandates. These mandates will usually result from treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements of international or regional organizations. A sample UN mandate is in Annex A ("Mandates") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

Figure I-6. Key Documents in Peace Operations

- For PKO, the mandate issued by the UN Security Council is based on negotiations with the parties to the dispute, the HN, and potential contributors of PK forces or personnel.

- For PEO, the UN Security Council will normally seek broad ranging support for enforcement actions from the international community before issuing a mandate.

b. **Status-of-Forces Agreement or Status of Mission Agreement.** These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, **establish the detailed legal status of PO forces.** These agreements are negotiated between UN, HN, and sponsoring organizations on behalf of participating countries and involve close coordination between combatant commanders, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements (such as a SOFA) is held at the national level. Some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff and combatant commanders. Neither the commander nor his staff has such authority without specific approval or delegation from higher authority. Before entering into any negotiations or agreement with another nation, consult the staff judge advocate. A sample SOFA is at Annex B ("Status-of-Forces Agreement") of Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- The SOFA or SOMA (hereafter SOMA is included wherever the term SOFA is used) proceeds from the mandate. However, PEO do not normally include a SOFA, except with the HN or other countries from which operations are staged.

- Members of PO contingents remain subject to applicable national laws,

policies, and regulations of their own nations, including military criminal codes. Ordinarily, military discipline and punitive actions are taken by the appropriate national chain of command, not by the sponsoring organization. All US personnel remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which will be administered by the appropriate US commander.

c. **Terms of Reference.** The TOR are developed to **govern implementation of the PO** based on the mandate and the situation and may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute in PKO. **The TOR describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force.** The TOR are written by the UN or other sponsoring organization. When the United States is a participant in a PO, the TOR are coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, and DOS before final approval by the NCA. A sample TOR is in Annex C ("Terms of Reference") of Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

d. **Rules of Engagement.** In PO, well conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between mission success and failure. **ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate or continue engagement with other forces or elements.** ROE define when and how force may be used. All commanders will assess threat capabilities and make recommendations for specific ROE through the chain of command. The ROE are written with consideration of legal, political, and military factors and may include elements of the law of armed conflict. A sample ROE is at Annex D ("Rules of Engagement") of Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, **"Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces,"** provides the starting point for all ROE development. These ROE may be tailored to each PO, but are approved by the combatant commander.

- **Restraint,** a principle of MOOTW, **should guide ROE development.** The development process balances mission accomplishment with political considerations that ensure protection of the force and its mission. However, nothing in the ROE can negate a commander's responsibility and authority to take all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense.

- **Commanders ensure dissemination of the ROE to all personnel.** Additionally, because ROE seldom anticipate every situation, commanders ensure personnel understand the intent of the ROE. ROE should be included in all plans and be reviewed by the force commander's legal advisor.

- **When ROE change, the changes should be rapidly disseminated to all personnel.** Changes may be driven by tactical emergencies, attacks by hostile forces, incidents involving loss of life, or other events. Commanders may request changes to the ROE through the chain of command. A strong, reliable command and control system must be in place, especially for PEO where ROE inputs to fielded troops under rapidly changing conditions is of utmost concern for force protection.

- US commanders will be aware that **PO forces from other nations may interpret ROE differently than US**

forces or may wish to use different ROE. This creates a challenge for unity of effort of the PO force as a whole. A common interpretation of the ROE between the contingents will facilitate unity of effort.

- **For PKO, ROE are normally highly restrictive** and written to limit the use of force to self-defense of the force and protection of its mission.

- **In PEO, the ROE are less restrictive on the use of force than in PKO,** but are tailored to the situation. Restraint will still be a primary consideration since the transition to peace may be easier when the PE force has only used proportional and appropriate force.

e. **The Campaign Plan.** The theater or multinational campaign plan is the **tool for linking operational- and tactical-level actions to strategic aims.** Because PO tend to unfold incrementally, **the joint or multinational staff writes a campaign plan that lays out a clear, definable path to the desired end state.** This plan should relate to and support a strategic-level interagency, political-military plan. Such a plan will help commanders to assist political leaders in visualizing operational requirements and defining a desired end state. Essential considerations for developing a PO campaign plan include understanding **the mandate and TOR, analyzing the mission,** and **developing the ROE.** A concept for transition and termination is essential. Joint Pub 5-00.1, "JTTP for Campaign Planning," includes a sample outline of a PO campaign plan.

10. Conclusion

PO are complex operations conducted in a dynamic environment that involves initial objectives that may change in pursuit of the end state. Consequently, commanders seek an understanding of the political-military objectives, the tasks and political-military plans designed to attain them, forces required, and the operational environment. Then commanders ensure that military actions support political objectives. Commanders and their staffs conduct detailed mission analysis and clearly articulate the situation, mission, and ROE. Finally, commanders will continue to analyze the situation to prevent divergence between military actions and the overall objectives of the operation.

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CHAPTER II
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."

Dag Hammarskjold

1. General

PKO support diplomatic efforts to **establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.** The United States has participated in and supported UN-sponsored PKO; for example, UNMIH, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, and others. The United States has also participated in non-UN sponsored PKO, which include the MFO in the Sinai and the MNF I in Beirut.

2. Description of Peacekeeping

PKO take place following **diplomatic negotiation and agreement** among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease-fire is in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. Peacekeepers conduct their operations in an open and highly conspicuous manner. **The peacekeepers' main function is to establish a presence** which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. **PKO support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normalized peaceful relations.** Agreements often specify which nations' forces are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute. The United States may participate in PKO as a **lead nation,** as a **contingent,** or by **providing military observers.** A major challenge for a PK force is to effectively deal with situations of extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

"War is an invention of the human mind. The human mind can invent peace with justice."

Norman Cousins

3. Fundamentals

There are certain fundamentals that help guide the conduct of successful PKO (see Figure II-1).

- **Firmness.** On matters of principle and integrity, peacekeepers must show a **firmness of purpose** and **unwavering solidarity** or the force's ability to effectively operate will suffer. However, PK forces are generally lightly armed and authorized to use force only in self-defense of the force and its mission. Hence, PKO have highly restrictive ROE.

"If historical experience teaches us anything . . . it is that the military measures alone will not suffice."

BGEN. S.B. Griffith
1961

- **Impartiality.** A PK force does not act in support of a government or any party to a dispute; it is entirely impartial. If the parties to the dispute **perceive** the actions of the PK force as partial, the



Figure II-1. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations

force's usefulness in the situation will be compromised. Therefore, **the actions of the PK force should be impartial to preserve the parties' consent.** If the PK force is suspected of favoring one of the parties concerned, the trust of the other party will be lost. Once lost, the PK force will find it difficult to implement its mandate. Demonstrated impartiality is essential to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the PKO.

"Key to this business (peacekeeping operations) is absolute impartiality. Favoritism will get you in trouble if you show the slightest hint of it."

Colonel H.C. Ross
Canadian Army
National Defense Headquarters

- **Clarity of Intention.** The parties should be made fully aware of what the PK force

is trying to achieve, and why. Failure in this respect will lead to misunderstandings and distrust.

"The formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which defines measurable and attainable objectives is paramount."

General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC
Commander in Chief,
US Central Command

- **Anticipation.** Incidents that are likely to provoke violence should be anticipated, and timely action taken to prevent them. A PK reserve force should be prepared to position itself between the two sides before an incident can escalate.

- **Consent.** A PK force is invited by the parties or a HN government to a dispute. The PK force remains only with their consent. This consent includes recognition of the host government's authority. While a PK force enjoys certain immunities, its members will respect the host country's laws and customs.

- **Integration.** A PK force could be integrated in two ways.

  •• **The national contingents may share force-wide responsibilities.** This can be achieved, for example, by allocating responsibilities for logistic support, communications, and airlift to different countries so that no one contingent is perceived to exercise undue influence.

  •• When a confrontation between the PK force and one or more of the disputing parties is likely, **interposing a small group drawn from as many national contingents as possible** or a force reserve to demonstrate solidarity will be useful.

- **Freedom of Movement.** The PK force will usually be granted sufficient freedom of movement to carry out its responsibilities.

4. Peacekeeping Personnel and Forces

US military personnel may perform a wide variety of functions in support of PKO. They may be detailed to serve on a **multinational staff** or in an observer group as **military observers** (MILOBs). The United States may also participate in PKO by providing PK forces. These forces may include ground, air, maritime, space, or special operations forces.

"There is no doubt in my mind, that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his noncommissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests."

Brigadier M. Harbottle
UN Forces, Cyprus

a. MILOBs are unarmed and **observe, record, and report on the implementation and violations of a formal agreement.** They serve as members of an observer group and carry out such tasks as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. **Their presence is often sufficient to deter violations.** By providing accurate, up-to-date, and impartial reports, MILOBs help reduce the number of claims and counterclaims by the disputing parties. The MILOBs rely strongly for defense on their impartial status and execution of assigned duties.

b. The **Secretary of the Army** (SECARMY) is the DOD executive agent for the administration of personnel support to:

- UN Headquarters in New York;
- Multilateral observer missions; and
- Peace operations for which a combatant commander is not assigned responsibility.

The **US Military Observer Group Washington** (USMOG-W), acting on behalf of the SECARMY and in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) and the Joint Staff, assumes responsibility for implementation. When directed by the USDP, the SECARMY may direct the Secretaries of other Military Departments and heads of Defense Agencies to provide personnel to support PO. **US MILOBs are under the command of USMOG-W.** USMOG-W is responsible for administrative and logistic support of US observers. US MILOBs perform observer duties under the control of and report to the observer group chief of staff or PK force commander designated by the sponsoring organization. When detailed as MILOBs, US personnel do not normally report to the geographic combatant commander.

c. **The force size and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate, and threat in the operational area.** At one end of the scale, the UN Yemen Observation Mission in 1963 utilized 189 personnel (primarily military) from 11 nations to supervise the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. At the other end of the scale, the UN's peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1993 included 22,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 32 nations. Typically, **PKO are conducted by forces that are smaller and more lightly equipped than those that conduct PEO.**

- **PK forces will usually require tailoring to include units or personnel with specialized abilities** such as language skills, engineering, decontamination, explosive ordnance disposal, PSYOP, and CA. The requirement for personnel with special skills is mission-dependent.
- PK forces are **generally lightly armed** and should be **mobile,** capable of **self-defense,** and **self-sufficient** until logistics

Mine awareness is a serious concern in peacekeeping operations.

resupply channels can be established. Contract logistics may serve to relieve the force of this requirement.

- **Ground forces may supervise and assist in the separation of opposing sides and to establish a buffer zone (BZ) or demilitarized zone (DMZ).** The PK force controls and surveys the line of demarcation, which facilitates the disengagement and withdrawal of forces, discourages infiltration confrontations, and assists in resolving local disputes. The presence of the PK force helps reassure each party to the dispute that other parties are not violating the agreements. **Ground operations may involve observation and monitoring of military and paramilitary units within a specified area.** This helps ensure that authorized units of the disputing parties are not increased above the strength levels stipulated in the agreement, existing fortifications are neither reinforced nor enlarged, no increase of arms and supplies occurs apart from those agreed to, and no side violates the BZ or DMZ. **Infantry, armored, armored cavalry, military police (MP) forces (with augmentation) and SOF ground forces are capable of changing their mission focus to support PKO** after proper training to maximize their inherent characteristics of mobility, communications, self-protection capability, and training. MP units, in particular, have a wealth of experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating tension. Their signature as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tensions. An analysis of the mandate, mission, and threat will be used to determine the composition of the PK ground force. Additional ground force capabilities include the support capabilities listed in Figure II-2.

GROUND FORCE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

- Observing, monitoring, and reporting
- Maintaining public order and protecting civilians and public officials
- Support to elections
- Delivery and protection of humanitarian assistance
- Manning of checkpoints
- Patrolling
- Demining operations
- Supervising truces and cease-fires
- Intelligence
- Surveillance
- Reconnaissance
- Incident management and crowd control
- Negotiation and mediation
- Interposition between parties to the conflict
- Demobilization and disarmament
- Inspection of facilities

Figure II-2. Ground Force Support Capabilities

- **Air assets** include both **fixed-** and **rotary-wing aircraft.** Air operations provide the **speed, range,** and **flexibility** to rapidly cover large areas. In PKO, air assets can meet a wide range of operational requirements. These include

the support capabilities listed in Figure II-3. Air assets are especially useful where the terrain is difficult to navigate or contains mines and unexploded ordnance. In response to rapidly developing situations, air operations can be **highly effective in gathering information regarding violations of cease-fire and arms-limitation agreements,** as well as in the **rapid transport of personnel and equipment.** Information gathered by air assets can help commanders and staffs assess situations, reduce risk, and enhance the operational effectiveness of the PK force. The use of air assets can increase the probability of detecting violations and can be a deterrent to major violations. The increased probability of detection provided through air operations encourages confidence among the parties to the dispute and fosters compliance with agreements.



Figure II-3. Air Assets Support Capabilities

"There are many times when platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at roadblocks, and company and battalion commanders working in cordon and search operations, must negotiate and communicate with potential belligerents. Leaders need to know that they may be placed in a position that requires them to mediate or negotiate on the battlefield."

BGEN. L. Magruder, III, USA
CG, Joint Readiness Training Center

- **Maritime forces provide a secure environment ashore** through credible, combat ready forces before, during, and after the operation. Naval assets may include supporting sealift, surface forces, submarine forces, amphibious forces, or individual observers. **Naval forces establish both a psychological and stabilizing effect** by their physical presence. To be effective, naval forces require free access to the territorial waters around the countries involved in the dispute. Naval vessels may provide the support capabilities described in Figure II-4. Additionally, naval forces can provide **harbor movement control** and **port security** to safeguard vessels, harbors, waterfront facilities, and cargo. Maritime forces may also conduct operations on inland waterways. With special authorization the US Coast Guard (USCG), under the US Department of Transportation, may provide the capabilities listed in Figure II-5 in support

NAVAL VESSELS SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

- A staging and sustainment platform for amphibious forces, particularly in the initial stages of peacekeeping operations if naval forces are in position before significant land-based forces arrive. They may also be used in the reinforcement or evacuation of peacekeeping forces
- Escort for neutral shipping in areas adjacent to territories of the parties to a dispute
- A neutral location where representatives may meet for supervised negotiations
- Early warning of potentially dangerous or hostile actions
- Protection of offshore assets (primarily petroleum-production platforms and deep water offshore port facilities)
- Access to, or transit of, oceans and waterways
- Search and rescue
- Port visits
- Coastal sea control
- Monitor and enforce exclusive economic zones
- Escort for vessels
- Coastal patrol and surveillance

Figure II-4. Naval Vessels Support Capabilities

of PKO. See also "Maritime Forces" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- **Space capabilities are essential to PKO efforts** largely in the area of force enhancement operations supporting air, ground, and maritime forces. Space missions comprising force enhancement include the items listed in Figure II-6. Tying all these systems together in theater requires the expertise provided by the forward-deployed space support teams.

•• **Communications.** In many areas where PKO are likely to occur, **existing communications infrastructure may not support the requirements of the PK force.** PK forces must have the capability to communicate among the assigned land, maritime, and air forces,

US COAST GUARD SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

- Port security and port safety services
- Coastal sea control and harbor defense services
- Maritime law enforcement and maritime interception operations
- Environmental defense and pollution prevention, mitigation, monitoring, and response
- Escort of vessels
- Vessel traffic control and aids to navigation
- Reflagging of merchant vessels
- Training (law enforcement, search and rescue, environmental protection, port safety and security, waterway management, and maritime safety)
- Port visits
- Maritime search and rescue
- Coastal patrol and surveillance

Figure II-5. US Coast Guard Support Capabilities

as well as to the combatant commander. **Satellite communications support** can be provided by the Fleet Satellite Communications System, Ultra High Frequency Follow-On Satellites, Defense Satellite Communications System, and the Air Force Satellite Communications System. In addition, military satellite communications are augmented by leased commercial satellite communications.

SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT CAPABILITIES

- Communications
- Positioning, velocity, and timing
- Weather
- Global geospatial information and services
- Surveillance and reconnaissance
- Theater ballistic missile attack warning

Figure II-6. Space Force Enhancement Capabilities

•• **Navigation. Global positioning system (GPS)** and other **space-based positioning, velocity, and timing (PVT) systems** support PKO by providing highly accurate three-dimensional location capability, velocity determination, and time reference. Such PVT systems allow PK forces to **know their exact location, which they can then communicate to friendly forces** to **determine the best routes for movement.** This is extremely important in areas where maps are out of date or nonexistent, physical landmarks are sparse, or local magnetic variations are unreliable. **Space-based PVT systems aid in the surveying of various features,** including minefields, borders, and BZs. They may also provide **navigation capabilities** in areas where other navigation aids are damaged or nonexistent.

•• **Weather.** Weather data from space-based systems is important to PKO. The National Oceanographic and

Atmospheric Administration operates a **constellation of weather satellites** that gives US forces global weather coverage. **Timely and accurate weather information is essential** for mission planning, route selection, communications, observation, and reporting.

•• **Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S).** GI&S assets can provide hard- and soft-copy maps, gravity values, sea surface topography measurements, hydrographic charts, and digital feature analysis. In addition, imaging systems can provide the capabilities listed in Figure II-7.

•• **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** Space systems provide a variety of ISR capabilities, which enhance a commander's situational awareness of the parties to a dispute and their compliance with agreements.

•• **Theater Ballistic Missile Attack Warning.** The proliferation of theater ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, is a growing threat to US deployed forces worldwide. In response to this threat, space continues to offer the perfect vantage point from which to view signs of a theater ballistic missile launch. **The Defense Support Program detects theater ballistic missile launches**; launch detection can be quickly disseminated to geographic combatant commanders via warning networks.



Figure II-7. Geospatial Information and Services Capabilities

See JP 3-01.5, "Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense"

"I think all our conventional leaders and commanders need to understand and work more closely with Special Operations forces — Special Forces Operational Detachments, Civil Affairs, and PYSOP teams. This marriage must occur; we've got to force it. We cannot succeed on the modern battlefield without cooperation among these elements."

BGEN. L. Magruder, III, USA
CG, Joint Readiness Training Center

- **SOF can play a significant role in PKO** because of their **unique capabilities, training,** and **experience.** SOF often have detailed regional knowledge of cultures and languages, as well as experience working with indigenous forces. SOF are capable of the activities listed in Figure II-8. SOF can form small, versatile, self-contained units that can **rapidly deploy, and provide a full spectrum of air, ground, and maritime support with links to space-based assets.** SOF capabilities of PSYOP and CA are particularly important in PO for their understanding of the complexity of operating in cross-cultural environments.

See also JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

•• **PSYOP can assist in facilitating cooperation** between the disputing



Figure II-8. Special Operations Forces Support Capabilities

parties, their supporters, and the PK force. PSYOP can help create **favorable attitudes and behavior** on the part of disputing parties and uncommitted segments of the population. For example, PSYOP personnel may: (1) Provide the capability to develop, produce, and disseminate by radio, television, newspapers, leaflets, or loudspeaker broadcasts a wide variety of products to inform all parties, including neutrals, about the role of the PK force, the requirements of the mandate, locations of critical services, and information that can assist in bridging cross-cultural gaps between PKO forces and indigenous populations. If the PKO force commander does not pay attention to these matters, the potential for misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and hostile propaganda is high; and (2) Assist commanders in analyzing the psychological effects of the operation.

For additional information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

"PSYOP is a tool that can enhance control and security and should be integrated into daily planning and operations. It must be flexible and capable of being delivered by various types of media . . . [commander, joint task force] can use these tools to reinforce policy directives and disseminate any other information to the population."

Operation SEA SIGNAL
Migrant Camp Operations: The Guantanamo Experience
USACOM

•• In PKO, **CA personnel** can: (1) **Conduct area assessments** of the population, economy, culture, and so forth, to aid the commander in decision making and planning; (2) **Provide training** to familiarize PK personnel with the dynamics of the political situation in the operational area, local cultures, customs, mores, religions, and taboos—such training programs enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the PK force by improving understanding and respect for the local populace; (3) **Establish liaison and coordination** among US, multinational, and indigenous forces such as NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies, as well as the HN; (4) **Coordinate host-nation support (HNS)** for the PK force and identify the local resources for use by the force; (5) **Provide advice and assistance** in handling refugees and dislocated civilians; and (6) **Establish CMOCs** to coordinate CMO and HA operations. Some CA activities require **careful consideration because of the risk of**

appearing partial to one or more disputing parties. Such activities may include advice or assistance to help the HN provide for public health, safety, and welfare; food and agriculture; trade and commerce; education; and administration and finance.

For additional information on CA, refer to JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

For additional information on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," and JP 3-05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures."

d. **PK members must wear distinctive items** that clearly identify them as members of the PK force or observer group. Such items include headgear (helmet liners or berets), badges, armbands, and identity cards. PK force vehicles, boats, aircraft, and facilities may be **painted in the colors of the force** and will **prominently display its insignia.** PK force facilities and observation posts (OPs) will **display the UN or force flag** and will normally be illuminated at night. In UN PKO, dismounted patrols normally carry a UN flag. The force commander may establish additional guidelines concerning identification requirements.

5. Peacekeeping Missions

PK missions will usually involve observing, monitoring, or supervising and assisting parties to a dispute (see Figure II-9).

a. **Observation.** Observation missions are performed primarily by unarmed MILOBs, but may also be performed by PK forces. In either case, they help **ensure the agreements are followed by the parties to the dispute.** UN observer groups may also use civilian personnel or police as observers. The success of these missions is dependent on the willingness of the disputing parties to cooperate with the terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may exist because MILOBs have established a visible presence and are able to detect violations of agreements. For the success of the mission, MILOBs establish and maintain good relations with the disputing parties. See, for example, "MOMEP" in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." **Typical observation tasks include the following.**

- **Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements.** Agreements may include treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements, or any other binding agreements between the disputing parties.

- **Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.** This may include incidents, unauthorized troop movements, and construction or reinforcing of defensive positions. An investigation provides evidence regarding violations of the agreements and may involve negotiation or mediation, to include direct dialogue between the disputing parties.

". . . we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations."

President Harry S. Truman

- **Negotiating and mediating.** MILOBs may undertake negotiations on behalf of the disputing parties to mediate low-level disputes. Reconciliation of differences at the lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of the PKO.

Figure II-9. Peacekeeping Mission Activities

- **Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.** Disputes thrive on rumors, uncertainty, and prejudice. Therefore, liaison visits maintain personal contact and allow for a timely and routine exchange of information with disputing parties, the HN, local civilian officials, international agencies, PK force headquarters, and other national contingents.

- **Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the operational area.** This

requires periodically visiting forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces of the disputing parties.

- **Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment** specified in the relevant agreements.

b. **Supervision and Assistance.** Supervision and assistance missions are normally performed by lightly armed PK forces. The PK forces undertaking these tasks require, in most cases, large service support organizations, equipment, and finances. In addition to the tasks performed by MILOBs in observation missions, PK forces may perform the following tasks when they are within the scope of the military mission, support the desired end state, and are authorized by appropriate authority.

- **Supervising cease-fires.** Once a cease-fire is arranged, PK forces may observe and report on the disputing parties' compliance with a cease-fire. The force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation to perform its mission. The tempo and outcome of diplomatic activities taken to establish a credible cease-fire are often unpredictable, and negotiations to constitute and insert a PK force may occur simultaneously. Therefore, rapid deployment of the PK force is generally required.

- **Supervising disengagements and withdrawals.** As diplomatic activity ensues, agreement to establish a BZ may require PK forces to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of hostile forces. Interpositioning of the PK force between the disputing parties is generally a high priority to prevent a breakdown of the cease-fire and to help ensure an uneventful disengagement and withdrawal. The inherent risks associated with interpositioning can be greatly reduced by timely deployment and implementation of well-conceived and detailed plans that are understood by all parties. PK force personnel may mediate disagreements in the positioning of the disputing parties' forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions and, if authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.

- **Supervising prisoner of war (POW) exchanges.** At any stage in the resolution of a dispute, PK forces may supervise and assist in POW exchanges between the parties.

- **Supervising demobilization and demilitarization.** The parties to the dispute may agree to demobilization or demilitarization of their forces. Therefore, PK forces may supervise and assist in these activities and provide progress reports to the sponsoring organization.

- **Assisting civil authorities.** PK forces may assist civil authorities in such functions as supervision of elections, transfer of authority, partitioning of territory, evacuation, convoy escort, or the temporary administration of civil functions. The CMO Staff Officer, in coordination with the CMOC, can provide advice and assistance in the execution of these functions.

- **Assisting in the maintenance of public order.** PK forces may assist in the reestablishment or maintenance of public order. The responsibility for public order rests primarily with the civil police. However, military assistance may be required if there has been a breakdown in the civil police structure or situations are beyond their capacity to control.

- **Assisting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations.** Although FHA is not a PO, it may be necessary for PK forces to provide security for and to supervise the offloading and transloading of relief supplies until FHA operations are fully established. It may also be necessary for PK forces to provide transportation and security for NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies. CA personnel provide to the commander a resource for the planning and conduct of FHA.

6. Command and Control

Commanders have responsibility for the C2 of the forces assigned to them. **C2 relationships are established prior to the PKO** in the appropriate operation plan, order, directive, or other authoritative correspondence. With continual mission analysis and revised plans, crucial in any military operation, the C2 relationships may be adjusted to the situation.

> *"One cannot succeed with peace operations if one allows subordinate commanders and men in the field to give way to their natural inclinations, and act the way they are trained to act in war. With proper measures, good commanders can make the distinction understood up and down the line, and do so without losing the ability to respond fast and forcefully should there be a situation which calls for it."*
>
> **Ambassador R. Oakley**
> **President's Special Envoy**
> **for Somalia**

a. **Force Headquarters.** The organization of a PK force headquarters in **non-UN sponsored operations** is normally **ad hoc,** but will generally be **structured around common military staff functions** such as administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and CA functions. The commander will also have a personal staff and civilian staff. **In UN-sponsored operations national contingents perform under OPCON of the UN force commander.** The UN Secretary-General (SYG) is responsible for implementing UN Security Council resolutions or mandates and for monitoring all UN PKO. The UN force commander is responsible to the UN mission's special representative for ensuring military activities support other components of the mission.

- **The SYG will appoint a UN force commander and a UN Special Representative.** The force commander is a military officer from a nation not involved in the dispute, whose qualifications are acceptable to the UN Security Council. Additionally, the force commander must also be acceptable to the HN and all the parties to the dispute. The force commander refers all policy matters to the UN Special Representative, normally a career diplomat, given the title of the Special Representative to the SYG (SRSG). The SRSG is appointed as head of mission (HOM).

- There is no standard staff organization common to UN PK force headquarters. The staff is ordinarily grouped into three main categories:

  •• The **MNF commander's personal staff** normally consists of a military assistant, a political adviser, a legal adviser, a public affairs officer (PAO), an interpreter, and LNOs from the armed forces of the parties to the dispute.

  •• The **military staff** normally consists of a chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff, and an operations staff (intelligence, plans, training, communications, air traffic control, security, police operations, observer groups, administration, health service support [HSS], logistics, and CMO staff officer). Linguists may also be included to facilitate communications.

•• The **civilian staff,** provided by the UN Secretariat in New York, at a minimum consists of a chief administrative officer (CAO). The CAO is responsible for the direction of all administrative matters having financial implications, as well as for the overall direction of the force's administration.

Minor differences reflect local requirements or the preferences of the officers who created the headquarters.

b. **Units.** The MNF commander may be given OPCON over US and other military units assigned to the PK force and ensures that the national contingent commanders perform assigned tasks consistent with the mandate and the force's mission.

- A national contingent consists of a nation's entire contribution (units as well as staff officers at the force headquarters). **National contingent commanders report to the force commander** and to the national chain of command as well.

- **National contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents** in accordance with their national military law. The authority for national contingent commanders to carry out their national laws in the HN's territory should be included in the SOFA and/or SOMA for the PKO. The force commander may discuss a major disciplinary breach with a contingent commander or, if warranted, may refer the matter to the SRSG.

- Each contingent commander is responsible for **accomplishing assigned tasks, communicating changes in the situation,** and **responding to the needs and the directives of the PK force commander.** Contingent commanders may recommend and advise the force commander on COAs.

- Figure D-1 in Appendix D, "Chains of Command," shows a **notional chain of command** for PKO. Figure D-2 shows the **chain of command** for the MFO.

c. **US Military Forces.** Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over US forces assigned to them by the "Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum." The geographic combatant commander exercises OPCON of US forces attached to them. The PK force commander, in turn, exercises OPCON of US forces as delegated by the combatant commander. US military forces are attached to the PK force upon entering the operational area.

d. **Commanders' Directives.** The force commander's directive should clearly outline **who is empowered to give orders to contingents and under what circumstances.** US contingent commanders may issue their own directives based on their own mission analysis and the force commander's directive. Although each directive is unique, **a commander's directive should include the items listed in Figure II-10.**

7. Planning Considerations

No two PKO are exactly the same; **each is tailored to the unique situation, requiring a thorough mission analysis.** Additionally, PKO are often initiated on short notice, requiring extraordinary efforts to develop a complete plan, identify and build a headquarters staff, and conduct training and orientation, if possible, before deployment. However, **the planning process for PKO is the same as for any other military operation.** The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is, first and foremost, policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts. JOPES is the focus of the Joint Pub 5-03 series.

COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ELEMENTS

- The degree of command and control the force commander has over national contingents by covering such topics as:
  - Appointment and authority of the force commander
  - Applicability of national laws and regulations to personnel in the various contingents
  - Support responsibilities and procedures
- Appointment of subordinate commanders, especially those detached from the main body
- Individuals authorized to issue directives and instructions to the unit, as well as under what circumstances
- Subunit operational areas and tasks
- Methods of operation and deployment
- Reserve forces
- States of readiness
- Succession to command
- Location of forces and unit headquarters
- Force composition
- Identification; for example, the wearing of force distinctive identification (headgear, badges, and armbands), marking of vehicles and positions, and so forth
- Duration of duty and policies on liberty and rest and recreation
- Relationship with the host government and its local administration, armed forces, and police; and other organizations and agencies in the operational area
- Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry
- Media relations, including guidance on when and through whom operational information may be provided
- Force protection measures, to include information and communications security
- Regulations and restrictions to be observed off duty

Figure II-10. Commander's Directive Elements

"The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war."

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

a. **The mandate, TOR, and SOFA are important sources of information** for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing the **lessons learned from previous PKO or training exercises.** Commanders and staff may conduct their review using the Joint Electronic Library PO data base, as well as other lessons learned data bases. See Appendix E, "References."

b. While most military units use **standing operating procedures** (SOPs), the duration of many PKO, number of participating multinational contingents, and rotation policies make **SOPs especially useful in these operations.** Annex E to Appendix A, "Standing Operating Procedures," is a sample format for SOPs.

- **SOPs standardize the conduct of operations and logistics and are tailored to the mission and situation.** The headquarters staff drafts and disseminates SOPs preferably before arrival in the operational area. SOPs address basic information about the force, standard procedures, and explain issues which require guidance. The overall force SOPs may be augmented by contingent commanders and subordinate unit commanders. At a minimum, the SOPs might include the items listed in Figure II-11.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

- Pertinent information from the mandate and terms of reference
- Rules of engagement
- Observation and checkpoint routines
- Communications links and procedures
- Reporting formats and procedures
- Resupply procedures
- Contingency or emergency procedures
- Building, vehicle, and personnel search procedures
- Health services information, to include medical evacuation request procedures
- Guidance on the media and controls on photography
- Lists of persons allowed to enter peacekeeping areas
- Procedures regarding refugees and displaced civilians
- Possible restrictions on contact with local forces and the populace

Figure II-11. Standing Operating Procedures

c. When practical, the force commander should consider having the staff develop an **area information handbook** to prepare personnel for their PK responsibilities. The purpose would be to **orient PK force members** to the mission, operational area, history of the conflict and its parties, religious and cultural factors, and other important information about the environment in which they will be operating. Army special forces (SF), CA, and PSYOP personnel are trained and experienced in the preparation of this product. Public affairs and intelligence

personnel are other resources. Annex F ("Area Information Handbook") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations," is a sample format for an area information handbook.

d. Successful planning and employment requires **detailed coordination at all levels** in the PK force. Therefore, **LNOs should be identified to assist the commander and staff** as they coordinate plans and actions among the PK contingents, UN or sponsoring organizations, NGOs, PVOs, other agencies, and local authorities. The latter may include military leaders, local officials, customs, transportation authorities, and police. **A CMOC provides a venue for coordination** between the military and these personnel.

e. **Logistics.** In PKO, logistics considerations are as important as operational considerations, just as they are in any other military operation. However, there are some differences in how logistic support is provided in PKO. Consequently, logisticians' involvement in the planning process from the very beginning will help to ensure mission success. **The ad hoc and multinational nature of PKO demands careful and detailed logistics planning.** This is particularly true in UN-sponsored PKO. Logistic support in PKO includes, but is not limited to, the categories listed in Figure II-12.

Figure II-12. Categories of Logistic Support

- **In UN operations, the deployed elements of the UN Field Administration and Logistics Division make arrangements for goods and services common to all the contingents,** such as for water, some food items, fuel, and billeting. However, the UN requires time to contract for this support. Consequently, when PK forces initially deploy they should, to the extent possible, be self-sufficient for a minimum of 60-90 days. **National contingents are responsible for all logistic support that is unique to their requirements.** Normally, US PK forces will be supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contingency contracting, HNS, and UN logistic support. Other logistic considerations for multinational operations include the possibility of **role specialization** and a **lead nation provider** for certain classes of supply or services.

- **In non-UN-sponsored operations, a single nation may be responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for the force.** For example, in the MFO in the Sinai, the United States is responsible for logistic support to all national contingents, to include supply, transportation, maintenance, communications, small arms maintenance, movement control, finance, postal, HSS, explosive ordnance disposal, and mortuary affairs. However, many of these requirements may be satisfied through **commercial contracts**

and require reimbursements from the participating or requesting nations or agencies.

- **In PKO, contracting for support will generally be necessary.** Contracting may include use of the **Army's logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP)**, the **Navy's emergency construction capabilities contract program (CONCAP)** and the **Air Force's Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP)**. **HNS contracting may also be used.** Consequently, effective **advance parties** include finance, logistics, resource management, and contracting personnel to assure the necessary level of support for the PK force. Planners should also be aware that in some regions, reliability and timeliness of contractor performance may not be the same as in developed areas. **The task of the advance party may be complex** due to differences in languages, currencies, accountability systems, sanitation systems, and hygiene standards. Veterinary personnel inspect food sources for food safety and sanitation as well as inspect food stuffs for quality assurance and wholesomeness. If bottled water is being used by the PKO force, veterinary personnel will also inspect these supplies. Preventive medicine personnel inspect and monitor water sources and supplies to include ice. When the United States participates in a UN PKO, direct coordination between US military planning staffs and UN planners should be authorized to ensure effective and responsive support to US forces.

- **For UN PKO, many of the costs incurred by the United States are reimbursable by the UN.** The UN issues detailed guidance (in the form of an aide-memoire) explaining the logistic support provided by the UN and the procedures for participating nations to follow to receive reimbursement for other support. **US units that participate in UN PKO must provide a detailed accounting for all costs incurred in the operations to justify UN reimbursement.** UN and US or US and coalition standards for various types of logistic support may be different and special costs and complications may ensue. Advanced determination of these differences is important. In any case, **specific agreements should spell out exactly who is to provide specified support to whom for what period in what quantities.** CA and CMO staff should be involved in any logistics efforts involving HN or civilian personnel. For additional information on UN reimbursement procedures, refer to Annex A ("United Nations Reimbursement Procedures") of Appendix C, "United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations."

- **PKO are often conducted in logistically austere theaters where there may be limited or inadequate air and seaport facilities.** If the HN has insufficient capability or capacity to support offloading at their ports, US support personnel must deploy before the scheduled arrival of the force. In some cases, existing facilities may require expansion or new facilities constructed to handle incoming forces. Repositioning of additional materials-handling equipment may also be necessary.

- **Logistics planners will also determine if previously established bilateral HNS agreements contain logistic support provisions** applicable to the sustainment of US PK forces and, if necessary, recommend changes. **If not in existence, then logisticians should be actively involved in their formulation,** a process that may take 12-24 months. Activation

of HNS agreements are not necessarily automatic during PKO. Approval by the concerned governments may be necessary.

For detailed information on logistics planning, refer to JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations;" JP 4-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations;" JP 4-01.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations;" JP 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control;" and other pertinent publications in the JP 4-series. See also, Appendix E, "References."

f. **Information Gathering Vice Intelligence Operations. Information is critically important to a PK force,** not only for mission success, but to protect the force. However, **sensitivities exist about use of the term "intelligence" in PKO.** Such sensitivity includes the argument that intelligence involves the collection of information from those who do not wish to provide it and that it is therefore a provocative act. An extension of that argument is that information collection by covert means involves deceit and may destroy the trust that disputing parties should have in the PK force. Intelligence support for US forces in PKO will be conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

- **The threat and situation influence the priority of information gathered.** During the initial phases of the deployment of a PK force, collection is focused on gathering information crucial to the security of the force.

- **The methodology for collecting information is generally the same as that for any other military operation.** In war, information collection has focused on the military capabilities, weapons systems, and intentions of the enemy. **In PKO, however, types of sources are different.** The information collection effort is directed toward:

  •• The leaders of the disputing parties;

  •• Civilian populations (including their expected level of support, indifference, or hostility to the PK force, as well as the potential for violence between different segments);

  •• Insurgent elements;

  •• Terrorists;

  •• Police and paramilitary forces;

  •• Criminal activity;

  •• Historical background that led to the dispute;

  •• Cultural, ethnic, and religious factors;

  •• Economic conditions; and

  •• Unique environmental and HSS threats to the force and others in the operational area.

- The mandate will normally require tracking and recording the activities of the disputing parties and, in some cases, the weapons and systems they possess. CA and PSYOP forces can provide information about the attitudes and needs of the civilian populace.

- Given the nature of PKO, **information collection may involve extensive use of human intelligence (HUMINT).** All members of the PK force are potential sources of information, particularly if they are fluent in the language spoken in the region. If present, **personnel from**

NGOs, PVOs, international organizations, and the UN may provide general information to corroborate other sources. Additionally, **open-source media** such as local newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet may be a valuable information source. However, local media sources may not provide neutral or objective points of view. Before relying on them, the PK forces should ascertain the political beliefs and motives of the media source.

- **Classified US information cannot be released to foreign nationals or other PK contingents unless authorized.** Under 18 USC 798 and 50 USC 421, it is unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper authorization. The release is governed by national disclosure policy (NDP). Guidance is available in NDP-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." **Release procedures should be established in advance** to allow for transfer of information to non-US PK forces when deemed appropriate. A foreign disclosure officer may be a useful addition to the US staff headquarters.

g. **Force Protection. Force protection is a high priority for a deployed PK force.** The impartiality of the force, as mentioned in Chapter I, "Primer for Peace Operations," may enhance force protection. **ROE are also an essential element of force protection** and will provide for appropriate action to protect the force. The US contingent commander is responsible for setting and enforcing minimum standards of physical security for US forces in coordination with the PK force commander and the geographic combatant commander. **Some force protection considerations include the following.**

- Coordination with HN civil police, supporting military police, CA, and PSYOPs units. Peacekeepers should coordinate information-gathering operations with local HN police and supporting military police and determine whether information received is for military intelligence versus criminal intelligence purposes. Coordination with supporting CA and PSYOPs units provides peacekeepers with information on the local populace relative to the environment in which they are employed, i.e., support for the PKO and attitude towards soldiers.

- **Terrorism poses serious problems for peacekeepers.** Overt observation makes peacekeepers vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism (offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) may be outside the scope of a PKO. However, antiterrorism (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces) is essential to a force protection plan. Key PK personnel are potential targets of terrorists. Terrorists may also abduct members of a particular national contingent in an attempt to undermine that nation's support of the PKO. All personnel who visit the operational area will receive force protection training prior to departure appropriate to the operational area, as well as appropriate terrorist awareness training upon arrival in the operational area and as required throughout the length of deployment. Adequate precautions will protect personnel, positions, headquarters, and all types of transportation and billets.

- **Criminal activity from a force protection point of view.** PK forces may

be significantly better off in a material sense than the local population. Additionally, they provide a ready source of weapons and other high value items of interest to the black market. As a result, the PK force may become the target of choice for criminal activity and/or a desperate populace.

- **Peacekeepers are vulnerable to attacks with mines; truck, bus, and car bombs; rocket-propelled grenades; or mortars.** Personnel should be billeted in secure areas, and the number of people billeted in any one building should be limited. Buildings should have a sufficient buffer zone around them to limit the effectiveness of car bombs. Sufficient vehicular control and barriers to prevent unauthorized approach should be provided. The possibility of suicide attacks should be considered. Posting personnel aboard ships should be considered when practical and when conditions and mission requirements warrant.

- **PK forces have limited authority to check the backgrounds of local employees.** Since these employees may be bribed or pressured to provide information about PK forces, their activities, and other sensitive matters, they may be a security threat. The PK force staff should coordinate with local officials to obtain a background check on potential employees when possible. Regardless, care must be taken not to discuss PK force matters or handle sensitive documents in the presence of local nationals.

- **PK forces may have limited communications-security capabilities.** Additionally, allied or coalition members may have a significantly lower awareness of the vulnerability of the PK force's communications system to hostile intelligence efforts. Care must be taken to determine the sensitivity of information prior to transmission over the PK force's communications system.

h. **Reserve Force.** Although the UN utilizes multinational reserves, **the US contingent commander may also designate a US reserve if needed, i.e., for force protection.** The US contingent reserve should be sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located, and mobile. When deployed under normal circumstances, the reserve will deploy in a high profile, non-tactical manner with the UN or force flag clearly displayed. **The contingent commander will commit the reserve in order to accomplish the mission.** In the event the contingent reserve cannot resolve the incident, the commander may request the US reserve force.

i. **Special Equipment.** Technologically advanced equipment can improve the ability of the PK force to perform its mission. **Some examples of advanced technology that have application in PKO are listed in Figure II-13.** The benefits of using advanced technology equipment in PKO are improved efficiency and effectiveness of the PK force, improved probability of detecting violations of agreements, enhanced force protection, and provision of the means for dealing with threat situations without resorting to lethal force. This latter benefit is especially important in countering the benefit to hostile parties of local and international adverse reactions to loss of human life from the actions of the PK force.

j. **Contingency Planning.** These plans may include states of readiness, evacuation, disaster plans, and procedures for handling displaced civilians and requests for asylum.

- **The PK force headquarters will establish states of readiness.** The states of readiness may vary from force to force, but UN forces normally have three states

Figure II-13. Examples of Advanced Technology

of readiness: normal vigilance, increased vigilance, and full alert (see Figure II-14). Each increase in the state of readiness will be complemented by restrictions on rest and recuperation (R&R), leave, pass, training, movement, and certain operations. **Changes in the states of readiness are normally implemented only by the force commander.** In an emergency, the US contingent commander may order a higher state of readiness, but must immediately inform the force headquarters.

- **A PK force may need to be evacuated if war breaks out or the disputing parties withdraw consent.** Evacuation of the entire PK force may be ordered by the appropriate authority; e.g., the UN Security Council or the sponsoring organization. If ordered to evacuate, **the force commander is responsible for the**

Figure II-14. States of Readiness

safe and speedy evacuation of the PK force, visitors, observer groups in the area, and personnel affiliated with the sponsoring organization. The US contingent commander will plan for the possibility that **the contingent may need to be evacuated unilaterally.** In this instance, the commander will coordinate with the force headquarters to determine if the contingent's positions and tasks are to be handed over to another contingent or abandoned. The US contingent commander will coordinate evacuation plans with the geographic combatant commander who has responsibility to evacuate the US contingent. Evacuation plans include specific instructions for destroying critical items, equipment, and other assets that cannot be removed. Every attempt must be made to evacuate HSS supplies and equipment. Those items which cannot be evacuated will be abandoned; however, such abandonment is a command decision. HSS supplies and equipment are afforded protection under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and may not be intentionally destroyed.

- US forces must be able to transition to fighting a major theater war from a posture of global engagement. The United States may have to accept a

degree of risk to withdraw and redirect forces from major PO in order to reduce the greater risk it would incur if the nation failed to respond adequately to major theater wars. Contingency plans should include plans to quickly replace withdrawn US forces with an increased commitment of available Reserve Component forces, coalition or allied forces, host-nation capabilities, contractor support, or some combination thereof.

- **Disasters.** Contingency plans address procedures to respond to potential **natural** or **manmade disasters.** CA and PSYOP forces can provide the interface with civilian authorities and the local populace.

- **Dislocated civilians can pose significant challenges.** Therefore, the TOR and SOP should identify **procedures for handling refugees and displaced civilians.** Commanders must determine the level of HSS required to support these operations, especially preventive medicine. A determination must be made on the eligibility of personnel for care by the PKO force. CA personnel are trained to assist in these activities.

- **Granting requests for asylum can compromise the impartiality of the PK force.** Handling of such requests should be outlined in the PK force SOPs or other document available to commanders.

k. **Special Considerations.** A number of special considerations apply to the unique nature of PKO. The following are examples.

- PK personnel will be required to conduct many **independent actions** involving a high degree of professionalism, self-discipline, flexibility, patience, and tact.

- PK personnel will encounter **differences in cultural norms, work ethics, and standards of professionalism** among other national contingents, requiring understanding and respect on their part.

- **The PK force will impact on the local economy.** Although the presence of the PK force may stimulate growth in the local economy, commanders must also be aware of the potential negative impacts on the economy after the PK force departs. Policies may be developed to reduce these impacts, such as regulating the amount of dollars US personnel are allowed to convert to local currency and paying local civilians hired to support the PK force the prevailing wages for the area. The policy on leave, pass, liberty, and R&R should also consider these economic impacts.

- PK forces may wish to avoid the development of elaborate base camps and support facilities that may lead to a **perception of a permanent presence** by the local population and false expectations.

- Peacekeepers will encounter **fast-moving situations** which require the evaluation and execution of COAs. Timely anticipation of an incident may allow a senior commander time to go to the scene and take action to prevent a major crisis. However, situations may develop so quickly that the senior military member on the scene will take immediate action to prevent a situation from becoming uncontrollable. When this occurs, a report will be submitted to the respective commander as soon as possible.

- **Coordination with other USG agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and UN agencies** will be an important part of the PKO.

- **HSS assistance** to the local population or other contingents may become part of the mission, requiring advanced planning for legality and procedures.

- **Coordinate** for special training in non-lethal weapons, munitions, and procedures. Non-lethal capabilities give commanders a wider array of capabilities in developing and implementing measured responses to a given situation. Non-lethal operations require special training to ensure they are effectively synchronized with other operations.

8. Employment

PK missions include separation of the parties to the dispute, patrolling, and observing and reporting on compliance with or violations of agreements. To successfully perform their mission, **peacekeepers must have freedom of movement, open access to all areas in their operational area, and the ability to freely patrol, observe, monitor, verify, and report their findings.** Key factors in successfully employing MILOBs or PK forces in PKO include:

- Active patrolling;

- Rapid responses to alleged or actual violations of agreements and other incidents;

- Effective operation of checkpoints;

- Close liaison with all parties to the dispute; and

- Constant vigilance throughout the operational area.

a. A PK force may be employed in one of two ways: each national contingent may be allocated to a specific operational area, or the national contingents may rotate among the operational areas.

"Unified combatant commanders are now using that joint task force approach to command and control forces in the field. That's significant, because if we're to use forces that way and command them that way, then we need to train them that way so you don't have pickup games in the future."

Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (Ret)

- **Assignment to a Specific Operational Area.**

  •• The key advantage is that **each national contingent develops indepth knowledge of the terrain and community** in its specific operational area. This results in continuity in collecting and processing information. Additionally, **useful relationships are developed** with the local authorities of the host government, police, and leadership of the parties to a dispute. Peacekeepers become **attuned to the normal activities in the area** and consequently can quickly detect changes from normal routines. Peacekeepers become **well-acquainted with the local forces** and are able to recognize and prohibit military personnel of the opposing forces from passing through checkpoints. Additionally, the transfer of information records for an operational area and its installations is easier when the relieving unit is of the same nationality.

  •• The disadvantage is that **national contingents may become overly familiar with the people in the area** due to habitual contact, and as a result may **liberally interpret agreements and PK force policies** in their operational area. This may lead to a perception of partiality and compromise mission accomplishment. If actual or perceived inequities exist, the parties to the dispute may request an exchange of PK forces.

An additional risk is that the force may become complacent in its tactical mission execution after remaining in the same area over time.

- **Rotation Among Operational Areas.**

  •• The key advantage is that **each contingent obtains a working knowledge of more than one area. The potential for peacekeepers to become overly familiar with parties to the dispute is also reduced.** Such familiarity might lead to perceptions of partiality. This potential, however, could be reduced through command controls and emphasis.

  •• There are several disadvantages. **A national contingent may not have sufficient time to acquire any depth of knowledge of the area or community.** Important background information gathered by a national contingent may not be effectively passed to succeeding national contingents due to language differences and different ways of operating. **Rotation may also disrupt logistics operations and HUMINT collection efforts.** With each rotation of national contingents, even slight differences in how the peacekeepers operate may cause distress for the local populace.

b. **Separation of Parties to the Dispute.** Many PKO will require the interpositioning of the PK force to supervise the orderly disengagement and withdrawal of the parties to the dispute. **Interpositioning of the PK force may be required to defuse sensitive or potentially explosive situations.** It will also give the disputing parties the confidence that their withdrawal will not be used to the advantage of another disputing party or parties.

- **Interpositioning places PK forces between the disputing parties in an effort to supervise the withdrawal of the disputing parties' forces and establish a BZ.** This operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce the inherent risks to the PK force. The PK force must be credible and completely impartial in order to interpose successfully. If possible, the PK force should take advantage of the lull in hostilities to interpose itself as the parties in the conflict disengage. If interpositioning occurs after disengagement or withdrawal has begun, it should be accomplished quickly to prevent clashes that could lead to renewal of the conflict or a general breakdown in the cease-fire.

- The possible **sequence of separation** may be as follows.

  •• After a truce or cease-fire is in effect and the disputing parties reach **agreement on the trace of an armistice demarcation line** (ADL) as shown in Figure II-15, PKO can begin. In some UN PKO, this line may be called a cease-fire line.

  •• **Coordinate the deployment of PK forces** with the disputing parties and their forces.

  •• **PK forces deploy along the ADL between the disputing forces** as shown in Figure II-16 **and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal** of the disputing forces behind their respective sides of the ADL. The ADL becomes the forward limit for the disputing forces. The purpose of the interpositioning is to establish a presence and place a buffer force between disputing forces. Interpositioning should be carefully preplanned with the disputing forces. (1) Where possible, **the trace of the ADL should follow identifiable natural or manmade terrain features.** Promptly



Figure II-15. Armistice Demarcation Line Trace

surveying and physically marking the ADL on the ground by an acceptable means such as the placement of painted barrels, oil drums, stakes, single strand wire, or coiled wire is important. GPS may assist most units to conduct marking accurately. Artillery or engineer survey-qualified PK force personnel should be responsible for carrying out demarcation duties. Monitoring of the line is required to ensure that the markings are not moved. ADL markers, which are difficult to remove and have a GPS signature, may be available for use. (2) **The size of the interpositioning force must be sufficiently credible** to provide the disputing parties with the confidence needed to disengage and withdraw safely from their positions. (3) **The utmost care is needed during the initial interpositioning** because of the likelihood of disagreements and misunderstandings. Furthermore, **mine clearance operations** may be necessary to safely deploy the PK force along the line. (4) Localized disagreements or potential clashes should be **promptly mediated** at the lowest practical level to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

•• Once there is agreement on the formation of a BZ, **lines of demarcation are established on each side of the ADL.** The PK force then supervises the withdrawal of the disputing forces to positions behind their respective lines of demarcation, as shown in Figure II-17, to prepare for the establishment of the BZ. The lines of demarcation are now the forward limits for the respective disputing forces.

•• PK forces **establish the BZ** and **begin observation and patrol activities** as shown in Figure II-18. In some UN PKO, the BZ may be referred to as the area of separation (AOS). A BZ or AOS is normally only a zone or area from which



Figure II-16. Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces Along an Armistice Demarcation Line and Withdrawal of Disputing Forces

the disputing forces have been excluded. (1) **Observation Posts** are established to provide visual coverage within the BZ. Patrols supplement the OPs by patrolling areas out of effective visual coverage of OPs. (2) **Access to the BZ will normally be restricted to the PK force or observer group.** Special arrangements may be negotiated between the disputing parties and the PK force to allow restricted access to local civilians, such as farmers or fishermen. At any point where people or vehicle traffic may be permitted by the agreement to pass into or through a BZ, access may be controlled at checkpoints manned by peacekeepers and could be restricted to daylight hours. Commanders will determine manning of such checkpoints based on their analysis of the mission and other factors.

•• Subject to negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree to **extended areas of supervision** called **areas of limitation** (AOLs), as shown in Figure II-19, where peacekeepers may inspect the strength and fortifications of the disputing parties. The usual arrangement is for the disputing parties to agree on equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces that may be maintained in the area immediately adjacent to the BZ. Larger forces of the disputing parties may be allowed in other areas of the AOL, but the agreement will specify an upper limit for the number and type of formations, tanks, and antiaircraft weapons and artillery (by caliber) permitted. The PK force or observer group will monitor each side's compliance with the personnel and armaments limitations. **Lines of demarcation define outer boundaries of the AOLs.** AOLs constitute an additional measure for improving the



Figure II-17. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation

security of the BZ and increasing the confidence of the disputing parties.

•• **The BZ may eventually become a DMZ,** following further diplomatic activity. In contrast to BZs, **DMZs are not normally occupied by PK forces, but are observed and patrolled by observer groups.** DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by two or more of the disputing sides and where control by one party could constitute a direct threat to the others. **The boundaries of a DMZ are defined by lines of demarcation.** These boundaries must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is also demilitarized and is denied to aircraft of the disputing parties.

c. **Observing and Reporting. Observing and reporting are the cornerstones of PKO.** Observers (both MILOBs or PK force observers) observe and report information on activities within their operational areas. **Observers must provide timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops in their operational area.** Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all successful PKO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams, video tapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions. Likewise, **inaccurate and biased reporting can adversely affect the operational situation,** thus damaging the image and credibility of the PK force. A



Figure II-18. Establishment of a Buffer Zone

thorough analysis of these reports by the force commander's staff is critical. Observation requires a complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications resulting from PKO actions.

- **Observation tasks commonly cover:**
  - •• The status of military installations;
  - •• Activities within the operational area related to personnel or weapons;
  - •• Violations of international agreements;
  - •• Observance of BZ and DMZ restrictions; and
  - •• Observance of local agreements that were approved by the parties to the dispute.
- **Observers report any violations of agreements such as:**
  - •• Movements of the disputing parties' forces (If unit identifications and other information of a sensitive nature are observed, the OP commander will record the time of



Figure II-19. Establishment of Areas of Limitation

the sighting and send the report by secure means);

•• Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against the PK force or civilians;

•• Improvements to the defensive positions of the disputing parties; and

•• Overflights by military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ or AOS is restricted.

- **Observers exercise discretion in official business.** They do not communicate any official information, except in the course of their duties or when authorized by higher authority.

- **OPs belong to either an observer group or to a PK force.** OPs should be located to give maximum visibility of an area, to have effective radio and phone communications, and be clearly marked (painted in the force color and insignia and force flag displayed). OPs are identified by serial numbers, names, color and number, or other suitable methods determined by the PK force commander or observer group chief of staff. The PK force commander or observer group chief of staff must approve locations and status changes of all OPs. Observer group OPs may be staffed by military officers or civilians; however, the on-duty observers are normally from different countries.

- **Report formats will vary for each PKO.** Reports normally include the categories listed in Figure II-20. Information concerning how to complete these reports should be contained in the force SOP. Reports are normally submitted to the force commander or, in the case of an observer group, the chief of staff.

Figure II-20. Report Formats in Peacekeeping Operations

d. **Patrolling.** Another essential element of most PKO is patrolling. Patrols gather information, investigate problems, supervise the implementation of a treaty or other agreement, and establish a visible presence. The mere presence of a PK force patrol, or the likelihood one may appear at any moment, helps deter violations of agreements.

- **Patrolling may be conducted on foot or by vehicle, naval vessel, aircraft, or helicopter. Patrolling must be overt and easily recognized by all sides.** Normally, vehicle and foot patrols will display the UN or force flag or other distinctive markings or uniforms. Vehicles and helicopters and certain air and naval craft assigned to the PK force are painted in the force color and bear the force insignia.

- **Patrolling may be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur.** When limited visibility makes identification difficult, the opposing sides may be nervous and, therefore, apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the mandate may require that patrols be dispatched under these conditions. Procedures and ground rules under which patrols operate are clearly defined and known by all, including the parties to the dispute.

- Patrols are normally conducted to:

  •• **Gather information** and complement the reports of OP personnel, LNOs, and other day-to-day observations — in large areas where the ground cannot be adequately covered by static OPs, patrols may be used, to ensure that possible breaches of the agreement are discovered;

  •• **Investigate reported activities** that may violate the agreement;

•• **Separate disputing parties** in an actual or potential localized confrontation; and

•• **Escort** farmers, fishermen, or others who are on their way to and from work where the route passes close to a hostile party. Patrols may also escort dignitaries and visitors.

e. **Checkpoints.** A checkpoint is a **manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians,** in order to enforce control measures, orders, and regulations. The peacekeeper's right to search is defined in the mandate and in the SOFA and/or SOMA. **Checkpoints may be static or mobile** and require the fullest measure of force protection considerations. Some checkpoints may be roadblocks. Checkpoints are established to:

- Show peacekeeping presence to all parties and to the population;
- Survey and report activities;
- Check and inspect persons and traffic into and out of the operational area;
- Prevent infiltration and smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and explosives into or out of the area;
- Act as, or work with, an observation post; and
- Block traffic.

f. **Rules of Engagement. Well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between success and failure in PO.** ROE in PKO are more restrictive than in PEO and war. ROE are written to enable the PK force to accomplish its mission without undue risk to itself and undue collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Sample ROE are found in Annex D ("Rules of Engagement") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." Also refer to CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces."

9. Conclusion

Although planned like any other military operation, PKO present a significant challenge to commanders and staffs. PKO take place in a rapidly changing environment and have an interrelated political dimension. To maintain the consent of the parties to a dispute and guarantee the agreement, the PK force must act overtly, with impartiality, and use or threaten force only in self defense. The key to successful PKO are well led, trained, and disciplined forces able to apply their skills under highly restrictive ROE.

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CHAPTER III
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

"Wars spring from unseen and generally insignificant causes, the first outbreak being often but an explosion of anger."

Thucydides
History of the Peloponnesian Wars
404 BC

1. General

US military forces may conduct PEO unilaterally or as a part of a multinational operation. Multinational PEO may be sponsored by the UN, a regional organization, or other coalitions or alliances. Any large-scale PEO in which the US participates will most likely be US-led and US forces will likely be under US control. In some instances, the composition of the force will be largely made up of US forces, but may include regional contingent forces. Although the contribution of forces by some nations may be comparatively small, their contribution demonstrates support and enhances the legitimacy of the operation.

2. Description of Peace Enforcement

". . . All mischief short of war."

Sir Winston Churchill

The goal of PEO is to enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PE forces use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. In PEO, force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although PEO may require

Peace enforcers generally have full combat capability and have the necessary support to accomplish their mission.

combat, they are not wars and may have more restrictive ROE than wars. Although PEO cannot solve the underlying problems that caused peaceful relations to dissolve, **PEO may help create the conditions in which the process of peaceful resolution of the dispute may proceed.** Conflict, violence, disorder, and possibly even chaos, rather than peace, describe the environment surrounding enforcement operations. Moreover, one or more of the parties to the conflict prefers it that way. PEO may be conducted in interstate conflicts, but increasingly have involved intrastate conflicts. In PEO, consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement, although some parties may extend it. **Peace enforcers generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting,** depending on the mandate, ROE, and tactical situation. PE forces strive to help create the conditions for conflict resolution. They cannot solve the underlying problems that caused peaceful relations to dissolve. The consent of one or both belligerent parties to PE may not exist. PEO are likely to disregard state sovereignty, and as such may be considered an act of war, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of a nation-state combatant that opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into its territory.

3. Fundamentals

Certain fundamentals help guide the conduct of successful PEO. These fundamentals are listed in Figure III-1 and described below.

a. **The ultimate measure of success in PEO is political, not military.** Therefore, commanders seek a clear understanding of the political objectives and how military operations support the attainment of these political objectives.

"Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it."

Theodore Roosevelt
June 2, 1897

b. **Impartiality is desirable but not necessary, may not be attainable, and is not central to achieving success in PEO.** However, the subsequent transition to peace is often easier if the focus remains on establishing the conditions for peace in an impartial manner. Specific attention must be paid to creating conditions for achieving consent of the belligerents toward the desired political end state. This will foster an environment conducive to transitioning to a PKO and engaging in subsequent peace building actions.

c. **Restraint in the use of force or, where appropriate, the use of nonlethal force will be required.** ROE are likely to be more restrictive than in war, but less restrictive than in PKO. Inserting forces to stop combat may be the essential first step in setting the conditions for peace, but military operations in and of themselves cannot be the basis of a lasting peace. Achieving the desired political objectives is the goal of PEO.

d. **Methods of coercion may be the rule rather than the exception for PE forces and operations.** Such coercion involves activities or objectives that make the political embrace of peace more attractive than continuance of the conflict.

e. **Coordinate for special training in nonlethal weapons, munitions, and procedures.** Nonlethal capabilities give commanders a wider array of capabilities in developing and implementing measured responses to a given situation. Nonlethal operations require special training to ensure that they are effectively synchronized with other operations.



Figure III-1. Peace Enforcement Operations Fundamentals

f. **PE forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force to separate the combatants physically.** Under these conditions, certain considerations must be taken into account. First, the PE force will normally retain the right to the first use of appropriate force. Second, the threat of overwhelming force, while not proportional to the requirement for protecting the PE force units, may be the best means of coercing the belligerents into separating.

g. **The operational area will normally be characterized by some density of civilians.** This will pose special considerations for threat identification, collateral damage, civilian casualties, and dislocated civilians.

h. **If the threat of force fails, the PE force may have to engage in offensive actions.** However, commanders must be aware that inappropriate use of force could worsen the overall situation. Inappropriate use of force could possibly undercut international and US domestic support and the legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the populace and others in the operational area. Situations may develop where the use of nonlethal force is appropriate.

In these instances, the use of deadly force may not be justified but the use of nonlethal assets may allow for an appropriate response.

i. **Participation in PEO with multinational partners involves several unique factors for the commander and staff to consider.** Certain multinational partners, for example, may not have a vital national interest at stake in the conflict or may even face certain dilemmas in regard to their involvement. Consequently, the partners' resolve may be reduced by factors such as casualties, protracted involvement, or financial costs. Some multinational forces may not possess the same military capabilities to conduct PEO as US forces. Each partner's objectives, agendas, military capabilities, doctrine, equipment, discipline, and morale must be considered carefully. The challenge to the PEO commander and staff is to constitute a force capable of coordinated and sustained offensive operations.

4. Peace Enforcement Personnel and Forces

Actual intelligence requirements are critical to a comprehensive mission analysis when determining force structure, especially in PE operations. Intelligence requirements are greater in PEO than in PKO since normally the potential for hostilities is higher and the requirement for force protection intelligence is more vital. **Accurate intelligence and comprehensive mission analysis will be the basis for determining the structure and composition of the force.** See, for example, the lessons learned on use of tanks in peace enforcement operations in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." The combat forces may range from a Marine air-ground task force to a multidivision JTF. The US commander will have **the authority to employ the force's full range of combat capabilities** to achieve the mission objectives and protect the force. Generally, the capabilities of ground, air, maritime, space, and special operations forces, discussed in Chapter II, "Peacekeeping Operations," will apply to PEO. However, in some PEO scenarios it is possible that aerospace and/or maritime forces may be able to meet mission objectives without the introduction of significant ground forces being necessary. Aerospace and/or maritime forces may be able to coerce an adversary, enforce sanctions, and/or deny the use of territory (e.g., buffer or exclusion zones) through a combination of "presence, ISR, humanitarian airlift or sealift, punitive strikes, and aerial psychological operations. PSYOP and CA are especially valuable in PEO to help set the conditions for long-term peaceful settlement. See, for example, "Realizing CA in the Civil Dimension" in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." CA activities can also make substantial contributions before, during, or after PEO.

> *"Any large scale participation of US forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or ad hoc coalitions."*
>
> **Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)**

5. Peace Enforcement Missions

PEO may include enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of HA, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

a. **Enforcement of sanctions** includes a broad range of possible missions. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UN Security Council, have traditionally been

considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly. It may include:

- Restricting the flow of goods across international borders;
- Confiscating or destroying unauthorized imports and exports;
- Denial of movement of military forces or supplies;
- Enforcing air, land, or sea exclusion zones; and
- Guaranteeing rights of movement or passage.

An example is Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991, where US forces protected Kurds in northern Iraq with an air exclusion zone. See also "USCENTCOMs 1994 Maritime and Air Operations" in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

"In the military operations off Cuba, President Kennedy did not look for military victory, he sought to change Mr. Khrushchev's mind, and he succeeded."

VADM Sir Peter Gretton
7 April 1965

b. PE forces may be tasked to provide **protection for HA.** This mission might include protection for NGOs, PVOs, USG agencies, and other military personnel who are providing HA. Such protection may include establishing secure base areas (normally air or sea ports), protecting routes or corridors for the transport of relief supplies, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of relief supplies by NGOs, PVOs, or other agencies, PE forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic support to FHA operations. For example, in Unified Task Force in Somalia, US-led forces provided security for relief supplies from the air and seaports to the distribution sites. The CMOC serves as the focal point for requests for support from US forces.

"The United States armed forces are becoming increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance operations around the world. Operations such as those involving Cuban and Haitian migrants, Kurdish and Rwandan refugees, and internal disaster relief are likely to continue . . . We have adapted well to these challenges by forming joint task forces (JTFs) and using our command and control systems, logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities in innovative ways. We must build from these experiences as we prepare for future challenges."

General J.J. Sheehan, USMC
Former Commander in Chief,
US Atlantic Command

c. **Operations to restore order** are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. They are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, US forces (as a part of a multinational force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 940) confiscated weapons, suppressed or detained threatening elements, provided security, and assisted in the training of a new police force prior to transferring the responsibility for long-term security to the UN.

d. **Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties.** This PE mission poses the highest risk of any PEO. Forcible separation may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties. The PE force will normally retain the right of first use of force. Forces conducting forcible separation require extensive offensive combat

capability, as well as combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). The goal is to force the belligerent parties to disengage, withdraw and, subsequently, to establish a BZ or DMZ. During Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic in 1965, US forces established a BZ to separate the belligerent parties and to preclude either side from gaining an advantage over the other until peace was made.

e. Conduct internment/resettlement (I/R) operations. If PEO require forcible separation of belligerent parties (as stated in subparagraph d), then there will be a requirement to conduct I/R operations as peacekeepers capture or detain parties to the conflict. Depending on the type of conflict that results from forcible separation, I/R operations will need to be conducted for enemy prisoners of war and/or civilian internees or refugees and/or dislocated civilians. Forces responsible for conducting I/R operations must ensure that appropriate CSS assets, i.e., I/R units, are deployed to support this operation. The I/R operations will become critical as peacekeepers transition from the PEO phase to the PKO phase of peace operations.

6. Command and Control

In most cases, PEO mirror conventional military operations and possess many of the same C2 characteristics.

a. **For both unilateral and multinational operations, US forces will probably be structured as a JTF.** The composition of the forces in the JTF will depend on the mission, political objectives, and the threat.

For information regarding JTF organization and planning, refer to JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."

"War is a process that pits the opposing wills of two commanders against each other. Great victories of military forces are often attributed to superior firepower, mobility, or logistics. In actuality, it often is the commander who makes good decisions and executes these decisions at a superior tempo who leads his forces to victory. Therefore, victory demands that commanders effectively link decision making to execution through the concept of command and control. Warfare will continue to evolve and command and control processes, organization, and supporting systems will continue to change, but the basic concept of command and control will remain the key to the decisive application of combat power. More than ever before, a command and control system is crucial to success and must support shorter decision cycles and instantaneous flexibility across vast distances of time and space."

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3 Command and Control, superseded by Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control

b. **For multinational operations, PE forces may operate under either a lead nation or a parallel C2 arrangement** (see Figure III-2).

- **In the lead nation C2 arrangement, one nation's commander directs or leads the multinational partners in the accomplishment of the PE mission.** The lead nation normally provides the force commander, the basic staff, the preponderance of the forces, and the command, control, communications, and computers system to control operations. This helps achieve unity of command and assures mutual understanding of the mandate by all partners. If the US is the designated lead nation, the US



Figure III-2. Peace Enforcement Operations Command and Control

geographic combatant commander or a subordinate commander will normally be designated as the PE force commander.

- **In the parallel command arrangement, a force commander is selected by the sponsoring organization.** The staff is comprised of staff members from all contributing nations and is assembled on an ad hoc basis. OPCON of the coalition forces may be passed to the force commander, but the degree of control is generally less than that exercised in the lead-nation arrangement. A US commander could be designated to lead the force.

7. Planning Considerations

". . . make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans."

George S. Patton, Jr.
War As I Knew It, 1947

Many planning considerations for PE will be similar to those for PKO, as described in Chapter II, "Peacekeeping Operations," especially for UN operations (See Figure III-3). The planning process for PEO is the same as for any other combat operation and begins with a comprehensive mission analysis. **US PE forces are normally**



Figure III-3. Planning Considerations

employed in accordance with a detailed campaign plan which includes the desired end state and a plan to transition responsibilities to a PK force. In multinational PEO, the campaign plan will be coordinated with the other members of the force and the force headquarters. The campaign plan for US forces is the responsibility of the combatant commander. A corresponding interagency political-military plan will enhance achievement of a successful end state and smooth transitions.

For information on campaign planning, refer to JP 5-00.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning."

> *"It is a bad plan that cannot be altered."*
>
> **Publilius Syrus**
> **Sententiae**

a. **Mission Analysis.** The mission analysis process is as critical in planning for PEO as in planning for war. However, in PEO there

may be **increased sensitivity with regard to political factors and constraints.** Mission-termination objectives, determined by the political objectives and desired end state and found in a mandate in UN operations, aim for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

b. **Intelligence.** Intelligence is developed to support PEO using the same process used in war. However, in addition to standard threat indicators and order of battle, **an emphasis must be placed on determining the root causes of the problem and those factors that will help commanders influence the behavior of the belligerents.** Examples of intelligence targets are:

- Belligerent leaders and their motives;
- Internal and external political factors;
- Economics;
- Civilian populations, including their expected level of support to the PE force;
- History of the conflict;
- Ethnic relationships;
- Cultural and religious factors; and
- The military and political context of the region bordering the operational area, such as:
  - Police and paramilitary forces; and
  - Terrorist groups and organizations operating in the operational area.

The PEO commander requires predictive intelligence that can give indications and warning of a deteriorating situation or resumption of hostilities. Therefore, the PEO intelligence cycle must be thorough, accurate, and timely. A detailed collection plan that leverages all of the unique capabilities of the PEO contingent — CA, MPs, NGOs, civilian agencies, and MILOBs — is the key to successful information collection. See, for example, the lessons learned on photo support and the Area Assessment Checklist in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

"In BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA, some of our best information came to be called transportation intelligence. Drivers often had the best information on the road conditions, attitude of the local populations, locations of check-points, and our ability to get through."

LTC R. Robinson, USA
HQ AFCENT

c. **Fire Support.** The principles and planning for fire support are the same in PEO as in war. However, **in PEO, fire support is constrained by more restrictive ROE, and a prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage to the fullest extent possible.** Precision engagement using precision-guided munitions and precision fire support help reduce collateral damage. The objective is to compel or coerce the belligerents to disengage, withdraw, and comply with the mandate. Therefore, fire support may be directed more toward **threats to the belligerent parties** and **suppression and neutralization** than toward destruction of targets. Examples include the firing of marking rounds, smoke, and other demonstrations of accuracy and capability. Detailed coordination of fire-support plans, procedures, and targeting is essential, particularly in multinational PEO.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support." See also the lessons learned on suppression of artillery in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

d. **Logistics.** Logistic planning and support in PEO are the same as in war, but include as well the considerations addressed for PKO in Chapter II, "Peacekeeping Operations." **The conduct of PEO,** especially where active combat takes place, **may complicate the conduct of operations by other than military entities,** such as the UN and NGOs and PVOs. Consequently, the demand for food, water, billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and HSS supplies and services **may increase substantially above the force's own requirements if large numbers of refugees or displaced persons must be supported until HA operations are fully established.** CA forces and the CMOC can enhance this effort and should be included in the logistics planning effort.

> *"Seldom will all logistics principles exert equal influence; usually one or two will dominate in any given situation. Identifying those principles that have priority in a specific situation is essential to establishing effective support."*
>
> **Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations**

For detailed information on logistics planning, refer to JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," JP 4-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations," JP 4-01.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations," JP 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control," JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," JP 4-02.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations," JP 4-02.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations," and other pertinent publications in the JP 4-0 series. See also Appendix E, "References," especially DA Pamphlet 700-30, "Commander's Handbook, Peace Operations (A Logistics Perspective)."

e. **Special Equipment. Superior navigation, sensor, and communications equipment provide US forces with a distinct advantage in most, if not all, PEO.** Nonlethal equipment, munitions, and weapons can significantly increase commander's flexibility in responding to belligerents. Equipment such as fire hoses, barriers, and water cannons can be obtained locally. Nonlethal munitions and weapons provide a more acceptable response to low-end threats than the use of conventional military force. Night-vision devices, GPS-navigation devices, superior communications systems, advanced sensors, and a wide range of current and emerging nonlethal technologies can dramatically enhance the capabilities of US forces to achieve information superiority while conducting PEO. **Information superiority has extraordinary potential in PEO.** The combination of IO with other advanced and nonlethal technologies that are integrated into an overall operation plan can help to:

- Reduce the overall level of violence necessary to achieve objectives;
- Minimize casualties on all sides;
- Reduce collateral damage and confound belligerent efforts to embarrass the PE force, by displaying damage to media;
- Maintain legitimacy for the operation;
- Preempt violations of rules;
- Reduce the number of troops required for effective enforcement; and
- Reduce the logistics tail of the PE force.

Logistic support to PE forces may require challenging engineering operations.

Use of special equipment requires special consideration for the capabilities of allies and coalition members.

"With respect to self-defense, ROE are permissive, which means that you are not required to take the full measure of action authorized. For example, assume that there has been a series of bomb threats in your area. A child runs toward a convoy with a box. Although authorized to fire (hostile intent) it may be prudent to hold fire. In Somalia, a beggar child was shot in this situation but the rifleman was not charged because he honestly believed there was hostile intent shown."

Colonel F.M. Lorenz, USMC
Unified Task Force Somalia

f. **Rules of Engagement. Well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between success and failure in PO.** ROE in PEO are usually less restrictive than in PKO, but more restrictive than in war. ROE are written to enable the PE force to accomplish its mission without undue risk to itself and undue collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Sample ROE are found in Annex D of Appendix A, "Rules of Engagement." Also refer to CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces."

g. **Force Protection.** Prior to deployment ensure that all personnel are briefed on the terrorist threat level. Ensure that appropriate antiterrorism awareness training is accomplished prior to and upon arrival in theater and as required during mission execution.

h. **Mobility and Survivability.** To ensure a mobile, survivable force, both engineer and chemical forces provide essential support during PO.

- **Engineer Forces.** Engineer forces in PO will face conditions that include rapid deployment, austere living conditions, lack of appropriate maps, destroyed infrastructure, extended lines of communication, multiple air and seaport development, extensive countermine and force protection operations, lack of construction materials, civic action projects, and environmental cleaning and support to deployment of forces. Early deployment of an appropriate combination of planning troop units and support personnel is essential. **Engineers play a major role in PO by developing**

Engineering operations play a major role in successfully supported peace operations.

achievable and supportable engineer end state options. These options identify the essential missions to be executed, the force package and construction materials needed, the proposed construction standard, the estimated time required to execute the option, and any special considerations such as civic actions. **Planners consider all available engineer capabilities,** to include other Services, coalition forces, contractors, and troop units, including Reserve Components. (The latter require activation time not required of the Active component engineers.) Planners consider the specific capability and availability of the units when building the force along with facilities available for leasing and infrastructure. The **joint task force contingency engineer manager** will normally provide staff assistance to the JTF commander who controls engineer assets. Similar considerations apply to coalition forces. **Interoperability must be considered** to ensure that assets are complementary, if not compatible. Engineer planners also consider **personnel or material assets** available through contracts, local sources, and private agencies including LOGCAP, CONCAP, and AFCAP. Engineer operations **require large amounts of construction materials** which may be acquired locally, regionally, and from the continental United States (CONUS). These materials may be obtained through military supply channels or by contract. Engineers identify, prioritize, and requisition required construction materials consistent with acquisition regulations. Either supply units process the requisition, acquire, receive, store, and transport construction materials, or this support may be provided through a combination of engineer unit Class IV acquisition and storage with LOGCAP contractor support. Engineers **continuously track the status of required construction materials** in order to keep pace with the operation. Thorough coordination between engineers and supply units is essential in obtaining construction materials in order to successfully support PO mission accomplishment. See, for example, lessons learned in engineer support in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- **Chemical Units.** Commanders consider the requirement for chemical support of PO if there is **evidence that belligerent forces have employed agents or have the potential for doing so.** In addition, **when properly authorized, commanders can employ riot control agents as an alternative to deadly force** in certain PO. A mix of different units (decontamination units, NBC reconnaissance elements, and smoke units) are often necessary to achieve the proper balance of capabilities. Additional capabilities include providing local security, spray, and storage, allowing a limited personnel shower and a firefighting capability. **Chemical staff officers may advise on commercial chemical threats,** as well as on the collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and clean-up of hazardous materials and/or wastes. This latter capability became important in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, where environmental assessment and reconnaissance teams encountered hazards associated with the misuse and improper disposal of industrial hazards and their by-products. In fact, the state of the environment in Bosnia-Herzogovina was assessed as being worse than some of the developing third-world countries.

8. Employment

Employment planning for PEO is the same as for combat operations, since these may occur. Establishing phases for PEO provides an execution framework for staff planning. Typical phases for PEO are shown in Figure III-4.

These phases and their sequencing may be different for some PEO, but they provide a starting point for the employment planning process.

a. **Preparation and Deployment.** Preparation and deployment considerations for PEO differ little from those for war. Both operations involve **movement from marshalling areas**, **loading and departure from ports of embarkation**, and **sequenced movement of forces to the objective area.** Mission analysis, available forces, and factors such as available HNS will influence deployment decisions. **The critical decision for the commander is selecting the proper units and time-phasing their entry to secure the lodgment.** If sufficient forces are not already forward-deployed in the theater, forces may be deployed from a variety of locations, including those already deployed elsewhere.

b. **Establishment of the Lodgment.** In this phase, PE forces secure the lodgment and establish security for follow-on elements.

- **Preparation of operational area by SOF.** SOF activities gain intelligence on the situation in the lodgment area. They accomplish this by:

  •• Making contact with US and international agencies, local military and paramilitary organizations, and civil authorities;

  •• Establishing surveillance over the planned points of entry;

  •• Conducting operations to reduce the risk to the force; and

  •• Depending upon agreed-upon ROE and SOFA, preparing people of the HN for insertion of the lodgment through an aggressive PSYOP operation using electronic (radio and/or television) and print (leaflets) media.



Figure III-4. Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases

SOF also provide up-to-the-minute situation reports prior to the entry of forces.

- The situation will dictate the nature of the initial entry of forces. **An unopposed entry of the force through diplomatic actions and coordination with HN or local authorities is preferred.** In this case, special considerations for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration will be required. **However, where the entry of forces may be opposed, forces conduct a forcible entry to secure the lodgment.** Initial objectives are normally air and seaports that will facilitate the rapid buildup of forces. The nature of the threat and the mission will dictate appropriate forces to initiate a forcible entry.

See JP 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations."

- **Air or maritime forces conduct operations to provide protection for the lodgment force and to set the conditions for establishing, securing, and expanding the lodgment.** These operations include offensive and defensive counterair to achieve local air superiority, interdiction, close air support, surveillance, reconnaissance, and coastal patrolling.

c. **Expansion of the Lodgment.** In this phase, **SOF expand their coverage** to gain information on belligerent dispositions. **Staffs continue to update their information on the area** and revise their assessments for operational requirements. **Combat, CS, and CSS elements continue to arrive.** The time necessary for the buildup of forces depends on the capability of air or seaports; the transportation infrastructure; staging, sustainment, and integration capabilities; and HNS. When possible, HNS contracting can be used to offset the amount of logistic support which must be deployed. **Air and maritime operations continue** and may involve the establishment and enforcement of exclusion zones. In order to expand the lodgment, air operations (specifically intertheater and intratheater airlift into and within the operational area) require protection.

d. **Enforcement of the Mandate.** In this phase, the provisions of the mandate are enforced. Some of the missions a PE force may conduct are listed in Figure III-5.

- Depending on the threat and the level of cooperation by the belligerents, the **PE force conducts operations to force the belligerents to disengage and withdraw.** This may involve show of force, demonstrations, or force-on-force combat operations with synchronized air, ground, maritime, and SOF actions. The PE force commander stays attuned to the willingness or desire of the belligerent parties to be separated. **The objective is to establish a BZ or DMZ between the belligerents.** As the belligerent forces disengage and withdraw, lines of demarcation will be marked to identify the forward limits of the belligerent forces. The resulting space between these lines of demarcation constitutes a BZ. If the belligerent parties show no inclination to consent to the formation of a BZ, the PE force may establish one using combat action. In doing so, the PE force commander considers the belligerent forces' dispositions and territorial advantages or disadvantages, as well as historical or cultural considerations. In order to help set the conditions for a possible follow-on PKO, **an impartial and evenhanded approach to the parties involved is desirable.** Even after the situation has stabilized, belligerent parties may still demonstrate animosity

Figure III-5. Peace Enforcement Force Missions During the Enforcement of the Mandate Phase

toward each other and perhaps the PE force. Also, other organizations and factions may not recognize the agreement. Therefore, the PE force must remain prepared to engage in combat.

- **The PE force commander will seek to thoroughly understand the political aims of the operation and the cause and effect relationship of all actions on the resolution of the conflict.** Military actions may involve monitoring the compliance of belligerent parties with agreements, provisions of a mandate, or other constraints, restraints, or provisions regarding their activities. Establishment of joint military commissions as in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia or mixed military working groups (used in UNTAC) may assist in such efforts.

See Chapter IV, "Organization and Command Relationships," of JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

- **Negotiations may eventually transform the BZ into a DMZ,** as stipulated in a formal agreement. **DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity.** Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by two or more sides in the conflict and where control by one could constitute a direct threat to the others. The boundaries of a DMZ are defined by lines of demarcation. These boundaries must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally accepted political or cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is also demilitarized and is denied to the aircraft of the belligerents.

- **Security operations** such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, cordon and search, and establishing checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the BZ or DMZ **may be conducted to maintain the separation of belligerent parties.** Actions of the PE force may include:

  •• Forcible suppression of violence by belligerent parties;

  •• Disarmament and incarceration of belligerent parties;

  •• Support to indigenous authorities in maintaining law and order; and

  •• Deterrence of violence through credible threats.

- **The mandate may require the PE force to disarm or demobilize the belligerent parties.** These tasks are complex, difficult, and often dangerous. The PE force demonstrates a clear resolve and intent to disarm or demobilize designated belligerent parties according to the agreement. If these actions are taken prematurely, without adequate preparation and involvement of the parties, the situation may destabilize, leading to a reemergence of violence. In addition to collecting weapons from combatants, disarming may include:

  •• Seizing ammunition stocks;

  •• Collection and possibly the destruction of stockpiles of weapons, munitions, and supplies;

  •• Closing weapons and ammunition factories; and

  •• Measures to prevent resupply.

- Other demobilization activities might include:

  •• The movement of forces to garrisons;

•• The stand down of military readiness; and

•• Demobilization and the return of troops to civilian life.

e. **Transition and Redeployment. An effective plan for PEO will include the conditions for the eventual exit of PE forces.** This will usually be expressed as part of the desired end state of the operation and will be as much of a political consideration as a military one. **Once the belligerent parties agree to stop fighting by a cease-fire or a truce, the stage is set for handover to a PK force.** As this agreement takes shape and the situation stabilizes, the PE force commander will begin a phased withdrawal of combat forces, which may help to defuse tensions. **As this withdrawal begins, PE forces assume the role of a PKO force.** However, where combat may have occurred, questions about actual or perceived impartiality will normally preclude the PE force (particularly the combat forces) from successfully transitioning to PKO except during the initial transition period. The handover of operations and facilities should occur as a relief in place. **It is important to establish liaison with and carefully synchronize the handover of operations to the PK force to facilitate the redeployment process.** In certain cases transition may be of a different nature as discussed in Chapter I, "Primer for Peace Operations." In either case the factors noted in Chapter I will be considered.

9. Conclusion

PEO are planned and executed like any other combat operation. The key to success is well led, trained, and disciplined forces that can conduct PEO under ROE that are less restrictive than those of PKO but more restrictive than those in effect during a war. The commander must use the appropriate force required to accomplish the mission, while minimizing collateral damage. In PEO, the enemy is the dispute, not the belligerent parties. The ultimate objective is to set the conditions for a workable peace.

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CHAPTER IV
EDUCATION AND TRAINING

"A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force."

LTG T. Montgomery, USA
SR MILREP to NATO

1. General

Readying forces for PO requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States — to fight and win the nation's wars. Forces cannot rely solely on Service-unique training in PO operations. In PO operations, the forces used will be a unique mixture of joint, combined, and possibly governmental and/or NGO agencies. In PO, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. Credible warfighting skills are the foundation for successful performance in PO. Readying forces to successfully conduct PO requires a two-pronged approach (see Figure IV-1).

a. The first prong is the **professional military education (PME) of all officers and noncommissioned officers.** Formal PO education begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the highest appropriate PME level. The focus of PO education is to ensure that leaders understand the principles of MOOTW applied to PO, as well as the characteristics of PO. Leaders will prepare to plan and conduct these operations.



Figure IV-1. Education and Training for Peace Operations

b. The second prong is the **training of individuals, units, and staffs.** In any operation time to train for the specifics of the mission is often short. A force trained and ready for warfighting can adapt to PO under the leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers educated in the conduct of PO. Adaptive leaders will think through and develop an effective training strategy for the time available.

2. Education

Leadership education includes **classroom instruction, discussions of lessons learned and historical PO experiences,** an **exchange of ideas,** and **situational exercises.** In the classroom environment, leaders learn about the unique aspects of PO and consider how best to adapt their warfighting skills in such operations. Leaders gain an understanding of the **political process** and the **principles** that guide PO. Additionally, the educational process provides leaders with **knowledge of other organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, that are typically involved in PO.** In many cases, Service schools will provide leaders with the opportunity to interact with interagency personnel who have experience in PO.

a. Given the unique aspects of PKO, **education is particularly critical.** PK requires an **adjustment of attitude and approach** by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those normally found in combat. Listings of pertinent schools for peacekeepers are available (Appendix E, "References").

b. **PME** includes individual study and reading (Appendix E, "References").

3. Training

Training for a specific PK or PE mission is done at both the **individual** and **unit level** and is tailored to the specific mission and situation. See Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations," for lessons learned in training for peace operations.

> *"If you don't understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values and in their taboos — you aren't going to be successful."*
>
> **George Wilson**
> **Commentary in Air Force Times**

a. Members of a deploying force require knowledge or proficiency in the following areas.

- US objectives and the implications of military activities.

- Regional orientation such as geography, climate, ethnic groups, belligerent forces or parties to a dispute and their weapons and systems, a brief history of the area, and an overview of the political aspects.

- Customs and basic language phrases. Language instruction and basic survival language materials may be minimal and consist of only basic key phrases; however, each person must receive instruction on the customs of the local population. This minimizes inadvertent provocation of local populace through discourteous actions or misinterpretation of their actions. Additionally, members of a deploying US force need to be familiar with the customs and courtesies of other nations who are members of a multinational PO force. A familiarity with other agency cultures and those of specific NGOs and/or PVOs may also prove valuable, especially for leaders and staff.

- Negotiation and mediation skills. Leaders of the deployed force should be prepared to negotiate (in coalition or alliance partners' or belligerents' language, or through the use of interpreters) issues such as the return of casualties and convoy clearance.
- Understanding roles and contributions of NGOs and PVOs in meeting PO objectives.
- Organization, mission, and background of the sponsoring body.
- Operating under more restrictive ROE and appropriate use of force.
- Information gathering and reporting such as the types of information collected and standard reporting formats (situation, shooting, overflight, and aircraft sighting).
- Vehicle, aircraft, water craft, weapon, uniform, and insignia identification, to include using graphic training aids, scale models, and flash cards.
- Media interaction.
- Detainee handling.
- Individual, vehicle, and building searches to include procedures for searching females.
- Riot control measures.
- Use of nonlethal technology.
- Antiterrorism measures.
- Counterintelligence measures. Emphasis is place upon recognizing hostile intelligence collection activities targeting the PE and/or PK force and proper reporting of these activities once identified.
- Sniper recognition and countermeasures.
- Reaction to hostage situations.
- Identification of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). All members of a deploying force should be aware of the threat of mines and booby traps. Even if the operational environment is fairly benign, mines and booby traps may remain from previous conflicts. Every member of the PO force must know how to identify, mark, and report the presence of a mine or minefield. Even when the belligerent parties have agreed to end the dispute and peaceful conditions exist, mines and booby traps remain operational. Belligerent parties will often emplace mines without marking them, making no record of where they were emplaced, thereby making it difficult to detect and clear them. This training will enable the individual to recognize, mark, and report unexploded military munitions and to understand that unexploded ordnance is dangerous no matter how old it appears.
- NBC identification, detection, and protection.
- Driver education.
- Land navigation.
- Marksmanship.
- Survival skills (including actions if kidnapped).
- First aid.
- Field sanitation.
- Physical security (prevention of pilferage and theft).
- HSS evacuation procedures.

Every member of the Peace Operations Force must know how to identify, mark, and report the presence of a mine field.

- Convoy operations.
- Airmobile operations.
- Checkpoint construction.
- ROE.
- Stress management.

b. Units preparing for deployment should train in **collective tasks,** to include the following.

- **OP operations.** Small units must learn the function and typical layout of an OP, be familiar with the general daily routine, and be prepared to operate isolated from their parent unit.
- **Patrolling.** Knowledge of the organization of patrols, selection of patrol routes, and the patrol debriefing format is important. Land navigation principles and road marches can be integrated into this training.
- **Command post operations.**
- **Convoy operations** to include actions on contact with hostile forces and encounters with mines.
- **Preparations for Overseas Movement** should be included as a training event so that PK and/or PE forces and their families are properly prepared prior to deployment.

c. Effective **situational training exercises** present members of the deploying PK or PE force with situations they can expect to encounter during the mission. By reviewing **lessons learned** and **after-action reports** of similar operations, leaders can identify unique situations that their units can expect to encounter. Unit leaders decide what the proper response is in each of these situations and train the unit accordingly. This response becomes an **immediate action drill,** and should be well rehearsed by members of the deploying force. Some examples of situations appropriate for predeployment training are when:

- Members of the belligerent parties or local populace request HSS assistance;
- The PO force apprehends a civilian criminal;
- A crowd mobs a food distribution truck or center;
- Someone discovers a land mine;
- A sniper engages a patrol;

Effective situational training exercises prepare joint forces for situations they can expect to encounter during PK or PE operations.

- Someone finds a dead body;
- A relief worker requests transportation on military vehicles;
- A member of the PO force is taken hostage or kidnapped;
- A convoy encounters a belligerent party checkpoint;
- A person or vehicle fails to stop when ordered to do so;
- A family approaches a checkpoint and must be searched;
- A member of one of the disputing parties is observed stealing something from a PO force member or vehicle;
- A large crowd of onlookers lingers outside the entrance to the base camp and interferes with movement into and out of the gate; and
- Other situations that cause members of the unit to decide how to respond with force under the constraints of the published ROE.

d. Ideally, **units selected for PK duty should have several weeks of predeployment training.** Units may have to prioritize tasks to be trained because of time constraints prior to deployment. All members of the unit should learn how PK involves ideas and tactics different from those for warfighting. **The unit training program includes these and other appropriate subjects:**

- The nature of PK;
- Checkpoint operations (Personnel operating checkpoints along major roads need to know how to slow and observe traffic without stopping it, allowing the PK force to observe and report traffic passing from one zone to another);
- Investigating procedures;
- Collecting information;
- Patrolling;
- Monitoring boundaries;
- Establishing a BZ;
- Supervising a truce or cease fire;

- Contributing to maintenance of law and order;
- Escorting and securing a very important person and/or belligerent parties;
- Establishing and securing a truce and/or negotiation site;
- Convoy security;
- Route and area reconnaissance; and
- Cordon and search.

e. When employed in PEO, **forces conduct many of the same missions as they would in war.** Units should train for probable missions as identified by a thorough mission analysis for the specific operation. **Executing combat operations is an important part of unit training in preparation for a PEO.** Normally, the most significant departure from warfighting skills is the degree of restraint required by the ROE. During training, leaders need to stress how the ROE will cause a PE force to act or react differently than in war.

f. **Planning for sustainment training** is part of a unit's predeployment activities. If time is available and the resources are identified before deployment, leaders can prepare a detailed training schedule. Sustainment training should emphasize both **leader development** and **basic soldier skills** as well as the maintenance of tactical-level unit skills.

- **During PKO, the force continues training on individual and small-unit warfighting skills in order to be prepared to transition to combat operations.** This sustainment training will reduce the time required to return the force to a combat-ready status upon completion of the PKO. Leaders will determine how they can effectively train for warfighting without causing concern among the parties to the dispute. Further, members of the PK force will understand that **although they are training for combat, their actions in the PKO continue to be restrained by the ROE.** Training during PKO may be restricted by an agreement between the United States and parties to the dispute.

- **During PEO, leaders attempt to conduct joint and combined arms training whenever possible.** This training prepares the PE force for future operations. It may also serve as a credible deterrent and a show of force if circumstances warrant.

g. **Post-Mission Training. Warfighting skills can deteriorate significantly during PO,** particularly PKO. Before a PKO, the deploying force trains in order to transition the combat-ready individual to one constrained in most, if not all, actions. **At the conclusion of the PKO, training is necessary to return the individual to a combat orientation and to return units to a combat-ready status.** Unit commanders will allow sufficient time after a PKO for refresher training and for redeveloping skills and abilities affected by the nature of PKO.

APPENDIX A
KEY DOCUMENTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

There are several key documents that are important for the successful execution of PO. Some of these documents address crucial topics that include the political objectives of the PO, restrictions placed on members of the PO force, and legal status of the participants. Other documents prepare members of the PO to conduct their mission and standardize their actions. The following documents are addressed in this appendix:

Annex	A	Mandates
	B	Status-of-Forces Agreements
	C	Terms of Reference
	D	Rules of Engagement
	E	Standing Operating Procedures
	F	Area Information Handbook
	G	Historical Examples

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
MANDATES

1. General

The PO force conducts operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations. Generally, a mandate should address the following points.

a. Role of the PO.

b. Mission of the PO organization.

c. Tasks or functions to be performed.

d. Size and organization of the force or mission.

e. Appointment of the commander, any special mediators and their TOR.

f. Nomination of the office responsible for the supervision of the operation.

g. General arrangements for financial and logistic support.

h. Division of sponsoring organization and national responsibilities.

i. Time limit of the mandate.

j. Terms or conditions the HN intends to impose on the presence of the force or mission.

k. Statements of the rights and immunities of force or mission members.

2. UN PKO Mandate

See Figure A-A-1 for a sample UN PKO mandate.

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
AT THE XXTH MEETING (DATE)

The Security Council, noting that the present situation with regard to (country[ies]) is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution:

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the 'peaceful intentions' signed at New York on (date):

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its article 2, para 4, which reads: 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations:

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in ( ) and ( ), or to endanger international peace.

Figure A-A-1. Sample UN PKO Mandate

2. Asks the Governments of ( ) and ( ), which have the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in their countries.

3. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Governments of ( ) and ( ), of a United Nations' Peacekeeping Force in those countries. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of ( ) and ( ). The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its (the peacekeeping force's) operation.

4. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

5. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Governments of ( ) and ( ). The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

6. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Governments of ( ) and ( ), a mediator, who shall use his or her best endeavors with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting ( ) and ( ), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the peoples of ( ) and ( ) as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate for the remuneration and Expenses of the mediator and his or her staff.

Figure A-A-1. Sample UN PKO Mandate (cont'd)

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A
STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

1. The SOFA (or SOMA) proceeds from the mandate. PEO may not normally include a SOFA, except with the host country or countries from which operations are staged. With the advice of the concerned military commander, the diplomatic elements establish stationing agreements that are often referred to as SOFA. These agreements between the HN, sponsor, and contributors will establish the detailed legal status of PO forces. Any proposed SOFA affecting US forces must be reviewed by appropriate US legal authorities to ascertain consistency with US law and policy. As a minimum, the SOFA for a PO should include the following main points.

a. The neutral status of the operation and its members (PKO only).

b. Entry and departure permits to and from the HNs.

c. Identity documents.

d. The right to carry arms as well as the authorized type of weapons.

e. Freedom of movement, both on and off duty, for members of the PO force.

f. Legal jurisdiction over members of the PO force.

g. The use of airports, harbors, rail, and road networks in the HN.

h. The right for the PK force to operate its own communications system.

i. Postal regulations and customs clearance procedures.

j. Authority to fly sponsoring organization and national flags.

k. Uniform regulations.

l. Permission to operate vehicles without special registration.

m. Matters of jurisdiction.

n. Military police actions and authority.

o. Tax and duty regulations.

p. General supply and maintenance matters (imports of equipment; commodities; local procurement of provisions; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants).

q. Matters of compensation (with respect to the HN's property).

r. The force has authority to gather, record, and report such information as is necessary to ensure the protection and security of the force and to monitor all regional forces or activities and to record and evaluate their compliance and noncompliance with the mandates or agreements being monitored by the force.

s. For operations sponsored by the UN, applicability of "The Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations."

t. Provisions that make clear that US forces can, and will, exercise their right to use

reasonable force in self-defense in response to terrorism or other threats.

u. Use of electromagnetic frequencies for distribution of radio and television products in support of the operation.

2. See Figure A-B-1 for an example of a SOFA. This figure is the verbatim text of a proposal made by Canada as a standard SOFA for use by the UN. As such, the text may use different spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and terminology from that used in US documents.

PROPOSED STANDARD UN SOFA

Introduction

1. The purpose of a status of forces agreement is to establish the legal position of a peacekeeping force and of its members in a host country, and to define the relationship of the force and of its members with the government and the citizens of the host country. On the basis of a status of forces agreement between the United Nations and a particular host country, appropriate detailed regulations can be drawn up to cover the special needs and circumstances of the situation affecting the status of forces in that country. Such sets of regulations, to cover administrative and operative activities of the peacekeeping force, are supplementary to the status of forces agreement itself.

2. The elaboration of, and attainment of, a general understanding on a standard status of forces agreement now would have considerable advantages in terms of ensuring efficient arrangements for the organization of future peacekeeping operations. In addition, Member States would be aware in advance of the sort of arrangements that could affect them directly if they had occasion to be involved with a peacekeeping operation, either as a host country or as a country contributing personnel to such an operation.

Definitions

3. Definitions.

a. Civil Authorities means all state and local, civil authorities of the government of the host country who may be required or called upon to perform functions relating to the Force.

b. The Commander means the Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

c. The Force means a United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

d. The Government means the government of the host country.

e. Host country means a country the government of which has consented to the presence of the Force on its territory.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA

f. Member of the Force means a member of the military service of the Participating State placed under the command of a commander by that State, or a civilian who is not a national of, nor ordinarily resident in, the host country, who is placed under the command of the commander by a Participating State, or the United Nations.

g. Participating State means a member of the United Nations that contributes military or civilian personnel to the Force.

International Status of the Force and its Members

4. Members of the Force shall respect the laws and regulations of the host country and shall refrain from any political or other activity in the host country incompatible with the international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit for these Arrangements or any subsequent Arrangements which may be entered into between the host country and the United Nations or any authority duly authorized by the United Nations. The Commander shall take appropriate measures to ensure the observance of the obligations.

5. The Government undertakes to respect, and to ensure respect of, the exclusively international character of the Force and the international nature of its command and functions.

Entry and Exit - Identification

6. Members of the Force shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from the host country. They shall also be exempt from any regulations governing the residence of aliens in the host country, including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right of permanent residence of domicile in the host country. For the purpose of such entry or departure each member of the Force will be required to have only:

a. An individual or collective movement order in the language of the Participating State and in French or in the English language issued by the Commander or an appropriate authority of the Participating State to which such a member belongs; and

b. A personal identity card issued by the Commander under the Authority of the United Nations showing the full name, date of birth, rank and number (if any), service and photograph of the member concerned.

Provided, however, that in the case of the first entry, a personal military identity card issued by the appropriate authorities of the Participating State concerned will be accepted in lieu of the Force identity card mentioned in b of this paragraph.

7. A member of the Force may be required to present, but not to surrender, his identity card upon demand of such host country authorities as may be mutually agreed between

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

the Commander and the Government. Except as provided in paragraph 6 of this agreement the identity card will be the only document required for a member of the Force.

8. If a member of the Force leaves the service of the Participating State to which he belongs and is not repatriated, the Commander shall immediately inform the Government, giving such particulars as may be required. The Commander shall similarly inform the Government if any member of the Force has absented himself for more than twenty-one days. If an expulsion order against an ex-member of the Force has been made, the Commander shall be responsible for removing the person concerned from the host country.

Arms

9. Members of the Force may possess and carry arms in accordance with an order issued by the Commander.

Freedom of Movement

10. The Force and its members together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the host country. The Commander, shall, to the extent he considers practical, consult with the Government with respect to large movements of personnel, stores, or vehicles to be made on roads used for general traffic. Upon receipt or a request made by or on behalf of the Commander, the Government will supply the Force with such maps, and other information, including location of dangers and impediments, as may be useful in facilitating movements of the Force. The Government will not establish restricted areas which inhibit the freedom of movement of the Force and thereby prevent it from carrying out the mission for which it was established. Buffer and demilitarized zones will be established where necessary and they will be clearly described in agreements between the Force Commander and appropriate authorities of the host country.

Use of Roads, Railways, Waterways, Port Facilities, and Airfields

11. The Force shall have the right to use roads, bridges, canals, and other waters, port facilities, and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls, or charges either by way of registration or otherwise, throughout the host country.

12. The provisions of para 10 and 11 shall apply to aircraft and vessels owned or chartered by Participating States when being used to obtain or to transport personnel or equipment destined for or being removed from duty with the Force. The Force shall have the right, without interference, to make provision for such additional facilities as are required by the Force to effectively conduct its operations and maintain the Force in being.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

Communications and Postal Services

13. The Force enjoys facilities in respect of communications provided in Article III of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Commander shall have authority to install and operate a radio sending and receiving station or stations to connect at appropriate points and exchange traffic with the United Nations Radio Network, and to authorize the installation and operation of communications between national contingents and their home governments for the purpose of maintaining direct communications on national administrative matters, subject to the provisions of Article 47 of the International Telecommunications Convention relating to harmful interference. The frequencies on which any such station may be operated will be duly communicated by the United Nations to the Government and to the International Frequency Registration Board. The right of the Commander is likewise recognized to enjoy the priorities of government telegrams and telephone calls as provided by the United Nations in Article 39 and Annex 3 of the latter Convention and in Article 62 of the Telegraph Regulations annexed thereto.

14. The Force shall also enjoy, within its area of operations, the right of unrestricted communications by radio, telephone, telegraph, or any other means, and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premises of the Force, including the laying of cables and land lines and the establishment of fixed and mobile radio sending and receiving stations. It is understood that the telegraph and telephone cables and lines herein referred to will be situated within or directly between the premises of the Force and the area of operations, and that connection with the host country's system of telegraphs and telephone will be made in accordance with arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the host country.

15. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to make arrangements through its own facilities or through those of national channels for the processing and transport of official and private mail including parcels addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members. The Government will be informed of the nature of such arrangements. No interference shall take place with, and no censorship shall be applied to, the official and private mail addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members, by the Government. In the event that postal arrangements applying to private mail of members of the Force include operations involving transfer of currency, or transport of packages or parcels from the host country, the conditions under which such operations shall be conducted in the host country will be agreed upon between the Government and the Commander.

United Nations Flag

16. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to display within the host country the United Nations Flag on its headquarters, camps, posts, or other premises, vehicles, vessels, and otherwise as may be decided by the Commander. Other flags or pennants

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

may be displayed only in exceptional cases and in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Commander. Sympathetic consideration will be given to observations or requests of the Government concerning this last-mentioned matter.

Uniform

17. Uniform wear.

a. Members of the Force shall normally wear their national uniform with such identifying United Nations insignia as the Commander may prescribe.

b. Members of the Force may wear civilian dress at such times and on such conditions as may be authorized by the Commander. Instructions relating to the wearing of civilian dress shall be notified to the Government by the Commander who shall give sympathetic consideration to observations or requests made by the Government concerning this matter.

Vehicle, Vessel, and Aircraft Markings, Registration and Operation Permits

18. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force shall carry a distinctive United Nations identification mark and license which shall be notified by the Commander to the Government. Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall not be subject to registration and licensing under the laws and regulations of the host country. Host country authorities shall accept as valid, without a test or fee, a permit or license issued by the Commander for the operation of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force.

Privileges and Immunities of Members of the United Nations Secretariat

19. Members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force remain officials of the United Nations entitled to the privileges and immunities of Articles V and VII of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. With respect to the locally-recruited personnel of the Force, however, who are not members of the Secretariat, the United Nations will assert its right only to the immunities concerning official acts, and exemption from taxation and national service obligations provided in sections 18 (a), (b), and (c) of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Privileges and Immunities of the Commander and the Officers of His Headquarters Staff

20. The Commander shall be entitled to the privileges, immunities, and facilities of sections 19 and 27 of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Officers serving on the Commander's Headquarters Staff and such other senior field officers as he may designate, are entitled to the privileges and immunities of Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

Privileges and Immunities of the Force

21. Privileges and immunities of the force.

a. The Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privileges and immunities of the Organization in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The provisions of Article II of the Convention shall also apply to the property, funds, and assets of Participating States used in the Force. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to import free of duty equipment for the Force, and provisions, supplies, and other goods for the exclusive use of members of the Force and members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force, excluding locally recruited personnel; such right includes the right of the Force to establish, maintain, and operate at headquarters, camps, and posts, service institutes providing amenities for such members. The amenities that may be provided by service institutes include goods of a consumable nature such as confectionery, tobacco, tobacco products, and spirits, and articles of a non-consumable nature normally sold in military canteens notwithstanding the availability of such merchandise in local commercial outlets. In order that duty-free importation for the Force may be effected with the least possible delay, having regard to the interests of the Government, a mutually satisfactory procedure, including documentation, shall be arranged between the appropriate authorities of the Force and the Government. The Commander shall take all necessary measures to prevent any abuse of the exemption and to prevent the sale and resale of such goods to persons other than those aforesaid. Sympathetic consideration shall be given by the Commander to observations or requests of the Government concerning the operation of service institutes.

b. Amenities by way of gifts or free issues of a consumable nature sent to national contingents by Participating States and gift parcels sent by relatives and friends as soldiers' comforts shall be imported free of duty into the host country and shall not affect the quotas, if any, established by agreement between the Commander and the Government.

c. Movement Control Staffs of the Force or Participating States shall have the right to board and inspect vessels and aircraft used by the United Nations in connection with the transportation of personnel and equipment of the Force.

Jurisdiction

22. The following arrangements, paragraphs 22 to 32 inclusive, respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction shall apply having regard to the special functions of the Force and to the interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit of the members of the Force.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

Criminal Jurisdiction

23. The military authorities of the Participating State shall have the right to exercise within the host country all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Participating State over all persons subject to the military law of that State, and the military authorities of the Participating State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of the State with respect to any criminal offenses committed by such person in the host country.

Civil Jurisdiction — Claims

24. Civil jurisdiction — claims.

a. Any claim made by:

(1) A resident of the host country in respect of any damage alleged to result from an act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties;

(2) The Government against a member of the Force; or

(3) The Force or the Government against one another, that is not covered by paragraphs 30 and 31 of this agreement, shall be settled by a Claims Commission established for that purpose. One member of the Commission shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, one member by the Government, and a chairman jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government. If the Secretary-General and the Government fail to agree on the appointment of a chairman, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either to make the appointment. An award made by the Claims Commission against the Force or a member thereof or against the Government shall be notified to the Commander or the Government, as the case may be, to make satisfaction thereof in the currency of the host country.

b. Members of the Force shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the host country or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties.

c. The United Nations and Government shall make provision for the appropriate mode of settlement of disputes or claims arising out of contract or other disputes or claims of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party other than those in this paragraph and in paragraphs 30, 31, and 46.

25. The Claims Commission, established under paragraph 24, shall settle claims in accordance with the law of the host country. The adjudication of a claim by the Claims Commission shall be conclusive and binding on all parties concerned.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

26. Any person who has a claim against a member of the Force arising out of an act or omission in the host country not done in the performance of official duty, may refer his claim to the Claims Commission established pursuant to paragraph 24.

Similarly, a member of the Force who has a claim against a resident of the host country arising out of an act or omission in the host country, may also refer his claim to the Claims Commission. Such a claim or other non-duty claims of which the Claims Commission becomes aware shall be reported to the Force or the Government, as appropriate, by the Claims Commission together with an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force or of a resident of the host country, and the reasonableness of the amount claimed. Where appropriate, the Force or the Government, as the case may be, shall co-operate in obtaining a settlement of such claims.

27. Subject to agreement between the United Nations and the Government, cases not falling under paragraph 24 and those not referred to the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 may be decided by the courts of the host country.

28. With respect to claims against members of the Force:

a. The courts, the Claims Commission, or other authority of the host country shall grant members of the Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. If the Commander certifies that a member of the Force is unable because of official duties or authorized absence, to protect his interests in a civil proceeding in which he is a participant, the court, the claims agency, or other authority shall, at the request of the Commander, suspend the proceeding until the disability has been eliminated. Unless the court, the claims agency, or other authority of the host country in its or his discretion orders otherwise, a suspension made pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed 90 days.

b. Where a judgment made against a member of the Force by a court of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force, given by the Claims Commission, under paragraphs 24 and 26 of this agreement has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Government may, without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary-General to obtain satisfaction.

c. Property belonging to a member of the Force which is certified by the Commander to be needed by such member for the fulfillment of his official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision, or orders. Other property belonging to a member of the Force which is not subject to seizure under the law of the host country shall also be free from such seizure.

d. The personal liberty of a member of the Force shall not be restricted by a court or other authority of the host country in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision, or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

29. With respect to claims by members of the Force, where a judgment made against a resident of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of the resident of the host country, given by the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 of this Agreement, has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Secretary-General may, where appropriate and without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Government to obtain satisfaction.

30. All differences between the United Nations and the Government arising out of the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which involve a question of principle concerning the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 30 of the Convention.

31. All other disputes between the United Nations and the Government concerning the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which are not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement shall be referred for final settlement to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, one by the Government, and an umpire to be chosen jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government. If the two parties fail to agree on the appointment of the umpire within one month of the proposal of arbitration by one of the parties, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint the umpire. Should a vacancy occur for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled within 30 days by the method laid down in this paragraph for the original appointment. The tribunal shall come into existence upon the appointment of the umpire and at least one of the other members of the tribunal. Two members of the tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the performance of its functions, and for all deliberations and decisions of the tribunal a favorable vote of two members shall be sufficient.

Notification and Certification

32. Where any civil procedure is instituted against a member of the Force before any court of the host country having jurisdiction, notification thereof shall be given to the Commander who shall certify to the court whether or not the matter giving rise to the proceeding is related to the official duties of such member. Where the Commander certifies that the matter is related to the official duties of such member such proceedings shall be terminated.

Military Police — Arrest — Transfer of Custody — Mutual Assistance

33. The Commander shall take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance of discipline and good order among members of the Force. To this end, military police designated by the Commander shall police the premises referred to in paragraph 42 of these Arrangements, areas where the Force is deployed in the performance of its functions, and other areas as the Commander deems necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of the Force. For the purpose of this paragraph, the military police of the Force shall have powers of arrest over members of the Force.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

34. Military police of the Force may take into custody any person who is not a member of the Force who is found committing an offense or causing a disturbance on the premises referred to in paragraph 42, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authority of the host country for the purpose of dealing with such offense or disturbance.

35. The authorities of the host country may take into custody a member of the Force, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Force:

a. When so requested by the Commander; or

b. In cases in which the military police of the Force are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member of the Force is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offense that results or might result in serious injury to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights.

36. When a person is taken into custody under paragraph 34 or paragraph 35b, the Commander, or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, may make a preliminary interrogation, but may not delay the transfer of custody and shall immediately inform the Commander or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, that the person is in custody. Following the transfer of custody, the person concerned shall be made available upon request for further interrogation. However, such an interrogation will be done in the presence of a military policeman of the Force or a responsible member of the Force.

37. The Commander and the authorities of the host country shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses in respect of which either or both have an interest, in the production of witnesses, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over, of things connected with an offense. The handing over of any such things may be made subject to their return within the time specified by the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the provisions of paragraphs 34 and 35 above. The Government will ensure that private and public buildings may be searched by the police of the host country who will search for property stolen from the Force and its members and the Government will ensure the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to the Force or its members which, if committed in relation to the host country armed forces or their members, would have rendered them liable to prosecution. The Secretary-General will seek assurances from Governments of Participating States that they will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offenses which may be committed against citizens of, or other persons in the host country, by members of their national contingents serving with the Force.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

Members of the Force — Taxation, Customs, and Fiscal Regulations

38. Members of the Force shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and emoluments received from their national government or from the United Nations. They shall also be exempt from all other direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed, and from all registration fees and charges.

39. Members of the Force shall have the right to import free of duty their personal effects in connection with their arrival in the host country. They shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the host country governing customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in the host country with the Force. However, the Government shall waive or refund customs duty on reasonable quantities of personal property imported by members of the Force for export as gifts or to be taken with the member when he completes his tour of duty in the host State. Members of the Force on departure from the host country may, notwithstanding the foreign exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the appropriate pay officer of the Force certifies were received in pay and emoluments from their respective national Governments or from the United Nations and are a reasonable residue thereof. Special arrangements between the Commander and the Government shall be made for the implementation of the Government and members of the Force. Particulars of the regulations of the host country concerning the rights of members of the Force to import duty-free articles for the personal use of the individual are set out at Appendix (to be provided by host country).

40. The Commander will co-operate with customs and fiscal authorities of the host country in ensuring the observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of the host country by members of the Force in accordance with these or any relevant supplemental arrangements.

Disposal of Nationally-Owned Materiel

41. Materiel owned by the Force or by a Participating State may be removed from the host country as a right, but it may be disposed of in the host country only in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that regard between the Commander and the Government.

Premises of the Force

42. The Government, in agreement with the Commander, shall provide to the Force without cost such areas or buildings in reasonable condition for headquarters, camps, or other uses as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfillment of the functions of the Force. The Force shall have the right to effect such construction, alterations, repairs, and improvements as are necessary. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain the territory of the host country, they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander. The entry upon such premises

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

by any person including civil authorities shall only be permitted by or under the authority of the Commander. Under normal conditions areas and buildings vacated by the Force shall be left in a reasonable state of repair. However, this last condition shall not apply if the Force is required to vacate the areas or buildings through circumstances beyond its control.

Water, Electricity, and Other Public Utilities and Services

43. The Force shall have the right to use water, electricity, and other public utilities and services at rates not less favorable to the Force than those to comparable consumers. The Government shall, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining water, electricity, and other public utilities and services required, and in the case of interruptions or threatened interruptions of service, will give the same priority to the needs of the Force as to essential Government services. The Force shall have the right, where necessary, to generate, within the premises of the Force, either on land or on water, electricity for the use of the Force, and to transmit and distribute such electricity as required by the Force. To the extent necessary to provide for the Force and/or the local population the Force shall have the right to operate waterworks and other public utilities and services.

Provisions, Supplies, and Services (Local)

44. The Government will, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies, and other goods and services required from local sources for its subsistence and operation. Sympathetic consideration will be given by the Commander to requests or observations of the Government respecting purchases on the local market in order to avoid an adverse effect on the local economy. Members of the Force and United Nations officials may purchase locally goods as necessary for their own consumption, and such services as they need, under conditions not less favorable than for citizens of the host country.

Locally-Hired Personnel

45. The Force may hire local personnel as required. Where necessary, the Government shall be responsible for obtaining the personnel to fulfill the labor requirements of the Force. The terms and conditions of employment for locally-hired personnel shall be prescribed by the Commander and shall generally, to the extent practicable, follow the practice prevailing in the locality. The Government shall not require such employees to perform any duties inconsistent with the United Nations mission during their period of employment with the Force.

46. Disputes concerning terms of employment and conditions of service of locally-employed personnel shall be settled by administrative procedures to be established by the Commander after coordination with appropriate authorities of the host country.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

Medical, Sanitary, and Health Measures

47. Where medical or dental facilities of the Force are inadequate, the Commander may enter into arrangements with the Government for the provision of such facilities locally. The Commander and the Government will co-operate with respect to sanitary services and health, particularly with respect to the control of communicable diseases and occupational/industrial health hazards in accordance with international conventions, and such co-operation shall extend to the exchange of relevant information and statistics.

Deceased Member's Disposition of Personal Property

48. The Commander shall have the right to take charge of and repatriate a deceased force member who dies in the host country. The commander shall turn over the decedent's personal effects to authorities of the decedent's participating state for proper disposition.

Supplemental Arrangements

49. Supplemental details for the carrying out of this agreement shall be made as required between the Commander and appropriate authorities designated by the Government.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont'd)

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A
TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Based on the mandate and the situation, TOR are developed to govern implementation of the PO. TOR, which may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute, describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. The draft TOR is coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it is forwarded through the Department of Defense to DOS for final approval. After NCA approval, an executive directive is issued.

2. It is important to note in PKO that although the parties to the dispute may agree to the mandate, truce, and the TOR because it is politically and militarily expedient for them to do so, they may have different or hidden agendas. They may interpret the TOR to suit their own purposes. Consequently, the PK force may find itself deployed in a situation where the TOR are far less precise than is desirable from a military point of view; therefore, commanders should ensure that the SOPs provide sufficient detail to augment the TOR.

3. The TOR may be in either letter or message format and are sent from the UN SYG or the sponsoring organization to the Commander of the Mission when a Commander is appointed. The TOR must be reviewed by appropriate US legal authorities prior to acceptance by US forces. The TOR should address the following points:

a. Authority under which the mission was created. This may be a quotation from the resolution relevant to the task of the mission; e.g., to ensure the supervision of the armistice and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the national boundaries that existed before the conflict.

b. Statement explaining the type of mission to be accomplished; e.g., observation, mediation. In addition, the statement may detail the primary duties of the force; e.g., "UNXYZ" is an observation mission with the primary duty of observing and reporting.

c. Statement of secondary duties and appropriate guidance. For example, the military observers, in supervising the observance of the armistice, will do all that they reasonably can to persuade local commanders to restore the armistice in cases where fighting has occurred. Observers have no power or authority to order an end to the fighting. Where their persuasive efforts fail, their recourse is to report fully on the entire circumstances, their efforts, and the results.

d. Instructions as to the method of reporting to the sponsoring organization, channels of communications to use, and other related areas.

e. Information regarding provision of logistic support and administration of the mission; e.g., the logistic, communications, and administrative needs of the mission will be provided by a representative of the UN Field Administration and Logistics Division.

f. Instructions concerning relations with any other UN Missions or agencies in the area.

g. Statement regarding the current status of negotiations with host countries concerning freedom of movement, immunities, and other related areas.

h. Specific instructions on methods of operation such as:

- Uniform;

- Use of weapons;
- Chain of command; and
- Advice or guidance on deployment.

i. Instructions, including public relations and contact with the people of the host country.

j. Miscellaneous points regarding the situation; e.g., the need for NBC protective equipment.

4. As an example, the TOR for US Forces in the MFO, as depicted in Department of the Army Circular 11-90-4, "The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers," Appendix C, are included here as Figure A-C-1.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT TO
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

1. Purpose. These TOR govern the implementation of US military participation in the MFO that was established by Protocol on 3 August 1981 to supervise the security arrangements as delineated by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, dated 26 March 1979.

2. Mission. The primary mission of the Department of Defense is to provide US military units and/or personnel to serve as elements and/or members of the MFO and to provide logistic support to the MFO as a whole. The primary mission of the Department of the Army, as DOD's Executive Agent, is to provide the most qualified military units and personnel available to accomplish those tasks as specified. The secondary mission of the Executive Agent is to function as the organization responsible for arranging administrative, operational, logistic, and associated C3 support for the US military units and personnel authorized and/or required by DOD regulations but not provided for by the MFO.

3. Command Relationships

a. US military units designated to participate in the MFO will be placed under the OPCON of the Commander, MFO upon entering his area of responsibility (Sinai). Combatant command of US military units will be retained by the appropriate combatant commander as recommended by the Executive Agent and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commanders of US military units under the OPCON of the Commander, MFO, will retain command of their subordinate and attached elements. As specified by paragraph 7, of the annex to the Protocol, the US military contingent commander is charged with responsibility for disciplinary actions under his command. Accordingly, each US commander will retain full authority to implement disciplinary actions under the

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO

specifications of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to include expanded authorities as may be deemed appropriate by the Executive Agent.

c. US military personnel assigned to serve with the MFO but who are not members of specific military units (e.g., personnel assigned as members of the MFO Commander's staff), should be assigned to the appropriate US unit for administration, quarters and rations, and, where appropriate and commensurate with their grade, UCMJ. At the discretion of the Executive Agent, such personnel may be placed under command of the senior US military member of the MFO Commander's staff.

4. Organization. US military units assigned to participate in the MFO will be drawn from Service rolls; MFO-only units will not be created as special entities. This does not preclude, however, task organizing existing units, to meet specific operation requirements and/or political restrictions that exist or which may be imposed.

a. Current requirements (as of August 1990), are for the United States to provide an infantry battalion task force and a logistic support element with a total aggregate strength of approximately 1,015 military personnel. Exact task organization of these elements will be agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO, and with the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD[ISA]).

b. No DOD personnel will agree to additional restrictions on US military participation as to personnel strengths, organization, and/or equipment without the express concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(ISA).

5. Logistics. US logistics requirements are to provide logistics support to the entire MFO. The level of logistics support provided by the US logistics support element will be agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO. Every effort will be made to maintain the logistics readiness posture of the deployed US military units at a level consistent with their normal CONUS posture. In all cases, normal supply and support procedures should be used to the maximum extent possible.

6. Budget. Those costs normally attributed to and budgeted for US units and personnel participating in the MFO will be absorbed by the unit's parent Service budget. Those extraordinary costs incurred by the Service to deploy and support their participating units to and in the Sinai will be reimbursed by the MFO through the Executive Agent. Those costs incurred by a Service to deploy and/or support non-US elements participating will be reimbursed by the MFO budget through the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will establish the necessary budgeting, billing, and accounting procedures as agreed between the Executive Agent and the Comptroller, in accordance with DOD fiscal instructions.

7. Training of Other National Contingents. The Executive Agent is authorized to provide training to other national contingents of the MFO as may be requested by the Director General.

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO (cont'd)

8. Other Services. The Executive Agent is authorized to provide administrative and technical support and services to the MFO as deemed necessary to ensure adequate support to the MFO in general and to US military units and personnel in particular.

9. Coordination and Liaison.

a. The Executive Agent is authorized direct coordination with those USG agencies and commands as deemed necessary and appropriate.

b. Liaison with the MFO headquarters will be established as agreed between the Executive Agent and the Office of the Director General with the concurrence of ASD(ISA) and the DOS.

10. Responsibilities of US Military Personnel.

a. US military personnel assigned to the MFO will perform such duties as assigned by the Commander, through their US unit commander as appropriate, and in consonance with the rules and regulations as established by the MFO Commander in consultation with the contributing countries.

b. No classified US military information of any nature, the release for which is not contained in appropriate directives, will be released to foreign nationals by US personnel assigned to the MFO.

11. Public Affairs. DOS will remain the lead US agency for PA activities regarding all aspects of the MFO. The Executive Agent's PA offices may conduct routine PA activities (respond to news media inquiries, internal and troop information programs, etc.) relating only to previously released aspects of US military participation in the MFO. Key personnel and construction announcements, or other significant new material will be coordinated in advance with the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) and the DOS PA.

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO (cont'd)

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. The Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) found in CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces," apply to US forces during all military operations and contingencies, to include PO. The SROE may be augmented for specific operations. Commanders must assess the capabilities and intent of other forces and make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command. ROE must be clearly stated in simple language.

2. The ROE for Operation RESTORE HOPE are included as an example in Figure A-D-1.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

1. Situation. Basic operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD).

2. Mission. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of the Operation.

(1) If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

(2) Nothing in these rules negates your inherent right to use reasonable force to defend yourself against dangerous personal attack.

(3) These rules of self-protection and rules of engagement are not intended to infringe upon your right of self-defense. These rules are intended to prevent indiscriminate use of force or other violations of law or regulation.

(4) Commanders will instruct their personnel on their mission. This includes the importance of proper conduct and regard for the local population and the need to respect private property and public facilities. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply in an overseas area. Expect that all missions will have the inherent task of force security and protection.

(5) ROE cards will be distributed to each deploying soldier (see Appendix I to this annex).

b. Rules of self-protection for all Soldiers.

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE

(1) US Forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm. Deadly force may be used to defend your life, the life of another US soldier, or the life of persons in areas under US control. You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense when:

(a) You are fired upon;

(b) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life;

(c) There is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence.

(2) Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against US Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of US Forces. Factors you may consider include:

(a) Weapons: Are they present? What types?

(b) Size of the opposing force.

(c) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are displayed; that is, Are they being aimed? Are the weapons part of a firing position?

(d) How did the opposing force respond to the US forces?

(e) How does the force act toward unarmed civilians?

(f) Other aggressive actions.

(3) You may detain persons threatening or using force which would cause death, serious bodily harm or cause interference with mission accomplishment. You may detain persons who commit criminal acts in areas under US control. Detainees should be given to military police as soon as possible for evacuation to central collection points (see paragraph d below).

c. Rules of Engagement. The relief property, foodstuffs, medical supplies, building materials and other end items, belong to the relief agencies distributing the supplies until it is actually distributed to the populace. Your mission includes safe transit of these materials to the populace.

(1) Deadly force may be used only when:

(a) Fired upon;

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont'd)

(b) Clear evidence of hostile intent exists (see above for factors to consider to determine hostile intent);

(c) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life, sensitive equipment and aircraft, open and free passage of relief supplies.

(2) In situations where the deadly force is not appropriate, use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forces which evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force or a show of force should be used if the security of US forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes:

(a) An order to disband or disperse;

(b) Show of force/threat of force by US forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force;

(c) Warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or the opposing force;

(d) Other means of nondeadly force;

(e) If this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

(4) Use of barbed wire fences is authorized.

(5) Unattended means of force (e.g., mines, booby traps, trip guns) are NOT authorized.

(6) If US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces will use the minimum amount of force reasonably necessary to overcome the threat. A graduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used. Such a response can include:

(a) Verbal warnings to demonstrators in their native language;

(b) Show of force, including the use of riot control formations (see below for rules about using RCAs);

(c) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements;

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont'd)

(d) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force when the element demonstrates a hostile intent, which are necessary and proportional to the threat.

(7) All weapons systems may be employed throughout the area of operations unless otherwise prohibited. The use of weapons systems must be appropriate and proportional considering the threat.

(8) US forces will not endanger or exploit the property of the local population without their explicit approval. Use of civilian property will usually be compensated by contract or other form of payment. Property that has been used for the purpose of hindering our mission will be confiscated. Weapons may be confiscated and demilitarized if they are used to interfere with the mission of US forces (see rule (10) below).

(9) Operations will not be conducted outside of the landmass, airspace, and territorial seas of Somalia. However, any United States Central Command force conducting a search and rescue mission shall use force as necessary and intrude into the landmass, airspace, or territorial sea of any country necessary to recover friendly forces.

(10) Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations.

(a) If an armed individual or weapons crew demonstrate hostile intentions, they may be engaged with deadly force.

(b) If an armed individual or weapons crew commit criminal acts but do not demonstrate hostile intentions, US forces will use the minimum amount of force necessary to detain them.

(c) Crew-served weapons are any weapon system which requires more than one individual to operate. Crew-served weapons include, but are not limited to, tanks, artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, mortars, and machine guns.

(11) Within those areas under the control of US forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort, whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of US forces. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

d. Use of Riot Control Agents (RCAs). Use of RCAs requires the approval of CJTF. When authorized, RCAs may be used for purposes including but not limited to:

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont'd)

(1) Riot control in the division area of operations including the dispersal of civilians who obstruct roadways or otherwise impede distribution operations after lesser means have failed to result in dispersal;

(2) Riot control in detainee holding areas or camps, in and around material distribution or storage areas;

(3) To protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists or paramilitary groups.

e. Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or who use or threaten deadly force against US forces, US or relief material distribution sites, or convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas under the control of US forces may likewise be detained.

(1) Detained personnel will be treated with respect and dignity.

(2) Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated location for turn-over to military police.

(3) Troops should understand that any use of the feet in detaining, handling or searching Somali civilians is one of the most insulting forms of provocation.

4. Service Support. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

5. Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

Acknowledge

ARNOLD
MG

OFFICIAL
SMITH
Staff Judge Advocate
Appendixes
1-ROE Card

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont'd)

APPENDIX 1 (ROE Card) to ROE FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Joint Task Force for Somalia Relief Operations
Ground Forces Rules of Engagement

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.

1. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.

2. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.

3. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

4. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.

5. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

Remember:

The United States is not at war.

Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

Use minimum force to carry out the mission.

Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont'd)

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. SOPs may also be referred to as the force commander's directive, or force standing orders. SOPs are developed for each operation, since each PO is unique. The UN has standardized the major subject headings of SOPs for use in UN PO; this format is appropriate for any PO.

2. Figure A-E-1 depicts an SOP format for PKO using the major subject headings established by the UN.

SAMPLE SOP FORMAT FOR UN PKO

1. Command and Control.

a. Status, authority, and responsibilities of the force commander, subordinate commanders (if applicable), national contingent commanders, sector commanders, and unit commanders.

b. National contingent commanders' responsibilities to the force commander and to each of the national contingent commander's government authorities on national matters.

c. Responsibilities of key civilian personnel.

d. Scheduled times as well as attendance requirements for operational briefings and logistics meetings.

e. NBC warning and reporting systems.

2. Organization.

a. Structure of the PK force headquarters.

b. Structure and TOR for operations, personnel, administrative, logistics, communication, and civilian personnel.

3. Operations.

a. Mandate

(1) Aim. Role and purpose of the PK force as it relates to the specific mandate.

(2) Scope. Limits within which the force must operate.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO

b. Tasks. Authorized methods for interposition of forces, buffer zone operations, patrolling, observing, and reporting. (Details may be included as appendixes to the SOPs, such as Appendix 1, "Hand Over Procedures," in this sample SOP format.)

c. Freedom of Movement. Rights of the PK force members as well as any restrictions concerning their movements in the PK area of operations. Specifics may include:

(1) Restrictions on movement and specific circumstances under which restricted areas may be visited.

(2) Identification requirements.

(3) Procedures to follow in the event a PK force member is stopped. Also, actions to take at a roadblock.

(4) Instructions for patrols operating in the buffer zone if they are stopped or otherwise prevented from performing their duties.

(5) Actions PK force personnel may take if members of the disputing parties attempt to search them or their vehicles.

(6) Authorities for transporting nonpeacekeeping force individuals in the force's vehicles; e.g., for emergency medical care.

(7) Procedures used during hijack situations.

(8) Incident reports that must be submitted if a violation occurs concerning the force's freedom of movement.

d. Weapons and Ammunition

(1) Authority to carry weapons while patrolling, performing escort duty, protecting property, etc.

(2) The amount of ammunition each individual may carry (usually one 20-round magazine), how the ammunition will be carried (e.g., in the pouch), and when a loaded magazine may be attached to the weapon.

e. Use of Force. The following points may be appropriate:

(1) Definitions of force and use of force.

(2) Situations when PK force members may use force.

(3) The manners in which firearms are to be used.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont'd)

f. Entry, Search, and Arrest. Since most PK forces have military and/or civil police units, explain the circumstances when these police powers may be used.

g. Night Operations. A reminder to be overt, whom to inform and the method to use, and what actions to take if stopped while conducting PK duties at night.

h. States of Readiness. What they are and how they are announced.

i. Reports. The who, what, when, where, and how of each report format. One report format is SALUTE, which means the following subjects are included in the report: size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.

j. Protest Procedures. How the PK force notifies one of the disputing parties of an infringement, the channels of communications to use, and which report to send to higher headquarters.

k. Naval and Water Operations. Overall defensive plan; contingency plans for situations where tide, current, or weather affects the afloat base; base patrols; and security of berths and anchorages.

l. Special Instructions. Force, contingent, or unit headquarters may require PK force members to carry cards with instructions on what to do in the event of:

(1) Entry into the buffer zone by a member of a non-PK military force or by civilians.

(2) Rules for the use of force in self-defense.

4. Information (or Intelligence). Detail the collection, collating, analyzing, and assessing of information and how it is to be disseminated. Provide information estimates detailing the current situation, history, belligerents, conflict trigger events, theater weapon systems and/or capabilities, political, cultural, and/or religious dynamics and terrain and/or weather information.

5. Air Operations. Flight notification and clearance procedures, tasking procedures, flying restrictions, and accident investigation procedures.

6. Operations Economics. Any special accounting procedures required by the force headquarters.

7. Communications. Use of communications systems provided by the UN or PK force headquarters, the host government, or national contingents. Also, frequency allocation policy, relay and rebroadcast facilities, call signs, cryptography, message forms, and message traffic handling.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont'd)

8. Personnel and Logistics.

a. Logistics. List the subjects for which the chief logistics officer will publish directives.

b. Identification. Distinctive dress, vehicle markings, and how to carry the UN or force flag.

c. Personnel Services. Procedures for strength reporting, leaves, jurisdiction for courts-martial, and graves registration.

d. Casualty Reporting. Missing persons, hostages, deaths, etc.

e. Internal Information. Arrangements for the reception and distribution of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service signals or other electronic news source signals; the production, printing, and distribution of a force newspaper, newsletter, or magazine; and procurement of any other form of internal information deemed necessary by the US national contingent commander.

9. Public Information. Media relations including clearance for press visits, briefing and interview policies, etc.

Appendixes: commander's signature block
1-Hand Over Procedures

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont'd)

APPENDIX 1 (Hand Over Procedures) to SAMPLE SOP

The following are suggested procedures for accomplishing the hand over of POWs, human remains, and parcels and mail.

1. The hand over of POWs must be carefully coordinated and well-organized to prevent confusion and delay. A disruption in the hand over could result in the PO force feeding and accommodating several hundred POWs. A narrow section of the buffer zone should be chosen so that the prisoners can be transferred on foot for better control. The supervisory authority should:

a. Contact the intermediary (a PO force member or other neutral persons agreed to by all sides) to ascertain the number of prisoners to be handed over. Determine if there are any sick or wounded prisoners who need an ambulance or other form of transport.

b. Inform the force commander of the number of escorts, ambulances, and vehicles required.

c. Ensure that the receiving party has the necessary transport marshaled just outside the buffer zone in the vicinity of the agreed checkpoint. The receiving party's authorized representatives will be allowed inside the buffer zone to proceed to the hand over point.

d. Secure the area with armed personnel who will remain at a discreet distance.

e. Close the checkpoints, and the road between them, to all unauthorized traffic and visitors.

f. Meet the prisoners with the intermediary at the arrival checkpoint, organize them into groups of 10, separate those requiring transport from those able to walk, obtain the necessary documentation (nominal roll of prisoners), and sign a receipt for them.

g. Escort the marching prisoners with unarmed personnel across the buffer zone to the receiving party at the agreed hand over point (usually near a checkpoint). Unarmed escorts will accompany the ambulances and vehicles transporting prisoners who are unable to walk.

h. Hand over the prisoners, and a copy of the nominal roll, to the receiving party's representatives in the presence of the intermediary. Obtain a receipt.

2. The hand over of human remains should be carried out quickly, efficiently, and with due respect for the dead. If POWs are to be handed over in the same operation, the dead should be transferred first. However, to avoid emotional scenes and possible demonstrations, the two should not be handed over simultaneously. The supervisory staff ensures that:

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont'd)

a. The receiving party has a suitable vehicle at the checkpoint just outside the buffer zone.

b. The PO force keeps the checkpoints on either side of the hand over area clear of vehicles and visitors not connected with the hand over.

c. The PO force provides a work detail if necessary.

d. The supervisory staff and the intermediary meet the vehicle bringing the remains to the checkpoint.

e. After the intermediary has signed a receipt for the remains and completed other required documentation, the work detail will transfer the remains to a force vehicle.

f. The force vehicle, accompanied by the supervisor's staff and the intermediary, drives across the buffer zone to the checkpoint and the receiving party's vehicles.

g. The work detail transfers the remains to the receiving party's vehicle and the intermediary obtains a receipt.

h. The transfer is recorded on the logbooks at each checkpoint. Also recorded are the names of the supervising officer and the intermediary.

3. Although the hand over of parcels and mail is a relatively simple operation, it must be planned in detail. The intermediary will normally send a vehicle from each side to a parking lot at one of the checkpoints where the mail will be transferred from one vehicle to the other by a work detail provided by the PO force. A record of the number of letters or parcels handed over should be obtained from the intermediaries to guard against subsequent claims. If the exchange of parcels and mail is part of a larger hand over operation, no attempt should be made to conduct both simultaneously.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont'd)

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A
AREA INFORMATION HANDBOOK

1. The purpose of an area information handbook is to assist personnel in transitioning to their assignment as members of a PO.

2. Figure A-F-1 contains the table of contents of the Sinai Area Information Handbook distributed to members assigned to the MFO on the Sinai Peninsula. This example illustrates the types of items appropriate for an area information handbook.

3. In addition to the example provided, various personnel topics may also be appropriate for an area information handbook. These other topics include: tour length; passport and visa requirements; deployed mailing address; leave policy; morale, welfare, and recreation opportunities; Red Cross notifications; etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SINAI AREA INFORMATION HANDBOOK

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook (cont'd)

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook (cont'd)

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook (cont'd)

10. Nations and Organizations Supporting the MFO.
11. Rules of Engagement.
12. Minefields.
13. OPSEC.
14. Predeployment Training.
15. Notes (this section allows each person to record notes).

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook (cont'd)

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ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

EXCERPT FROM: "Wings For Peace: Airpower in Peacemaking Operations" by Major Bruce Rember, USAF (Note also that the current terminology for these operations is Peace Enforcement).

Immediately following World War I, Britain successfully used its Royal Air Force (RAF) in a primary role of "policing the empire." The British government found the air force particularly suited to enforcing the peace throughout sparsely populated areas of the Middle East:

> The airplane can be regarded as a primary weapon in wild unadministered country, and as a secondary weapon in cooperation with the Army wherever a strong and settled administration exists. It is fairly obvious why this should be so, for when trouble breaks out in a settled country...the guilty and innocent parts of the population are living close together, antigovernment forces rarely come out into the open, and the chief requirement is to separate the combatants or to give physical protection to property and to the many important and vulnerable points which exist in any organized community: the whole thing is on too small a scale to give scope for the characteristics of the aeroplane....

The minimum political objectives for these air control operations were to ensure British officials could "travel unmolested" anywhere they wanted to go, to preserve the "sanctity of the trade routes," and to ensure that any fighting between tribes did not interfere "with the rights of third parties." The first such example of British air control occurred in 1919, when the RAF's "Z" Unit deployed with its DH-9s to Somaliland to compel Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "mad" mullah, to stop raiding friendly tribes. The first raid of six aircraft scored a direct hit on the mullah himself. Subsequent raids forced the mullah and his dervishes to evacuate their villages. Less than a month later, after a combined pursuit by ground forces and "Z" unit, the operations concluded with the mullah fleeing the country due to his loss of face after most of his personal following was killed or captured. (Quotes are from British military journal articles in the 1930s.)

EXCERPTS FROM: A DOD News Briefing: "Information Dominance for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR"

Dr. Paul Kaminski, USD (Acquisition and Technology): What we're talking about here is deploying advanced command and control capabilities in support of the US European Command and operations in Bosnia, thereby further enhancing our coalition forces' significant information advantage. This system will provide better communications connections between US-based information sources into the theater, and among rear and forward deployed commanders. We are using commercial satellite technology protected at the Secret level through the use of encryption devices to directly broadcast information to operation centers and to deployed forces.

COL Ed Mahan, USAF, Technical Assistant to the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency: The information dominance vision really is a transition from how we look

at information today in a single thread — from the source of the information through the distribution system to the user — and transforming that into information geographically oriented or oriented in the way the soldier sees it in his battle space. Being able to take information from a number of different sources, organize it into this geographical orientation, and provide it to all the commanders at one time to provide this common operational picture. For this concept to be successful, one needs a unified integrated communication networking system, and that's really the objective of this Bosnian Command and Control Augmentation Program.

What this program will provide for the warfighter primarily is a lot more communication capacity to places where he really doesn't have it today. The last mile, as we refer to it, tends to be a very difficult place to get a lot of communications. We have a lot of luxury in this country because we can pick up the phone and get a lot of connectivity. Forward-deployed troops don't have that kind of connectivity or bandwidth. The use of these commercial direct broadcast capabilities allows it to put a lot of this connectivity and capacity down to the very distant end of the soldier in the field.

MG David Kelley, USA, Vice Director, Defense Information Systems Agency: We have a large command and control infrastructure in Bosnia, primarily focused on core C2 requirements. The nature of the terrain here, as we often find when we go into an area on an operation, the infrastructure simply is not there to let us do terrestrial extensions. When you couple that with the terrain in Bosnia, which is highly compartmented and mountainous, and then you throw in the mine situation where there are literally thousands of mines in unmarked locations, the thrust within country has been to use space assets to establish the backbone of communications. Largely military satellites. That means we've used a lot of the capacity in military satellites. We also have the grid communications in the nations that are cooperating with us, and we have connections from the European continent back to the United States through undersea fiber optic cable.

What this initiative is going to do is really add to the capability of the forces in a dramatic fashion. This broadcast satellite has the ability to see the entire theater. We have the potential now, for example, to put a Predator UAV flying over Bosnia, downlink that information to a satellite station, uplink it back into the broadcast location, and put it out to multiple locations on the battlefield.

One of the biggest problems we had in DESERT STORM was disseminating large bandwidth information. This broadcast capability is going to allow us to do that. Additionally, we can, on the broadcast, put the intelligence summaries. We can have the soldiers in the field pull the information that they need. The commanders can pull the information from data bases in the United States.

Another initiative that's tied in very closely with the American forces in Tuzla is the telemedicine capability. This initiative will allow us to connect Landstuhl Hospital to deployed hospitals in the Tuzla area where medical expertise can be called upon. If the answer's not good enough in Landstuhl, we have connectivity back to the United States to San Antonio, where from there we have a hub that can reach every hospital in the United States that's tied into the telemedicine network. So that way, we can have the specialists on call at any time

across time zones. The thing that it brings to the table primarily is improved situational awareness — the common operational picture that was mentioned earlier. From that common picture, the commanders can make a decision taking into account the variables and the different aspects of the operation.

Finally, it allows the commanders to synchronize their forces. That is one of the most complex problems our commanders say in any deployment: the ability to synchronize the different services and the different forces. In this case, the allied forces as well. So this initiative is going to provide us a real look-ahead to the 21st century and the capabilities of command and control we see on the horizon.

EXCERPT FROM: "Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia," by CPT Fred Johnson, CALL Publication, Chapter 3, Sep-Oct 96:

"On several occasions, civil disturbances could not be avoided and units found themselves caught between two hostile crowds. Tactical PSYOP teams and civil affairs personnel proved to be very effective assisting units in literally talking themselves out of a crisis."

EXCERPT FROM: "A Task Force Eagle Brigade Commander," CALL Newsletter 96-11, Section IV:

"The factions get real nervous around the press, they get real nervous around cameras…it definitely makes things happen. I can say I have close air support — that's obvious. I have attack helicopters — that's obvious. I have "x" number of MK 19s, I outnumber you. But I've also got *Time*, *Newsweek*, and CNN, and that has a big impact on their behavior."

EXCERPT FROM: Call Newsletter 96-11, Section IV:

"The Public Affairs Office and Information Operations (including PSYOP) ensured TFE (Task Force Eagle) beat the factions to the media (both international and indigenous) with the correct information before the factions could launch a propaganda campaign of biased and erroneous press reports."

EXCERPT FROM: General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 May 1995:

"As Commander of Joint Task Force 180 during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, it is my belief that the integration of psychological operations (PSYOP) early in the planning process was critical to the successful execution of the operation. Long before any American military forces stepped ashore, PSYOP helped us quickly to accomplish our political and military objectives by laying the foundation for transition from forced entry to semi-permissive operations. Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti's citizens, as well as setting the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the Joint Task Force's mission. There is

no question PSYOP saved lives on both sides during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be an unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation — a true force multiplier."

EXCERPT FROM: General (Ret.) George A. Joulwan, Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 10 September 1996:

"The information you (PSYOP soldiers) have put out to the Former Warring Factions (in Bosnia), the Coalition Force, as well as the civilian agencies allows us to speak with one voice and has promoted cohesion and solidarity among all the forces."

EXCERPT FROM: Public Affairs Update, Summer 1996:

The top ten technologies of media war coverage are:

- Electronic mail and computer-to-computer communications.
- Digital transmission of still photographs.
- Facsimile transmission.
- Portable satellite telephones.
- Remotely sensed satellite imagery.
- Frame capture of video images to print.
- Portable laptop computers.
- International data transmission networks.
- Flyaway satellite uplinks.
- Computer graphics analysis.

"Today one of our biggest challenges is keeping pace with all the technology at our disposal. We produce a 12-page, glossy, four-color, weekly publication in a totally digital environment. Each forward-deployed public affairs team has a Pentium computer and a top-of-the-line digital camera....our printer picks up everything he needs in one 230 MG optical disk....We also exchange photos and stories via e-mail with US Army community newspapers in Germany. In addition we transmit the finished paper to ...BosniaLINK, the DOD World Wide Web site..... I'm sure PA veterans of DESERT STORM, Somalia and Haiti wish they would have had these capabilities. Connectivity has been a boon to the entire public affairs apparatus. The Early Bird is downloaded...and placed on a local network....specialists stay abreast of breaking coverage though the major network's websites on the Internet...." National Guard CPT John Goheen, OIC, The Talon.

EXCERPTS FROM: "The Employment of Maritime Forces in Support of United Nations Resolutions" Strategy and Campaign Department, Naval War College, Research Report 6-93 Dated 11 Aug 93:

PREVIOUS UN MARITIME OPERATIONS

It was in 1947, just two years after the United Nations was established, that the amphibious transport, USS *Renville*, became the headquarters ship for the UN Truce Commission which supervised the negotiation of the terms of a settlement between the Dutch colonialists and the Indonesian nationalists. The subsequent agreement was a precursor to the Netherlands' recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state and was denoted "The Renville Truce". In the next year, a number of naval units from several countries were at the organization's disposal during the Palestinian crisis. In addition, naval and marine observers were deployed ashore and the US Marine Corps (USMC) landed at Haifa with communications equipment to assist the UN officers in what was to become the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). On 17 June 1947, the Commander of the Sixth Task Fleet loaned three destroyers to the UN mediator, USS *Putnam*, USS *Henley*, and USS *James C. Owens*. The French Navy contributed a corvette. All four warships flew the UN flag on the same halyard as the national ensign and immediately below it.

UNTSO, which remains in operation today, enjoyed other examples of maritime support. For instance, on 2 November 1956, USS *Cambria* evacuated 21 UN observers from Gaza and provided a show of force enabling the seven remaining UNTSO personnel to continue negotiations with the Egyptians.

In the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) whose mandate was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of French, Israeli and United Kingdom forces from Egyptian soil, maritime capabilities were again widely exploited. A Landing Ship Tank (LST) was loaned by the US government to the force and manned by UN personnel for some years "to give practice to troops in loading and unloading personnel and vehicles from beaches". In addition, units of the US Sixth Fleet sealifted 4000 UN troops at the start of the operation and later provided logistic support.

Sealift is perhaps the most obvious use of maritime assets, but the transportation in theater of personnel and materials in connection with the operation ashore is a complementary and equally well-practiced task. Observation and reporting tasks have also been widely exercised. The ability of maritime forces to poise offshore has allowed evacuation operations to be timed to meet the circumstances, and both beleaguered nationals and UN servants have benefited from a seaborne escape route. The use of platforms afloat to launch humanitarian operations has enjoyed considerable success and, on occasion, obviated the need for much more than the most rudimentary infrastructure ashore. Postconflict mopping-up operations under UN direction have ensued from a number of conflicts, and multi-national forces have successfully worked together in often dangerous circumstances. On several occasions, embargo operations have been instituted, including the need to board and search suspect vessels.

Military Observer Mission-Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) and JTF Safe Border

In March 1995 soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A), US Army South (USARSO), and USSOCOM deployed to Patuca, Ecuador, to assist the countries of Ecuador and Peru with the observance of a cease fire along their eastern border. The dispute is primarily territorial, neither country being willing to relinquish land they believe is sovereign.

The MOMEP observer force is composed of personnel from the countries of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and the United States. Each country provides ten observers. The mission of MOMEP is to supervise the cease-fire agreement and assist in the maintenance of peace between Ecuador and Peru. The force is led by a Brazilian general, known as the Coordinator General. Each country also provides a colonel as its senior representative, who serves as a senior staff officer on the Coordinator General's staff as well as the senior observer for his country.

The MOMEP mission occurred in phases:

- Phase 1 included the signing of the peace treaty, a cease fire by both countries, the suspension of military operations, and the signing of a Declaration of Procedures.

- Phase 2 consisted of a continuation of the cease fire, Ecuador and Peru providing MOMEP their order of battle by outlining where their forces were arrayed on the battlefield, and relinquishing control of airspace within the conflict zone to MOMEP.

- Phase 3 of the initial operation involved separation of the forces and their removal from the conflict zone. This phase was the most tenuous as the forces had become intertwined in the jungle and had to be removed without causing an incident that would reignite the hostilities. MOMEP provided planning assistance and recommendations to the Ecuadorian and Peruvian leadership as the extraction plan was developed to give the countries a sense of ownership in the process. Phase 3 lasted approximately 30 days as MOMEP ensured that the units remained separated.

The mission for the observers is to observe, verify, and report. In short, they observe that the conditions of the peace treaty within the established conflict zone are being met and, in the event that a violation occurs, they verify (or confirm) that an incident occurred and report the circumstances and the agreed-upon corrective actions to the coordinator general. The MOMEP staff goes to great lengths to maintain its neutrality and recommends solutions to the violation rather than directing what actions will be taken to maintain the cease-fire. To provide MOMEP dedicated support, such as transportation and communications, the United States agreed to provide the support structure creating JTF Safe Border. JTF Safe Border is mainly comprised of soldiers from 3/7 Special Forces Group (A) and USARSO's 1-228 Aviation, based at FT Kobbe, Panama. 1-228 provides UH-60 support. Along with transporting observers to the outposts, the aviation task force flies reconnaissance missions over the conflict zone. These missions assist in projecting MOMEP's presence in the conflict zone, and they allow the observers to verify that the cease fire agreement is being maintained. The future of peace along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border is promising. The next planned phase of MOMEP is a transition of oversight of the process to Ecuador and Peru.

Adapted from "News from the Front," The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Jan-Feb 96, by CPT Steve Hiller

EXCERPTS FROM: A Speech By The Hon. H. Allen Holmes, Asst. Sec. of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict "Realizing CA in the Civil Dimension":

In Rwanda, CA units ran three Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC's) throughout the country. They coordinated and ensured the secure distribution of food, shelters for the refugees, and their ultimate repatriation.

In Haiti, the CA-managed CMOC acted as the nerve center for coordination with US civilian agencies and for requests for military support from US and international nongovernment organizations, the Haitian government and its population.

CA personnel also provided invaluable assistance in restoring the legitimate government to power. Thirty-four CA officers served as ministerial advisors in twelve ministries, which included Education, Public Works, Transportation, Commerce, and Public Health. They created, often from scratch, institutional guidelines for the ministries which they supported—establishing emergency preparedness systems, developing budgets, and creating a model for a working government. CA also worked exceptionally well as part of the Special Forces A-teams. CA soldiers accompanied many Special Forces detachments into the Haitian countryside and coordinated many civic action projects. For example, they helped restore electric power to a number of towns and organized the local citizenry to rebuild road and bridges.

CA activities in the Sarajevo and the French/British sectors have been unparalleled successes. CA soldiers got the water restarted in Sarajevo. They reopened the phone lines between Serbia and the war-torn areas of the Bosnian Federation. They are encouraging civil industry back into the area and are facilitating the election process. CA units also fixed an electrical connection which repaired the "odorizer" at Sarajevo's natural gas plant. This put an end to the frequent gas explosions caused by undetected gas leaks which were killing dozens of innocent civilians.

Landmines are an enormous problem in Bosnia. It will likely take 20 years to clear the estimated 6 million land-mines in that country. The role of CA in demining in Bosnia is twofold. First, CA soldiers are providing information about the whereabouts of minefields to the Mine Action Center in Sarajevo. Second, CA units, alongside PSYOP forces, are supporting a substantial Mine Awareness campaign as part of IFOR to reach and inform large audiences of young people about the land mine threat. The campaign involves the distribution of articles with mine awareness slogans and the future distribution of a comic book with a mine awareness theme using the "Superman" character.

In Cambodia, CA are doing much more than assisting with demining operations. For example, finance teams are working with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to establish payscales, software programs, accounting systems, and budgets. A CA unit has also supported a Khmer

Rouge defector program. A US-trained Cambodian CA unit orchestrated the recent transport and distribution of 23 tons of US humanitarian assistance to former Khmer Rouge soldiers and their families.

EXCERPTS OF: USCENTCOM's 1994 Operations:

• MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) enforcing United Nations Sanctions against Iraq continued through 1994. The sanctions provide for an embargo of certain goods destined for Iraq until it complies with a series of UN Security Council resolutions addressing weapons of mass destruction and other issues stemming from the Gulf War. MIO is being conducted by multinational naval forces which patrol assigned areas and monitor, query, board and inspect if necessary those vessels which are suspected of violating UN sanctions. Warships from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom participated in the 1994 operations in the North Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Maritime Intercept Operations underwent significant changes during 1994. In September, 1994, North Red Sea UN Sanction Enforcement Operations shifted from "at-sea" to "shore-based" inspections. Inspection responsibility was shifted by contract from the UN to Lloyds' Register of London. Additionally, at-sea command of MIO forces shifted from the US Coast Guard back to the US Navy, with the primary area of responsibility moving to the Arabian Gulf. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) continue to remain aboard Navy ships enforcing the sanctions. In March 1994, one vessel attempted to export unauthorized foodstuffs from Umm Qasr but was intercepted and diverted by MIO forces. In October 1994, two merchant tankers suspected of transporting Iraqi oil in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions were diverted to ports in GCC states.

• AIR OPERATIONS — OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH

Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has aggressively tried to suppress the Kurds in northern Iraq and Marsh Arabs in the south. Saddam Hussein has directed major division-level counterinsurgency operations against the population in the marshes northwest of Basra. Brigade-sized ground and air forces using combined arms tactics carried out search and destroy operations. Additionally, large-scale engineering efforts have been used to divert waters away from the marshlands to facilitate combat operations. In response to these developments, the United Nations Security Council in 1992 passed Resolution 688 condemning Iraq's repression of its civilian population. To allow monitoring of compliance with Resolution 688, an Iraqi no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel was established. Named operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the coalition effort to enforce that ban against both military and civilian Iraqi aircraft in the no-fly zone, as well as any surface-to-air weapons presenting a threat to aircraft conducting the monitoring mission, has been in operation since August 1992. The United States, France, United Kingdom, and others have contributed forces or support for SOUTHERN WATCH.

EXAMPLE LESSONS LEARNED, CALL

- TOPIC: Use of Tanks in Peace Enforcement Operations.
- DISCUSSION: While infantry forces are best suited for peace enforcement operations, armor forces can make significant contributions to the operations. Tanks are potent weapons systems when performing traditional functions, but they also make excellent infantry support weapons. Some of their capabilities are:
  - •• Antitank and antiarmor.
  - •• Intimidation of belligerent forces.
  - •• Heavy weapons support to infantry fighting vehicles.
  - •• Target acquisition especially at night using thermal sights.
  - •• Survivable to mines and light antiterrorism weapons.
  - •• Provide advanced guard support to convoys.
  - •• Provide support during search and attack operations.
  - •• Protect infantry against automatic weapons fire.

Some advantages to using tanks during peace enforcement operations are:

- •• Armor/Mech can be rapidly emplaced at decisive points throughout sector to support threatened UN forces.
- •• Heavy forces have extremely high visibility and can deter aggression by belligerent forces (consider firepower demonstrations as a show of force).

Some disadvantages of using armor during peace enforcement operations are:

- •• The enemy can focus on, isolate, and destroy armor forces in a piecemeal fashion.
- •• Tanks have limited bunker and building destruction capability.
- •• Tanks and other armored vehicles destroy the secondary roads and main supply routes.
- •• The size of armored vehicles often block narrow country roads and can destroy private property during movement (may offset attempts to gain support of local civilians).

LESSON(S):

•• There is no pure "heavy" or "light" scenario in peace enforcement operations. The best way to achieve success is to balance the array of tactical capabilities in accordance with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available.

•• The combined arms concept requires teamwork, mutual understanding, and the recognition by everyone involved with the critical roles performed by other arms.

•• There is no place for parochialism or ignorance; the success of the mission and the lives of soldiers will depend on the ability to understand and synchronize the complexities of the light/heavy force.

- TOPIC: Armor Considerations for Built-up Areas.

- DISCUSSION: There are several difficulties in using tanks in built-up areas. Tanks can provide effective support to infantry operations in built-up areas, but infantry teams must be assigned to protect each tank from short-range antitank weapons.

LESSON(S):

•• Mobility is restricted because tanks are confined to roads or streets that often require clearance of debris, and possibly mines.

•• Where possible, tanks should take advantage of parks and gardens which offer the best fields of fire.

•• Buildings will restrict the full traverse of the turret and the elevation of the main armament may be insufficient to reach top floors and rooftops. However, the commander's machine gun is not so restricted.

•• Tanks are particularly vulnerable to short-range antitank weapons. Their crews, if exposed, may become casualties from snipers. Tanks must, therefore, move through built-up areas buttoned up. They must move in short bounds using suppressive fire and be supported by other tanks.

- TOPIC: Engineer Support.

- DISCUSSION: Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the usefulness of engineers in operations other than war. Somalia's austere landscape and climate posed challenges similar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations DESERT SHIELD/ STORM including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances, limited resources, and a devastated infrastructure.

  The deployed engineer force was a joint and combined effort, building on the engineer capabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided

standard maps and imagery products; detected and cleared hundreds of land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance; built base camps for US and coalition forces; and drilled water wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads; built and repaired several Bailey bridges; upgraded and maintained airfields; and participated in local civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and local water supplies.

Army engineers cooperated fully with and complemented engineer capabilities found within the US Marine Corps, US Navy, and US Air Force. In addition, coalition force engineer efforts were fully coordinated with US and UN goals for the area.

- TOPIC: Suppression of Artillery.

- DISCUSSION: The suppression of artillery used to harass population centers and airfields will be a formidable task during peace operations. It cannot be suppressed by air power alone. When faced with an air threat and counter-battery threat, belligerents will seek to protect their artillery by exploiting its high mobility (especially the mortars) and using concealment offered by terrain. Weapons may be deployed individually, rather than in batteries. Weapons may re-deploy from one camouflaged position to another after firing a few rounds. Weapons may be located in populated areas such as near schools, hospitals or other restricted fire areas. This complicates the delivery of counter-battery fire through fear of inflicting civilian casualties and collateral damage.

LESSON(s):

•• Use precision-guided munitions or attack helicopters to conduct counter-battery fire to reduce unnecessary collateral damage.

•• Deploy artillery with the withdrawal force. Besides counter-battery fire, it can fire illumination and smoke rounds if needed.

•• Deploy firefinder radars to support suppression of combatant artillery and to document violations of cease-fire agreements and fix blame for damage and civilian casualties. This information can be passed to the media (if approved by commander) to give an accurate portrayal of the situation to the world.

- TOPIC: Photo Support.

- DISCUSSION: Ground and aerial photographs of urban areas enhance the commander's intelligence picture. If taken well ahead of time, photos of key facilities, intersections, staging areas and potential trouble spots from both air and ground levels can be stored and later disseminated to all levels of command for planning purposes. Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, US patrols used video cameras to document hostile actions by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers. The presence of the video camera helped to discourage hostile acts and harassment of US forces. If there is a need to take photographs to enhance intelligence efforts, take them discreetly.

LESSON(S):

•• Use photo assets to give commanders updated views of areas of operation. This will assist them and their staffs in the planning process.

•• Helicopters are good platforms for photography and route reconnaissance missions.

•• Use video cameras to film convoy routes and use the film during convoy briefings and rehearsals.

•• Consider using remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) instead of helicopters during peace enforcement operations because of the threat of hostile fire.

•• Use video cameras to document violations of peace agreements.

- TOPIC: Area Assessment Checklist.

- DISCUSSION: A standardized checklist can enhance the intelligence collection effort and minimize trainup time for S2 sections. The area assessment checklist below was developed by US forces during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia to enhance the intelligence collection effort during MOOTW. For additional guidance, see Appendix B, FM 41-10, "Civil Affairs Operations."

LESSON(s): Use the following checklist as a guide to develop a standardized checklist.

- Where are the refugees originally from?
- What is the size of the original population?
- What is the size of the area and population that the village services in the surrounding countryside?
- What is the size of the refugee population?
- Why did they come here?
- What is the relationship of the village with the surrounding villages?
- Are they related?
- Do they support each other?
- Are they hostile towards each other?
- Is any portion of the village population discriminated against?
- What is the food and water status of the village?
- Where do they get their food?
- What other means of subsistence is available?
- Are the villagers farmers or herders?
- What is the status of their crops/herds?
- What is the quality of the water source?
- What is the medical status of the village?
- What services are available in the village?
- What is the location of the nearest medical facility?
- Is there evidence of illness and/or starvation?
- What portion of the population is affected?

- What is the death rate?
- What diseases are reported in the village?
- What civilian organization exist in the village? Who are their leaders?
- What civil/military organizations exist in the village?
- Who are their leaders?
- What organization/leadership element does the general population seem to support or trust the most?
- Which organization seems to have the most control in the village?
- What UN relief agencies operate in the village?
- Who are their representatives?
- What services do they provide?
- What portion of the population do they service?
- Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside?
- What is the security situation in the village?
- What element(s) is the source of the problems?
- What types and quantities of weapons are in the village?
- What are the locations of minefields?
- What commercial or business activities are present in the village? What services or products do they produce?
- Determine the groups in the village that are in the most in need.
- What are their numbers?
- Where did they come from?
- How long have they been there?
- What are their specific needs?
- What civic employment projects would the village leaders like to see started?
- Determine the number of families in the village.
- What are their names (family)?
- How many in each family?
- What food items are available in the local market?
- What are the cost of these items?
- Are relief supplies being sold in the market?
- If so, what items, what is their source, and what is the price?
- What skilled labor or services are available in the village (non-HRA)?
- What is the size of any transient population in the village? Where did they come from and how long have they been there?

EXCERPTS FROM: "Selection & Training of Military Observers: Lessons Learned from the Naval Experience, Maritime Command," LT (N) G. Shorey, Canadian Armed Forces (Based on Experience in Cambodia, El Salvador, Former Yugoslavia):

Peacekeeping has entailed:

- Providing refugee security during repatriation along river routes.
- Mediating sea boundary/patrol area disputes.
- Organizing coastal search and rescue.
- Conducting medevacs.
- Smuggling Interdiction.

- Vessel boardings.
- Patrolling coasts and inland waterways.

Exercise Venom Strike Combined US/Canadian Peacekeeping Training, Lessons Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 1995

Observation: Rules of Engagement in Combined Forces Operations.

Discussion:

Task organizing with units from other countries is complicated by restrictions imposed by their national ROE.

In the VENOM EDGE exercise, Canadian ROE was more restrictive than the US ROE. A Canadian unit was task organized within a notional US division. The division plan contemplated offensive operations, yet Canadian ROE was self-defense oriented. Notwithstanding execution of the US OPORD, Canadian forces could not comply with the OPORD's direction to utilize more permissive US ROE because Canadian forces had to comply with their national ROE.

What follows is an illustration of the observation:

Background: The training scenario WAS the rescue of UN Forces who had been conducting peacekeeping operations between warring territories. NATO Forces were tasked with the military mission of extracting UN Forces, but only if diplomatic measures failed to secure their release. The US-led NATO Forces arrived in-theater under the invitation of one of the warring territories. Therefore, NATO ROE were restrictive and self-defensive in nature. Offensive combat operations were not authorized unless and until NATO Forces were directed to execute their military mission.

ROE: To meet the dual requirements of facilitating diplomatic negotiations initially, and later executing the military extraction mission if necessary, the exercise ROE had two tiers: Tier I was self-defensive and effectively prohibited offensive operations; Tier 2 was more permissive and authorized preemptive attacks when approved by the authorized NATO Commander.

National implementation of the ROE differed only slightly under Tier 1; however, under Tier 2, US forces could use deadly force and reemptive artillery fires against defending forces in zone.

The US Division OPORD ordered an "attack." Based upon the US ROE, defending enemy formations could be fired upon with artillery and direct fire weapons. The Canadians could not use artillery. They also could only use direct fire weapons if the defending enemy demonstrated hostile intent or committed a hostile act. The Canadians could initiate deadly force only upon approval by its national headquarters.

IMPLICATIONS:

Training: Before a peace operation begins, senior commanders from the coalition forces must strive to resolve the differences in the interpretation of ROE. Vignettes that train all coalition soldiers to understand other national responses to the ROE must be developed before the operation begins.

EXCERPTS FROM: Enhancing US and Russian Relations Through Combined Peacekeeping Exercises, Call "News from the Front," March-April 1996 (MG Randolph W. House and MAJ Mark R. Pires):

Peacekeeper 95 (PK 95), a US and Russian peacekeeping exercise, was conducted from 22 October to 4 November 1995 at Ft Riley, Kansas. It marked the first time that Russian soldiers trained with American soldiers in the continental United States. The exercise enabled soldiers from both countries to practice interoperability in peacekeeping operations and to share and develop tactics, techniques and procedures for peacekeeping tasks. Perhaps more importantly, the exercise allowed US and Russian soldiers to develop personal relationships based on trust and mutual understanding.

Peacekeeper 95 was a follow-on exercise to Peacekeeper 94, held in Totskoye, Russia. The 1st Infantry Division, Mechanized, received a directive from OSD and JCS in February 1995 to plan and execute a combined peacekeeping exercise with the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD), Totskoye, Russia, and 3rd Infantry Division, Mechanized, Wurzburg, Germany.

The training scenario for PK 95 was designed to replicate actual peacekeeping operations as realistically as possible. The scenario was set in "Kanza," a fictitious country attempting to establish a new government after undergoing a devastating civil war. The war was fought between two factions. Elements of the factions, splinter groups, refugees, and the media were intermingled in the buffer zone when the peacekeepers arrived.

The scenario was developed to replicate a peacekeeping operation in which there exists formal consent by all parties on the presence and mission scope of the peacekeeping forces ¾ Chapter VI of the United Nations charter. Hence, the peacekeepers deployed into a region in which the belligerents had already separated and the buffer zone was mutually agreed upon and in effect at the outset of the CPX/FTX. The mission statement of the peacekeeping forces was as follows:

US and Russian contingents from the 1ID(M)(-) and the 27th GMRD(RU)(-), as part of UN Combined Peacekeeping Forces - Kanza, conduct combined peacekeeping operations in the established buffer zone to supervise, monitor, and verify observance of the truce between belligerents and help maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process.

The scope of the peacekeeping mission was limited to verifying and, where necessary, enforcing the terms of the peace agreement, within the buffer zone. The mission statement also included

one of the gray areas of peacekeeping, "maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process." This part of the mission challenged the peacekeepers and stressed the employment of the rules of engagement (ROE). The scenario and events portrayed during the 4-day CPX/FTX were developed using various sources including publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the "Russian- US Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises," and the experiences of both Russian and US past operations. The scenario and events were developed from a cross section of peacekeeping operations and were not based on events in Bosnia, or any other single area.

All participants learned valuable lessons at the small unit and individual soldier level. Soldiers from both nations improved interpersonal skills when dealing with civilians and members of factions. At the beginning of the exercise, both US and Russian soldiers tended to treat civilians and faction members as enemies. During the course of the exercise, soldiers from both nations learned that they needed to change their mindset. The peacekeepers learned to display a friendly demeanor while still maintaining vigilance and force protection. Small unit leaders learned to use negotiation prior to using force. Early in the exercise, the peacekeepers failed to use controlled escalation of force which resulted in soldiers shooting into crowds or other undesired outcomes. However, during the course of the exercise, the peacekeepers learned to control events without having to resort to the use of force.

Civil Aspects of the Dayton Accords

The implementation of the civil aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, know as the Dayton Accords, is essential to NATO's exit strategy for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD and the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

The Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CJCIMIC) is the vital link between military and civilian organizations operating in theater. NATO has deployed more than 400 CA personnel to support these efforts.

In BiH, CJCIMIC has been instrumental in facilitating a wide variety of activities in support of NATO's Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, European Union, International Committee for the Red Cross, and others.

Activities include:

Participation in Joint Civil Commissions to facilitate civil actions throughout BiH. Coordination with local organizations and utilities for assessments and improvements of public infrastructure projects. Successes in this aspect of operations included: Security for shipment of equipment needed for electrical, coal, and natural gas power generation and facilitation of construction of facilities in coordination with the Office of Disaster Assistance and local officials.

Facilitating the repair or reconstruction of roads and bridges through coordinating with the World Bank, NATO engineers, and local agencies and conduct of bridge, overpass and road surveys.

Transit of commercial aircraft and more frequent operation due in part to brokering of the over flight policy and the installation of an instrument landing system.

Monitoring and facilitating the development of telecommunications legislation, regulations and plans for privatization that are being led by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Environmental inspections of potable water and facilitation of shipment of laboratory materials for water analysis.

Support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This includes the provision of security and logistic support to ICTY investigative teams, and surveillance and ground patrolling of alleged mass grave sites.

Providing liaison, guidance and support in the areas of logistics, operations and training to the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The CJCIMIC Police Working Group was instrumental in generating the plan and subsequent employment of the IPTF with police throughout the country and developing plans for the reorganization of police forces.

Support prior, during and after the election process. CJCIMIC provided computer training to staff members who are helping to manage the voter data base and helped coordinate information programs among OSCE, USAID, the NATO force, and other international organizations.

Support to UNHCR to the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and development of a process for enhanced communications between the military and civilian agencies involved. These include the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, as well as the Human Rights Task Force Property Subcommittee concerning legal and property rights.

CJCIMIC has worked closely with the OHR and International Federation of Journalists to develop the Open Broadcast Network. This included site surveys, lease agreements for property and equipment, and shipment and distribution of transmission and production equipment. Another initiative is the development and implementation (in conjunction with OSCE) of an Inter-Entity Editors Working Forum.

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APPENDIX B
US GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. General

PO normally require significant coordination within the USG structure in an effort to employ all instruments of national power. This appendix describes agencies and elements of the USG which are typically involved in PO. Additionally, this appendix briefly discusses USG support to PO not sponsored by the UN.

2. National Command Authorities

The NCA consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense together, or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Both the movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; no one else in the chain of command has such authority. The NCA direct armed forces involvement in operations. Orders given to the US forces commander must include the appropriate NCA mandate (instructions) for the operation.

3. National Security Council

The first step in translating national-level decisions and guidance into operational plans and specific guidance to government agencies and departments begins with the National Security Council (NSC). The Deputies Committee of the NSC (NSC/DC) is supported by a core group as well as regional and functional committees. The NSC/DC may activate an interagency response group to coordinate US activities if the situation warrants.

4. Department of State

The DOS is the lead government agency in executing US foreign policy. It also has the lead management and funding responsibility for traditional PKO and other diplomatic actions that do not involve US combat units.

a. **Authority and Responsibilities.** In a given country, DOS authority is delegated to one of several principal staff assistants. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) provides a senior DOS representative to any interagency or interdepartmental PO primary policy guidance in the following areas.

- Matters having an impact on US relations with other countries.
- The extent to which commanders interfere in the government of a particular country.
- The level at which the economy of a country is maintained.
- Matters involving informational programs, supporting psychological aspects, and attitudes of the indigenous population.
- The level of subsistence for civilians in a country in which US forces are stationed or employed and by whom such subsistence in part or in whole must be provided.
- Plans or procedures for the return of civil government functions to civilian control.
- Efficiency and costs of programs undertaken to gain the understanding, acceptance, confidence, and support of civil populations.
- Embassy or consulate emergency action plans for the city or area under their cognizance. These plans and photographs

could be beneficial to the forces involved in missions. The information they provide includes evacuation sites, landing zones, ports, and beaches; the number of evacuees (if required); assembly areas; and command posts.

- **Acts of terrorism.** If the HN is unable to adequately protect itself from acts of terrorism, the DOS can provide support through its antiterrorism assistance program to teach HN officials governance and law enforcement. The latter should include how to maintain the internal security of the nation. In particular, Federal Aviation Administration instruction on airport procedures and security could be included.

b. **Important State Department Embassy Positions.** Commanders involved in PO should be familiar with the duties of the following State Department officials and organizations normally found at US embassies.

- **Ambassador and/or Chief of Mission.**

  •• The ambassador is the chief of mission and is the senior US official, military or civilian, in country. The ambassador usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in a host country. This authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. A crisis may arise where the United States has no diplomatic mission. In such a situation, the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the standard authorities and responsibilities of a chief of mission.

  •• During cross-border emergencies, the US ambassador to the HN normally exercises authority in the interagency environment. However, this control may be complicated when cross-border emergencies such as civilians crossing international borders or attacks against refugee camps take place. Therefore, interagency working groups should establish procedures on cross-border situations.

- **Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).** The DCM is the senior diplomatic official in an embassy below the rank of ambassador. The DCM has the diplomatic title of minister, minister-counselor, or counselor (depending upon the size of the mission) and is nearly always a career foreign service officer (FSO). The DCM usually chairs the Country Team meetings and coordinates the embassy staff.

- **Chief of Military Mission.** The chief of military mission is the senior military person at the embassy. The chief of military mission maintains liaison with the HN's military forces. The chief of military mission is authorized by law to perform certain military functions with host country military barred to others. The chief of military mission is cognizant of the advance party forward command element.

- **Defense Attaché Officer (DAO).** The DAO is the military person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status representing the Department of Defense. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the embassy or under direct control of the ambassador, must coordinate their activities through the DAO.

- **Security Assistance Officer (SAO).** The SAO is the person assigned to carry out security assistance management functions, primarily logistics management, fiscal management, and contract

administration of country security assistance programs.

- **Administration Officer (AO).** The AO is responsible for various activities at the embassy compound, which may include providing security at small posts; running the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling monetary aspects of the embassy business, including foreign service national payroll, cash collection, and budget. The AO is the third in command in the embassy hierarchy. In a small post with no security officer assigned, the AO assumes the functions of the security officer.

- **Political Officer.** A political officer is an FSO who reports on political developments, negotiates with governments, and represents views and policies of the USG to his or her contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact with host government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of a country, as well as third country diplomats.

- **Economic Officer.** The economic officer analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors and DOS personnel on economic matters in the host country. Economic officers also negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They may also work in close contact with relief organizations.

- **Consular Officer.** The main function of the consular officer is to screen, process, and grant US passports and visas. Other duties include attending to the welfare of US citizens and performing administrative tasks such as maintaining a count of US nationals within the host country. The consular officer provides appropriate personnel to screen documents of all potential evacuees during noncombatant evacuation operations and provides any necessary instructions that personnel may need to effectively staff processing stations.

- **Medical Officer.** The medical officer is qualified for general practice and responds to and sets up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical officer also advises on indigenous disease vectors and proper prophylaxis necessary for forces introduced into the country.

- **Public Affairs Officer.** The member of the Country Team that represents the US Information Agency (USIA) or US Information Service (USIS) overseas normally serves as the PAO to provide public affairs advice to the ambassador and coordinate information efforts with other agencies.

- **Regional Security Officer (RSO).** The RSO is a security officer responsible for the security functions of US embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries.

- **Post Security Officer (PSO).** The PSO has general security duties at a specific embassy (or consulate). The PSO is a special staff officer under the control of the AO.

- **Special Security Force.** The special security force consists of DOS employees who respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the ambassador, the DCM, and others.

- **General Services Officer.** The general services officer performs many of the same functions as a military logistics staff officer. This individual is normally responsible for buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

- **Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment.** The MSG Detachment is responsible to the PSO for internal security, protection of classified material, and American lives. An MSG detachment normally has 5 to 35 personnel assigned. The detachment is not available for duty with incoming forces, except with the express consent of the ambassador.

- **Country Team.** The Country Team consists of the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other USG agencies operating within a country. Chaired by the ambassador or the DCM, the Country Team meets regularly to advise the ambassador on US matters and to review current developments in the country. The Country Team facilitates interagency action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of US programs and policies. Included in the Country Team are the following personnel:

  - Ambassador;
  - DCM;
  - Chief of political section;
  - Political and military affairs officers;
  - Consular officer;
  - AO;
  - Economics officer;
  - USIS representatives;
  - Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and Peace Corps representatives;
  - DAO and military assistance group; and
  - SAO.

c. **United States Agency For International Development.** USAID is an agency under the policy direction of the DOS that coordinates US foreign assistance efforts. In a PO, armed forces work closely with USAID staff. Foreign economic assistance provided by USAID is normally in the form of development assistance loans and grants to improve the quality of life of the poorest people in less developed countries. It also includes the Economic Support Fund, part of the Security Assistance Program. The SECSTATE and the USAID administrator make policy decisions concerning the Economic Support Fund Program. The fund includes balance of payment support and financing of infrastructure and other capital projects. Food is administered in close cooperation with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). USAID emphasizes:

- Stimulation of market economies and investment by US companies in developing nations;
- Improvement of schools, colleges, training organizations, supportive government ministries, and other institutions to support economic growth;
- Policy reform to advance development; and
- Transfer of technology to help countries produce their own resources.

d. **United States Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).** OFDA is the federal agency responsible for providing prompt nonmilitary assistance to alleviate loss of life and suffering of foreign disaster victims.

OFDA may request DOD assistance during HA operations. Coordination and determination of required forces is normally accomplished through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. **United States Information Agency.** The USIA, or USIS overseas, helps to achieve US foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes overseas. The agency advises the President and US departments outside CONUS on the possible impact of policy, programs, and official statements on foreign opinion. USIA monitors the impact of PO on local attitudes and aids PO forces by gaining popular support for them. To encourage public support for US policy objectives and to counter hostile attempts to distort and frustrate US programs, USIA conducts a wide range of information activities.

5. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense has lead management and funding responsibility for PO that involve US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat.

a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has several assistants who may be involved in the conduct of PO.

- **Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) (ASD[S&R]).** ASD(S&R) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USDP and the Secretary of Defense on DOD policy and planning for US participation in international PK and PE operations. In these capacities, the ASD(S&R) shall develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy and plans for matters related to the participation of Armed Forces of the United States and other DOD resources in UN and other international PK or PE activities. This includes the development of policy related to creating, identifying, training, exercising, and committing military forces for such purposes.

- **Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]).** ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USDP and planning-related special operations (SO) and MOOTW within the Department of Defense. SOF, especially CA, PSYOP, and SF units, have unique capabilities and responsibilities for peace operations. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance serves under the ASD(SO/LIC). Among other responsibilities, ASD(SO/LIC):

  •• Provides policy guidance and oversees planning, programming, resourcing, and execution of SO and MOOTW activities;

  •• Provides policy concerning PSYOP forces, plans, and programs;

  •• Oversees integrated development and refinement of doctrine, strategies, and processes for SO and MOOTW, to include supporting studies and analyses;

  •• Reviews and evaluates policies, processes, and programs of DOD components to plan, resource, prepare forces, and execute SO and MOOTW and initiate and coordinate action to enhance readiness;

  •• Supervises overall preparation and justification of program recommendations and budget proposals for SO activities in the Five Year Defense Plan;

•• Advises the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) on acquisition priorities and requirements for SO- and MOOTW-related materiel and equipment, to include participation in appropriate boards and committees; and

•• Serves as principal staff assistant and advisor to the USDP and Secretary of Defense.

- **Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).** DSAA directs, administers, and supervises the execution of security assistance programs. This involves providing guidance to Military Services, unified commands, and in-country security assistance officers in their efforts to assist foreign governments obtain US equipment, training, and other defense-related services authorized by the FAA, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act.

b. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides overall guidance to combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The entire Joint Staff monitors aspects of PO. The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate provides PO guidance, and the Operations Directorate monitors current PO. Often, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs that a joint action cell be formed to organize, coordinate, and monitor the support required. This cell will develop written taskings and coordinate these taskings with affected combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, and the heads of other DOD agencies.

c. **Combatant Commanders**

- MCM-144-93, "Implementation of the Unified Command Plan" stipulates that: "The commander of a unified command that includes a general geographic area of responsibility is responsible for commanding US forces conducting peacekeeping operations within the commander's geographic area of responsibility, whether as a unilateral US action or as part of a multinational coalition; and, unless otherwise directed by the NCA, supporting US forces under the direction of a multinational peacekeeping organization."

  Note: The term "peacekeeping," as used in MCM-144-93, "Implementation of the Unified Command Plan," is intended to include all PO, not just peacekeeping.

- A geographic combatant commander (CINC) exercises COCOM over assigned forces. The tasked CINC will normally exercise OPCON over attached forces. Combatant commanders will provide or receive support from other combatant commanders in accordance with NCA orders. This support may also include assisting forces of other nations when such support is in accordance with a diplomatic agreement. Because of the broad nature of PO, the entire geographic combatant command staff may be involved in planning, monitoring, or coordinating support to PO activities.

d. **Executive Agent (EA).** The Secretary of Defense may appoint a Service as an EA to act on behalf of the Department of Defense. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the EA. An EA may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. The Department of the Army is

the EA for all US personnel assigned to duty as MILOBs. Through the USMOG-W, the Department of the Army provides administrative and logistic support of US observers, to include personnel records management (including efficiency reports and notification of personnel actions), finance, and ensuring the well-being of deployed personnel.

6. Department of Transportation

a. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has technical capabilities and expertise in public transportation that may be available upon request to assist specific HA operations. The primary organization with which PO forces may work is the USCG.

b. The USCG is an agency of the DOT and is a military Service with law enforcement authority. In CONUS, the USCG is responsible for assuring the safety and security of US ports and waterways, and provides the following services: enforcing vessel cargo and waterfront facility regulations; inspecting vessels, including vessels of the Ready Reserve Force; licensing of mariners; enforcing customs laws; establishing and servicing aids to navigation; regulating and administering bridges over navigable waterways; port emergency response; maritime search and rescue (both within and beyond CONUS); and operation of vessel traffic services in selected ports and establishing safety and security zones. Outside of CONUS, the USCG operates in support of geographic combatant commanders.

7. Department of Agriculture

The USDA has projects and activities ongoing in foreign countries and can provide technical assistance to PO forces, if requested. The USDA may provide important support to nation assistance programs.

8. Department of Justice

Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies with which FHA forces may come into contact include the International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), DEA, and Community Relations Service (CRS).

a. The ICITAP was established within the DOJ in 1986 to enhance investigative capabilities in democracies throughout Latin America. The ICITAP is funded through the Economic Support Fund appropriations to USAID. The DOS provides policy guidance and oversight, while design, development, and implementation of projects rests with the DOJ. The ICITAP directs its assistance primarily at police agencies, but an important focus is the relationship between the police, judges, and prosecutors. Through training courses, conferences, and seminars, greater coordination among the three criminal justice sectors is sought.

b. **Drug Enforcement Administration.** DEA programs and projects can be developed for specific countries and regions. The DEA can:

- Assist in providing legal, self-sustaining, income-earning alternatives to underdeveloped, agriculturally based nations; and
- Improve international exchange of information about successful drug prevention and education programs.

c. **Community Relations Service.** CRS is under the general authority of the attorney general. CRS provides on-site resolution assistance through a field staff of mediators and conciliators. CRS not only aids in resolving difficulties as they erupt but also seeks to assist and support communities in developing mechanisms to address future problems.

9. Office of International Affairs

The Office of International Affairs coordinates and supports DOJ international efforts and supports the DOS during international treaty negotiations.

10. Public Health Service

Public Health Service (PHS) promotes the protection and advancement of a nation's physical and mental health. PO forces are most likely to work with PHS when bringing migrants or refugees into the United States or US territories. PHS ensures that no health threat is posed by such immigrations.

11. Immigration and Naturalization Service

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) provides information and service to the general public while enforcing immigration control. The INS:

a. Facilitates the entry of persons legally admissible as visitors or as immigrants of the United States;

b. Grants benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including assistance to those seeking permanent resident status or naturalization;

c. Prevents unlawful entry to the United States; and

d. Apprehends and removes aliens who enter or remain illegally in the United States or whose stay is not in the best interests of this nation.

12. Non-UN Sponsored Peace Operations

The United States may participate in PO sponsored by the UN, regional organizations or friendly countries, or as a unilateral action. Participation in PO not sponsored by the UN is more likely in PKO than in PEO. PEO would normally only be conducted when there is broad international consensus legitimizing such actions. Thus the UN would be the appropriate forum.

a. PKO depend on the consent of the parties to a dispute, the HN, and the agreement of other powers that perceive their interests may be affected. Consequently, the UN is not always an acceptable or practicable sponsor of PKO, as was the case leading to the establishment of the MFO.

b. Some of the reasons the United States may participate in a PKO outside of UN sponsorship are as follows.

- Lack of agreement in the UN Security Council that would lead at least one of the five permanent members to veto the establishment of the operation. Any one of the five permanent members may block approval with a veto. For example, the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty presumed that a UN force and UN observers would monitor the security arrangements. However, faced with Arab opposition and a threatened Soviet veto, the mandate for UN Emergency Force II expired and the force and observers began to withdraw. On 18 May 1981, Egypt and Israel, with the assistance of the United States, opened negotiations leading to the creation of the MFO on 3 August 1981.

- The attitude of some developing nations toward a UN PK force might favor another organization to sponsor the effort. While developing nations often find a UN PK force a convenient means of controlling a dangerous local conflict, they also have reservations. For example, some African nations regarded the UN operation in the Congo as thinly disguised western interference, and are now inclined to favor the OAU as a sponsor for PK.
- An existing treaty, agreement, or regional organization may call for US participation without the involvement of the UN. For example, when the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted in 1995, the United States participated in the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru along with the other Guarantor nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) of the 1947 Treaty of Inmarty.

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APPENDIX C
UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Annex A United Nations Reimbursement Procedures

UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. General

The primary responsibility of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter provides the TOR for the various elements of the UN in fulfilling this responsibility. Article 29 of the UN Charter is generally agreed to be the basis of authority for the UN to conduct PKO. Article 42 of the UN Charter provides the authority for UN PEO. This appendix provides a general description of UN organization and functions, and includes pertinent extracts of the UN Charter.

2. UN Headquarters Organization

a. **Security Council.** The Security Council is vested with the authority from the UN Charter to investigate any situation or conflict that threatens international peace and security. It will usually task the SYG to prepare a plan to deal with the crisis and will be the approving authority for that plan. The Security Council may either decide to take action or refer the matter to the UN General Assembly for consideration. The Council's decisions are theoretically binding on all member states of the UN.

b. **Secretary General.** The SYG is responsible to the security council for the organization, conduct, and direction of UN PKO. The office is responsible for conducting negotiations with the HNs, belligerents, and contributing states, preparing the operational plan and presenting it to the Security Council for approval.

c. **General Assembly.** The General Assembly may consider any matter referred to it by the Security Council or may consider any other situation or conflict it feels impairs the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The recommendations of the General Assembly are not binding on the SYG, the Security Council, or its own members. Its powers in conflict resolution are not well-defined.

d. **Military Staff Committee (MSC).** The MSC was originally designed to advise and assist the Security Council and the SYG on matters of military concern. It is composed of the chief of staff of the permanent representatives of the Security Council or their representatives. Although envisioned as an international joint staff to plan, organize, and command UN PKO, various factors precluded its development in that direction. From time to time, a military advisor or assistant has been appointed to advise and assist the SYG on military matters.

e. **Secretariat**

- The UN Secretariat is headed by the SYG and is the permanent organization responsible for the establishment, coordination, and administration of PKO. Several secretariat departments are involved in PKO and may interface directly with the SRSG (see Figure C-1).

- The Under SYGs (USYGs) are responsible to the SYG for policy concerns with respect to PKO. The two USYGs for Political Affairs oversee PO based on their geographic location.

- The USYG for Peacekeeping is responsible to the SYG for the day-to-day operational matters affecting PO. Under the USYG for Peacekeeping is the military advisor to the SYG as well as the Director, Field Administration and Logistics Division, who is responsible for logistic support of PO.



Figure C-1. United Nations Secretariat

- The USYG for Administration and Management is responsible to the SYG for the administration and financial support of PKO.

- The USYG for Humanitarian Affairs may also provide guidance to the SRSG with respect to the humanitarian aspects of a specific PO and interface with PVOs and NGOs.

- The Department of Political Affairs is the political arm of the SYG in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and the control and resolution of conflicts within states. As such, it advises on policy in those areas and is responsible for political research and analysis. It also has executive responsibilities in the fields of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, including negotiations and other diplomatic activities. All these functions and responsibilities as they relate to field operations are prepared and carried out by the department under the overall direction of the SYG.

- The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the operational arm of the SYG for the day-to-day management of PKO. In this capacity, the department acts as the main channel of communication between UN headquarters and the field. However, the Department of Political Affairs (on strictly political matters), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (on humanitarian policy matters), and the Department of Administration and Management are also in regular contact with the field (see Figure C-2).



Figure C-2. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

- The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for the coordination of humanitarian operations, particularly for making the necessary arrangements for the timely and effective delivery of assistance by UN relief organizations. As the focal point of the SYG for HA, its responsibilities also include early warning of potential conflicts and negotiations for access to populations in need. In most recent complex operations, the Department has appointed a field-based humanitarian coordinator, who works under the authority of the SRSG and is in direct contact with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. In some cases, the humanitarian coordinator is with an agency or program, while in others the coordinator is independent.

f. **Field Administration and Logistics Division**

- Each UN PO will have a UN official on staff. This official will command the deployed elements of the Field Administration and Logistics Division and be responsible for all matters related to the operation. The official is usually a career UN civil servant. The Field Administration and Logistics Division, in coordination with selected military staff officers, is also responsible for negotiating the SOFA, receiving and dispatching UN personnel, and establishing administrative and logistic SOPs (see Figure C-2).

- The Field Administrative and Logistics Division is responsible for the support of UN-sponsored POs, including contracting. The UN procures on the world market and uses international transportation to ship directly to the force area. If UN-contracted transportation assets are inadequate or not available, the UN has historically requested US lift assets. Intratheater lift forces may be placed under the OPCON of the PO force commander. Intertheater lift is a major US contribution to UN-sponsored PO. However, US intertheater lift assets always remain under the COCOM of US Transportation Command.

3. Subordinate UN Organizations

UN organizations primarily concerned with PO include the following.

a. **United Nations Office of the High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR).**

- The UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the UN system, NGOs, or private technical agencies.

- Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with UNHCR before and during the operation, or failure to meet UNHCR standards, may preclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military disengages. To preclude this, a working relationship should be established with UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR. A copy of the UNHCR text that outlines specifications for refugee camp construction should be available.

b. **United Nations Disaster Management Team (UN-DMT).** The UN-DMT is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to persons compelled to leave their

homes as a result of disasters, natural and otherwise.

c. **United Nations Department Of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).**

- UNDHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation (through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related matters.

- UNDHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management entities and emergency services worldwide and is able to mobilize specialized resources. The appointed UNDHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at country level, and also coordinates locally represented PVOs and NGOs as required. The resident coordinator convenes the UN-DMT at country level, seeking unity of effort among all the various PVOs, NGOs, and agencies. The following UN programs help form the UN-DMT when the UN system has been mobilized to assist in an emergency.

d. **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).** UNDP promotes the incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all aspects of disaster management. Work is long range. The UNDP senior member may be appointed as a regional coordinator or may also serve as the UNDHA in-country coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the resident coordinator and to the UN-DMT.

e. **World Food Programme (WFP).** WFP is an operational, relief-oriented organization. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence aligned to a special segment of the population. This organization mobilizes and coordinates the delivery of complementary emergency and program food aid from bilateral and other sources.

f. **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).** UNICEF is a relief-oriented organization. It attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health and nutrition. The activities of this organization may include social programs, child feed (in collaboration with WFP), water supplies, sanitation, and direct health intervention (in coordination with the World Health Organization [WHO]). UNICEF provides related management and logistic support.

g. **World Health Organization.** WHO is primarily involved in long-range programs. It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance includes the preparedness of health services for rapid response to disasters.

h. **Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) (FAO).** FAO is an organization also involved in long-range programs. It provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization emphasizes local food production. It also monitors food production, exports and imports, and forecasts any requirements for exceptional food assistance.

4. Planning Process

While no formal planning process exists for UN PKO, the planning unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for developing plans for approved operations. Each operation is unique and individually authorized, planned, and controlled. Instead

of a universal checklist, a general pattern based on past experience is utilized for UN planning.

a. **Situational Analysis.** On the outbreak of a conflict, the Security Council or General Assembly may perceive this as a threat to international peace and security. The situation may be debated, and if a permanent member of the Security Council does not use its veto, a resolution may be passed.

b. **Security Council Resolutions.** A Security Council resolution will usually call for a cease fire and may appoint a special representative, ambassador, or mediator to be sent to the conflict area to report on the crisis. The resolution may also require the SYG to prepare a plan to deal with the conflict by creating a PO. The SYG will then be responsible for informal negotiations and the preparation of a mandate. Mandates are typically established for a 6-month period and must be renewed by the Security Council twice per year.

c. **Informal Preparations.** Based on the direction the SYG receives from the Security Council, informal negotiations will commence. This will involve negotiations with member states to establish the tentative contributions (personnel, financial, logistic) that can be provided to a UN force. The requirements, balanced with the scale of contribution, will determine the general composition and organization of the force. The SYG will approach the disputing parties and draft a mutually acceptable and enforceable mandate which will also be acceptable to contributing members. The final product of these negotiations should be a viable mandate. From this mandate will be derived the role, mission, and tasks of the operation.

d. **Mandate.** The SYG will submit a plan for the PKO and a proposed mandate for approval by the Security Council. If the council approves the plan and the mandate, the SYG will commence formal preparations. The mandate will provide the international legal authority for the operation. A second and equally important document is the budget plan which must be accepted to ensure that the operation can be funded.

e. **Formal Preparations**

- With the approval of the mandate and the budget, the SYG will ensure that negotiations are commenced with the disputing parties and the HN for preparation of the SOFA. The SYG will select the key appointments for the force. They are the force commander, a military officer from a nation not involved in the conflict, and the UN political advisor (often titled the SRSG), normally a career diplomat. These appointments have usually been agreed to by the belligerents prior to the formal announcement to the media. The appointment of HOM may be either the force commander or the SRSG.

- The SYG will make informal requests for military forces and equipment to the contributing members in the form of a verbal request. The requests at this stage will still be general in nature, allowing some flexibility to contributing members, until the exact scale of the force and international composition is determined. Once the UN has an acceptable force composition, it will issue formal requests for troops and equipment services in the form of notes, verbals, or letters of assistance.

f. **Participating Member-State Preparations**

- Participating member states will negotiate the extent of their contribution to the operation with the UN and the HN for memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to secure those services or

support from the HN that are not provided by the UN. It is not unusual for the UN to place limits on national contributions due to nonmilitary factors such as financial limitations.

- The UN should finalize the SOFA with the HN prior to deployment of the force. Until the SOFA is finalized, a member of the PO force will be subject to the local laws or granted diplomatic status.

g. **Reception and Service Support**

- The Field Administration and Logistics Division will usually deploy an advance party to establish reception and service support arrangements for the operation. The UN will plan, organize, and direct the deployment of the force to the theater.

- National contingents will conduct training and administrative preparations required for deployment to the operation. National reconnaissance may not be allowed prior to deployment.

h. **End Survey.** The key action at the start of operations with the UN is the conduct of the "end survey." The end survey is performed by the UN command after the arrival of a national force. The survey is the UN military staff identification of the equipment, supplies, and personnel that the member country has deployed in support of the mission. Based on that survey, the UN command can identify member nation capabilities and what items the UN is responsible to support or provide reimbursement for costs associated with operational use. The UN normally pays for equipment deployment and the costs to maintain equipment for operational use. The UN normally also pays for personnel rotations twice annually, usually on a 6-month basis. For additional information on UN reimbursement procedures, refer to Annex A of this appendix, "United Nations Reimbursement Procedures."

i. **Terms of Reference.** This document is described in Annex C ("Terms of Reference") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." If a US force is deployed without being tasked in the TOR, the UN will not provide resources or reimbursement to support that force.

j. **Deployment.** Deployment is usually a UN responsibility. It may be delegated to nations which possess a self-deployment capability. In the absence of this capability, a third nation such as the United States may, under UN arrangements, assist in deployment of national contingents. Upon arrival in the operational area, the national contingents are placed under OPCON of the force commander.

k. **Operational Control.** The operational chain of command for PKO will be from the unit commander to the force commander to the HOM; if not the force commander, to the SYG, who will report to the Security Council. In certain cases, the US forces may be placed under OPCON of a foreign commander, but command is exercised only in the US chain to the NCA.

5. UN Documents

a. **United Nations Mandate.** The Security Council or General Assembly resolution authorizing and defining a PO is referred to as "the mandate." The mandate is the authority under which an operation is conducted. It may be subject to periodic renewal. Mandates are described in Annex A ("Mandates") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

b. **UN Secretary-General Directive.** The UN SYG, upon appointing the force or mission commander, will issue a formal

written directive outlining the TOR. Subsequent direction will be issued in supplementary directives.

c. **UN Regulations.** The force commander will issue specific force regulations once a force has been established. These regulations will cover such subjects as:

- General provisions such as regulations, definitions, instructions, amendments.
- International character such as uniform, insignia, privileges, immunities.
- Authority of the force commander such as command authority, chain of command, delegation, discipline, and employment of military police.
- General administrative, executive, and financial arrangements such as authority of the SYG and the force commander, finance and accounting, personnel, food, accommodations, amenities, transportation, supplies, equipment, communications, maintenance, medical, dental, sanitation, contracts, and public information services.
- Rights and duties of members of the force, such as respect for local law, conduct, legal protection, information handling, honors and awards, jurisdiction, customs duties, foreign exchange regulations, identity cards, driving privileges, pay, overseas service allowances, service-related death, injury or illness, dependents, leave, and promotions.
- Observance of international conventions applicable to military personnel.

d. **Force Commander's Directive.** This is also referred to as SOPs or force standing orders. Upon receipt of the UN regulations, the force commander will prepare more detailed regulations and operating procedures which will be issued to the force. All key members of the force must be completely knowledgeable of them since all operations will be conducted in accordance with them. Although each operation is unique and has its own SOPs, the UN has standardized the main subject headings, as outlined in Annex E ("Standing Operating Procedures") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations." SOPs are designed and issued for each force.

e. **Memoranda of Understanding.** MOUs may be reached between the force commander, the UN, other PO force contingents and the HN. These will be concerned primarily with administrative matters such as use of airports for rotation, national visitors, and similar matters requiring coordination.

6. Mine Clearance

The need for mine clearance has grown significantly in a number of regions around the world. There are an estimated 110 million landmines affecting at least 70 countries, killing and wounding some 20,000 people each year. As a result, the UN is increasingly called upon to operate mine clearance programs in areas that are completely infested with landmines and UXO. Consequently, prior to any large deployment of personnel or equipment to a given area, the UN must prepare for a safe working environment by initiating preliminary mine clearance activities in localized areas. Once this has been completed, a broader operation can be accommodated to conduct mine clearance activities on a more comprehensive scale.

a. The clearance of areas for use by a supported nation is undertaken only when specially mandated by the Security Council. It is standard procedure for the UN to not only

perform mine clearance but also to assist a supported nation in the development of its own sustainable clearance capacity.

- The UN program may include such topics as mine awareness, mine marking, mine survey, and mine clearance as well as UXO disposal. Additionally, the program's overall efforts may go beyond mine-specific issues to cover related areas, such as management and logistics, training, and support.

- The UN may vary its approach to each situation as there are currently no standardized templates or universal procedures established for mine clearance activities worldwide.

- Mine clearance in the UN is presently divided into two areas:

  •• The Demining Unit (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) which plans and advises on mine clearing activities carried out under UN auspices as well as maintains contact with governments and organizations that participate in or contribute to these activities; and

  •• The Mine Clearance and Policy Unit (Department of Humanitarian Affairs) which serves as the focal point for coordinating all humanitarian mine clearance and related activities.

  These two units work together to ensure a seamless approach to United Nations Mine Clearance Activities.

b. The UN also maintains a demining data base. Established by a General Assembly resolution in 1994, the data base is a regularly updated repository designed to keep the global public informed about the problem of uncleared landmines. The data base can be accessed on the Internet at http:// www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/. Topics include the following.

- Demining Reports.
- "Landmines" Newsletter.
- Conferences.
- Other Landmine Links.
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
- Arms Trade Data Base.
- Landmine Awareness Education.
- University of Pittsburgh.
- Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
- Norwegian People's Aid.
- Handicap International.
- US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining.
- US Department of State — Mine Web.
- The Canadian International Demining Center.
- Documents.

  •• General Assembly Resolution 51/149: "Assistance in Mine Clearance."

  •• Resolution adopted by the 96th Inter-parliamentary Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union: "Worldwide Ban

on Anti-personnel Mines and the Need for Mine Clearance for Humanitarian Purposes."

•• Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations: Mine Clearance and Related Activities.

•• SG Report on Assistance in Mine Clearance.

•• SG Report on Moratorium on Export of Landmines.

•• Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance.

•• Latest News.

• International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations.

7. UN Volunteers

This program is administered by the UNDP, which maintains a roster of some 5,000 specialists that may be available to assist missions in a variety of activities, including but not limited to the following: demilitarization and demobilization; electoral activities and training; camp construction and management; conflict resolution training; human rights; epidemiology; food aid distribution; public information; sanitation; and crime prevention.

8. UN Charter

See Figure C-3 for extracts of the UN Charter that contains Articles pertinent to PO.

EXTRACTS FROM THE UN CHARTER

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 33

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Figure C-3. Extracts from the UN Charter

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE,
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Figure C-3. Extracts from the UN Charter (cont'd)

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C
UNITED NATIONS REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

1. The United States normally provides support to the UN on a reimbursable basis. During all UN operations, commanders should comply with national and UN procedures to ensure that all reimbursable expenses are captured and charged to the UN.

2. Prior to providing support to a UN operation, the Department of Defense normally negotiates an agreement under provisions of Section 607 of the FAA. This agreement ensures that UN reimbursements are returned to the Department of Defense vice the US Treasury.

3. The UN automatically pays troop reimbursements ($988 per soldier per month, plus usage factor per soldier), plus supplemental pay for specialists. The UN construes the numbers of specialists as 25% of the logistic (support) contingents and 10% of other (infantry etc.) contingents, so monthly personnel strength reports for the UN must indicate unit type and follow UN guidance.

4. Reimbursements for all other categories are based upon authorization and submission of proper documentation of expenses.

a. The general rule is that the UN must authorize the expenditure before it is incurred.

b. Specific procedures differ from mission to mission and will be included in the mission "Guidelines for Contributing Nations."

5. The UN authorizes expenditures through a letter of assist (LOA) issued by UN Headquarters to the United States government.

a. Expenditures are generally not reimbursable unless an LOA has been issued.

b. While the LOA authorizes the expenditure, the USG must present a bill for services or supplies provided pursuant to the LOA before any payment is made.

6. While the UN normally provides logistic support to contingents in PKO, there are occasions when contributing states must provide their own logistic support for reimbursement by the UN.

a. Self support must be authorized by a LOA.

b. The mission will specify procedures for documenting self support costs and submitting bills for reimbursement.

7. With the general exception of watercraft and aircraft, the UN reimburses member states for depreciation of equipment deployed in support of UN operations.

a. To obtain reimbursement, the deployed force must conduct a comprehensive joint inventory with UN officials upon arrival and departure in the mission area. These inventories are known as "in surveys" and "out surveys."

b. It is important that these inventories be conducted in accordance with mission directives and promptly submitted to the mission headquarters and the Joint Staff to ensure prompt reimbursement.

c. In missions where the United States provides forces, precertification of US bills in the field by the mission CAO will greatly

speed up the process of validating bills upon submission by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).

8. Components are responsible for capturing and reporting costs of goods and services provided to the UN. This information should be reported through Service channels to the DFAS for billing to the UN.

9. Within the UN mission headquarters, the CAO (or Director of Administration [DOA] in larger missions) is responsible for all logistics and financial issues.

a. The CAO or DOA establishes detailed procedures for validating requirements and authorizing reimbursements within the mission.

b. Logistics and financial managers must work closely with the CAO or DOA to ensure that logistics and accounting systems capture sufficient detail to support billings.

APPENDIX D
CHAINS OF COMMAND



Figure D-1. Notional Chain of Command for a Peacekeeping Operation



Figure D-2. Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers

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6. Internet Sites

a. Joint Doctrine Home page: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

b. Defense Link Home page: http://www.defenselink.mil

Defense Link is an entry point for Internet sites for Services, SecDef, and related agencies. Includes information about combatant commands and selected peace operations.

c. International Peacekeeping News Home page: http://csf.colorado.edu/dfax/ipn/

Published every 6 weeks; summarizes by region, major peacekeeping issues as documented in international publications; itemizes recent UNSC resolutions; reviews current ongoing UN peacekeeping missions.

d. Center for Defense Information Home page: http://www.cdi.org

Publishes a bi-weekly listing recent publications on peacekeeping and multilateral military operations.

e. United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Home page: http://www.un.org

Joint Staff (J-34) Combating Terrorism SIPRNET homepage contains links to all CINC Homepages: nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/'~dj3cleap/j34.html.
Department of State Homepage: travel.state.gov/travel_warnings.html

DPKO, Training Unit develops and distributes all UN approved training material. This ranges from VCR-based training programs to books and other publications supporting UN mission training programs. (Includes a booklet, Mission Readiness and Stress Management, prepared by the Office of Human Resources Management, published in 1995. This booklet contains detailed checklists for civilian UN employees assigned to a UN PK mission, many of which may be of interest to military practitioners.)

f. International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers Home page: http:www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca

The Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center provides instruction on an array of peacekeeping related disciplines, ranging from legal and logistical challenges, to leader preparation and lessons-learned. The Center recently assumed the role as the secretariat for the International Association.

g. Watson Institute: The Humanitarianism and War Project Home Page: http://www.brown.edu/Department/Watson Institute/H W/H W ms.shtml

The Humanitarianism and War Project is an independent policy research initiative which reviews the experience of the international community in responding to recent complex emergencies around the world. The Project works at the interface between humanitarian

action and political-military forces. Relying primarily on data gathered from interviews with those involved in crises, it frames recommendations to improve the functioning of the world's humanitarian system. Since its inception in 1991, the Project has received resources from a wide range of largely practitioner organizations, including UN, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies and private foundations. In addition to country monographs and training materials, the Project publishes an array of books and articles.

h. United States Institute of Peace Home Page: http://www.usip.org

This site contains information by and about the United States Institute of Peace and a collection of links to Internet resources relating to international conflict resolution, negotiation theory, and peace studies.

i. United Nations Demining Data Base: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/

j. Joint Warfighting Center Homepage: http://www.jwfc.js.mil

The JWFC homepage contains the "Peace Operations Database." This data base contains information regarding peace operations doctrine and policy, humanitarian issues, research papers, etc. The data base is updated quarterly, and is a more robust version of the data base originally published as the "JEL Peace Operations CD-ROM."

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APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-07.3, 29 April 94, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations."

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP (DOCTRINE)//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

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Army:	US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181
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Navy:	CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps:	Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA 31704-5000
Coast Guard:	Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD) 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADL	armistice demarcation line
AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
AO	Administration Officer
AOL	area of limitation
AOS	area of separation
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(S&R)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements)
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)
BZ	buffer zone
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAO	chief administrative officer
CINC	commander in chief
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONCAP	construction capabilities contract program
CONUS	continental United States
CRS	Community Relations Service
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
DAO	defense attaché officer
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOA	Director of Administration
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
EA	executive agent
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance

FSO	foreign service officer
GI&S	geospatial information and services
GPS	global positioning system
HA	humanitarian assistance
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOM	head of mission
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICITAP	International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO	information operations
I/R	internment/resettlement
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LOA	letter of assist
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program
MFO	multinational force and observers
MILOB	military observer
MNF	Multinational Force
MOE	measures of effectiveness
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MP	military police
MSC	Military Staff Committee
MSG	Marine Security Guard
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	national disclosure policy
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMS	national military strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSC/DC	Deputies Committee of the National Security Council
NSS	national security strategy
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance

OP	observation post
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PE	peace enforcement
PEO	peace enforcement operations
PHS	Public Health Service
PK	peacekeeping
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PME	professional military education
PO	peace operations
POW	prisoner of war
PSO	post security officer
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
PVT	positioning, velocity, and timing
R&R	rest and recuperation
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO	regional security officer
SAO	security assistance officer
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SF	special forces
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOMA	status of mission agreement
SOP	standing operating procedure
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
SYG	Secretary General (UN)
TOR	terms of reference
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-DMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNPA	United Nations Participation Act
UNTAC	United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USDP	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USMOG-W	United States Military Observer Group — Washington
USYG	Under Secretary General
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of limitation. A defined area where specific limitations apply to the strength and fortifications of disputing or belligerent forces. Normally, upper limits are established for the number and type of formations, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, artillery, and other weapons systems in the area of limitation. Also called AOL. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

area of separation. See buffer zone. Also called AOS. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

armistice. In international law, a suspension or temporary cessation of hostilities by agreement between belligerent powers. (Joint Pub 1-02)

armistice demarcation line. A geographically defined line from which disputing or belligerent forces disengage and withdraw to their respective sides following a truce or cease fire agreement. Also called cease fire line in some United Nations operations. Also called ADL. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

buffer zone. A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Also called area of separation in some United Nations operations. Also called BZ. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

cease fire line. See armistice demarcation line. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist

in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demilitarized zone. A defined area in which the stationing, or concentrating of military forces, or the retention or establishment of military installations of any description, is prohibited. Also called DMZ. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. (Joint Pub 1-02)

executive agent. A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. Also called EA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and

equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

line of demarcation. A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone or area of limitation. A line of demarcation may also be used to define the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations to restore order. Operations intended to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. They are designed to return an unstable and lawless environment to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and restore civil authority. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

peace building. Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Also called PE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Also called PK. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

preventive deployment. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

UN*

Peace-building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. Peace-building includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace-enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

Peace-keeping is a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

Peace-making is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

Preventive Diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

*From General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, (N.Y.: The United Nations, October 1995). The document notes that "peace-enforcement is beyond the scope of this document."

NATO*

Conflict Prevention. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialized civilian organizations.

Peace Building. Peace Building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

Peace Enforcement (PE). PE operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

Peacekeeping (PK). PK operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the

consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions.

Preventive Deployment. Preventive deployments within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

*From Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11 December 1995. (PfP Unclassified).

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

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 3-07.3** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:




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