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Joint Counterdrug Operations



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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is designed to consolidate some of the existing information on counterdrug (CD) operations, but it is not intended as an all encompassing, single-source CD document. Other publications provide information for implementing the guidance provided in this publication in the areas of detailed planning, organizing, and employing forces for Department of Defense CD operations. References to these publications are made throughout this document.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, US Navy
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides General Background on Joint Counterdrug Operations**
 - **Discusses the General Threat**
 - **Covers Counterdrug Organizations**
 - **Focuses on Department of Defense Counterdrug Operations**
 - **Covers Planning Counterdrug Operations**
 - **Discusses the Execution of Counterdrug Operations**
-

Introduction and Overview

In 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance to Department of Defense forces that identified drug trafficking as a national security problem for the United States.

The United States role in counterdrug (CD) initiatives has evolved from independent actions to one of joint military and civilian cooperation. Although the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and its predecessor agencies have had primary responsibility for enforcing US drug laws, each significant expansion in drug abuse has brought additional Federal, state, and local agencies into the CD effort. **The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is a comprehensive program of CD actions** which employs a multinational and multiagency approach to the problem of illegal drugs and has five goals: educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco; increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. The Department of Defense (DOD) policy for CD support must be consistent with legal and regulatory constraints imposed by law.

General Threat

The economic drain of addiction, drug-related crime, and a multitude of associated family problems are the result of drug abuse.

Those who contribute to the production, transport, sale, and use of illegal drugs and laundering of drug money present a threat to the national security of the United States. To help ensure the safety and security of our citizens and preserve our national values, the threat from illegal drugs must be confronted. All personnel involved in CD activities should be familiar with the major categories of controlled substances, the common characteristics of traffickers and their organizations, and their strengths and weaknesses. The DEA identifies **the five major categories of controlled substances as: narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and cannabis.** The major drugs of abuse within the United States are cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. The production, transportation, and marketing of illegal substances are supported by systems similar in character but often uniquely different for each type of drug because of geographical considerations, processing requirements, and the weight and volume of the product itself. **A common denominator of the major drug industries is transportation,** whether air, maritime, or surface movement, including the techniques used to disguise these drug shipments. To be effective in CD efforts, knowledge of the threat is needed.

Counterdrug Organizations

For counterdrug (CD) operations to be successful and for available resources to be used in the most effective and efficient manner, all agencies must coordinate and integrate their efforts.

An understanding of each organization's roles, missions, and structure will help those involved in CD operations to better communicate and cooperate in the effort to reduce illegal drug supply and demand. The National Security Council is the principal forum for national security issues that require a Presidential decision. **The Office of National Drug Control Policy is the primary agency within the Executive Branch responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the NDCS.** The United States Interdiction Coordinator coordinates the efforts of US agencies involved in international interdiction programs. Policies and coordination of all aspects of drug enforcement are then overseen by the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of State, United States Information Agency, Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation, Department of Agriculture, Department of the Interior, and the Department of Education. Special arrangements have been created to focus specifically on drug traffickers throughout the United States and the world and include the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, the Organized Crime

Drug Enforcement Task Forces, DEA, Operation Alliance, Project North Star, Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos, and Operation Cadence. **The National Guard also provides military support for local-, state-, and Federally-sponsored domestic CD efforts.** The International Criminal Police Organization and many different intelligence organizations play a significant role in the distribution of intelligence data on international drug trafficking. Strategic, operational, and tactical efforts are applied to drug law enforcement just as in military support.

DOD Counterdrug Operations

The Department of Defense's principal CD mission is the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.

The desired end result of successful detection and monitoring is interdiction by a law enforcement agency (LEA), which can happen in three types of environments: air, maritime, or land. To be successful in supporting the drug interdiction process, **detection and monitoring must be closely organized and coordinated with all its support systems in place.** The following factors must work together in order to help the LEAs: host-nation (HN) support; command, control, communication, and computers; intelligence support; planning support; logistic support; training support; manpower support; research, development, and acquisition support; demand reduction; and land reconnaissance.

Planning Counterdrug Operations

CD operations are designed to reduce or eliminate the supply and demand for illegal drugs.

Only a comprehensive planning process at the strategic (national), operational, and tactical (regional) levels can provide the means to reach this goal. **The nature of the CD planning should be joint, multinational, and interagency,** thus requiring close coordination with all participants. The three levels of effort (strategic, operational, and tactical) for the planning and coordinating of CD operations apply equally to the Department of Defense, HN forces, and US LEAs and other agencies. **Unity of effort, alternate plans, simplicity, and priorities must all be considered** along with plan development, review, and support.

Execution of Counterdrug Operations

There are CD commanders designated by the Secretary of Defense.

The US Southern Command, US Atlantic Command, US Pacific Command, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command are designated the four CD commanders and are responsible for assisting in the protection of the United States from the intrusion of illegal drugs. HNs

and US LEAs combat drug production and trafficking with the help of special operations forces, psychological operations forces, civil affairs forces, and the Services.

CONCLUSION

The United States' role in CD initiatives has evolved into a comprehensive program of CD actions employing a multinational and multiagency approach to the problem of illegal drugs. The five goals of the NDCS provide a common framework for all US agencies involved in the collective effort to reduce illegal drug use and its consequences in America. Only a comprehensive planning process at the strategic (national), operational, and tactical (regional) levels can provide the means to reach this goal. The nature of the CD planning should be joint, multinational, and interagency, thus requiring close coordination with all participants.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

“Unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct and indirect threats to the US homeland, such as the illegal drug trade, especially when the potential for violence exceeds the capacity of domestic agencies.”

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997

1. General

In 1989 the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) issued guidance to Department of Defense (DOD) forces that identified drug trafficking as a national security problem for the United States and stated that the Department of Defense would have a “crucial role” in defending the United States from the threat of illegal drugs. **The Secretary of Defense designated the countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs as a “high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.”** The stated strategy for the Department of Defense’s role in counterdrug (CD) operations included attacking drugs at the source, in transit, and in the United States. This chapter provides a brief summary of US CD efforts, the national drug control strategy (NDCS), personnel supporting the overall strategy, and a description of the Department of Defense’s current roles. Subsequent chapters then provide a more in-depth explanation of the specific missions in DOD CD operations derived from the strategy and roles described in this chapter.

2. Background

The US role in CD initiatives has evolved from independent actions to one of joint military and civilian cooperation. In the past century, the US CD effort has changed in response to the drug abuse and drug trafficking problem. Although the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and its predecessor agencies have had primary responsibility for enforcing US drug laws

since 1914, each significant expansion in drug abuse has brought additional Federal, state, and local agencies into the CD effort. Each expansion in the number of agencies involved has been followed by a reorganization and consolidation of resources applied to this effort.

a. In 1986, the Congress passed an Anti-Drug Abuse Act to give the Executive Branch more authority to fight the “war on drugs.” The act left broad discretion to the Executive Branch in developing and implementing a national strategy. **Also in 1986, the President issued National Security Directive 221, which declared drug trafficking to be a threat to national security.**

b. After recognizing the limitations of various agencies involved in the CD effort, the President signed Executive Order 12590 which established the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB) in March 1987. Under the leadership of the Attorney General, the NDPB assumed responsibility for coordinating the Federal CD effort. Its specific responsibilities included the coordination of international and domestic law enforcement efforts and the development of a strategy for CD operations; however, the mechanisms used to coordinate this new Federal effort proved to be cumbersome. In an attempt to improve coordination, Congress passed a new Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988.

c. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 100-690) eliminated the NDPB and replaced it with **the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)** within the Executive

Branch. The ONDCP, under the leadership of the Director for National Drug Control Policy, **was created in order to establish a coherent national policy to unify the more than 30 Federal agencies and innumerable state and local authorities.** The law also directed the Executive Branch to develop an annual NDCS.

d. Congressional support for using the military in CD efforts culminated with passage of the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. This act imposed specific responsibilities upon the Department of Defense in support of the national CD effort and was the basis for many of the specific CD missions that have evolved. This act and subsequent actions that increased DOD CD responsibilities are discussed in detail in this publication.

3. National Drug Control Strategy

The NDCS is a comprehensive program of CD actions employing a multinational and multiagency approach to the problem of illegal drugs. The first NDCS was disseminated by the ONDCP in 1989. Since then, while the Federal government has achieved some success for its efforts, illegal drugs continue to pose a significant threat to the country. The strategy is a common framework for all US agencies involved in the collective effort to reduce illegal drug use and its consequences in America. Highlights of the NDCS (shown in Figure I-1) follow.

- **Goal 1. Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.** This goal targets the increased prevalence of drug use and substance abuse by our youth.
- **Goal 2. Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.** One of the major drug challenges facing our

STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

- Educate and Enable America's Youth to Reject Illegal Drugs as well as Alcohol and Tobacco
- Increase the Safety of America's Citizens by Substantially Reducing Drug-related Crime and Violence
- Reduce Health and Social Costs to the Public of Illegal Drug Use
- Shield America's Air, Land, and Sea Frontiers from the Drug Threat
- Break Foreign and Domestic Drug Sources of Supply

Figure I-1. Strategic Goals of the National Drug Control Strategy

nation is protecting our citizens from drug-related crime and violence.

- **Goal 3. Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.** US health care costs related to drug use have been growing steadily. Action must be taken to both expand the treatment system's capacity and increase its efficiency and effectiveness.
- **Goal 4. Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.** Interdiction, a visible sign of our Nation's commitment to fight drugs, has both symbolic value as a demonstration of national will and real value as a deterrent to the flow of drugs. The United States Interdiction Coordinator

(USIC), appointed by the Director, ONDCP, coordinates the efforts of US agencies involved in international interdiction programs.

- **Goal 5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.** Another critical challenge is to reduce the availability of drugs by reducing their cultivation and production and

destroying the trafficking organizations that bring drugs to the United States or distribute them within our Nation. The international narcotics control policy objectives of the United States remain clear and straightforward: to reduce drug flows and create a hostile international environment for narcotics trafficking.

TRANSNATIONAL THREAT: DRUG TRAFFICKING

The US response to the global scourge of drug abuse and drug trafficking is to integrate domestic and international efforts to reduce both the demand and the supply of drugs. Its ultimate success will depend on concerted efforts by the public, all levels of government and the private sector together with other governments, private groups and international organizations.

Domestically, we seek to educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs; increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; and shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Abroad, the US National Drug Control Strategy seeks to reduce cultivation of drug producing crops, interdict the flow of drugs at the source and in the transit zone (particularly in Central and South America, the Caribbean and Mexico), and stop drugs from entering our country. The strategy includes efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; root out corruption; destroy trafficking organizations; prevent money laundering; eradicate illegal drug crops in this hemisphere, Asia and the Middle East; and encourage alternate crop development. The United States is aggressively engaging international organizations, financial institutions and non-governmental organizations in counternarcotics cooperation. For instance, the President has invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to attack the finances, companies and individuals owned or controlled by the Cali Cartel as well as other Colombian drug cartels, freezing their assets in the United States, identifying front companies and barring Americans from doing business with them.

Our strategy recognizes that at home and abroad, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives must go hand-in-hand with law enforcement and interdiction. Long-term efforts will be maintained to help nations develop economies with fewer market incentives for producing drugs. We have also increased efforts abroad to foster public awareness and support for foreign governments' efforts to reduce drug abuse.

SOURCE: A National Security Strategy for a New Century,
The White House, May, 1997

4. Counterdrug Organizations Overview

a. **General.** There are many organizations involved in the NDCS. Figure I-2 provides a listing of the major Federal, composite-regional, state, and local organizations and their roles in CD operations. Although a somewhat complex chart, it does serve to show the intricacy of the US CD effort.

b. The lead or primary agencies and their major responsibilities are further highlighted in Figure I-3.

DETAILED CD ORGANIZATIONS' DESCRIPTIONS → SEE CHAPTER III, "COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS"

5. DOD Counterdrug Operations

a. **General.** Prior to the FY 89 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD CD activities were primarily in support of other Federal agencies and were executed through the Military Departments. That support mainly consisted of training, equipment loans and transfers, and limited support for law enforcement agency (LEA) operations. **With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, the Department of Defense increased its CD roles and missions.**

b. **Legal and Regulatory Considerations.** DOD policy for CD support must be consistent with legal and regulatory constraints imposed by law, including the following restrictions:

- **Posse Comitatus.** The "Posse Comitatus Act" is the popular name for **the statute** (title 18, US Code [USC], section 1385) **that makes it a crime to use the Army, and by derivation the Air Force, to enforce civil law.** It is the keystone of a legal philosophy that emphasizes the

distinction between the military mission and that of civilian law enforcement. **There are a number of exceptions to the statute that, with proper authorization, allow military support to civilian law enforcement.** The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) must review all operations to ensure that they comply with the Act.

- **Title 10, USC.** Title 10 is the "Armed Forces" section of the USC. **Chapter 18, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," gives basic guidance for the interaction of military, Reserve Component, and civilian LEAs.** Restrictions on direct participation in law enforcement activities, on use of information collected during military operations, use of military equipment and facilities, and guidelines on reimbursement are some of the topics covered. **Title 10 prohibits the military from directly participating in arrests, searches, seizures, or other similar activity unless authorized by law** (e.g., arrests on military property). The FY 1989 and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts have authorized the Department of Defense to provide more support to LEAs in the CD effort.
- **Foreign Assistance Act.** "The Mansfield Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act (22, USC §2291[c][1]) **prohibits US personnel from performing foreign law enforcement activities overseas.** Under Chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President may furnish assistance to eligible countries and international organizations for CD programs. **The 1978 "Kennedy Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act (22, USC §2304[a][2]) prohibits foreign governments with a record of gross human rights violations from**

COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS							
ORGANIZATIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE	DRUG TREATMENT	EDUC. CMTY ACTION; WORKPLACE	INTERNT'L INITIATIVES	DRUG INTERDICTIONS	RESEARCH & DEVEL	INTEL & INFO MGT
EXEC OFC PRES-NSC	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
EXEC OFC PRES-ONDCP	P	P	P	M	S	S	S
DOD	A	A	A	A	L(3) & M(3)	S	S(1), M(3)
DOJ-DEA	L(1), M(2)	-	A	M	M	-	L
-FBI	L(1), M(2)	-	A	S	S	-	M
-INS	S	-	A	A	S	S	A
-INS-US BORDER PATROL	S	-	A	A	M(4)	-	A
-US ATTORNEY	L(2), M(1)	-	A	L(2)	S	-	M
-US MARSHALS	S	-	A	S	S	-	A
-BUREAU OF PRISONS	S	A	A	-	-	-	A
-INTERPOL - (US)	S	-	A	M	S	-	S
DOS-INL	A	-	A	L	A	-	A
-AID	-	A	A	M	-	-	-
-COUNTRY TEAMS	A	-	A	M	S	-	S
-US INFO AGENCY	-	-	S	S	-	-	-

Figure I-2. Counterdrug Organizations

COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS									
ORGANIZATIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE	DRUG TREATMENT	EDUC. CMTY ACTION; WORKPLACE	INTERNT'L INITIATIVES	DRUG INTERDICTIONS	RESEARCH & DEVEL	INTEL & INFO MGT		
TREAS-CUSTOMS SERVICE	M	-	A	S	L(4) & (6)	-	M		
-ATF	S	-	A	A	S	-	A		
-IRS	S	-	A	A	S	-	A		
-SECRET SERVICE	S	-	A	A	A	-	A		
DOT-COAST GUARD	A	-	A	S	L(4) & (5)	-	M		
-FAA	S	-	A	A	S	-	A		
AGRIC-US FOREST SERVICE	A	-	A	-	S	-	A		
INTERIOR-BIA (INDIAN AFF)	-	-	A	-	A	-	A		
-BLM (LAND MGT)	-	-	A	-	A	-	A		
-NPS (PARK SVC)	A	-	A	-	S	-	A		
EDUCATION DEPT	A	M	M	-	-	S	A		
HEALTH & HUMAN SVC	-	L	M	A	-	M	A		

Figure I-2. Counterdrug Organizations (cont'd)

COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS							
ORGANIZATIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE	DRUG TREATMENT	EDUC. CMTY ACTION; WORKPLACE	INTERN'T'L INITIATIVES	DRUG INTERDICTIONS	RESEARCH & LEVEL	INTEL & INFO MGT
COMPOSITE/REGNL-HDTAS	M	-	A	S	M	-	S
-OCDETFs	M(1) & (2)	-	A	L(2)	A	-	M(2)
-OP ALLIANCE	M(1)	-	A	M	M	-	S
-PROJ NORTH STAR	M(1)	-	A	M	M	-	S
-OPBAT	M(1)	-	A	M	M	-	S
-EPIC	S	-	A	S	M	-	M
STATE/LOCAL -NG (STATE)	S	-	A	-	M	-	S
-DEA S/L TASK FORCES	M(1) & (2)	-	A	S	M	-	S
<p>A =ANCILLARY ROLE L =LEAD AGENCY & MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES L(1) =LEAD AGENCY - INVESTIGATIONS L(2) =LEAD AGENCY - PROSECUTIONS L(3) =LEAD AGENCY - DETECTION & MONITORING L(4) = SHARED LEAD AGENCY - AIR INTERDICTION L(5) =LEAD AGENCY - MARITIME INTERDICTION L(6) =LEAD AGENCY - LAND INTERDICTION M = MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES M(1) =MAJOR RESPON - INVESTIGATIONS M(2) = MAJOR RESPON - PROSECUTIONS M(3) = MAJOR RESPON -C3 M(4) = PRIMARY AGENCY - BORDER INTERDICTION P = POLICY GUIDANCE S = SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT ROLE S(1) = SIGNIF SPT ROLE - INTELLIGENCE</p>							

Figure I-2. Counterdrug Organizations (cont'd)

LEAD OR PRIMARY CD AGENCIES	
LEAD OR PRIMARY AGENCIES	RESPONSIBILITIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	DETECTION AND MONITORING OF AERIAL AND MARITIME TRANSIT OF ILLEGAL DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES
DEA	ENFORCING LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DRUGS & CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES - Investigating major interstate and international drug law violators - Enforcing regulations on legal manufacture and distribution of controlled substances and precursor chemicals - Managing national drug intelligence - Coordinating LEA and international counterparts' efforts
FBI	INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAWS - (concurrent with DEA) - Targeting major multi-jurisdictional trafficking organizations - Goal is dismantling trafficking networks
US ATTORNEYS	PROSECUTING CRIMINALS - Prosecuting violations of Federal Laws concerning controlled substances, money laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and violent and organized crime - Overseeing OCEDET's activities
US BORDER PATROL	"PRIMARY AGENCY" - LAND INTERDICTION BETWEEN US PORTS OF ENTRY (POEs)
DOS - BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS	COORDINATING US INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY REDUCTION STRATEGIES
US CUSTOMS SERVICE	LEAD - INTERDICTION AT LAND AND SEA POEs (with US Border Patrol as "Primary Agency" between POEs) AND US TERRITORIAL WATERS CO-LEAD (with Coast Guard) - AIR INTERDICTION
US COAST GUARD	LEAD - MARITIME INTERDICTION CO-LEAD (with Customs Service) - AIR INTERDICTION

Figure I-3. Lead or Primary CD Agencies

receiving security assistance (SA) funds. Additionally, section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USC §2420) prohibits the use of the funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad. Exceptions to these broad prohibitions may exist,

so each operation must be reviewed by the command's legal advisor.

- **Economy Act.** This statute (title 31, USC, section 1535) **requires that other Federal agencies reimburse the Department of Defense for services or support provided.** Reimbursement for DOD support provided to LEAs is not required when that support is in the normal course of military training and operations, results in benefit to the Department of Defense that is substantially equivalent to that which

would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training, or is provided under the authority of section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended.

- **Title 32, USC.** Title 32 is the **“National Guard” section of the USC**. Section 112, “Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities,” describes the mechanism by which the Secretary of Defense may provide funds to state governments (including the District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and US territories) for CD operations by the National Guard when not in federal service. **The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to troops when not in federal service.** Unlike title 10, this title does not specify how the National Guard may be employed. Each state determines its own employment laws. Nevertheless, under National Guard regulations, members of the National Guard generally may not participate directly in law enforcement activities. In some cases, however, **National Guardsmen may conduct limited law enforcement activities**, such as searches of shipping containers for illegal drugs, if their state law authorizes it. For these reasons, section 112 requires that the plans submitted by the state governors to the Secretary of Defense specify how the National Guard personnel will be used when providing support to LEAs.
- **Appropriations and Authorization Acts.** The acts passed each year to authorize or appropriate funds to the Department of Defense **often contain provisions relating to the CD effort**. For example, the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Department of Defense to be the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring

(D&M) of illegal drug shipments into the United States. The FY 1990-91 National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Department of Defense to create an integrated command, control, communications, and technical intelligence network linking the military and the various civilian LEAs. The first of these provisions was subsequently incorporated into permanent law (10 USC, section 124).

- **Fiscal Law. The proper expenditure of funds for CD operations is very important.** Failure to correctly apply fiscal principles to Federal activities can lead to the unauthorized expenditure of funds and potential criminal or administrative sanctions against those responsible. The principles are complex and the answers cannot necessarily be derived by applying common sense rules. **Funds appropriated must be used for the purpose for which they were appropriated.** Additionally, funds may also have specific limitations as to CD activities for which they can be used. After-the-fact audits by the Government Accounting Office and other agencies are common.
- **Executive Orders.** Executive Order (EO) 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” regulates the use of national intelligence assets. DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities,” and DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Actions of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons,” implement for the Department of Defense the provisions of EO 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” and set forth **the conditions under which the Department of Defense can collect information on US citizens**. Within the limits of the law, **the Department of Defense may collect information on US**

persons reasonably believed to be engaged in international illegal drug activities under the provisions of DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities,” and DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Actions of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons.”

- **International Agreements.** A number of international agreements exist that affect CD operations. **These include status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), multilateral conventions, and bilateral agreements.** Ad hoc agreements can also be prepared for specific operations. SOFAs establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. **Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries are a few of the topics usually covered.** In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with a nation, DOD personnel in foreign countries have the legal status of a tourist and are subject to all the laws and judicial processes of the host nation (HN) unless other conventions or agreements create exceptions to that rule.

“There is a tendency [in democratic countries] to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.”

**Sir John Slessor,
Strategy for the West, 1954**

- **Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Use of Force.** CD operations are **conducted under Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) standing peacetime ROE.** Military personnel have the right to defend themselves, other members of their unit, LEA officers, or innocent bystanders; however, they may use only the minimum force necessary for that

purpose. Deadly force (any force likely to cause serious injury or death) may be used only when lesser means have been exhausted, are unsuccessful, or lesser force poses unacceptable risks to friendly forces or individuals. **In instances where US Coast Guard (USCG) personnel are assigned to US Navy (USN) ships for law enforcement purposes, those ships may be governed by the Coast Guard’s Use of Force Policy** once tactical control (TACON) has been relinquished to the appropriate USCG operational commander. Use of warning and disabling fire would then be governed by the current USCG policy. Additional information on the Use of Force Policy and Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) procedures are discussed in Appendix B, “US Code Provisions,” and Appendix E, “Law Enforcement Detachments.”

- **Delegation of Authority.** To provide the geographic combatant commanders with greater flexibility and responsiveness, **the Secretary of Defense periodically delegates approval authority for certain kinds of DOD support to LEAs and HNs.** This guidance is provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3710.01, “Delegation of Authority for Approving Operational Support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterdrug-Related Deployment of DOD Personnel.”

DETAILED LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
-> SEE APPENDIX B, “US CODE PROVISIONS”

c. **DOD CD Policy and Guidance**

- **General.** With the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1989, promulgation of yearly

NDCSs, and issuance of the Secretary of Defense and the DOD Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (OCDEP&S), **CD guidance as well as general and specific missions have evolved to ensure support to the NDCS** for attacking the supply and demand of illegal drugs.

- 10 USC 124 assigned **three major responsibilities to the Department of Defense:**

- To act as the **single lead agency for D&M of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States;**

- **To integrate into an effective communications network the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets** of the United States that are dedicated (in whole or in part) to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States; and

- **To approve and fund State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard** to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of the LEAs.

- **SecDef Guidance**

- In 1989, responding to both the Defense Authorization Act and the first NDCS, the Secretary of Defense issued the "DOD Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy." In response to the 1993 Interim NDCS released by the Director of the ONDCP, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance in order to continue to aggressively execute a comprehensive CD program. **The DOD CD policy enhances programs that support source nation activities,**

dismantle cartels, and demand reduction. Consistent with applicable laws, the Department of Defense will continue to support Federal, state, and local LEAs in their efforts to disrupt the transport of illegal drugs into the United States, emphasizing the critical border locations.

- An overview of program guidance promulgated by the Secretary of Defense through the DOD OCDEP&S is shown in Figure I-4.

d. Specific CD Mission Categories.

From the various sources that have requested DOD assistance, specific missions in support of CD operations have been derived for the US military. In some instances, combinations of missions (other than D&M and host-nation support [HNS]) are categorized as "counterdrug operational support" or "counterdrug nonoperational support." **In general, CD operational support is CD support to LEAs or HNs involving US military personnel and their associated equipment and training provided by the combatant commanders and Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the Services.** CD operational support does not include equipment alone, but includes conduct of joint law enforcement investigations or other support provided by the Services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders and CINCNORAD. **CD nonoperational support is support provided to LEAs or HNs that includes training in formal schools, loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of facilities (such as buildings, training areas, and ranges), transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the Services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders and**

OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM GUIDANCE

SOURCE NATION SUPPORT

The Department of Defense will focus its supporting efforts in Peru, Columbia, and Bolivia. The support is aimed at strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty and "endgame" (effective arrest and prosecution) capabilities.

DISMANTLING THE CARTELS

The Department of Defense will enhance its support of the counterdrug community's linear strategy, designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine "business."

DETECTION AND MONITORING OF THE TRANSPORT OF ILLEGAL DRUGS

The Department of Defense will support domestic law enforcement and host nation detection and monitoring efforts by emphasizing activities in cocaine source countries, streamlining activities in the transit zone, and refocusing activities in the United States to emphasize the cocaine threat at critical border locations.

DIRECT SUPPORT TO DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DOMESTICALLY

Emphasizing the Southwest Border and Other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.

The Department of Defense will develop comprehensive prioritization plans for law enforcement agency requirements submitted under programs that provide intelligence analysts, linguists, support personnel, transportation, maintenance, excess equipment, and the Governor's Plan for using the National Guard for counterdrug support.

DEMAND REDUCTION

Drug testing will be continued with an emphasis placed on cost effective automated and consolidated testing.


Figure I-4. Overview of Program Guidance

CINCNO RAD. Although these specific categories are defined below to commonly used terms are useful in characterize the various DOD missions. describing categories of support, more

- **Detection & Monitoring.** Drug interdiction is a multiphase, multienvironment, and multiagency activity in which the Department of Defense has significant general responsibilities, as well as specific responsibility as the **lead Federal agency for the D&M** of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.

- Drug interdiction of air, sea, and land targets is accomplished in five major phases. The process is shown in Figure I-5.

- **Drug interdictions can take place in the air, at sea, or on land, and these phases often overlap.** The ultimate goal of interdiction is to disrupt and/or deter drug smuggling by intercepting and seizing illicit drug shipments en route to or entering the United States. This disruption of drug trafficking



operations raises the traffickers' cost of doing business by forcing them to take expensive countermeasures such as using longer and more circuitous routes, training new personnel to replace those apprehended, purchasing sophisticated electronic equipment to detect law enforcement surveillance, developing new concealment techniques, replacing expensive seized assets, and stockpiling drugs closer to production areas, making them more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts. **Drug interdiction has both symbolic and real value.** It demonstrates the national will to oppose drug traffickers on every available front, and it increases the chances of apprehending traffickers and their agents, thereby potentially making the supply of drugs erratic and unreliable. This process is extremely complex because it frequently involves several Federal, state, and local agencies and departments with different charters and jurisdictions, operating over a vast area.

- **The D&M role** involves an integration of several areas (intelligence, communications, planning, operations, logistics, and other appropriate areas) into a cohesive system to support the LEAs in the interception and apprehension of maritime and aerial drug traffickers. Generally, it **can be divided into three activities:** (1) **sources and sensors** for D&M suspected traffickers; (2) **information processing and fusion** activities; and (3) **communications or dissemination** activities.

DETAILS ON D&M MISSION → SEE CHAPTER IV, "DOD COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS," SECTION A

- **Support to Foreign Countries.** The Department of State (DOS) has primary oversight responsibilities for all support provided to foreign countries. **The DOS**

Figure I-5. Phases of Drug Interdiction

provides assistance to foreign countries under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, and the International Narcotics Control Act. The Department of Defense has a support role that is usually in the form of foreign internal defense (FID). General categories of DOD foreign country support are described below. Greater details about FID-specific programs are also described in Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).”

•• **Security Assistance Programs.** SA support areas for CD operations include: (1) **equipment** — HNs can obtain equipment from the United States to meet the drug trafficking threat; (2) **services** — Services are usually provided as a follow-on to equipment support; and (3) **training** — The training element of SA is a significant means of assistance for HNs combatting an illegal drug threat. Geographic combatant commanders can provide a variety of training to a foreign country’s LEA and military forces when granted an exception to the Foreign Assistance Act’s restrictions on training police. (This is in addition to their authority to provide such training under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, to which such restrictions do not apply.)

•• **Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** Two important aspects of CMO in CD operations are **civil affairs (CA)** and **psychological operations (PSYOP)**. In addition to CA and PSYOP, CMO includes the areas of humanitarian assistance (HA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and military civic action (MCA).

•• Other forms of HNS, usually categorized as either operational or nonoperational support (depending on the situation in which it is used) are command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support, intelligence support, planning support, logistic support, and training support. These missions have been separately listed below because of their dual support functions (HN and US LEA support).

DETAILS ON HOST-NATION SUPPORT → SEE CHAPTER IV, “DOD COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,” SECTION B

• **C4 Systems Support.** CD missions require reliable, secure, rapid, interoperable, and flexible C4 systems. **The Department of Defense serves as the executive agent for the integration of US military C4 support assets into communications systems supporting drug enforcement activities.** A major portion of this responsibility is the Department of Defense’s lead agent status for aerial and maritime D&M, which requires significant C4 commitments. Information includes computer-formatted reports, encrypted contact reports, alphanumeric and graphical environmental support data, or clear or secure voice communications. **Information flow** within the C4 system is usually **separated into two categories:**

•• **The flow of data from various sensors and sources** at all levels of the command structure. These data are generally preprocessed in the form of contact reports, individual tracks, environmental support information, specific intelligence reports, status reports, or historical data.

- **The flow of information after the data are evaluated, correlated, and assessed (i.e., intelligence).**

DETAILS ON C4 SYSTEMS SUPPORT
→ SEE CHAPTER IV, "DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,"
SECTION C

- **Intelligence Support.** Intelligence support is provided to LEAs, HNs, and DOD operational components by **collecting and analyzing drug-related information from a variety of sources.** These sources are the origins and means (or systems) used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events to the intelligence user. **The Department of Defense provides personnel and equipment to support the intelligence cycle by which intelligence is obtained, produced, and made available to users in CD operations.** DOD intelligence assets provide intelligence in support of CD policy development, planning, and resource allocation decisions. These assets are responsible for development of assessments, trends, and pattern analyses of movements associated with drug trafficking; managing the collection activities in support of both LEA and DOD CD requirements; managing the exploitation, production, and dissemination of all-source CD intelligence; communications security monitoring; investigations of alleged incidents of unauthorized disclosure of official DOD information; provision of security education and personal protection training; and analysis of illegal drug traffickers' intelligence collection capabilities.

DETAILS ON INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT → SEE CHAPTER IV, "DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,"
SECTION D

- **Planning Support.** Providing planning support to US LEAs and cooperating HNs **consists of planning and coordinating operations, determining resource requirements, and gathering information for operations or financial reports.** Planning for operations by the Department of Defense can be effectively employed to enhance the use of limited CD resources.

DETAILS ON PLANNING SUPPORT →
SEE CHAPTER IV, "DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,"
SECTION E

DETAILS ON DOD CD OPERATIONS
PLANNING → SEE CHAPTER V,
"PLANNING COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS," AND APPENDIX C,
"COUNTERDRUG PLAN FORMAT"

- **Logistic Support.** This includes providing support to US LEAs in the form of equipment loans, engineering support, transportation support, maintenance support, facilities support, military working dog support, and other miscellaneous forms of support.

DETAILS ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT →
SEE CHAPTER IV, "DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,"
SECTION F

- **Training Support.** Training support consists of **preparing, conducting, and/or coordinating CD-related DOD institutional and noninstitutional training of US and HN LEAs or military forces.** Training is provided to US LEAs and HN LEA or military forces, as well as CD-related training provided to DOD personnel involved in CD operations.

DETAILS ON TRAINING SUPPORT →
SEE CHAPTER IV, “DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,”
SECTION G

- **Other Operational Support.** Other operational support can be provided to LEAs **to take advantage of unique military skills**, providing this support enhances the LEAs’ technical skills and relieves law enforcement officers to do field work. Examples of such operational support are diver support, intelligence analysts, and linguists.

DETAILS ON MANPOWER SUPPORT
→ SEE CHAPTER IV, “DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,”
SECTION H

- **Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) Support.** RDA covers a broad spectrum of **initiatives, from innovative technology (for long-term applications) to product improvements or system modifications (for near-term applications), to the actual acquisition of systems.** The entire RDA process is designed to improve our operational capabilities by maintaining a technological advantage over the threat. Many technologies and systems can be used to provide either direct or indirect assistance for DOD, HN, and/or LEA forces.

DETAILS ON RDA SUPPORT → SEE
CHAPTER IV, “DOD COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS,” SECTION I

- **Demand Reduction.** Prevention and/or reduction of drug abuse requires a **combination of education, deterrence, and treatment or rehabilitation.** Drug abuse awareness education includes programs for all DOD military personnel and their families, students

attending DOD schools, and DOD civilian personnel. Drug use deterrence for DOD personnel is provided through scheduled and random urinalysis testing. The DOD treatment and rehabilitation program is designed to diagnose, treat, and return to full productivity as many people as possible with drug abuse or dependence problems.

DETAILS ON DEMAND REDUCTION
→ SEE CHAPTER IV, “DOD
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,”
SECTION J

- **Land Reconnaissance.** Although reconnaissance is an integral part of the aerial and maritime D&M mission category, **the mission of land reconnaissance is specifically intended to define the support that the Department of Defense provides to US LEAs inside the United States.** This distinction is made because of the legal and regulatory restrictions on the military’s role within our borders. **The mission category includes aerial and ground reconnaissance through a variety of means** such as observation posts (OPs) or listening posts (LPs), foot or mounted patrols, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) equipped with a variety of sensors, and remote sensors.

DETAILS ON LAND
RECONNAISSANCE → SEE
CHAPTER IV, “DOD COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS,” SECTION K

- e. **Examples of Support.** Figure I-6 provides a summary of the mission categories and examples of the types of support that can be provided by the Department of Defense in support of CD operations.

6. Employment Concepts and Tasks

a. **Regional Concept.** The Secretary of Defense directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to define the organizational responsibilities and develop the necessary plans to accomplish DOD CD missions. After receiving CJCS advice, **the Secretary of Defense directed regional execution and tasked three combatant commanders and CINCNORAD to accomplish the mission within their assigned geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).** Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) are designated supported CD commanders in chief (CINCs). All other combatant commanders are supporting commanders. Additionally, any of the three supported CD CINCs or CINCNORAD may be tasked to provide support to other CINCs. Other DOD organizations have also been tasked with CD support missions and are discussed in Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations.” The major CD commanders are as follows:

- **USCINCSO** — Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
- **CINCUSACOM** — Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USACOM).
- **USCINCPAC** — Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USPACOM).
- **CINCNORAD** — Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

b. **Subordinate Organizations.** Each of the major CD commanders have **subordinate organizations that are dedicated, in whole or in part, to the CD mission.**

DETAILED DOD CD
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES →
CHAPTERS III, “COUNTERDRUG
ORGANIZATIONS” AND VI,
“EXECUTION OF COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS”

c. **Counterdrug Commander Tasks.** The three supported CD CINCs are responsible for the following tasks:

- **Planning and conducting operations to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, supporting the D&M of overland transit of illegal drugs,** and reporting suspected traffickers to the appropriate US LEAs and/or HN authorities (CINCNORAD task also).
- **Providing assets to support drug interdiction agencies’ CD activities,** with emphasis on those operations planned for execution in high intensity drug trafficking areas (HIDTAs).
- **Planning, scheduling, and directing support provided to LEAs and cooperating HNs.**
- **Conducting strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence collection** (consistent with the law) against illegal drug trafficking originating in or transiting through their respective AORs to support cueing of foreign and domestic LEAs.
- **Collecting (consistent with the law), processing, and disseminating all-source, drug-related intelligence.**
- **Ensuring that adequate counterintelligence (CI) and operations security support** are provided as appropriate.

COUNTERDRUG MISSION CATEGORIES--EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT	
MISSION CATEGORIES	EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT
Detection & Monitoring	Airborne Early Warning Sea- & Land-based Radars "Interceptor" Aircraft Maritime Patrol Aircraft Picket Ships Reconnaissance (within and outside the continental United States [CONUS]) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aerial - Maritime Surveillance (outside CONUS) - Maritime
Host-Nation Support	Security Assistance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Equipment - Services - Training Civil-Military Operations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil Affairs - Psychological Operations - Military Civic Action - Humanitarian Assistance - Humanitarian & Civic Assistance
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers	Command & Control Communications & Computers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multi-Agency (anti-drug network, Federal Telephone System) - DOD Systems - Other Agency Systems
Intelligence Support	Tactical Analysis Teams
Planning Support	Liaison Planning Strategy Development

Figure I-6. Counterdrug Mission Categories — Examples of Support

COUNTERDRUG MISSION CATEGORIES--EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT	
MISSION CATEGORIES	EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT
Logistic Support	Transportation Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ground - Aerial - Maritime Maintenance Support Engineer Support Facilities Usage Equipment Loans Military Working Dog Support
Training Support	Deployments for Training Mobile Training Teams Extended Training Service Specialists Operations Planning Groups Joint and/or Combined Exercises Institutional Training Non-Institutional Training Training Simulations
Manpower Support	Plant Eradication Support Administrative Support Diver Support Linguist Support Liaison Officers to LEAs Legal Specialists Cargo Inspection Support Accounting Specialists Criminal Investigative Support Clerical Support Military Police Support Supervisory Support
Research, Development, and Acquisition	Off-the-Shelf Technology Developed Technology

Figure I-6. Counterdrug Mission Categories — Examples of Support (cont'd)

COUNTERDRUG MISSION CATEGORIES--EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT	
MISSION CATEGORIES	EXAMPLES OF SUPPORT
Reconnaissance	Aerial Reconnaissance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fixed-Wing Aircraft - Rotary-Wing Aircraft - Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Ground-Based Radars Land Reconnaissance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Listening Posts and/or Observation Posts - Patrols - Ground Surveillance Radars - Remote Ground Sensors

Figure I-6. Counterdrug Mission Categories — Examples of Support (cont'd)

- **Encouraging law enforcement and eradication programs in source and transshipment countries** through bilateral and multilateral exercises, training, personnel exchanges, and SA programs.
 - In coordination with other US agencies, **applying political, economic, and military influence to suppress illegal drug activities** in production, processing, and transshipment countries.
 - **Establishing and maintaining selected connectivity in the CD command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) network.**
 - **Coordinating CD activities with other Federal agencies and cooperating HNs.**
 - **Analyzing current and future surveillance needs** for support of air, maritime, and land interdiction and establishing long-range planning to (CINCNORAD task also):
 - **Identify areas with the highest potential for CD success;**
 - **Identify to the Secretary of Defense those areas requiring higher authority for action and resolution; and**
 - **Develop CD campaign strategies.**
- d. **Other CD Tasks.** Additional tasks assigned to the major CD commanders and other supporting commanders are as follows:
- **US Central Command and US European Command.** Conducts planning to accomplish the above tasks and is prepared to implement plans as directed, consistent with the evolution of the threat.
 - **USACOM, delegated to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).**

- Coordinates the employment of DOD forces (Active and Reserve Component) in a title 10 status in operational support of LEA activities within the continental United States (CONUS).
- **NORAD.** Coordinates with USACOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM to ensure integration of radar track data from radar sensors along the US Southwest border and North American coastlines with that provided by offshore mobile assets, airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, and various radar sites. The objective is to provide a composite radar picture for drug interdiction operations.
- **US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).**
 - Provides training and assistance to US Government (USG) agencies in order to enhance their capabilities to stop or reduce the movement of illegal drugs.
- When coordinated with the concerned US ambassador(s) and geographic combatant commander, and upon direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), conducts special operations against the production, transportation, and trafficking of illegal drugs.
- Provides special operations support to the CINCs.
- **US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).** Coordinates transportation and aerial refueling requests from the Department of Defense, supported CINCs, non-DOD Federal agencies, and various other LEAs.
- **US Strategic Command.** When requested by a supported CINC, provides reconnaissance assets in support of CD operations.
- **All combatant commanders.** Combat illegal drug use by DOD personnel through drug abuse awareness and prevention programs.

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CHAPTER II

GENERAL THREAT

“. . .one does simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has already to know a great deal and know it well.”

Marshall Ferdinand Foch
Precepts, 1919

1. General

a. The economic drain of addiction, drug-related crime, and a multitude of associated family problems are the result of drug abuse. **Those who contribute to the production, transport, sale, and use of illegal drugs and laundering of drug money present a threat to the national security of the United States.** To help ensure the safety and security of our citizens and preserve our national values, the threat from illegal drugs must be confronted.

b. All personnel involved in CD activities should be familiar with **the major categories of controlled substances, the common characteristics of traffickers and their organizations, and their strengths and weaknesses.** This chapter will discuss these areas. More specific threat depictions will be presented under each CINC's portion in Chapter VI, "Execution of Counterdrug Operations."

2. Categories of Controlled Substances

a. The DEA identifies the **five major categories of controlled substances** as:

- Narcotics;
- Depressants;
- Stimulants;
- Hallucinogens; and
- Cannabis (marijuana and hashish).

b. Figure II-1 lists various drugs within these categories.

3. Major Drugs of Abuse

The major drugs of abuse within the United States are cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. The industries that grow or process, transport, sell, and use these drugs, as well as diverted drugs or chemicals and other dangerous drugs, constitute the threat. The following paragraphs provide general information about source(s) production methods, use or effects, and industry characteristics.

a. Cocaine

- **General.** One of the most threatening drugs to US society, **cocaine is a stimulant that is readily available throughout the country.** It is derived from the coca plant and its effects have been known for centuries; however, the drug "cocaine" itself was first isolated by the Austrian chemist Albert Niemann in 1862.
- **Sources.** **Coca plants are grown mainly in a region of South America known as the "Andean Ridge"** (sometimes called the "Silver Triangle"). The major source countries for the coca plant are Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia (Figure II-2). The principal growing area in Peru is the upper Huallaga Valley, and in Bolivia it is the Chapare region. Peru and Colombia produce the majority of

CATEGORIES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES	
CATEGORIES	DRUGS
NARCOTICS	Opium, Morphine, Codeine, Heroin, Hydromorphone, Meperidine, Methadone, Other Narcotics
DEPRESSANTS	Chloral Hydrate, Barbituates, Banzodiazepines, Methaqualone, Glutethimide, Other Depressants
STIMULANTS	Cocaine, Amphetamines, Phenmetrazine, Other Stimulants
HALLUCINOGENS	LSD, Mescaline & Peyote, Amphetamine Variants, Phencyclidine, Phencyclidine Analogues, Other Hallucinogens
CANNABIS	Marijuana, Tetrahydrocannabinol, Hashish, Hashish Oil

Figure II-1. Categories of Controlled Substances

the coca leaf supply, and Colombia is the primary refining site that produces the white powder — cocaine hydrochloride (HCL).



Figure II-2. Coca Plant Growing Areas

- **Characteristics** (See Figure II-3)

b. **Heroin**

- **General.** Heroin is a highly addictive narcotic that poses a great threat to the United States. This threat arises from the precipitous increase in opium production, the emergence of new and aggressive heroin trafficking organizations, the increasing rise in the purity of street-level heroin, and the fact that heroin is more profitable per unit than cocaine.
- **Sources.** Heroin is derived from the opium poppy, a plant cultivated principally in **three areas of the world: Southeast Asia’s “Golden Triangle,” Southwest Asia’s “Golden Crescent” and, in recent years, Mexico and Colombia.** The region known as the Golden Triangle includes the opium

Characteristics of Cocaine		
STRENGTHS		WEAKNESSES
COCAINE	<p>Coca plants are grown in remote regions.</p> <p>Chemicals used for production are very common and have other legitimate uses.</p> <p>Sales generate large quantities of cash which can be used for legal investment and/or establishing front companies or bribes.</p> <p>Distribution and/or transportation systems are well organized.</p> <p>Labs are difficult to locate.</p>	<p>Large quantities of chemicals are required for production.</p> <p>Chemicals are bulky, so labs are normally near major lines of communications.</p> <p>Need to launder large amounts of money.</p>

Figure II-3. Characteristics of Cocaine

production areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand (Sometimes the nearby poppy growing areas of China are also included. See Figure II-4). **A majority of the opium fields are in Burma, with heroin refineries in Thailand and Laos.** Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan comprise the three main heroin producers in the Golden Crescent of Southwest Asia (See Figure II-5).

- **Characteristics** (See Figure II-6)

c. Marijuana (Cannabis)

- **General.** Marijuana is the common name for the flowering tops and leaves of the female plant of cannabis sativa. The dried resin secreted by the plant is known as hashish. The active oil extracted from the cannabis plant is hashish oil. All forms of the cannabis plants contain a compound known as **tetrahydrocannabinol, which is considered to be the principal psychoactive material of the plant.**
- **Sources.** **Much of the marijuana consumed in the United States is domestically grown.** Cannabis also

grows wild throughout most of the tropic and temperate regions of the world. Growing methods vary widely from backyard plastic buckets to expensive indoor facilities with elaborate lighting and irrigation systems. Huge illicit plots have also been seized on secluded tracts of Federal land. Mexico and Colombia produce a large amount of the marijuana imported into the United States. Other source countries include Morocco, Jamaica, Belize, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Thailand. Smaller quantities of cannabis also arrive from the Middle East. The majority of this Middle Eastern cannabis is converted to hashish or hashish oil.

- **Characteristics** (See Figure II-7)

d. Diverted Drugs or Chemicals

- **General.** **Legitimate pharmaceutical drugs, while not as prevalent as illicit drugs, still remain a high priority in the CD effort as both precursor and essential chemicals.** These drugs are either diverted from legitimate US producers or smuggled into the country and sold on the black market, much like




Figure II-4. The Golden Triangle



Figure II-5. The Golden Crescent

Characteristics of Heroin		
	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
HEROIN	<p>Abundant supply of opium plants, some of which provide drugs for legitimate medical uses.</p> <p>Can be grown in remote areas.</p> <p>Uses common, legitimate chemicals.</p> <p>Distribution and/or transportation system well organized and equipped.</p> <p>Production is well suited to small operations by persons with virtually no formal education.</p> <p>Sales generate large quantities of cash that can be used for legal investment and/or establishing front companies.</p>	<p>Need to handle and transport large quantities of cash or use the money.</p> <p>Poppy fields are susceptible to herbicide spraying and a few natural enemies.</p>

Figure II-6. Characteristics of Heroin

Characteristics of Marijuana		
	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
MARIJUANA	<p>Hardy plant that can grow in a number of different areas.</p> <p>Plants can be grown indoors.</p> <p>Established production and distribution networks.</p> <p>Does not require the use of essential chemicals.</p>	<p>Bulky cargo for shipment.</p> <p>Plants have a distinctive odor that is easily recognized.</p> <p>Produces signatures of indoor growth such as high power and water bills.</p>

Figure II-7. Characteristics of Marijuana

illicit drugs. Generally, these chemicals are not available in the drug source regions and must be transported into the production areas. A number of other drugs, such as LSD and crystal methamphetamine or “Ice,” also must have various chemicals for their production. Anabolic steroids are also under law enforcement control procedures to reduce their illegal use.

- **Characteristics** (See Figure II-8)

4. Drug Traffickers

This section covers the general characteristics and methods of drug trafficking for the major threat industries of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. The diversion and dangerous

drug industries will be briefly addressed later. Although specific definitions used by CD organizations may vary, the following represents a working consensus for the purpose of describing the threat.

a. **Growers and Producers** include those who grow their own crops, ranging from very small patches using simple farming methods to highly sophisticated cultivators with tracts of hundreds of acres spread throughout a country. Their outputs can range from a few to hundreds of kilograms or pounds.

b. **Smugglers** represent that part of trafficking organizations that specialize in shipping drugs. They transport drugs from one place to another by a variety of means (e.g., aircraft, ships, motor vehicles, and people).

Characteristics of Diverted Drugs or Chemicals		
	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
DIVERTED DRUGS OR CHEMICALS	Due to other legitimate purposes, they are hard to track. There are a number of worldwide producers. Numerous substitute chemicals are readily available.	They are heavy and bulky, making them hard to ship.

Figure II-8. Characteristics of Diverted Drugs or Chemicals

c. **Smuggler Intelligence Systems** represent that part of trafficking organizations or independent groups that specialize in providing traffickers with data base or current operational intelligence and warning about our capabilities, intentions, and current activities to detect, sort, classify, track, and intercept smugglers.

d. **Couriers** are individuals or groups who physically carry or transport a quantity of drugs. These people are sometimes called “mules.” They use a variety of drug transport methods such as swallowing them, concealing them in various body cavities, taping them to their bodies, or hiding drugs in their luggage. Couriers usually work for the smugglers.

e. **Distributors** are the wholesalers or middlemen. Distributors can also be retailers. They either have direct contacts with one or more producers or with another distributor. The distributor frequently arranges for the smugglers to move the drugs.

f. **Dealers** are usually individuals on the streets commonly selling less than one kilogram of drugs. Dealers work for the distributor and may have other dealers working for them.

g. **Financiers** are individuals who provide funds or resources to establish or maintain a

drug trafficking organization, normally without direct involvement in trafficking operations.

h. **Kingpins** are specific heads of international cocaine and heroin trafficking organizations (or parts of a drug consortium) in source countries who are responsible for directing all phases of unlawful production, transportation, and wholesale distribution of bulk quantities of illegal drugs and/or directing the financial operations. **To qualify as a kingpin, the individual’s role in all aspects of that organization’s drug trafficking is such that the neutralization of the kingpin and his leadership would result in the collapse and the dismantling of the organization’s infrastructure,** resulting in a significant impact on the drug traffic in the United States. Because the kingpin is so closely identified with the organization, the term “kingpin” is often used interchangeably to refer to either the individual or the organization.

i. **Money Launderers** are those individuals involved in the exchange or investment of money in such a way as to conceal the fact that it comes from an illegal source. Various items of value such as precious metals or gems, bank drafts, cashier checks, deposits, and transfers to foreign banks are a few things exchanged for illicit cash.

NARCOTRAFFICKING

Narcotrafficking is a menace that threatens the social, moral, and political fabrics of the Latin American countries. Though not classically within the military's purview, narcotics suborn officials, institutions, and governance. Narcotrafficking makes a mockery of the principle of sovereignty in international order. It also distorts economies and generates violence that often stretches the thin capabilities of inadequately trained and poorly paid police forces, which are too often vulnerable to the corrosive attraction of easy money. The military's role is to support the police forces within constitutional limits. The police may be ineffective against an enemy that can outgun and outmaneuver them. Then too, in Peru for example, the traffickers are in a de facto tactical alliance with the puritanical and barbarous insurgents of the Upper Huallaga Valley, the principal area of coca cultivation in the world. Therefore, the counternarcotics effort must be supported by a counterinsurgency designed to win back people and territory from the insurgents and blunt the cultivation of coca. How to accomplish both without fueling the insurgency by driving the peasants into the arms of the insurgents is a serious strategic dilemma.

**SOURCE: Dr. Gabriel Marcella
Forging New Strategic Relationships
Military Review, October 1994**

j. **Narcoterrorists** are those involved in drug trafficking while members of terrorist or insurgent groups which perform violent acts designed to influence national-level CD policy.

k. **Insurgents** are those in revolt against civil authority but not recognized under international law as having the legal status of belligerents. Insurgents have entered into cooperative agreements with drug traffickers for mutual benefit.

l. **Drug Cartels** are partnerships or associations of criminal groups formed to undertake an illicit drug enterprise beyond the capabilities of any one member.

5. Cocaine Industry

In the major producing countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, coca leaf, paste, cocaine base, and cocaine HCL are viable cash sources that offer many times the profit per acre than any legitimate crop. A description of these areas is provided below.

a. **Peru. Much of the world's coca is grown in Peru.** Peru is also the major refiner of coca paste to cocaine base. Most of the cocaine base is then shipped to Colombia. Although Colombians control a sizable portion of the cocaine processing in Peru, Peruvians are also developing independent operations. Essential chemicals required by clandestine laboratories are diverted from legitimate chemical shipments entering Peru's seaports as well as those coming overland from Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. **Eradication efforts in Peru have been hampered by rivalry between Peru's various governmental organizations, the presence of insurgency groups in the cultivation areas, and the fact that cultivation is legal.** Both the "Sendero Luminoso" (Shining Path) and the "Tupac Amaru" Revolutionary movement terrorist organizations are involved in narcotrafficking in order to help finance their insurgencies.

b. **Colombia. Colombia is second in worldwide coca cultivation and first in**

cocaine HCL production. There are over 150 groups trafficking in cocaine, with cartels centered in Medellin and Cali. These cartels rely mostly on Bolivian- and Peruvian-produced cocaine base. **Cocaine HCL is smuggled out of Colombia utilizing aircraft and maritime vessels, both commercial and noncommercial.** The aircraft either drop their drugs into the sea to waiting vessels or fly into other countries for unloading and future transshipment to the United States. Colombian insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Army of National Liberation also benefit from the illicit trade. These groups “tax” drug profits and protect crops, laboratories, and storage facilities; occasionally they extract payment in weapons. Insurgent groups have also carried out kidnappings and acts of terrorism in support of traffickers’ aims. Colombian government initiatives to control the access to supplies of essential chemicals have prompted traffickers to adopt new processing formulas that use alternative chemicals and require production and recycling at on-site, clandestine laboratories.

c. Bolivia. Bolivia is the third largest producer of coca. Most Bolivian coca paste and cocaine base is shipped to Colombia in private aircraft operating from unimproved airfields. **Most cocaine HCL produced in Bolivia is smuggled out through Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.** Essential chemicals required for processing generally enter by truck from Chile or by train and aircraft from Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay is also a source for required chemicals. There are some 30 to 35 major organizations managing drug activities in Bolivia. Eradication is also made difficult in Bolivia because the cultivation of coca is legal.

6. Heroin Industry

Heroin reaching the United States originates from **three major source areas; Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Colombia and Mexico.** It is characterized by consistently high

purity at the retail level. Heroin from the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia predominates in a number of major east coast city drug markets. Heroin from Southwest Asia predominates in the Chicago and Detroit markets. Colombian heroin is destined for the eastern United States and Puerto Rico. Mexican heroin, primarily in the form of high-purity “black tar,” dominates supplies on the west coast and the southwest United States.

a. Burma (Myanmar). Most of the world’s illicit opium poppy is grown in Burma, and most processing of opium and heroin also occurs here. In Burma, insurgent organizations operate large refineries along the Thai border and ethnic groups operate large heroin refineries along the border with China. Although Thailand remains the principal exit to the world market for opium, morphine base, and heroin, increasing amounts of opiates leave Burma via China and Indochina to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Bangladesh. Thai and Sino-Thai financiers and middlemen play a major role in trafficking. Chinese-Americans with links to criminal organizations are the largest US importers of heroin and often use Chinese or ethnic Thai nationals as couriers to move the drugs. In addition, multikilogram shipments of drugs are secreted in containerized freight aboard commercial marine vessels, air freight cargo, international mail parcels, and fishing trawlers.

b. Laos. Laos also produces opium in the Golden Triangle. Thai and Chinese traders purchase opium and convey it to traffickers for refining and distribution.

c. Thailand. The Thai opium poppy crop produces an extremely small percentage of the total Golden Triangle cultivation, but **Thailand’s well-developed transportation system facilitates the transfer and export of various opium-based drugs and is considered to be the principal export point from Southeast Asia to the world.** The Thai

government has enacted several statutes that empowered their navy to search carriers, confiscate them, and detain personnel suspected of drug trafficking within Thailand's territorial waters. Thailand's efforts to control drug traffic remain hampered by a lack of conspiracy statutes that could facilitate prosecution of major violators.

d. **Afghanistan.** Afghanistan is the **world's second largest producer of illicit opium**, with the majority grown in the Nangahar Province and the Helmand Valley. Most opium from here is processed in Pakistan, and most trafficking occurs along the borders with Iran and Pakistan. Other drug smuggling routes transit through Turkey and the former Soviet Union. Opium poppy has been a traditional and reliable cash crop for generations in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government exerts little control over production or trafficking.

e. **Pakistan.** **Pakistan is both a producer of and a transit country for opiates.** The major growing areas are in the Northwest Frontier Province near Afghanistan. Although the government maintains a credible poppy ban in some areas, there have been production increases in those areas under nominal government control.

f. **Iran.** Data on opium poppy cultivation and heroin traffic in Iran is limited, although it is known that Iran does have a sizable domestic addict population. Laboratories for producing morphine base and heroin HCL operate in Kurdish areas in the northwest and Baluch areas in the southeast. Heroin is transshipped from there to Europe and then to the United States. Iranian traffickers have expanded their operations in the United States by exploiting the ethnic Iranian population in California.

g. **Mexico.** Mexico has produced heroin since the early 1940s, but did not become a major supplier to the United States until the

1970s. **Opium poppy cultivation has expanded from the northern Mexico provinces of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango to include most of the entire west coast to the Mexican-Guatemalan border.** Although both brown and black tar heroin are produced, the latter represents the largest portion of production. The advantages of producing black tar heroin include easy chemical conversion and ability to use mobile laboratories brought to the growing areas. This reduces time required for making the product ready for transport to the United States to as little as 2 to 3 days after the raw opium is collected. Another advantage is that mobile laboratories are harder to detect than fixed or stationary ones. **Mexican heroin is smuggled into the United States by established family groups primarily using overland routes.** Mexican smugglers are also involved in cocaine trafficking. The Government of Mexico has assisted in combatting the transport of illegal drugs by enacting strong measures to reduce or eliminate official corruption and by implementing vigorous eradication efforts by the military.

h. **Guatemala.** Within the past several years, **opium poppy production in Guatemala has increased in the western provinces** of San Marcos and Huehuetenango. Most of the crop is hidden in steep, narrow, high mountain valleys and is grown by subsistence farmers. Mexican traffickers provide financing, seed, and a market for growers, and most processing occurs in Mexico. The Guatemalan government has been conducting both manual and aerial eradication efforts to reduce production.

7. Marijuana (Cannabis) Industry

Although there has been some reduction in marijuana use, **it remains the most commonly used illicit substance in the United States.** The decrease is probably attributed to substantially

increased cost and attitudinal changes. **The major suppliers are the United States, Mexico, and Colombia.**

a. **United States. The majority of marijuana consumed in the United States is grown domestically.** Cultivation trends include efforts to enhance the potency of marijuana through employment of advanced agronomic practices, including hydroponics and cloning as well as indoor production.

b. **Mexico.** Mexico continues to be **the major foreign source of marijuana imported to the United States.** Cannabis is grown throughout Mexico, with the principal growing areas in the western states of Chihuahua, Jalisco, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. Veracruz on the east coast is also believed to contain large growing areas. Mexican-produced marijuana is smuggled into the United States primarily by vehicles, with the remainder by private aircraft. The Mexican government is actively involved in marijuana eradication and seizure efforts.

c. **Colombia.** Colombia was once the primary source of marijuana available in the United States, but in recent years has only provided a small percentage of the total imports.

8. Characteristics of Threat Operations

The production, transportation, and marketing of illegal substances are supported by systems similar in character but often uniquely different for each type of drug because of geographical considerations, processing requirements, and the weight and volume of the product itself. **A common denominator of the major drug industries is transportation.** As previously mentioned, drug smugglers use many types of aircraft, motor or sailing vessels, motor vehicles, and couriers to transport drugs into the United States. Certain

trafficker profiles and common tactics and techniques have been observed. The information in Figures II-9, II-10, and II-11 is a partial listing of these characteristics.

9. Summary

a. The various drugs entering the United States pose concern because of their societal and security threats. **The production process is easy to understand, but difficult to interdict and eradicate.** The sources of both raw materials and finished products have also shifted, presenting new threats and challenges to LEAs and foreign governments. **A successful CD effort must include an accurate, updated appraisal of the threat and an effective targeting of the trafficker's weaknesses** in a coordinated effort conducted as close to the production areas as possible.

b. To be effective in CD efforts, **knowledge of the threat is needed.** With sufficient intelligence and knowledge, the threats' strengths and weaknesses can be identified and confronted. There are clearly identifiable strategic and operational centers of gravity for the illegal drug industries. **At the strategic level, two components are key: the demand for illegal drugs and the huge profits that can be made by drug trafficking.** Drug money is the source of power for the illegal drug industries. It buys crops, chemicals, transportation, popular support, sanctuary, public officials, and even governments. **At the operational level, the centers of gravity of the illegal drug industries are their leadership, the organizations themselves, and their transportation and smuggling systems.**

c. **Intelligence gathering is a key in the US CD effort.** A modified military approach to analyzing and evaluating the threat that has been described in this chapter is provided in Appendix K, "Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation for Operations."

AIR MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

- Aircraft passenger seats removed
- Illegally modified fuel systems to dramatically extend range
- Appearance of incomplete or altered aircraft registration numbers
- Indications of landing on dirt or sand strips (muddy and/or oversized tires, dirty aircraft, beat-up prop)
- Flying without lights after dark
- Orbiting little-used strips, roads, or coastal waters
- Flight paths avoiding radar coverage (around or under radars)
- Departing from filed flight plans
- Landing for short period of time
- Flying close to commercial aircraft to avoid radar detection
- Flying in bad weather (especially when aerostat radars are not deployed)
- Possessing and using radar warning devices
- Employing secure communications
- Using decoy aircraft
- Avoiding areas of high law enforcement agency activity
- Using ground spotters
- Using low-level flight navigation techniques
- Flying with side windows taped over

Figure II-9. Air Movement Characteristics

MARITIME MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

- Larger radar or more radio antennas than appear suitable for the class of vessel
- Vessel's name and/or hailing port missing or temporarily affixed
- Absence of fishing gear aboard boats designed for fishing
- Traveling outside normal navigational routes
- Located near offshore islands for no apparent reason
- Under way at night without running lights
- Sailing vessel under way during adverse weather conditions
- Conducting at-sea transfers of cargo as indicated by damaged hull and deck fittings or rubber tires rigged over the sides at sea
- Fishing vessel not located near the bulk of other fishing boats, or outside traditional fishing areas
- Using low-signature vessels ("stealth boats")
- Weapons sighted on the vessel
- Bales wrapped in burlap and/or plastic on deck
- Extra fuel and/or lube oil drums
- Vessel operating at unusual hours
- Vessel modified to increase storage capacity
- Boat riding excessively low in the water and/or having its waterline repainted higher on the hull
- Number, appearance, and demeanor of persons aboard a boat not compatible with the type of vessel
- Vessels which conduct immediate or erratic course changes when sighted

Figure II-10. Maritime Movement Characteristics

TECHNIQUES TO DISGUISE DRUG SHIPMENTS

- Drugs concealed in passenger luggage
- Forged US customs seals attached to luggage
- Filing legitimate flight plans
- Using identification friend or foe transponders
- Flying in approved air space corridors
- Using US-registered aircraft
- Fishing vessels blending in with a fishing fleet
- Using commercial shipping routes
- Using pleasure craft
- Visiting ports-of-call consistent with the vessel type or normal use
- Storing drugs in floors, walls, structurally modified compartments, false decks, pipes, cavities within or outside the keel, fuel or water tanks, fire extinguisher, with legitimate cargo
- Using US mails

Figure II-11. Techniques to Disguise Drug Shipments

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CHAPTER III

COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS

“An optimum system is one where all of the parts work better because of the other parts.”

Unknown

1. General

a. This chapter details the scope and complexity of US Federal, state, and local organizations and selected international organizations involved in the CD effort.

b. For CD operations to be successful and available resources to be used in the most effective and efficient manner, **all agencies must coordinate and integrate their efforts.** CD initiatives associated with this goal are complicated by such factors as large and diverse organizational missions and structures, differing regional boundaries for subordinate organizations, language differences (both national languages and use of acronyms between US agencies), and even interagency mistrust. There are also structural and philosophical differences between the military and civilian law enforcement organizations.

c. **An understanding of each organization’s roles, missions, and structure will help those involved in CD operations to better communicate and cooperate** in the effort to reduce illegal drug supply and demand.

2. Organization

This chapter will review basic descriptions of CD organizations, then present an overall view of the structural interrelationships within the framework of the levels in which they function — strategic, operational, or tactical.

SECTION A. FEDERAL CD ORGANIZATIONS

3. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT — National Security Council

a. **The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for national security issues that require Presidential decision.** Its function is to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

b. Figure III-1 illustrates the various levels of NSC-sponsored interagency committees that formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy.

c. The Deputies Committee is a forum subordinate to the Principals Committee (the NSC without the President and Vice President), and it in turn has two tiers of supporting Interagency committees. First, a number of Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are formed at the Assistant Secretary level. The NSC has established regional policy coordinating committee(s) (PCCs) chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State of the appropriate DOS regional bureau. The NSC has also established two functional PCCs, one to deal with combatting terrorism and another to deal with counterdrugs.




Figure III-1. National Security Council Interagency Forums

d. Coordinating Sub-groups are IWGs. These groups work at the deputy assistant secretary, office director, and action officer level. **The Coordinating Sub-group for Narcotics works on broad CD policy development.** To facilitate this policy development, major issues are assigned to separate IWGs for more detailed study and action.

4. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT — Office of National Drug Control Policy

a. ONDCP is the **primary agency within the Executive Branch responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the NDCS.** The

ONDCP oversees and coordinates both the international and domestic CD functions of all Executive agencies and ensures that those functions sustain and complement the government's overall CD efforts. **Activities of the ONDCP include the following:**

- Developing the NDCS.
- Developing a consolidated National Drug Control Budget for presentation to the President and Congress.
- Coordinating and overseeing narcotics-related programs and policies of the Federal departments, agencies, and bureaus.
- Recommending changes to the President in the organization, management, and budgets of Federal agencies involved in the CD effort.
- Representing the Administration's drug policies before the Congress.
- Producing legislatively-mandated studies and reports for submission to the President and Congress.

b. The USIC is designated by the Director of the ONDCP, under authority vested by the President. **The USIC is responsible for ensuring that assets for interdiction are adequate, that their use is properly integrated and optimized, and that interdiction efforts and priorities are consistent with overall US international counternarcotics policy.** The USIC will focus oversight coordination on all potential lines of approach for the transportation of illicit drugs, up to but not including the borders of the United States. This tasking includes nonoperational and nontactical oversight coordination of all aspects of D&M, sorting, and apprehension supported by US resources. **Activities of the USIC include the following:**

- Coordination of international counternarcotics efforts with departments and agencies with overseas interdiction responsibilities.
- Coordination with senior military commanders and civilian supervisors in the field to ensure that assets committed are adequate, integrated, and location and scheduling are optimized.
- Coordination with the Counternarcotics IWG of programs to support the enhancement of US interdiction efforts overseas.
- The Interdiction Committee (TIC) advises and supports the USIC in ensuring the adequacy and optimum use of Federal Interdiction Assets. The Director of ONDCP appoints a principal from an LEA to serve as chairperson of the TIC.

US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

5. Department of Defense

Within the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Agencies, combatant commands, NORAD, the Military Departments (Services), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) have been assigned CD responsibilities.

a. Secretary of Defense

- **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]) has been designated as the DOD OCDEP&S. The Drug Coordinator is the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary of Defense for drug enforcement policy, requirements, priorities, systems, resources, and**

programs and serves as the Department of Defense's liaison to ONDCP. The Drug Coordinator also works closely with other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals, the Joint Staff, and Defense agencies.

- The ASD(SO/LIC), in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), coordinates and monitors provision of intelligence and communication support to drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs).
- The ASD(SO/LIC), in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), coordinates and monitors National Guard (NG) support to state drug enforcement operations.

b. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman **provides strategic guidance to the CINCs for the conduct of CD operations.** This guidance is based primarily on the National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), both key components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

- **Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), Counternarcotics Division (CND).** CND operates as the central coordinating element in the Joint Staff for employment of DOD CD forces. It has three branches.
 - **Management and Budget.** Reviews Service and Defense Agency CD Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions to ensure that CINC CD requirements and priorities are identified, accepted, and support CJCS priorities; validates and prioritizes CINC, Service, and Defense Agency CD projects; and reviews current program and budget to ensure that they resource military support to CD missions.

- **Western Hemisphere and Eurasian.** Provide for the review and coordination of national and international CD strategy and policy development.

- **Joint Staff J-3, Geographic Divisions.** Responsible for worldwide monitoring of current drug interdiction D&M operations; coordinates all operational aspects of CJCS responsibilities for implementing the Department of Defense's mission as the lead agency for D&M operations; and serves as the coordinator for CD operational matters on all LEA requests for military support.
- **Joint Staff J-3, Special Operations Division.** Provides for the support of DOD activities by special operations forces (SOF).
- **Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5).** Monitors the SA program.
- **Joint Staff C4 Systems Directorate (J-6).** Provides support to CINCs for all C4 activities.

c. **Defense Agencies**

- **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).** DIA is responsible for producing and disseminating intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other major elements of the Department of Defense. DIA produces strategic intelligence based on all-source collection assets. (See Section E, this chapter, for more details on DIA.)
- **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** DISA oversees the operation and modernization of the Defense Communications System (DCS), the long-haul voice, data, and record traffic system that supports the Department of Defense and selected LEAs. The Joint



Combat assault transport helicopters are useful in CD operations and provide surface search, airborne tracking, and LEA apprehension.

Interoperability and Engineering Organization, a DISA organization, provides communications and data systems engineering to LEAs through the CD Technology Center of ONDCP.

- **National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA).** NIMA supports CD operations by providing traditional and nontraditional mapping products and several digital mapping data bases for geological information and intelligence systems.
- **Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).** DSAA administers and supervises SA planning and formulates and executes SA efforts in coordination with other government programs. The DSAA conducts international logistic and sales negotiations with representatives of foreign nations and serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry regarding SA. DSAA also develops and promulgates SA procedures, maintains the data base for programs, and makes determinations with respect to the allocation of foreign military sales administrative funds.

- **National Security Agency (NSA).** NSA is responsible for providing intelligence, secure communications, and computer security. (See Section E, this chapter, for more details on NSA.)

d. CD Commanders

- As discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview,” **the NCA has assigned four CD commanders specific CD missions.** These primary CD commanders have each organized their CD efforts in different ways. A basic depiction of these organizations is represented in Figure III-2.
- Presidential Decision Directive 14 instructed the Director, ONDCP, to complete a review of the multiplicity of command and control (C2) centers involved in international counternarcotics and recommend steps to streamline the structure. As a result of this review, **the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan** provides for three geographically oriented CD Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF-East [-E], -South [-S], and -West [-W]),




Figure III-2. Primary Counterdrug Commands

and one Domestic Air Interdiction Coordinator Center (DAICC). TheUSIC coordinates the plan’s implementation.

e. **Military Departments (or Services).** The Services contribute to the CD effort by **providing personnel and equipment support to the CINC**s for the entire range of DOD mission categories.

f. **Military Criminal Investigation Organizations (MCIOs).** MCIOs consist of the US Army Criminal Investigation

Command, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Naval Criminal Investigation Service. **MCIOs conduct CD operations to detect, interdict, suppress, and monitor drug trafficking and user demand that directly or indirectly affects their respective Services.**

g. **National Guard Bureau.** The NG has a dual capacity to serve. Generally, the NG operates under title 32 or state status. When Federalized under title 10 status, the NG performs active duty missions. **The NGB is**

the national-level agency of the NG that coordinates state or territory plans. In the CD role, the Director, Counterdrug Directorate is the CD support manager. The CD division in this directorate reviews state or territory plans upon their submission and recommends mission and funding levels to the Secretary of Defense through the OCDEP&S. (See Section C, this chapter, for more details on the NGB-NG relationship.)

- Enforcement of the prohibition on illegal uses of controlled substances; and
- Application of the internal revenue laws to ensure the payment of taxes.

b. Under the direction of the Attorney General, **the DOJ is the Federal agency responsible for supervision of seven agencies or bureaus with significant CD missions** (See Figure III-3).

US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

6. Department of Justice

a. The Department of Justice (DOJ) supports the national CD effort through:

- Prevention and detection of drug-related crime;
- Enforcement of drug-related civil and criminal laws enacted by Congress;

7. Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal investigative arm of the Justice Department. It is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases involving Federal jurisdiction. **The FBI's drug program targets major drug trafficking organizations through long-term investigations aimed at dismantling**




Figure III-3. US Department of Justice

trafficking networks, arresting core leadership, and seizing illegally obtained assets. In addition to the above, the drug program enhances the FBI's drug intelligence base, works with the DEA to identify organizational trafficking trends, makes projections for the FBI's Drug Investigative Activity, and provides assistance to other LEAs. The Organized Crime and Drug Branch (Figure III-4) was created to implement the NDCS by increasing its ability to coordinate with other agencies; authorize, direct, and review its own sensitive multi-stage drug investigations; and represent the

FBI in a unified manner with the drug law enforcement community.

8. Drug Enforcement Administration

a. The DEA was created in 1973 by merging the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, US Customs Service elements, and the Narcotics Advance Research Management Team. It has 20 domestic Field Divisions with subordinate




Figure III-4. FBI's Organized Crime and Drug Branch

Resident Offices, with at least one office located in each state (See Figure III-5). DEA operates seven regional Forensic Laboratories, a Special Testing and Research Laboratory, and an Air Wing. Overseas, DEA maintains 71 offices staffed by special agents and support personnel in 44 foreign countries.

b. **DEA's mission is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States** and to bring to the criminal and civil justice systems those organizations (and principal members of organizations) involved in the growing, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States. **DEA also**

recommends and supports nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

c. The major functions of DEA are to act as lead agency for developing the overall Federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning, and evaluation; to investigate and prepare for prosecution of major violators; to manage a national narcotics intelligence system; to seize and forfeit assets from illicit drug trafficking; to enforce manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances; to maintain liaison with the United Nations, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and



Figure III-5. Drug Enforcement Administration Field Divisions

other organizations; and to act as lead US LEA in foreign countries.

d. In addition to DEA's top priority of investigating major drug traffickers and their organizations, **it also plays a major role in state and local task forces, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), and HIDTAs.**

e. DEA headquarters is organized into six divisions: Inspections, Operations, Human Resources, Intelligence, Operational Support, and Financial Management (See Figure III-6). DOD agencies interact most often with the Operations and Intelligence Divisions, which are discussed below:

- **Operations Division** is responsible for the DEA's investigative activities and is organized into six offices: Management Support, Domestic Operations,

International Operations, Diversion Control, Aviation Operations, and Special Operations.

- **International Operations.** Assists foreign DLEAs in establishing traditional enforcement activities, developing drug law enforcement programs, and implementing other programs aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs destined for the United States.

- **Diversion Control.** Monitors the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals and the diversion of controlled chemicals.

- **Intelligence Division** provides tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence products and services that identify the structure and members of international




Figure III-6. Drug Enforcement Administration

and domestic drug trafficking organizations. It also develops intelligence that focuses on the financial aspects of drug investigations and provides interagency intelligence support to other Federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a subordinate unit of the Intelligence Division.

9. Immigration and Naturalization Service

a. **The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is responsible for the admission, status administration, and removal of aliens within the United States.** Missions include antismuggling, patrolling of US borders, detention and deportation, employer-labor relations, examinations, intelligence, and investigations. Almost one third of the INS budget is used for the US Border Patrol (USBP). The next largest component of the INS's program is the detention and deportation of aliens caught smuggling drugs into the United States or convicted of drug-related criminal activity. Each of the INS's ports of entry (POEs) and USBP sectors have intelligence collection responsibilities, such as gathering information on drug interdiction, drug smugglers, alien smugglers, and bogus documents used for illegal entry.

b. The INS Commissioner heads this organization, which has its headquarters located in Washington, DC. The two major sections of the INS are Management and Operations (See Figure III-7). The field offices of the Management Section are located in regional geographic divisions. Within the Operations Section, the major CD operational elements are the Detention and Deportation Office, Investigations, and the Border Patrol headquarters, sectors, and stations.

10. US Border Patrol

a. The USBP is the law enforcement component of the INS. **Its principal mission is the detection and prevention of smuggling and illegal entry of aliens into the United States.** It has also been designated as a **primary agency for drug interdiction in the land areas between US POEs.**

b. The USBP has approximately 5,000 agents and support personnel, primarily positioned along the US borders with Canada and Mexico — most of these on the US Southern border. Its headquarters is located in Washington, DC, with Sector and Remote Headquarters throughout the United States (See Figure III-8).

11. US Attorney

a. The US Attorney is, in effect, **the senior Federal law enforcement official in each US Judicial District.** The responsibility of the US Attorney is to prosecute violations of Federal law, regardless of which agency discovered the infraction. The full range of options available to the US Attorney in criminal law includes the use of investigative grand juries, electronic surveillance, grants of immunity, and search warrants. To prosecute violators US Attorneys employ many elements of the law, ranging from simple possession of illegal substances to drug trafficking statutes. They also use the Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations statute, the drug "kingpin" Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, and the laws governing money laundering, firearms, and public corruption. **Both criminal and civil forfeiture statutes are used to remove all illegal drug-related gains.** Tax charges are also used to prosecute drug traffickers.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE




Figure III-7. Immigration and Naturalization Service

b. There is a US Attorney’s Office in each of the 94 US Judicial Districts, with each state having at least one district. The US Attorneys are appointed by the President and preside over criminal and civil divisions. A separate CD unit often exists within the criminal division, and an Assistant US Attorney usually serves as the area coordinator for the various OCDETFs (See Section B, this chapter).

12. International Criminal Police Organization — US National Central Bureau

a. INTERPOL-US National Central Bureau (USNCB) provides Federal, state, and local LEAs with information on seizures of drugs that are destined for the United States, foreign drugs and contraband trends, and US citizens who have been arrested abroad. The

US BORDER PATROL REGIONAL ORGANIZATION



Figure III-8. US Border Patrol Regional Organization

INTERPOL-USNCB also provides a communications channel for agencies seeking investigative assistance in one of the other INTERPOL member countries.

b. On behalf of the US Attorney General, the USNCB of INTERPOL acts as the US representative to that organization, which has 147 member countries.

13. US Marshals Service

a. **The US Marshals Service (USMS) is responsible for:** providing support and protection of the Federal courts; apprehending most Federal fugitives; operating the Federal Witness Security

Program; maintaining custody of and transporting Federal prisoners; executing court orders and arrest warrants; and **seizing, managing, and selling property forfeited to the USG by drug traffickers and other criminals.** The USMS also participates in international investigations and conducts local law enforcement.

b. Presidentially-appointed marshals and their support staff of over 2,900 deputy marshals and administrative personnel operate from 427 office locations in all 94 US Judicial Districts nationwide. The USMS includes the following primary units: Protection of the Judicial Process; Prisoner Transportation and Detention; Fugitive Apprehension; and Seized Assets Management.

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

14. Department of State

a. The DOS has primary responsibility for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. The DOS is the most important source of foreign affairs information for the United States, providing much of the national security and economic information available to the government and most of the data on internal policies of foreign countries.

b. Under the direction of the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), **the DOS has three units that contribute significantly to CD operations: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); Agency for International Development (AID); and US Embassy Country Teams** (See Figure III-9).

15. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

a. The INL has **primary responsibility for coordinating the USG’s international supply reduction and demand reduction strategies and programs**. Through the Foreign Assistance Act as well as INL funding a broad range of drug control programs are supported in key countries. These efforts include but are not limited to crop eradication, income replacement, investigations, support for interdiction operations, and intelligence gathering.

b. Major INL programs are primarily concerned with four areas.

- **Bilateral and multilateral assistance in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia** for crop control, drug interdiction, and related enforcement activities in producer and transit countries.




Figure III-9. Department of State

ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State, through US ambassadors and country teams, is the lead agency for executing the [national drug control strategy] in foreign nations. Military commands are just some of many US agencies supporting host nations by coordinating support for their counterdrug efforts. Operationalization serves a critical function in that it is the vehicle to achieve consensus building on where, what, when, why, and how all agencies will work together to defeat narcotrafficking. The operational process provides a framework, and specific coordination mandates that all involved become one team. There are not enough resources to support independent operations because the narcotics trafficking network is too complex. The operational process synchronizes the interagency resources that can accomplish the end state.

SOURCE: LTC David G. Bradford
Planning for Victory in the Drug War
Military Review, October 1994

- **Interregional aviation support program** (The Air Wing), funding overall maintenance and operational costs in support of Department-owned aircraft engaged in support of drug law enforcement, and aerial eradication activities.
 - **Drug-related development assistance**, technical assistance for demand reduction programs, and training through US LEAs for foreign personnel in illegal drug enforcement and related procedures.
 - **Funding for regional and international drug control through various international organizations**, including the US Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the Organization of American States, and the Pan American Health Organization.
- administered programs include agricultural improvements, disease eradication, literacy and education reforms, and environmental planning. **AID is an ancillary participant in international CD efforts through its design and implementation of foreign assistance programs in traditional drug-producing regions.**
- b. AID manages assistance programs in over 40 countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

16. Agency for International Development

a. Created by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, **AID administers the US nonmilitary assistance programs.** AID-

17. US Embassy — Country Teams

a. The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. The Chief of Mission (the Ambassador) represents the President, but takes policy guidance from the SECSTATE through regional bureaus. **Responsible for US CD activities within the HN, but not personnel or facilities under the command of a US area commander, the Ambassador interprets US national drug policy and strategy and oversees its application.** The “Country Team Concept” denotes the process

of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the diplomatic mission. The Ambassador uses the Country Team to assist in translating strategy or policy into operational direction for the HN. The Deputy Chief of Mission is often tasked as the Narcotics Control Coordinator to chair the Country Team meetings that concern CD matters.

b. The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the desires of the Chief of Mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of the US departments and agencies present. Principal players of the Country Team with CD interests are shown in Figure III-10.

c. Although US military commanders (CINCs or subordinates) are not members of diplomatic missions, they often participate in meetings and coordination sessions concerning CD and SA matters that are in support of the HN.

US INFORMATION AGENCY

18. US Information Agency

a. The US Information Agency (USIA) is an independent organization within the Executive Branch and is **responsible for the USG’s overseas information, educational exchange, and cultural programs**. USIA provides some support in international operations by conducting information programs on drug-related issues for audiences in drug source and transshipment countries. Overseas, USIA is known as the US Information Service.

b. USIA’s Director reports to the President and receives policy guidance from the SECSTATE. Major divisions of the USIA include the Voice of America, Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs, Bureau of Programs (press and publications services),




Figure III-10. Principal Players of the Country Team With Counterdrug Interests

and the Television & Film Service. USIA has over 200 posts in over 125 countries, grouped in five geographical areas: Africa; Europe; East Asia and the Pacific;

American republics; and North Africa, Near East, and South Asia.

US DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

19. Department of the Treasury

a. The Department of the Treasury (TREAS) (Figure III-11) primarily manages the Nation's finances, although many amendments to the act that created the Department have greatly broadened the scope of its activities. Most of its CD roles and missions are encompassed within the five subordinate organizations described in the following pages.

b. **The division of the TREAS under the Under Secretary for Enforcement is the focus of Treasury's CD activities,** although the Commissioner for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also has an important role. The Under Secretary of the Treasury for

Enforcement chairs the Southwest Border Committee and appoints the Director for Operation Alliance, the multiagency drug law enforcement coordinating center for the Southwest United States. (See Section B of this chapter for further explanation of Operation Alliance and Section F of same for interagency relationships.)

20. US Customs Service

a. The US Customs Service (USCS) is responsible for controlling, regulating, and facilitating the movement of carriers, persons, and commodities between the United States and other nations. **It is the Federal lead agency for land interdiction and is the co-lead agency with the USCG for air interdiction.** Customs' border strategies are designed to interdict the illegal flow of drugs by air, land, and sea. The USCS has maritime interdiction authority within US territorial waters (within 12 miles of the US shore line). It also has an extensive




Figure III-11. Department of the Treasury

money laundering control program. Customs is responsible for coordinating with the USCG, the INS (including the USBP), and other Federal agencies involved in the effort to stop drugs from crossing the US borders.

b. The USCS, with headquarters in Washington DC, is headed by the Commissioner of Customs (See Figure III-12).

- Responsibility for cargo and passenger processing is distributed between 20 Customs Management Centers throughout the United States (See Figure III-13).
- The portion of the USCS with the greatest involvement in CD operations is the Office of Investigations, headed by an Assistant Commissioner (See Figure III-14).

•• **Special Agent in Charge (SAC).** SACs are in charge of criminal investigations. They also have supervisory responsibility for the various CD boats operating for the USCS.

•• **Intelligence Office.** Responsible for the management of intelligence information and data.

•• **Air Interdiction Division.** This division has program management responsibilities, but no command and control of assets. The Air Interdiction Division is organized as follows: (1) All aviation assets are consolidated under the **Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC)** located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. CNAC provides operational, administrative, and logistic control and accountability over all nationally deployed Customs aviation resources. Customs airborne assets are deployed nationally at nine Aviation

Branches. In addition, there are seven Aviation Units, each of which falls under the command of an Aviation Branch. (2) **Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) System.** The C3I function is performed at DAICC, located at Riverside, California (See Figure III-15). The DAICC performs the C3I function for the entire land mass of the United States and extends seaward 100 nautical miles (NMs). It receives handoffs to the endgame within its AOR and the Republic of Mexico. It coordinates with the Information Analysis Center, the Center for the Planning and Control of Drugs in Mexico, and the JIATFs to ensure safe and effective enforcement actions. It is also responsible for the Puerto Rico Law Enforcement Coordination Center and the area within 150 NMs from Puerto Rico. (3) **Surveillance Support Branch (SSB).** The SSB is located in Corpus Christi, Texas. It provides a centrally located operations and maintenance center for P-3 AEW radar surveillance aircraft and P-3A (Slick) long-range interceptors. (See Appendix F, "Major Equipment Descriptions," for further information on USCS aircraft.)

21. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

a. The law enforcement objectives of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) are to investigate arson, suppress trafficking in illicit distilled spirits, suppress interstate trafficking in contraband cigarettes, and eliminate illegal trafficking, possession, and use of firearms, destructive devices, and explosives. **Because many crimes of violence involving firearms are drug-related, BATF directs a significant portion of its resources to fighting illegal drug trafficking.**

b. The 1972 order establishing BATF transferred the functions, powers, and duties under laws relating to alcohol, tobacco,

US CUSTOMS SERVICE ORGANIZATION




Figure III-12. US Customs Service Organization




Figure III-13. US Customs Service Customs Management Centers




Figure III-14. US Customs Service Office of Investigations

firearms, and explosives from the IRS to BATF. BATF operates nationally, with 22 District Law Enforcement offices in principal cities and five Compliance Operations Regional offices.

22. Internal Revenue Service

The IRS is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws and related statutes, except for those covered by the BATF. **Individuals owe taxes on all income, including income from**

narcotics-related activities. The attempt to “launder” illegal revenues through legitimate businesses (without reporting the income), willfully attempting to conceal income, or simply failing to pay taxes on reported income are all violations of the Internal Revenue Code. This often gives the IRS jurisdiction in drug-related cases.

23. US Secret Service

The Secret Service, best known for protecting the President, Vice President, and




Figure III-15. US Customs Service Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence System

their families, also has the mission of detecting and arresting any person committing an offense against the laws relating to currency, obligations and securities of the US or foreign governments, or the laws pertaining to electronic funds transfer frauds, credit card frauds, false identification documents, and computer access fraud. **The Service's CD activities are associated with ongoing criminal investigations involving counterfeiting, money laundering, and other financial crimes.**

24. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

a. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is the lead organization for interagency training of Federal law

enforcement personnel. As a bureau of the Treasury Department, **FLETC provides basic and advanced training for personnel from more than 70 participating organizations, including all Federal LEAs involved in drug law enforcement** (except the FBI and DEA). It also trains many state and local police officers. The Center conducts advanced programs in areas such as microcomputers, photography, contract fraud, criminal intelligence analysis, antiterrorism, and marine law enforcement, and provides several instructor training courses.

b. The major facility is located at Glynco, Georgia. Also located at Glynco is the National Center for State and Local Training, which conducts specialized programs for Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

25. Department of Transportation

a. Department of Transportation (DOT) functions are to develop and coordinate policies that will provide an efficient and economical national transportation system, with due regard for need, environmental standards, and national defense.

b. DOT's headquarters is located in Washington, DC, and it has numerous agencies and offices throughout the United States to fulfill its responsibilities. Under the direction of the Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS), DOT has **two subordinate organizations that are instrumental in CD operations — the USCG and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).**

26. US Coast Guard

a. The USCG is responsible for a wide range of Federal maritime programs, including search and rescue, aids to navigation, icebreaking, marine safety, and military readiness. It is the principal maritime LEA of the United States, and it is the only Federal agency with jurisdiction on the high seas as well as in US territorial waters. **The USCG is the CD lead agency for maritime interdiction and co-lead agency (with the USCS) for air interdiction.**

b. The USCG was established in 1790 (initially as the Revenue Cutter Service) and became a part of the DOT in 1967. With its national headquarters in Washington, DC, it has two area headquarters and nine district headquarters located throughout the United States (See Figure III-16).




Figure III-16. US Coast Guard Structure

c. For a depiction of the USCG's major geographic locations, see Figure III-17. (See Appendix F, "Major Equipment Descriptions," for USCG equipment descriptions.)

27. Federal Aviation Administration

The FAA controls the use of US airspace, operates a common system of air traffic control and navigation for both civil and military aircraft, regulates air commerce, and coordinates research that pertains to air navigation facilities. **The FAA assists in identifying airborne drug smugglers by using radar, posting aircraft lookouts, and tracking the movement of suspect aircraft.** The FAA's Drug Investigation Support Program provides support by investigating violations related to drug smuggling. The Law Enforcement Assistance Unit provides limited intelligence and investigative support and performs document searches for LEAs.

US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

28. Department of Agriculture

a. The US Department of Agriculture is the principal agency that oversees agricultural research, conservation, crop control, and various programs to control plant and animal diseases.

b. The Agriculture Department has **one subordinate organization with a significant CD role.** That agency is **the US Forest Service (USFS)**, which is subordinate to the Assistant Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment.

29. US Forest Service

a. The USFS manages national forests, grasslands, and land utilization projects in 44 states. State and local LEAs also have jurisdiction over violations of state and local




Figure III-17. US Coast Guard Regional Organization

laws and ordinances on National Forest Service lands. **Eradication of illegal drug producing plants is a significant CD role of the USFS.**

b. There are over 150 criminal investigators and approximately 600 uniformed law enforcement officers in the USFS. These agents are skilled in enforcement operations unique to remote areas.

US DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

30. Department of the Interior

a. The Department of the Interior (DOI) regulates and manages the natural resources of the country.

b. The agencies of DOI with CD roles are the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the National Park Service (NPS).

31. Bureau of Indian Affairs

a. The BIA has as its principal objective the training of native Indian and Alaskan Americans to manage their own affairs and develop their human and natural resource potential under a trust relationship with the Federal Government. **BIA performs marijuana eradication missions and other CD activities** with a focus on those reservations that are being used as bases of operation for the sale and distribution of illegal narcotics to Indians and non-Indians.

b. The BIA operates a marijuana eradication unit in the northwest United States at Klamath Falls, Oregon. Other CD operations are also active on Indian reservations throughout the country.

32. Bureau of Land Management

The BLM is responsible for the total management of 272 million acres of public lands located primarily in the West and Alaska. Because of the remote and relatively uninhabited nature of these lands, and the proximity of much of this acreage to the US-Mexico border, **the BLM faces increasing problems with drug activities that not only adversely impact resource values but also endanger visitors and users.**

33. National Park Service

a. The NPS administers an extensive system of parks, monuments, historic sites, and recreation areas. **Many park areas are located near known drug smuggling or trafficking routes.** Law enforcement functions are performed by the park police of the NPS.

b. Roughly 21 percent of the 1,700-mile border with Mexico is within the National Park System. Significant percentages of the coastlines of a number of states lie within National Parks (31 percent of Georgia, 42 percent of North Carolina, 50 percent of Maryland, 35 percent of Virginia, and 20 percent of California).

US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

34. Department of Education

a. The Department of Education is responsible for establishing Federal education policy and for administering and coordinating Federal educational assistance funds. **It administers the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, which authorizes**

funding for drug education and prevention activities as a means of reducing the demand for illicit drugs.

b. Its four main offices that contribute to demand reduction are the Educational Research and Improvement, Elementary and Secondary Education, Post Secondary Education, and Special Education and Rehabilitative Services.

SECTION B. REGIONAL AND COMPOSITE CD ORGANIZATIONS

35. General

There are several organizations that have been formed to focus on the identification and investigation of drug traffickers. The following paragraphs will describe the missions or roles and organization of these CD elements.

36. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

a. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the Director of the ONDCP to designate certain localities in the United States as HIDTAs. **These areas have the most serious drug trafficking problems and the most pressing need for more Federal assistance.** The overall goal of this program is to take action in each HIDTA to identify and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.

b. There are 15 geographic HIDTAs (See Figure III-18). ONDCP coordinates implementation of the HIDTA program that designates geographic areas to which federal resources are allocated to link local, state, and federal drug enforcement efforts. Continued DOD support of HIDTAs through personnel details, integration of NG CD activities, and support of CD activities along the southwest border is important to the success of this program. Properly targeted, the HIDTA

program offers greater efficiency in countering illegal drug trade in local areas.

37. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces

a. The overall goal of the OCDETF program is to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking and related enterprises and to dismantle the operations of those organizations by means of:

- Adding Federal resources for drug-related investigations and prosecution; and
- Fostering improved interagency coordination and cooperation.

b. Achieving these two aims has resulted in more and better cases against high-level drug traffickers.

c. The OCDETFs obtain support from those organizations depicted in Figure III-19. **This program is coordinated by the US Attorneys offices in 13 regions throughout the country.** Each region (Figure III-20) encompasses a number of Federal judicial districts, with a core city designated as the region's headquarters. OCDETFs concurrently administer the Metropolitan HIDTA CD programs.

38. DEA State and Local Task Forces

a. These task forces are **established to promote cooperation between the DEA and state and local law enforcement officials** with the goal of immobilizing local drug trafficking groups. This program represents a force multiplier in which drug enforcement coverage is provided to a large geographic area using fewer Federal agents.

b. **Objectives** of this program include the following:




Figure III-18. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

- **Disruption of illicit drug traffic in specified areas** by targeting individuals and organizations for investigation and prosecution.
- **Increasing the effectiveness of participating agencies by extended on-the-job training.**
- **Improving the operational interaction** among all agencies participating in the task force.
- **Establishment of investigative priorities** that emphasize those drugs and traffickers posing the greatest risk to society.
- **Increasing effectiveness of nonparticipating agencies** through direct assistance, intelligence information, and other support.
- **Providing access to the Federal judicial system** for prosecutions that could not be effectively tried in state or local courts.
 - c. DEA state and local task forces vary from year to year as to their composition and total numbers.

39. Operation Alliance

- a. **The primary function of Operation Alliance is to facilitate Federal agency (primarily LEA) advisory support to state and local LEAs, and their supporting Active, Reserve, and NG forces, in their**

ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE AGENCIES




Figure III-19. Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Agencies

interdiction efforts along the US Southwest border. Specific goals and initiatives are as follows:

- Emphasizing asset sharing with state and local LEAs.
- Establishing groups (known as “Border Alliance Groups”) to focus the enforcement efforts of Federal, state, and local resources.
- Distributing compatible communications systems for interfacing with all LEAs.

b. Operation Alliance operates under the policy guidance of the ONDCP Southwest Border Committee and the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group (OAJCG)

and under the direction of the Southwest Border HIDTA coordinator (who is also the Director of Operation Alliance). The OAJCG functions under the Director, Operation Alliance, as a coordinating and planning group. Its membership includes over 20 Federal, state, and local LEAs (See Figure III-21). Group meetings are chaired by the Senior Tactical Coordinator, a position that rotates among representatives of the DEA, USBP, and USCS.

40. Project North Star

a. **Project North Star is a multiagency law enforcement coordination organization similar to Operation Alliance but along the US-Canadian border.** The purpose of North Star is to halt the flow of illegal drugs,

ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE REGIONS




Figure III-20. Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Regions

aliens, firearms, currency, and other contraband items across the common borders in both directions. Specific purposes of North Star include:

- Providing an orderly method for law enforcement coordination in jurisdictions adjacent to the US-Canadian border;
- Improving border-wide and regional CD strategy, intelligence, and operation planning;
- Improving effectiveness of high cost, high value assets such as aviation and mobile ground-based radars (GBRs); and

- Collectively addressing intergovernment problems related to law enforcement.

b. The North Star Joint Command Group was established in order to promote effective liaison among the participating agencies. Representatives from US Federal, state, and local LEAs and from Canadian national and provincial LEAs make up the group.

41. Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos

a. Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) is a DEA program responsible for coordinating and monitoring all CD efforts in the Bahamas, the Turks, and Caicos Islands.

OPERATION ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS




Figure III-21. Operation Alliance Participants

It is primarily involved in air interdiction operations.

b. OPBAT's operational area is limited to the West Indies and the operational facilities in the above named countries. OPBAT's headquarters is located in Nassau, Bahamas, with the DEA supervisor reporting to the Ambassador. Support for OPBAT is provided by the USCG, USCS, US Army (USA), and JIATF-E, as well as Bahamian, Turk, and Caicos law enforcement personnel and assets.

SECTION C. STATE AND LOCAL CD ORGANIZATIONS

42. National Guard

a. The NG provides **military support for local-, state-, and Federally-sponsored CD efforts**. Its role in CD operations is another portion of its traditional state mission of providing military support to civilian authorities. These activities are funded under title 32 of the USC rather than title 10, which is Federally controlled. The NG has categorized its support missions into areas that are essentially subdivisions of those listed in Chapter I, "Introduction and Overview." The six major CD support missions of the NG are shown in Figure III-22 and discussed below:

- **Program Management.** Plan and coordinate state CD supply and demand reduction support, establish liaison with supported LEAs and other community organizations, resource and manage personnel and equipment requirements for CD support operations, and prepare operational or financial reports and briefings as required.
- **Technical Support**
 - **Linguist Support.** Transcription or translation of audio tapes, seized

documents and other information media. NG personnel will not participate in interrogation activities. The NG will not maintain or store final products in NG facilities or data bases.

- **Intelligence Analyst Support.** Assist LEAs in the establishment of CD intelligence systems or data bases and provide intelligence analyst support.

- **Operational or Investigative Case Support.** Provide assistance to LEAs in developing investigations and cases for prosecution. Activities include, but are not limited to, inputting, reviewing, and analyzing collected LEA information and providing assistance such as legal, paralegal, and auditing. Operational support to LEAs is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the supported agency and "free up" law enforcement officers for drug enforcement duties.

- **Communications Support.** Provide personnel to establish, operate, and maintain communications stations, bases, and equipment in support of LEA CD operations.

- **Engineer Support.** Provide engineer support to LEAs and community organizations where the project has a CD nexus. This will exclude drug laboratories or hazardous materials.

- **Subsurface or Diver Support.** Subsurface inspections of commercial vessel hulls within US territorial waters or US maritime POEs through the use of sidescan sonar buoys or divers to detect alien devices or containers attached to the vessel hulls or other underwater activities. Divers may visually inspect and report to LEAs any unusual physical hull configurations.

MAJOR COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT MISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

TECHNICAL SUPPORT

- Linguist Support
- Intelligence Analyst Support
- Operational or Investigative Case Support
- Communications Support
- Engineer Support
- Subsurface or Diver Support

GENERAL SUPPORT

- Domestic Cannabis Suppression and Eradication Operations Support
- Transportation Support
- Maintenance or Logistic Support
- Cargo and Mail Inspection

COUNTERDRUG-RELATED TRAINING

RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

- Surface
- Aerial

DEMAND REDUCTION SUPPORT

- Community Based
- Educational Institutions
- Informational
- Leadership Development
- Coalition Development

Figure III-22. Major Counterdrug Support Missions of the National Guard

- **General Support**

- **Domestic Cannabis Suppression and Eradication Operations Support.**

Support of LEA domestic cannabis suppression and eradication operations. This includes but is not limited to aerial support, logistic support, communications support, intelligence, planning support, operational staff coordination, medical, physical security, ground transportation, eradication and destruction of contraband, and spraying of herbicides.

- **Transportation Support.** Provide transportation (aerial, ground, or maritime) of LEA personnel or equipment; persons in LEA custody; and seized property or contraband to, from, or as part of CD operations or when security or other special circumstances reasonably necessitate NG support and there is a CD nexus.

- **Maintenance or Logistic Support.** Provide maintenance or logistic support for LEA vehicles and equipment to enhance the CD effectiveness of the supported agency and free up law enforcement officers for drug enforcement duties.

- **Cargo and Mail Inspection.** Assist LEAs by inspecting cargo and mail. Primary emphasis will be placed on POEs and functional equivalents. Cargo and mail include but are not limited to vehicles, containers, commercial cargo, aircraft, watercraft, baggage, and mail.

- **Counterdrug-Related Training.** Train LEA or military personnel in military subjects and skills useful in the conduct of CD operations or in the operation of military equipment used in CD operations.

- **Reconnaissance and Observation**

- **Surface.** Reconnoiter or perform area observation by land or water to detect and report illegal drug activities that include (but are not limited to) cultivated marijuana, suspected isolated drug airstrips, drug drop zones, drug trafficking corridors, illegal drug labs, suspicious aircraft, watercraft, or motor vehicles. Approved categories of CD activities include the following: (1) **Unattended Sensor Support.** Personnel will support LEAs in the emplacement, monitoring, and maintenance of unattended sensors. (2) **Visual Reconnaissance or Observation by mobile patrols and LPs and/or OPs.** An LEA officer must be present or in direct contact with the NG team. (3) **GBR.** Establish and operate ground radar sites using either Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps GBR systems.

- **Aerial.** Reconnaissance or observation of airspace, maritime, or surface areas (land and internal waters and waterways of the United States and its territories) for illegal drug activities.

- **Demand Reduction Support.** Demand reduction support organizes NG resources, members, and their families in support of drug abuse prevention programs in the community.

- **Community-Based.** Support provided to community activities primarily designed to educate, train, or otherwise prevent drug abuse among youth.

- **Educational Institutions.** Support community-based activities that focus on educational institutions or otherwise have an educational institution as the primary sponsor, and are primarily designed to educate, train, or prevent youth from drug abuse. This includes tutoring, mentoring, DARE support,

after-school programs, drug-free activities, role modeling programs, and sports-drug awareness programs.

•• **Informational.** Participation for the sole purpose of providing information about drug abuse or drug abuse programs. This includes speakers' bureaus, static displays, Red Ribbon Campaign, and educational material distributions.

•• **Leadership Development.** Support camps, retreats, seminars and programs, not primarily associates with educational institutions, that focus on developing drug abuse prevention leadership skills in youth and adults.

•• **Coalition Development.** Assist in the development of a functioning community coalition organized to reduce the illegal use of drugs.

b. Each active Service has a "reserve" structure designed to provide an immediate expansion capability if needed. The Army and Air Force each have two separate "reserve" elements; Army Reserves and Air Force Reserves, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG). **Both ARNG and ANG are under state control until they are mobilized.** Other NG elements include the following:

• **National Guard Bureau.** The NGB is a Federal agency responsible for the administration of the ARNG and ANG. It is both a staff and operating agency. As a staff, it participates with the other Service staffs in developing and coordinating programs pertaining to the NG. As an operating agency, it formulates and administers programs for training, development, and maintenance activities, and it acts as the channel of communications between the states and Departments of the Army and Air Force.

• **National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute (NICI).** NICI is a Federally-funded activity located in San Luis Obispo, California, which provides management-level training in the planning and conduct of interagency CD operations to both military and law enforcement personnel. NICI conducts CD courses, publishes bulletins to provide CD information, and maintains an extensive library on CD materials.

• **The Adjutant General (TAG).** Each state, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia have TAGs who are appointed by the Governor and have the responsibility for administration of NG programs within their state, territory, or district boundaries.

43. Law Enforcement

The governor of each state or territory, through the state attorney general, has an impact on the various state and local LEAs with regard to CD operations and policy. Federal program support such as the DEA's State and Local Task Forces described in Section B of this chapter provide an organizational structure for coordinated Federal, state, and local CD efforts.

SECTION D. INTERNATIONAL CD ORGANIZATIONS

44. General

The demand for illegal drugs is a worldwide problem. Further progress in reducing the demand for drugs in the United States depends in part on reducing the supply of drugs entering this country. For other nations to cooperate with the United States and with each other in reducing the supply, they must understand that drug production, trafficking, and consumption threaten their national well-being and the entire community

of nations. **The United States works to persuade other nations that involvement in any segment of the drug chain ultimately results in corruption and drug use at home, and that drug consumption soon affects national security by destroying the essential fabric of their society.**

45. International Criminal Police Organization

INTERPOL plays a significant role in the distribution of intelligence data on international drug trafficking to its 147 member countries. The INTERPOL drug program generates a worldwide portrayal of international drug trafficking and provides access to information and statistics generated by its members. It also provides a communications channel for agencies seeking investigative assistance in other INTERPOL member countries.

46. Countries

a. Canada

- The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is Canada's national police force. **The RCMP is the single law enforcement point of contact for CD operations and intelligence in Canada.**
- The Department of National Defence, responsible for the defense of Canada, was named as a support department to the RCMP for this effort, similar to the Department of Defense in the United States. Canadian forces provide equipment and personnel to assist in detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into Canada. Aerial detection in CD operations is executed through the NORAD (see Chapter VI, "Execution of Counterdrug Operations," Section D). Canada's Maritime Command is responsible for maritime surveillance operations. Land forces personnel are able

to provide the RCMP with ground surveillance as well as assistance to RCMP land interdiction operations.

b. Mexico

- **Enforcement efforts along the Southwest border are enhanced by cooperating with the Government of Mexico.** The Mexican government has arrested major figures connected with drug trafficking networks, increased domestic crop eradication efforts, committed more financial and personnel resources, and strengthened interdiction efforts against drug traffickers who transship drugs via Mexico.

- The Mexican government responded to the increased threat of air-delivered shipments of cocaine from South America by developing an enhanced interdiction capability, including creation of the Northern Border Response Force (NBRF); construction of a series of GBRs along its southern border; and purchase of specially-outfitted tracker aircraft that can work in concert with US radar assets operating in international airspace. The NBRF program is an integrated bilateral law enforcement effort between the US and Mexican LEAs. Its primary focus is to interdict illegal drugs moving through Mexico en route to other countries.

c. **Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos.** OPBAT is discussed in Section B of this chapter.

d. **Other Countries.** **The level of effort and the success in HN CD operations usually depends on the strength of the government, the resources it has available, the influence of the drug smugglers, and the influence of the United States.** The cooperation, support, and the amount of effort varies depending on the nation. Most

European countries, especially Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, have agreed with the United States to attempt to stop the flow of illegal drugs. They are providing information, increasing interdiction efforts at their borders, and cooperating with the United States in the Caribbean, where the Dutch and British also provide maritime support with military ships.

SECTION E. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

47. General

a. A coordinated, interagency campaign such as **CD operations requires a cooperative approach to the coordination, exchange, and integration of intelligence.** As the national drug control effort has evolved, an increasing number of intelligence functions and activities have been established to support CD operations. Existing drug intelligence capabilities have been improved and extensive DOD and foreign intelligence resources have been brought to bear on the problem.

b. DOD components and many LEAs have internal intelligence components that are structured and authorized to support their own missions and operations. There are also a number of national, theater, and law enforcement intelligence analysis centers with CD missions. Familiarity with these organizations is useful to understanding how intelligence support is provided to operators, planners, and policymakers. The principal CD intelligence organizations are described below.

48. National-Level Intelligence Organizations and Centers

a. **Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC).** The CNC was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to render analytical and operational

support to the national CD effort. Its official mission is to use intelligence more effectively in order to help form the policy required to address the security problems resulting from drug trafficking. CNC personnel conduct all-source collection, analysis, and production of intelligence related to the international production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs. Much of CNC's intelligence remains "in house" and is not passed to LEAs to avoid compromising sensitive sources and methods or jeopardizing potential criminal prosecutions. The CNC is located at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

b. Defense Intelligence Agency

- DIA, located in Washington, DC, produces strategic intelligence as a member of the national foreign intelligence community. It also provides tactical and operational intelligence support both to DOD elements performing D&M missions and to LEAs performing interdiction missions. **Within DIA, the Transnational Warfare Counterdrug Analysis (TWD) Office monitors and supervises the accomplishment of all CD intelligence requirements.**
- TWD provides intelligence support directly to OSD, the Joint Staff, and other senior agencies at the national level. **TWD also coordinates at the headquarters level with intelligence and LEAs for the provision of defense intelligence support,** and provides detailed intelligence support packages to designated tactical analysis teams (TATs) and to the USSOUTHCOM joint air operations center (JAOC).
- TWD provides analytical assessments on the collection threat posed by illegal drug traffickers against DOD CD operations and activities. TWD also assesses the

role of foreign intelligence services in drug trafficking or CD efforts.

- DIA's Requirements Management Division (CL-1), located in Room 1D918 in the Pentagon, provides DOD with all-source collection requirements validation of all DOD collection requirements requiring national systems support. It serves as the CD joint task force (JTF), supported command, and the DOD advocate on all national collection involving support to CD operations. It also provides DIA-DOD representation to the counternarcotics national working groups for signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) issues. It provides direct operational support as well as strategic national support.

c. **National Security Agency.** NSA provides intelligence, secure communications, and computer security advice to authorized military and drug LEAs. NSA headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

49. Theater Intelligence Centers

a. **Atlantic Intelligence Center (AIC).** The AIC is a joint military intelligence center responsible for theater intelligence support within the USACOM AOR. It provides all-source operational intelligence to USACOM and its Military Service components. The AIC is located in Norfolk, Virginia.

b. **Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific (JICPAC).** The JICPAC is a joint military intelligence center responsible for theater intelligence support within the USPACOM AOR. It provides all-source operational intelligence to USPACOM, its Military Service components, and JIATF-W. The JICPAC is located in Camp Smith, Hawaii.

c. **USSOUTHCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).** The USSOUTHCOM JIC is a joint military intelligence center responsible for theater intelligence support within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. It provides all-source operational intelligence to USSOUTHCOM, its Military Service components, JIATF-E, and JIATF-S. The JIC is located in Miami, Florida.

50. JIATF and/or JTF Intelligence Support Elements

USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, and USACOM oversee regional JIATFs and/or JTFs that conduct CD D&M within their respective AORs. Intelligence directorates within each JIATF and/or JTF are the focal points for tactical and operational intelligence support for DOD and LEA CD operations within the AOR.

a. **JIATF-E (USSOUTHCOM).** The JIATF-E Intelligence Directorate maintains a 24-hour intelligence watch in the JIATF-E joint operations command center (JOCC), which provides real-time tactical intelligence to both DOD- and LEA-deployed D&M assets. The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) also operates an intelligence fusion center that provides indications and warning (predictive) and targeting intelligence in support of DOD D&M and LEA interdiction operations in the transit zone of the USSOUTHCOM AOR. JIATF-E is located in Key West, Florida.

b. **JIATF-S (USSOUTHCOM).** The JIATF-S Intelligence Division maintains a 24-hour intelligence watch to provide real-time tactical intelligence to both DOD- and LEA-deployed D&M assets. The Intelligence Division also provides indications and warning (predictive) and targeting intelligence in support of LEA interdiction operations in the source zone of the USSOUTHCOM AOR. JIATF-S is located at Howard Air Force Base (AFB), Panama.

- The Intelligence Division uses a variety of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level collection systems covering the full spectrum of intelligence collection, to provide information on all aspects of drug production and trafficking.
- This intelligence information is analyzed and incorporated into various intelligence products tailored to meet the needs of key CD players at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. **The critical element in this intelligence effort is the ability to coordinate intelligence assets and integrate trafficking intelligence data to produce usable targeting information.**
- The Intelligence Division is capable of accessing all available communications supporting CD operations and intelligence. The Counternarcotics Command and Management System provides secure data, voice, and imagery to selected TATs.
- **Tactical Analysis Teams.** As part of the Ambassador's Country Team, TATs are the focal point of USSOUTHCOM's CD intelligence support between the Intelligence Division and HN CD forces. **Their mission is to support the US Country Team and HN CD operations by providing tactical intelligence advice and/or assistance, targeting support, collection management, automated data processing (ADP) support (including data base management) and SIGINT advice and/or assistance to the Country Team.** TATs further assist the DEA by producing all-source intelligence analysis. TATs provide a direct link between the CD team operating within the HN and the D&M capability of the Department of Defense.
 - c. **JIATF-W (USPACOM).** The Intelligence Directorate of JIATF-W maintains an analysis section whose analysts conduct long-term, all-source CD analysis, often while forward deployed to the USPACOM AOR. The analysts provide tactical intelligence support to both DOD D&M operations and LEA interdiction operations within the USPACOM AOR. The 24-hour intelligence watch in the command center generates real-time intelligence in support of both DOD- and LEA-deployed D&M assets. JIATF-W is located in Alameda, California.
 - d. **JTF-6 (USACOM).** JTF-6 is tasked with supporting CD land operations in CONUS. The J-2 operates a joint tactical intelligence center that provides all-source tactical and operational intelligence to LEA, the Department of Defense, and NG elements. JTF-6 is located in El Paso, Texas.

51. Law Enforcement Intelligence Organizations

- a. **Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Intelligence.** **The DEA Office of Intelligence, with both strategic and tactical intelligence sections, provides direct analytical support to DEA enforcement operations.** DEA intelligence analysts are also assigned to field division offices, selected domestic offices, and several foreign offices. These personnel support investigations, conduct strategic studies, and provide other intelligence services to DEA operations.

- **El Paso Intelligence Center.** DEA established EPIC **to provide operational and tactical drug interdiction intelligence to the law enforcement community.** EPIC provides information to authorized DOD, Federal, and state agencies. It has its own proprietary data base as well as access to a variety of other

law enforcement data bases, thus functioning as a clearinghouse and conduit for law enforcement information. Only accredited representatives of state police agencies can directly access the EPIC data base; all other requests pertinent to drug investigations must be submitted via designated police offices or officials. **EPIC is a full-service intelligence operations center.** Its primary mission is to provide tactical support to Federal, state, and local LEAs in areas that relate to trafficking in drugs, weapons, and aliens. Surveillance and interdiction operations against drug shipments into the United States are also supported by EPIC. In addition to DEA, 11 other Federal agencies are members of EPIC.

b. **US Coast Guard. The USCG operates several intelligence centers that have CD missions.** These include the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland, the Maritime Intelligence Center in Miami, Florida, and intelligence staffs at the Atlantic and Pacific area commands in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda, California. Coast Guard District Staffs subordinate to the area commanders also have intelligence staffs.

- **USCG ICC.** The ICC supports USCG CD programs with long-range, strategic, and operational intelligence production. It is the USCG's principal intelligence liaison element with other national and law enforcement intelligence centers.
- **USCG Atlantic Area and Pacific Area Command Intelligence Centers.** These centers provide operational intelligence support to CD detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations in their respective operational areas.
- **USCG District Intelligence Branches.** Intelligence nodes located at district

headquarters serve as intelligence "pipelines" between area intelligence centers and operational commands and units.

- **Maritime Intelligence Center (MARINCEN).** The Seventh Coast Guard District operates a major intelligence center in its Miami, Florida, headquarters. It is manned by USCG personnel with liaison personnel from USCS and DEA. The MARINCEN serves as a fusion center for current, all-source tactical CD intelligence that is provided to the DOD and LEA operational units.

c. **US Customs Service, Office of Intelligence.** The USCS Office of Intelligence (OI) is responsible for supporting the investigation and inspection requirements of the agency. The OI produces operational and tactical intelligence that supports USCS CD interdiction and apprehension efforts.

52. Intelligence Organizations Relationships

All DOD CD intelligence organizations should receive and provide intelligence to other CD intelligence organizations. The scope, methods, and communications means for this exchange of intelligence information are necessarily classified. Further details on this subject may be obtained from classified manuals such as the DOD "Intelligence Communications Architecture" publications produced by the Joint Staff, J-6.

SECTION F. CD ORGANIZATIONAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS

53. General

As shown in the previous sections, there are numerous and diverse organizations involved in CD operations. This section will

clarify their interrelationships by depicting key government organizations and LEAs that are involved in the reduction of drug supplies within the context of two criteria.

- a. Levels of effort.
- b. Whether within CONUS or outside the continental United States (OCONUS).

54. Levels of Effort

As in the conduct of a traditional military campaign, **three levels of effort apply to drug law enforcement and military support of those efforts. These levels are strategic, operational, and tactical.** To be effective, national and theater CD strategic objectives must be translated into operational guidance that specifies tactical actions.

- a. **Strategic. At the national strategic level, broad policy is established and desired conditions are agreed upon.** National leaders set forth strategic objectives (what needs to be done to support policy and protect interests), strategic concepts (how we are going to do it), and priorities for resources (what will it take in terms of money, manpower, and time to get the job done). **At the theater strategic level, the geographic combatant commander designs the theater strategy and campaign to accomplish the broad national direction.**

- b. **Operational.** At the operational level, **the broad vision and strategic intent of the national and theater leadership are translated into operational objectives.** Officials at this level should have the authority of law and regulation to compel the synchronized efforts of myriad supporting tactical elements. Within the military chain of command such authority exists. The synchronization is accomplished through detailed planning and the application of resources. Between governmental agencies planning and operations are conducted more through cooperation and coordination than authority of law or regulations.

- c. **Tactical.** At the tactical level, **the actual CD operations and support for those operations are conducted within the intent of the strategic guidance and operation plans.** Here are found Federal, state, and local drug LEAs, often combined in various task forces as described earlier.

55. Graphic Representations

Figures III-23 and III-24 represent displays of organizational relationships within and outside the United States. The levels at which the organizations are depicted in these figures are not absolute. For example, the major CD commanders operate at the strategic and operational levels although they are only displayed at the strategic level on the charts. The intent is to project organizations at the level in which they generally operate.




Figure III-23. Continental United States Counterdrug Organizations




Figure III-24. Outside the Continental United States Counterdrug Organizations

CHAPTER IV

DOD COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

“If you know the enemy’s plans beforehand you will always be more than a match for him, even with inferior numbers.”

Frederick the Great
The Art of War, 1761

SECTION A. DETECTION AND MONITORING

1. General

As explained in Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview,” **the DOD role of D&M is a complicated part of the overall drug interdiction process.** The goal of D&M is to provide early notification to, and as necessary prolonged tracking of, aerial and surface targets for appropriate LEAs, thus enabling them to conduct interceptions, searches, arrests of traffickers, and seizures of illegal drugs and illegally obtained property.

2. Drug Interdiction Process

The Department of Defense’s principal CD mission is D&M, and the desired end result of successful D&M is interdiction by the LEAs. **Drug interdiction can take place in the air, at sea, or on land. These areas often overlap, causing a multienvironment and therefore multiagency process.** The three environments of drug interdiction, of which D&M is an integral part, are described below:

a. **Air Interdiction.** Drug smuggling by air constitutes a major means by which illegal drugs are transported into the United States. The principal goals of air interdiction operations are to deter drug smuggling by seizing drugs, aircraft, and the smugglers and by denying smugglers safe, direct, and economical routes to major distribution areas in the United States. **Air interception activities in international airspace are**

conducted by the USCG and USCS (co-lead agencies) with assistance by other agencies, if needed. HN’s also conduct interdiction operations with US D&M assistance.

b. **Maritime Interdiction.** Maritime interdiction on the high seas and in US territorial waters is **primarily the responsibility of the USCG, although numerous USN vessels are also involved. The USCS has identical jurisdiction in US territorial seas and is the lead agency at US POEs.** Maritime interdiction efforts focus principally on deterring drug smuggling by monitoring seaborne smuggling routes, detecting and seizing drug smuggling vessels, and arresting their crews. Over the years, maritime smuggling methods have grown increasingly sophisticated in order to counter enforcement efforts. As with air interdictions, HN’s also conduct maritime interdictions.

c. **Land Interdiction.** The primary goal of land interdiction is to seize drugs, drug-related money, and illegal munitions and chemicals as they enter or leave the United States. **Apprehension at POEs is accomplished primarily by the USCS. The land between POEs is the responsibility of the INS’s enforcement branch—the USBP.** Line watch operations and checkpoints along and in proximity to the US border are used extensively.

3. D&M System

To be successful in supporting the drug interdiction process, **D&M must be**



Active duty surface combatants are used as radar picket ships to provide air and maritime search and surveillance in support of the D&M mission.

closely organized and coordinated.

Commanders must ensure that the following elements are present and operating efficiently.

a. Intelligence. A means of collecting, fusing, producing, and disseminating drug intelligence is critical to the success of D&M units. The system must take into account a multitude of sources such as IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). This use of all-source intelligence provides a basis for narrowing the focus of the huge areas involved in the D&M mission. (See Section D, this chapter, for more details on intelligence support.)

b. Personnel. The D&M mission requires a full-time commitment of personnel for it to be successful. These personnel can be either permanently assigned to dedicated CD organizations such as CD JIATF and/or JTF headquarters, or on temporary duty for a specified time or mission.

c. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. Internal DOD C4 systems must be integrated into interagency C4 systems and procedures. To streamline the overall drug interdiction C4 process, organizations and techniques have been established for the major drug transiting areas, such as the JIATFs and CD planning through the national counterdrug planning process. (See Section C, this chapter, for more details on C4 systems.)

d. Physical Resources. A variety of active duty and reserve military forces support the D&M mission. These forces are deployed in a defense-in-depth strategy, from source countries, in-transit zones, or within the United States. Assets such as the ones shown in Figure IV-1 are used by the Department of Defense in the D&M role. (See Appendix F, “Major Equipment Descriptions,” for more details.)

e. Coordination and Liaison. Drug trafficking organizations and individuals operate without regard to jurisdictional

ASSETS USED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE DETECTION & MONITORING ROLE

- Airborne Warning and Control Systems
- Sea- and Land-Based Radars
- "Interceptor" (identification, track and/or handoff) aircraft
- Maritime Patrol Aircraft
- Picket Ships
- Submarines
- Listening Post and/or Observation Post
- Coastal Patrol Craft

Figure IV-1. Assets Used by the Department of Defense in the Detection & Monitoring Role

boundaries, thus creating the need for multijurisdictional task forces, close coordination, and liaison between the Department of Defense and LEAs and HN forces. Examples of task forces are Operation Alliance, OPBAT, and the CD JIATFs and/or JTFs. **Continuous interagency coordination through the use of liaison officers between DOD elements, LEA, and HN organizations is also essential** for exchange of information, interpreting organizational structures, and ensuring cooperation. Planning conferences, such as CINCs' quarterly regional planning conferences, also serve to improve the cooperation between different CD agencies (see Chapter V, "Planning Counterdrug Operations"). Issues such as who is in charge, who has operational control (OPCON) or TACON, what classification guidelines must be observed, what

reporting structures and systems will be utilized, and required communications interface can be discussed and agreed upon.

f. **Financial Resources.** There are many legal restrictions on the use of CD funds. **Unauthorized expenditure of funds can lead to criminal or administrative action against those responsible.** D&M missions are usually funded by the Services' operation and maintenance (O&M) funds. Listed below are principles to follow:

- **Expenditure must be reasonably related to the purpose for which Congress made the appropriations.**
- **Expenditures must not be prohibited by law** (e.g., DOD personnel are not permitted to participate in a search, seizure, or arrest or similar activity "unless otherwise permitted by law").
- **Expenditures must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation** (e.g., title 10 O&M funds versus title 22 SA funds).
- **If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably to achieve the same objective.** This is a prohibition against augmentation of funds. (See Appendix G, "Resource Management" for more details.)

g. **Logistic Support.** The support needed in order to maintain the physical systems and personnel deployed to conduct a D&M mission can be substantial. **Logistics is a Service responsibility and must be considered whenever large units or complex equipment are deployed.** The logistic principles of responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability apply to CD D&M missions as well as combat missions.

4. D&M Concepts

The participation of the Department of Defense, with its unique capabilities in the CD effort, enhances the Nation’s capabilities. This is particularly true in the mission area of D&M. **DOD forces and platforms such as ships and aircraft typically operate under the OPCON of DOD commanders. Requests for forces, particular equipment, or capabilities follow DOD channels** (See Appendix A, “Procedures for Requesting DOD Support”). Many DOD platforms such as fighter “interceptors,” naval combatants, or AEW aircraft were designed for modern combat and are sophisticated and expensive to operate, yet do have significant impact in CD operations because of their capabilities. Performance capabilities of various DOD platforms are provided in Appendix F, “Major Equipment Descriptions.” In supporting LEA “endgames” (interception and apprehension), a complicated and time-sensitive series of events is required.

a. **To ensure efficiency as well as success of D&M operations, there must be some form of cueing to the D&M forces.** This intelligence “tipping” allows D&M platforms to be properly positioned and ready to detect the target.

b. **The target must then be detected or cued by patrolling pre-positioned D&M assets.** In the case of an aerial target transiting over the open sea, there are a number of assets that can effect initial detection; air assets such as AEW or modified maritime patrol aircraft, submarines conducting covert coastal surveillance, and surface patrol assets such as naval combatants, USCG cutters, or ground- or sea-based radars could be primary means of detection. In the case of targets crossing land areas such as in the Southwest border area of the United States, many of the assets above

can provide initial detection, as could ground D&M forces and ground-based aerostats.

c. Following initial detection and sorting, **the target must then be sorted and monitored or tracked until it can be handed off to LEA or HN forces for interception and apprehension.** In the case of a maritime smuggling target, this can be accomplished on the high seas by a naval combatant that has a USCG LEDET on board. The LEDET will conduct the boarding and search the target, if necessary. (See Appendix E, “Law Enforcement Detachments.”)

d. **Smuggling assets employ their supporting intelligence systems and various operations security (OPSEC) measures and deceptions to avoid interception.** The Department of Defense and LEAs must employ OPSEC measures and deceptions at the operational and tactical levels to influence smuggler planning and increase the likelihood of essential secrecy about US D&M and handoffs to LEAs for intercept and arrest.

SECTION B. HOST-NATION SUPPORT

5. General

a. **The United States supports the security, stability, and well-being of US allies and other nations friendly to US interests.** Assisting cooperating nations in this effort generally employs the full range of informational, economic, diplomatic, and military instruments of US national power.

b. Although many mission categories can be interpreted as providing “support to a host nation” (DOD support to US LEAs operating in an HN, non-SA funded training, and other appropriate areas), **this category of CD missions only addresses the following types of support:**

- **Security Assistance.** Specifically, foreign military financing program (FMFP), foreign military sales, and international military education and training (IMET) funded programs.

- **Civil-Military Operations**

c. **CINCs are responsible for integrating and coordinating the mission categories of CD support** (see paragraph 7 below). Figure IV-2 provides a graphic representation of these concepts and relationships between HNS and other areas that benefit an HN but are in other categories of DOD support.

d. **HNs can also provide support to US forces in their mission accomplishment.** Factors that must be considered in determining the suitability of using HN resources are also discussed in this section.

6. Legal or Regulatory Considerations

Many of the constraints concerning HN CD support have been imposed by US law or DOD regulations. An explanation of these statutory or regulatory limitations are included in Appendix B, “US Code




Figure IV-2. Support of Host Nation Counterdrug Operations

Provisions.” The major HN-specific constraints are provided in Figure IV-3.

7. Major Relationships

a. The DOS is the lead agency for the coordination of US international supply reduction strategies. **Through the US Ambassadors and the Country Teams, the DOS executes programs designed to increase the HN’s CD will and capabilities.** INL is the organization within the DOS responsible for developing and implementing international initiatives in support of the NDCS.

b. **DEA is the lead LEA in coordinating all US LEAs and their international counterparts’ efforts that are in conjunction with US elements.**

c. **CINCs are responsible for planning and executing CD operations within their AORs.** This is usually done by developing a concept of operations and then a campaign plan. This plan incorporates all the appropriate DOD mission categories into a coordinated program to reduce the supply of illegal drugs.

8. Types of Host-Nation Support

Assistance provided for HN CD efforts may be provided through SA and supported by CMO. **Most of the CD efforts are supportive of US FID initiatives.** More information about the overall US FID program is described in Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).” CD HNS initiatives are discussed below.

a. **Security Assistance Programs.** SA is a broad program aimed at enhancing regional security in areas of the world facing internal and/or external threats. SA is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS. The military portions




Figure IV-3. Major Host Nation-Specific Constraints

of the program are administered by the Department of Defense under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the DSAA. **Combatant commanders have the responsibility for planning FID operations for their AOR;** however, they interface directly into the SA process through

THE REALITY OF THE DRUG WAR

The laws and norms of democracies may preclude the military's performing drug law enforcement functions. This sensitive and somewhat ambiguous area bears watching because in situations of insurgency and narco trafficking, there is a thin line between law enforcement and direct military action. Indeed, Peruvian civilian and military leaders insist that the national strategy must be holistic — attacking the causes rather than the insurgents, and it must summon all of the nation's resources. At the same time, counternarcotics is not a growth industry for the US military looking for new post-Cold War missions. Nor is it much of an opportunity to fatten the defense budget to avoid downsizing. Similar views prevail among Latin American militaries. There is, however, an acceptance among the Venezuelan, Brazilian, Argentine, Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Central American, and Mexican militaries that they must support the national effort against the traffickers. The Mexican army has been involved in the eradication of marijuana fields for many years. In 1992, nearly 60 percent of the Mexican army was involved in the counternarcotics effort. Since 1974, 282 Mexican soldiers have died in this unusual war.

SOURCE: Dr. Gabriel Marcella
Forging New Strategic Relationships
Military Review, October 1994

the security assistance organization (SAO) located in the HN. This action is coordinated with the US Chief of Mission (or Ambassador). **CINCs are active in the SA process by advising the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs.** SA support areas for CD operations include equipment, services, and training.

- **Equipment.** HNs can obtain equipment from the United States to meet the threat to their internal defense and development.
- **Services.** This is usually provided as a follow-on to equipment support. Two kinds of teams used in this type of support are as follows:
 - **Quality Assurance Team** — These teams receive, inspect and, if necessary, repair equipment provided to the HN. (Their duty is for 179 days or less.)
 - **Technical Analysis Team** — Technical Analysis Teams are normally deployed when an HN

experiences difficulty in maintaining US equipment or in implementing US-designed management techniques. (Their duty can be from 179 days to 2 years.)

- **Training.** The training element of SA is a significant means of assistance for HNs. The combatant commander can provide training by SOF, conventional forces, or a combination of both. The following are the primary types of teams or programs that can be employed:
 - **Mobile Training Teams (MTT).** Forces that are tailored for the training that the HN requires.
 - **Extended Training Service Specialists.** Teams employed over a longer period to assist an HN train its own instructor cadre.
 - **Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT).** Teams deployed over a long period to train HN personnel in non-equipment-specific military skills.

- **HN personnel training provided in CONUS.** IMET and FMFP funds can be expended to bring HN personnel to the United States for institutional-type training at US military facilities.

- **Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET)** (Formerly known as deployment for training). US military units deploy to an HN for training to enhance their operational readiness and provide the added benefit of strengthening the HN's operations.

b. **Civil-Military Operations.** CMO contribute significantly to an HN's internal defense and development process, facilitate US operations in foreign countries, and can enhance US CD interests abroad. **CMO are activities supporting military operations that embrace the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the HN's population.** The two most important CD operations aspects of CMO are CA and PSYOP. In addition to CA and PSYOP, CMO includes the areas of HA, HCA, and MCA.

- **Civil Affairs.** CA serves as a link between US forces providing support in an HN and the HN's government, military force, and civilian population. CA provides assistance, advice, coordination, and analysis to CD operations by:

- Providing information and analysis on the political, economic, and cultural basis of the HN's drug culture and on the implications of alternative approaches to carrying out assigned CD missions;

- Supporting bilateral cooperative programs that have been approved by the Chief of Mission and are aimed at reducing the supply, demand, and trafficking of illegal drugs;

- Providing collateral intelligence support to CD efforts through contacts with HN personnel; and

- Assisting the HN CD capabilities in informational activities designed to publicize positive aspects of HN education and prevention programs, change attitudes toward drugs, and discredit drug producers and traffickers. This reinforces the combatant commanders' PSYOP program as discussed in the following subparagraph.

Further information on CA operations may be found in Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

- **Psychological Operations.** An effective PSYOP program ensures clear communication of US intentions and goals and takes the offensive against any deception initiated by adversaries. **PSYOP provides information support and training in CD operations and cannot be directed toward US citizens either inside or outside the United States.** DOD Directive 3321.1, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War," tasks each combatant command to implement an Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program (OP3) and identifies the approval procedures. The combatant commander's OP3 can be accomplished by the use of the following terms:

- **Military Information Support Teams** are deployed to selected countries to train HN forces or agencies in the production of drug public awareness programs.

- Teams to provide information management for SOF JCET.

- Publications or pamphlets that provide information on drug awareness and CD operations.

More information on PSYOP may be found in Joint Pub 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

- **Military Civic Action. MCA programs help build an HN's infrastructure and strengthen host governments while enhancing the legitimacy and popular support of the national government and military.** This is accomplished by using mostly indigenous military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and provide services useful to the local population. These missions may involve US supervision and advice, but will always be conducted by the local military. MCA projects are designed to improve the HN in such areas as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to its economic and social development. These programs are especially helpful where gaining public acceptance of the HN's military is important to the long-term success of CD operations.
- **Humanitarian Assistance. HA employs US military personnel to promote urgent, nonmilitary objectives.** The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs) (DASD[P&HA]) manages and approves all HA programs for the Department of Defense. HA can be included in the combatant commander's overall FID plan, but **it is most often provided in response to unforeseen disaster situations.** Properly coordinated and responsive HA, incorporating active PSYOP and CA activities, can be instrumental in bolstering an HN's internal defense and development.

- **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** HCA is a specific program authorized by title 10, USC, section 401 funding. Whereas HA focuses on support necessary to alleviate urgent needs in an HN, **HCA is designed to provide assistance to the HN's populace in conjunction with a military exercise.** These usually include such activities as medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling; and other activities designed to train US forces while benefiting the HN. The DASD(P&HA) is also responsible for the management of this program. Coordination with the US Agency for International Development and the Country Team is also very important to efficient HCA operations. The HCA program is more decentralized than HA, thus allowing the combatant commander greater influence in the AOR. The incorporation of CA and PSYOP is also important in HCA projects to get the maximum CD benefit.

9. Other Support Missions

CINCs that are providing HN CD support can also provide various kinds of operational and nonoperational support to the HN's military or LEA forces that are not specifically funded by SA programs. **These include C4 and intelligence, planning, logistic, and training support.** These areas are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

10. Host-Nation Support to US Forces

- a. **Types of Support.** HNS to US forces are normally based on agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support according to prescribed conditions. **Types**

of support that can be provided include the following:

- **Government Agency Support.** HN’s government agencies that provide services and support can directly or indirectly provide support. Support such as telephones, electrical supplies, and border patrol police units are some examples.
- **Contractor Support.** Supplies and services such as laundry, bath, transportation, and supplies or equipment that cannot readily be shipped from CONUS can be contracted by US forces.
- **HN Facilities.** This could include the use of buildings and facilities for headquarters, billeting, maintenance shops, or other activities.

b. **Factors to Consider in HNS.** HNS may be appropriate in some CD operations. However, extreme care must be exercised to avoid negative results. Impacts on the local economy and counterintelligence concerns stemming from employment of local-hire domestics and support personnel must be carefully weighed. Factors that must be considered in determining the suitability of using this kind of support include those shown in Figure IV-4.

SECTION C. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS

11. General

a. The FY 1990-91 National Defense Authorization Act assigned the Department of Defense the responsibility to “integrate into an effective communications network

the command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated . . . to the interdiction of illegal drugs into the United States.” Although the acronym “C3I” has since changed to C4I, the tasking still serves as the foundation for the Department of Defense to assume executive agency responsibilities for integration of DOD and LEA communications systems.

b. CD operations depend on a responsive C4 system — one that allows commanders, LEA directors and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, and react to drug interdiction operations. **This C4 system must centrally draw all aspects of these operations together and support all phases and facets of CD operations.**




Figure IV-4. Factors to Consider in Host-Nation Support



Some air traffic control radars have been integrated into the NORAD surveillance system along the southern border of the United States.

c. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations,” contains approved basic doctrine for C4 systems support and outlines the responsibilities of the Services, agencies, and CINCs with respect to C4 systems support. In addition, the Joint Staff J-6-sponsored publications on “Intelligence Communications Architecture” for the CD CINC and JTFs (see Appendix N, “References”) provide classified C2 information.

12. Command and Control

a. **General.** The C2 relationships established for CD operations will vary based on the environments in which they are conducted. Considering that most DOD CD operations are in support of either HNs or LEAs, **it is important to remember that even though command of US Military forces will remain within the Department of Defense, the overall control of the mission may be determined by other agencies.** The objective is to integrate communications and, most importantly,

liaison sufficiently to support operational coordination, the effective sharing of information, and efficient use of assets.

b. Military Command and Control

- **Responsibility and authority for conducting military CD operations normally are vested in the CINCs, who exercise command through the chain of command.** General command arrangements or organizations available to the CINC are discussed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).” A unified combatant commander may exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM):
 - Through the commander of a JTF;
 - Through Service component commanders;
 - Through functional component commanders;
 - Through a commander of a subunified command;

- Directly over specific operational forces; and
- Through a single-Service force reporting directly to the combatant commander.

- **A common superior commander is responsible for determining the basis on which subordinate commanders will exercise C2 and for clearly assigning responsibilities, authorities, and command relationships for subordinates.** The major command relationships used in CD operations are (see glossary for definitions):

- COCOM;
- OPCON;
- TACON; and
- Support.

- The manner in which each of the primary CD CINCs have organized their commands for CD operations is discussed in Chapter VI, “Execution of Counterdrug Operations.”

c. **DOD-LEA C2.** The major mission in which DOD and LEA C2 systems interface is in drug interdiction operations. **The DOD D&M role is a major portion of drug interdiction and is consequently closely associated with LEA C2 assets.** The major organizations that provide C2 for aerial and maritime drug interdiction are the DAICC and JIATFs East, South, and West as described in Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations.” In limited circumstances, the Department of Defense can take TACON of LEA forces and LEA forces can do the same for DOD forces (e.g., USCG operational commanders assume TACON of USN ships when an embarked LEDET is involved in a law enforcement

boarding. See Appendix E, “Law Enforcement Detachments”). Specific C2 arrangements must be determined during planning meetings and liaison sessions for specific CD operations. This is an important portion of any CD operation’s planning effort and must be thoroughly understood by all forces involved in the operation.

d. **DOD or HN C2. The US military or LEAs and HNs command their respective units and normally work in cooperation with, but not under the OPCON of, each other.** The degree of C2 that US forces could exercise over HN forces (and vice versa) depends on the location, tactical situation, political environment, and existing agreements.

13. Communications

a. **General.** CD communications systems consist of the facilities, equipment, procedures, and personnel essential for commanders or directors to plan, direct, and control operations of forces pursuant to the mission. **The purposes of these systems are to pass information (commands, data, reports) and intelligence to and from operational forces.**

b. **Responsibilities. The National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement was produced by the Communications Interoperability Working Group of ONDCP.** DISA is responsible for the integration of the national telecommunications and information systems master plan for the Federal LEAs, and is also responsible for the production of the National Information Management and Communications Master Plan. Figure IV-5 provides the responsibilities of the combatant and subordinate commanders.

c. **Communications Systems. No one single suite of communications systems supports the entire CD operational spectrum.** Instead, CD

communications architectures draw from multiple agency systems that are integrated between commands and agencies to facilitate the intelligence, operations, and administrative or logistic requirements of the users. Descriptions of the major communications systems that support CD operations are included in Appendix H, "Communications Systems."

d. **Secure Communications.** **Secure communications should be used to the maximum extent possible in support of CD operations.** Employment of secure communications systems reduces the effectiveness of drug traffickers in gaining intelligence resulting from monitoring CD operations radio and telephone systems. Nonsecure communications provide drug traffickers with invaluable tactical information that may allow them to evade or circumvent D&M, as well as interdiction and apprehension forces.

- Proper use of communications security devices, codes, keys, aids, and techniques may be successfully employed to protect CD communications and minimize exploitation by drug traffickers.
- C4 protection encompasses all measures taken to maintain effective friendly C4 capabilities against actual or potential adversary countermeasures. **The overall C4 protection objective is to ensure that the vital C4 systems are afforded the necessary protection to allow the accomplishment of assigned missions, despite efforts to disrupt or deceive.**
- **The command and control warfare (C2W) threat from drug smugglers varies greatly with the sophistication, targeted organization size, geographical region, and time frame.** Drug smugglers have been known to use many types of C2W methods.




Figure IV-5. Commanders' Communications Responsibilities

- The SIGINT threat to communications systems is greatest to nonsecure radio signals.
- Some drug smugglers have the ability to intercept, jam, or employ intrusion on

ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communications (SATCOM), very high frequency (VHF) and UHF line of sight (LOS), high frequency (HF), microwave, and telephone transmission systems through the use of commercially available technology.

- Various deception procedures employed by drug traffickers, including transmission of false distress signals and use of decoy boats to draw forces away from smuggling vessels, are intended to mislead CD D&M and law enforcement operations. Drug traffickers use high-quality commercially available electronic scanning radio and direction finding equipment to locate DOD and LEA communications. These capabilities further emphasize the need for secure CD communications use by all commands and agencies.
- **All C4 systems used by DOD forces assigned under a Chief of Mission's authority must comply with the appropriate DOS and DOD security standards for the use of communications and ADP equipment.** Where necessary, waivers should be obtained when working within HN facilities. The Embassy Regional Security Officer is the individual primarily responsible for ensuring that all appropriate security measures are met. The Office for Security and Counterintelligence, DIA, is the DOD executive agent for overseas security matters and represents DOD interests in this area to the DOS. The anti-drug network (ADNET) program is managed by DISA, with program oversight provided by the Joint Staff J-6, Counterdrug Division.

SECTION D. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

14. General

a. **Intelligence** is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. It is **the foundation upon which the CD operational effort is built.** In CD operations and drug investigations, Federal, state, and local LEAs and the military depend on intelligence to understand and effectively combat the illegal drug trade. Intelligence has the potential to identify the activities, movements, conveyances, operating procedures, capabilities, structure, and membership of criminal drug organizations, in addition to the details of particular drug smuggling activities. This information is crucial for conducting successful CD operations, because it enables the Department of Defense and LEAs to identify and understand the organizations and people that traffic in drugs, identify and target their vulnerabilities, and ultimately to attack and disrupt their operations.

b. **The principal CD objectives of the intelligence community are to provide timely and focused intelligence to tactical forces** involved in D&M efforts, LEA interdiction and prosecution efforts, and USG programs supporting the development of CD capabilities of HNs.

15. Background

a. The President directed the Department of Defense to provide information to LEAs to support CD efforts. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," authorizes agencies within the US

intelligence community to collect information on foreign illegal drug activities; however, it limits the ability of the Department of Defense, as a member of the intelligence community, to collect, retain, or disseminate domestic intelligence or information concerning US persons. DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities,” which implements Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities” within the Department of Defense, emphasizes protecting the constitutional rights and privacy of US persons; however, it authorizes DOD organizations to collect information about any US person reasonably believed to be engaged in international drug activities. Procedures for collecting, retaining, and disseminating this information are covered in DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities,” and DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Actions of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.”

b. Before FY 1989, CD responsibilities belonged entirely to LEAs. The Department of Defense provided limited assistance to those agencies, including intelligence support. As part of the FY 1990-91 National Defense Authorization Act, **the Department of Defense was directed to integrate the US C3I resources into an effective network that can exchange real-time information between DOD sites and LEA locations.** The defense intelligence community was further directed to provide CD intelligence support to LEAs, DOD forces engaged in D&M, and selected foreign governments. Accordingly, the Department of Defense provides intelligence information, technology, personnel, and equipment in response to LEA requirements at both the national and tactical level. **Defense intelligence support at the national level is assigned to the DIA.** Additionally, DIA provides some operational and intelligence support to the CINCs. At the operational and tactical level, designated CINCs are the main

producers and providers of defense intelligence to local and regional LEAs.

c. **USCINCSO, USCINCPAC, and CINCUSACOM have established forward-based CD JIATFs and/or JTFs that provide tactical intelligence support to DOD D&M operations and law enforcement interdiction operations.**

d. **USCINCSO has established TATs in key drug source and transit countries.** TATs provide tactical intelligence support to HN CD operations through the Country Teams. When necessary, a single analysis team can support more than one Country Team.

16. Types of Intelligence

The Department of Defense and LEAs commonly refer to three types or categories of intelligence; strategic, operational, and tactical. It is important to note, however, that although they subscribe to the same categories, the Department of Defense and LEAs define them differently. This is a result of differences in missions and functions performed by LEAs and DOD organizations and is an important distinction when operating in a joint DOD-LEA environment. DOD definitions are provided below.

a. DOD Definitions

- **Strategic intelligence** is intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels.
- **Operational intelligence** is intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.
- **Tactical intelligence** is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

b. Generalized Law Enforcement Definitions

- **Strategic intelligence** is evaluated information from various sources about broad patterns and trends that can be used to make strategic planning and programming decisions.
- **Operational intelligence** is information that can provide analytic support to the criminal investigation and prosecution process.
- **Tactical intelligence** is actionable information that is of immediate tactical use in effecting investigations and interdiction.

17. Intelligence Sources

Intelligence sources are the **means or systems** used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. There are **seven primary source types**: IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and CI (See Figure IV-6).

18. The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle (Figure IV-7) is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. DOD users include the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and all other commanders and forces. **The US intelligence cycle has the following six phases: planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback.** The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operations in terms of processes. As a model, it is important to note that **intelligence actions do not always follow sequentially through the cycle.** For

instance, a request for imagery causes activity in the planning and direction phase but may not involve new collection, going instead to a production facility where imagery is drawn from an archive. The intelligence cycle, however, presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the **clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence.** Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. **The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.** Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

a. Planning and Direction

- **Planning and direction involve establishing the command relationships between all intelligence elements within the joint force and identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements.** This phase also includes preparing a collection plan, determining priority intelligence requirements (PIR), issuing request for information (RFI) collection and production, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.
- **Collection planning is normally conducted through the collection requirements management (CRM) process.** CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint and component force commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, **CRM tasks**

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES			
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence		
	PHOTINT	- Photo Intelligence	
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence		
	COMINT ELINT	- Communications Intelligence - Electronic Intelligence	
		FISINT TELINT RADINT	- Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence - Telemetry Intelligence - Radar Intelligence
HUMINT	Human Intelligence		
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence		
	ACINT OPTINT ELECTRO- OPTICAL IRINT LASINT NUCINT RINT	- Acoustical Intelligence - Optical Intelligence - Electro-optical Intelligence - Infrared Intelligence - Laser Intelligence - Nuclear Intelligence - Unintentional Radiation Intelligence	
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence		
CI	Counterintelligence		

Figure IV-6. Intelligence Sources

requirements to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies. CRM also **monitors the overall satisfaction of these requirements** and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.

- **Planning and direction also includes identifying** intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to the management and personnel officer, key

logistic requirements to the Logistics Directorate of a joint staff (J-4), lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment list to the J-5, and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the J-6. This phase also includes **establishing and coordinating intelligence dissemination procedures and systems** with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands, and **identifying national-level support requirements.**




Figure IV-7. The Intelligence Cycle

b. **Collection.** Collection includes both the **acquisition of information** and the **provision of this information** to processing and/or production elements.

- **Collection Management Principles**

- Joint force collection management must be able to task any joint force collection asset and obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.
- Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element’s responsiveness to the requirements of the joint force.

- **Collection Guidelines**

- **Intelligence Collection Activities.** **Collection resources** supporting military operations **should be allocated or tasked** to satisfy anticipated and potential operational and tactical intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. **Different types of collection capabilities may be needed** so information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others in order to subject the full range of enemy activity to observation. **The collection system also needs some redundancy** so the loss or failure of one collection asset can be compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint or multinational operations, responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence

collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

•• **PIR and Intelligence Requirements.** **The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for identifying and determining the PIR for the mission.**

In turn, the J-2 is responsible for identifying the intelligence shortfalls, stating them in terms of intelligence requirements, and then tasking collection assets, conducting processing and exploitation and/or analysis and production, and ensuring dissemination and integration. Identification of preplanned PIR greatly enhances intelligence support to the joint force.

•• **Intelligence Requirements.** At each level of command, **senior intelligence officers must be aware of their command's intelligence requirements, as well as those of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.** The collection or production capabilities of one component of a joint force may be able to satisfy another's requirements. Acting for the JFC, the J-2 (collection management) can task resources to collect, process, and exploit the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force based on assigned or potential missions. See Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations," and Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for requirements management details.

•• **Available Collection Resources.** A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and leadtime required for tasking intelligence collection and production.

•• **Coordination of Collection Sources.** **Collection operations** (including data exchange) of all collection sources

should be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cuing and tipoff among collectors. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis, as appropriate. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.

•• **Collection Opportunity and C2W Tradeoffs.** When determining intelligence operations, the JFC's staff and the components should **identify and compare the longer term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence.**

The J-2 and J-2 staff should monitor collection results and provide feedback to the JFC to assist in determining when specific targets can be nominated for attack. In conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, **the J-2 should nominate a "no strike" target list** to the J-3 and keep it updated. The JFC will determine when and if these targets are to be attacked.

• **Collection Operations Management (COM) Responsibilities.** **COM activities are driven by collection requirements.** COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and tasking of the broad array of technical sensor operations and HUMINT collection operations and their associated processing and dissemination resources.

c. **Processing and Exploitation.** **Processing is the action of converting information to formats that can be readily used by intelligence personnel** in the analysis and production of intelligence.

Processing includes data form and format conversions, graphics, art work, photographic developing, video production, printing, and computer applications.

d. **Analysis and Production.** **Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information** from single or multiple sources **into finished intelligence** for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. A term associated with production is “intelligence application.” **Intelligence application is the direct extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near-real-time reporting.** It is focused on and meets specific requirements, normally on demand.

- **Production Guidelines**

- **Purpose and Use of Intelligence.** To better understand the exact needs of the consumer and the best way of answering the requirements, **the producer needs to know who will use the intelligence** at what level(s) of command, the user’s mission, the general intelligence requirements and responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

- **Objectivity.** Producers must be **objective, unbiased, and avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas.** When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time or resources are inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the JFC should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all available pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradicting information and opinion.

- **Integrated Products.** **Intelligence analysts** at JICs and other fusion centers **should use information available from**

multiple sources, integrate it, and provide the decision maker with a clear picture.

- **Production Among Echelons.** **Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels.** These production activities should **be directed and coordinated by the J-2** so they are mutually supporting and nonduplicative.

- (1) **Intelligence production** for joint operations **is accomplished** by units and organizations **at every echelon.** It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces. (2) **Intelligence produced at higher echelons** is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. **Subordinate units**, in turn, use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy.

- **Production Responsibilities.** **Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate’s organic production capability.** Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide JFCs with required intelligence products and services.

- **Production Management.** **Production management** is a critical element in ensuring **effective and efficient military intelligence production** in support of joint operations. Within each production agency, production managers receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the producer and schedule, the

task, and editing requirements for intelligence products. ADP on-line updates are controlled by the production manager. **Strict controls should be applied to changing information in ADP systems** that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such changes. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (e.g., a data field in a record in an official data base).

e. **Dissemination and Integration.** Dissemination is conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. Intelligence is disseminated in many forms, using a variety of means. Dissemination means include personal contact, physical transfer or courier of hard copy textual and graphic materials, digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference, telephones, FAX transmissions, messages, briefings, remote terminal access to computer data bases, and direct data transfers. In addition, tactical intelligence can be disseminated via intercom, tactical data systems, tactical radio circuits, and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts. **Each intelligence dissemination method can be further categorized as secure or nonsecure, over dedicated or common-user communications, and/or raw or finished intelligence.** The diversity of forms and dissemination paths reinforces the need for interoperability among C4I systems.

- **Joint intelligence dissemination should be consistent with the “C4I For The Warrior”** concept that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior’s requirements for intelligence exchange. **This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs** to the maximum extent possible if they: (1)

have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through preplanned PIR (which involves tailoring data bases); (2) emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates); and (3) accommodate warrior pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). **This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of RFI messages and intelligence reports.** Broadcasts such as the tactical information broadcast service and the tactical related applications are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders.

- **An important consideration in the dissemination process is management of information transmitted over communications systems.** JFCs should ensure for provision of critical, time-sensitive intelligence for force protection and operations, using the “push-pull” system to receive finished intelligence products from higher or adjacent commanders and intelligence producers. JFCs should manage information dissemination in terms of the product, available communications paths through dynamic bandwidth management, and time sensitivity to ensure the joint force receives what is required to support joint operations. Intelligence dissemination should be continuously reviewed throughout the joint operation.

f. **Evaluation and Feedback Phase.** During the evaluation and feedback phase, **intelligence personnel at all levels assess how well each phase of the intelligence cycle is being performed.** Commanders and operational staff elements must provide feedback. When areas are identified that need

improvement, the necessary changes are made. Evaluation and feedback are continuously performed during every other phase of the intelligence cycle. Personnel involved in different phases coordinate and cooperate to identify if transitions from one phase to another require improvements.

19. Intelligence Support to US LEAs

a. **US LEA personnel require detailed intelligence information concerning all aspects of CD operations** to support their various mission areas, including interdiction, border control, international operations, domestic law enforcement, and financial crimes. LEA officers also work with foreign military and law enforcement officials to support eradication and interdiction efforts overseas, and operate in combined efforts to track traffickers to destinations in the United States. **Information required to support these operations must be both detailed and timely to be effective.** LEA headquarters and regional intelligence support offices interact directly with the intelligence community to ensure information is accurate, complete, and timely. LEA field officers and forward-deployed units are provided with intelligence data in a format and classification level that will support their mission, whether planning for interdiction or to support arrest and prosecution. LEA field elements receive intelligence reports from their own sources and maintain local data bases to handle information that is specific to their mission. They also access other LEA data bases and national intelligence community data bases to ensure that they have all of the relevant data.

b. **The DOD intelligence community shares data with LEAs at a variety of classification levels.** To protect DOD sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, certain sensitive compartmented information and sensitive HUMINT information is either

not released or is sanitized and the classification downgraded to make the information usable outside the intelligence community. **The Department of Defense produces and disseminates CD intelligence at the lowest possible classification consistent with protection of sources and methods.** See Appendix L, “Security Classifications,” for comparisons of security classifications and procedures.

c. It is important for DOD personnel to be aware of the sensitivity of the information related to LEA criminal investigations. LEA regulations often inhibit the sharing of certain case-specific information with other government agencies. In addition, classified information cannot be used in criminal prosecutions, and it may be subject to discovery motions by defense attorneys. Thus, it is often important to the LEAs that classified information be kept out of the files of active criminal investigations.

20. Intelligence Support to Host Nations

The principal means for providing CD support to HNs is through TATs and bilateral information exchange agreements.

a. **Tactical Analysis Teams.** TATs are established based on agreement between the US Ambassador, the geographic CINC, and the HNs. Once in operation, **the TAT becomes the focal point for DOD CD intelligence support to the HN.** The DIA’s TWD produces tailored, all-source intelligence materials in response to TAT requests. TWD receives its information from national-level agencies such as the CIA, NSA, DIA, and DEA. The TAT mission is to support the US Country Team and HN CD operations by providing tactical intelligence advice or assistance, targeting support, collection management, ADP support (including data base management), and

SIGINT advice or assistance to the Country Team. TATs further assist the DEA by providing some limited analysis and fusion of HN and US multisource information. TATs provide a direct link between the CD team operating within the HN and the D&M capability of the Department of Defense.

b. **Bilateral Exchanges.** Bilateral exchanges are **vehicles for sharing specific intelligence information under terms or conditions defined in a formal agreement negotiated between the HN and the USG.** This exchange can be designed to occur via diplomatic, geographic CINC, military component, or LEA channels. Details of the information exchange such as the type, quantity, format, frequency, and points of contact for the exchange are outlined in the agreement.

21. Counterintelligence Support

Because of the covert nature of illegal drug trafficking operations, it is often necessary to penetrate and interdict them in a covert manner. At a minimum, **the planning and nature of US CD operations must be protected from premature disclosure to drug traffickers.** CD operations may be compromised in a number of ways. Well-meaning people may inadvertently reveal important information. More deliberately, there have been cases where knowledgeable individuals have provided information to people involved in drug trafficking for financial gain. Additionally, there exists a threat from corrupt foreign individuals.

a. **Operations Security Support.** At the request of staff OPSEC planners, **CI organizations of the Military Departments provide support for OPSEC surveys and planning.** Support for OPSEC includes multidiscipline CI,

advice about OPSEC vulnerabilities to human collectors, and advice about physical security and either OPSEC measures to eliminate the OPSEC vulnerabilities, or deception actions to exploit the vulnerabilities.

b. **Force Protection.** CI organizations of the Military Departments **provide security vulnerability assessments of fixed facilities and other locations where DOD elements will engage in CD operations** with respect to threats of hostile action. They also advise and train personnel in self-protection OPSEC, **personal protection measures,** countersurveillance, defensive driving, use of protective equipment, and physical security for vehicles, buildings, and sites. Force protection support is coordinated through the CINC counterintelligence support officers (CISOs).

c. **Counterintelligence Analytical.** This support is provided by DIA, CIA, FBI, DEA, and the Military Departments. **It includes intelligence briefings on threats posed by corruption and drug traffickers' intelligence collection capabilities and analysis of the involvement of foreign intelligence services in drug trafficking and in CD operations.** Such support should be coordinated through the CINC JICs. The JIC production manager, in coordination with the CISO, can task DIA to fulfill this requirement.

d. **Counterintelligence Investigations.** This support is provided by the CI elements of the Military Departments in coordination with the military criminal investigative elements and Federal, state, and local LEAs. **Investigations are conducted on allegations that official DOD information involving CD operations is being provided to persons not specifically authorized to have such information.** These investigations should be coordinated with the CISO as appropriate.

SECTION E. PLANNING SUPPORT

22. General

a. Planning support can be one of the Department of Defense’s most effective means of supporting the national CD effort.

The numerous Federal, state, and local LEAs engaged are making a conscious effort to combine their operations to better employ limited resources against an adversary whose fiscal, equipment, and manpower pools can be staggering. For military personnel to be fully effective players in the interagency and/or HN planning processes, **an understanding of the supported agency or HN, its culture, and people is critical.**

b. Before initiating a planning effort, DOD representatives must understand the agency they are supporting. The organization’s mission, current goals, structure or chain of command, measures of success, and even its relationships with other government agencies or countries are but a few of the factors to keep in mind when preparing to assist in any planning project. The world of an undercover narcotics agent is significantly different from that of military personnel.

23. LEA Planning Support

Providing planning support to US LEAs must take into account the following factors:

a. Background. The amount of experience senior law enforcement officials have with military operations and procedures varies with the agency. In some cases, the average agent gets little exposure to what military officers and noncommissioned officers take for granted in the course of their professional careers — professional military education that focuses on group dynamics, written and oral communication, large force employment and

planning, and strategy development. However, some headquarters-level Federal agents have attended DOD Service schools and can be useful in providing a cultural bridge between the military and civilian law enforcement personnel involved in the planning effort.

b. Mission. Different agencies have different legal mandates, and thus areas of emphasis and operating methods. Arresting suspects and seizing assets requires substantial investment in time and resources, but is only one step in a lengthy and complicated legal process. Somewhat like post-combat CA and military police operations in a military campaign, planning a long-range strategy must take into account the support requirements necessary to capitalize on initial investigative successes in the field. **A critical factor in understanding an agency’s mission, and why it operates the way it does, is the method by which it defines its success.** Measures of effectiveness vary between agencies, affecting their operating philosophy and sometimes putting those philosophies, and in some ways their operational goals, at odds with other organizations involved in the drug war. There is no set of measures acceptable to all agencies.

c. Internal Environment or Organization. At the Federal level, the **agencies involved differ significantly in how they organize to execute their missions.** The planner must understand how each major subordinate organizational element supports the other in that mission. **Some agencies have little experience in long-range planning** and what does exist is often spread among a number of offices. The senior management’s focus may be on operations — at the expense of supporting systems, i.e., the intelligence, technical, logistic, contracting, and/or administrative elements. DOD personnel assigned to planning support duties should be prepared to educate, and in turn be

educated by, their counterparts in the LEA that they are supporting. Normally, this process is ongoing throughout the support effort, requiring flexibility, diplomacy, an ability to speak the supported agency's language, and a willingness to tailor prior experience and methodology to that organization.

d. **External Environment.** Some agencies operate exclusively within CONUS; others are extensively involved in OCONUS activities. These jurisdictions substantially alter the planning requirements, but DOD experience in such missions is usually recognized, particularly in the case of overseas operations. Interagency relationships and interaction vary, depending on past experience between the different Federal departments and their associated agencies and the organizational level involved. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, missions and measures of effectiveness differ, at times generating disputes over operational and resource priorities that can become particularly acute at the headquarters level. **Joint planning efforts at the tactical level are normally easier to compromise on and implement than those at higher headquarters.**

24. Host-Nation Planning Support

The process of planning support to HNs is similar to those undertaken for support to US LEAs. However, the planner must also consider a number of additional factors, such as the HN's cultural differences or perspectives, historical perspectives or sensitivities, political climate, and economic conditions.

25. CD Strategy Development

a. **General.** The following paragraphs summarize one method of helping any organization, civilian or military, build a comprehensive strategy. They

describe a seven-phased process (see Figure IV-8) that can be tailored to the supported agency's or country's needs and operating methods.

b. **Phase 1.** Preliminary Preparation. Before any productive work can be done, **some basic organizing tasks need to be accomplished.**

- **Define the Team.** Determine who staffs the products, who is on the writing team, and who is responsible for selling the strategy to higher headquarters, legislatures, and other organizations.
- **Literature Search.** All references to the organization's mandate and strategic direction need to be consolidated and studied. **Data on the threat are required. Information on the organizational environment** (current policies, existing goals and senior guidance, problems requiring resolution, and other appropriate information) **should be assembled.**
- **Development Process.** This is often an education process for both parties. **The military strategy model and terms** (centers of gravity, culmination points, and other concepts) **may or may not be translatable to a civilian or HN audience**, at least not without some explanation. Planning time frames with which military people are comfortable may not be appropriate for a law enforcement community — "long-term" may translate to 2, rather than 10, years. What are the individual process time lines and milestones? What happens if they are not met? Even the basic structure mentioned in the preceding section may not be entirely acceptable to the audience — resolve these disputes before beginning the major effort.
- **Assign Responsibilities.** **Define and agree on who is responsible for what**

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY BUILDING PROCESS




Figure IV-8. Counterdrug Strategy Building Process

in the process (team leaders, facilitators, staff liaisons, overall manager, technical advisers, editors, and subject matter experts).

- **Define Tasks. What exactly needs to be done?** For example, the group writing the assessment should know before they start that they must, in the final product, address:

- **The threat;**

- **The internal environment** (current state of the organization, capabilities, unique initiatives or subordinate agencies, and requirements);

- **The external environment** (interagency roles, relationships, political and economic considerations);

- **Constraints and restraints;**
- **Other issues as necessary;** and

• **Administrative procedures** — who provides clerical support? What word processing program will be the project standard? How long does it take to staff a product through that agency’s system? When is the best time to meet as a group? What other duties are team members responsible for and how will that affect the time line? Who will be the final arbiter on these decisions?

- **Obtain Project Approval. Ensure that the group has the support of senior leaders on how and what will be produced.** At this point, an obvious demonstration of their commitment to, and support of, the project would be helpful.

c. **Phase 2. Define the Mission.** Based on known directives, guidance, internal policies, and other relevant guidance, **develop and have approved a mission statement.**

d. **Phase 3. Describe the Operating Environment.** Draft and staff the assessment, based on intelligence estimates of the threat, the current organization’s characteristics as described by the employees and managers, and the outside world as seen by agency or HN and DOD team members.

e. **Phase 4. Define Success.** Based on the above, **draft a statement for the top leader’s “vision” of success.**

f. **Phase 5. Build the Strategy.** Describe in general “what” the organization should be doing for the period covered by the vision. Define main avenues of effort. Set operational and support priorities for the short-, mid-, and long-term. Define resource requirements and contrast them with current funding and

manning levels for justifying the inevitable funding requests. Establish measures of effectiveness that accurately reflect strategic goals and the strategic vision. Develop OPSEC planning guidance per NSDD 298, “National Operations Security Program and National Operations Security Doctrine,” for application in anticipation of future and during CD operations and in OPSEC surveys.

g. **Phase 6. Develop an Implementation Plan. Build a roadmap that people in the organization can follow to support the strategy** — define operation plans required from lower echelons, assign responsibilities for managing strategy implementation, and prepare a “marketing plan” for presentation to higher headquarters and funding sources.

h. **Phase 7. Institutionalize the Process.** Make the strategy a living document — constantly evaluated for relevance and effectiveness through an organization-wide feedback process. **Create a regular review process that exploits successes and corrects (or abandons) ineffective initiatives or policies.** Keep information channels open in order to honestly assess current priorities and respond to a changing environment.

SECTION F. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

26. General

a. **The Department of Defense can make a substantial contribution in logistic support of LEAs.** Typical categories of support to interagencies are executed under authority of Section 1004 of the FY 91 DOD Authorization Act (as amended) and consists of the following:

- Maintenance and/or repair of equipment made available by the Department of Defense to interagencies for the purposes

of preserving its future utility for the Department of Defense or upgrading the equipment to ensure compatibility with other DOD-used equipment.

- Maintenance, repair, and/or upgrading of other than DOD-provided equipment for the purposes of ensuring that it is compatible with DOD equipment.
- Transportation of US and/or foreign personnel and transportation of supplies and/or equipment to facilitate CD activities.
- Establishment of bases of operations or training facilities (including unspecified minor construction).
- CD logistics-related training of US and/or foreign law enforcement personnel.

b. For the most part, costs incurred in DOD logistic support of LEAs are reimbursable. (See Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview,” para 5b for exceptions.) Non-Federal LEAs should provide the supporting activity with a fund advance based on the estimated cost of equipment and services. The system used to account for the cost of DOD support to civilian LEAs need not be different from existing data collection systems (e.g., Vehicle Interactive Management System). For airlift services, the Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation accounting procedures apply. The specific types of DOD logistic support are shown in Figure IV-9 and described below.

27. Transportation Support

a. **Surface.** Surface transportation assets are usually wheeled vehicles of various types. **Vehicles can transport personnel, cargo, and/or equipment.** When contraband is transported, an LEA officer must accompany each operation to maintain a chain of custody of the transported evidence or seized property or

contraband at all times. Limitations or specific requirements include the following:

- If LEA personnel request a loan of wheeled vehicles, then vehicle operators must be licensed and certified by the lender; and
- Use of Active Force and Reserve Force Component Service members in conjunction with missions performed on land owned by a private citizen can be executed only after written permission of the land owner is obtained or provided.

b. **Air. Air transportation of LEA personnel, equipment, and apprehended suspects is available and can be provided by rotary- or fixed-wing assets.** Air transport is contingent upon weather, equipment readiness, and pilot availability.



Figure IV-9. Types of Department of Defense Logistic Support



The C-130 aircraft satisfies a wide variety of CD-related transportation needs.

Airlift capabilities will be tailored to the cargo. The same “rules” apply about missions performed on private lands. When air transportation to a drug apprehension site is required, the mission requires advance approval by the US Attorney General. The following items must be addressed in a request for use of any DOD air transportation asset:

- Precaution(s) must be taken to reduce the likelihood of aircraft drawing fire during the operations.
- Mandatory safety briefings must include pre-, during-, and post-flight requirements.
- ROE, both during flight and after landing, must be clearly defined.
- Landing areas must be clearly defined, including the specific distance from the apprehension site.
- All aircraft requirements should be submitted in the US Message Text Formatting Program (MILSTAD 6040) format; or, for non-DOD users, at least in sufficient detail to include number of

passengers, cargo dimensions, weight, and cubic feet. Further information on airlift support is available in Joint Pub 4-01.1, “JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations.”

c. **Maritime. Maritime transportation of LEA personnel, supplies, and equipment is available and may be provided by USTRANSCOM, the USN, or commercial shipping.** USN “lifts of opportunity” are routinely available from major US naval facilities as ships deploy for training exercises. Maritime transport is contingent upon equipment readiness, availability, and mission priority.

28. Maintenance Support

The use of DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist in operating or maintaining equipment **is limited to situations when the training of non-DOD personnel would be infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective, and would not otherwise compromise national security or military preparedness.** LEAs may request DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist in operating or maintaining equipment for their agencies. Such assistance may not

involve DOD personnel in a direct role in an LEA operation.

29. Engineer Support

Engineer support varies from individual expert advice on terrain denial and construction management to battalion level vertical and horizontal construction operations. **The goal of this support is to improve training facilities that enhance law enforcement drug interdiction efficiency as well as upgrade US border roads, fencing, and security lighting that reduce the availability of illegal drugs.** The supported LEA must provide any required material and comply with legal environmental and cultural documentation requirements. Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support,” provides additional information on engineering support.

30. Facilities Usage

The Department of Defense may make base facilities available to Federal, state, or local LEAs. **These include such facilities as buildings, training areas, and firing ranges.** These facilities are generally needed either in conjunction with training being conducted by the LEAs or by DOD forces providing training support to the requester(s).

31. Equipment Loans

a. **The Secretary of Defense has established two Counterdrug Support Offices (CDSOs)** to coordinate the transfer of excess DOD property to DLEAs. They operate under the management of the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the policy oversight of the OCDEP&S. CDSO areas of authority are shown in Figure IV-10.

b. **Authority for approval or denial of requests for nonoperational support rests**

with the appropriate Service. This authority has been delegated, under certain circumstances, by the Secretaries of the Military Departments to subordinate agencies.

- Requests for nonoperational support can be received by any level of command or any agency of the Services. **Local commanders receiving LEA support requests may coordinate them with the appropriate local agencies and refer requests to the proper approval authority.** The local commander determines the command’s capability to support the request.
- If the local command does not have the equipment or the equipment is not available for lease or loan, the commander notifies the chain of command, which identifies an alternate DOD installation or unit to fulfill the request.
- CDSOs submit monthly reports to the OCDEP&S, listing support that has been provided and that which is pending. Reports include new, continuing, and completed support and are categorized by Service within the CDSO’s areas of authority.

c. See Appendix M, “Points of Contact,” for phone numbers and addresses of CDSOs.

32. Military Working Dogs

Military working dogs and their handlers can be provided to conduct limited support to LEAs. The provisions of that support are provided in detail in DOD Instruction 5525.10, “Using Military Working Dog Teams to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in Counterdrug Missions.”

COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT OFFICES AREAS OF AUTHORITY




Figure IV-10. Counterdrug Support Offices Areas of Authority

SECTION G. TRAINING SUPPORT

33. General

In January 1990, the Secretary of Defense approved initiatives to broaden the DOD training support of the NDCS. The initiatives included:

- a. Detailing up to 275 military personnel to Federal LEAs to perform liaison, training, and planning functions;
- b. Authorizing military personnel to provide specialized training for future

supervisory personnel in state and local rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first-time drug offenders; and

- c. Authorizing the Department of Defense and its operational units to expand programs for training LEA personnel in languages, planning skills, logistics, communications, tactics, equipment operation and maintenance, and intelligence.

34. Types of Training Support

The Department of Defense can provide HNs and US LEAs with the following training support to enhance their CD efforts:

a. **Training Support to Host Nations.** Most training support to HNs is provided through SA funding (See Section B, this chapter). However, some programs that are conducted in conjunction with HNs are not part of SA. Those include:

- Joint combined exercises for training;
- Operations planning groups; and
- Joint and combined exercises.

b. It is DOD policy that no advanced military training will be provided to US civilian law enforcement agency (CLEA) personnel, except as noted below. “Advanced military training,” in the context of this policy, is defined as high intensity training which focuses on the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to apprehend, arrest, detain, search for, or seize a criminal suspect when the potential for a violent confrontation exists. “Advanced military training,” includes advanced marksmanship (including sniper training), military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), advanced MOUT, close quarters battle and/or close quarters combat, and similar specialized training. It does not include basic military skills such as basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical, and survival skills.

As a single general exception to this policy, the US Army Military Police School is authorized to continue training CLEA personnel in the Counterdrug Special Reaction Team Course, the Counterdrug Tactical Police Operations Course, and the Counterdrug Marksman and/or Observer Course. Additionally, on an exceptional basis, the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) may approve such training by SOF. In such cases, USCINCSOC will inform the Executive Secretary to the Secretary of Defense of the training support provided. Similarly, the US Army Military Police School will continue

to report training performed in accordance with existing procedures.

35. Training Simulations

Training simulations are an integral part of the training process to prepare forces to conduct CD operations. **Operational planners use these systems to test concepts, analyze the entire drug trafficking process, and develop systems to counter traffickers.** Examples of training simulations are listed below:

a. **USACOM forces use the Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System (ENWGS)** located at Tactical Training Group, Atlantic (TACTRAGRULANT), Dam Neck, Virginia, as the principal training simulation for deploying naval units in the D&M role. ENWGS is a wargaming system that combines high-speed computer processing with player interface to enable tactical decision making in various peacetime, crisis action, and combat situations. It allows players to maneuver ships and aircraft and turn sensors on and off while presenting a realistic geographic picture. ENWGS has remote sites located at the Amphibious School, Little Creek, Virginia, and at the Joint Warfare Center, Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is the principal training simulation for prospective component elements.

- **General Capabilities.** ENWGS has the capability to simulate all types of platforms, including ships, submarines, aircraft, land bases, and radar sites. Each ENWGS module contains two geotactical displays to view the tactical picture, and from three to six automatic status boards that provide access to important game information reports such as flight status, airbase status, and all tracks.
- **Scenario Development.** CD scenarios for the wargame can either be an existing CD scenario developed by

TACTRAGRULANT for routine CD training or be developed by the sponsor and TACTRAGRULANT to meet specific training requirements. Existing CD scenarios are modified to replicate the forces and tactics for the mission and game objectives.

b. Other CINCs are developing enhanced wargaming and simulation capabilities to provide a forum (or framework) for evaluating proposed CD operations, to increase the understanding of the operational capabilities and business environment of the drug industry, and to develop and test courses of action for the forces arrayed against the illicit drug threat.

SECTION H. MANPOWER SUPPORT

36. General

The Department of Defense can provide a variety of skilled individuals or units in support of HN and interagency CD efforts. This section provides descriptions of many, but not necessarily all, types of support that may be provided. LEAs can request support for other types of skills that the Department of Defense possesses through the procedures explained in Appendix A, "Procedures for Requesting DOD Support." Although several of the major restrictions concerning the use of DOD personnel have been included with the description of each category, others may exist, and consultation with legal personnel is imperative.

37. Manpower Support Categories

(See Figure IV-11)

a. **Eradication Support.** Eradication is defined as physical removal of growing plants (usually marijuana), their growing mediums, and the associated infrastructure (e.g., watering systems) or the dismantling

of drug laboratories. LEA officers must accompany military personnel, make necessary arrests or seizures, and take custody of evidence or contraband at all times.

b. Administrative Support

- **Staff Judge Advocate Officers or Legal Specialists.** Once assets have been seized from drug traffickers, SJA officers or legal specialists may work with criminal justice representatives to take full advantage of asset forfeiture statutes and process documents in accordance with established procedures.

- **Accounting Specialists.** This support area provides expertise in the technical accounting aspects of the asset seizure or forfeiture process, keeping track of the property seized and assisting criminal justice representatives in processing it.

c. **Diver Support.** Divers from the Navy, Army, and/or the Marine Corps may assist LEAs for subsurface hull inspections. **Divers may visually inspect only and cannot attempt to enter, search, or alter features that are detected.**

d. **Linguist Support.** This category includes translator and interpreter support. **DOD personnel are not permitted to conduct real-time translations of oral or wire intercepts or directly participate in interrogation activities.**

e. **Liaison Officers to LEAs.** Military personnel have been assigned to positions or billets within LEAs and other agencies to primarily perform liaison functions. They also can assist these organizations in the training and planning functions, as appropriate.

f. **Inspection Support.** Border points of entry or exit are under the jurisdiction of the USCS. **Military (title 32 status) personnel**



Figure IV-11. Manpower Support Categories

may assist LEA officers in inspecting cargo, vehicles, air or water craft, baggage, courier shipments, and/or mail at border entry or exit points. LEA officers must be present at all inspection locations, make all necessary seizures, and maintain custody of all evidence. Military forces can only be at these locations at the request of the USCS and cannot engage in law enforcement activities.

g. **Criminal Investigative Support.** This support assists LEAs in major case development. DOD investigators contribute

their criminal investigative skills to the analysis of gathered, but not yet processed, evidence.

h. **Military Police Support.** Military Police personnel can assist with supervising and coordinating activities for LEA activities such as temporary task forces. Serving in such positions as Operations Officers, these personnel can serve as the link between the Department of Defense and LEA elements.

i. **Intelligence Analysts.** These personnel can receive and process incoming reports from multiple sources in accordance with established LEA procedures. **They would assist in evaluating the information, analyzing trafficking group composition, disposition, strengths, and weaknesses.** They can also help establish and maintain an LEA automated intelligence data base, a system designed to evaluate current intelligence holdings and identify intelligence gaps and additional requirements. The Department of Defense is not allowed to maintain an intelligence data base on US citizens.

SECTION I. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION SUPPORT

38. General

a. The Department of Defense has an RDA capability which far exceeds that of the LEAs. The Department of Defense applies these resources to assist in resolving critical technical requirements of the LEAs. **Near-term support consists of technical assistance in identifying off-the-shelf technology that may provide solutions to existing requirements. In the mid- to long-term, the Department of Defense integrates CD requirements into the established DOD process** where operational requirements can be better defined, validated, and prioritized, scientific and engineering solutions to these

requirements can be screened, developed, and pursued, and systems can be tested, procured, and logistically supported.

b. **Technology’s role in CD activities is that of a force multiplier.** Sensors and technically derived intelligence permit focusing of limited law enforcement assets on high probability targets instead of dispersing them over an endless spectrum of drug trafficking possibilities. Technology alone will not solve the problem, nor will personnel, but a synergy between the two is a powerful weapon to counter drug trafficking organizations.

c. Critical CD research and development requirements and technology areas for exploitation include communications, tracking and surveillance, tactical operations support, contraband detection, D&M, ADP, crop control, and laboratory detection.

39. RDA Legal Constraints

Materiel developers, facing the responsibility of supporting the national CD effort, are legally constrained in the following two ways:

a. Through specific rules defining how materiel solutions to capability issues are researched, developed, and acquired; and

b. Through enacted legislation authorizing and directing military support to LEAs, which places specific conditions on the CD support allowed.

40. RDA Materiel Requirements Process

a. The current RDA system applies to major weapon system programs and typically requires a 12-year period to evolve from the technology base to a fielded system. **For the Department of Defense to be responsive to the changing requirements of the CD environment, a**

tailored or streamlined approach must be incorporated.

b. Resources for the Department of Defense are obtained through the resource allocation process. Resources include funds, people, facilities, and equipment. This resource allocation process is known as the Bi-annual Planning, Programming, and Budget System (BPPBS). See Appendix G, “Resource Management.”

41. CD RDA Organizations and Processes

There are several aspects of RDA that are unique with respect to CD operations. The most obvious differences relate to the organization and requirements POM processes.

a. Requirements include those technologies that operational forces need in order to execute their missions. **CD requirements are generated and defined by coordination between the CINCs, JIATFs and/or JTFs, and the DOD materiel development community.** After the requirement is defined, the CINC must validate this requirement and send it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Chairman then justifies the requirement to the DOD “Drug Coordinator” as a critical need that should be pursued and supported with appropriated CD funding. OSD guidance has dictated that only those requirements that are validated CINC requirements will potentially receive OSD CD funding.

b. If a requirement is fundamental to innovative technology (technology base), then approval for funding this requirement is channeled through the OSD Development, Research and Engineering office to the OCDEP&S. If the requirement can be accomplished through system development

(acquisition research and development), then approval for funding this requirement is through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the OCDEP&S. The key element to this process is the mandate of a validated CINC requirement. This ensures that all efforts are in direct response to providing a solution to a validated CINC requirement. This process is not always followed. Some LEAs coordinate and fund CD requirements directly with the DOD materiel development community, independent of validating this requirement with a CINC. Since these requirements were not demonstrated to be validated CINC requirements, they do not receive any OSD CD funding. Actions of this type are totally funded by the LEAs and are considered by OSD as LEA programs.

SECTION J. DEMAND REDUCTION

42. General

DOD efforts to reduce the demand for illegal drugs concentrate in the areas of education, deterrence, and treatment and/or rehabilitation. It is the goal of the Department of Defense to be free of the effects of substance abuse. The policies developed by the Department of Defense include (to varying degrees of applicability) military, DOD civilians, and families of military personnel. DOD Directive 1010.4, “Alcohol and Drug Abuse by DOD Personnel” establishes policy for the implementation of these programs. The provisions of the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act significantly broadened the role of the Military Services in nationwide community demand reduction activities. The Secretary of Defense is specifically directed to conduct programs aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs in the civilian community including, but not limited to, supporting community anti-drug campaigns, youth camps, substance abuse counseling and

treatment services, and programs in which appropriate personnel of the Armed Services act as role models for youths.

43. Education

Drug abuse awareness education and training is provided to commanders, supervisors, program personnel, and other military members and civilian employees and their families concerning effective measures to alleviate problems associated with drug and alcohol abuse. Additionally, courses such as the Demand Reduction Course offered by NICI (see Section C, paragraph 42b, Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations,”) offer DOD expertise and support to non-DOD agencies.

44. Deterrence

a. The major deterrence programs were established by DOD Directive 1010.1, “Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program” and DOD Directive 1010.9, “DOD Civilian Employee Drug Abuse Testing Program.” These directives established policies for the drug abuse urinalysis programs for military personnel and DOD civilian employees.

b. **The purpose for these programs is to provide a deterrence to drug abuse**, thereby preserving the health of DOD military and civilian personnel and permitting commanders and/or supervisors to assess the security, fitness, and discipline of their commands and to take appropriate action based upon such assessments.

c. Specific guidance for the collection, handling and laboratory testing of the urine samples is included in the above cited references.

45. Treatment and/or Rehabilitation

The reliance on illegal drugs following use on a periodic or continuing basis can cause

either psychological and/or physical dependence. In accordance with DOD Directive 1010.4, “Alcohol and Drug Abuse by DOD Personnel,” **it is DOD policy to treat or counsel drug abusers and rehabilitate the maximum feasible number of them.**

SECTION K. LAND RECONNAISSANCE

46. General

As described in Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview,” **this mission category is similar to the D&M mission, yet different in that various legal and/or regulatory restrictions are applicable to active duty forces.** In most cases, active duty forces are more restricted than NG (title 32 or state status) units in performing this mission category (See Section C, Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations,” for the types of missions that NG units are able to perform). This section presents the major types of land reconnaissance means that can be provided by the Department of Defense to LEAs.

47. Legal and Regulatory Constraints

Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview,” and Appendix B, “US Code Provisions” (both in this publication), provide detailed descriptions of the legislative and regulatory restrictions on DOD forces. The list below is a review of the constraints covered in those portions of this publication that apply to land reconnaissance.

a. **Missions are information gathering in nature.** DOD personnel cannot maintain or store gathered information in files. The information must be immediately given to the supported LEA.

b. Aviation support must adhere to all military and civilian safety rules and regulations.

c. Supported LEAs are responsible for obtaining any warrants required for searches, or for determining that searches, inspections, or observations do not require warrants or private property owners’ permission.

d. Any operation that has the potential for CD activity requires that an LEA officer be physically present or have the capability to respond rapidly.

e. DOD personnel cannot be placed in situations which would probably require the discharge of firearms, other than for self protection.

48. Categories of Support

a. **Aerial-Based Reconnaissance.** A variety of sensors, such as forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR), side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), photographic devices, and human beings can be employed to perform reconnaissance missions for CD organizations. The systems generally used for this type of reconnaissance are listed below and described in Appendix F, “Major Equipment Descriptions.”

- Fixed-wing aircraft.
- Rotary-wing aircraft.
- Unmanned aerial vehicles.

b. **Ground-Based Reconnaissance.** This category uses ground-based systems to reconnoiter an area (private land, abandoned property, and public land) for cultivated drug plants, laboratories, or other drug operations. Means to accomplish this mission are:

- Listening Posts and/or Observation Posts;
- Manned patrols (foot or mounted);
- Ground surveillance radars; and
- Remote ground sensors.
- c. **Sea-Based Reconnaissance.** Ships and submarines possess capabilities to conduct littoral reconnaissance.

CHAPTER V

PLANNING COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

“For by wise counsel shalt thou make thy war; and in multitude of counsellors there is safety.”

Proverbs 24:6

1. General

a. CD operations are designed to reduce or eliminate the supply and demand for illegal drugs. **Only a comprehensive planning process at the strategic (national), operational, and tactical (regional) levels can provide the means to reach this goal.**

b. The State Department (and its Country Teams), HN militaries and LEAs, and US LEAs play decisive roles in accomplishing the goals set at all levels of planning. **The nature of the CD planning should be joint, multinational, and interagency, thus requiring close coordination with all participants.** This chapter provides a general guide to be used for planning military CD operations. Such operations involve significant commitments of military forces or equipment (i.e., D&M missions). Section E, Chapter IV of this publication, “DOD Counterdrug Operations,” provides information with respect to the military in the role of advisor to other CD organizations.

2. Planning and Coordinating Forums

a. **Planning Levels and Forums.** The three levels of effort for the planning and coordinating of CD operations apply equally to the Department of Defense, HN forces, and US LEAs and other agencies. The National Counterdrug Planning Process established a series of coordinated meetings between LEA and the Department of Defense to plan the United States’ attack on drugs and their traffickers. These interagency meetings are conducted at two tiers in which strategic and operational level planning are accomplished. Numerous subordinate level meetings are also conducted at the operational and tactical levels (See Figure V-1).

b. Strategic Planning

- Planning at the strategic (national) level is **primarily concerned with broad policy and the establishment of conditions, objectives, concepts, and**

PLANNING FORUMS	
PLANNING FORUM	PLANNING LEVEL
USIC and Joint Staff J-3 Quarterly Planning Conference	Strategic Operational (limited)
CINCs' Regional Planning Conferences	Operational Strategic (limited)
Subordinate Organizations' Meetings	Tactical Operational (limited)

Figure V-1. Planning Forums

priorities. ONDCP provides the national policies, strategies, objectives, and priorities for CD efforts.

- **National Security Directives, Congressional actions, and the President’s NDCS, developed by ONDCP, provide most of the broad**

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Non-DOD agencies involved in planning at the strategic level within the three drug trafficking zones are depicted in Figures III-23 and III-24, Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations.”



The E-3 is used for air and maritime radar surveillance, detection, and monitoring of suspected smuggler aircraft and vessels.

national guidance for the Department of Defense. From that guidance the Secretary of Defense issued the DOD guidance discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction and Overview.” Yearly guidance and missions are further provided to the CINCs through the JSPS. The JSCP assigns strategic tasks and apportsions available resources. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the JSCP as needed, and from this document the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies develop their plans.

- The coordinating center for DOD CD operations at the strategic level is in the Joint Staff J-3 Counternarcotics Division. CND receives its strategic direction from the Secretary of Defense

c. Operational Planning

- Operational planning is the process of deciding what conditions must be met in order to achieve a strategic goal, what actions are most likely to produce positive results, and how to employ available forces to accomplish strategic goals. **Very often this requires a campaign.** A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. These operations, or campaigns, are based on fundamental decisions about where and when to engage the threat.
- **Operational planning focuses on how to concentrate friendly forces against**

the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. CD planning at the operational level requires an understanding of joint, multinational, and interagency operations, and the ability to anticipate the drug threat. Operational planners provide direction to tactical level agencies.

- **Major agencies involved with operational planning include JIATFs -E, -W, and -S, as well as JTF-6.** The CD commanders and most components have established separate staff sections within their headquarters to accomplish their operational planning.
- Non-DOD agencies involved with operational level planning are depicted in Figures III-23 and III-24, Chapter III, "Counterdrug Organizations."

d. **Tactical Planning.** Supporting plans are derived from operation plans, including campaign plans. **The planner at the tactical level is involved with the movement or employment of forces or assets to gain advantage over the threat at a point where they will make the greatest contribution to success.** In the CD effort, the process of planning and coordinating the support for CD operations is the tactical planner's greatest challenge. Planning, coordinating, and deconflicting tactical CD operations is similar to planning tactical combat operations. The responsibilities of the tactical planner are shown in Figure V-2.

3. Key Considerations

a. **General Policy.** The following considerations should be reviewed during the planning process:

- **Unity of Effort. The agency in charge of an operation is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of that operation's planning efforts.** In

most military operations, unity of effort is achieved by the expression of common goals and clear, concise, and simple C2 from the designated commander. However in CD operations, with the numerous agencies involved, **unity of effort is achieved more by persuasion and cooperation than by direct exercise of authority.** Success requires interagency synchronization and coordination. **The roles that liaison officers (LNOs) play in CD operations' unity of effort cannot be overstated;** therefore, they should be included in all planning efforts. The earlier LNOs are incorporated into the planning process, the fewer revisions will be required. CD operations should include detailed plans and assessments for the subjects listed. Organizations conduct operations differently and it is important that they all know and understand how the others operate. Planners should, at a minimum, consider the issues shown in Figure V-3 that are associated with organizations.

- **Alternate Plans. Flexibility is a key to success in CD planning.** An alternate plan has the potential for becoming the executed plan and should be as fully coordinated as the primary plan.
- **Simplicity.** Considering the various US and HN agencies with the potential to be involved in the operation, the more complex the plan, the more difficult it will be to coordinate and control. **Simpler plans will result in fewer misunderstandings.** Clearly, some operations will require extensive, detailed, and often complex planning and coordination. This may require issuing mission-type orders so that participating units or personnel can clearly understand the missions' objectives and complexity.
- **Priorities.** Planning first requires the identification of the objective(s). When

TACTICAL PLANNER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Anticipate traffickers' future actions
- Prioritize each action as to its degree of threat
- Clearly define the objective (or mission) of the operation
- Determine the centers of gravity (if appropriate) and critical vulnerabilities
- Outline the scheme of maneuver
- Designate the main effort
- Precisely synchronize the various activities of the plan
- Provide for using operations security measures to gain and maintain essential secrecy
- Ensure effective command, control, communications, and computers
- Confront and handle limitations and problems such as:
 - Requests for augmentation forces and specialized equipment
 - Restrictions on US military personnel derived from US law, host-nation forces or law enforcement agents
 - Restrictions imposed by host-nation support agreements
 - Limits on the number of personnel authorized to participate in any given operation in a particular country or region

Figure V-2. Tactical Planner Responsibilities

there is more than one objective in an operation, **common sense requires that the operation order prioritize the objectives.** If the purpose of the operation is to capture or seize the methods of drug transportation (aircraft, boats, and trucks), then other objectives (traffickers and weapons) are ranked lower in priority.

b. **Planning Considerations**

- **Threat Assessment.** Because CD operations rely on current intelligence, **planners should have a thorough understanding of the drug trafficking threat** to plan successful CD operations. Detailed plans for collection and timely dissemination of intelligence are critical.



Figure V-3. Considerations for Planners

Because the drug threat is so changeable, CD planners should consult the current intelligence sources for accurate and timely threat information. **Most CD operations should be based on all-source intelligence data** that indicates where the limited CD assets can be most effectively utilized. Without knowing what the traffickers' intentions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and methods are, the operation can be ineffective and wasteful.

- **Target Identification.** A clear distinction should be made as to what constitutes a valid target. The intelligence estimates will identify the most likely methods of delivery or transportation of drugs. Information such as expected speed, altitude, and course of suspect aircraft originating from particular areas, or descriptions of various known drug trafficking surface craft, will provide principal means of determining which targets will be pursued if involved in D&M. This information is crucial to the success of the mission and should be relayed to all participants of the operation.
- **Evaluation Method.** All plans should include a method of evaluating not only the success of the mission, but where it can be improved. These lessons learned should be shared with all CD agencies.
- **Legal Considerations.** Because there are many legal implications in CD operations, **the SJA is vital in reviewing CD plans.** Special care must be exercised to ensure that military personnel act in accordance with legal and policy restrictions on their employment while involved in CD operations. Use of military support may require special procedures to ensure that legal proceedings resulting from joint CD

operations can be effectively prosecuted and will not be dismissed from court due to illegal or procedurally incorrect actions.

- **ROE and/or Use of Force Policy.** All DODCD operations are conducted under JCS Standing Peacetime ROE. **Planners should ensure that the ROE to subordinate elements do not interfere with their inherent right of self-defense.** Ignoring or placing unclear interpretations on the ROE could jeopardize the current operation and result in damaging relations with HNs and future operations. US naval units, with embarked law enforcement detachments (see Appendix E, “Law Enforcement Detachments”), can come under the TACON of the USCG for law enforcement functions. These vessels are then subject to the “Use of Force Policy” as defined by current USCG regulations, while at the same time retaining the right of self-defense under the JCS Standing Peacetime ROE. Participating CD operations units should be familiar with the following:

- Existing JCS Standing Peacetime ROE.
- Additional or pending CD ROE.
- Methods of requesting changes to ROE.
- Use of Force Policy (while under USCG’s TACON only).

- **Status-of-Forces Agreements.** When conducting CD operations in another country, **planners should determine whether or not a SOFA is in place in that country.** If a SOFA exists, it should be reviewed to determine if it provides sufficient protection for the military

members participating in the operation, and to ensure that it allows for adequate freedom of action to accomplish the mission. If a SOFA is inadequate, the geographic combatant commander may contact the US diplomatic mission to determine whether or not the HN’s government is willing to reach an agreement on military members’ status and related issues.

- **Equipment Interoperability.** Although maximum communications interoperability is desired, it might not be possible, especially when working closely with HN LEAs and military forces. **Therefore, planning for alternate communications methods is essential.** Operators should:

- Know what systems are in use by supporting agencies and/or HNs and be familiar with their capabilities and limitations; and

- Plan for back-up systems and methods.

- **Operations Security.** OPSEC is the process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems;

- Determine what indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and

- Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. The need to gain and maintain essential secrecy by using OPSEC measures cannot be

overemphasized. **Every effort should be made to prevent information on CD operations from becoming available to trafficking organizations or their informants.** OPSEC should be integrated into all aspects of the planning and implementation of DOD CD operations. Per OPSEC planning guidance, OPSEC planning should be done in anticipation of and during CD operations, selected OPSEC measures executed, and success evaluated. **Because CD operations are repeated, often from the same site, OPSEC surveys of the operations should periodically be accomplished.** OPSEC should be applied and appropriate site surveys completed to support physical security and force protection for DOD CD assets (see Section D, paragraph 21, Chapter IV, “DOD Counterdrug Organizations”).

- **Command and Control. CD operations require centralized command and decentralized execution.** Centralized command allows for the establishment of a clear focus on the objectives, while decentralized execution provides the tactical commander with the flexibility to adapt to the situation as it develops. Clear distinctions are necessary to establish command lines and for the determination of relationships and/or methods with and between:
 - US military forces employed;
 - Diplomatic agencies;
 - Other US agencies (USCS, DEA, and other relevant agencies); and
 - Other HN forces and agencies.
- **Public Affairs (PA).** Unwanted disclosures of operations by the media

can render a plan ineffective. In addition, bad publicity can negate the positive results of an operation (such as arrests and seizures). **Positive PA planning can minimize these risks by providing the media with only the information the operation commander wishes released.** A good PA plan will account for the public’s right to know as well as OPSEC measures essential to a successful operation (See Appendix D, “Public Affairs”).

4. CD Planning Procedures

In most situations, **the planning of a CD operation is a methodical or deliberate process.** While the deliberate planning process does take time, it also allows planners the opportunity to ensure that the plan is complete and understood by all participants. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) deliberate planning process is an excellent procedural tool and format for conducting the analysis required to build an effective plan. **The JOPES deliberate planning process consists of five phases.** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)” provides detailed information on this process. This section will discuss major CD considerations in each of these five phases (see Figure V-4) and show how they fit into the overall CD planning. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),” and CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)” provide detailed information on this process. Appendix C, “Counterdrug Plan Format,” provides a CD plan format.

a. **Initiation.** In this phase, the commander receives the planning tasks and is told what forces and other assets can be expected to be allocated for accomplishment of the mission.



Figure V-4. Counterdrug Planning Procedures

b. **Concept Development.** There are five separate steps in this phase that take the commander's staff through the problem solving process. Even though these steps are listed individually, they are accomplished almost simultaneously, and what is done in one area affects what is being done in another.

- **Mission Analysis.** Prior to beginning CD planning, the commander's staff should conduct a thorough analysis of the operations environment, threat, and the limitations that are imposed by US and HN governments. During the mission analysis phase, **the planners should analyze the assigned tasks, develop a mission statement, formulate subordinate tasks, and prepare guidance for the commander's approval.** The first two of these are discussed below:

- **Analyze Assigned Tasks.** With the background gained through the environmental analysis and strategic assessment, **the planner reviews assigned missions to determine the specified and implied tasks.** These may range from providing forces to conduct CD operations, to providing forces to train HN forces and/or LEAs, or providing specific equipment to conduct operations.

- **Develop a Mission Statement.** The mission statement guides much of the remaining planning process. **The mission statement will provide the who, what, when, where, why, and possibly the how.** The theater mission established by the combatant commander will be very general but may identify specific CD tasks. Tactical operations will naturally be more specific.

- **Planning Guidance.** The commander issues planning guidance to the staff to begin development of courses of action

(COAs) and to communicate the commander's guidance to subordinate commanders. **The commander outlines tentative COAs, additional assumptions, and a planning directive.** This, as well as the other planning steps, may be formal or informal, written or verbal. The commander establishes the parameters for future planning at this point.

- **Staff Estimates.** In this step, **the staff analyzes the mission and refines the tentative COAs to determine whether they are supportable from a functional standpoint.** Detailed options are constructed by the staff based on the commander's planning guidance. These options serve as the foundation for the commander's decision to select a COA. These options go to the commander for evaluation, selection, or modification in establishing the final plan. The "Tests for COAs" assist the staff with the process of determining whether the COAs are capable of accomplishing the mission. The following tests are appropriate:
 - **Suitability.** Will the COA actually accomplish the mission if conducted successfully? Is it aimed at the correct objective?
 - **Feasibility.** Do you have all the necessary assets or will they be available in time?
 - **Acceptability.** Is it worth the cost in time, material, money, or even people?
 - **Variety.** The COAs should be substantially different. Superficial differences preempt a decision and waste time. Do the COAs offer significant differences?
 - **Completeness.** Does each COA really answer the questions: (1) Who or

what forces will execute the plan? (2) What action is contemplated? (3) When will the operation begin? (4) Where will the operation take place? (5) How will the operation be accomplished? Care is taken not to intrude upon the initiative of subordinate commanders by providing detailed "hows." The staff estimates are crucial to the success of the mission, for they influence the commander as to the best COA. The key point is that the purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and which COA is best. While each staff estimate varies somewhat from the others, it tends to follow similar themes. The exception will be the intelligence estimate, which concentrates on the threat situation and capabilities. Generally, the estimates contain these principal analysis elements: (a) Mission; (b) Situation and considerations (COAs); (c) Analysis of friendly COAs; (d) Comparison of COAs; and (e) Conclusions and/or recommendations.

- **Commander's Estimate.** This document **clearly states the commander's decision regarding the chosen COA and summarizes his reasoning.** While there is no proper format for the estimate, it generally addresses the following points:
 - **Mission.**
 - **The situation and COAs.** (The following must be factored in planning: (1) Considerations affecting the possible COAs, including characteristics of the operational area and availability of assets; (2) Enemy capabilities; and (3) Own COAs.)
 - Analysis of opposing COAs.
 - Comparison of own COAs.
 - Recommended and/or selected COA.

- **Concept of Operations (CONOPS).**

This is a **narrative statement of how the commander expects to conduct the operation** and is a greatly expanded version of the commander's estimate. It clarifies the intent of the commander as to the deployment, employment, and the support of the forces used in the operation and it also identifies the major objectives of the operation and the target dates for the objectives to be accomplished.

c. **Plan Development.** In this phase, **the CONOPS is expanded into a complete operation plan.** This is accomplished by the supporting agencies forwarding their estimates of supportability to the higher headquarters, identifying any known shortfalls in assets or units and conflicting dates, times, missions, and other areas. This allows the planning staff the opportunity to resolve issues before the plan is finalized. While there are eight separate steps that normally take place in this phase for combat operations, this document concentrates on the two most important for CD operations; force and support planning.

- **Force Planning.** The purpose here is to **identify all forces that are needed to accomplish the mission** as stated in the CONOPS. This is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the real work is done by the various agencies participating or supporting the operation. **Early identification of the required forces is crucial to identify shortfalls and request force augmentation.**

- **Support Planning.** This involves a **determination of how much and what types of equipment, supplies, spares, and even people will be needed to sustain the operation.** This is taken in a broad view, since the forces themselves should work out the detailed estimates of their needs.

d. **Plan Review.** This essential step is a **comprehensive review of the plan for adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and consistency with joint doctrine.** Approval of the plan is based on whether or not it will accomplish the mission, whether it is proportional and worth the expected cost, and if it can be done with the forces available (adequate, acceptable, and feasible).

- The review for adequacy determines whether (a) the plan is sufficient in scope and concept to accomplish the assigned mission; (b) the assumptions are valid; and (c) the plan is in compliance with existing guidelines and task assignments.

- The review for acceptability determines whether the contemplated COA (a) is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; (b) is consistent with the ROE and legal constraints; and (c) is militarily and politically supportable.

- The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish assigned tasks using available resources and considers both the appropriateness and the planned use of available resources.

- The review for consistency with joint doctrine ensures that the plan is consistent with joint doctrine as stated in approved and test pubs contained in the Joint Publication System.

e. **Supporting Plans.** These **plans are prepared by the agencies that are asked to provide support to the supported headquarters.** The supported headquarters is responsible for reviewing and approving supporting plans.

f. **Summary.** Planners should realize that planning for joint CD operations is an integrated process. Careful planning and coordination are essential to the successful

execution of any CD operation. These requirements become even more critical in situations where personnel from different backgrounds with diverse types of experience work together towards a common goal. Joint law enforcement and HN military CD operations are situations where diversity presents both benefits and challenges. While

there are many similarities between the agencies and/or organizations, there are also many differences. Each has its own particular training focus, language, and procedures. This section is intended to provide ideas, techniques, and formats that may help law enforcement and military planners to meet the challenge of designing joint CD operations.

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CHAPTER VI

EXECUTION OF COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

"It [narcotrafficking] makes a mockery of the principle of sovereignty in international order. It also distorts economies and generates violence that often stretches the thin capabilities of inadequately trained and poorly paid police forces, which are too often vulnerable to the corrosive attraction of easy money. The military's role is to support the police forces within constitutional limits."

Dr. Gabriel Marcella

SECTION A. US SOUTHERN COMMAND

2. Threat

1. Missions

a. **General Military Mission.** The USSOUTHCOM military mission is to **defend the southern flank of the United States and advance US national interests.** The strategic concept for this mission is that USSOUTHCOM, in concert with friendly nations in the region, deters aggression, strengthens democracies, enhances military professionalism, and conducts combat operations should deterrence fail. Figure VI-1 shows USSOUTHCOM's AOR.

b. **Counterdrug Missions.** USSOUTHCOM is responsible for the following CD missions within its AOR:

- Providing support to reinforce cooperating HNs.
- Coordinating aerial and maritime D&M of drug production and trafficking.
- Providing CD operational support to US interagencies and HN forces.
- Providing CD nonoperational support to US interagencies and HN forces.

- **Drug traffickers in South and Central America have developed the production, transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs into an extremely well-organized business.** They have managed to saturate the US market and are expanding into Europe. Profits from their enterprises have been used to corrupt public officials and police and military leaders, thereby simplifying the movement of large quantities of illegal drugs through ports of entry and exit. Traffickers have made alliances with insurgent and terrorist groups to provide security to clandestine processing labs in return for weapons and financial backing. Counterinsurgency and CD efforts throughout South America have threatened the operations of drug-producing and -trafficking organizations, who have in turn reacted violently. The pattern of escalating violence in response to enhanced US and HN CD efforts will probably continue.
- **Air Smuggling. Smuggling by general aviation aircraft is a commonly detected means of moving cocaine through transshipment and staging areas to the United States.** The

US SOUTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY




Figure VI-1. US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

principal air smuggling routes to the United States extend from Colombia to Mexico and Central America via the Eastern Pacific, from Colombia to Mexico via the Western Caribbean, and from Colombia to the Bahama Islands and the Lesser Antilles via the Eastern Caribbean. Traffickers either land at clandestine airfields and quickly off-load to waiting ground transportation or airdrop drug shipments to waiting boats or vehicles and then return to Colombia. The drugs are then moved to the United States by a variety of means.

- **Maritime Smuggling. Cocaine smuggling by noncommercial vessels is the primary maritime drug smuggling threat in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.** Trafficking routes for noncommercial vessels extend from Colombia up the western and eastern coasts of Central America, from Colombia and Venezuela to the Lesser Antilles, and from the Bahama Islands to southern Florida. Large shipments of cocaine have been concealed in legitimate container, bulk, or breakbulk cargo aboard commercial vessels. Smaller shipments have been detected in “parasite” containers attached to the hull or under the control of individual crewmembers. The magnitude and complexity of smuggling via commercial vessels generally precludes interdiction at sea. Since most marijuana used in the United States is now domestically produced, it is infrequently encountered in detected smuggling ventures in the Caribbean. When it is encountered, it is usually found aboard coastal freighters or converted fishing vessels carrying large, sometimes multi-ton shipments of marijuana to transshipment locations in the Caribbean.

3. USSOUTHCOM’s CD Strategy

a. USSOUTHCOM’s CD strategy is integrated into its theater military mission. This is done because illegal drug production and trafficking problems cannot be separated from the economic, social, and political ills of the region.

b. **The principal objective** of USSOUTHCOM’s strategy and campaign plan is, in conjunction with other Federal agencies, **to eliminate and/or prevent the production and transshipment of illegal drugs into the United States.** Supporting objectives include the following:

- Enhancing HN capabilities to establish positive control over sovereign territory (air, land, maritime, and riverine).
- Enhancing HN capabilities to interdict and arrest drug traffickers.
- Supporting HN efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and HNs’ political will.
- Influencing HNs to respect and protect their citizens’ human rights.
- Enhancing HN’s military professionalism.
- Supporting HN efforts toward continued economic and social progress.
- Enhancing HN capabilities to combat and defeat drug-related insurgent and/or terrorist threats.

4. Organization

a. **USCINCSO** is responsible for the conduct of normal operations in Central and

South America and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans from 92 degrees W, east to 30 degrees W, north to 8 degrees N, west to 58 degrees W, north to 28 degrees N, and west to Florida. Forces represented in USSOUTHCOM are from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Operating forces are organized into Service component commands, a subunified command, and JTFs.

b. USSOUTHCOM Components

- **US Army Forces, US Southern Command (USARSO).** The Army component is currently headquartered at Fort Clayton, Panama, and is scheduled to relocate to Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico in the future. Its primary mission is ground defense of the Panama Canal, but it also supports other regional missions. USARSO has lead operational authority for CD operations in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
- **Southern Command Air Forces (SOUTHAF).** 12th Air Force headquartered at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, serves as the Air Force component for USSOUTHCOM in its capacity as SOUTHAF. It provides air defense and tactical air operations capability in the USSOUTHCOM area.
- **Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT).** CINCLANTFLT, located in Norfolk, Virginia, has been designated as the Navy component commander for USSOUTHCOM. CINCLANTFLT provides the sea-air-land team (SEAL) and special boat unit detachments for operations in the AOR as well as support functions for US and allied naval forces in the area.
- **US Marine Corps Forces, South.** Commander, US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (headquartered at Norfolk,

Virginia) has been designated as Commander, US Marine Corps Forces, South (Designate) for USSOUTHCOM.

- **Special Operations Component, US Southern Command (SOCSOUTH)** is a subordinate unified command with air, land, and maritime forces. These forces can be employed throughout the theater to provide training for HN forces and, when authorized, can conduct operations to counter insurgency, terrorism, drug production, and trafficking.
- **Joint Interagency Task Force-South,** located at Howard AFB, Panama, is the lead organization for D&M operations in the source zone. JIATF-S is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supporting joint interagency CD operations with other CD elements and LEAs, and providing targets to LEAs for interception and apprehension. Intelligence and operations personnel exchange tactical data, streamlining and enhancing their tactical support efforts. CD intelligence is exchanged with appropriate supporting agencies.
- **Southern Regional Operations Center (SROC),** also located at Howard AFB, Panama, is the primary source of radar surveillance information for JIATF-S. SROC collects real-time radar tracking data for possible LEA and/or HN interdiction of coca paste and/or cocaine base air transports in the Andean Ridge and cocaine-laden aircraft flying north from the South American landmass. Radar operations include the fusion of all real-time radar data obtained from the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN), GBR, relocatable over-the-horizon backscatter radar (ROTHR), and air surveillance platforms. SROC coordinates CD operations with Caribbean Regional Operations Center (CARIBROC) to track drug traffickers

passing between the JIATF-S and JIATF-E AORs. SROC is the southern operations center of the CBRN, whereas CARIBROC is the northern operations center.

- **Joint Air Operations Center.** The JAOC is the focal point of source zone CD air activity. It is a joint operations facility for the coordination and monitoring of USSOUTHCOM CD air operations to support the Country Teams' requirements with US and HN LEAs and other supporting DOD elements.
- **Joint Interagency Task Force-East,** located at Key West, Florida, is the lead organization for air and maritime D&M operations in the transit zone. JIATF-E maintains a 24-hour JOCC watch consisting of intelligence analysts and operations personnel. The watch is responsible for coordinating and supporting JIATF-E's D&M assets, coordinating and/or planning joint interagency CD operations with other DOD CD elements and LEAs, and providing targets to LEAs for interception and apprehension. Intelligence and operations personnel exchange tactical data, streamlining and enhancing their tactical support efforts. CD intelligence is exchanged with appropriate supporting agencies.
- **CARIBROC,** also located in Key West, Florida, is the primary source of radar surveillance information for JIATF-E. It is responsible for collecting radar inputs produced by DOD and non-DOD assets in the Gulf of Mexico and/or Caribbean region and processing and/or fusing that data into a coherent radar surveillance picture. CARIBROC oversees regional aerial and maritime reconnaissance missions conducted to satisfy strategic intelligence requirements within the

USSOUTHCOM AOR. Radar operations include the fusion of all real time radar data obtained from CBRN, GBRs, ROTHr, land-based aerostats, surface surveillance platforms, and air surveillance platforms.

- As directed by USCINCSO and approved by the Secretary of Defense, USARSO, SOUTHAF, CINCLANTFLT, Commander, Marine Forces, Atlantic, and SOCSOUTH provide forces, equipment, intelligence and logistic support to D&M operations as well as supporting and assisting operations, joint and multinational exercises, US SAO activities, CD operations, and nations support operations. These forces, in turn, coordinate with other organizations such as the following:
 - The SAO in each country provides the required liaison between USSOUTHCOM and the US Ambassador to the HN, supports refinement of the Ambassador's country plans that focus on drug threats to the HN and HN CD capabilities, and aids in administration of SA programs.
 - Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B), located at Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras, is a support facility whose mission is to conduct training and perform contingency planning and nation support projects in Honduras. JTF-B is in an excellent position to support CD operations throughout Central America.

5. Concept of Operations

USSOUTHCOM provides CD support through HN assistance, CD operational support, CD nonoperational support, and aerial and maritime D&M support to US LEA and HN CD forces that are combatting drug production and exports.

a. Host-Nation Support

- A significant portion of USSOUTHCOM's involvement in the national CD effort comes in the form of **FID initiatives, which center on source country operations**. CD focused programs are integrated into USSOUTHCOM's theater strategy as a coordinated effort to support HN governments' internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy. As such, USSOUTHCOM's efforts are tailored to the needs of the individual nation and how that nation is organized to most effectively use the support being provided. To ensure a coordinated regional CD effort, USSOUTHCOM maintains close coordination with Country Team DEA and DOS's INL representatives.

•• **SA is a valuable element in USSOUTHCOM's FID effort.** To ensure maximum use of limited resources, USSOUTHCOM has developed resourcing programs with SAOs. The SAOs' mission is to serve as US military representatives to US Ambassadors and their Country Teams as well as to HN governments and their defense establishments. Their primary function is to manage US SA programs.

•• **Each SAO is tasked to develop a 5-year program for SA in support of their HN's goals which are in concert with the CINC and Country Team objectives and policy.** Training that is funded under the SA program makes a significant impact on the HN's IDAD program. MTTs, TAFTs, and IMET programs not only meet the immediate HN requirement for increased training, but improve HN-US relations and provide a means for transferring democratic ideas and strengthening democratic values within military

organizations. Joint riverine CD training by MTTs is an example of the training provided to HN forces.

- **Psychological Operations.** This includes efforts to foster favorable attitudes toward the HN through counterinsurgency and/or CD operations. Posters, leaflets, and radio and TV broadcasts are often the means by which the goals and results of CMOs are communicated to the HN's people.

b. **Counterdrug Operational Support.** CD operational support provided by USSOUTHCOM is **designed to increase the effectiveness of HN's forces' efforts** to destroy drug processing laboratories, disrupt drug producing enterprises, and control the air, land, maritime, and riverine routes by which these enterprises exfiltrate illegal drugs from the country. US forces are prohibited from accompanying US LEAs or HN forces and/or foreign LEAs on actual field CD operations or participating in any activity where hostilities are imminent. The types of support provided include C4, intelligence, planning, logistic, and training support.

- **C4 Support.** In-place systems provide the operational architecture for USSOUTHCOM. The overall objective of this support is **to provide an integrated network for efficiently coordinating and conducting intelligence collection and enforcement operations in support of LEAs.**

- **Intelligence Support.** USSOUTHCOM assists cooperating HN's forces in combatting the export of drugs with shared intelligence collection and CI efforts. **On a continuing basis, USSOUTHCOM gathers and processes drug-related intelligence information and interacts with Federal intelligence organizations and**

LEAs to exchange information and monitor CD surveillance operations.

This access to intelligence information ultimately assists at the second line of defense — the attack on drugs in-transit to the United States. Successful action in potential source and transit countries in the northern part of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean depends on an overarching US program of intelligence collection and dissemination, drawing together US and allied drug suppression efforts and improving the ability of US and HN law enforcement to interdict the flow of drugs.

- **Planning Support.** USSOUTHCOM provides planning support to US LEA and HN forces for deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of CD operations.
- **Logistic Support.** USSOUTHCOM assists HN CD operations by developing and coordinating the logistic support required for HN military and/or LEA forces to achieve their operational objectives. It also provides logistic support to US LEAs and interagencies through the provisions of the Economy Act. The logistic support includes deployment and sustainment of US forces in a supporting role, support to other non-DOD agencies, and limited (non-SA) support to HNs. The extent of support provided is based on: type and degree of support requested by the HN and/or US interagency; an assessment of the HN's and/or interagency's capability to support their proposed operations; availability of funding; and priority of support designated by the combatant commander. Routine logistic support includes the use of logistic support equipment such as vehicles, power generation equipment, and fuel systems;

contracting and engineering support to US forces; and coordination and provision of some types of base support to forward operating locations for HN and/or interagency personnel and their equipment as well as to other DOD forces deployed in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Typical categories of support to interagencies are executed under authority of Section 1004 of the FY 91 DOD Authorization Act (as amended) and consists of the following:

- Maintenance and/or repair of equipment made available by the Department of Defense to interagencies for the purposes of preserving its future utility for the Department of Defense or upgrading the equipment to ensure compatibility with other DOD-used equipment.
 - Maintenance, repair, and/or upgrading of other than DOD-provided equipment for the purposes of ensuring that it is compatible with DOD equipment.
 - Transportation of US and/or foreign personnel and transportation of supplies and/or equipment to facilitate CD activities.
 - Establishment of bases of operations or training facilities (including unspecified minor construction).
 - CD logistics-related training of US and/or foreign law enforcement personnel.
- **Training Support. JCETs and joint and multinational exercises** funded under various non-SA programs offer the advantage of training US forces, while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering them limited training opportunities. **Civic actions and PA**

efforts have been incorporated into many of these exercises in an attempt to improve the HN economic environment and increase the HN population's acceptance of US CD activities. In providing assistance during exercises, USSOUTHCOM insists that internationally accepted standards on human rights be respected.

c. **Detection and Monitoring**

• **JIATF-S**

•• **JIATF-S coordinates D&M efforts by US forces and integrates C4I assets to support the drug interdiction process.** JIATF-S relies upon the CBRN, GBRs, airborne radars, and ROTHF for early detection of airborne targets. Detecting airborne smugglers is accomplished by utilizing fixed radars, airborne radar platforms (including E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], E-2C, and P-3 aircraft), anti-air warfare capable ships, and GBR, which provide surveillance coverage of low-flying smuggler aircraft. JIATF-S relies upon the CBRN for early detection of airborne targets. This enables JIATF-S to cue subsequent sensors and coordinate with other countries as required. The goal is to provide continuous monitoring and tracking until suspect aircraft can be sorted and possibly apprehended.

•• **Drug interdiction and apprehension within the JIATF-S AOR fall under the sovereignty of the HN's government.** Rather than turning suspect aircraft over to the USCS or other US LEAs, D&M agencies or USLEAs must coordinate with appropriate HN officials.

• **JIATF-E**

•• **To tailor the concept of operations, JIATF-E uses a planning cycle which**

considers the threat, asset requirements, asset availability, and both preplanned and quick response operations. To facilitate this process, JIATF-E publishes a quarterly threat assessment, which is sent to all headquarters and agencies that provide D&M asset support. JIATF-E hosts a monthly regional tactical planning conference where a CONOPS for the next month is developed. JIATF-E then publishes the next month's CONOPS for execution.

•• JIATF-E's CONOPS is **built on defense in-depth to detect and monitor drug traffickers as close to the source country as possible, followed by continuous monitoring using a mixture of electronic and visual means as the target transits across JIATF-E's AOR, and finally handing off the target to LEAs.** The process is extremely complex because it frequently involves several CINCs and Federal agencies. To accomplish this, JIATF-E employs a mixture of DOD and LEA assets and sensors to conduct routine patrol operations and respond to changing intelligence assessments. The actual employment of ships and airborne assets is determined on a daily basis in response to current intelligence information concerning ongoing or expected drug trafficking operations. Assets are positioned to optimize time-on-station time to cover threat routes. Timely intelligence support enables JIATF-E to provide target alerts to law enforcement command centers, allowing cueing of assets for successful apprehensions. D&M operations are concentrated along known and suspected drug smuggling routes from the departure zones.

•• Forces under OPCON to JIATF-E operate a variety of D&M platforms to support JIATF-E's mission. **The full**

range of naval surface vessels is used, along with USCG cutters which may be under TACON to JIATF-E. These provide radar surveillance of airspace and D&M of surface traffic. Surveillance platforms also provide valuable radar information which is integrated into D&M and law enforcement fusion and/ or intelligence centers.

- Once an aircraft has been detected and sorted by JIATF-E, it is monitored in transit until a positive handoff or other disposition is coordinated for apprehension by the LEAs. Maritime targets are handled in much the same manner.
- While not under OPCON of JIATF-E, submarines assigned to CD operations are capable of providing information on both sea and air traffic while remaining completely covert.

6. Relationships With Other CINCs

a. **USACOM** transfers forces to and from USSOUTHCOM as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Subordinate USACOM elements include the following:

- **FORSCOM** provides Active and Reserve Component Army forces to USSOUTHCOM as coordinated between the two commands and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
- **FORSCOM's JTF-6** is responsible for providing DOD CD support to the LEAs in their interdiction of drug smugglers entering the United States by land across the Mexican border.

b. **USPACOM** transfers certain forces within the Eastern Pacific ocean area to USSOUTHCOM as approved by the Secretary of Defense for over-water

operations east of 92-degrees west longitude. JIATF-W is responsible for coordinating the employment of surveillance and monitoring assets against maritime and airborne drug smuggling threats in the USPACOM AOR. JIATF-S and JIATF-W routinely exchange suspect maritime platform information on ships departing Latin American ports which may potentially visit US Pacific ports. USPACOM coordinates with JIATF-E through JIATF-W on targets that approach or cross mutual boundaries (See Section C, this chapter for more information on USPACOM).

c. **NORAD** conducts aerial D&M (10 USC 124) of drug trafficking into North America (including Mexico) and supports USSOUTHCOM D&M operations in the transit zone (See Section D, this chapter).

d. **USSOCOM** provides active and reserve forces to USSOUTHCOM as coordinated between the commands and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

e. **USTRANSCOM** coordinates and provides intertheater lift in support of USSOUTHCOM's CD programs.

7. Relationships With Other CD Agencies

a. **The Joint Staff** coordinates military resources in support of USSOUTHCOM's CD plans, programs, and operations.

b. **Defense Security Assistance Agency.** DSAA coordinates SA programs in support of USSOUTHCOM CD programs.

c. **National Imaging and Mapping Agency** produces maps and charts for USSOUTHCOM and supporting units for locations that are in current (map) production. For those locations where maps do not exist, NIMA provides HN edition maps as substitutes.

d. **The Services** provide forces to USSOUTHCOM as directed in the “Forces For” memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, in support of USSOUTHCOM CD plans and programs as coordinated between the Services and USSOUTHCOM. In addition, the Services provide other SA resources as coordinated between the Services and USSOUTHCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

e. The following non-DOD agencies are also involved to varying degrees with USSOUTHCOM’s CD operations:

- **The Office of National Drug Control Policy** develops the NDCS and coordinates the activities of all US national agencies in order to achieve the NDCS objectives.
- **The Department of State** is the designated lead agency for implementing the NDCS in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Through its Ambassadors and Country Teams, the DOS executes programs designed to increase HN’s CD will and capabilities. US Ambassadors in the HNs are the focal point for all US CD support and assistance. Two agencies within the DOS participate in CD efforts.
 - **Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs**, as the lead agency within the DOS for developing and implementing international initiatives in support of the NDCS efforts overseas, concentrates on providing support to civilian LEAs that are focused on CD matters in USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. These efforts include but are not limited to crop eradication, income replacement, investigations, support for drug interdiction operations, and intelligence gathering.

- **The Agency for International Development** has an overall economic development program for HNs. Additionally, in drug producing countries AID has specific CD funding earmarked for economic assistance programs aimed at improving economic and social conditions.

- **The US Information Agency** is the executive agent for international drug public awareness. Its primary responsibility is to inform HN’s populations about US programs and policy.
- **The Department of Justice** and its subordinate agencies, specifically the **DEA**, play a key CD role in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. DEA provides operational support and conducts drug interdiction operations in concert with HN LEAs.
 - **The El Paso Intelligence Center.** Both JIATF-S and DIA TWD exchange intelligence information with EPIC. The EPIC data base includes information on suspect individuals, air and afloat platforms, and drug trafficking organizations and their operations.
 - DEA and the Department of State’s INL have established **joint information coordination centers (JICC)** in many Central American countries and the Caribbean countries to collect, analyze, and coordinate information about traffickers and their air and seaborne assets.
- **The Department of Transportation** and its subordinate agencies, specifically the **USCG**, have a major CD role in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. The USCG supports air interdiction by conducting aerial detection, monitoring, and tracking and providing intelligence

information to other US agencies and HN LEAs. The USCG also provides training to HN forces through its waterway law enforcement program.

- Commander, Coast Guard District (CCGD)-7, in Miami, Florida, and CCGD-8 in New Orleans, Louisiana, are the primary command centers for the interception and apprehension of suspected surface drug smugglers in the JIATF-E joint operations area (JOA). CCGD-7 and CCGD-8 plan and conduct surface D&M and interdiction operations in the arrival zone, and coordinate arrival zone operations with other agencies. **Close continuous coordination with JIATF-E and other locations ashore, afloat, and airborne is required to exchange target data, handoff targets, coordinate surveillance activities, and exchange CD intelligence.** CCGD-7 also operates MARINCEN. In coordination with JIATF-E, the center collects, collates, analyzes, and disseminates tactical intelligence for the purpose of interdicting suspect vessels in the Caribbean. CCGD-7 and -8 conduct the interdiction and apprehension phase of surface operations. The USCG takes TACON of USN ships during boarding operations to ensure the continuity of the statutory chain of authority should a violation of US law occur.
- **The Department of Treasury** and its subordinate agencies, the USCS and IRS, have a significant CD role in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
 - **US Customs Service.** The USCS supports air interdiction by conducting aerial detection, monitoring, and tracking and providing intelligence information to other US agencies and HN LEAs. It shares lead agency status with the USCG for air interdiction. DAICC coordinates the interception and apprehension of drug traffickers attempting to enter the United States. CARIBROC and/or JIATF-E information on suspect air targets departing Latin America is passed to DAICC via ADNET.
 - The IRS investigates money laundering in USSOUTHCOM's AOR and its movement through US banks.
- **Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos. OPBAT (and subsequent operations in support of OPBAT regionalization) is a DEA-led multinational strike force comprised of law enforcement officers from the United States, the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.** OPBAT provides 24-hour interdiction and apprehension response capabilities for all CD efforts involving US participation in the Bahamas. Operations involve air interdiction, CD patrol operations, and follow-up investigations. OPBAT coordinates operations through JIATF-E. US military support for OPBAT is provided by FORSCOM through USACOM. USSOUTHCOM and/or JIATF-E also sponsors TAT intelligence support to OPBAT.
- **Puerto Rican Radar Integration System (PRRIS).** The PRRIS provides the Puerto Rican Operations Center (PROC), 140th Air Defense Squadron Puerto Rico Air National Guard at Punta Salinas, Puerto Rico, with an air surveillance display. Digitized radar inputs from existing radars are integrated to provide a comprehensive air situation display for air surveillance tracking and identification functions. This data is also provided to CARIBROC as part of the CBRN.
 - **The basic CD mission of the PROC is to support monitoring of critical**

lines of communications and to assist in drug interdiction. The secondary mission is to exchange surveillance data with the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies involved in CD operations.

- **The Drug Interdiction Operations Center (DIOC), located in the PROC, is a joint interdiction center** that uses inputs from the Puerto Rican radars (via the PRRIS) and intelligence and cueing from JIATF-E in a defined area around Puerto Rico. The DIOC coordinates LEA alert forces within its operational area to carry out intercept and apprehension functions for the USCS.

SECTION B. US ATLANTIC COMMAND

8. Missions

a. **General Military Mission.** USACOM conducts operations to train forces and joint units, provides joint forces to warfighting CINCs, and executes responsibilities as assigned. Figure VI-2 shows the USACOM AOR.

b. **Counterdrug Mission.** USACOM, through FORSCOM, conducts CD D&M operations and provides title 10 CD operational support to DLEAs. These operations are in support of DLEAs and other Federal, state, and local agencies to interdict and/or counter the flow of drugs into the United States. USACOM also stimulates support and cooperation from nations to oppose the illegal production, transit, and sale of drugs.

9. Threat

a. **Air Smuggling.** **Smuggling by general aviation aircraft is a commonly detected means of moving cocaine through the USACOM AOR to the United States.**

b. **Maritime Smuggling.** **Cocaine smuggling by noncommercial vessels is the primary maritime drug smuggling threat in the USACOM AOR.**

c. **Ground Smuggling.** Once drugs have reached points in Central America or Mexico, **ground transportation can be used to get the product to its final destination in the United States.** Extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific coast, the US border is nearly 2,000 miles long. The Southwest border is the principal corridor for moving illegal drugs into the United States, although USACOM must also consider possible threats from the border with Canada. Typical modes of ground transportation through legitimate POEs include large loads in tractor-trailer trucks, smaller loads in passenger vehicles, and people concealing drugs on their person. Drug trafficking across non-POEs also poses a substantial problem, as traffickers continue to search out weak and/or unpatrolled points along the Southwest border and employ novel methods, such as tunnels, to transport drugs across the border.

10. USACOM's CD Strategy

USACOM's CD strategy is **designed to support DLEA efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs across the US borders.** Cooperation among nations to oppose the illegal production, transport, and sale of drugs is emphasized. Fostering interagency cooperation is integral to the strategy.

11. Organization

a. **CINCUSACOM** is responsible for the conduct of normal operations in the Atlantic Ocean west of 17 degrees E (excluding the territories and waters south of 28 degrees N, west of 58 degrees W, south of 8 degrees N and west of 30 degrees W), the Arctic Ocean east of 95 degrees W and west of 100 degrees E, and Greenland and other islands (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) in all

US ATLANTIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY




Figure VI-2. US Atlantic Command Area of Responsibility

assigned water areas. USACOM has responsibility for providing DOD CD operational support within CONUS and Mexico.

b. **USACOM Components.** Subordinate to and under CINCUSACOM COCOM are four Service component commands and one subunified command.

- **FORSCOM**, located at Fort McPherson, Georgia, is USACOM's Army component commander and has lead operational authority of all CD land operations in CONUS. FORSCOM provides overall coordination and sets priorities among its major subordinate commands.
- **JTF-6**, located at Ft. Bliss, Texas, has been designated by FORSCOM as responsible for coordinating DOD title 10 support to LEAs within CONUS, with priority to the HIDAAs (See Figure VI-3).
- **Air Combat Command**, located at Langley AFB, Virginia, provides US Air Force (USAF) elements to CD operations.
- **Atlantic Fleet**, located in Norfolk, Virginia, is USACOM's Navy component.
- **Marine Forces Atlantic** is USACOM's Marine component commander and is located in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.




Figure VI-3. JTF-6 Operational Area

- **Special Operations Command, Atlantic** is a subordinate unified command that provides C2 for assigned SOF.

12. Concept of Operations

USACOM provides CD D&M asset support, HNS, and operational and nonoperational support to US LEA and HN CD forces that are combatting drug production and export. **USACOM's concept of operations is driven by mission, threat, and force available. USACOM has delegated to FORSCOM the responsibility for providing operational support to assist DLEA efforts to counter the flow of drugs in the arrival zone.**

a. FORSCOM and/or JTF-6

- FORSCOM employs forces in support of DLEAs in their efforts to counter the flow of drugs across US borders.
- **JTF-6 serves as the planning and coordinating (operational) headquarters providing DOD support to Federal, state, and local LEAs within CONUS.** The objective of this military support to CD operations is to assist LEAs in their mission to detect, deter, and disrupt illegal drug trafficking. This support is provided using the "Total Force Approach" support packages drawn from a variety of sources. **All military operations in the operational area are conducted in support of a lead LEA.** This total force approach results in joint (LEA and military) operations involving title 10 personnel, title 32 (NG) personnel and nonoperational assets from the CDSO, providing a variety of enhanced capabilities to supported LEAs. JTF-6 receives requests for support, validates the requirement, coordinates and/or determines the

supporting units, and coordinates joint air-land CD operations through NORAD and FORSCOM when both air and land D&M forces are involved.

b. Host-Nation Support

- CD-focused FID programs are integrated into USACOM's theater strategy as a coordinated effort to support HN's IDAD strategy. **USACOM's FID effort is tailored to the requirements of the region with emphasis on individual country programs.** To ensure a coordinated regional CD effort, USACOM maintains close coordination with Country Team, DEA, and DOS's INL representatives. By overseeing SA support to Caribbean countries, USACOM complements the existing efforts of the other governmental agencies that manage activities and programs in support of nations. These programs improve the social and psychological well-being of individual citizens, stimulate an increased dialogue with the United States, support a more stable economic and political environment, and minimize the destabilizing influence of drug traffickers. SA programs also reinforce the overall CD strategy by strengthening and improving local regional law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. They also assist HN military organizations to execute interdiction and eradication operations by supporting tactical units with training, equipment, and technical assistance.
- **Civil-Military Operations.** CMO also contribute to the stability and economic security of HNs in the USACOM AOR.
 - **Civil Affairs Programs.** CA activities assist HNs with operations of basic government services (e.g.,

education, public government services, public health, communications). These efforts contribute to HN economic and social development.

•• **Military Civic Action.** MCA operations are commonly conducted by HN forces with the assistance of US personnel. MCA programs are particularly beneficial in assisting HNs in establishing local expertise for future long-term independent development.

attitudes toward the HN in counterinsurgency and/or CD operations. Posters, leaflets, and radio and TV broadcasts are often the means by which the goals and results of CMO are communicated to the HN's people.

c. **Counterdrug Operational Support.** CD operational support provided by USACOM is **designed to increase the effectiveness of LEA and/or HN forces' efforts to disrupt drug flow to the United States.** US forces are prohibited



The E-2 Hawkeye is capable of detecting air and maritime targets and provides identification friend or foe link as well as HF, VHF, and UHF communications capabilities.

•• **Humanitarian Assistance.** This category encompasses a variety of humanitarian programs, including disaster relief and relocations.

•• **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** HCA general activities include medical and dental care, construction of basic transportation systems, and repair of public facilities.

•• **Psychological Operations.** This includes efforts to foster favorable

from accompanying US LEAs or HN forces and/or LEAs on actual field CD operations or participating in any activity where hostilities are imminent. The types of support provided include C4, intelligence, reconnaissance, planning, logistic, and training support.

- **C4 Support.** USACOM has integrated in place communications systems to support the LEAs. Systems have been established to support real-time intelligence requirements for forces operating in support of LEAs.

- **Intelligence Support.** USACOM assists HN forces and/or LEAs in combatting the transshipment of drugs through the AOR with shared intelligence collection efforts to improve the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence information. Successful action depends on an overarching US program of CI, intelligence collection, and dissemination, which draws together US and allied drug suppression efforts and improves the ability of US and HN law enforcement authorities to interdict the flow of drugs. JTF-6 provides fused and analyzed data from the Department of Defense and LEA sources to DOD elements in support of LEAs operating in the four Southwest border states. The intelligence support that USACOM provides to LEAs consists of techniques, systems, and procedures that facilitate information analysis, fusion, and sharing. By coordinating efforts of US forces and by integrating assets to support the drug interdiction process, USACOM's efforts are forcing traffickers to change their methods to avoid detection and evade interdiction.
- **Reconnaissance Support.** USACOM provides a wide variety of air and land reconnaissance assets to support LEAs. Included are LPs and/or OPs, divers, radars, sensors, FLIR, and UAVs.
- **Planning Support.** USACOM provides planning support to US LEA and HN forces for deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of CD operations.
- **Logistic Support.** USACOM assists HN CD operations by coordinating logistic support requested by HN military and/or LEA forces to achieve their operational objectives. The extent of support provided is based on results of an initial assessment of an HN's capability to support its proposed operations. **This logistic support includes deployment and sustainment of US forces in a supporting role, support to other US non-DOD agencies, and support to the HNs.** Within CONUS, engineering projects (road repair, ranges, and other projects) are frequently requested by LEAs. Additionally, air and ground transportation can be provided.
- **Training Support.** JCETs and joint and combined exercises funded under various non-SA programs offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering them limited training opportunities. **Efforts emphasize multinational exercises, with regional security forces conducting D&M training to further strengthen US and HN relationships.** Civic actions and PA efforts can be incorporated into these exercises in an attempt to improve HNs' economic environments and to convince the public to be more receptive to CD activities. All of the above programs enhance USACOM's efforts in developing greater dialogue among the United States and HNs and helps to reduce drug traffickers' influence. Additionally, in providing assistance during exercises, USACOM insists that internationally accepted standards on human rights be respected.

13. Relationships With Other CINCs

USACOM, FORSCOM and/or JTF-6 conduct CD operations in conjunction with other DOD commands. Lateral transfers of assets among these CD forces are critical to ensure proper coordination of D&M assets, to avoid coverage gaps, to hand-off targets

that cross AOR borders, to receive target warning or alert for early detection, and to allow horizontal flow of statistical data on drug trafficking.

a. **USSOUTHCOM** shares tactical intelligence information and supports forward operating bases for USACOM-provided resources (See Section A, this chapter for more information on USSOUTHCOM).

b. **NORAD** conducts aerial D&M (10 USC 124) of drug trafficking aircraft into North America (including Mexico) (See Section D, this chapter for more information on NORAD).

c. **USSOCOM** provides CD support to USACOM under CD Project Code 6415 (theater CINC support). USSOCOM also maintains a rapid support unit at El Paso, Texas, composed of SOF ground and aviation assets. This unit is under the TACON of FORSCOM or JTF-6. Its purpose is to facilitate quick reaction DOD CD operational support responsive to perishable LEA intelligence.

14. Relationships With Other CD Agencies

a. **Operation Alliance. FORSCOM and/ or JTF-6 support Operation Alliance by planning and coordinating all requested DOD (title 10) support to Federal, state, and local LEAs within CONUS.** NG (title 32) support to Alliance is coordinated directly between Alliance and the respective state NG CD organizations. Additional logistic support is provided by the CDSO, who coordinates material support requests and equipment transfers for Alliance-approved projects and operations. (See Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations,” Section B.)

b. **Project North Star.** The concept of Project North Star is **similar to that of**

Operation Alliance. Collocated at Project North Star are the DOD CDSO and a representative of the NGB to assist civilian LEAs seeking Federal and state military support (See Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations,” Section B).

c. **EPIC, a multi-LEA facility, is a full-service intelligence center** which provides information related to trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and illegal aliens. EPIC provides operational-level data on foreign drug trafficking organizations’ trends and patterns, drug seizure data, and related data on international drug smuggling into the United States. EPIC is the government’s principal tactical intelligence center (See Chapter III, “Counterdrug Organizations,” Section E).

d. **Department of State.** The DOS’s INL is the lead agency for coordinating the government’s international supply-reduction strategies. INL supports a broad range of drug control programs, focusing on such activities as crop eradication, investigations, interdictions, and intelligence gathering. **INL and DEA have established JICCs in many sites in the Caribbean and Central America** to collect, analyze, and coordinate information about traffickers and their air and maritime assets.

e. **US Customs Service**

- **Conducts aerial D&M operations** of drug trafficking within the USACOM AOR. It shares air interdiction operations within the AOR with the USCG.
- **DAICC coordinates the interception and apprehension of traffickers attempting to enter the United States.** CARIBROC and/or JIATF-E information on suspect air targets departing Latin America is passed to DAICC via ADNET.

SECTION C. US PACIFIC COMMAND

15. Missions

a. **Military Mission.** The mission of USPACOM is to maintain the security of the USPACOM AOR (Figure VI-4), defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, and to discharge other US military responsibilities in the USPACOM AOR.

b. **Counterdrug Mission.** USPACOM's CD mission is to conduct air and maritime D&M operations and provide operational and intelligence support to US LEAs within the AOR.

16. Threat

The overwhelming maritime geographic characteristic and physical size of the USPACOM AOR poses a great challenge for successful CD operations. There are few geographic choke points and numerous open maritime approaches to the US West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii. Also, **drug traffickers tend to transship drugs using multiple platforms while en route and respond quickly to D&M efforts.** Air smuggling operations are restricted by the great distances involved. The high value and ease of concealing low volumes of cocaine and heroin make them some of the easiest drugs to smuggle and the most difficult to detect. The threat can be divided into three areas; Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Central and South America. Primary drugs of interest and methods of transportation are different for each area and require specialized methods of interdiction. **While cocaine remains the number one drug moved through the USPACOM AOR, heroin and hashish are the principal drugs produced in the AOR.**

a. **Southeast and Southwest Asia.** The **primary drugs of interest in this region are heroin and marijuana and, to a lesser extent, hashish.** Most of the world's illicit opium and refined heroin is produced in Southeast Asia's "Golden Triangle" — Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where indigenous control programs and eradication efforts have not been effective.

- Highly-structured trafficking groups control heroin movement from the growing regions to staging areas for shipment to foreign markets including the United States. Heroin is then shipped to the United States by personnel aboard commercial transportation (aircraft or vessels), shipped by international mail, or secreted in cargo containers carrying a wide variety of products. A preference for heroin movement by commercial courier or cargo makes D&M difficult. Tremendous profits derived from heroin have enabled traffickers to influence and control governments, finance terrorist and insurgent activity, and force many legitimate governments into de facto accommodation with traffickers' interests.
- Due to its bulk, marijuana is usually transported via a "mothership" to within 200-1,500 miles of the North American coast and then transferred to smaller motor vessels, sailing vessels, or pleasure craft for transport to the mainland. Hashish originates in Southwest Asia in the vicinity of Pakistan and Afghanistan and is transported in the same manner as marijuana. Motherships bringing in marijuana and hashish utilize the short Northern Great Circle route in the summer and the Fair Weather Equatorial Route in the winter when the northern routes are rough.

US PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY




Figure VI-4. US Pacific Command Area of Responsibility

b. **Central and South America.** The primary threats from this area are cocaine, “black tar” heroin, and marijuana.

Cocaine base is largely produced in Peru and flown to refining sites in Colombia. After refining, the cocaine is primarily exported by maritime means through the ports or flown by non-commercial aircraft into Central American countries or Mexico. All Central American countries are known to be transshipment areas for cocaine moving to the United States. Although not a source country, Mexico is by far the largest single transshipment country for cocaine. The “black tar” heroin originates almost entirely in Mexico and is normally transported into the United States by private aircraft or individuals using private transportation directly across the US and Mexican border. Most of the heroin is destined for the western United States. Marijuana is transported to US ports by numerous types of maritime platforms. These vessels have included coastal freighters, motor vessels, fishing vessels, sailing vessels, pleasure yachts, and even small pleasure boats. Small vessels may hug the Central American coast as they transit north, while the large vessels venture farther out into the Pacific, at times as far as Hawaii, in order to avoid or deceive searchers.

17. USPACOM’s CD Strategy

Due to the geographic size and maritime characteristics of USPACOM’s AOR, **the majority of transit zone D&M operations for combatting drug traffickers are maritime in nature.** To detect and monitor drug traffickers in this vast AOR, an all-Service, all-sensor, and all-agency effort is required. To accomplish this, USPACOM’s JIATF-W intelligence structure is the key to refining areas of search for CD operations. This fusion of intelligence allows US LEA and HN CD forces to be employed more effectively to detect and monitor illegal drug activities.

18. Organization

a. **USCINCPAC** is responsible for the conduct of normal operations in the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees W, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees W and east of 100 degrees E, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees E (excluding the waters north of 5 degrees S and west of 68 degrees E), Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Mongolia, the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern Asian landmass to the western border of India, Madagascar, and the other islands in all assigned water areas. In addition, USCINCPAC’s general geographic AOR for the conduct of normal operations other than air defense will include Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

b. **US Army Forces, US Pacific Command (USARPAC).** USARPAC forces are controlled in the USPACOM AOR from headquarters located at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii.

c. **US Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT).** Providing maritime forces to CD operations, USPACFLT is located at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

d. **US Air Forces, US Pacific Command (USPACAF).** USPACAF forces are provided from assets controlled by headquarters located at Hickman AFB, Hawaii.

e. **US Marine Component, US Pacific Command (USMARFORPAC).** USMARFORPAC is located at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.

f. **Special Operations Component, US Pacific Command (SOCPAC).** SOCPAC is a subordinate unified command with air, land, and maritime special forces. These forces can be employed throughout the theater to provide training for HN forces and, when

authorized, can conduct operations to counter insurgency, terrorism, drug production, and trafficking.

g. **JIATF-W.** JIATF-W is the center for coordinating CDD&M operations within the USPACOM AOR. It is a USCINCPAC standing JTF for DOD CD support.

- Intelligence analysts perform detailed tactical analysis of all-source CD intelligence. The analyses generate intelligence which is the focus for cueing the D&M effort. The Command Center watch conducts 7 day-a-week, 24-hour intelligence fusion and/or operations and can access theater and national resources in support of drug interdiction operations.
- The J-3 reviews and validates requests received from LEAs for DOD surveillance or logistic support. Air and ground operations personnel broker DOD resources in order to facilitate support of US Country Team and HN validated requests.
- The J-4 is responsible for ensuring that the JIATF-W strategic plan accurately reflects the processes by which JIATF-W executes the national CD policy, particularly as defined by the Department of Defense. The J-4 is also responsible for developing and updating coordinated intelligence and operations plans which prescribe an integrated JIATF-W CD effort.

19. Concept of Operations

Since JIATF-W has no permanently assigned forces, assets are tasked as required to operate under JIATF-W TACON or in support of JIATF-W's CD mission.

a. **Detection and Monitoring.** JIATF-W's concept of operations involve **directing resources at detecting maritime drug**

trafficking activity as close to the source countries as possible. Traffickers are then continuously monitored as they transit through the JOA, allowing LEAs sufficient time to plan and execute interdiction and apprehension operations prior to delivery in the United States.

b. Counterdrug Operational Support

- **C4 Support.** JIATF-W has integrated the existing infrastructures and command element capabilities of in-place military C4 systems with the unique operational and intelligence architectures of civilian LEAs. Secure and reliable multimode communication resources provide real-time support for JIATF-W CD forces and facilitate conducting intelligence collection and enforcement operations.
- **Intelligence Support.** Collection, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration of drug-related tactical intelligence comprise some of the most complicated activities of CD operations. The timely flow of this tactical intelligence allows operational assets to be positioned most effectively for D&M of drug trafficking. **The intelligence fusion and/or operations efforts within the AOR and area of interest (AOI) complement the operational efforts of LEA, DOD, and HN assets contributing to D&M and ultimately to interdiction.** Surveillance efforts lead to timely detection of drug trafficking activities and ensure responsive monitoring of the movements of high interest targets. Intelligence analysis incorporates current analysis, trend analysis, and predictive modeling. Current analysis is the key to providing actionable information in support of ongoing law enforcement operations. Informational gaps are filled with trend analyses and predictive modeling explaining the observed events and

identifying key events which may signal future trends or events.

- **Planning Support.** USPACOM provides support to the various LEAs and HN forces for deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of CD operations.
- **Logistic Support.** USPACOM coordinates the logistic support to achieve

training opportunities. PA efforts have been incorporated into many of these exercises in an attempt to improve the HN's economic environments and increase the public acceptance of US and HN CD activities. In providing assistance during exercises, USPACOM and other commands insist that internationally accepted standards on human rights be respected.



The P-3 aircraft provides maritime surface radar search, electronic surveillance, HF, VHF, and UHF communications. Some have been configured especially for the CD mission.

operational CD objectives. This support includes deployment and sustainment of US forces in a supporting role, support to other US non-DOD agencies, scheduling the logistic support, and coordinating with the HNs.

- **Training Support. JCETs and joint and multinational exercises funded** under various non-SA programs offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering them limited

20. Relationships With Other CINCs

a. **USSOUTHCOM and USACOM.** JIATF-W exchanges intelligence with JIATF-S, JIATF-E, and JTF-6 on drug traffic approaching mutual AOR boundaries and coordinates operations for mutual support (See Sections A and B, this chapter).

b. **NORAD** conducts aerial D&M (10 USC 124) of drug trafficking aircraft into North America (including Mexico) and

supports USPACOM D&M efforts in the transit zone (See Section D, this chapter).

c. **USSOCOM** provides active and reserve forces to USPACOM as coordinated between the commands and approved by the Secretary of Defense (See Section E, this chapter).

d. **USTRANSCOM** coordinates and provides air refueling and intertheater lift in support of USPACOM's CD program (See Section E, this chapter).

21. Relationships With Other CD Agencies

JIATF-W's CD operations are conducted in support of LEAs.

a. **Drug Enforcement Administration.** The DEA maintains a liaison representative to the JIATF-W staff to facilitate and expedite JIATF-W and DEA coordination.

b. **US Customs Service.** The USCS maintains a liaison representative on JIATF-W's staff to facilitate and expedite coordination. Their focus is on maritime and air CD operations.

c. **US Coast Guard.** JIATF-W is located with USCG's Pacific Area Command, which oversees USCG districts in the USPACOM AOR.

d. **EPIC.** JIATF-W and EPIC exchange intelligence and data base information on drug production and transportation involving CD cases and operations.

e. **FBI.** The FBI maintains a liaison with the JIATF-W staff to expedite coordination. The FBI also receives support from JIATF-W on pertinent CD cases and provides information to JIATF-W involving specific operations. CD efforts are coordinated through the Joint Drug Intelligence Group.

f. **Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.** OCDETF is involved in resolution of CD cases and coordinates with JIATF-W to gain information pertaining to specific cases.

SECTION D. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

22. Missions

a. **Military Mission.** The NORAD Agreement defines NORAD's objectives as:

- to assist the United States and Canada to safeguard the sovereignty of their airspace;
- to contribute to the deterrence of attack on North America; and
- should deterrence fail, to ensure an appropriate response against attack.

b. **CD Mission.** The 1991 exchange of notes to the NORAD Agreement stated that the Agreement "includes the surveillance and monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs into North America." In this mission context, "surveillance" refers to actions taken to "detect, identify and monitor . . ." "Control" refers to actions taken to intercept or otherwise influence airborne objects.

23. Threat

a. **The air component of the illegal drug trade and its support structure are well-established, organized, equipped, and trained, and is therefore capable of frustrating interdiction efforts.** Airborne smugglers will circumvent and subvert surveillance and monitoring efforts whenever possible. Drug traffickers have demonstrated great adaptability in their mode of operation, and can be expected to increase the number of flights across the borders if sea and land routes can be denied.

b. **The greatest threat to US national borders from airborne drug traffickers is across the southern border.** The tremendous number of small landing strips and terrain suitable for landing small aircraft on both sides of the US and Mexican border makes D&M a difficult task. Flights of up to 12 hours one-way from South America for destinations into northern Mexico or across the Gulf of Mexico are common; off-loading, refueling, and takeoff can be accomplished in less than 15 minutes. The drugs are then transshipped on to the United States or stored for later transshipment.

c. Small single- and multi-engine aircraft are the primary conveyance, with Aero Commanders, Beechcraft, and Cessna aircraft the primary types used. However, general aviation aircraft of all makes and models can be, and have been, used for trafficking operations. DC-3 and DC-6 aircraft are sometimes used for long distance air trafficking. Some smugglers even use small jet aircraft capable of speeds in excess of 500 mph and ranges of 2,000 miles. Many of these aircraft have been modified with long range fuel tanks to increase their range and endurance.

d. Personnel involved in airborne smuggling have experience in penetrating US and Canadian airspace successfully and have demonstrated knowledge of surveillance methods, capabilities, and limitations. Motivated by the great profits that can be realized, pilots continue to be innovative and take risks to counter interdiction efforts.

e. Annual losses of trafficking aircraft through seizures, crashes, or age number in the hundreds. In general, loss of aircraft is simply considered by smugglers as the cost of doing business. Replacements are readily available through purchase, lease, or theft.

24. NORAD's CD Strategy

a. Because use of illegal drugs constitutes a long-term threat to North American society, the governments of Canada and the United States have directed military organizations to assist civilian agencies in reducing the international flow of illegal drugs into both countries. In this context **CINCNORAD's objective is to end undetected, unchallenged air trafficking of illegal drugs into North America through D&M operations.** These operations serve as a part of NORAD's overall air sovereignty mission and are consistent with the NDCS.

b. In light of policy guidance from both capitals, and against a backdrop of increasing drug trafficking, **NORAD strategy for contributing to the CD effort can be described as follows:**

- to maintain a balanced peacetime air sovereignty capability, but shift mission emphasis from the north to south;
- to improve communication with DLEAs and DOD CD organizations; and
- to correct shortfalls and deficiencies in equipment and assets as funding may permit.

25. Organization

NORAD (located at Peterson AFB, Colorado) is a bi-national, combined command which includes Canadian and US forces. CINCNORAD is responsible, through the Chief of the Defence Staff-Canada and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Canadian and US NCA for the use of forces supporting NORAD.

a. Defense of North America against air attack is carried out on a geographical basis, but is united into a single coordinated air defense entity by the NORAD structure. **NORAD has three regional air operations centers (RAOCs):** Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR), Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), and CONUS NORAD Region (CONR). The missions of the RAOCs are to provide capabilities for the surveillance, identification, and control of aircraft within or near their region, to support accomplishment of NORAD missions, to provide air defense warning, and to exercise force management.

- **Alaskan NORAD Region.** The ANR Headquarters, 11th Air Force Headquarters, and Alaskan RAOC are located at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The Commander, ANR, is also the Commander, 11th Air Force. ANR is responsible for the air defense of Alaska. The Alaskan RAOC is the only RAOC which also performs sector air operations center (SAOC) functions of receiving, processing, and displaying radar inputs. The 11th Air Force provides, trains, and equips tactical air forces to preserve the national sovereignty of US lands, waters, and airspace within Alaska.
- **Canadian NORAD Region.** The CANR Headquarters and the Canadian RAOC are located at Winnipeg, Manitoba. The Commander, CANR is the Commander of the 1st Canadian Air Division. The Canadian SAOC (NORAD) is located in North Bay, Ontario. CANR is responsible for the air defense of Canada. CANR is divided into East Sector and West Sector, each having a SAOC. Headquarters for both CANR SAOCs are collocated in North Bay.
- **CONUS NORAD Region.** Headquarters CONR RAOC is located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The Commander, CONR also

acts as the Commander, 1st Air Force. CONR is responsible for the air defense of CONUS. CONUS is divided into three air defense sectors: Northeast, located at Rome, New York; Western, located at McChord AFB, Washington; and Southeast, located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The SAOCs are responsible to the RAOCs and are the command, control, and communications facilities through which the sector commanders exercise TACON over assigned forces. Each SAOC has the capability to receive, process, and display radar inputs. The SAOCs provide a capability for the surveillance and identification of manned threats and control of aircraft.

b. **NORAD/US Space Command Center (N-Sp/CC) is the principal peacetime command center in the current NORAD C4 system.** It receives, processes, integrates, and displays a summary of all indicators and events that can be used by CINCNORAD and the NORAD battle staff (when activated) to determine if an enemy attack is impending or underway. The N-Sp/CC also oversees overall air defense operations and sensor management for North America.

c. **The NORAD Air Center (NAC) monitors and evaluates information received from the RAOCs and/or SAOCs and other operations centers and makes recommendations to the N-Sp/CC.** The NAC maintains force status, monitors deployment and employment of air defense forces, and updates information on deployment operations. NAC personnel also monitor other DOD and LEA assets conducting operations which may impact NORAD's CD mission on an "as required" basis.

26. Concept of Operations

a. NORAD uses a variety of radar sensors to accomplish its CD mission. Initial

detection can come from any of the assets shown in Figure VI-5.

b. Centralized CD control and planning occurs at Headquarters NORAD, and decentralized planning and mission execution occurs at the NORAD region and sector level. The focal points for North America are ANR, CANR, and CONR. They manage the CD operations of their respective SAOCs (Figure VI-6). Each SAOC's strategy is to accomplish the following:

- Establish direct liaison with the appropriate CD JIATF and/or JTF control centers or applicable DLEA organization, to provide information on possible drug traffic crossing between AORs.
- Conduct radar correlation and forward track data received from AWACS and other sensors to NORAD NAC, applicable NORAD RAOCs, and DAICC.
- Coordinate the handoff of fighter aircraft with the FAA when suspect tracks move inland.
- Deconflict with DAICC simultaneous intercept by USAF fighters and the USCS.
- Provide advisory target information to LEA interceptors when requested by DAICC.

c. NORAD maintains USAF, ANG, and Canadian fighter aircraft on alert status at numerous locations around the United States, Canada, and Alaska. NORAD fighters launch on suspected drug smuggling aircraft if USCS interceptors are not available or not in the best position for a timely intercept. NORAD fighters remain covert, following the suspect aircraft to its landing site (except in the event of an air drop, where




Figure VI-5. Radar Assets

NORAD aircraft will remain with the drugs) or until LEA aircraft take over the escort role for apprehension.

d. In addition to the fighter aircraft, under special circumstances NORAD coordinates with USACOM for E-3 AWACS aircraft to respond to intelligence or surveillance cueing, and can assist the USCS in detecting incoming drug smuggling aircraft flying from South or Central America or Mexico, into the United States and/or Canada.

27. Relationships With Other CINCs

a. USSOUTHCOM. JIATF-S, through cueing, coordinates tracks of interest (TOIs) with NORAD as they approach and/or cross CINC boundaries. USSOUTHCOM also provides intelligence cueing. JIATF-E coordinates with NORAD SAOCs on TOIs that approach or cross mutual boundaries and launch alert

NORAD'S COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS STRUCTURE




Figure VI-6. NORAD'S Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Structure

fighters and/or AWACs. NORAD and JIATF-E share intelligence and coordinate and/or deconflict operations.

b. **USACOM.** FORSCOM and/or JTF-6 and NORAD work together for the land defense of CONUS. Commander, Air Combat Command, provides dedicated CD E-3 AWACS missions and provides additional resources as coordinated (such as mobile theater air control systems, communications equipment, and personnel) to augment existing radar facilities.

c. **USPACOM.** Through its SAOCs, NORAD coordinates TOIs that approach or cross mutual boundaries with USPACOM and/or JIATF-W.

28. Relationships With Other CD Agencies

a. **NGB** provides fighter forces to support the alert mission along the coasts of the United States and also provides additional resources similar to the Commander, Air Combat Command.

b. **US Customs Service.** The USCS has responsibility for detecting, monitoring, and apprehending general aviation drug smugglers and seizing contraband that has crossed the international border.

- The DAICC detects, tracks, and sorts suspect radar targets. When required, the DAICC launches USCS or USCG aircraft and controls these aircraft from intercept through apprehension. Memorandums of understanding are in effect between USCS and NORAD that establish standards for coordination and cooperation.
- The Customs National Aviation Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, controls USCS air resources nationwide and prepares long-range estimates of airborne drug smuggling.

c. **Federal Aviation Administration.** The FAA controls the use of navigable airspace in the United States and develops and operates a common system of air traffic control and navigation for civil and military aircraft. **The FAA, through its Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), coordinates with SAOCs on unknown and/or suspect aircraft entering the Air Defense Identification Zone.** The ARTCCs also provide flight information and other appropriate air traffic control data to the SAOCs.

d. **Project North Star.** NORAD supports Project North Star by planning and coordinating CD air surveillance operations in response to North Star requirements along the Canadian and US border.

e. **Operation Alliance.** NORAD supports Operation Alliance air surveillance requirements by planning and coordinating CD operations for and/or with Operation Alliance.

SECTION E. OTHER CINCs CD OPERATIONS

29. US Special Operations Command

a. **General.** USSOCOM provides active and reserve force SOF to other CINCs as coordinated between the commands and approved by the Secretary of Defense. SOF includes Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF units as well as CA and PSYOP units. These forces provide HNS as well as operational and nonoperational support to HNs and US LEAs to combat drug production and trafficking and eliminate the flow of drugs to the United States.

b. **Special Operations Forces.** SOF operations involve Army Special Forces Operational Detachment “A” Teams, Navy SEAL and/or special boat unit detachments

and coastal patrol craft (PC), and Air Force special operations personnel. Use of SOF can provide low cost and/or visibility combined training in areas shown in Figure VI-7.

c. **Psychological Operations Forces.** USSOCOM can provide PSYOP forces as requested and approved for information support and training in CD operations (See Chapter IV, “DOD Counterdrug Organizations,” Section B).

d. **Civil Affairs Forces.** USSOCOM can also provide active and reserve CA forces to provide assistance, advice, coordination, and analysis to CD operations (See Chapter IV, “DOD Counterdrug Organizations,” Section B).

e. **SOF CD Operations.** SOF are capable of operating in a joint, multinational, or multi-agency environment. The major types of SOF CD operations are listed below:

- **Joint Combined Exercise for Training.** These are low-cost, small unit operations that provide training to US military forces, but at the same time provide benefit to the LEA or HN where the JCET is operating.
- **Mobile Training Teams.** MTTs can be either SA-supported (for HNs) or funded through other means (for LEAs). MTTs provide dedicated training in such areas as those shown in Figure VI-8.

30. US Central Command

US Central Command coordinates CD activities to combat illicit drugs flowing from its AOR. Intelligence developed is shared with various agencies, cooperating friendly nations, and the other CINCs.

AREAS OF COMBINED TRAINING

- Individual and Small Unit Skills
- Leadership Development
- Airmobile Operations
- Riverine Operations and Coastal Patrol and Interdiction
- Advice on C4I

Figure VI-7. Areas of Combined Training

31. US European Command

US European Command conducts D&M operations, with the primary focus on transshipment routes across the Mediterranean. It coordinates D&M activities with adjacent CINCs, components, and cooperating foreign nations. D&M operations usually result in handoff to European maritime forces and LEAs for interdiction and apprehension operations.

32. US Transportation Command

USTRANSCOM coordinates transportation requests from the Department of Defense, non-DOD Federal agencies, and various other LEAs. Requests are reviewed to determine which USTRANSCOM component is best suited to fulfill the




Figure VI-8. Training Provided by Mobile Training Teams

requirement (sea, air, or land); then the transportation support requirements are passed to the appropriate component command for execution.

SECTION F. MILITARY SERVICES

33. General

The Services provide forces to the CINCs and assist them in developing and executing plans to support LEAs. The following paragraphs provide a brief discussion of each Services’ roles in CD operations.

34. US Army

a. Under the CINCs, **USA forces participate in ground operations and provide training across a wide operational spectrum** — from listening and observation posts on the Southwest border to air defense radars. The Army also provides assets such

as ground surveillance radars, vehicles, and communications equipment. Army personnel provide direct operational staff and intelligence support through embassy Country Teams to foreign nations conducting CD operations.

b. **USA aircraft participating in CD operations are primarily patrol, transport, and intelligence collectors.** The bulk of Army flight efforts take place for USSOUTHCOM in Central and South America, and USACOM in CONUS. One operation which has been in existence for an extended period and is supported by USA aircraft is OPBAT.

35. US Air Force

a. **Aircraft. A primary USAF contribution to D&M operations is through the use of E-3 AWACS aircraft.** Intelligence-collecting aircraft are also used on a regular basis. ANG interceptors are on alert for CD taskings both in and out of CONUS. Transport aircraft, both active and reserve forces, provide the ability to move assets for DOD and LEA CD efforts in all CINC’s AORs. (Requests for intertheater airlift support should be coordinated with USTRANSCOM. Requests for intratheater support should be coordinated with the appropriate CINC.) USAF helicopters (Active and Reserve Components) support LEA land operations through search and rescue and insertion and/or extraction of LEA teams.

b. **Radar. The USAF provides fixed and mobile GBR systems to support CD operations.** Capabilities are listed in Appendix F, “Major Equipment Descriptions.” The USAF manages the contractor-staffed and -operated tethered aerostat radar system (TARS) and the CBRN.

c. **Security. USAF security elements are employed for airfield security OCONUS.**

USAF dog teams are used in support of LEA operations at land, sea, and air POEs.

d. The **Air Force Office of Special Investigations** conducts CD operations to detect, interdict, suppress, and monitor drug trafficking and user demand which directly or indirectly affects the Department of the Air Force and its resources.

36. US Navy

The USN ROTHRS are used to provide round-the-clock, real-time detection and tracking of targets of interest over the entire Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, and the Eastern Pacific. A third ROTHR site will provide coverage of South American source countries.

a. USN support of land operations is narrow due to the inherent nature of naval assets. Navy active duty and reserve units have deployed for MTTs and JCETs, and USN intelligence personnel have provided support to the Department of Defense and LEAs. Navy corpsmen accompany Marine Corps units during MTTs and JCETs. Navy divers also support a variety of CD operations.

b. **Navy aircraft employed in CD operations are primarily patrol aircraft such as P-3s, S-3s, and E-2s.** Some P-3 aircraft (the counterdrug update [CDU]) have been specially modified to support the CD mission. Both the S-3 and E-2 are normally carrier-based aircraft which, for CD missions, are flown from land bases. In this maritime patrol capacity they are used to search for and track suspect drug trafficking vessels and aircraft on and over the high seas. There is also a small number of Navy maritime intelligence collection aircraft which are regularly called on to support DOD and LEA operations.

c. **The primary classes of naval vessels conducting D&M operations are**

combatants such as destroyers, frigates, and cruisers. Modified tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance (MOD T-AGOS), contract-operated, are also integral to Caribbean CD operations. Naval support ships are dedicated to the joint task group operating in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific for refueling and resupply. Patrol coastal ships are capable of conducting CD operations in the source and transit zones.

d. The Fleet Tactical Readiness Group can provide advice and assistance in planning and executing OPSEC measures and in developing and using deception means in support of CD operations.

e. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducts CD operations to detect, interdict, suppress, and monitor drug trafficking and user demand which directly or indirectly affects the Department of the Navy and its resources.

37. US Marine Corps

a. **The US Marine Corps (USMC) provides personnel and materials to support surveillance and/or reconnaissance and riverine operations by conducting MTTs and JCETs.**

b. The USMC has also provided GBRs for operations within the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

c. Active duty and reserve USMC forces, (to include helicopters) are used in CONUS to support LEA operations.

d. USMC aircraft which operate in support of CD operations have been used for maritime patrol.

38. US Coast Guard

See detailed discussion in Chapter III, "Counterdrug Organizations," paragraph 26.

APPENDIX A

PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING DOD SUPPORT

1. General

a. The purpose of this appendix is to explain how LEAs, other agencies, or HNs can request CD support from the Department of Defense. Reference can also be made to CJCSI 3710.01, "Delegation of Authority for Approving Operational Support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterdrug-Related Deployment of DOD Personnel."

b. Requests have been categorized into two major areas:

- OCONUS area support for the source and transit zones; and

- CONUS area support for the arrival zone.

2. OCONUS Support

(See Figure A-1)

Requests for CD support by HNs or USLEAs in foreign countries must be forwarded through the Country Team Security Assistance Organization to the CINC in whose AOR the support is needed. Upon the CINC's receipt and concurrence, a request for deployment order (RDO) is forwarded to the appropriate Division of Joint Staff J-3. Figure A-2 shows the specific actions and suspenses required by




Figure A-1. OCONUS Support Request Process

the OCONUS support request process. The CINC's RDO must include the following information:

- **Situation.** Brief description of the events or circumstances that precipitated the request.
- **Mission.** The who, what, when, where and why of the US military element's involvement and the source of the support.
- **Execution.** How the deployment will be conducted (i.e., phases).
- **Location**
- **Deployment Dates**
- **Unit Composition**
- **Sourcing.** What type unit and the recommended organization to conduct the mission (if known).
- **OPCON.** Who has OPCON.
- **Funding**
- **Concurrence.** Who has agreed that the mission is acceptable (i.e., CINC, US ambassador, SAO, HN officials).

- **Threat and/or ROE**

- **Administrative Requirements.** Specific requirements for deployment (i.e., passports and/or visa, country and theater clearances, uniform requirements, required training, medical requirements, statements of preparedness).

- **After Action Report Requirements**

- **PA Guidance**

- **Points of Contact**

3. CONUS Operational Support

LEAs have many ways to request support for a CONUS CD operation that they plan to conduct. They are depicted in Figures A-3 and A-4.

4. CONUS Nonoperational Support

Request procedures for support provided to LEAs for such missions as planning, training, administration, logistics, and certain types of intelligence support are depicted in Figure A-5.

OCONUS SUPPORT REQUEST PROCESS MATRIX			
UNIT	ACTION	DOCUMENT/CONTENT	SUSPENSE
AMEMBASSY (COUNTRY TEAM)	REQUEST FOR DOD SUPPORT. TO: GEOGRAPHIC CINC INFO: JIATF	VIA MESSAGE/LETTER/FAX, SPECIFIC SUPPORT RQMTS BY DATE/QTR/FY. HN, AMBASSADOR, SAO APPROVAL, POC.	AS REQUIRED. 1 YEAR FOR RECURRING OPS.
CINC	a) <u>ROUTINE OPS.</u> FORWARD REQUEST TO COMPONENTS (SERVICE/SOC) FOR FEASIBILITY/SUPPORTABILITY. INFO JIATF. b) <u>PREAPPROVED/ANNUAL PLANS.</u>	a) VIA MESSAGE. SPECIFY CINC APPROVAL. b) VIA MESSAGE.	a) AS REQUIRED. ANNUALLY DURING JANUARY FOR RECURRING OPERATIONS. b) 30 DAYS PRIOR TO CINC BRIEF TO SECDEF.
COMPONENTS	ESTIMATE OF SUPPORT TO CINC. INFO JIATF.	VIA MESSAGE.	AS REQUIRED. ANNUALLY NLT FEB (BUDGET PREP).
CINC	a) <u>NON-THEATER FORCES.</u> REQUEST FOR DEPLOYMENT ORDER (RDO) TO CJCS. INFO JIATF. b) <u>THEATER FORCES.</u> CINC EXORD. INTO TO OSD, CJCS.	a) VIA MESSAGE. RDO CONTENT PER CJCSI 3710.01. b) VIA MESSAGE. EXORD CONTENT PER CJCSI 3710.01.	a) 21 DAYS PRIOR OR AS DESCRIBED IN CJCSI 3710.01. b) 14 DAYS PRIOR OR AS DESCRIBED IN CJCSI 3710.01.
*NON CD CINC	REQUEST SECDEF APPROVAL OF SUPPORT VIA CJCS.	OPORD VIA MESSAGE IAW DOD CD EXORD.	AS REQUIRED. 30 DAYS PRIOR IF FEASIBLE. MINIMIM DESCRIBED IN CJCSI 3710.01.
CJCS *CD CINC	DEPLOYMENT ORDER TO CINC.	VIA MESSAGE. CONTAINS AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY NON-THEATER FORCES.	14 DAYS PRIOR IF POSSIBLE.
CJCS *NON-CD CINC	EXECUTE ORDER TO CINC.	EXORD CONTAINS SECDEF APPROVAL FOR SUPPORT.	AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
*AS DEFINED BY DOD CD EXORD DTG 302146Z MAY 97			

Figure A-2. OCONUS Support Request Process Matrix

DLEA DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT REQUEST PROCESS




Figure A-3. DLEA Domestic Operational Support Request Process




Figure A-4. CONUS Air Operational Support Request Process




Figure A-5. CONUS Nonoperational Support Request Process

APPENDIX B

US CODE PROVISIONS

1. Statutory Authority

a. 10 USC 124 creates the primary DOD CD mission of D&M of air and sea traffic into the United States.

b. 10 USC 371-380 contains the statutory authority to provide military support to domestic LEAs.

- 10 USC 371 allows the Department of Defense to provide information acquired during military training.
- 10 USC 372 authorizes the Department of Defense to make available equipment and facilities to LEAs.
- 10 USC 373 authorizes the use of DOD personnel to provide training and expert advice.
- 10 USC 374 and applicable National Defense Authorization Acts (see 1004, FY 91 Authorization Act, as amended) provides the statutory basis for many of the services the military provides LEAs.

c. 10 USC 375 and 18 USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act) limit military support to preclude direct participation in law enforcement activities.

d. Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended. Section 1004 authorizes the Department of Defense to provide support for the CD activities of any other department or agency of the Federal Government or of any state, local, or foreign LEA.

2. Detailed Statutory Provisions

a. **10 USC 124.** Detection and Monitoring of Aerial and Maritime Transit of Illegal Drugs: Department of Defense to be Lead Agency.

- **Lead Agency.** The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the D&M of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
- **Performance of Detection and Monitoring Function.** To perform these provisions, DOD personnel may operate equipment of the Department to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of:
 - Identifying and communicating with that vessel or aircraft; and
 - Directing that vessel or aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials.
- In cases in which a vessel or an aircraft is detected outside the land area of the United States, DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of that vessel or aircraft over the land area of the United States.
- **United States Defined.** In this section, the term “United States” means the land area of the several states and any territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States.

b. **10 USC 371.** Use of Information Collected During Military Operations.

- The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, provide to Federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military training or operations that may be relevant to a violation of any Federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials.
- The needs of civilian law enforcement officials for information shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be taken into account in the planning and execution of military training or operations.
- The Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the extent consistent with national security, that intelligence information held by the Department of Defense and relevant to drug interdiction or other civilian law enforcement matters is provided promptly to appropriate CLEA officials.

c. **Public Law 101-189, Section 1206.** Training Exercise in Drug-Interdiction Areas.

- **Exercises Required.** The Secretary of Defense shall direct that the armed forces, to the maximum extent practicable, shall conduct military training exercises, including training exercises conducted by the Reserve Components, in drug-interdiction areas.
- **Drug-Interdiction Areas Defined.** For purposes of this section, the term “drug-interdiction areas” includes land and sea areas in which, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, the smuggling of drugs into the United States occurs or is believed to have occurred.

d. **10 USC 372.** Use of Military Equipment and Facilities. The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), base facility, or research facility of the Department of Defense to any Federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.

e. **10 USC 373.** Training and Advising Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make DOD personnel available:

- To train Federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equipment, including equipment made available under Section 372 of this title; and
- To provide such law enforcement officials with expert advice relevant to the purposes of this chapter.

f. **10 USC 374.** Maintenance and Operation of Equipment.

- The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make DOD personnel available for the maintenance of equipment for Federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials, including equipment made available under Section 372 of this title.
 - Subject to subparagraph (b) and in accordance with other applicable law, the Secretary of Defense may, upon request from the head of the Federal LEA, make DOD personnel available to operate equipment (including equipment made available under Section 372 of this title) with respect to: (1) A criminal violation of a provision of law specified in paragraph 2.f.(2)(d)1; or (2) Assistance

that such agency is authorized to furnish to a state, local, or foreign government which is involved in the enforcement of similar laws.

- DOD personnel made available to a CLEA under this subsection may operate equipment for the following purposes: (1) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic; (2) Detection, monitoring, and communicating the movement of surface traffic outside the geographic boundary of the United States and within the United States, not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside the boundary; (3) Aerial reconnaissance; (4) Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of communicating with such vessels and aircraft in order to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials; (5) Operation of equipment to facilitate communications in connection with law enforcement programs specified in paragraph 2.f.(2)(d)1; and (6) (a) The transportation of civilian law enforcement personnel, and (b) The operation of a base of operations for civilian law enforcement personnel. (6a and 6b are subject to joint approval by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General [and the SECSTATE in the case of a law enforcement operation outside of the land area of the United States.]

- DOD personnel made available to operate equipment for the purpose stated in paragraph 2.f.(2)(b)3 may continue to operate such equipment into the land area of the United States in cases involving the pursuit of vessels or aircraft where the detection began outside such land area.

- In this subsection: (1) The term “Federal law enforcement agency” means an agency with jurisdiction to enforce any of the following: (a) The Controlled Substances Act, (21 USC 801 et. seq.) or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 USC 951 et. seq.); (b) Any of sections 274 through 278 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1324-1328); (c) A law relating to the arrival or departure of merchandise as defined in section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC 1401) into or out of the customs territory of the United States or any other territory or possession of the United States; and (d) The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 USC App. 901 et. seq.). (2) The term “land area of the United States” includes the land area of any territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States.

- The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make DOD personnel available to any Federal, state, or local CLEA to operate equipment for purposes other than described in subsection 2.f.(2)(b) only to the extent that such support does not involve direct participation by such personnel in a civilian law enforcement operation unless such direct participation is otherwise authorized by law.

g. **10 USC 375.** Restriction on Direct Participation by Military Personnel. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under 10 USC 371 et. seq. does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless

participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

h. **10 USC 376.** Support not to Affect Adversely Military Preparedness. Support (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter if the provision of such support will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that the provision of any such support does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.

i. **10 USC 377.** Reimbursement

- To the extent otherwise required by Section 1535 of title 31 (popularly known as the “Economy Act”) or other applicable law, the Secretary of Defense shall require a CLEA to which support is provided under this chapter to reimburse the Department of Defense for that support.
- An agency to which support is provided under this chapter is not required to reimburse the Department of Defense for such support if such support:
 - Is provided in the normal course of military training or operations; or
 - Results in benefit to the element of the Department of Defense, providing that the support is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training.
- 10 USC 377 requires reimbursement for support provided under the provisions of 371-374, unless the support satisfies one of the exceptions above. Support provided under 10 USC 124 note,

“Training in Drug Interdiction Areas,” is funded by military training funds.

j. **10 USC 378.** Nonpreemption of Other Law. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided by law before December 1, 1981.

k. **10 USC 379.** Assignment of USCG Personnel to Naval Vessels for Law Enforcement Purposes.

- The Secretary of Defense and the SECTRANS shall provide that there be assigned on board every appropriate surface naval vessel at sea in a drug-interdiction area members of the USCG who are trained in law enforcement and have powers of the USCG under title 14, including the power to make arrests and to carry out searches and seizures.
- Members of the USCG assigned to duty on board naval vessels under this section shall perform such law enforcement functions (including drug-interdiction functions):
 - As may be agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the SECTRANS; and
 - As are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the USCG.
- No fewer than 500 active duty personnel of the USCG shall be assigned each fiscal year to duty under this section. However, if at any time the SECTRANS, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that there are insufficient naval vessels available for purposes of this section, such personnel may be assigned other duty involving

enforcement of laws listed in section 374(b)(4)(a) of this title.

- In this section the term “drug-interdiction area” means an area outside the land area of the United States (as defined

in section 374[b][4][b] of this title) in which the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Attorney General) determines that activities involving smuggling of drugs into the United States are ongoing.

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APPENDIX C

COUNTERDRUG PLAN FORMAT

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No.

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of
Signature

COUNTERDRUG PLAN: (NUMBER or CODE NAME)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

1. Situation

Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.

a. **Strategic Guidance.** Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the plan.

- Relate the strategic direction to the local situation.
- List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.
- Constraints: List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (ROE, legal, jurisdictional).

b. **Criminal Forces (Threat).** Provide a summary of intelligence data.

- Composition, location, disposition, weapons and/or armament, equipment movements, and strengths of drug traffickers that can influence your domain.
- Strategic concept. Describe threat intentions.
- Major threat objectives.
- Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.
- Operational and sustainment capabilities.
- Centers of gravity. Describe the main source of that power.

- Critical vulnerabilities.
- c. **Friendly Forces.** State the information on friendly LEAs or supporting military forces not assigned or attached that may directly affect the organization.
 - Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting LEAs and military forces.
 - Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting foreign forces.
- d. **Assumptions.** State assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole.
- e. **Legal Considerations**

2. Mission

State the task(s) of the organization (lead agency) and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieve the strategic objective(s). State in terms of who, what, where, when, and why.

3. Execution

- a. **Overall Concept.** State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of participating elements during the operation as a whole.
 - Area organization (where will each organization operate).
 - Objectives of the overall plan.
 - Phases of major events or operation of the plan.
 - Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. EXAMPLES: Phase I, D-Day — D+45, or Phase I, March 29-May 15.
- b. **Phase I (Timing for Phase)**
 - Operational Concept. How participating organizations and supporting activities accomplish the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives and detailed scheme of operations (actions) for the phase. Indicate lead and supporting LEAs required to do the job. Consider the role of supporting DOD forces.
 - Tasks of LEAs and other units participating in this phase (List each organization separately and list its tasks for this phase).
 - Forces Held in Reserve. Location and composition. Explain any “be prepared” missions.
 - OPSEC. State critical information to be kept secret; outline a concept of OPSEC measures; list intelligence, CI, operational reports, and security monitoring feedback requirements; and indicate tasks to execute the concept.

- Deception. When appropriate, state the adversary action to be induced and a desired appreciation that would evoke the action; outline a concept of deception actions to induce adversaries to derive the desired appreciation and a supporting OPSEC concept; list intelligence, CI, operational reports, and security monitoring feedback requirements; and indicate tasks to execute the concept.
- Psychological Operations. Describe any PSYOP that might support the strategic objectives.

c. **Phases II through Subsequent Phases.** Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each of the subsequent phases. Provide a separate phase for each step which may require a major reorganization of forces and/or another significant action.

d. **Coordinating Instructions.** General instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the organization should be stated here.

4. Administration and Logistics

Brief, broad paragraph describing how supplies, services, and other support will be provided. State the overall logistic goals and priorities.

- a. **Phase I** (Timing-same as Paragraph 3). Consider providing the following information.
- Logistic goals and priorities for this phase of the plan.
 - Supply aspects (include role of each LEA in providing supplies; consider any foreign participating LEAs).
 - Base development (develop a base from which to provide supplies and services if required).
 - Transportation.
 - Maintenance of equipment.
 - Medical services.
 - Personnel (common procedure for replacements, manning, and other relevant issues).
 - Administration (describe any administrative management procedures which impact on the plan).

b. **Phases II through Subsequent Phases.** Cite information stated in subparagraph 4a above for each subsequent phase.

5. Command and Communications

a. **Command Relationships.** If using a lead agency concept, state lead agency by phase. Generally, give the command and/or coordination relationships for the entire plan or phases thereof. Indicate any shifts of command or lead agency contemplated during the plan, indicating time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of commander and command posts. If commander or lead agency is out of action, who is next in charge?

b. **Communications.** Plans for communications (may be contained in an annex). Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; and plans for using radio, telephone, and computer networks.

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

APPENDIX D

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. General

a. This appendix provides guidance for DOD PA support for CD operations.

b. As a matter of policy, and consistent with the security requirements necessary to minimize operational risks, DOD PA efforts should keep DOD personnel and the public informed about its CD mission.

c. Many aspects of CD operations are inherently sensitive and involve various risks which may be increased by any release of information to the public. These risks can be minimized through a comprehensive coordination process before any information is released concerning the operation.

2. Organization

a. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]) provides overall PA guidance for CD operations and coordinates DOD PA actions affecting other countries and international organizations.

b. Close coordination must be maintained at all levels with the US Embassy concerned if operating in HNs.

c. At the local and regional level, CD JIATF and/or JTF PA offices (or their equivalents) will coordinate PA actions with appropriate CINC PA offices, which will in turn maintain contact with their OASD(PA) counterparts.

3. Guidance

The following guidance is provided for CD operations:

a. OASD(PA) must approve all invitations for news media to participate with operational CD missions.

b. Requests received by Service component PA organizations should be referred to the appropriate combatant command PA office to develop the request for approval consideration by OASD(PA).

c. For specific CD deployments requiring CJCS deployment orders, the supported CINC proposes specific PA guidance as part of the request for deployment order. Topics to be covered include:

- Proposed public announcement of deployment;
- Proposed questions and answers; and
- PA point of contact and phone number at all levels in the chain of command.

d. All PA actions will be in accordance with applicable DOD and CINC directives, unless specifically stated otherwise.

e. Specific units participating in CD operations should not be identified.

f. The agency and/or organization that actually makes the seizure or arrest will normally make the announcement of the investigation, seizure, or arrest. Such announcements will indicate that the operation was a “coordinated Federal effort” and will list participation of the agencies, units, and organizations following coordination with each. DOD components should not unilaterally make announcements of investigations, seizures, or arrests.

g. Certain training mission activities may be covered by the media. Media requests to cover training activities should be referred to the appropriate commander's Public Affairs Office (PAO). Prior to coverage, the PAO should coordinate with other agencies involved and address any existing security considerations.

h. Interviews with the media may be granted by the supported CINC or a subordinate JFC when the following criteria are met:

- All interviews should be with the commander or his designated representative.
- All interviews should be on the record.
- Interviewees should discuss information within their personal purviews and experience. The discussion of additional subjects should be in accordance with published guidance.
- OPSEC requirements should be met.
- The commander's PAO should be included in the planning and conduct of all interviews.
- Interviewees should not answer hypothetical questions and should not comment on matters pertaining to other US Federal, state, and local organizations and agencies and/or the military, police, or security forces of other nations.
- A summary of controversial interview discussions and/or notification of interview results that might require

OASD(PA) response should be provided through appropriate command channels to OASD(PA).

i. PA command relationships will be in accordance with normal command relationships.

j. DOD components should not release information about investigations, seizures, or arrests prior to the announcement by the agency and/or organization that actually made the seizure or arrest. After the initial announcement, release of information will be coordinated with OASD(PA) through the chain of command.

k. Release of information concerning accidents and/or incidents involving DOD units participating in CD operations should be coordinated through the supported CINC and OASD(PA).

l. Joint press conferences may be organized by Federal, state, and/or local LEAs following a drug seizure and/or arrest where the Department of Defense was involved. Criteria for participation in such a press conference is the same as that for interviews listed in para 3i, above.

m. Internal release of information must be subject to the same strict guidelines as material being considered for use in the public domain. Additionally, videotape that is initially shot for internal use must be cleared by the US Attorney handling the case if it is later decided to publicly release the tape. Videotapes are considered evidence by the US Attorney.

APPENDIX E

LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS

1. General

USN ships contribute significantly to the D&M phase of CD operations, as they are frequently in a position to intercept and apprehend maritime drug smugglers. However, since the Department of Defense does not participate in drug apprehensions, USCG personnel (who are authorized to perform law enforcement activities) are frequently embarked in USN ships to act in this capacity (as prescribed in 10 USC section 379).

2. Command Relationships

The USN Fleet Commanders and the USCG area commanders for the Atlantic and Pacific areas have drafted memorandums of agreement (MOAs) to govern LEDET procedures. Under these MOAs the Navy fleet commanders, and occasionally the USCG commanders, provide ships and cutters to operate under JIATF TACON when engaged in the D&M mission. The USCG deploys LEDETs aboard USN combatants to perform law enforcement activities. The JIATFs hold periodic scheduling conferences to match JIATF D&M requirements, Navy ships, and USCG LEDETs. While under JIATF TACON, any surface vessel with a LEDET aboard will coordinate to shift TACON to either USCG area or district TACON when it detects a target deemed suitable for interception and boarding. Boardings are conducted in accordance with USCG law enforcement procedures and policy, including Use of Force Policy. USN ships carrying LEDETs must display the USCG ensign. The ensign also must be illuminated at night when engaged in law enforcement operations.

3. Availability of Ships

Geographic combatant commanders make USN ships available in support of USCG law enforcement operations. These ships are categorized as either “specially designated,” or “ships of opportunity.”

a. **Specially Designated.** Specially designated (or dedicated) ships are ones under JIATF TACON being used in direct support of CD operations, and which conduct the interception and/or apprehension phase of law enforcement operations under USCG TACON.

b. **Ships of Opportunity.** USN ships of opportunity are ones that are operating in or transiting through possible drug trafficking areas and are not under the control of a CD JIATF and/or USCG command. These ships may be diverted for a law enforcement role after TACON has been shifted to the USCG.

4. Assignments

A LEDET is normally a seven-person team assigned on a temporary basis to US or foreign military vessels. The LEDET consists of an officer in charge (E-7 through O-3) assigned to serve as the command maritime law enforcement advisor for the host commanding officer; a boarding officer (E-5 or above); and boarding team members. While assigned to a USN ship, LEDET activities are governed by the MOAs signed between the USCG area commanders and the respective Navy fleet CINC.

a. **Officer in Charge (OIC).** The team leader advises the Navy Commanding Officer on USCG policies and maritime law enforcement procedures. His duties are similar to those of an operations officer aboard a medium or high endurance cutter in regards to law enforcement. During boardings, the OIC directs all searches and makes all law enforcement decisions. The OIC coordinates USN vessel support for the boarding party during boarding operations, provides guidance for the boarding officer, and is responsible for all law enforcement message traffic. The team leader will be a graduate of maritime law enforcement (MLE) school at Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia, be a qualified boarding officer, and possess at least a SECRET clearance.

b. **Boarding Officer.** The duties of a LEDET boarding officer are the same as any other USCG boarding officer. The boarding officer is responsible to the OIC for the safety and conduct of the boarding party, and will be guided by current USCG policies in executing these responsibilities. The boarding officer will be a graduate of MLE school, be qualified by the group or district commander, and have at least a CONFIDENTIAL clearance.

c. **Boarding Team Members.** The remainder of the LEDET will be comprised of five qualified boarding team members. Ideally, all boarding team members should be graduates of either the boarding officer course at the MLE school or the boarding team member course at Training Center, Petaluma, California.

d. **Specialty Billets.** Each LEDET will have at least one person designated as a Spanish linguist and at least two personnel qualified in accordance with current Naval Air Training Operating Procedures Standards requirements as helicopter special mission

passengers (including 9D5 multiple egress Navy “Dunker” training).

5. Boarding Procedures

The following paragraphs provide an overview of LEDET boarding procedures. More detailed guidance for the LEDETs themselves are found in COMDTINST M16240.1, “Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) Administrative and Operating Guidelines.”

a. Boarding parties consist of at least two members and are armed and equipped as required. Utilizing the appropriate boarding kit and the USCG boarding checklist, the boarding party will expeditiously carry out their assigned duties.

b. The boarding party will approach a vessel of interest and note its location, activities, and identifying characteristics. While maintaining continuous surveillance of the vessel and in an enhanced state of readiness, the boarding party will hail the vessel.

c. If the determination is made to board the vessel, the master will be instructed to heave to and prepare for boarding. The vessel is boarded and, in cases where a felony violation is suspected or when it is believed that there is a potential threat to the boarding party’s safety, the vessel’s crew will be instructed to move to a single open location such as the vessel’s fantail. The boarding party will secure any weapons found on board and conduct a personnel security sweep for hidden or missing crewmembers.

d. Once the boarding party’s safety is deemed secure, the accuracy of any information provided by the vessel’s crew is verified. The vessel is inspected and any arrests or seizures are made. Debriefings and documentation of the boarding are completed after debarking the suspect vessel.

APPENDIX F

MAJOR EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS

1. General

This appendix describes the major military and civilian assets that are available for CD missions.

2. Airborne Platforms

Airborne platforms provide CD forces several capabilities. They can provide much greater height and range for electronic and visual search, reconnaissance, or surveillance missions. They provide a platform with equal or better performance than the drug smuggling aircraft to allow for interception and tracking, and they provide the means for LEA officers to be rapidly, administratively transported. Advantages of airborne platforms include speed, flexibility, and rapid reaction times. Disadvantages include relatively short endurance and, unlike smugglers, they are generally limited to established support facilities. They also must frequently rely on other platforms (e.g., land or sea) to perform the intercepts and apprehensions. The following are airborne platforms employed by various agencies in CD roles.

a. **E-3 Sentry (AWACS) - (USAF).** This is an AEW, C2 aircraft based on the Boeing 707 airframe. It is used for air and maritime radar surveillance, detection, and tracking of suspected smuggler aircraft and vessels. The E-3 can datalink radar to ground sites, USN vessels, and E-2 aircraft, and can also provide close control to US and Canadian military interceptor aircraft. It is equipped with a surveillance radar with detection ranges of over 200 NMs and has identification, friend or foe (IFF) and/or selective identification feature (SIF) interrogation capability. Communications include HF, VHF, VHF-frequency modulation (FM), UHF, and SATCOM. It has a maximum speed of 460

NMs per hour (or knots [kts]) and an endurance of over 9 hours, which can be extended through aerial refueling.

b. **P-3 Orion - (USN, USCS).** The Orion is a fixed-wing, multi-engine turboprop surveillance aircraft. It is used as a surveillance platform in the CD role. Capabilities include maritime surface radar search, electronic surveillance, and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. A Navy variant of the P-3 (the CDU), which includes several roll-on/roll-off systems, has been configured especially for the CD mission. The USCS version includes a FLIR sensor and air-to-air radar. It has a maximum speed of 411 kts, a maximum range of over 4,000 NMs, and a maximum endurance of over 11 hours.

c. **P-3 Orion (AEW&C) - (USCS).** This P-3 aircraft is specially modified for the USCS with the same radar system as the E-2 Hawkeye (see below). It is capable of detecting large targets up to 260 NMs and smaller targets up to 145 NMs. CD mission capabilities include air and maritime radar search and surveillance, with IFF and/or SIF interrogation and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. Performance is similar to the Navy P-3 (above).

d. **E-2 Hawkeye - (USN).** This is a carrier-capable, fixed-wing, twin-turboprop AEW aircraft capable of detecting air and maritime targets out to 260 NMs. Other capabilities include air and maritime radar search and surveillance, with IFF interrogation, data link, and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. Maximum speed is 323 kts, maximum range is 1,394 NMs, and maximum endurance is 6 hours.

e. **S-3 Viking - (USN).** The S-3 is a carrier-capable, fixed-wing, twin-turboprop

anti-submarine warfare aircraft used in a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) role for CD missions. It has a maximum speed of 450 kts and a maximum range of over 2,000 NMs, which can be extended through aerial refueling. Capabilities include surface radar search, electronic surveillance, FLIR, and HF and UHF communications. The ES-3 variant of the S-3 will also become involved in CD operations.

f. **F-14 Tomcat - (USN).** This is a two-seat, twin-turbofan, carrier-based fighter, with a maximum speed of over Mach 2 and a combat radius of 425 NMs (interceptor role), which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with an air-to-air search and tracking radar with IFF capability, infrared seeker (F-14D only), TV tracker, and UHF communications. Operated by the USN in the CD role as an interceptor.

g. **F-15 Eagle - (USAF/ANG).** The F-15C is a single-seat, twin-turbofan air superiority fighter, with a maximum speed of over Mach 2 and a combat radius of 425 NMs, which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with an air-to-air search and tracking radar with IFF capability as well as UHF communications. Operated by the USAF and the ANG in the CD role as an interceptor.

h. **F-16 Fighting Falcon - (USAF/ANG).** This is a single-seat, single-engine, turbofan air-to-air or air-to-ground fighter with a maximum speed of over Mach 2 and a combat radius of 425 NMs, which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with an air-to-air search and track radar with IFF capability as well as VHF and UHF communications. Operated by the USAF and ANG in CD role as an interceptor.

i. **F/A-18 Hornet - (USN, USMC and Canadian Forces).** The Hornet is a single-seat, twin-turbofan, naval strike fighter. It has a maximum speed of over Mach 1.8 and a

combat radius of 350 NMs (interceptor role), which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with a multi-mode air-to-air and air-to-ground search and tracking radar as well as VHF and UHF communications. It is operated as an interceptor in the CD role by the USN, USMC, and Canadian Forces.

j. **RC-12G Crazy Horse - (USA).** The RC-12G is a variant of Beechcraft Super King Air (see below). It is used for CD electronic surveillance.

k. **U-2R/TR-1 - (USAF).** These are single-seat, single-turbojet, high-altitude reconnaissance and research aircraft, with a maximum speed of 373 kts, a maximum range of over 2,600 NMs, and a maximum endurance of 12 hours. Equipment includes a variety of electronic and optical sensors and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. Used by the USAF for CD reconnaissance mission.

l. **Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - (USMC/USA/USN).** This is an unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle that has a maximum speed of 100 kts, a maximum range of 100 NMs, and a maximum endurance of 6 to 9 hours. It may be ground or shipboard operated, and carries a television camera payload for visual surveillance and reconnaissance.

m. **HC-130H/N/P Hercules - (USAF/USCG).** This variant of the Hercules is a fixed-wing, four-engine turboprop aircraft, with a maximum speed of 354 kts, a maximum range of 3,600 NMs, and a maximum endurance of 11 hours. It is equipped with surface search radar and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. It is used for both air and maritime detection, as a communications platform, and as an MPA. USAF variants also act as airborne tankers, and SOF versions (MC-130P) are refuelable, adding to their maximum endurance and range.

n. **AC-130 H Spectre - (USAF).** The AC-130 is a fixed-wing, four-engine turboprop special operations aircraft. It is used for surveillance in the CD role. Capabilities include FLIR and low light level television sensors, HF, UHF, VHF, FM, and SATCOM communications. It has a maximum speed of 240 kts, maximum range of approximately 1,000 NMs, and maximum endurance of 5 hours, which can be extended through aerial refueling.

o. **C-130 Hercules - (USAF).** The C-130 is a fixed-wing, four-engine turboprop aircraft. It is used by the USAF and can be used in a variety of configurations in a CD role.

p. **OV-1D Mohawk - (USA).** This is a fixed-wing, twin-turboprop observation aircraft, with a maximum speed of 265 kts, a maximum range of 1,155 NMs, and a maximum endurance of 4.5 to 5 hours. It is equipped with SLAR or FLIR as well as UHF communications. It is used by the USA in the MPA role.

q. **H-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Jayhawk/Pavehawk - (USA/USCS/USN/USCG/USAF).** This is a twin-turbine, combat assault transport helicopter, with a maximum speed of 180 kts, a range of over 720 NMs, and an endurance of up to 6 hours. Air Force H-60's are air refuelable and provide extended range and endurance. Capabilities include VHF and UHF communications, plus surface search radar and FLIR, depending on the variant. Operated in different variants by the USA, USN, USAF, USCG, and USCS, for surface search, airborne tracking, and LEA apprehension.

r. **HH-65 Dolphin - (USCG).** This is a twin-turbine general purpose helicopter, with a maximum speed of 165 kts, a maximum range of 400 NMs, and a maximum endurance of 4 hours. Capabilities include a surface search radar and HF, VHF, and UHF communications. Deployable on high and

(most) medium endurance cutters, it is used by the USCG for short-range maritime patrol and interdiction.

s. **C550 Cessna Citation II - (USCS).** The Citation is a modified twin turbofan, fixed-wing general aviation jet with a speed of approximately 350 kts, a 1,200 NM range, and an endurance of 4 to 5 hours. It is equipped with an air search and tracking radar and FLIR. It is used by the USCS to intercept and track suspected smuggling aircraft.

t. **HU-25A/B/C Guardian/Falcon - (USCG).** This is a modified twin turbofan, fixed-wing general aviation jet with a speed of approximately 350 kts, a 2,045 NM range, and an endurance of 5 hours. It is equipped with a 160 NM range surface search radar. A further modified version (HU-25C), the air interdiction interceptor, includes an F-16 air search and tracking radar and a FLIR sensor. Communications capabilities include HF, VHF-FM, and UHF.

u. **Cheyenne III Customs High Endurance Tracker (CHET) - (USCS).** The CHET is a modified twin-turboprop, fixed-wing general aviation aircraft with a speed of 275 to 305 kts, a range of 1,800 to 2,200 NMs, and an endurance of 6 to 8 hours. It is equipped with radar, FLIR, and VHF communications. It is used by USCS to intercept and track suspected smuggler aircraft.

v. **Beechcraft B200/C-12 Super King Air - (USCS).** This is a twin-turboprop general aviation light transport aircraft with a maximum speed of 260 kts and a range of over 1,600 NMs. It is equipped with VHF radios and used as an apprehension aircraft by the USCS.

w. **Cessna 210 Centurion - (USCS).** The Centurion is a single-engine general aviation aircraft with a maximum speed of 170 kts

and a range of up to 1,100 NMs. It is equipped with VHF communications and used as an apprehension aircraft by the USCS.

x. **RC-135 Rivet Joint (USAF).** This is a modified Boeing 707 aircraft. It is flown by the USAF and can be used in a CD role.

y. **RU-21H Guardrail V (USA).** The RU-21 is a variant of the Beechcraft Queen Air 100. It can be flown by the USA in a CD role.

z. **RG-8A (USCG).** The RG-8A is a single-engine, low-wing, fixed-gear motor-glider monoplane. It is designed for day and night covert detection, classification, and surveillance of MLE targets. With its 62 foot wingspan, specifically muffled engine and 100 gallon fuel load, the RG-8A can operate virtually undetected at altitudes above 1,000 feet for up to 10 hours with a maximum range of 900 NMs at 95 kts. This two-seat aircraft (pilot and sensor operator) has FLIR with videotaping capabilities. The pilot also has ANVS-6 night vision goggles. It is equipped with dual VHF, tactical VHF (secure), HF (secure), UHF (secure), and an all-mode IFF transponder.

3. Afloat Platforms

Sea-based platforms operate in the air and maritime D&M, and interception and apprehension roles. Advantages include long endurance and mobility. Disadvantages include relatively slow speed compared to some smuggler craft.

a. **High Endurance Cutters - (USCG).** These 378 foot cutters have a maximum speed of 29 kts, and a range of 14,000 NMs. They are equipped with air and surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter. They are used for air surveillance and maritime surveillance, interception, and apprehension.

b. **Medium Endurance Cutters - (USCG).** These 210 to 270-foot cutters have a maximum speed of 15 to 19.5 kts and a range of 6,100 to 9,500 NMs. They are equipped with surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter. They are used for maritime surveillance, interception, and apprehension.

c. **Patrol Boats - (USCG).** These patrol crafts are from 82 to 110 feet long with maximum speeds up to 26 kts and ranges from 1,200 to 1,900 NMs. They are equipped with maritime navigation radars and used by the USCG for maritime surveillance, interception, and apprehension.

d. **Picket Ships - (USN).** USN cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are used as radar picket ships to provide air and maritime search and surveillance. They typically have maximum speeds in excess of 30 kts and, with underway refueling and replenishing, indefinite range and endurance. They are equipped with air and surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter. All USN cruisers with new threat upgrade have a surveillance capability in excess of 220 NMs. Ticonderoga (Aegis) class cruisers have a range out to 250 NMs. Destroyers and frigates have a variety of air surveillance radars, with range capabilities from 175 to 250 NMs. Ranges vary significantly dependent upon target size. Most are capable of data linking radar data with other ships and have UHF SATCOM as well as UHF LOS, VHF, and HF communications. On occasion, ships such as amphibious assault ships, amphibious assault ships (helicopter), and tank landing ships can be used to support air and maritime D&M missions. Certain ships have a system called "Outboard," which provides an electronic surveillance and direction-finding capability. While used primarily for air and maritime surveillance, detection, and tracking, picket ships may also be used for maritime intercept and apprehension when a USCG law enforcement detachment is embarked.

e. **Modified Ocean Surveillance Ships (MOD T-AGOS) - (USNS).** These are 224-foot ocean surveillance vessels with a speed of 11 kts that have been modified for CD operations. They are equipped with an air search radar and are deployed in lieu of USN combatants. They are capable of data linking with other platforms and have extensive communications equipment. Law enforcement detachments are not embarked. Their low operating cost and long endurance on station make these platforms optimum for D&M operations.

f. **Submarines - (USN).** US nuclear-powered submarines can provide information on both sea and air traffic while remaining completely covert. Capable of speeds in excess of 20 kts, they have indefinite range and endurance. All have UHF SATCOM as well as UHF LOS, VHF, and HF communications.

g. **Patrol Craft - (USN).** These special operations coastal PC perform D&M using surface search radar and support interdiction if a law enforcement detachment is embarked. The 170-foot PCs have a speed of up to 35 kts and a range of up to 2,500 NMs. PCs are equipped with UHF SATCOM, UHF LOS, VHF, and HF communications.

4. Land-Based Systems

Land-based systems may be either fixed or mobile, depending on size and mission requirements. Advantages may include relative ease of operation and maintenance as opposed to air- or sea-borne systems, and the ability to cover smuggling routes not easily covered by other systems. Disadvantages may include being slow or having no mobility and, for some systems, shorter detection ranges due to ground clutter.

a. **Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems.** This is a system of static, tethered balloons that carry radar sets to an altitude of 10,000-

15,000 mean sea level, which allow radar coverage out to approximately 160 NMs. TARS cover the major drug smuggling routes along the US southern border and into the Gulf of Mexico.

b. **Joint Surveillance System (JSS).** JSS is a joint NORAD and FAA surveillance radar system used for air traffic control and surveillance of aircraft entering and within North American airspace.

c. **Air Traffic Control Radar Augmentation.** This is a NORAD initiative to integrate existing airport surveillance radars along the southern border of the United States into the NORAD surveillance system.

d. **Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar - (USN).** ROTH is a Navy-sponsored system capable of providing wide area detection and surveillance of air targets up to 2,000 NMs from the site, with real-time reporting of targets of interest via ADNET to appropriate agencies. There are currently two ROTH sites, operating in Chesapeake, Virginia, and Kingsville, Texas. A third site is currently planned for installation in Puerto Rico, with operations beginning in FY 1999.

e. **Ground-Based Radars - (USAF, USMC, ANG, and Canadian Forces).** GBRs provide primary or augment existing radar coverage and are capable of long range searches up to 240 NMs and height finding up to 95,000 feet. Communications available from the unit include HF, VHF, UHF, and SATCOM.

f. **Patriot Air Defense Missile System Radar - (USA).** The Patriot radar system is a multi-function, phased-array radar capable of surveillance, IFF interrogation, and tracking of low-, medium-, and high-altitude airborne targets.

g. **Hawk Air Defense Missile System Radar - (USAR/USMC).** The Hawk radar

system consists of an agile continuous wave acquisition radar (3-D) for surveillance and detection of airborne traffic.

h. **Night Vision Devices.** The Department of Defense fields a variety of man-portable night vision devices. These provide visual surveillance capabilities at night, based either on amplification of low levels of ambient light or by thermal imaging. These devices may be used by DOD personnel in support of LEAs, or loaned to LEAs for their own use.

i. **Ground Surveillance Radars - (USA/USMC).** Typically, small, man-portable radar sets capable of detecting vehicle and personnel traffic to a maximum range of approximately 6 km. Used by DOD personnel in D&M support.

j. **Remote Ground Sensors - (USA/USMC/USBP).** Remote ground sensors are

typically man-portable systems capable of detecting human or vehicular traffic using radar, infrared, seismic, magnetic, or pressure sensors. In the CD role, they are employed along suspected smuggling routes and automatically monitored from a remote location.

k. **Caribbean Basin Radar Network.** CBRN is a series of linked US- or HN-owned radars throughout the Caribbean which provide air surveillance information to NORAD, USSOUTHCOM, and participating HNs.

5. Summary

Figures F-1 and F-2 provide a graphic summary of the agencies employing the equipment listed in this appendix, as well as their general capabilities.

EQUIPMENT LIST							
WHO HAS WHAT?	AGENCIES						
	DOD				FAA	LEA	
SYSTEMS	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	FAA	USCG	USCS
AIRBORNE							
E-3			X				
P-3C		X					
P-3 CDU		X					
P-3 AEW							X
P-3 SLICK							X
E-2		X					
S-3		X					
F-14		X					
F-15			X				
F-16			X				
F/A-18		X		X			
RC-12D	X						
FC-12G	X						
U-2/TR-1			X				
UAV	X	X		X			
HC-130			X			X	
AC-130/H			X				
C-130			X				
OV-1D	X						
H-60	X	X	X			X	X
HH-65						X	
CITATION							X
HU-25A/B/C						X	
CHET							X

Figure F-1. Equipment List

EQUIPMENT LIST							
WHO HAS WHAT?	AGENCIES						
	DOD				FAA	LEA	
SYSTEMS	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	FAA	USCG	USCS
AIRBORNE							
SUPER KING AIR							X
CENTURION							X
RC-135			X				
RU-21H	X						
RG-8A						X	
SEA BASED							
WHEC						X	
WMEC						X	
WPB						X	
PICKETS		X					
MOD-TAGOS		X					
SUBMARINE		X					
PC		X					
LAND BASED							
TARS			X				
JSS					X		
OTH-B			X				
ROTHR		X					
GBR			X				
PATRIOT	X						
HAWK	X			X			
NVD	X	X	X	X			
GSR	X						
RGS	X						

Figure F-1. Equipment List (cont'd)

EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES								
SYSTEMS	CAPABILITIES							
	D & M			INTERCEPTION			APPREHENSION	
	LAND	SEA	AIR	LAND	SEA	AIR	LAND	SEA
AIRBORNE								
E-3		X	X		X	X		
P-3C		X			X			
P-3 CDU	L	X	X		X	X		
P-3 AEW		X	X		X	X		
P-3 SLICK		X	X		X	X		
E-2		X	X		X	X		
S-3		X			X			
F-14		L	L		X	X		
F-15		L	L		X	X		
F-16		X	L		X	X		
F/A-18		X	L		X	X		
RC-12D	X	X						
RC-12G	X	X						
U-2/TR-1	X	X						
UAV	X	L		X	X			
HC-130		X			X			
AC-130/H	X	X						
C-130	L							
OV-1D	L	X		X	X			
H-60	X	X		X	X		X	
HH-65		X		X	X			
CITATION		L	X		X	X		
HU-25A/B/C		X	L		X	X		
CHET		L	X		X	X	X	

X = Possesses Capabilities

L = Limited Capabilities

Figure F-2. Equipment Capabilities

EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES								
SYSTEMS	CAPABILITIES							
	D & M			INTERCEPTION			APPREHENSION	
	LAND	SEA	AIR	LAND	SEA	AIR	LAND	SEA
AIRBORNE								
SUPER KING AIR						X	X	
CENTURION						X	X	
RC-135			L					
RU-21H			X					
RG-8A	X	X						
SEA BASED								
WHEC		X	L		X			X
WMEC		X	L		X			X
WPB		X			X			X
PICKETS		X	X		X			X
MOD-TAGOS		X	X		X			
SUBMARINE		X						
PC		X			X			X
LAND BASED								
TARS			X					
JSS			X					
OTH-B			X					
ROTHR			X					
GBR			X					
PATRIOT			X					
HAWK			X					
NVD	X							
GSR	X							
RGS	X							

X = Possesses Capabilities

L = Limited Capabilities

Figure F-2. Equipment Capabilities (cont'd)

APPENDIX G

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

1. General

a. Support of the NDCS must be done strictly within the parameters of prescribed fiscal guidance. Accordingly, the out-year strategy to effectively marshal and manage available assets to have the greatest sustained impact will require detailed objectives, plans, and programs. This is the inherent challenge of resource management, and the applicable methods being utilized to accomplish this task will be outlined in the accompanying sections.

b. To accomplish this broad mission with any assurance of success requires the strict management of existing resources, a prescribed method of obtaining additional resources to be a viable force in a dynamic environment, and a plan to efficiently marshal and target these resources to areas where they have the most impact.

2. Background

Beginning in 1991 all DOD funding, with the exception of military personnel and certain NSA and DIA programs, was budgeted in a central CD transfer account. From that account, and with a mandate to stay strictly within the prescribed fiscal guidelines, the OCDEP&S (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Military Services, and the Directors of the Defense agencies) developed program proposals that sought to accomplish assigned objectives.

a. The OCDEP&S supervises the identification of CD requirements and assignment of appropriate funding lines within the areas identified. Additionally all intelligence-related CD activities, financed out of DOD CD funds appropriated for drug

interdiction to the Department of Defense, are managed as the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), executed by the individual agency involved and subject to OSD JMIP oversight recommendations. Military personnel funding, although tracked within the CD program, is not included in the DOD CD central account and continues to be budgeted in the Services' military personnel accounts.

b. The CD program is managed in a centralized fund with a single budget line that accounts for all resources except military personnel. This centralization provides the flexibility to support the evolving NDCS and rapidly changing operational priorities. Additionally, the process promotes the required program visibility to ensure that the Department of Defense's contribution to the CD effort remains focused.

3. DOD Specifics

To effectively establish the required procedures for prioritization, procurement, and allocation of critical DOD resources, the following methodology is used:

a. **Planning.** Using OSD strategy guidance and the President's NDCS, the OCDEP&S prepares a planning strategy to complement the efforts of intelligence, LEAs, and cooperating HNs. The strategy is operationally oriented, detailed enough to provide the basis for resource allocation, and is provided in the CD POM summary. The CD POM is reviewed annually to reflect any changes in the CD effort, and is fully integrated into the BPPBS.

b. **Programming.** In consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Directors of the

Defense agencies, the OCDEP&S is responsible for submission of the CD POM in accordance with DOD POM preparation instructions.

- The OCDEP&S will be issued fiscal guidance for the complete DOD CD program. Using the NDCS as a guide, the Drug Coordinator assigns the Services and Defense agencies specific objectives and fiscal guidance and then tasks them to develop specific CD programs. The Services and Defense agencies, in turn, develop program proposals that seek to accomplish assigned objectives within fiscal guidance. These proposals are submitted to OCDEP&S for review and approval. To ensure POM submissions meet the strategy and objectives of the overall integrated concept of operations for CDs, inputs from the Services and Defense agencies are provided to the Joint Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense for C4I, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs for review and deconfliction. Defense agency inputs must be coordinated with supported CINCs prior to submission.
- All international programs are coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In accordance with DOD Directive 5111.10, the OCDEP&S selects among or amends Service proposals as necessary to maximize achievement of DOD CD objectives. The results of this review are consolidated into a comprehensive DOD CD program and submitted to the Defense Planning and Resources Board as the CD POM.
- The OCDEP&S is required to work closely with the Services and Defense agencies to ensure that program adjustments affecting them are discussed and incorporated prior to POM

submission. The Services and Defense agencies provide cost information to the OCDEP&S for use in preparing the POM. Only direct costs can be attributed to the CD program. For example, aircraft operations tempo costs will include fuel and consumables directly related to hours flown, but intermediate or depot level maintenance (which are considered indirect costs) cannot be included. The Services and Defense agencies provide estimates of indirect costs to the OCDEP&S at the end of the fiscal year.

c. **Budgeting.** The OCDEP&S prepares the budget for the CD program and submits that budget to the DOD Comptroller in accordance with applicable budget guidance. The DOD CD budget is then submitted to Congress in a single account and coordinated as necessary with the Services and the Secretary of Defense. After coordinating as necessary with the DOD Comptroller and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C4I, the OCDEP&S presents the CD program to Congress.

d. **Execution.** The DOD Comptroller transfers CD funds to the various DOD components (Services and/or agencies) for budget execution. All components must obtain the OCDEP&S approval before making significant changes or requests for transfer of funds concerning programs during the execution process. The following guidance applies:

- All CD funds transfer requests must identify the project number, the appropriation, the budget activity, line item, or program element as applicable. If transfer to a new project or previously unapproved project is being requested, detailed justification and funding requirements must be provided.
- In specific cases where the proposed transfer of funds is between approved CD projects within the same

appropriation and same budget activity, the OCDEP&S has 5 working days to disapprove the request. Otherwise, the requesting organization may proceed with the transfer in accordance with Service guidance.

- In those cases where the proposed transfer of funds is between Services, appropriations, budget activities, line items, and/or research and development program elements (for projects not previously approved or to non-CD projects), the OCDEP&S must indicate approval or disapproval within 10 working days of receipt of the request. Implementation, however, remains subject to Congressional reprogramming understandings, including Service and/or agency approval of any required below

threshold reprogramming and receipt of appropriate funding documents.

e. General time frames for submission of required inputs to the CD BPPBS are delineated in Figure G-1. Dates have been designed to parallel as closely as possible the normal BPPBS process and time lines; however, because all departmental CD funds are centrally managed, justified to Congress under one cover, and subsequently appropriated into a central transfer account, CD BPPBS milestones must be tailored somewhat to accommodate the unique aspects of this program. Services retain the responsibility for ensuring that CINC requirements, as appropriate, are included in all planning, programming, and budgeting submissions to OCDEP&S.

COUNTERDRUG BPPBS GENERAL TIME LINES	
<u>DATE</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
MAY	Current year project execution review.
JUNE-AUG	CD plan development. Data call for development of Budget Estimate Submission exhibits for 2 years.
SEPT	CD POM developed (if POM year).
DEC	Budget year Congressional Justification Book (CJB) inputs due.
FEB	List of projects forwarded to Service and Defense Agencies. Call for POM exhibits. Budget Year CJB forwarded to Congress.
MAR	POM exhibits due.
APR	POM forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

Figure G-1. Counterdrug BPPBS General Time Lines

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APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

1. General

Communications systems provide the means for C2 to be achieved. This appendix describes the major systems that are used in CD operations. Additional information about this topic may be found in the OSD(C4I) publication “Counterdrug Communications,” which is obtainable through that office, ATTN: IPSG-2.

2. Multi-Agency Communications

Multi-agency CD operations are supported through the use of communications systems that include the following:

a. **Anti-Drug Network.** ADNET provides rapid, secure, and interoperable command, control, and intelligence connectivity, supporting the CD missions for both DOD and non-DOD agencies. ADNET uses the Joint Visually Integrated Display System as the primary means to exchange and display information over a primary backbone provided by Defense Data Network (DDN).

- ADNET nodes are subdivided into command, operational, and intelligence sites. The command sites exercise oversight responsibility for CD operations and are located at major command headquarters. Command sites do not routinely input intelligence data into or track information within the ADNET system. Operational sites are charged with C2 over intelligence gathering assets, D&M and/or suspect target interdiction. Intelligence sites are primarily involved with fusing, analyzing, and disseminating

information within ADNET. Intelligence sites do not exercise C2 over intelligence assets.

- ADNET is divided into regions to facilitate information flow and data base integrity, but not for chain of command purposes. ADNET regions define the areas where the Department of Defense and LEA require coordination for effective transfer of information and the maintenance of accurate data bases.

b. **Command Management System (CMS).** CMS provides a C4I infrastructure to support narcotrafficker D&M of DOD and DLEAs performing ground, air, and maritime suppression operations in the source and transit countries of Central and South America. The CMS data and imagery suite allows host country nationals to provide DOD and DLEA field operatives with near-real-time covert photography of individuals, vehicles, aircraft, landing strips, processing laboratories, ships, and other suspect facilities. This imagery can be shared immediately within country teams, among country teams, with the regional center, and with the national CD intelligence (both DOD and DOJ) community. Through Defense Switched Network (DSN)-1, ADNET subscribers are interoperable with CMS users, exchanging E-mail and files on either a real-time or a store-and-forward basis.

c. **Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) 2000.** FTS 2000 provides Federal agencies having CD missions with a wide variety of voice, data, and video services. FTS 2000 uses state-of-the-art digital, fiber optic, and networking technology to provide effective communications services.

d. **International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT).** INMARSAT is capable of providing voice, record, data, facsimile, and slow-scan video between ships, aircraft, and land-based stations around the world. Government users are equipped with INMARSAT terminals that supports an encrypted UHF communications system, secure telephone unit (III) (STU-III), portable data terminals, and an optical scanner.

3. DOD Systems

The voice, data, and information management systems used to support DOD CD operations primarily consist of ten systems.

a. **National Communications System (NCS).** The NCS is an interagency group responsible for the coordination of 23 Federal departments and agencies telecommunications assets to ensure that compatibility and interoperability is maintained during emergencies, without compromising day-to-day operations.

b. **Defense Communications System.** The DCS is a composite of specific DOD communications systems and networks under the managerial control and operational directions of DISA. DCS provides the long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications services needed to satisfy C2 requirements of the Department of Defense and those civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements.

c. **Global Command and Control System (GCCS).** GCCS provides the means for strategic and operational direction and technical administrative support for C2 of US military forces. GCCS ensures effective connectivity among the NCS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other components of the National Military

Command System (NMCS) down to the Service component commanders.

d. **National Military Command System.** The NMCS is the priority component of GCCS designed to support the NCA and the JCS in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the Secretary of Defense can receive warning and intelligence information to formulate accurate and timely decisions, apply resources of the Military Departments, assign military missions, and provide direction to CINCs or the commanders of other commands established by the NCA.

e. **UHF Tactical Satellite Communications.** The principle UHF satellite capability within the Department of Defense resides in the Fleet Satellite Communications. This system provides worldwide, high priority naval communications between aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground terminals. The only complementary UHF military satellite communications capability immediately available to the Navy is the leased satellite (LEASAT) network. LEASAT is designed to provide worldwide communications satellite service to the Department of Defense through the 1990's. Air Force Satellite Communications provides UHF channelized, low data rate service primarily to support strategic and theater forces, and wideband channel access to validated users. Within the limits of space segment resources, CD users may be accommodated on UHF Tactical Satellite systems.

f. **Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).** DSCS provides connectivity for the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, DOD agencies, DOS and, by resource sharing agreements, the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition to serving

DOD components, DSCS directly supports the ground mobile forces. The need to provide DCS communications services to remote locations which are not adequately served by other communications means is met through the global DSCS, which provides both digital and analog transmission paths. Telecommunications may be established to virtually every geographical area in the world in the time required to deploy and install a transportable earth terminal.

g. Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). DODIIS consists of data bases and associated communications links supporting the exchange of intelligence information.

h. Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). AUTODIN is the principle worldwide long-haul DOD digital network used to process message traffic through automatic store and forward between switching centers and among a wide variety of fixed or transportable subscriber terminals. Managed by DISA, AUTODIN is used by both DOD and non-DOD government agencies.

i. Defense Switched Network. DSN provides users with a secure packet-switching service for data communications. It supports data connectivity between DOD commands and non-DOD agencies.

j. Defense Data Network. DDN enables computer systems and terminals and/or workstations to exchange information. DDN supports military operational systems and intelligence systems, as well as general purpose ADP and command-based data networks with long-haul communication requirements. DDN offers CD operations the capacity to transfer computer data rapidly and at any level of classification.

4. Other Systems

The following systems describe the capabilities used by various agencies that support CD operations and efforts:

a. Secure Telephone Unit. STU-III enables end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over non-secure commercial and DSN circuits.

b. Joint Maritime Information Element (JMIE). JMIE provides the capability to extract commercial shipping information from participating agencies' data bases into a central computerized system for access by authorized users.

c. Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS II). TECS II is an ADP system that provides border-related lookout and/or suspect information to authorized users.

d. Customs Over-the-Horizon Enforcement Network (COTHEN). COTHEN is an HF communications system installed in all USCS aircraft and is available to all USCS shore unit locations. COTHEN is secured through the use of voice privacy 110 or high frequency cryptological device (PARKHILL) encryption systems. Only the USCS shore units and USCS P-3 AEW aircraft have PARKHILL capability. COTHEN provides an excellent means of HF communications between any two points.

e. Drug Enforcement Administration Communications Network (DEACN). DEACN is a radio communications network primarily designed to provide long-haul coverage of the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central and South America.

5. Transmission Media Used By the Department of Defense and LEAs

Transmission media used by the Department of Defense and LEAs include the following:

- a. HF radio groundwave and skywave paths.
- b. VHF amplitude modulation (AM) and FM LOS radio.
- c. UHF AM and FM LOS radio.
- d. UHF and super high frequency satellite radio.

APPENDIX J

REPORTS AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. General

Reports and reporting procedures standardize the flow of information needed to manage the CD effort. This appendix provides information on the basic report types and reporting procedures for naming TOIs.

2. Types of Reports

a. **Summary Reports.** A summary report provides historical information of significant activities which have occurred over a specified period of time. The primary historical CD report utilized in the Department of Defense consists of a monthly Joint Staff requirement for inputs from the four designated CD CINCs. The data which comprises this report is provided to the CINCs from subordinate commanders operational reports. Additionally, USTRANSCOM and United States Strategic Command report monthly air activities in support of supported commanders' CD operations. CINCs with adjacent AORs coordinate their reports to eliminate duplicative reporting. Input is required in the following areas:

- Aircraft assets by type, number of sorties, and hours flown.
- Ship assets applied - steaming days.
- Assets applied, such as vehicles, ground radars, night vision devices, and supporting personnel.
- Air targets.
- Surface targets and/or vessels.
- Surface vessel boardings and results.
- Support to LEAs.

- Support to foreign LEAs.
- Commander's needs and assessment.
- Lessons learned.
- Problem areas requiring assistance of a higher headquarters.
- Future planned operations.
- Exercises and/or training conducted in high traffic areas not in support of LEA operations.

b. Spot Reports

- Spot reports are designed to inform designated organizations of emergent activities as quickly as possible. Information which cannot be held until the regular summary report qualifies for generation of a spot report. An example is information which relays the location of a recently located, high interest vessel so that operational forces may react.
- Because spot reports commonly include items of significance, the information is usually condensed and repeated in the summary reports.

c. **Ad Hoc Reports.** Less formal, non-routine reports are sometimes generated for quick tactical analytical or coordination purposes and may be sent by phone calls, operator notes, or traditional messages.

d. **Serious Incident Reports (SIR).** Various commands require SIRs in the event of a death or serious injury to a civilian LEA or military member involved in CD operations.

e. **After-Action Reports.** After-action reports should be submitted as appropriate in accordance with the provisions of CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

S = JIATF-S
N = NORAD
4 = JIATF-E
5 = JIATF-W
6 = JTF-6

3. TOI Reporting Procedures

TOI reporting procedures are as follows:

a. The first ADNET regional coordinator (defined by the Joint Staff as either JIATF-S, JIATF-E, JIATF-W, JTF-6, or NORAD) handling a track which meets TOI criteria will assign a seven character alpha-numeric name to the track using the following procedures:

- Letter or number indicating the regional coordinator;

- Three letter abbreviation for the current month based on ZULU time; and

- Three-digit serial number, starting over each month. If the number exceeds 999, four digits are used.

b. Example: The sixth TOI handled by JIATF-W in July would be “5JUL006.”

c. Once named, this name is used in all communications. The name does not change as the TOI moves through different regions.

APPENDIX K

COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION FOR OPERATIONS

1. General

a. One of the most valuable tools a planner can use for CD operations, counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations (CDIPO), ties intelligence developed during the intelligence process into actual operations. CDIPO is an intellectual process of analysis and evaluation that is modified from traditional military intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). CDIPO modifies the military IPB process to identify likely trafficking routes and most efficiently allocate scarce resources to locate, track, and apprehend drug traffickers.

b. CDIPO is a five step process consisting of operations area evaluation, terrain analysis, weather analysis, threat evaluation, and threat integration. CDIPO is a cyclical process with all functions performed continuously and simultaneously (See Figure K-1).

2. Operations Area Evaluation

Operations area evaluation involves the assessment of the drug trafficking area with regard to the overall nature of the HN's population, friendly forces, threat, and the operating environment. This evaluation will assist the CDIPO analyst in identifying what




Figure K-1. Intelligence Preparation for Operation Process

additional information and support will be required to complete the CDIPO. In later steps of the process, terrain and weather within the area are evaluated to determine how they will affect operations in general. Drug traffickers expected to operate in the areas are then evaluated to assess their capabilities in relation to the terrain, weather, and the mission of CD forces. The CD “battlefield” consists of the area of operations (AO) and the AOI. These are viewed in terms of width, depth, and time.

a. The AO is the geographic area where CD forces have been assigned both the authority and responsibility to conduct operations. It is usually the area in which the LEA expects to conduct surveillance, interdiction, and/or eradication operations. The AO may coincide with the lead agency’s entire jurisdiction or just a portion of its jurisdiction.

b. The AOI extends beyond the AO. It consists of areas in which information on smuggling may be developed or in which activity affecting the operation may occur.

3. Terrain Analysis

Terrain analysis functions reduce uncertainty regarding the effects of terrain on drug trafficking activities. Determining how the terrain will influence drug traffickers will assist the analyst in predicting where smugglers will move. Terrain factors will affect each mode of travel used by the traffickers differently. Therefore, each mode of transport must be independently evaluated. Terrain analysis in CDIPO focuses on the drug trafficking aspects of the terrain.

a. **Observation.** Observation involves the influence of the terrain on the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of both drug traffickers and CD forces. In CDIPO it refers to visual and electronic LOS. Traffickers will attempt to exploit the natural features of the terrain to minimize the effectiveness of visual

observation and that of communications and electronic monitoring equipment.

b. **Concealment.** Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. For drug traffickers, it is vital to avoid detection and interdiction by CD forces. The analyst determines the amount of concealment afforded by the terrain and vegetation and considers observation from both the ground and air. Drug traffickers can be expected to move where the vegetation and terrain offer the best concealment. Smuggling aircraft will use low level flight and terrain-following techniques to avoid detection by radar.

c. **Obstacles.** Obstacles are natural or manmade features that stop, impede, or divert the movement of traffickers and/or CD forces. Obstacles are an important analytical factor during terrain analysis. The analyst must determine the location of obstacles to foot, horse, mule, vehicular, and air movement as well as what effects removing, overcoming, or bypassing these obstacles will have on trafficking operations.

d. **Key Terrain.** Key terrain is area that provides a marked advantage to the force that occupies or controls them. The most important aspect of the terrain to drug traffickers will be locations that facilitate logistic support and security.

e. **Avenue of Approach (AA).** AAs are analyzed from the perspective of both the drug traffickers and CD forces. AAs are a conceptual tool to identify the most likely areas of movement. AAs are air, maritime, and ground routes available for trafficking or movement of CD forces. The factors used to analyze AAs are based on terrain, intelligence, and statistical history.

- Terrain factors include the following:

- **Availability of alternate routes.** Traffickers will seek alternate routes to

provide them with a range of options from which to react to the presence of CD forces.

- **Availability of escape routes.** Traffickers will attempt to use routes that provide rapid withdrawal from crossing or stash sites. Their intent will be to reduce their vulnerability to interdiction during movement.

- **Security.** Traffickers will select routes that provide them the greatest security. They will normally avoid checkpoints and areas they believe contain CD forces.

- **Crossing sites.** Obstacles such as rivers and open areas with no concealment constitute danger areas for traffickers.

- Intelligence and statistical factors incorporate known or suspected information trafficking activity with the terrain. Some of these indicators include the following:

- **Evidence of electronic surveillance or communications equipment.** Traffickers routinely use electronic surveillance equipment to monitor law enforcement activity. Communications equipment is used to coordinate smuggling operations. Confirmed reports of traffickers using surveillance and communications equipment correlates to potential trafficking activity within a particular area or AA.

- **Visual signs of trafficking activity.** Visual indicators of smuggling include the discovery of abandoned or stashed loads, drug packing or waterproofing debris, and vehicle or foot tracks crossing the border between POEs or in other areas where legitimate traffic is unlikely.

- Seizures of drug loads provide an obvious indicator of trafficking activity in a particular area or AA.

- **Logistic support factors.** As with any activity involving the transportation of personnel and materials, drug trafficking requires a system of logistic support. Some of the logistic support factors that correlate to drug trafficking are: (1) Transportation networks, such as rivers, railroads, and public and private roads to which the traffickers have access; (2) Known or suspected property (structures or land) controlled by trafficking organizations that may facilitate the storage and movement of drug loads; and (3) Known or suspected stash sites and staging areas for drug shipments.

4. Weather Analysis

The weather in an AO or AOI is analyzed to determine its effect on trafficking activity and CD operations. The analysis of terrain and weather are inseparable because the environment surrounding smuggling activity requires them to be considered simultaneously. By incorporating the terrain- and weather-induced obstacles together, it shows the ease or difficulty of movement through an area. The combined effects of weather and terrain must be considered for each type of transportation and must be continuously updated.

5. Threat Evaluation

After analysis and evaluation of terrain and weather, the analyst evaluates the drug trafficking forces in terms of operations, weapons and/or armament, equipment, tactics, capabilities, and the areas in which they operate.

a. An essential element to threat evaluation is the development of a drug trafficker data base. The purpose of the data base is to build an accurate and complete picture of the drug trafficking threat. Information to be placed in the data base includes organizational structure, modes of operations, and personal data on known smugglers. To develop the drug trafficker data base, the intelligence analyst conducts a review of the drug smuggling threat within an AOI. All available sources for the data base will be included.

b. As the data base is completed, it will provide the analyst with a tool to assess trafficking organizations, their AOs, capabilities, and operational trends and/or patterns. It also allows the intelligence analysts to make judgments about the relative intensity of drug trafficking in specific areas, the amount of support the traffickers receive from the local population, and potential areas for future activity.

6. Threat Integration

The final step of the CDIPO process integrates the results of threat evaluation with the analysis developed concerning terrain and weather. Threat integration relates the drug traffickers' mode of operation, established trends, and patterns to the terrain and weather in order to predict where and when drug traffickers will move. During threat integration, the intelligence analyst develops two important decision making aids: the named area of interest (NAI) and the drug trafficking event template.

a. NAIs are defined as locations where drug trafficking activity or the absence of activity will confirm or disprove that trafficking forces are behaving as predicted. NAIs facilitate intelligence collection and analysis for several reasons.

- Focus attention on areas where trafficking forces must appear if they have selected a particular route.
- Identify when and where drug traffickers will employ their reconnaissance, surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance assets.
- Frame drug trafficking significant events by time and location.
- Information thresholds can be assigned to each NAI. These confirm or deny that the expected activity has occurred within the established time limits.
- Expect events to occur within NAIs which can be targeted by CD reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

b. Event templating analyzes significant drug trafficking activity and expected smuggling events in order to provide indicators to the traffickers' intentions. It is the intelligence analyst's technique to identify the COA adopted by the drug traffickers operating in a particular geographic area. By recognizing what the traffickers can do, and comparing it with what they are doing, the analyst can predict what they will do next. Event templating is critical to proactive CD operations. The event templating process can be expanded to include actions that traffickers might take to avoid CD forces. It can also be used to predict changes in trafficking patterns and future operations.

- Event templating enables the intelligence collection manager to develop precise, prioritized collection requirements based on probable drug trafficking behavior. This process serves to maximize the efficient employment of limited collection assets over an extended area

and almost unlimited sources of information.

- Event templating provides the basis for the final product of the CDIPO process, the decision support template. The decision support template is essentially the CD intelligence estimate in graphic form. It relates the detail of event templates to decision points that are significant to CD interdiction forces. It does not dictate decisions, but identifies critical events and drug smuggling activities relative to time and location — this information may require tactical decisions. It provides a framework for using judgment and experience to minimize uncertainty on the CD AO.
- The analyst previously identified those areas on the CD AO where significant events and trafficking activities will occur and where interdiction targets will appear. Areas along each known trafficking route in the AOI where drug traffickers will appear as targets for interdiction are identified as target areas of interest (TAIs). TAIs are essentially locations identified as a good place to make arrests and/or seizures. TAIs are normally areas which were designated earlier as NAIs.
- Following the selection of TAIs, decision points are identified. Decision points

identify those drug trafficking events which may require decisions in support of interdiction and show the deadline for making those decisions. Decision points equate time to specific points on the CD AO. They are determined by comparing times required to implement decisions with the expected times of arrival of drug traffickers at the TAI. A decision support template will help identify the CD force commander's opportunities and options while ensuring timely and accurate decisions.

7. Intelligence Estimate

The intelligence estimate is essentially a written summary of the terrain and weather analysis and enemy evaluation developed during the CDIPO. It provides a narrative study of drug trafficker capabilities, limitations, and most likely COAs. While the CDIPO process and its products provide decision making aids for the CD force commander and guidance to the staff in preparing the joint operation plan, the intelligence estimate provides this essential information to the organizations and personnel who will execute the plan. CDIPO is the mechanism for conducting the collection and evaluation, collation, and analysis steps of the intelligence process; the estimate is the primary means of accomplishing the dissemination of intelligence during joint CD operation planning.

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APPENDIX L

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS

1. General

a. This appendix is designed to assist personnel in marking information used to support the CD mission. CJCSM 3701.01, “Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information,” should be used in conjunction with this appendix to determine proper CD information classification.

b. CJCSM 3701.01, “Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information,” assists DOD offices in properly extracting, marking, protecting, and using DLEA information. Use of CJCSM 3701.01 will limit the tendency for DOD offices to incorporate DLEA unclassified sensitive information into DOD products which restate DLEA’s unclassified information at classifications up to SECRET. The DOD goal is to provide information and intelligence to DLEA at unclassified levels, when possible. DOD components will not upgrade classification of DLEA information merely because it is included in a classified DOD intelligence product.

2. Classification Systems

a. DLEA Markings

- LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SENSITIVE
 - Information and material involving DOD support to domestic DLEA are considered FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY information unless the requesting LEA requires that the information be protected and marked as LEA SENSITIVE. To the maximum extent possible, this information will be transmitted via secure means, stored in a locked container, disseminated when the need-to-know of the recipient has been established, and

shredded when no longer required. However, the LEA SENSITIVE information may be processed on unclassified computers and local area networks. Data will not be stored on a system accessible via the Internet. The treatment of this information within DOD channels is not meant to prevent the exchange of this information between DOD units and the originating DLEA. In the event the originating DLEA does not have secure storage or transmission capabilities, the information may be transmitted over unsecure facsimile machines and stored in locked containers. Within DOD documents, each page, paragraph, and section will be marked in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program Regulation.”

- Information on DOD CD operations within the United States is generally considered as UNCLASSIFIED, but may be marked LEA SENSITIVE, as determined by the originating agency.
- During initial coordination with a supported DLEA, efforts will be made to determine if a specific CD support operation requires protection. If an operation involves support to a sensitive law enforcement investigation, the requesting law enforcement agent can request the operation be safeguarded as LEA SENSITIVE. When an operation is determined to be LEA SENSITIVE, the requesting law enforcement agent must also provide a date after which the information will no longer require protection. Concept, operations, and execute orders will indicate the name of the law enforcement agent and a date after which the information will no longer

require protection. Based on current CD missions, DOD units will not normally originate LEA SENSITIVE information (with the exception of the imagery-derived Gridded Reference Graphic). However, DOD units will use LEA SENSITIVE protective markings on DOD documents that include such information.

- DLEA CD operations should be decontrolled at the determination of the originating agency.

- Handling Instructions. In addition to the general guidance above and in DOD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," the following specific guidance applies to the handling of LEA SENSITIVE information: (1) Determining Authority. The requesting DLEA should determine if the sensitivity of a CD operation requires protection as LEA SENSITIVE; (2) Mail. LEA SENSITIVE information should be double wrapped and sent via first-class mail, with no requirement for certified or registered mail; (3) Storage. LEA SENSITIVE information should be stored in a locked container, with no requirement to use General Service Administration-approved security containers; and (4) Reproduction. Copies of LEA SENSITIVE information should be kept to a minimum.

- DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION SENSITIVE

- DEA SENSITIVE is used to identify sensitive information provided by and marked by the DEA. This information is not releasable, either outside DOD channels or to foreign governments, without the express permission of the DEA. It will be protected against unauthorized disclosure and handled in

accordance with instructions specified under LEA SENSITIVE.

- Originators of DOD reports containing DEA information must obtain DEA authority to release information outside DOD and/or DLEA channels.

- LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES). The term LES was initially intended to replace both LEA SENSITIVE and DEA SENSITIVE as an identifier of UNCLASSIFIED CD information. However, the interagency manual authorizing its use was never approved for publication and the term LES is unauthorized. Any information erroneously labeled LES will be protected against unauthorized disclosure and handled in accordance with instructions in DOD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," until properly redesignated as LEA SENSITIVE and/or DEA SENSITIVE.

b. DOD Markings

- Information which requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security must be classified with one of only three designations: TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL. The markings FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and LIMITED OFFICIAL USE cannot be used to identify classified information.

- TOP SECRET is the designation applied only to information the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the

compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.

- **SECRET** is the designation applied only to information the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.
- **CONFIDENTIAL** is the designation applied only to information the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Examples include information indicating strength of ground, air, and naval forces, or performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on US weapons systems and munitions.
- Other DOD control markings
 - **LIMITED DISSEMINATION (LIMDIS)**. The LIMDIS caveat may be used to enhance the security of CD information requiring protection beyond those measures involving access to classified information. However, protection is not so stringent that it requires establishment of a special access program. LIMDIS controls are the only security enhancements that may be employed to control CD information for a specified period, other than special

access programs. (1) When additional access controls are required to ensure the security of CD information, original classification authorities may use the LIMDIS caveat. LIMDIS may be used for DOD CD operations outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions. (2) CD operations will remain classified until they are completed or until the original classification authority determines that it warrants declassification.

- **DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR (ORCON)**. ORCON is used with a security classification to allow the originator to maintain knowledge of and control over the use of the information. The marking is to be used only on information that clearly identifies, or would reasonably permit ready identification of, an intelligence source or method which is susceptible to countermeasures. This marking should not be used when information can reasonably be protected by use of other markings, by application of the principle of “need-to-know,” or by standard safeguarding procedures inherent in the security classification system. (1) ORCON is the most restrictive marking in CJCSM 3701.01, “Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information.” Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated beyond the headquarters elements of recipient organizations. It may not be incorporated, in whole or in part, into other reports or briefings other than those by and for the recipient without permission of the originator. It may not be used in investigative actions without the advance permission of, and under conditions specified by, the originator. (2) Agencies should establish procedures to ensure that ORCON is applied to particularly sensitive intelligence only. They should also establish timely

procedures to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. (3) The marking may be abbreviated as ORCON or OC.

•• CAUTION — PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED (PROPIN). PROPIN is used, with or without a security classification, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source. An expressed or implied understanding exists that the information will be protected as a trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value. Information bearing this marking will not be disseminated without the permission of the originator in any form to any individual, organization, or foreign government that has interests, actual or

potential, in competition with the source of the information. The marking may be abbreviated as PROPIN or PR.

•• REL. (AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO [name of country(ies) and/or international organization(s)]). This marking is used to identify intelligence that an originator has predetermined to be releasable, or has been released to foreign country(ies) or international organizations. Release must be made through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels. No other foreign dissemination of the material is authorized, in any form, without the permission of the originator. The marking may be abbreviated “REL (abbreviated name of country[ies]/international organization[s]).”

APPENDIX M

POINTS OF CONTACT

This appendix provides points of contact information for the following agencies:

UNITED STATES

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
Regions/Bureau of State and Local Affairs
US Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)

DOD

Office, DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (OCDEP&S)
Joint Staff, USACOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM, NORAD, FORSCOM
Joint Interagency Task Forces East, South, and West/Joint Task Force 6 (JIATF-E, S, W
and JTF-6)
Regional Air Operations Centers
Defense Logistics Agency, Counterdrug Support Offices
National Guard Bureau - Counterdrug Directorate and National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute (NICI)
National Guard Counterdrug Coordinators (CDC)

DOJ

FBI
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Field Division Offices
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

DOS

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)

DOTRES

US Customs Service Regional Enforcement Offices
US Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC)

DOT

US Coast Guard Area and District Law Enforcement Offices
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Operation Alliance

Project North Star

CANADA

National Defence Headquarters

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Office of National Drug Control Policy
750 17th St. NW
Washington, DC 20500
(202) 395-6741

Bureau of State and Local Affairs by Region

Call (202) 395-6792 and connections will be made to the desired region.

Region I	Region II	Region III
Maine	New York	Delaware
Vermont	New Jersey	Washington, DC
Massachusetts	Puerto Rico	Maryland
New Hampshire	Virgin Islands	Pennsylvania
Rhode Island	Virginia	
Connecticut	West Virginia	
Region IV	Region V	Region VI
North Carolina	Illinois	New Mexico
South Carolina	Indiana	Arkansas
Georgia	Michigan	Texas
Florida	Minnesota	Oklahoma
Alabama	Wisconsin	Louisiana
Mississippi	Ohio	
Tennessee		
Kentucky		
Region VII	Region VIII	Region IX
Iowa	Colorado	Arizona
Kansas	Montana	Nevada
Missouri	North Dakota	Hawaii
Nebraska	South Dakota	California
	Utah	
	Wyoming	
Region X		
Alaska		
Idaho		
Oregon		
Washington		
American Samoa		
Northern Mariana Islands		

US Interdiction Coordinator
2100 Second St. SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001
(202) 267-6638

DOD

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy & Support (DEP&S)
Pentagon, Rm 2E538
Washington, DC 20318
(703) 697-5656 DSN 227-5656

Joint Staff J-3/CND
Pentagon, Rm 2B913
Washington, DC 20318-3000
(703) 695-1476/7 DSN 225-1476/7

Joint Staff J-3/WHEM
Pentagon, Rm 2B885
Washington, DC 20318-3000
(703) 695-1726 DSN 225-1726

Joint Staff J-3/PACOM
Pentagon, Rm 2B885
Washington, DC 20318-3000
(203) 695-2927 DSN 225-2927

Joint Staff J-3/SOD
Pentagon, Rm 2C840
Washington, DC 20318-3000
(703) 695-8101/2 DSN 225-8101/2

US Atlantic Command (USACOM)
ATTN: J3D
1562 Mitscher Ave, Ste 200
Norfolk, VA 23551-2448
(757) 322-7636 DSN 836-7636

US Pacific Command (USPACOM)
ATTN: J-33
Camp Smith, HI 96861-5025
(808) 477-1274/75 DSN 315-477-1274/75

US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
ATTN: SCJ35
3511 NW 91st Ave.
Miami, FL 33172
(305) 437-3348 DSN 567-3348

Appendix M

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

ATTN: J3-OD

7701 Tampa Pt Blvd

MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323

(813) 828-5159/5197

DSN 968-3947/5159/5197

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

ATTN: J-30D

250 S. Peterson Blvd, Ste 116

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3260

(719) 554-3566/6917

DSN 692-3566/6917

Forces Command (FORSCOM)

ATTN: AFOP-OD

Fort McPherson, GA 30330-6000

(404) 669-5004/5010/5955

DSN 367-5004/5010/5955

Joint Interagency Task Forces/Joint Task Forces (JIATFs/JTFs)

Joint Interagency Task Force - East

P.O. Box 9051

Naval Air Station

Key West, FL 33040-0002

(305) 293-5610/5225

DSN 483-5610/5225

Joint Interagency Task Force - South

Unit 0612

APO AA 34001

011-507-284-7534

DSN 313-284-7534

Joint Interagency Task Force - West

Coast Guard Island

Bldg 51

Alameda, CA 94501-5100

(415) 535-5378/79/69

DSN 828-3378/79/69

Joint Task Force 6

Fort Bliss, TX 79916-0058

(915) 568-8740/8578

DSN 978-8649/8539/8598

Regional Operational Centers (ROCs)

CARIBROC

P.O. Box 9046

NAS Key West, FL 33040

(305) 293-3113

DSN 483-3113

SOUTHROC

630th RADS

APO AA 34001

011-507-284-4800

DSN 313-284-4800

HQ NORAD/J-30D

250 S. Peterson Blvd, Ste 116

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3260

(719) 554-3065/3568

DSN 692-3065/3568

Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR/DOY)

5800 G. St, Ste 102

Elmendorf AFB, AK 99506-2130

(907) 552-5505

DSN 317-552-5505

HQ Fighter Group/Canadian NORAD Region (DO/SO SOPS)

Canadian Forces Base, BFC, North Bay

Hornell Heights, Ontario POH 1PO

(705) 474-7575 Ext 6636

DSN 628-6636

HQ CONR (DO)

501 Illinois Ave, Ste 2

Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5548

(904) 283-2106

DSN 523-2106

Southeast Air Defense Sector (DO)

164 Alabama Ave

Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5015

(904) 283-5576

DSN 523-5576

Western Air Defense Sector (DO)

852 Lincoln Blvd

McChord AFB, WA 98438-1317

(206) 984-4633

DSN 984-4633

Northeast Air Defense Sector (DO)

4 Otis St

Rome, NY 13441-4712

(315) 330-6303

DSN 587-6303

Defense Logistics Agency
Counterdrug Support Offices

CDSO East
DLAHQ, 8725 John J. Kingman Rd
Ste 2533
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6221
1-800-532-9946

CDSO West
222 N. Sepulveda Blvd
Ste 501
El Segundo, CA 90245-4320
(310) 335-3518/3656
FAX (310) 335-3903

National Guard Bureau

Counterdrug Directorate
NGB-CD
(202) 697-3848
DSN 225-3848

National Interagency
Counterdrug Institute (NICI)
(805) 549-3940/3978
DSN 630-9940/9978

National Guard
Counterdrug Coordinators (CDC)

STATE	DSN	COMMERCIAL
Alabama	363-7473	(334) 271-7473
Alaska	COMM ONLY	(907) 428-3617
Arizona	853-2501	(602) 267-2501
Arkansas	962-5492	(501) 212-5492
California	466-3889	(916) 854-3889
Colorado	877-2058	(303) 397-3058
Connecticut	636-0728	(203) 493-2728
Delaware	440-7085	(302) 326-7085
District of Columbia	288-7317	(202) 433-7317
Florida	860-7438	(904) 823-0438
Georgia	925-3473	(770) 919-3473
Guam	344-8280	(671) 647-6019
Hawaii	COMM ONLY	(808) 737-9450
Idaho	422-6044	(208) 422-6044
Illinois	555-3728	(217) 785-3728
Indiana	369-2516	(317) 247-3516
Iowa	946-2606	(515) 252-4606
Kansas	COMM ONLY	(913) 862-0001/2
Kentucky	366-3257	(502) 564-6256
Louisiana	485-8491	(504) 278-8491
Maine	476-4316	(207) 626-4316
Maryland	496-6137	(410) 576-6135
Massachusetts	220-2420	(617) 944-0500
Michigan	623-0896	(517) 483-5896
Minnesota	825-4147	(612) 282-4147
Mississippi	637-1670	(601) 936-7670

Missouri	555-9952	(573) 526-9952
Montana	747-3009	(406) 444-6909/6938
Nebraska	946-1132	(402) 458-1132
Nevada	830-5520	(702) 677-5217/5233
New Hampshire	684-9356	(603) 228-8534
New Jersey	944-0812	(609) 530-7038
New Mexico	246-7152	(505) 846-7152
New York	974-9056	(518) 344-2064
North Carolina	582-9322	(919) 664-6322
North Dakota	344-5269	(701) 224-5269
Ohio	273-7146	(614) 889-7146
Oklahoma	940-3688	(405) 425-8688
Oregon	355-3938	(503) 945-3938
Pennsylvania	491-8223	(717) 861-8224
Puerto Rico	COMM ONLY	(787) 723-7712
Rhode Island	557-3285	(401) 457-4285
South Carolina	583-1559	(803) 748-1559
South Dakota	747-8723	(605) 399-6723
Tennessee	683-0648	(615) 313-0648
Texas	954-5516	(512) 465-5516
Utah	766-3174	(801) 576-3174
Vermont	636-3350	(802) 864-1350
Virginia	953-2305	(757) 775-9305
Virgin Islands	COMM ONLY	(809) 772-7740
Washington	323-7894	(206) 512-8894
West Virginia	366-6425	(304) 341-6424
Wisconsin	724-3540	(608) 242-3540
Wyoming	943-5259	(307) 772-5259

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chief, Organized Crime/Drug Intelligence Section
Criminal Investigative Division
FBI
9th St. and Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20535
(202) 324-5742

Drug Enforcement Administration
700 Army/Navy Dr
Arlington, VA 22202
(202) 307-1000

Field Division Offices

Atlanta Field Division
Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg
75 Spring St. SW, Rm 740
Atlanta, GA 30303
(404) 331-4401

Miami Field Division
8400 N.W. 53rd St
Miami, FL 33166
(305) 591-4870

Boston Field Division
Rm G-64, JFK Federal Bldg
Boston, MA 02203
(617) 565-2800

Newark Field Division
970 Broad St
806 Federal Office Bldg
Newark, NJ 07102
(201) 645-6060

Chicago Field Division
500 Dirksen Federal Bldg
219 S. Dearborn St
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 353-7875

New Orleans Division
1661 Canal St
Ste 2200
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 589-3894

Dallas Field Division
1880 Regal Row
Dallas, TX 75235
(214) 767-7151

New York Field Division
99 Tenth Ave
New York, NY 11001
(212) 337-3900

Denver Field Division
115 Inverness Dr, East
Denver, CO 80112
(303) 784-6300

Philadelphia Field Division
10224 William J. Green
Federal Bldg, 600 Arch St
Philadelphia, PA 10019
(215) 597-9530

Detroit Field Division
357 Federal Bldg
231 West Lafayette
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 226-7290

Phoenix Field Division
One North First St
Ste 201
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 261-4866

Houston Field Division
333 West Loop North
Ste 300
Houston, TX 77024
(713) 681-1771

Los Angeles Field Division
Edward Roybal Federal Bldg
255 E. Temple St
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 894-2650

San Diego Field Division
402 W. 35th St
National City, CA 92050
(619) 585-4200

San Francisco Field Division
Rm 12215
450 Golden Gate Ave
P.O. Box 36035
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 556-6771

Seattle Field Division
Ste 301
220 West Mercer
Seattle, WA 98119
(206) 442-5443

St. Louis Field Division
7611 Forsythe Blvd
Ste 500
United Missouri Bank Bldg
St. Louis, MO 63105
(314) 425-3241

Washington Field Division
Room 2558
400 Sixth St, SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 724-7834

Drug Enforcement Administration
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

El Paso Intelligence Center
11339 Sergeant Sims Blvd
El Paso, TX 79908-2000
COMM: (915) 564-2000
FTS: 570-6070

US Immigration and Naturalization Service

US Immigration and Naturalization Service
Office of Enforcement
425 I St. NW
Rm 7246
Washington, DC 20536
(202) 514-3034

Department of State
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
2201 C St. NW
Rm 7333
Washington, DC 20520
(202) 647-9635

US Customs Service
Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

Atlanta - SAC
1691 Phoenix Blvd, Ste 250
Atlanta, GA 30349
(770) 994-2240
Fax (770) 994-2262

Baltimore - SAC
40 South Gay St
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 962-2620
Fax (410) 962-3469

Boston - SAC
10 Causeway St
Rm 722
Boston, MA 02222-1054
(617) 565-7400
Fax (617) 565-7422

Buffalo - SAC
111 West Huron St
Rm 416
Buffalo, NY 14202
(716) 551-4375
Fax (716) 551-4379

Chicago - SAC
610 South Canal St
Rm 1001
Chicago, IL 60607
(312) 353-8450
Fax (312) 353-8455

Denver - SAC
115 Iverness Dr, East
Ste 300
Englewood, CO 80112-5131
(303) 784-6480
Fax (303) 784-6490

Detroit - SAC
McNamara Federal Bldg
477 Michigan Ave, Rm 350
Detroit, MI 48226-2568
(313) 226-3166
Fax (313) 226-6282

El Paso - SAC
9400 Viscount Blvd
Ste 200
El Paso, TX 79925
(915) 540-5700
Fax (915) 540-5754

Houston - SAC
4141 N. Sam Houston Pkwy, East
Houston, TX 77032
(713) 985-0500
Fax (713) 985-0505

Los Angeles - SAC
300 South Ferry St
Rm 2037
Terminal Island, CA 90731
(310) 514-6231
Fax (310) 514-6280

Miami - SAC
8075 NW 53rd St.
Scranton Bldg
Miami, FL 33166
(305) 597-6030
Fax (305) 597-6227

New Orleans - SAC
423 Canal St
Rm 207
New Orleans, LA 70130-2336
(504) 670-2416
Fax (504) 589-2823

New York - SAC
6 World Trade Center
Rm 714
New York, NY 10048-0945
(212) 466-2900
Fax (212) 466-2903

San Antonio - SAC
10127 Morocco
Ste 180
San Antonio, TX 78216
(210) 229-4561
Fax (210) 229-4582

San Diego - SAC
185 West "F" St
Ste 600
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 557-6850 Ext. 680
Fax (619) 557-5109

San Francisco - SAC
1700 Montgomery St
Ste 445
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 705-4070 Ext. 267
Fax (415) 705-4065

San Juan - SAC
P.O. Box 9020431
San Juan, PR 00902-0431
(787) 729-6975
Fax (787) 729-6646

Seattle - SAC
1000 2nd Ave
Ste 2300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 553-7531
Fax (206) 553-0826

Tampa - SAC
2203 North Lois Ave
Ste 600
Tampa, FL 33607
(813) 348-1881
Fax (813) 348-1871

Tucson - SAC
555 East River Rd
Tucson, AZ 85704
(520) 670-6026
Fax (520) 670-6233

US Customs Service
National Aviation Center

US Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC)
5020 South Meridian Ave
Oklahoma City, OK 73119
(405) 686-6440
Fax (405) 231-5938

Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC)
P.O. Box 6363
March AFB
Riverside, CA 92518-5000
(909) 656-8000
Fax (909) 656-8085

US Coast Guard Operations/Law Enforcement Offices

COMDT (GOPL)
Coast Guard Headquarters
2100 2nd St. SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001
(202) 267-1890

Atlantic Area

Commander (AO)
USCG Atlantic Area
431 Crawford St
Portsmouth, VA 23704-5004
(757) 398-6336

Commander (O)
First Coast Guard District
408 Atlantic Ave
Boston, MA 02210
(617) 223-8458

Commander (O)
Fifth Coast Guard District
431 Crawford St
Portsmouth, VA 23704
(757) 398-6221

Commander (O)
Seventh Coast Guard District
Brickell Plaza Federal Bldg
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 536-5634

Commander (O)
Eighth Coast Guard District
501 Magazine St
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 589-3671

Commander (O)
Ninth Coast Guard District
1240 E. 9th St
Cleveland, OH 44199
(216) 522-3980

Pacific Area

Commander (PO)
USCG Pacific Area
Coast Guard Island, Bldg 51
Alameda, CA 94501-5100
(510) 437-3810

Commander (O)
Eleventh Coast Guard District
Coast Guard Island, Bldg 51
Alameda, CA 94501-5100
(510) 437-3494

Commander (O)
Thirteenth Coast Guard District
915 2nd Ave
Seattle, WA 98174
(206) 553-5860

Commander (O)
Fourteenth Coast Guard District
300 Ala Moana Blvd
Honolulu, HI 96850
(808) 541-2306

Commander (O)
Seventeenth Coast Guard
P.O. Box 3-5000
Juneau, AK 99802
(907) 463-2230

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

National Headquarters
800 Independence Ave
Washington, DC 20591

Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center
6500 South MacArthur
Oklahoma City, OK 73125
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 25082
(405) 680-3784
FTS: 747-3784

Key Law Enforcement Centers and Operations

Operation Alliance
Bldg 11606
Sergeant Sims Blvd
Ft Bliss/Biggs Army AflD
El Paso, TX 79916
COMM: (915) 540-7523
FAX: (915) 540-7523
FTS: (915) 570-7523
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 8051
El Paso, TX 97708

Project North Star
Director Enforcement/Operations
P.O. Box 400
Buffalo, NY 14225-0400
COMM: (716) 846-3053
FAX: (716) 846-3067

Three Regional Groups of Project North Star

West

USCS SAIC
909 1st Ave
Ste 4100
Seattle, WA 98174
COMM: (206) 442-7531
FAX: (206) 553-0829
FTS: 399-7531
FAX: 399-0826

Washington, Idaho, Montana,
North Dakota, Alaska,
British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Yukon

East

US Attorney, Maine
P.O. Box 1588
Portland, ME 04104
COMM: (207) 780-3257
FAX: (207) 780-3304
FTS: 833-3304

Pennsylvania, New York
Vermont, New Hampshire
Maine, Quebec, New Brunswick
Nova Scotia

Central

Sheriff
Lake County Sheriff's Office
104 East Erie St
Painsville, OH 44077
COMM: (216) 639-5517
FAX: (216) 639-5590

Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Ontario

Canada

National Defence Headquarters
MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2
(613) 996-7246 DSN 846-7246
FAX: (613) 995-0063 DSN 845-0063

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
1200 Vanier Pkwy, Rm G310
Ottawa, Ontario K1A0R2 Canada
(613) 945-6707

APPENDIX N

REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 3-07.4 is based upon the following primary references:

1. National

- a. Title 10, USC 124, 371-380.
- b. Title 18, USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act).
- c. Title 22, USC 2301-2349.
- d. Title 32, USC.
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- f. National Drug Control Strategy.
- g. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities."
- h. Fact Sheet describing NSDD 298, "National Operations Security Program and National Operations Security Doctrine," issued by the National OPSEC Advisory Committee.

2. DOD

- a. DOD Directive 1000.17, "Detail of DOD Personnel to Duty Outside of the DOD."
- b. DOD Directive 1010.1, "Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program."
- c. DOD Directive 1010.4, "Alcohol and Drug Abuse by DOD Personnel."
- d. DOD Directive 1010.9, "DOD Civilian Employees Drug Abuse Testing Program."
- e. DOD Directive 1304.23, "Acquisition and Use of Criminal History Record Information By the Military Services."
- f. DOD Directive O-2000.12, "DOD Combatting Terrorism Program."
- g. DOD Directive 3321.1, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War."
- h. DOD Directive 5030.49, "DOD Customs Inspection Program."
- i. DOD Directive 5132.3, "DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance."

- j. DOD Directive C-5200.5, “Communications Security.”
- k. DOD Directive 5200.21, “Dissemination of DOD Technical Information.”
- l. DOD Directive 5200.27, “Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated With the Department of Defense.”
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- u. DOD Instruction 5240.4, “Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations.”
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- x. DOD Memorandum for Planning, Programming, and Budget Guidance for the DOD Counternarcotics Program, 1 Mar 90.
- y. DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program Regulation.”
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- aa. DOD Guidance for Implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Policy, Oct 93.
- bb. DOD Initial Additional Actions to Implement the National Drug Control Strategy, 1990.

-
- cc. DOD OSD(C4I) Pub, “Counterdrug Communications,” Apr 92.
 - dd. “Intelligence Communications Architecture,” (JIATF-E, JIATF-S, JIATF-W, JTF-6, and NORAD[S]).
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 - ff. CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System,” 23 Aug 97.
 - gg. CJCSI 3710.01A, “DOD Counterdrug Operational Support,” release pending.
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 - ii. CJCSM 3701.01, “Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information.”
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 - kk. SecDef memorandum, “Counterdrug Operations and Programs,” Apr 95.

3. Joint Publications

- a. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
- b. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
- c. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
- d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”
- e. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”
- f. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.”
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- h. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
- i. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”
- j. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”
- k. Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).”

- n. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
- o. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”
- p. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
- q. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”
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- b. COMDTINST M16247.1A, “Maritime Law Enforcement Manual.”
- c. COMDTINST M16247.2, “Maritime Law Enforcement Reference Manual.”
- d. MCBUL 4400 of 19 Oct 92 (ALMAR 317/92), “Guidance for Marine Corps Nonoperational Support to Drug Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs).”
- e. MILSTAD 6040, “US Message Text Formatting Program.”

APPENDIX O

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

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4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

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GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	avenue of approach
ADNET	anti-drug network
ADP	automated data processing
AEW	airborne early warning
AEW&C	airborne early warning and control
AFB	Air Force Base
AIC	Atlantic Intelligence Center
AID	Agency for International Development
AM	amplitude modulation
ANG	Air National Guard
ANR	Alaskan NORAD Region
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARTCC	Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BPPBS	Bi-annual Planning, Programming, and Budget System
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CANR	Canadian NORAD Region
CARIBROC	Caribbean Regional Operations Center
CBRN	Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CCGD	Commander, Coast Guard District
CD	counterdrug
CDIPO	counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations
CDSO	Counterdrug Support Office
CDU	counterdrug update
CHET	Customs High Endurance Tracker
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander in chief

Glossary

CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCUSACOM	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
CISO	counterintelligence support officer
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CLEA	civilian law enforcement agency
CMO	civil-military operations
CMS	Command Management System
CNAC	Customs National Aviation Center
CNC	Crime and Narcotics Center
CND	Counternarcotics Division
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COM	collection operations management
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONR	CONUS NORAD Region
CONUS	continental United States
COTHEN	Customs Over-the-Horizon Enforcement Network
CRM	collection requirements management
D&M	detection and monitoring
DAICC	domestic air interdiction coordinator center
DASD (P&HA)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs)
DCS	Defense Communications System
DDN	Defense Data Network
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEACN	Drug Enforcement Administration Communications Network
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOC	Drug Interdiction Operations Center
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLEA	drug law enforcement agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN	Defense Switched Network
ENWGS	Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System
EO	executive order
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center

FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID	foreign internal defense
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FLIR	forward-looking infrared radar
FM	frequency modulation
FMFP	foreign military financing program
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
FTS	Federal Telecommunications System
GBR	ground-based radar
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HCL	hydrochloride
HF	high frequency
HIDTA	high intensity drug trafficking area
HNS	host-nation support
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICC	Intelligence Coordination Center
IDAD	internal defense and development
IFF	identification, friend or foe
IMET	international military education and training
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INMARSAT	international maritime satellite
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
IWG	Interagency Working Group
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
J-5	Plans Directorate of a joint staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Systems Directorate of a joint staff
JAOC	joint air operations center
JCET	joint combined exercise for training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIATF	joint interagency task force
JIATF-E	joint interagency task force - East
JIATF-S	joint interagency task force - South
JIATF-W	joint interagency task force - West

Glossary

JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JICC	joint information coordination center
JICPAC	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific
JMIE	Joint Maritime Information Element
JMIP	Joint Military Intelligence Program
JOA	joint operations area
JOCC	joint operations command center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSS	Joint Surveillance System
JTF	joint task force
JTF-6	Joint Task Force-6
JTF-B	Joint Task Force-Bravo
kt	knot (nautical miles per hour)
LEA	law enforcement agency
LEASAT	leased satellite
LEDET	Law Enforcement Detachment
LES	law enforcement sensitive
LIMDIS	limited distribution
LNO	liaison officer
LOS	line of sight
LP	listening post
MARINCEN	Maritime Intelligence Center
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MCA	military civic action
MCIO	military criminal investigation organizations
MLE	maritime law enforcement
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOD T-AGOS	modified tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance
MOUT	military operations in urban terrain
MPA	maritime patrol aircraft
MTT	mobile training team
N-Sp/CC	NORAD/US Space Command Center
NAC	NORAD Air Center
NAI	named area of interest
NBRF	Northern Border Response Force (Mexico)
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCS	National Communication System
NDCS	national drug control strategy
NDPB	National Drug Policy Board
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau

NICI	National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute
NIMA	National Imaging and Mapping Agency
NM	nautical mile
NMCS	National Military Command System
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPS	National Park Service
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
O&M	operation and maintenance
OAJCG	Operation Alliance Joint Control Group
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OCDEP&S	Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
OCDETF	Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OI	Office of Intelligence
OIC	officer in charge
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OP	observation post
OP3	Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program
OPBAT	Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
ORCON	dissemination and extraction controlled by originator
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PARKHILL	high frequency cryptological device
PC	patrol craft
PCC	policy coordinating committee
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
POE	port of entry
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PROC	Puerto Rican Operations Center
PROPIN	caution -- proprietary information involved
PRRIS	Puerto Rican Radar Integration System
PSYOP	psychological operations
RAOC	regional air operations center
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RDA	research, development, and acquisition
RDO	request for deployment order
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
ROTHR	relocatable over-the-horizon backscatter radar

Glossary

SA	security assistance
SAC	special agent in charge
SAO	security assistance organization
SAOC	sector air operations center
SATCOM	satellite communications
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SECTRANS	Secretary of Transportation
SIF	selective identification feature
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIR	serious incident report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLAR	side-looking airborne radar
SOCPAC	Special Operations Component, United States Pacific Command
SOCSOUTH	Special Operations Component, United States Southern Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOUTHAF	Southern Command Air Forces
SROC	Southern Region Operational Center
SSB	Surveillance Support Branch
STU-III	secure telephone unit III
TACON	tactical control
TACTRAGRULANT	Tactical Training Group, Atlantic
TAFT	technical assistance field team
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAI	target area of interest
TARS	tethered aerostat radar system
TAT	tactical analysis team
TECS II	Treasury Enforcement Communications System
TIC	The Interdiction Committee
TOI	track of interest
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TWD	Transnational Warfare Counterdrug Analysis
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicles
UHF	ultra high frequency
USA	United States Army
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USARPAC	United States Army Forces, United States Pacific Command
USARSO	United States Army Forces, United States Southern Command
USBP	United States Border Patrol
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command

USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USCS	United States Customs Service
USFS	United States Forest Service
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIC	United States Interdiction Coordinator
USMARFORPAC	United States Marine Component, United States Pacific Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMS	United States Marshals Service
USN	United States Navy
USNCB	United States National Central Bureau
USPACAF	United States Air Forces, United States Pacific Command
USPACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VHF	very high frequency

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

airborne alert. A state of aircraft readiness wherein combat-equipped aircraft are airborne and ready for immediate action. It is designed to reduce reaction time and to increase the survivability factor. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airborne early warning. The detection of enemy air or surface units by radar or other equipment carried in an airborne vehicle and the transmitting of a warning to friendly units. Also called AEW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Carrier Initiative Program. Mutual assistance program with signatory commercial air carriers to assist in illegal drug detection and detection of internal conspiracies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

aircraft vectoring. The directional control of in-flight aircraft through transmission of azimuth headings. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense identification zone. Airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. Also called ADIZ. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air defense operations area. An area and the airspace above it within which procedures are established to minimize mutual interference between air defense and other operations; it may include designation of one or more of the following: air defense action area, air defense identification zone, and/or firepower umbrella. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airdrop. The unloading of personnel or materiel from aircraft in flight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airdrop platform. A base on which vehicles, cargo, or equipment are loaded for airdrop or low-altitude extraction. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air picket. An airborne early warning aircraft positioned primarily to detect, report and track approaching enemy aircraft or missiles and to control intercepts. Also called aerial picket. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Route Traffic Control Center. The principal facility exercising en route control of aircraft operating under instrument flight rules within its area of jurisdiction. Approximately 26 such centers cover the United States and its possessions. Each has a communication capability to adjacent centers. Also called ARTCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air smuggling event. In counterdrug operations, the departure of a suspected drug smuggling aircraft, an airdrop of drugs, or the arrival of a suspected drug smuggling aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airway. A control area or portion thereof established in the form of a corridor marked with radio navigational aids. (Joint Pub 1-02)

alert force. Specified forces maintained in a special degree of readiness. (Joint Pub 1-02)

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation and reporting

systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (Joint Pub 1-02)

anticrop operation. The employment of anticrop agents in military operations to destroy the enemy's source of selected food or industrial crops. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

arrival zone. In counterdrug operations, the area in or adjacent to the United States where smuggling concludes and domestic distribution begins. By air, an airstrip; by sea, an offload point on land, or transfer to small boats. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

cartel. An association of independent businesses organized to control prices and production, eliminate competition, and reduce the cost of doing business. (Joint Pub 1-02)

caveat. A designator used with a classification to further limit the dissemination of restricted information. (Joint Pub 1-02)

change of operational control. The date and time (Coordinated Universal Time) at which a force or unit is reassigned or attached from one commander to another where the gaining commander will exercise operational control over that force or unit. Also called CHOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. Also called CMO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert

operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

classified information. Official information which has been determined to require, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command, control, communications, and computer systems. Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their

interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. Communications security includes crypto security; transmission security; emission security; and physical security of communications security materials and information. a. cryptosecurity — The component of communications security that results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. b. transmission security — The component of communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. c. emission security — The component of communications security that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunications systems. d. physical security — The component of communications security that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

compartmentation. 1. Establishment and management of an organization so that information about the personnel, internal organization, or activities of one component is made available to any other component only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give

an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

continental United States. United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North American between Canada and Mexico. Also called CONUS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

controlled substance. A drug or other substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the Controlled Substances Act. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug nonoperational support. Support provided to law enforcement agencies/host nations which includes loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of facilities (such as buildings, training areas and ranges), training conducted in formal schools, transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the Services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug operational support. Support to host nations and drug law enforcement agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the geographic combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the Services for this purpose. Operations support does not include support in the form of equipment alone, nor the conduct of joint law enforcement investigations with cooperating civilian law enforcement agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug operations. Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterdrug Support Office. In counterdrug operations, offices under the office of the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support responsible for processing, tracking, and coordinating all nonoperational support requests from drug law enforcement officials. Also called CDSO. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term “Regional Logistics Support Office” and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Customs Over-The-Horizon Enforcement Network. US Customs Service long-range voice communications system. Also called COTHEN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

data link. The means of connecting one location to another for the purpose of transmitting and receiving data. (Joint Pub 1-02)

declassification. The determination that in the interests of national security, classified information no longer requires any degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with removal or cancellation of the classification designation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Communications System. Department of Defense long-haul voice, data, and record traffic system which includes the Defense Data Network, Defense Satellite Communications Systems, and Defense Switched Network. Also called DCS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Data Network. Component of the Defense Communications System used for switching Department of Defense automated data processing systems. Also called DDN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Switched Network. Component of the Defense Communications System that handles Department of Defense voice, data, and video communications. Also called DSN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

downgrade. To determine that classified information requires, in the interests of national security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, coupled with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such lower degree. (Joint Pub 1-02)

drug interdiction. The interception of illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic intelligence. Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation's emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential chemicals. In counterdrug operations, compounds that are required in the synthetic or extraction processes of drug production, but in most cases do not become part of the drug molecule. Essential chemicals are used in the production of cocaine or heroin. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fusion. 1. The process whereby the nuclei of light elements combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element, with the release of tremendous amounts of energy. 2. In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Golden Crescent. The heroin-producing countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Golden Triangle. A remote area where the countries of Myanmar (formerly Burma), Thailand, and Laos meet. (Joint Pub 1-02)

handover. The passing of control authority of an aircraft from one control agency to another control agency. Handover action may be accomplished between control agencies of separate Services when conducting joint operations or between control agencies within a single command and control system. Handover action is complete when the receiving controller acknowledges assumption of control authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation assistance. See host-nation support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities.

Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence collection plan. A plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement. Specifically, a logical plan for transforming the essential elements of information into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence summary. A specific report providing a summary of items of intelligence at frequent intervals. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

international narcotics activities. Those activities outside the United States which produce, transfer, or sell narcotics or other substances controlled in accordance with Title 21, "Food and Drugs" - United States Code, sections 811 and 812. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant command, Services, and Joint Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations

to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

laundering. In counterdrug operations, the process of transforming drug money into a more manageable form while concealing its illicit origin. Foreign bank accounts and dummy corporations are used as shelters. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Law Enforcement Agency. Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense) chartered and empowered to enforce laws in the following jurisdictions: The United States, a state (or political subdivision) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or to enforce US laws within the borders of a host nation. Also called LEA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military assistance advisory group. A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and

programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Assistance Program. That portion of the US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides defense articles and services to recipients on a non reimbursable (grant) basis. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) Also called MCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobile training team. A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

monitoring. 1. The act of listening, carrying out surveillance on, and/or recording the emissions of one's own or allied forces for the purposes of maintaining and improving procedural standards and security, or for reference, as applicable. 2. The act of listening, carrying out surveillance on, and/or recording of enemy emissions for intelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

narco-terrorism. Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings and kidnapping directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCODE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated

execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN.

b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN.

c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for

phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. A network of 13 regional organized crime drug enforcement task forces designed to coordinate Federal law enforcement efforts to combat the national and international organizations that cultivate, process, and distribute illicit drugs. Also called OCDETF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

over-the-horizon radar. A radar system that makes use of the atmospheric reflection and refraction phenomena to extend its range of detection beyond line of sight. Over-the-horizon radars may be either forward scatter or back scatter systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Posse Comitatus Act. Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus" - United States Code, Section 1385) (Joint Pub 1-02)

precursor chemical. Compounds that are required in the synthetic or extraction processes of drug production, and become incorporated into the drug molecule. Not used in the production of cocaine or heroin. (Joint Pub 1-02)

producer countries. In counterdrug operations, countries where naturally occurring plants, such as coca, cannabis, or poppies are cultivated for later refinement into illicit drugs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information and community relations activities directed toward the general public by the various elements of the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

radar picket. Any ship, aircraft, or vehicle, stationed at a distance from the force protected, for the purpose of increasing the radar detection range. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security

assistance functions. Also called SAO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

seizures. In counterdrug operations, includes drugs and conveyances seized by law enforcement authorities and drug-related assets (monetary instruments, etc.) confiscated based on evidence that they have been derived from or used in illegal narcotics activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sensitive compartmented information. All information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. (These controls are over and above the provisions of DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation.) Also called SCI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Silver Triangle. The South American region consisting of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia that is historically known to be a major illegal drug production area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sorting. 2. In counterdrug operations, the process involved in differentiating traffic which could be involved in drug trafficking from legitimate air traffic. Initial sorting criteria are established jointly by the US Coast Guard and US Customs Service, coordinated with Department of Defense

counterparts, and disseminated as required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

source. 1. A person, thing, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained. 2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes intelligence information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special agent. A person, either United States military or civilian, who is a specialist in military security or the collection of intelligence or counterintelligence information. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special interest target. In counterdrug operations, a contact that may be outside initial sorting criteria but still requires special handling, such as controlled deliveries or other unusual situations. Also called SIT. See also suspect; track of interest. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations or in coordination with

operations of conventional, non special-operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02).

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

spot report. A concise narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions that may have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations that is afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

standing operating procedure. A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called SOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral.

Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

stimulants. Controlled drugs which make the user feel stronger, more decisive and self-possessed; includes cocaine and amphetamines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surface smuggling event. In counterdrug operations, the sighting of a suspected drug smuggling vessel or arrival of a suspected drug smuggling vessel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suspect. In counterdrug operations, a track of interest where correlating information actually ties the track of interest to alleged illegal drug operations. See also special interest target; track of interest. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and

control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

task force. 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. Semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. 3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02)

track correlation. Correlating track information for identification purposes using all available data. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tracking. 1. Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)


track of interest. In counterdrug operations, contacts that meet the initial sorting criteria applicable in the area where the contacts are detected. Also called TOI. See also special interest target; suspect. (Joint Pub 1-02)

transit route. A sea route which crosses open waters normally joining two coastal routes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

transit zone. The path taken by either airborne or seaborne smugglers. Zone can include transfer operations to another carrier (airdrop, at-sea transfer, etc.). (Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 3-07.4** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

