Joint Publication 3-16

Joint Doctrine
for Multinational
Operations

5 April 2000

Throughout our nation's history, our Armed Forces have participated in alliances and coalitions in support of freedom in all parts of the world. From the birth of this great nation and our own struggle for freedom to the epic battles of two world wars in the twentieth century and the ensuing Cold War, the strength of our partnership has always exceeded the sum of its parts. Our liberty, and the liberty of so many people in other democracies, is owed to the selfless dedication of our comrades who had the vision to set common goals and the will and capability to fight together to achieve greatness.

"Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations" will help to guide you through the challenging and sometimes complex nature of operating as a part of a multinational force. It takes us beyond the hardware of force interoperability and types of operations to the software of command relationships, considerations for the planning and execution of multinational operations, and divergent cultures working together toward a common end.

While we will always prepare to operate unilaterally if necessary, we must also be prepared to operate in multinational alliances and coalitions when practical. This doctrine will assist you in the latter endeavor.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidance and principles for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force. This publication describes multinational operations that the United States may participate in as a part of an alliance, coalition, or other ad hoc arrangement. It describes joint organizational structures essential to coordinate land, maritime, air, space, and special operations in a multinational environment. It addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should contemplate during the planning and execution of multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations.

The United States has often shared common security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Typically, multinational operations are performed within the structure of a coalition or alliance. **A coalition** is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. **An alliance** is the result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. Normally each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action. Multinational operations may include combat and are conducted both during war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). **War** is the extreme case for conducting multinational operations; the goal is to achieve the multinational objectives as quickly as possible and with as little cost as possible. **MOOTW** focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and stability, and supporting civil authorities. **Peacetime engagement** activities are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. These activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. During multinational operations, respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience must be practiced during all activities to ensure unity of effort. Steps to achieve rationalization, standardization, and interoperability will significantly enhance the probability of success in multinational operations. When providing alliance or coalition leadership, the geographic combatant

commander ensures that unified action integrates US joint operations, in conjunction with multinational, interagency, and international organizations, into a strategic unity of effort to achieve the strategic end state.

Command Relationships

Several key individuals and organizations determine the level of US military involvement in multinational operations.

The National Security Council is the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decisions. Its membership includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The National Command Authorities (NCA) consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense and may employ military power and personnel to respond to situations affecting US interests. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor and the Department of State administers US Embassies abroad and supports the Secretary of State in pursuing US foreign policy goals. The President retains command authority over US forces, yet sometimes it is prudent to place appropriate US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. Foreign operational control, tactical control, and support relationships may all be advantageous to multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. Coalition command relationships often are a parallel command structure, a lead nation command structure, or a combination of the two.

Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

One of the most important tasks when planning multinational operations is to conduct a detailed mission analysis.

A mission analysis for a multinational operation should include assessments of the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of each of the national contingents. This analysis should result in a mission statement for the multinational force as a whole and a restated mission for the US contingent of the force. Once the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives have been approved, the multinational force commander (MNFC) assigns specific tasks to the contingent most capable of completing those tasks. Every phase of the intelligence cycle, including planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback,

is substantively adjusted to support multinational operations. Effective logistic support in a multinational operation will pose particular problems for the MNFC and will require detailed planning and flexible execution, taking into account the logistic capabilities, demands, and limitations of each national contingent. During the commander's assessment, the overall objectives also need to include criteria for termination and transition, communications, force protection, international law considerations, rules of engagement, doctrine, education and training, media relations, health service support, religious ministry support, meteorology, and oceanography as well as many cultural and linguistic needs.

Operational Considerations

Operational considerations include land, maritime, air and space, special operations, information operations, and search and rescue operations.

Land operations occur across the range of military operations, during war and MOOTW. Land forces possess the capability to hold or occupy land areas. Capabilities to land forces include operational mobility, interoperability, sustainability, and versatility. **Maritime operations** cover a range of military activities undertaken, in peacetime or in war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. The qualities that characterize maritime forces include readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. **Air operations** gain and maintain control of the air and exploit its use to achieve the MNFC's objectives. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. **Space operations** include force enhancement, space control, space support including spacelift and on-orbit operations, and force application. **Special operations forces** enable the commander to develop and exercise unconventional military options in multinational operations independently or in support of other components. They are trained to provide liaison to multinational maneuver units, taking advantage of their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with foreign military and paramilitary forces. **Information operations** (IO) are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Additionally, information assurance (IA) is an element of IO that is concerned with the protection and defense of information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,

authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Both IO and IA must be factored into every operation conducted by any task force. The Joint Staff coordinates US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. **Search and rescue** (SAR) operations are those efforts undertaken to find and recover downed and/or missing personnel. Normally each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own SAR missions.

CONCLUSION

Multinational operations include alliances or coalitions between two or more nations in order to best achieve their common interests. The NCA will retain ultimate command authority over US military forces and personnel, but often will employ the aid of foreign command and additional support relationships in order to achieve specified military objectives. Detailed mission analysis and organized objectives help provide a successful multinational operation through the coordinated employment of forces.

CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its people."

Woodrow Wilson
(1856-1924)

1. Multinational Operations Defined

"Multinational operations" is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken **within the structure of a coalition or alliance**, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization (such as the United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives than long standing alliances, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Although the description of "multinational" will always apply to such

forces and commanders, they can also be described as "allied," "alliance," "bilateral," "combined," "multilateral," or "coalition," as appropriate.

Sovereignty issues will be one of the most difficult issues for the multinational force commander (MNFC) to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by host country nations. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged and often the MNFC (and subordinates) must depend on their diplomatic as well as warrior skills.

2. Strategic Context

a. General

- **The United States has often shared common or mutually-compatible**

Flags of participants in Operation COOPERATIVE OSPREY 1996.

F-16 participating in Bright Star exercise in Egypt.

security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Contemporary threats to collective security objectives have become more ambiguous and regionally focused since the end of the Cold War. Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Resultant instabilities can cause increased levels of activity outside commonly accepted standards of law, order, and fairness, in the form of employing intimidation, drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgencies, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, and information systems exploitation or disruption. It is difficult to predict when or where such threats may emerge.

• **Where commonality or compatibility of interest exists, nations may enter into political, economic, and military partnerships.** These partnerships occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests; ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats; and conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and peace operations (PO). Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact on multinational operations. Many operation plans (OPLANs) to deter or counter threats are prepared within the context of a treaty or alliance framework. Sometimes they are developed in a less structured coalition framework, based on temporary agreements or arrangements. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in allied laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language must be taken into account. Normally each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action.

• The United States employs a national security strategy committed to protecting its own national security interests and achieving strategic objectives by directing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, information, military) toward the strategic end state. The National Security

Strategy states that, while US forces retain unilateral capability, whenever possible they will seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths, to promote regional stability throughout the world. Therefore, US commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). US forces may participate in these multinational efforts across a range of military and civil operations in concert with a variety of US governmental agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, and international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

b. **The Military Commander's Role**

• **In responding to crises, US military commanders must understand that military operations are one part of an overall strategy to focus all elements of national power.** Though the military application of power may not in itself achieve US strategic objectives, failure to apply that power properly could preclude attaining those objectives.

• When assessing the theater strategic environment, combatant commanders should consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies or coalition partners, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. United Nations Security Council resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military force.

• In multinational operations, planners and participants should be sensitive to the demands of consensus-driven decision making.

3. Types of Multinational Operations

Multinational operations may be conducted during periods of both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation, perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili inspects a map of the Bosnian area during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

a. **War.** When diplomatic, economic, and informational means are unable or inappropriate to achieve objectives, the alliance or coalition may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations, thereby placing the alliance or coalition in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieve alliance or coalition objectives, and conclude hostilities on terms favorable to all multinational partners. War may be of a limited or general nature. Limited war is armed conflict short of general war, as was conducted during Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. General war, such as World Wars I and II, involves armed conflict among major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed and survival is at stake. In either instance decisive force is applied to fight and win.

- MNFCs may employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations to attack the enemy's physical capabilities, morale, and will to fight. When required to employ force, MNFCs can seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in applying maximum combat capability at the decisive time and place. This is accomplished by arranging symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be symmetrical (if the US force and the enemy force are similar), or asymmetric if forces are dissimilar. MNFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. National contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can

not be viewed in isolation. Each may be critical to the success, and may have certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other resources. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. Synergy is achieved by synchronizing the contributions of alliance or coalition partners in multinational operations to enable MNFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy for exploitation.

- Multinational force operations will be characterized by the following.

  •• **Simultaneity and Depth.** The intent of simultaneity and depth is to bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist. "Simultaneity" refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, MNFCs cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon. To be effective, MNFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. This is accomplished by conducting operations across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, thereby overwhelming the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions.

  •• **Anticipation.** Anticipation is key to effective planning. MNFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.

MNFCs should consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. Surprise can be avoided by monitoring operations as they unfold and signaling to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. MNFCs should realize the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces. Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners in order to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) can assist MNFCs in defining likely or potential enemy courses of action (COAs), as well as the indicators that suggest the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. Anticipation is not without risk. MNFCs and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider the information upon which decisions are being based.

•• **Balance.** Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the MNF as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. MNFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight.

•• **Leverage.** Achieving leverage entails gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions among the forces available to MNFCs. Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). A principal MNFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the MNF. Support relationships afford an effective means to weigh (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations. MNFCs can gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage, which can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit MNF strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides joint force commanders (JFCs) with decisive advantage. Leverage allows MNFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy's dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

•• **Timing and Tempo.** Multinational forces should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, MNFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy's ability to react. MNFCs may vary the tempo of operations during selected phases of a campaign. They may elect to reduce the pace of operations or conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities. "Timing" refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force.

b. **Military Operations Other Than War.** MOOTW are operations that encompass the use of military capabilities

across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peace, crisis, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat (such as some peace enforcement operations) may have many of the same characteristics as war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. The following list of MOOTW categories that may be conducted in a multinational setting are presented in alphabetical order. Multinational participation in any MOOTW category will present unique and regionally specific challenges which will require consideration of the tenets of multinational cooperation to be discussed later in this chapter.

See JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," or other appropriate publications in the JP 3-07 series for further detail.

- **Combating Terrorism.** Combating terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat exists. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism).

- **Department of Defense (DOD) Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations.** DOD support to the national drug control strategy includes support to US law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments by providing intelligence analysts and logistic support personnel; support to detection and monitoring of the movement of air and sea traffic; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; training of foreign CD organizations in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can be applied to their CD operations; and research and development.

Special operations forces enhances multinational force capabilities through interaction with host nations during peacetime engagement operations.

Canadian and Hungarian troops train in an urban environment.

- **Enforcement of Sanctions and Maritime Intercept Operations.** These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.

- **Enforcing Exclusion Zones.** An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), at sea (maritime), or on land (zones of separation or inter-entity boundary lines). The measures are usually imposed by the UN or other international bodies.

- **Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight.** These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes.

- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** FHA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or than can result in great damage to or loss of property in regions outside the United States. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. US civil affairs (CA) forces are trained to assist the commander in coordinating with NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international organizations, and local civilian agencies through the civil-military operations center (CMOC) in situations involving FHA which may also be in coordination with UN relief efforts.

- **Nation Assistance and Support to Counterinsurgency.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peace, crisis, emergency, or war, based on agreements concluded between the United States and that nation. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to security assistance; foreign internal defense (FID); and humanitarian and

civic assistance (HCA). Unlike FHA, HCA is support provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

- **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).** These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include selective evacuation, contingent on space availability, of citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries.

- **Peace Operations.** PO are operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace; they include peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of MOOTW (e.g., FHA and NEO) may complement peace operations. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, and after conflict. US CA forces and security assistance officers (SAOs) provide a significant capability to the commander in the planning and conduct of PO. These forces can provide the liaison between the military force and the local populace, local government, and NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations.

- **Protection of Shipping.** When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flagged vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence on and over international waters. With the consent of the flag state, and the approval of the National Command Authorities (NCA), this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law.

- **Show of Force Operations.** These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or MNFs.

- **Arms Control.** Arms control, though not a military operation, is a means to reduce the risk of war by limiting or reducing the threat from potential adversaries (e.g., through a cap on, reduction or elimination of particular weapons) and through confidence building measures rather than relying solely on military responses to perceived or anticipated changes in the military threat. It may manifest itself through several conventions (i.e., treaties, agreements, or unilateral action). Arms control complements military preparedness to enhance national and regional security. Combatant commanders and their staffs must be aware of applicable arms control conventions and those negotiations in progress that affect their AOR.

4. Peacetime Engagement

Peacetime engagement is defined as all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. These activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In

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MULTINATIONAL ENDEAVORS

There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual interests established by our nation around the world. Here again the role of the combatant commanders in conducting the broad sweep of unified operations within their theaters is crucial and requires acute political sensitivity (the supporting joint and component commanders within combatant commands also play key roles in this regard).

SOURCE: JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States"

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addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, peacetime engagement activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, freedom of navigation exercises, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-military contacts including SAOs and military assistance advisory groups. Given their location and knowledge of the region, peacetime engagement forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to multinational operations. Space forces enhance peacetime engagement by providing a continuous worldwide presence that allows monitoring and quick reaction at all levels throughout the range of military operations.

5. Tenets of Multinational Cooperation

After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that **"mutual confidence" is the "one basic thing that will make allied commands work." This mutual confidence stems from several intangible considerations which must guide the actions of every participant**. While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.

a. **Respect.** In assigning missions to MNFs, the commander must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing MNF as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas often lead to solidification of the partnership. This includes respect for each partner's culture, religion, customs, history, and values. Seemingly junior officers in command of small contingents are the senior representatives of their government within the MNFs and, as such, should be treated with special consideration beyond their US-equivalent rank. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

b. **Rapport.** US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the MNFC (who may or may not be from the United States). This is a personal, direct relationship that only they can develop. The result of good rapport between leaders will be successful teamwork by their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort. It is essential that each member of the MNF understand their partners' national views and work to minimize friction within the MNF.

c. **Knowledge of Partners.** US commanders and their staffs should know each member of the MNF. Much time and

effort is expended in learning about the enemy and a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner.

d. **Patience.** Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, even-handed patience. This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.

6. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability

International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) with allies, coalition partners, and other friendly nations is important for achieving: the closest practical cooperation among their military forces; the most efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources; and the most effective multinational warfighting capability. International military RSI applies to both materiel and non-materiel matters.

Additional guidance on RSI may be found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2700.01, "International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations."

a. **Rationalization.** This is any action that increases the effectiveness of allied and/or coalition forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance and/or coalition. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and materiel resources and non-weapons military matters.

b. **Standardization.** Unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation among MNFs through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational, logistic, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational military operations.

A US Marine assists a Slovakian soldier with camouflage makeup.

Equipment waits to be loaded at a Bosnian airport.

- Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts for compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality (see glossary definitions). The Department of Defense is actively involved in several international standardization programs, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) many standardization forums, the five-nation (United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Air Standardization Coordinating Committee, and the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program (ABCA). The United States also participates in the Combined Communications-Electronics Board and Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Naval command, control, and communications (C3) organizations to achieve standardization and interoperability in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I).

- Alliances provide a forum to work towards standardization of national equipment, doctrine, and TTP.

Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a framework that planners utilize as much as possible in all multinational operations. Coalitions, however, are by definition created for a single purpose and usually (but not always) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They do not provide military planners with the same political resolve, commonality of aim, or degree of organizational maturity as alliances.

- Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard to administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. The mechanisms for this standardization are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materiel or non-materiel in nature. Non-materiel related ISAs should already be incorporated into US joint and Service doctrine and TTP. The five paragraph operations order is one common example. Materiel ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or adaptation processes to facilitate standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as standardization agreements (STANAGs) and are instruments that must be used to establish commonality

in procedures and equipment. The quadripartite standing agreements (QSTAGs) agreed to within the ABCA are another type of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean that they will be automatically used during an alliance's multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring resources.

See the discussion on use of acquisition cross-Service agreements (ACSAs) in Chapter III, "Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations."

- Standardization agreements like the STANAGs and QSTAGs provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC must disseminate ISAs among the MNF or rely on existing standing operating procedures (SOP) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force; in communications, logistics, or administration, for example. This is more difficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated together prior to the particular contingency. The limitations apply when non-alliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize procedures and processes.

c. **Interoperability.** Historically, the problems of interoperability have been solved — when they have been solved at all — primarily through trial and error during actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. Interoperability is an essential RSI requirement for multinational operations. Nations cannot operate effectively together unless their forces are interoperable. The most important areas for interoperability include language, communications, doctrine, and exchanges of information.

- Factors which enhance achieving interoperability start with adherence to the tenets of multinational operations in paragraph 5. Additional factors include planning for interoperability; the personalities of the commander and staff; visits to assess allied capabilities; a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism; liaison teams; multinational training exercises; and a constant effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such standards should already be established for alliance members.

- Factors that inhibit achieving interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information infrastructure systems for C4I; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; the degree of differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities.

CHAPTER II
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

> *"Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations."*
>
> **General Robert W. RisCassi, USA**
> **"Principles for Coalition Warfare," <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>**
> **Summer 1993**

1. National Security Structure

Several key individuals and organizations determine the level of US military involvement in multinational operations. The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decisions. Its membership includes four statutory members: **the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense**. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisors (see Figure II-1).

a. **National Command Authorities. The NCA consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense**, or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The NCA may employ military power to respond to situations affecting vital US interests. The Secretary has statutory authority, direction, and control over the Military Departments. By law, only the NCA has the authority to direct both the movement of personnel and the initiation of military action.

b. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President and statutory advisor to the NSC.** The Chairman may seek advice from, and consult with, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman may also seek advice from the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders. When directed by the President, the Chairman facilitates actions within the chain of command by transmitting communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the NCA; however, the Chairman does not exercise command over any of the combatant forces.

c. **Combatant Commander. The combatant commander is a commander in chief (CINC) of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.** Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. This broad authority allows the combatant commanders to perform a variety of functions, including organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks and designating objectives; and directing military operations, joint training, and logistics as necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM is exercised only by the combatant commander, and cannot be delegated.

d. **Department of State. The Department of State (DOS) is organized to provide foreign policy advice to the President, nation-to-nation representation throughout the world, US interagency coordination in the various nations with whom the United States has relations, and worldwide information services.** Key players within the DOS are shown in Figure II-2 and include the following.

• **Secretary of State.** The Secretary of State is the principal foreign policy advisor to the President and is responsible for the overall direction, coordination,

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

National Security Council

National Command Authorities

President

Secretary of Defense

Vice President

Secretary of State

Diplomatic Missions

NSC Statutory Advisors

Director of Central Intelligence

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commander Unified Command (CINC)

Commander Joint Task Force

Commander Subunified Command

Commander Component Command

Command/Direction —————
Coordination – – – – – –

Figure II-1. The National Security Structure

and supervision of US foreign relations and for the interagency activities of the US Government (USG) both outside the United States and with US missions to international organizations.

- **Ambassador or Chief of Mission.** The Ambassador, or Chief of Mission (COM), is the senior US official, military or civilian, at the embassy. The ambassador usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in a host country. This authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those

assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. A crisis may arise in a nation or an area in which the United States has no diplomatic mission. In such a situation, the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the standard authorities and responsibilities of a COM.

- **Diplomatic Missions.** The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes the representatives of all in-country USG departments and agencies. US missions to multinational organizations and alliances such as the Organization of

KEY PLAYERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Ambassador

Diplomatic Missions

Political Advisor

Country Team

Political Representatives

Figure II-2. Key Players in the Department of State

American States (OAS), NATO, and the UN include representatives of USG departments and agencies routinely engaged in activities with those organizations.

- **Political Advisor.** The political advisor (POLAD) uses knowledge of US alliance, coalition, and regional matters to assist the commander in translating political objectives into military strategy. Each geographic combatant commander is assigned a foreign service officer by the Department of State to act as the POLAD. By exception, the DOS may assign a POLAD to component or subordinate command levels. Those not assigned a foreign service officer may be assigned a civil service POLAD. The POLAD coordinates with, and ensures cooperation between, the primary political and military personnel (either US or MNF as appropriate).

- **Country Team.** The Country Team is a council of the senior officers representing each USG agency or activity operating in a host country. It is the informal title of the in-country interagency coordination among the key members of the US diplomatic mission. The Country Team works together under the Ambassador's COM direction to identify their problems and pool their skills and resources to best serve US national interests. The Country Team has no legal standing or formal structure; it is, essentially, what the COM makes it. It is made up of the COM, the deputy COM, senior foreign service councilors assigned to the embassy, and senior representatives of USG agencies assigned to the country. If there is a SAO, its chief is also a member. When appropriate, the geographic CINC and US military area commander may send representatives to the Country Team meetings, or may choose to work through the United States Defense Representative to coordinate CINC related issues. The CINC also coordinates directly with the COM on policy and strategy issues. Through the Country Team, the COM ensures that all USG activities in the country are coordinated and in harmony with each other.

- **Other Political Representatives.** There are other political representatives that military commanders will have to deal with, cooperate with, or support. These political representatives include special envoys, ambassadors-at-large, or UN high commissioners.

2. Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations

The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent

or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Additional command and control (C2) considerations include the following.

a. **Operational Control. OPCON is a type of command authority.** Within the US command structure, OPCON is transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. On a case by case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral PO under UN auspices under the OPCON of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall

OPCON over US forces. Any large scale participation of US forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and OPCON or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

OPCON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the AOR agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

b. **Foreign OPCON.** The MNFC must be aware that many different interpretations of OPCON and tactical control (TACON) exist among alliance and coalition partners and must ensure complete understanding of the terms early in the planning of the operation. The fundamental elements of US command apply when US forces are placed under the OPCON of a foreign commander. US commanders will maintain the capability to

Swedish units patrol near Sarajevo.

Large scale participation of US forces will likely be conducted under US command, or through competent regional security organizations.

report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commanders. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders will refer the matters to higher US authorities. Concerns relating to legality, mission mandate, and prudence must be addressed early in the planning process. These same considerations apply to foreign forces placed under the OPCON of US MNFCs. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. US commanders must be prepared to deal with these issues as they arise during an operation. This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. In multinational operations, consensus through compromise is often essential to success. The United States will continue to work with MNFs to streamline C2 procedures and maximize effective coordination. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the President will agree to have a foreign commander exercise overall OPCON over US forces. Any large scale participation

of US forces will likely be conducted under US command, or through competent regional security organizations such as NATO.

c. **Tactical Control.** TACON is another form of command authority exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON (when so authorized) and administrative control over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

d. **Support**. Supporting relationships will be established among participating forces in multinational operations. The establishing authority is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted, the responsibilities of the supporting commander, and the opportunities for establishing mutual support arrangements among participating forces. US force commanders must be apprised of the opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic support may be provided to forces of other nations.

e. **Coordinating Authority**. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which C2 may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. For this reason, its use during operations should be limited. Since NGOs and PVOs are not within the chain of command, coordination is the only mechanism available for working with those agencies.

f. **Chain of Command**. **The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.** There is no intention for the conditions specified earlier in this paragraph to subvert command links. While unity of command is certainly an important criterion in any command structure, the emphasis may change in operations when coordination and consensus building become the key elements and the means to achieve unity of effort.

g. **Termination and Self Protection**. The President has the right to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time. Additionally, US forces are authorized and obligated to take all necessary actions for self protection while participating in multinational operations.

3. Multinational Force Commander

"MNFC" is a general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC's command authority is determined by the participating nations. This authority could range in degree from command, to directing support relationships, to being the coordinating authority between the various nations, as discussed in paragraph 2 above. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. MNFCs unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives. Gaining consensus is an important aspect of decision making in multinational operations.

Multinational flight of aircraft participating in Operation DENY FLIGHT.

4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures

No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in an alliance or coalition.

a. **Alliances.** In alliances, national political objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Generally, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus. Doctrine, standardization, and political consensus characterize alliances. However, these command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially when alliance operations may include non-alliance members. However, use of alliances for purposes other than those for which their integrated structures were designed, or in operations for which they have not had the lead time necessary to develop integrated plans and structures, may result in behavior that more closely approximates that of a coalition.

b. **Coalitions**. Within a coalition formed to meet a specific crisis, the political views of the participants may have much greater influence over the ultimate command relationships. National pride and prestige of member nations can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Coalition missions and objectives tend to evolve over time. Likewise, force capabilities may vary over time. This variation will, in turn, affect the overall command capability to react to a changing mission. Political objectives and limitations will also change over time, further complicating the task of the MNFC. The commander should be attuned to these changes and make adjustments to the command structure and training program to mitigate negative impacts where possible.

c. **Organizational Structure.** As in the case of unified action and joint operations, basic organizational options are area or functional orientation and single-Service or joint organization, to which are added national or multinational formations. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its forces. Its functions are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. (The US military structure to conduct multinational operations is normally the joint task force.) The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the National Support Element. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. As in the case of a joint headquarters (HQ), a multinational HQ should reflect the general composition of the MNFs as a whole. The national element will be the vehicle for execution of Title 10, US Code (USC) responsibilities for US forces. (See Figure II-3 for a notional multinational command structure.)

NOTIONAL MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

LEGITIMIZING AUTHORITY*

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

US NATIONAL FORCE

NATIONAL FORCE

NATIONAL FORCE

NATIONAL COMMAND

COMMAND AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER BY PARTICIPATING NATIONS

* EXAMPLES INCLUDE UN, ALLIANCES, TREATIES, OR COALITION AGREEMENT

Figure II-3. Notional Multinational Command Structure

See JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations."

5. Alliance Command Structures

Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and standardized procedures. In alliance operations, such structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. **Alliance command and force structures often mirror the degree of alliance member participation.** Subordinate commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations. Effective operations within an alliance require that the senior political and military authorities be in agreement on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of the forces.

See Appendix A, "Commander's Checklist for Multinational Operations," for a discussion of other alliance command terminology. It may help the MNFC and the national leaders identify and agree on a command relationship definition that satisfies unity of effort while protecting their national autonomy.

Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships within an alliance, it should be recognized that because of the political sensitivities of an actual multinational operation, a considerable "learning curve" will be experienced regarding command relationships and operating procedures. **Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure.**

a. **Integrated Command Structure.** An alliance organized under an integrated command structure provides unity of effort in a multinational setting (see Figure II-4). A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key ingredients in an integrated alliance command are that a single commander be designated, that the staff be composed of representatives from all member nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs be integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.

b. **Lead Nation Command Structure**

• This structure exists in an alliance when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-5). A current example in NATO is the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, the makeup of whose HQ staff and subordinate commands depends largely on the lead nation. The command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.

• It is also possible for a lead nation command in an alliance to be characterized by an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the

ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

```
                    ALLIANCE            INTEGRATED
                   COMMANDER              STAFF

     ALLIANCE              ALLIANCE              ALLIANCE
    INTEGRATED            INTEGRATED            INTEGRATED
    COMPONENT            COMPONENT            COMPONENT

  MULTINATIONAL        MULTINATIONAL        MULTINATIONAL
     FORCES               FORCES               FORCES
```

Figure II-4. Alliance Integrated Command Structure

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

Figure II-5. Lead Nation Command Structure

commander to draw upon the expertise of alliance partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

• Rotational command, a variation of lead nation command, allows each participating nation to be the lead nation in turn. To be effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that other nations may have the opportunity to be the lead nation. However, command tours should not be so short to be operationally meaningless. Examples include the NATO Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean, which have 12 month command tours that rotate between the participants.

6. Coalition Command Structures

Many coalitions are formed in rapid response to unforeseen crises which usually occur outside the area or scope of an alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance to handle it. **The command relationships usually evolve as a coalition develops. Coalitions are most often characterized by one of three basic structures: parallel, lead nation, or a combination of the two.** In coalition operations, member nations may desire to retain even more control of their own national forces than is generally associated with alliance operations.

a. **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command, no single force commander is designated (see Figure II-6). The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers (See paragraph 7b). Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

b. **Lead Nation Command Structure.** Another common command structure in a coalition is the lead nation command (see Figure II-5). A coalition of this makeup sees

COALITION PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE (WITH COORDINATION CENTER)

COALITION HEADQUARTERS WEST	COALITION HEADQUARTERS EAST

COORDINATION CENTER

FORCES FROM COALITION NATIONS #1, #2, & #3	FORCES FROM COALITION NATIONS #4, #5, & #6

- - - - - - - COORDINATION
———————— COMMAND OR CONTROL

Figure II-6. Coalition Parallel Command Structure (With Coordination Center)

all coalition members subordinating their forces to a single partner. However, nations are generally reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead nation's interests. One means of ensuring that the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides the coalition commander with representative leadership, a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members, and facilitates the planning process.

c. **Combination.** Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-7).

7. Control of Multinational Operations

There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the control of MNFs: a liaison network and coordination centers.

a. **Liaison.** The need for effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool between the MNFC and lower levels of different nationalities, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational operations, joint forces establish liaison early with forces of each nation, fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, and developing an increased level of teamwork. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM

NATIONAL LDRS OF UNITED KINGDOM	**NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES OF UNITED STATES**	**NATIONAL LDRS OF FRANCE**	**NATIONAL LDRS OF** ARAB/ISLAMIC NATIONS

UNITED STATES FORCE COMMANDER (CINCCENT)

JOINT FORCE/THEATER OF OPS COMMANDER (SAUDI)

BRITISH FORCE COMMANDER

FRENCH FORCE COMMANDER

F2C2

GROUND COMMANDER

ARMY COMMANDER (ARCENT)

MARINE COMMANDER (MARCENT)

GROUND COMMANDER

JOINT FORCE GROUND COMMANDER (SAUDI)

AIR COMMANDER

AIR FORCE COMMANDER (CENTAF) (JFACC)

NAVY COMMANDER (NAVCENT)

AIR COMMANDER

JOINT FORCE AIR COMMANDER (SAUDI)

SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES COMMANDER (SOCCENT)

NATIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMAND
TACTICAL CONTROL
COORDINATION

KEY (terms used during DESERT STORM)

ARCENT	US Army Forces, US Central Command
CENTAF	US Central Command Air Forces
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
F2C2	friendly forces coordinating council
JFACC	joint force air component commander
MARCENT	US Marine Component, US Central Command
NAVCENT	US Navy Forces, US Central Command
SOCCENT	Special Operations Component, US Central Command

Figure II-7. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM

systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

- Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams must be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, C4I systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or normally staffed. Personnel liaison requirements must be identified early during the planning process and staffed accordingly. Team members should be language qualified or provided interpreter support.

Understanding language and culture are key factors to successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important and influential.

- Once liaison is established, liaison teams become the direct representatives of their respective commanders. Their use enhances understanding of any situation that may have been distorted by the filters of other national agencies and levels.

- Special operations forces (SOF) have proven particularly effective in integrating MNFs. Their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries' militaries allows them to improve coordination, minimize misunderstanding, and save lives during MNF operations. SOF can also provide the MNFC with accurate assessments of MNF readiness, training, and other factors.

b. **Coordination Centers.** Another means of controlling an MNF is the use of a friendly forces coordination center. US commanders should routinely advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of enhancing stability and interaction within the coalition as capabilities develop within the operating area. Not only can a coordination center be used for C2 purposes, but variations can be used to organize and control a variety of functional areas, including logistics and civil-military operations (CMO).

- Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, alert and warning, host-nation support (HNS), movement control, and training. However, as a coalition matures, the role of the

Multinational operations may require interaction with a variety of agencies, both military and nonmilitary.

coordination center can be expanded to include command activities.

- When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide a staff element to the center that is comprised of action officers who are familiar with support activities such as those listed above. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent HQ.

Apart from the central coalition coordination center mentioned above, a number of functional coordination centers may be established within an overall combined logistics coordination or support command for either an alliance or coalition operation. Activities centrally coordinated

or controlled by such centers would include movement control, centralized contracting, theater-level logistic support operations, overall medical support, and infrastructure engineering. Key to the success of such centers is the early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate control of designated activities.

8. Civil-Military Coordination

In many operating environments, the MNF interacts with a variety of entities requiring unified actions by the geographic combatant commander, including nonmilitary governmental agencies (like US Agency for International Development), NGOs (such as religious relief agencies), corporations, PVOs (such as the American Red Cross), and international organizations (such as the UN). These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar.

a. **Relationships.** The MNFC's relationship with these organizations will vary depending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved.

- Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and those of other nations) and supranational agencies (UN and alliance structures) will be marked by a degree of formality that may duplicate or at least resemble a supported and/or supporting command relationship. In war, nonmilitary objectives will usually be subordinated to military ones and any interagency structures should support military action. During MOOTW, nonmilitary objectives can either be superior, equal to, or subordinate to the military objectives. It is imperative that any interagency structure relationships

be clearly defined with respect to military support before commencement of operations other than war. Other agencies may be lead agent for operations other than war, with military forces providing support. In some cases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the agencies involved. (US NCA should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and US governmental agencies.)

- In order to achieve the greatest unity of effort, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources, and integrated into the selected concept of operations. In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations operating within the operational area. Because many of these organizations do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy, the relationship between an MNFC and PVOs and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting. An associate or partnership may more accurately describe the relationship that exists between them. In some cases, NGOs and PVOs may provide management and direction. Typically, this relationship would occur during MOOTW. Operations of NGOs and PVOs will vary based upon the nature of the MOOTW (i.e., they may be much more heavily involved in FHA operations than peace enforcement). Communicating clearly, recognizing each other's limitations, and building consensus and cooperation are critical stepping stones to achieving a unified effort. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing to

PVOs, NGOs, and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations. During war, the relationship with most NGOs and PVOs will be subordinated to the military tasks at hand.

b. **Coordination Centers.** MNFCs can achieve significant positive results in accomplishing their missions and shaping better conditions by finding positive ways to interact with these organizations. One means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs and PVOs when there is no command relationship is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in paragraph 7b. While the MNFC cannot always exert command influence over these entities, it is possible to operate through a process of communication, consensus, cooperation, and coordination. The CMOC can be useful in deconflicting and coordinating operations among these groups.

See JP 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations."

c. **Agreements.** The interagency environment does not preclude establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian government agencies. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding or terms of reference. When appropriate, heads of agencies and military commanders negotiate and co-sign plans. Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces or agencies. Also, there are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US governmental and nongovernmental agencies. A Judge Advocate should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside the Department of Defense. (Normally, the DOS will take the lead in US negotiations with supranational and other nations' agencies.) The greatest success will be achieved if these negotiations are concluded prior to the commencement of an operation.

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," provides more detail on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved.

Presidential Decision Directive 56, "Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations," signed 20 May, 1997, provides additional guidance for interagency planning, coordinating and executing MOOTW, both at the USG policy level and the operational and/or field level.

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CHAPTER III
CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. Man is the measure of all things... This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the hearts and minds of men."

Hanson W. Baldwin

1. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks

The conditions that could generate a multinational operation are varied and may result from manmade causes, such as armed aggression by one nation against another, or natural disasters. Likewise, the sources for the strategic guidance in responding to such emergencies are numerous and may come from such organizations as the UN, NATO, other existing alliances or coalitions, or an individual nation. Regardless of the source of that strategic guidance, **a detailed mission analysis must be accomplished and is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations**. **This analysis should result in a mission statement and campaign plan for the MNF as a whole and a restated mission for the US element of the force.** Before assigning tasks to various elements of the MNF, a commander, with the assistance of the staff, should conduct an estimate of the situation. This will allow the MNFC to analyze, in an organized manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This analysis should include the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the MNF components. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from alliance or likely coalition participants. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines what its contribution to the operation will be. National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC should assign a specific task to the element of the MNF most capable of completing that task. If there are several elements that can complete the task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that ensures that all elements can make meaningful contributions to the desired end state.

2. Political and Military Considerations

a. **Capabilities. As shown in Figure III-1, military capabilities of nations differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics.** The MNFC must be aware of the differences in the political constraints and capabilities of the forces of various nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. The MNFC commander may be required to spend considerable time working political issues. The commander's role as diplomat should not be underestimated. Commanders will

FACTORS AFFECTING THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS

NATIONAL INTERESTS

OBJECTIVES

ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS

DOCTRINE

ORGANIZATION

TRAINING

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

EQUIPMENT

HISTORY

DEFENSE BUDGET

DOMESTIC POLITICS

Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations

routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. Even within their own command, political limitations and constraints on the employment of the forces will greatly influence daily operations.

b. **Integration. The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and employment of all assets provided toward the achievement of a common objective.** This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior

to the deployment of forces to the operational area. This process relies heavily upon detailed coordination between prospective forces and the MNFC. The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be a purely political decision, and the commander must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual units. It may be necessary to employ the force according to national and political considerations.

c. **Employment.** The national interest of countries varies in most contingencies and results in differing degrees of commitment by alliance and coalition members. Those most committed will authorize the full range of employment. Other countries may limit their country's forces to defensive or combat service support roles.

3. Intelligence and Information

Every phase of the intelligence cycle — planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback — is substantively affected in multinational operations (see Figure III-2). In addition, the type of operations, be they war or MOOTW, imposes further unique considerations that significantly alter standard joint intelligence operations. Consequently, each coalition or alliance must develop its own intelligence procedures, utilizing available assets, that are tailored to the mission. In every case, however, the procedures developed must be responsive to the MNFC's requirements, and the delivered intelligence products timely and accurate. The release of classified information to MNFs is governed by national disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain of command in accordance with National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119, "Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations" and NDP-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority where appropriate (e.g., combined force protection purposes). However, the senior US officer needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing and releasing of information early in the process in order to ensure that the commander's requirements have been clearly stated and understood; that

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

DISSEMINATION AND INTEGRATION

PLANNING AND DIRECTION

EVALUATION

MISSION

AND FEEDBACK

ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

COLLECTION

PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION

Figure III-2. The Intelligence Cycle

Multinational operations provide unique challenges in developing intelligence procedures among the participating nations.

the guidance issued is supportive of those requirements; and that the procedures to be followed are supportable by the MNFC.

a. **Planning. When planning or directing intelligence operations, centralized control is desired but frequently unattainable.** As with overall command relationships, but especially in intelligence, a hybrid organization evolves that usually has some national assets (and the intelligence gathered by them) placed at the coalition's disposal, while others are retained under the direct control of individual nations. Due to the covert and clandestine nature of many intelligence gathering operations, nations are reluctant to share all of their sources and methods of obtaining intelligence. It is very unlikely that nations will make many of their intelligence resources directly available for tasking by a coalition. Many nations may adopt the technique of having a national intelligence cell at the MNF HQ through which tasking and/or support will flow to and/ or from the nation and the MNF HQ. The basis of a collection strategy is formed by weaving the intelligence requirements with available assets, superimposed upon the coalition's intelligence estimate of the existing geographical, political, social, cultural,

economic, and military factors in an operational area, and the likely threat courses of action. Each nation's ability to gather and process intelligence, through human or technical means, varies widely. The MNF's collection manager(s) must account for this and task resources accordingly. The manager must approach this task with an "all-source intelligence" mentality, gathering information that answers intelligence requirements from a variety of sources and fusing it, strengthening the reliability of the overall conclusions in the process. The process of gathering information, processing information, and ultimately disseminating it to a wide spectrum of users is predicated on effective communications, both vertical and lateral. The usefulness of intelligence information to the MNFC is directly proportional to its timeliness and accuracy, especially in targeting and maneuver.

b. **Communications and Processing Architectures.** Due to the perishable nature of pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units. Frequently this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment

by one country's forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition liaison officers at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant intelligence communications channels to their parent nation, and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation's mission in time to exploit it.

c. **Coordination.** Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures, practices, and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use. Coalitions, however, are frequently ad hoc organizations, created and disbanded relatively quickly. It is therefore imperative to compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination. As mentioned above, communications architectures are essential elements to coordinate. Additional areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, use of space and/or space assets, geographical location of intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence processing centers should be multinational in character, serving the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that has value in support of national missions. However,

establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation in order to make this a functioning reality. Again, the MNFC's priority intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

See JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for further details.

d. **MOOTW.** Operations conducted in a MOOTW environment demand far greater attention from the military analyst to the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics that exist within an AOR and/or joint operations area (JOA) than does conventional war. Such operations expand IPB well past geographical and force capability considerations. In a MOOTW environment, the centers of gravity frequently are not conventional military forces or terrain. Sources describing these non-traditional dynamics are plentiful. Within an operational area, the local media, diplomatic mission personnel (including attachés), NGOs, PVOs,

Close coordination is essential when alliances are formed to ensure the smooth flow of information between nations.

and international organizations can provide significant detail which is unobtainable elsewhere. Traditional reconnaissance elements such as SOF are useful as well. However, special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that combat support soldiers have during operations in a MOOTW environment. Given that the operational area is non-traditional (i.e., non-linear), medical personnel, transportation personnel, contracting personnel, CA personnel, psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel, and soldiers performing missions involving extensive contact with the local population will provide a much better source for information than in conventional operations. These personnel will operate in the HN environment routinely and will be able to discern change within it.

See JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," for further details.

e. **Other Considerations.** It is important to consider the ramifications of labeling information about an AOR and/or JOA as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitary organizations. In many cultures, the perception of intelligence connotes information gathered on a nation's citizenry to exploit it. Further, attempts to exchange information with many NGOs and PVOs would likely be stifled as they strive to maintain political neutrality throughout the world and would not associate in any perceived intelligence gathering attempts. Therefore, unclassified facts and/or data should be referred to as information in order to facilitate its exchange throughout the AOR and/or JOA for the purpose of fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict or providing support.

f. **Geospatial Information & Services (GI&S).** Multinational operations require interoperable GI&S data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to work on a standard datum and ensure that all products utilize that datum. A multinational GI&S plan must coordinate all products for use by member forces, to include access approval procedures, blending their assets into a cohesive production program.

See JP 2-03, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations," for further details.

4. Logistics and Host-Nation Support

Effective logistic support is fundamental to operational success; the MNFC must be able to logistically influence the conduct of operations. Multinational operations increase the complexity of executing logistics and reduce the degree of flexibility normally found in a national logistic support system. Although each nation is responsible for logistic support of its national forces, the execution of multinational logistics must be a collective responsibility of the nations comprising the MNF. This collective responsibility is critical and cannot be overstressed. Multinational logistics should be flexible, responsive, predictive, and should provide timely sustainment throughout the entire MNF. The multinational logistic plan should incorporate the logistic requirements and capabilities of the MNF to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. The intent is to provide the MNFC with the timely introduction and proper mix of support units and resources into the operational area. Achievement of this goal requires considerable cooperation and continuous coordination among (and between) all elements of the logistic support and operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation's termination.

Unloading an Air Force C-5 Galaxy in Haiti.

a. **Responsibility.** The responsibility for providing logistic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, unless previously agreed to in accordance with alliance implementing arrangements (IAs) or coalition ISAs. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support exist in multinational operations and must be planned to complement partners' capabilities and minimize weaknesses. To require each nation in an MNF to perform all logistic functions separately would be inefficient, expensive, and hinder the MNFC's ability to influence operations logistically. The synergy required for successful multinational logistics is centralized control and coordination of common services and common funding for logistic services where appropriate (e.g., transportation, billeting) to reduce overall costs.

See JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations."

b. **Differences.** Among the participating nations, there will be differences in logistics doctrine, organizational capabilities, SOPs (to include reporting formats), terminology and definitions, methods for computing requirements, organizational policies, and automated data processing (ADP) support systems. These differences must be understood by all, harmonized where realistically possible, and accounted for during OPLAN formulation. IAs and ISAs should be clearly specified in OPLANs to ensure their use by multinational formations. Multinational logistics planning must occur simultaneously and concurrently with operation planning. Such plans should be developed in consonance with prospective participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The challenge of planning is in simultaneously supporting an ongoing operation while developing the support organization, bilateral and multilateral agreements and associated C2 mechanisms to achieve unity of effort. To the extent that concurrent planning occurs, many of these challenges may be avoided or minimized.

c. **Authority.** MNFCs may have directive logistic authority if coordinated in plan development or when consent is provided by participating national commands. Requests will be made to national commanders to assume organizational missions in support of MNFs. In some cases, the MNFC may exercise control over the various national logistic units. In other cases, the MNFC may

have only coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend upon existing agreements and ad hoc arrangements negotiated with participating nations and/or as identified in the campaign plan and/or OPLAN. The MNFC may delegate to component commanders (land, maritime, air) only the level of coordinating authority granted by the individual nations. The MNFC may establish a logistic coordination or control center headed by a senior logistic coordinator to control or coordinate common or theater-level logistic support within the operational area. Some of the major support issues that must be resolved by the MNFC include the following.

- Ensuring that the mutual logistic support for US forces is in accordance with existing legal authorities. The Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, ACSA authority, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (as amended), the Fly America Act, and the Cargo Preference Acts all have a bearing on the degree of support that the United States can provide to or receive from other nations. In addition, specific legislative language

contained in DOD authorization or appropriation acts may limit US ability to receive and/or provide logistic support from and/or to allies.

- Identification of common supplies and services that might be provided by one nation or a multinational organization.

- Establishing if, when, and how an MNFC will be provided authority over national logistic assets (to include authority for redistribution of national supplies under emergency conditions). This requires a national decision by participating nations.

- Availability and use of common and/or up-front funding for establishing cost-effective contracts, establishing multinational headquarters, and general and/or common support.

- Development of policies and procedures to account and reimburse for logistic services and supplies exchanged between the United States and other nations under the ACSA authority.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — 1965

"The intervention [in the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965], was not a mission of conquest, but rather an effort to safeguard the lives of US and other nationals and to restore order in the country without taking sides in the dispute... In addition to providing security of US property and evacuating American citizens... [the] US military forces conducted urban warfare operations...participated in civil affairs and psychological warfare programs, supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement, and provided troops for the Inter-American Peace Force...The establishment of the IAPF was a historic first. [It] demonstrated that multinational forces can work together effectively...It also reaffirmed the requirement for joint doctrine..., [however several] problems were encountered…the lack of adequate strategic communications... Pertinent intelligence and availability of maps... [lack of] joint public affairs organization representing the Department of Defense, the State Department and other... agencies."

SOURCE: James B. Motley

- Establishment of responsibility and release procedures for national assets.

- Development of the means to maintain national asset accountability (from the national sustaining base to the front line units).

- Ensuring compatibility and interoperability of communications networks to include ADP interfaces between national logistic organizations of the MNF and national support systems, and how to integrate information classification requirements.

- Prioritization, C2, allocation, and use of common infrastructure capabilities (e.g., ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations.

- Identification and distribution of those ISAs (STANAGs, QSTAGSs) that can facilitate the provision of multinational logistic support.

d. **Civilians and Contractors.** The use of civilian contractors and HNS agencies often increases the logistic capability of the MNF. Non-uniformed support agencies may be integrated into the logistic structure of the MNF to ensure their most effective employment and use. Commanders should be prepared to assume all essential logistic-related responsibilities in the event this support is curtailed or terminated. The CMOC, as well as logistic coordination centers, may be useful in coordinating with HN infrastructure. Consideration should be given to the centralization of HNS expertise (legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative) to ensure that the force's total requirements are known and to prevent competition between partners. Allocation of this support is based on command priorities which best support the operational objectives. Additionally, nations must agree on whether

an MNF commander will have the authority to conclude HNS arrangements or whether prior national approval is required.

e. **Planning. Often little planning time is available prior to a multinational operation. However, to the extent that planning time is available, logistic support planning should be conducted concurrently with operational planning.** Since such planning is critical, it will be frequently necessary to share partial or incomplete planning data (or data not fully approved) with prospective partners. **Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations and, where situations permit, come to agreement on which nations will be responsible for providing logistic support functions for the MNF, the task organization of the logistic units to support the MNF, and the procedures and methods for how the support will be provided.** At the MNF HQ, the focus should be on measuring the requirements of executing the campaign plan, providing advance estimates of these requirements to national units, and ensuring that proper controls are in place to deconflict and permit movement and processing. Frequently, planning HQ, especially logistic planning HQ, are staffed with personnel temporarily assigned. To facilitate early planning, personnel must be identified and made available in a timely manner. There are three generally accepted methods of executing cooperative logistics in an MNF. These can be used singularly or in combination. Regardless of the mutual support method(s) used, it is imperative that national decisions and commitments to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during the planning cycle. Assuming a lead nation or role specialization nation status does not grant the US forces any additional legal authority to provide support to coalition partners on a non-reimbursable basis.

- In the lead nation concept, a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more logistic functions within a specified geographic area in support of the MNF.

- In a role specialization agreement, a nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNF.

- Using pooled assets and resources, two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the MNF.

The role specialist nation (RSN) mission in NATO can be implemented for a NATO operation that includes member and non-member nations. Specific planning considerations should address the US military role as the RSN for a specific logistic commodity and the on-demand support level available when another nation provides a specified commodity as the RSN. During the planning process, components and defense agencies should prepare, develop, and disseminate specific policies and procedures for potential RSN applications in NATO and other multinational operations. US participation as an RSN often is constrained by legal authorities. This factor must be considered early in the planning process so that any required agreements or arrangements can be put in place prior to the operation.

f. **Available HNS Infrastructure.** Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is critical to understanding force sustainability. MNF logistic planners should evaluate what facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel, and medical support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition forces. First, assess the ability of the HN to receive US and/or MNF personnel and equipment (e.g., ports and airfields). Second, determine the capability of transportation systems to move forces once

they arrive in theater. Third, evaluate availability of logistic support. The impact of obtaining HNS upon the host country's national economy must also be considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must be recognized and addressed during the planning process. In addition, specific technical agreements in many areas (e.g., environmental clean-up, levying of customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit and disposal) must be developed to augment status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) that may have been concluded with HNs.

g. **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Authority.** Normally, USG acquisitions must be accomplished by means of a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract. Transfers of defense goods and services to foreign nations must generally be done through a foreign military sales (FMS) case. Often, in coalition operations, these methods may prove to be cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient. Under ACSA authority (10 USC 2341 and following) the Secretary of Defense can enter into agreements for the acquisition of or cross-servicing of logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. These agreements can be with eligible nations and international organizations of which the United States is a member. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement which is generally supplemented by an IA. The IA contains points of contact and specific details of the transaction and payment procedures and under which orders for logistic support supplies and services are placed. Neither party is obligated until the order is accepted.

- Logistic support, supplies, and services is defined as food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations

An Acquisition and Cross-Servicing agreement would provide for the logistic requirements needed to support multinational operations.

support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services.

- Items that may not be acquired or transferred under the ACSA authority include weapons systems, major end items of equipment (except for temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other items of military equipment not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to 22 USC 2778(a)(1), guided missiles, naval mines and torpedoes, nuclear ammunition, cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components, chaff and chaff dispensers, guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition, and chemical ammunition (other than riot control agents (RCA)).

h. **Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Title 22 US Code.** The AECA FMS agreement negotiated between the United States and an allied and/or coalition country or organization is the preferred agreement for operations other than short-term emergent emergency operations. The primary instruments are: the letter of request from the country or organization requesting logistic support; and the letter of offer and letter of acceptance (LOA) from the United States. Within this agreement, the basic ordering agreement (BOA) may be included to establish an account for ordering a wide range of undefined materiel requirements, unknown at the signing of the LOA. A BOA is particularly useful for food, fuel, medical, ammunition, unscheduled repairs, and repair parts. Using this agreement, the full range of logistic support from routine through emergency requirements may be provided, including weapon systems and major end items if necessary. The LOA provides a formal contractual agreement and includes the use of established logistic systems in the FMS community. Many of the countries interface directly with US logistic systems. US logistic systems, procedures, and methods of financial accounting are institutionalized and documented by DOD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," to support eligible country's armed forces today. For the purposes of training and standardization the emergency operation's systems should be the same as those used for the routine peacetime

operations. Many countries are already trained and use the familiar FMS process.

- The two basic elements are a signed LOA and funded accounts to support the country's requirements. The full range of materiel, supplies and services, including weapon systems and major end items, may be provided under the AECA.

- Benefits of the AECA and/or FMS system include the following.

  - •• Use of standard logistic systems.

  - •• Complete financial accountability.

  - •• Control of materiel in accordance with the country and/or organization's assigned force activity designator and the priority assigned individual requests.

  - •• Handling of "non-standard" item requisitions. Existing FMS logistic systems are set up to support these requirements.

  - •• May prevent an excessive drawdown on US forces' logistic support and/or unit organic supplies and equipment.

  - •• Transportation of materiel to the operational area, particularly ammunition, may be provided utilizing the country's assets and handling system, thereby reducing the transportation requirements on the Defense Transportation System during a crisis situation.

i. **Contingency Contracting.** Contracting is another essential tool of the logistician in support of the mission, and a significant enhancement to the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of combat forces into the operational area. Contingency contracting is the process of contracting for locally available supplies, services, and construction in immediate support of deployed units, either at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. Properly used, contracting is an effective force multiplier for deployed forces during a contingency. It can serve to reduce dependence on the continental United States-based logistic system. Contracting can affect force structure and personnel ceiling requirements, allow more nations to participate, save funds, and enhance infrastructure recovery. Satisfying requirements for supplies and services by local contracting can improve response time and reduce logistic footprints. Contracting can augment the existing logistic support capability, providing an additional source for critically required supplies and services.

However, as indicated for HNS, the contractor resources available in theater are to be prioritized by the MNFC or the designated logistic coordinator. In doing so, consideration must be given to the impact of local contracting upon the HN's economy and infrastructure. These economic effects may influence attainment of the eventual end state within the operational area and timing of withdrawal. External contractors may be used; however, their operation in theater must be addressed in a SOFA or other international agreement, where applicable, for such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees.

- Contingency contracting will not replace HNS or the existing supply systems where these systems are available or operational. However, deployments most likely to require employment of contingency contracting are those occurring in areas of the world where there are few, if any, HNS agreements.

- Most recent deployments of US forces have been joint operations supporting contingencies in remote areas of the world. The trend of world events suggests that such operations will

become more probable in the future. Whether for FHA, disaster relief, peacekeeping, NEO, war, or other contingencies, such operations may require the creation of joint contracting elements, staffed by personnel from all Services operating in the theater. Services will coordinate and cooperate in development of contingency contracting procedures to enhance the ability of contracting to be an effective force multiplier. Joint contracting elements will also preclude inter-Service competition for local supplies and services and more effectively use scarce personnel resources during a contingency.

• Contingency contracting warrants special treatment because of the complex nature of the acquisition process and the need to support operational forces. This necessitates that the combatant commanders formulate comprehensive implementation plans that will support this essential element of the logistic chain. This will ensure that proper legal methods are employed in the procurement of supplies and services and that military forces receive the required

logistic resources to perform their mission.

5. Language, Culture, and Sovereignty

a. **Language. Differing languages within an MNF can present a real challenge to unity of effort.** US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Language content is conveyed by word choice, mannerisms, and other means, and information loss, miscommunications, and misunderstandings can have a negative effect on operations. The time required to receive information, process it, develop operational plans from it, translate the plans, and distribute them to multinational partners can adversely impact the speed and tempo of operations. Planners may lessen these difficulties by early identification of translator support and the use of multilingual liaison personnel. Contractor support for interpreters and translators should be addressed during the planning phase. HN resources may be very important and may serve an especially important role if available during the initial

An Estonian soldier mans a checkpoint during a multinational exercise.

stages of the deployment. In addition, the importance of staffing HQ with qualified liaison personnel cannot be minimized. This will usually place additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical to the success of any multinational mission.

b. **Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact.** Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

c. **Linguists and Area Experts. To assist with cultural and language challenges, the JFC employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service components or from other US agencies.** In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage. The use of such abilities should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications. Appropriate security measures should be taken to ensure that contracted linguists or area experts recruited to assist the commander are not able to jeopardize the operation through espionage or subversion.

d. **Sovereignty Issues.** Sovereignty issues will be most difficult for the MNFC to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by host country nations. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged and often

the MNFC (and subordinates) must act as "diplomats" as well as "warriors." MNFCs should address all sovereignty issues to ensure that operations are not adversely affected. MNFCs should seek advice on sovereignty issues from the DOS, Country Teams, and the Ambassador of the HN. Examples include: collecting and sharing information, basing, overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, location and access, railheads, border crossings, and operations in the territorial sea. The commander may create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. However, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed SOFAs. In many cases SAOs, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations resident in the HN will have detailed knowledge and could establish good will in these areas which may be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or establishing a congenial relationship in the HN.

6. Health Service Support

Multinational delivery of health services presents numerous challenges. How health services are delivered in the field may be a factor in a particular nation's decision to participate. Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination and planning. Exchange of blood and blood products between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated as early as possible. Blood audit trails must be established for each nation providing blood during an operation. Effective C2 of medical operations is critical to mission success. An MNF surgeon may be appointed for each

Health services for multinational operations could pose many challenges for the multinational force commander.

participating command and task force. A medical coordination center staffed with representatives from participating nations should be established. Such a center will facilitate coordination of health service support (HSS) initiatives, regionalization, standardization and interoperability, review of plans, and integration with overall operation. This coordination center will coordinate the evacuation of casualties to non-national medical facilities. Often, casualties from one nation will use the medical facilities of another nation. Casualty evacuation and use of non-national medical facilities must be closely coordinated. The MNFCs need to assess MNF HSS requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively, and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. The senior US commander should be apprised of legal limitations concerning the use of non-US medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by US forces. The commander should also be apprised of limitations of providing medical care or supplies to non-US forces as well as the legal requirement to treat wounded enemy prisoners of war. Mutual medical support must be in accordance with existing legal authorities in the same manner as logistic and HNS.

Coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or ACSA authority must be addressed during the multinational planning process. Theater medical evacuation requires careful planning and an ACSA.

7. Termination and Transition

Mission analysis, an identifiable end state, and the political policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements. The commander determines the objectives that will achieve the desired end state. Objectives and conditions must be clearly defined, measurable, and attainable. In the absence of other termination criteria, nations may select an arbitrary date for withdrawal of their forces. Transferring control of an operation from or to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations requires detailed planning and execution. This is even more important during mission start-up. Planning for such transfers should occur as part of operation planning. Disposal of equipment, a task that may become a political issue, must be carefully planned.

NOTE: Environmental issues must be addressed during initial planning.

8. Communications

Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning considerations include frequency management, equipment compatibility, procedural compatibility, cryptographic and information security, identification friend or foe, and data-link protocols. MNFCs should anticipate that some forces from MNF member nations will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leaderships. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaderships external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the MNF. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically proficient participant. Effective communications support must be established which allows control over diverse, widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning requirement to support widely dispersed elements. The MNFC should address the need for integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning phase of the operation. MNF planning and technical communications systems control centers should be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications and information operations. Liaison officer (LNO) teams should be sent to other MNF HQs to facilitate integration of operations. These LNO teams should deploy with sufficient communications equipment to conduct operations with their respective HQs. Consideration should also be given to possible degradation of communications due to the extended distances over which the MNF must operate and the effects of enemy exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Planning for communications support must also include provisions which allow execution of required communications under adverse conditions. Additionally, US law requires prior international and implementing agreements defining quid pro quo payments for allied use of the Defense Information Systems Network and military satellite communications assets.

9. Force Protection

a. Force protection are actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD resources (to include family members), facilities, and critical information. These measures, both offensive and defensive, conserve the force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, and disease. Force protection planning considerations during multinational operations are similar to US-only operations. There are, however, certain facets about force protection in a multinational environment that must be considered.

See JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," for planning force protection.

b. Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute force protection in the same way as the US Military. Some nation's armed forces may or may not be willing or able to assume more risk than US forces. The Unified Command Plan designates all force protection responsibilities to the geographic combatant commander for all service members within their AOR. US commanders, whether under US control or under a command relationship to a

multinational or coalition force, must continuously assess threats and vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate force protection countermeasures in accordance with published combatant commander directives.

c. Special consideration must be given to personnel who must interact with local populations, such as civil affairs, PSYOP, and local contract liaison. Separate assessments should be conducted to determine the appropriate protection requirement in order to facilitate the accomplishment of their tasks.

d. Throughout multinational operations, risk management should be used to reduce or offset risk by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk. The risk management process helps commanders make decisions that weigh risk against mission accomplishment.

e. Another significant problem facing the multinational force is the potential for fratricide. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference can increase this risk. Multinational force support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing and reducing the fratricide risk to the multinational force by recommending operational coordination measures or technological solutions.

f. Finally, commanders must understand that US forces, as part of a multinational force, can potentially be a greater target. Because of the US policy of engagement, the US military often assumes the leadership role in multinational operations. As a result of US global leadership, adversaries may view attacks against American Service members as a higher payoff target. As such, commanders must continue security programs to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment in all locations and situations.

10. International Law and the Law of War

US forces will comply with applicable US and international law during the conduct of all military operations. US forces will apply the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all operations. US commanders will ensure that the DOD Law of War Program is implemented in accordance with DOD and Service directives, and that adequate procedures are in place to ensure that all violations of the law of war are promptly reported and thoroughly investigated in accordance with those directives. Legal advisors should be immediately available at all appropriate levels of command and during all stages of operation planning and execution to provide advice concerning law of war compliance.

a. **Treatment of Combatants.** Combatants are those persons who have the right under international law to participate directly in armed conflict and include all members of the regularly organized armed forces of a party to the conflict (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defense personnel, and members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defense status). Irregular forces who are under responsible command, carry their arms openly, distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, are also considered combatants. Although combatants are lawful targets, the right of US forces to injure combatants is limited by the law of war.

b. **Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs).** Combatants that have surrendered or otherwise fallen into enemy hands are entitled to POW status and are protected by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. Generally, they must be treated humanely and protected against violence, intimidation,

insult, and public curiosity. Should a question arise regarding a captive's entitlement to POW status, that individual should be accorded POW treatment until a competent tribunal determines the status to which that individual is properly entitled.

c. **Treatment of Noncombatants.** Noncombatants are those individuals who do not form a part of the armed forces and who otherwise refrain from the commission of hostile acts. Noncombatants also include those members of the armed forces who enjoy special protected status, such as medical personnel and chaplains, or who have been rendered incapable of combat by wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or capture. The law of war prohibits making noncombatant persons the object of intentional attack and requires that they be safeguarded against injury not incidental to military operations directed against military objectives. Noncombatants who take a direct part in hostilities by taking up arms or otherwise trying to kill, injure, capture, or impede the mission accomplishment of US and/or MNF personnel or destroy US and/or MNF property lose their immunity and may be attacked.

d. **Treatment of Other Detainees.** For reasons of force protection or mission accomplishment, US forces may detain personnel during multinational operations when the United States is not a party to an armed conflict. Although not POWs, such detainees will be accorded the minimum protections thereof and shall be treated humanely under all circumstances until released or turned over to appropriate HN or international authorities.

11. The Law of the Sea

All waters seaward of the territorial sea (contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and high seas) are international waters in which the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are preserved to the international community. The high seas include all parts of the ocean seaward of the exclusive economic zone. The high seas are open to all States, and no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. Nations may have interpretations of some aspects of the law of the sea which differ subtly or materially from those of other partners, particularly as they may relate to rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage, or recognition or nonrecognition of certain excessive maritime claims of third states. The maritime component commander

Under international law, the high seas are open to all States, and high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply to all waters seaward of the territorial sea.

MNFCs seek to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and sharing resources, such as the loan of equipment.

(MCC) must be cognizant of national differences in interpretation and the impact that may have on operations. Commanders of national forces have a particular responsibility to apprise the MCC of any national interpretations that may be pertinent. Legal support is critical for multinational operations, particularly when involved in an HN, including its territorial waters and airspace. Participating nations should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to ensure that there is a comprehensive understanding of any national differences governing operations at sea or differences in national positions with respect to the maritime claims of nations in a theater of operations.

12. Rules of Engagement

Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time consuming process and should be addressed early in the planning process. An area of particular concern in multinational ROE is clarifying to what extent RCAs are authorized for use. Even though the participants may have similar political mandates, ROE may differ among the nations represented. In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable. The commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. In some cases, MNFCs can use the differences in national policies to their advantage. US forces assigned OPCON to an MNF will follow the ROE of the MNF unless otherwise directed by the NCA. US forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a foreign MNFC only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that MNF are consistent with US policy guidance on individual and unit self-defense as contained in the standing rules of engagement (SROE) (CJCSI 3121.01 CH1, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces"). SROE serve as the default ROE and are applicable at all times during multinational operations unless superseded by approved supplemental ROE.

13. Doctrine, Training, and Resources

Some nations possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of strategic,

operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs that support military forces much smaller than US forces. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations, while others concern themselves with insurgency or other forms of warfare. US joint doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the guidelines provided by the overall commander's intent. Some nations' forces may be unfamiliar with this approach and be uncertain about its implementation in the multinational operation.

a. **Doctrine.** US multinational doctrine endeavors to be compatible with both US joint doctrine and MNF capabilities. Due to different levels of training, equipment, and technologies, commanders must carefully consider which units are best suited for particular missions. One example of this is the Multinational Maritime Operations manual which has been created as a doctrinal guide for coalition operations.

b. **Training and Resources.** When the situation permits, MNFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and sharing resources consistent with agreements between alliance and coalition members, such as the loan of equipment (e.g., radios, vehicles, or weapons). Multinational exercises are key components of training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. Simulation can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces. Loans of equipment and sharing of logistic resources are either covered under the Arms Export Control Act or the NATO Mutual Support Act, and require a negotiated ACSA (see DOD Directive (DODD) 2010.9, "Mutual Logistic Support Between the United States and Government Eligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary

Bodies," Draft) or foreign military sale. Multinational exercises should include robust logistics play in order to exercise multinational logistic support mechanisms and identify possible constraints in providing or receiving logistic support with forces from other nations.

14. Media

Today's technological environment provides the media with greater access to military operations. Commanders should consider media impact during planning and execution of multinational operations. Planning should facilitate the interaction between the military and the national and international press organizations. Each nation has its own viewpoint on media freedom and access, and the MNFC should consider this during planning. Respect for the viewpoints of other nations must be demonstrated even if they are contrary to that of the United States. Simplicity should be the driving factor in planning for media support in a multinational environment. Commanders should plan for regular media access. Ground rules need to be established which are clear and maintain appropriate operations security. Media considerations will be channeled through a media coordination center at the MNFC level, staffed by representatives from participating nations. The MNFC's media coordination center will work on an integrated basis with representative international organizations operating within the operational area. Media operations must be coordinated both within the US forces chain of command and through MNF channels. Predeployment media training for military and civilian personnel (media included) is essential. Ensure early and continuous coordination between public affairs, CA, and PSYOP so that their messages are not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the MNFC. Include public affairs and public information officers in the planning process. Develop a policy for releasing information on incidents, especially casualty reports. Policy should distinguish

between situations where the victims are from one nation or from several nations.

See JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations," for additional details.

15. Religious Ministry Support

Religious cultural differences of both participating nations and HNs must be identified and addressed during the planning stages to be properly recognized during execution. Religious considerations may seriously impact multinational operations. The primary responsibility for religious ministry support in multinational operations remains with the national component commanders. The MNFC may assign the most senior national component chaplain to the MNFC staff if this position is not already staffed. This will help ensure comprehensive ministry cooperation and respect for any religious sensitivities of the HN and the national components.

16. Meteorology and Oceanography

The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that knowledge to mission execution could contribute significantly to the success of a multinational operation. The state of the weather and oceans can be a force multiplier or force detractor. Successful commanders use the environment to their advantage. In multinational operations, early planning is critical. Differences in language, techniques, data formats, and communications must be overcome prior to any operation. To ensure that meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) forces of all participating nations operate together, the MNFC may designate a senior METOC officer to coordinate METOC support. This officer will ensure that all METOC forces operate from a coordinated planning forecast, and that all METOC requirements are met.

17. Environmental Considerations

a. Environmental considerations may be an important factor in any joint multinational operation. These considerations include the following.

- Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.

- Cleanup of base camps and other occupied areas to an appropriate level.

- Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the operational area.

- Environmental safety and health.

- Hazardous material management.

- Hazardous waste disposal.

- Medical and infectious wastes management and disposal.

- Natural and cultural resources protection.

- Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

- Pesticide management.

- Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.

- Solid waste management and disposal.

- Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.

- Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.

b. To the extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, commanders

should take these environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of a multinational operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be different from the normal practices of any of the member nations and obtain agreement from participating nations. Besides agreeing on common goals and objectives for the operation, commanders of participating multinational forces should reach some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure to accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex for the operation.

For a further discussion of environmental considerations refer to JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

> "Organizations created to fight the last war better are not going to win the next."
>
> **LTG James M. Gavin, USA**
> **(1908-1990)**

SECTION A. GENERAL-UNIFIED ACTION

1. General

When providing alliance or coalition leadership, the geographic combatant commander should ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of the respective allies, to include land, maritime, air, special operations, information operations (IO), search and rescue, and space support operations. These operations, in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or UN operations, must all be integrated to achieve a strategic unity of effort and the strategic end state.

SECTION B. LAND OPERATIONS

2. General

Land operations occur across the range of military operations, during war and MOOTW. The operational aim of land forces during wartime, as an integral portion of a joint force, is to conduct military operations in support of the MNFC objectives. During MOOTW, the operational aim is to achieve the MNF end state constituting success.

a. **Capabilities of Land Forces (see Figure IV-1).**

- **Operational Mobility.** MNFCs can attain the degree of operational mobility necessary through the proper use of maneuver. At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which MNFCs set the terms of military operations by time and location, decline military operations, or exploit existing situations. The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity. There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority, thereby facilitating freedom of action, is one example. Concentration of forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum can be key to the MNFC's campaign or major operation. The MNFC must consider the contribution of MNFs in attaining positional advantage. At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. Seamless integration of MNFs, capabilities, and systems enhances the MNFC's ability to exploit positional advantage, maintain the degree of operational mobility desired, and provide an inherent level of force protection.

- **Interoperability.** Failure to ensure interoperability presents a clear threat that all MNF participants recognize. There are material and non-material solutions to interoperability challenges.

CAPABILITIES OF LAND FORCES

Figure IV-1. Capabilities of Land Forces

Standardization enhances interoperability, but time and resources will probably preclude complete standardization. Achieving operations effectiveness in multinational land formations is an integral part of effective multinational operations.

For further information, see CJCSI 2700.01, "International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations."

• **Sustainability. Land forces logistic support** includes, but is not limited to, manpower, medical, maintenance, supplies, storage facilities, and transportation, with emphasis on technology and common sourcing. The extent of in-theater logistic infrastructure, including medical support and corresponding capabilities, will relate to

the force levels employed and the type of operation and will be subject to the limitations of geography, distances, and transportation. Sustainability activities compete for many of the same transportation assets as those needed for the movement of land forces. Logistic support can be centralized or decentralized. Centralized support is usually more cost effective, but can be inflexible and unresponsive. Decentralized support is often less efficient, but is generally more adaptive to the requirements of local commanders. The MNFC makes a determination on how to organize logistic support based on the situation.

• **Versatility. Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements.** The MNFC must be involved in the initial tailoring of the force to meet mission requirements by rationalizing prospective force

OPERATIONAL MOBILITY

The most serious consequence of the offensive (Western Front, 21 March 1918), from the German point of view, had been the institution of an allied unified command. Thus, despite its initial brilliant tactical success, the offensive was a strategic failure. There were three main reasons for this: (1) Lack of logistic mobility. Once a breakthrough had been made, the Germans found themselves advancing across land devastated by 4 years of war, particularly by their own "scorched earth" measures at the time of the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. They did not have the means of keeping up a flow of ammunition, food, and other supplies to their troops advancing through a veritable quagmire. (2) Lack of Strategic Mobility. The same problem prevented them from fully exploiting the gap with fast-moving mobile forces, or even from providing adequate reinforcements and replacements to the breakthrough troops. (3) Lack of mobile tactical fire support. Once the breakthrough was made, the front-line infantry quickly outran their artillery, which was unable to advance in any significant numbers through the roadless morass. Thus when the British were finally able to move reserves into the gap, the Germans lacked sufficient firepower to maintain the momentum of their drive or to deal adequately with the British fighter planes strafing them.

SOURCE: R. Ernest Dupuy

contributions during the planning phase. Versatility implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across the range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels as required by the MNFC. Trained leaders with versatile and maneuverable air and surface forces will enable the MNF to operate effectively during war and MOOTW.

b. **Land Component Commander (LCC)**

- To most effectively exploit the capabilities of multinational land forces, the MNFC normally designates an overall LCC. The LCC must shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. In the absence of an LCC, the MNFC must plan, direct, and control land operations. Due to the complexity and fluidity of land operations, designation of an LCC may provide the MNFC greater flexibility to conduct multinational operations.

c. **Geographical Relationships**

- The MNFC provides guidance to major subordinate commanders and component commanders using campaign plans, OPLANs, and operation orders. The MNFC assigns or attaches forces to subordinate commands, to the extent agreed to by the participating nations. Subordinate commanders plan and execute supporting operations. This ensures that activities are synchronized both internally and with other elements of the MNF.

- **Area of Operations.** MNFCs may define an AO for land forces. The land AO will normally have forward, lateral, and rear boundaries. They do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the MNF, but are large enough for the LCC to accomplish assigned missions and protect the land forces. The size, shape, and positioning of the LCC's AO will be established by the MNFC based on the concept of

operations and the LCC's requirement to maneuver and protect the forces.

d. **Supported and Supporting Relationships**

- In order to most effectively synchronize operations, the MNFC will establish supported and supporting relationships among forces. During such relationships, the supported commander must clearly articulate the vision of operations to those supporting commanders that apply forces within the supported commander's boundaries. Supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

- The LCC is the supported commander within the AO designated by the MNFC. Within this designated AO, the LCC synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, the LCC has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within the AO. Within the MNF operational area, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within the land AO with operational area-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the MNFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the operational area, including within the LCC's AO. In coordination with the LCC, those commanders designated by the MNFC to execute operational area-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these MNFC prioritized operations and attack targets within the LCC AO.

e. **Synchronizing MNF Land Operations**

- The LCC synchronizes joint multinational fires within the AO to assist land, maritime, air, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. These fires include both lethal and nonlethal effects. Successful joint multinational fires are enhanced by the establishment of common doctrine and procedures, seamless communications, system interoperability, and liaison.

The LCC is responsible for the synchronization of operations within the AO.

• **Maneuver and interdiction are two key components of MNF operations. Synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within the AO provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the LCC.** Interdiction and maneuver are not separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve campaign objectives. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists land commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

• The LCC is directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land maneuver supports that maneuver to enable the LCC to achieve the MNFCs objectives.

SECTION C. MARITIME OPERATIONS

3. General

Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities exercising sea control or projecting power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily Navy and Marine or naval infantry; however, they may also include maritime-focused air elements, expeditionary forces, or other government agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.

a. **Characteristics of Maritime Forces.** As shown in Figure IV-2, **the qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and/or military instruments in support of government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility.** Maritime forces may be used to reassure or assist allies and friends in times of distress, deter and respond to aggression, and influence unstable situations.

• **Readiness.** One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. As a matter of course, by maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services in support of peacetime operations.

• **Flexibility.** Maritime forces have been employed in the resolution of many international crises since the end of World War II. The flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus and reconfigure and realign forces to handle a variety of contingencies by providing a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistic or administrative skills. In tasks ranging from forcible entry and air interdiction operations to NEOs, disaster relief, show of force, maritime interdiction, and FHA, maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or time of crisis. The strategic and tactical C3 capabilities of maritime forces provide for a controllable force to complement diplomatic efforts. In all cases, maritime forces provide both a perception and a potential for action ashore.

• **Self-Sustainment.** Although the degree of self-sustainment achievable by an allied force will be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME FORCES

MOBILITY

READINESS

MARITIME

SELF-SUSTAINABILIT

FLEXIBILITY

Figure IV-2. Characteristics of Maritime Forces

units committed by the participants, maritime forces are capable of operating in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With the provision of replenishment-at-sea and on-station replacement of personnel and ships, maritime operations may be continued indefinitely. To support the sustainability of maritime forces, it may be necessary to establish multinational forward and/ or advanced logistic sites. A force logistic coordinator should be designated for the afloat maritime forces who will coordinate with the ashore multinational logistic coordinator.

• **Mobility.** Maritime forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a sustained period, respond to a crisis rapidly, and deploy in combat with authority. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from

over-the-horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces can be quickly withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly either from one end of the theater to another or from one theater to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces provides commanders with a tactical and operational advantage. In addition to being able to project power, maritime forces have been useful in supporting FHA and NEOs by meeting basic water, food, and medical support during such operations.

b. **Waterspace Management.** Waterspace management is complex even under ideal circumstances in which all participants are fully conversant with common operating

operations, Marine expeditionary operations provide the MNFC with an important capability. Land, sea, and air forces can conduct expeditionary operations, but Marine Corps forces are typically the most accomplished practitioners of expeditionary operations. Flexible and responsive, Marine Corps forces can make a valuable contribution to any MNF. Specially trained and equipped for multipurpose combined arms expeditionary operations, Marines combine the capabilities of land, sea, and air forces. Marines are most effective when organized to operate in combined arms teams as a Marine air-ground task force. Marine operational effectiveness is significantly diminished if Marine combined arms forces are divided among land and air component commanders.

SECTION D. AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

4. Air Operations

The purpose of multinational air operations is to gain and maintain control and exploit the use of the air to achieve the MNFC's objectives. Multinational air operations range from complex, wartime air operations to FHA. Air forces provide the MNFC with the capability to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical effects simultaneously throughout the full depth and breadth of the battlespace. In order to achieve unity of air effort, C2 is normally exercised from the highest practicable level by a designated air commander. **Centralized control of air forces optimizes the use of airpower and maximizes the probability of achieving established MNFC objectives (see Figure IV-3).**

a. **Characteristics of Air Forces**

• **Flexibility and Versatility.** Air forces can operate free from obstacles and barriers. In addition, many air elements

The mobility of maritime forces is less constrained by geographic boundaries than air and ground forces.

doctrine and procedures. In multinational operations, designation of an MCC may greatly assist the MNFC in coordinating and effectively exploiting multinational maritime forces. Additionally, without a formalized process for preventing mutual interference among undersea, surface, and air activities, the MNFC (or the MCC) will have to exercise precise judgment in assigning tasks to submarine forces. Geographic isolation may be the only practicable method of avoiding fratricide. The commander must get early agreement among the participating nations during the planning phase that there will be a single submarine operating authority; this will normally be provided by the nation with the most experience and best facilities for performing this service.

c. **Expeditionary Operations.** Often conducted in connection with maritime

KEY ASPECTS OF AIR OPERATIONS

CENTRALIZED CONTROL

AIR DEFENSE

AIR

UNITY OF EFFORT

AIRSPACE CONTROL

Figure IV-3. Key Aspects of Air Operations

can be adapted to more than one mission, which provides to the MNFC a wide range of flexibility and versatility needed to successfully accomplish the assigned tasks.

- **Inherently Strategic.** The capability of air power to strike at the heart of the adversary enables MNFCs to accomplish multinational and theater strategic-level objectives. Airpower is suitable for strategic, diplomatic, and humanitarian purposes.

- **Suitable for Simultaneous Operations.** Airpower can be employed across the range of military operations to simultaneously conduct symmetric and asymmetric operations and attack a broad spectrum of targets.

- **Persistent.** While the intention of most modern air operations is to attain objectives through swift, simultaneous and decisive action, there may be

occasions in which goals may not be attained quickly. Air operations allow air assets to visit and revisit targets over extended periods of time.

b. **Air Component Commander (ACC).** To most effectively exploit the capabilities of multinational air power, the MNFC normally designates an overall ACC. When an ACC is not designated, the MNFC may plan, direct, and control air operations. The ACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, and controlling air missions to meet the MNFC's objectives. In multinational operations, the authority and command relationships of the ACC are established by the MNFC. If designated, the ACC typically exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities and forces made available for tasking, with the exception of strategic air mobility forces, which will remain under the OPCON of Commander in Chief, United States Transportation

Command. In some instances, the MNFC may decide that direct support is a more appropriate command authority for certain capabilities and/or forces.

c. **Air Operations Planning.** An integral part of the MNFC's planning efforts is the concept of air operations. The ACC is responsible for air operations planning, and develops the concept for air operations that describes how the multinational assets made available are envisioned to be employed in support of the MNFC's overall objectives. Since the purpose of developing this concept is to achieve unity of effort in air operations, the staff assigned the responsibility to develop the plan should include appropriate representation from all nations and Services providing resources to the plan. This ensures adequate consideration and understanding of multinational weapon systems and force capabilities. Air planning should also include the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This is especially important for the coordination of tactical air operations with logistic operations, especially the air movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance from aerial ports. In the event that no established multinational guidance is available, planning considerations for multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air operations.

See JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," for details on the air planning process.

d. **Airspace Control.** The primary purpose of airspace control is to promote safe, effective use of airspace with minimal restraint imposed on the users. International agreements, enemy and friendly force structures, deployments and resupply operations, commanders' concepts and operations, and operating environments such as foreign continents, the high seas, and amphibious objective areas will necessitate different specific arrangements for airspace control.

• **Responsibility.** The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC, who normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspace control activities for multinational operations. The broad responsibilities of the ACA include coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval of the MNFC,

Multinational air operations range from complex to routine.

the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among nations' forces. The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the MNFC, integrates the MNF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply assumption of OPCON over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement shall be referred to the MNFC for resolution. If the ACC is not assigned duties of the ACA, then the ACA and staff would normally be collocated with the ACC staff. The responsibilities of ACA and ACC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual.

• **Requirements.** The system used for airspace control must integrate all airspace users and be flexible and responsive to the changing requirements of the component commanders. This system enhances the MNFC's ability to employ forces. It is central to the concept of air operations and it should promote operational effectiveness while reducing the risk of fratricide.

e. **Air Defense. The successful conduct of air defense operations requires the integrated operation of available multinational air defense systems.** Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC may designate an area air defense commander (AADC) to ensure an integrated defensive effort by MNFs. The responsibilities of the ACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the MNFC decides not to assign the ACC, AADC, or ACA as on individual, then close coordination between all three positions is essential.

5. Space Operations

Space forces provide a means to exploit and, if required, control space to assist in the successful execution of multinational operations. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. As a point of contact for military space operations, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) enables commands to have access to space capabilities and systems. USSPACECOM can deploy space support teams to assist in providing the necessary space-related capabilities.

a. **Space Control Operations.** Space control operations are conducted to gain and maintain space superiority. They ensure that friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. To accomplish this, space forces must survey space, protect US ability to use space, prevent adversaries from interfering with that use, and negate the ability for adversaries to exploit their space forces.

b. **Force Enhancement Operations.** Force enhancement operations consist of those operations conducted from space with the objective of enabling or supporting terrestrial forces. Navigation, communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing help reduce uncertainty and friction at all three levels of war.

c. **Space Support Operations.** Space support operations are carried out by terrestrial elements of military space forces to sustain, surge, and reconstitute elements of a military space system or capability. These activities deploy, sustain, or augment on-orbit spacecraft, direct missions, and support other

government or civil organizations. Space support involves spacelift and satellite operations.

d. **Space Support to MNF.** Allied or coalition forces will have many of the same requirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is controlled according to intelligence guidelines. Multi-spectral imagery products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is global positioning system navigation support. Of special importance is providing warning and defense against attack from theater ballistic missiles. USSPACECOM is responsible for assisting in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called "shared early warning."

SECTION E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

6. General

All considerations associated with the conduct of unilateral special operations are applicable to multinational operations. SOF provides the MNF with a range of specialized military responses that lessen political liability or risk of escalation (Figure IV-4). The establishment of a combined joint special operations task force offers the MNFC a C2 element for US or combined SOF.

a. SOF can provide specific assistance in the area of assessment, liaison, and training of non-US military forces operating with the US force. SOF may deploy teams ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability of non-US units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This capability is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with non-US military units as a regular function, such as

US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CAPABILITIES
● **Direct Action**
● **Special Reconnaissance**
● **Foreign Internal Defense**
● **Unconventional Warfare**
● **Combatting Terrorism**
● **Psychological Operations**
● **Civil Affairs**
● **Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**
● **Information Operations**

Figure IV-4. US Special Operations Command Capabilities

the FID mission. SOF are trained to provide liaison to multinational surface and air units taking advantage of their language and cultural capabilities. SOF can provide training to overcome existing shortfalls identified during the assessment.

See JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," for details.

b. **Psychological Operations Support.** PSYOP should be incorporated into all multinational operations. The MNFC must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless of national origin, are coordinated. PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of MNFs and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of the operation. PSYOP provides the commander with a controlled mechanism to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent factions. PSYOP communicates policy, provides information, and can persuade groups to cooperate with

MNFs. A detailed analysis of a country's culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US PSYOP will normally be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNF chain of command.

See JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," for further information.

    c. **Civil Affairs Support.** CA provides a bridge between the US military and the HN military and civilian authorities in support of military objectives of the operation. CA units can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations. Planners coordinating CA support must factor in the fact that the majority of CA units are in the Reserve Component. The interface between the force commander (multinational or US), local authorities and civilian populace in the operational area is called CMO. CMO is a generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission. As with so many other areas, CMO must be coordinated to accomplish the MNFC's mission. The activities of multinational CA resources should be prioritized through the MNF's CMO plan to maximize the benefit of these resources. CMO encompasses any impact of the civilian populace on military operations. Commanders should establish this liaison with civil authorities, local populace, NGOs, and PVOs. This will assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, if directed, to these organizations upon mission completion. One means by which the commander can accomplish this interface is through a CMOC. CA personnel can provide CMO support by helping to staff the CMOC and conduct liaison with the local populace. CA personnel are routinely trained in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team into which functional specialties are integrated.

See JP 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations," for further information.

SOF may conduct multinational operations independent of or in support of other components.

SECTION F. GENERAL

7. Information Operations

The Joint Staff will coordinate US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational operations in a specific theater are the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander.

a. **The Multinational IO Cell**

- When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners and subject matter experts from the MNF. All MNF members should be represented in the IO cell in positions to contribute, when possible, to each of the elements of IO. IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of the MNF with the goal of using all the available IO resources. Direct representation ensures that multinational IO assets are efficiently used and that the multinational IO plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the multinational operation.

  See JP 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations."

- In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy to achieve MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using IO as a part of military strategy within the joint force to support MNF objectives.

b. **Multinational IO Planning. Planning IO to support multinational operations is** more difficult because of complex security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.

- How to plan multinational IO is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level with detailed planning at the individual element level would give multinational IO planning the most consistency with US IO planning procedures.

- The multinational IO plan should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy.

c. **Multinational Information Assurance.** The appropriate US geographic combatant commander should issue clearly stated guidelines for the release of classified US information to the MNF, based on existing policy directives and any applicable approved exceptions to national disclosure policy. These guidelines should be issued to US participants only and should be specific enough to allow implementation down to the tactical level. The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent IO in support of multinational objectives.

See CJCSI 6510.01A, "Defensive Information Operations Implementation."

8. Search and Rescue

The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each member's search and rescue (SAR) capability and procedures. Normally each nation and/or component is

Each multinational partner brings unique SAR capabilities.

responsible for conducting its own SAR missions. However, not all participants may possess this capability, so the MNFC may have to establish an organization and procedures to provide this service to all participants. The commander should develop and organize a comprehensive SAR organization. A good model for this type of organization is the joint search and rescue center.

See JP 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)."

APPENDIX A
COMMANDER'S CHECKLIST FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The checklist provided below offers the MNFC a planning tool for multinational operations.

_____ Has the mission been analyzed for clear and attainable objectives?

_____ How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state?

_____ How do the objectives help to ensure the desired end state?

_____ Have these objectives been translated into missions for subordinate commanders?

_____ Has the source of mission tasking been identified?

_____ If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the multinational operation, has clarification and support from the national military chain of command been requested?

_____ Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?

_____ What process should one follow to consider and approve changes to the original mission statement?

_____ Have all US forces received the proper predeployment training?

_____ What type of predeployment training have MNFs received?

_____ Have standards regarding operational and/or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated method of resolution?

_____ Has adequacy in terms of mission accomplishment been assessed?

_____ Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations been assessed?

_____ Have appropriate orientation briefings from the State Department and NGOs and/or PVOs been requested?

_____ Have ROE been agreed upon?

    _____ By military commanders?

    _____ By policy makers?

_____ Do the ROE of the multinational force permit the same degree of individual self-defense and unit self-defense as the US SROE?

_____ Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities?

_____ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

_____ Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?

_____ Have strategic mobility assets been allocated?

_____ Are multinational legal representatives available to provide counsel on international law and/or legal agreements?

_____ What are the alternative courses of action to be followed by the multinational force when a national military element withdraws from the force (i.e., actions following decomposition of the force)?

_____ Do transition plans exist to move from standing start to MOOTW and/or to war or war to MOOTW?

_____ What are the courses of action to be executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of multinational forces in advance of end state achievement?

_____ Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been completed and validated?

_____ Have the non-US forces relying on US strategic mobility for deployment and/or redeployment been included in the TPFDD?

_____ Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO and/or PVO as well as contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

_____ Has status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Who has been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?

_____ Are forces, C4I capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

_____ Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

_____ Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the operational area been fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high

value and high payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way that facilitates operations and end state?

_____ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs and PVOs, to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate redundancy in operations?

_____ Are chemical weapon threats known and are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?

_____ To what extent are RCAs authorized for use?

_____ Review plan for duplication of effort in supporting the operation.

_____ Is there an initiating directive which clearly articulates the command arrangements?

_____ Has the MNFC done a mission analysis to determine the most appropriate command authorities required from contributing nations' political authorities to ensure that the directed mission can be accomplished? Should the necessary command authorities not be forthcoming, the MNFC should explore the following:

　　　_____ Feasibility of achieving unity of command and associated conditions?

　　　_____ Feasibility of achieving unity of effort and associated conditions?

　　　_____ Feasibility of achieving coherent federated operations wherein national forces remain under national OPCON and TACON?

　　　_____ Assistance required from the NCA in negotiating unity of command or effort at the strategic level?

　　　_____ Multinational command channels for the execution of military operations and national channels for reporting status and requesting support?

_____ Have supported and supporting command relationships been established or referred to higher authority for resolution of inadequacies?

_____ Have command relationships regarding control of forces been defined?

_____ Have liaison arrangements associated with C2 of the forces been assessed?

_____ Do liaison elements on the command staff possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both national interest and multinational objectives?

_____ Have deficiencies with coalition commanders been negotiated for resolution?

_____ Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic, and office support capabilities in place?

_____ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more horizontal organization?

_____ Have 24 hour command centers been provided for if required?

_____ Have C2 arrangements been made to include the US Ambassador, the Country Team, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?

_____ Have US as well as multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?

_____ Is there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture?

_____ Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and maintainers to enable interaction with the commander and other multinational members?

_____ Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among same nation staff members?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regarding communication equipment capability?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

_____ Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the C4I network?

_____ Have common data bases been provided for?

_____ Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable C4I network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C4I infrastructure?

_____ Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security issues, and other planning factors been reached among all multinational components? Are compatible materials available?

_____ Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contract multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure to ADP and classified information used in daily operations?

_____ Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to that datum?

_____ Has a multinational GI&S plan been produced and disseminated which designates all GI&S products for use?

_____ Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established?

_____ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?

_____ Has theater foreign disclosure authority been identified?

_____ Has the adversary's use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

_____ Has the C4I system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate, to all participants, time-sensitive information and/or intelligence for use in targeting or rapid reaction?

_____ Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under the control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?

_____ Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks in accordance with the MNFC's intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinational equipment under MNF control?

_____ Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

_____ Has a policy and a plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information been promulgated?

_____ Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?

_____ Does the United States have an ACSA with coalition nations?

_____ Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

_____ Do other US legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to coalition nations?

_____ Has the MNFC's authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been defined and agreed to?

_____ Have reimbursement or replacement-in-kind procedures been developed and agreed to?

_____ Have contractor procedures been established to allow US participation in contracts led by non-US personnel and used by US personnel?

_____ Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force?

_____ Are there existing standardization agreements that could facilitate mutual support?

_____ Can the HN provide support and, if so, have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?

_____ Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being complied with by all nations, Services, and units?

_____ Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support of goods and services between the United States and MNF allies and accounts for the amounts received?

_____ Has a logistic determination been made, (i.e., what countries will provide what piece of the logistics system, health services to include aeromedical evacuation and health service logistics)?

_____ Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logistic requirements?

_____ Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are there mechanisms in place to track the cost?

_____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?

_____ Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?

_____ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

_____ Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?

_____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?

_____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

_____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

_____ Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans, both intra- and intertheater, in place?

_____ Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties?

_____ Has a PSYOP program(s) been developed to support the operation?

_____ Have PSYOP assets been requested?

_____ Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of PSYOP objectives, themes, programs, and products?

_____ Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander's authority to impose them been included in the MNF plan?

_____ Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?

_____ Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventional military options for the commander?

_____ Has a public affairs plan been promulgated that:

    _____ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission?

    _____ States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the MNF and its mission?

    _____ States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the MNF and its national components?

_____ Is predeployment media training complete?

_____ Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations and future strategic decisions understood by all commanders?

_____ Have requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to MNFs the need for operational documentation, been arranged?

_____ Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?

_____ Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned?

_____ End state identifies the conditions under which the multinational military operation can be terminated. Are the conditions tangible in military terms? Are they contained in the mission statement?

_____ Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander's vision for subordinates for translation into unit objectives and sustainment of unit mission orientation? What is the exit strategy? How do US forces get out? What constitutes mission success?

_____ What is the coalition end state criteria?

_____ What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner?

_____ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

_____ What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for multinational forces? Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?

_____ What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations?

_____ What US forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposal of US equipment supplies been properly planned?

_____ What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?

_____ Who will support US forces that remain behind?

_____ Have the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNF presence been identified?

APPENDIX B
A REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF US PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1900. International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. Eight nation force, led by a British general and later a German, included 2,000 US soldiers and Marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through meetings of a Council of Generals.

1918. Allied Armies in France, World War I. Some 2,000,000 Americans served alongside French and British armies under the overall coordination of a French Officer, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. A precedent was set that US soldiers should remain in large units under US command. The French and British originally argued that US soldiers should be placed in allied units as individual and small-unit replacements as soon as they arrived in theater, a concept successfully vetoed by the senior US commander, General John J. Pershing.

1918. Allied Intervention in Russia, Vicinity of Murmansk in the Far North. Three US battalions joined British, Canadian, Italian, Finnish, and Serbian units under command of a British general at the end of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution. Contemporaneous US military activities in Siberia and the Far East were not formally integrated with allies, due to disagreement on political goals.

1942. Allied Operations in World War II. Due to the combined nature of allied operations against Axis powers, US and UK commands and staffs were often inter-layered. US units were subordinated to British commanders a number of times, for example, in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the China-Burma-India Theater. This experience made the US military a proponent of coalition warfare and a world leader in its practice.

1948. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. The longest-lived UN peace observing mission, continuing today. The United States has contributed various numbers of military observers and support personnel through time, with an early peak strength of 327—137 officers of all Services and 190 enlisted men. Some 17 nations have participated at various times and successive commanders have come from Sweden, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Norway, Finland, Ireland, and Ghana. Many precedents, agreements, and laws have derived from this experience.

1949. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. One of 14 nations participating, the United States contributed up to 28 military observers and an air crew until 1954. The group was headed successively by generals from Belgium, Canada, and Australia.

1950. Allied Operations During the Korean War. As part of the United Nations Command (UNC), US forces played an important role in repelling the attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK). Because no peace treaty ever ended that war, the UNC still stands today. A US general commands the UNC and its sister organization, the Combined Forces Command, Korea (CFC). The ground component command of the UNC and CFC, commanded by a South Korean general, consists during armistice of one US division and 23 ROK divisions. All told, there are approximately 37,000 US Service members in South Korea helping to maintain the armistice.

1962. United Nations Security Force for the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea. A US Air Force task

force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in-country support for operations commanded by a Pakistani general.

1965. Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. First peacekeeping force of the OAS. After the initial US intervention, six Latin American nations sent small forces to join some 21,500 US troops — soon reduced to 12,000 — in an MNF commanded by a general from Brazil.

1982. Multinational Force in Beirut. About 1,200 US troops joined contingents from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom to observe the withdrawal of Palestinian Liberation Organization, Syrian, and Israeli forces from Beirut, Lebanon. No central command structure was established, although coordination was effected through a Liaison and Coordination Committee. Two separate terrorist attacks killed 241 US Marines, sailors, and soldiers at the US Headquarters and 58 French soldiers at the French Headquarters on 23 October 1983, and the MNF withdrew in March 1984.

1982. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. A ten nation, independent force empowered by Egypt and Israel to supervise truce provisions in the Sinai Peninsula. The United States provides support troops and an infantry battalion rotated every 6 months; Congress limits participation to 1,200 personnel. The military commander is a Norwegian general, and the Director General is an American operating from Rome.

1990 to Present. Maritime Interception Operations. Fourteen nations continue to enforce a UN embargo of Iraq in the northern Arabian Gulf, preventing the import and export of banned items.

1991. DESERT STORM Coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Over 23 nations joined to eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. US, UK, and French forces were under the CINC, US Central Command, while Arab forces were under the Saudi commander of the joint forces theater of operations; the two entities were linked in the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Center. Within that structure, a US brigade from the 82d Airborne Division was placed under OPCON of the French 6th Light Armored Division.

1992 to Present. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Multinational operations to enforce the UN No-fly Zone over southern Iraq in order to protect Shia enclaves.

1991-1996. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Establishment of a combined task force at the conclusion of the Gulf War to enforce the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq and to support coalition humanitarian relief operations for the Kurds and other displaced Iraqi civilians.

1992. United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia. 21 nations combined in an effort to provide humanitarian relief and attempt to create an environment for peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1993. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) after US Humanitarian Intervention of December 1992 — UNOSOM II. Some 9,000 US military personnel participated as part of a multinational UN force of at least 28,000 peace operations troops. The overall UN commander was a Turkish general, assisted by a US deputy.

1994. Multinational Force and United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The American-led MNF, a coalition of (eventually) 37 countries, entered the country of Haiti on 19 September 1994 in order to restore the legitimate and democratically elected government of Haiti. The MNF transferred responsibility for operations in Haiti to UNMIH on 31 March 1995.

1995. NATO Implementation and Stabilization Force. NATO led, multinational effort conducted to stabilize UN brokered peacekeeping effort by introducing forces of participating nations within the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1999. NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE. An offensive military operation led by NATO with multinational involvement, undertaken in order to prevent an outbreak of humanitarian crises in Kosovo.

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APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.

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4. CJCSI 6510.01A, "Defensive Information Operations Implementation."

5. DOD 5105.38M, "Security Assistance Management Manual."

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7. DODD 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

8. DODD 5100.77, "DOD Law of War Program."

9. DODD 5530.3, "International Agreements."

10. JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States."

11. JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

12. JP 1-0, "Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations."

13. JP 1-01, "Joint Doctrine Development System."

14. JP 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

15. JP 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

16. JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

17. JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

18. JP 2-03, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations."

19. JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

20. JP 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats."

21. JP 3-01.5, "Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense."

22. JP 3-03, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations."

23. JP 3-05, " Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

24. JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."

25. JP 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations."

26. JP 3-07.5, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations."

27. JP 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance."

28. JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."

29. JP 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."

30. JP 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations."

31. JP 3-14, "Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations."

32. JP 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations."

33. JP 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)."

34. JP 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone."

35. JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

36. JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations."

37. JP 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations."

38. JP 3-59, "Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support."

39. JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations."

40. JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."

41. JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations."

42. JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

43. JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations."

44. JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."

45. JP 5-00.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning."

46. JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."

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48. NDP-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations."

49. NSDM 119, "Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations."

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APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

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a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program
ACA	airspace control authority
ACC	air component commander
ACSA	acquisition cross-Service agreement
ADP	automated data processing
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
BOA	basic ordering agreement
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CD	counterdrug
CFC	Combined Forces Command, Korea
CINC	commander in chief
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COM	Chief of Mission
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FMS	foreign military sales
GI&S	geospatial information and services
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support

IA	implementing arrangement
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
ISA	international standardization agreement
JFC	joint force commander
JOA	joint operations area
LCC	land component commander
LNO	liaison officer
LOA	letter of offer and acceptance
MCC	maritime component commander
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	national disclosure policy
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
OAS	Organization of American States
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
PO	peace operations
POLAD	political advisor
POW	prisoner of war
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
QSTAG	quadripartite standing agreement
RCA	riot control agents
ROE	rules of engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RSI	rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
RSN	role specialist nation
SAO	security assistance office/officer
SAR	search and rescue
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement

SOP	standing operating procedures
SROE	standing rules of engagement
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
TACON	tactical control
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called combat airspace control; airspace control. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. See also coalition. (JP 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. See also area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. Also called CMO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance. (JP 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer

cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

commonality. A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training. b. having interchangeable repair parts and/or components. c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without adjustment. (JP 1-02)

compatibility. Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. See also interchangeability. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military

Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling data bases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also called GI&S. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interchangeability. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance. See also compatibility. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority)

or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

military capability. The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. force structure—Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings. b. modernization—Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit readiness—The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. sustainability—The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition; coalition action. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. See also private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." Also called PVOs. See also nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both internal and external publics with interests in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

rationalization. Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/materiel resources and non-weapons military matters. (JP 1-02)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command

which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the

designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

sustainability. See military capability. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

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
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-16** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #1
Project Proposal

- Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #2
Program Directive

- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #5
Assessments/Revision

- The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

STEP #4
CJCS Approval

- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

STEP #3
Two Drafts

- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

Project Proposal

Assessments/Revision

Program Directive

CJCS Approval

Two Drafts

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION

ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY