

TOP SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Date 2/8/95
ERP 911

1. In order that there will be a complete and detailed record of the specific precautions, policies and courses of action authorized by the DCI in connection with the above project there is set out below a resume of the decisions reached and approved by the DCI at the conference held in his office on 18 November 1954 which was attended by the DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, C/OPS, ADCO, CFI, C/STD and [REDACTED] *W. K. HARVEY*

2. At all times during the construction phase and after the completion of this project, the target objective and the surrounding area will be kept under constant visual observation.

3. The following physical precautions will be taken within the tunnel and the site itself, each one being put in place as soon as the construction permits it to be safely and efficiently installed:

a. On the near side of the pre-amp chamber a heavy steel door set in substantial concrete slabs will be emplaced with an adequate lock and bar on the inside and wired with an alarm system against tampering. This door will be locked at all times except when individuals are actually inside the pre-amp chamber. Telephone connections will be established between the pre-amp chamber and the site.

b. An area forty feet long, ten feet on the near side of the demarcation line and thirty feet on the far side of the demarcation line will be mined as soon as the construction has progressed sufficiently to permit. It will be mined by using C-3 plastic in sealed garden hose threaded behind the liner plate in sufficient quantities that when exploded

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it will collapse the tunnel without causing a major surface explosion. After mining, the necessary caps and fusing for arming this mined area will be fixed and secured in the immediate area but the mined area will not be armed except in case of emergency, and no effort will be made to lay in the explosives on a "push button" basis.

c. The near end of the tunnel at the building line will be closed by a second steel, concrete emplaced door.

d. The entrance to the shaft from the basement floor will be covered and concealed as well as possible.

e. The ramp leading from the basement to the first floor of the warehouse will be covered and concealed as well as possible and equipped with a locked steel door.

4. In the event enemy action is observed which could logically be construed as possibly leading to discovery of the project, i. e. at the target objective or between the target objective and the installation, the following steps will be taken:

a. Simultaneously, and as rapidly as possible all personnel will be removed to the site and the Chief, BOB, will be immediately notified. Emergency two-way radio communications will be provided for this purpose in the event telephone service fails at any given time.

b. If the enemy action observed is such that time permits, there will be immediate consultation between the Chief, BOB, and the Commanding Officer of the site as to further steps.

c. If time permits, consideration will be given to removing as much of the equipment as possible.

d. Coincident with the removal of the personnel, the steel doors will be appropriately secured and if discovery appears really imminent, the mined area will be armed and blown when it appears necessary to prevent entry or progress of enemy personnel through the tunnel.

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e. Under no circumstances will the installation be precipitately abandoned.

f. In the event there is any imminent move against or attempt to gain entry to the installation, regardless of by whom or under what circumstances such occurs, the Commanding Officer of the installation will have orders to resist entry with all means at his disposal notifying Chief, BOB, and USCOB immediately.

g. In the event of discovery and any possible protest the official American reaction is to be flat, indignant denial ascribing any such protest to a baseless enemy provocation. Further possible policy and propaganda maneuvering in such an event cannot be decided upon at this time.

5. With specific regard to Paragraph 4 above, the question of whether or not Ambassador ~~Conant~~ should be briefed was again brought up and reconsidered by the DCI. After considerable discussion and careful reconsideration it was the DCI's decision that ~~Conant~~ should not be briefed and that he did not desire to re-raise this issue with the highest policy levels with whom it had been previously discussed.

6. After discussion it was decided that the personnel for the forward processing unit would be covered by preparing and processing them in the States and sending them to Berlin in the normal manner as members of the 9539th TSU, Signal Corps, the present cover organization for the site. These personnel will at no point appear as KUBARK personnel.

*the
any further
reason
[redacted]
[redacted]*

his
Chair
*see any
reason*

~~Chief~~

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