

Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Support Program

Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs

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Foreword

The Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) is providing funds to States under the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program for the purchase of specialized equipment for fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials response services, and law enforcement agencies. These funds will be used to enhance the capabilities of State and local units of government to respond to acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As the State agency designated to administer this program, your role in strategic planning and in assessing overall State and local capabilities is a critical component of OJP's State and local domestic preparedness initiative. Receipt of additional funds under the program will be contingent on the State's development of two separate, but related, documents. The first is a Statewide Needs Assessment, and the second is a Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. The Needs Assessment will require each State to assess its requirements for equipment, first responder training, and other resources involved in a WMD response. This Needs Assessment will form the basis of the Statewide Strategy. The Strategy will direct how States will target grant funds received under the OJP equipment program and provide OJP a guide on how to target first responder training and other resources available through OJP's Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. It is important to understand that the Strategy is a multi-year document and will continue to guide deployment of these resources, by the States for equipment funds, and OJP for other resources, over the next three years.

To assist States in conducting their threat, risk and needs assessments, and developing their three-year strategy, OJP has developed an on-line data collection tool. This on-line tool was developed in close cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). To guide users of the on-line tool, OJP is providing this Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. The intent of the Took Kit is to provide users with a step-by-step guide to which they can refer when the on-line tool becomes available.

States may begin registering users for the on-line data collection tool beginning July 5, 2000, in the first phase of this process. OJP will implement the second phase of the data collection process on August 1, 2000. At that time, software will be made available on-line for local jurisdiction data input. State agencies will be able to input data beginning August 15, 2000, when the third phase of the on-line process is implemented. Instructions for electronic submission of the data and statewide strategies using the world wide web can be found on OJP's web page at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps.

I look forward to working with you and your colleagues during the implementation of this program to enhance State and local emergency response capabilities in preparation for an event that will hopefully never take place.

Sincerely,

C.H. "Butch" Straub II

Director

Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

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This version of the Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit supercedes all previous versions.

Effective Date: May 15, 2000

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ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL KIT TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Section 1

Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit Introduction

A Program Guidelines and Application Kit was provided to each state-s designated administrative agency for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program during February 2000. These guidelines and materials included an Appendix C, AGuidance for Conducting a Needs Assessment and Developing a Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy.@ This guidance specified that the conduct of a Needs Assessment, followed by the development of a three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy were conditions of the state ≈ acceptance of grant funds under the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Additionally, this guidance indicated that OJP/OSLDPS developed assessment and strategy tools, detailed guidance and forms to be provided in a subsequent mailing. Accordingly, this document, Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit for the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program is provided for each of the designated state administrative agencies (SAA) to assist and guide their assessment conduct and strategy development. This document will be available online and may be accessed at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm. Please note that the version mailed to you is for planning purposes only and that none of the forms therein may be used for submitting information. All information submitted pursuant to satisfaction of assessment and strategy requirements must be submitted electronically and forms downloaded from the Web version of the Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. It was augmented by OJP/OSLDPS regional workshops held in April, 2000 for the SAAs and by the availability of extended direct technical assistance.

The tool kit contains eight separate sections following the introduction which combined with an additional task from Appendix C of the Program Guidelines and Application Kit represent sequential steps/tasks which each SAA should conduct and complete in order to satisfy the assessment and strategy conditions of its acceptance of grant funds under the program. A summary of each of these sections/steps along with a brief commentary on its relationship to other tasks follows:

Step/Task 1 (Appendix C, Items IIIA and IIIB, Program Guidelines and Application Kit): Identification and Coordination of Jurisdictions. Prior to conducting the work tasks detailed in each section of the Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit, each SAA should take actions to comply with IIIA and IIIB of Appendix C in the Guidelines and Application Kit. Item IIIA specifies the identification of jurisdictions and item IIIB specifies the particulars of coordination among program areas, response disciplines, and levels of government. The SAA is responsible for assuring that its assessment and strategy represent the entire state and all programs, response disciplines, and levels of government involved in domestic preparedness within the borders of the state. Only subsequent to initiating and completing the task of jurisdiction identification and to initiating the task of coordination, should SAAs begin work on tasks covered in the various sections of the Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit.

Step/Task 2 (*Section 2*): Risk Assessment Process includes instruments developed by the FBI and the CDC to evaluate and integrate vulnerability, threat, and public health performance and yield a risk profile. This assessment is to be conducted for each identified jurisdiction within the state. The results of these assessments combined with the results of the Capabilities and Needs Assessment at Section 3 will allow the SAA to complete the Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. Additionally, the results should be directly and indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections 3, 5, 7, 8, and especially in completion of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9.

Step/Task 3 (*Section 3*): Capabilities and Needs Assessment is designed to provide operational capability information and guide identification of program needs. This assessment is to be conducted for each identified jurisdiction within the state. The results of these assessments combined with results of the Risk Assessment process at Section 2 will allow the SAA to complete the Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. The results of these assessments also should be directly or indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections 5, 7, 8, and 9. Results are of particular importance for tasks at Sections 5, 8, and 9.

Step/Task 4 (*Section 4*): Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix is a form for priority ranking of each of the state \approx identified jurisdictions based on Task 1 (Section 2), Risk Assessment Process and Task 2 (Section 3), Capabilities and Needs Assessment. One matrix for each state is to be completed by the SAA. The prioritization should be reflected in tasks related to completion of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Sections 9.

Step/Task 5 (*Section 5*): Three-year Projection Forms are designed to report existing resources/efforts and projected needs for each response discipline within each domestic preparedness program area. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Following completion of jurisdiction forms, the SAA is to complete roll up forms providing a statewide summary of each response disciplines resources, efforts, and needs within each domestic preparedness program area. The results of Section 3 work should be helpful in this effort and the results of Section 5 will be instrumental in completion of tasks at Sections 8 and 9.

Step/Task 6 (*Section 6*): Additional Training Information. This form is designed to report information about domestic preparedness training capacity and needs. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with information on state assets and Arolled-up@into one statewide summary form by the SAA. Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9.

Step/Task 7 (*Section 7*): Emergency Response Team Survey. This form is designed to report the number and composition of emergency response teams within the state. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with information on state assets and Arolled-up@into one statewide summary form by the SAA. Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy covered at Section 9.

Step/Task 8 (Section 8): Recommendations for State and Local Response to WMD Terrorism Incidents. This form is designed to report recommendations regarding overall domestic preparedness efforts within the jurisdiction and state. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with state-level recommendations and Arolled-up@into one statewide summary by the SAA. Information from the state roll-up should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy covered at Section 9

Step/Task 9 (*Section 9*): <u>Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy</u>. This section provides an outline, guidance, and forms to assist completion of the statewide strategy. One statewide strategy representing all jurisdictions, domestic preparedness programs, and responder disciplines is to be completed by the SAA based on all work tasks, forms, and guidance covered at Sections 2 through 8.

The conduct of Needs Assessments and the development of Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategies represents a thorough nationwide planning process designed to fill critical gaps in this countrys knowledge about domestic preparedness and to better guide Federal efforts aimed at building domestic preparedness capacity through development of a sound, fully informed, national domestic preparedness strategy. The Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit combined with OJP/OSLDPS regional workshops and the availability of extended direct technical assistance should function to minimize potential difficulties that may be encountered by states in conducting assessments and developing statewide strategies.

Section 2

Risk Assessment Process

Overview: The United States government has initiated numerous programs aimed at improving our domestic preparedness against potential terrorist attacks involving WMD. A fundamental comment made by numerous government agencies reviewing these programs is that most can improve the effectiveness of their equipment, training and exercise programs if a needs assessment process is employed to help prioritize efforts.

The following four tasks of this document are intended to provide a process to conduct assessments prior to establishment of program priorities aimed at improving jurisdictional domestic preparedness.

Tasks A, B, C and D are designed to provide the jurisdictions with a methodology and the supporting tools to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment (a combination of threat, vulnerability, and public health). The risk assessment is designed to provide the necessary evaluation information to establish priorities for the jurisdiction that will improve response capabilities to WMD terrorism incidents.

Section 2, Tab a Task A: Vulnerability Assessment

For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP **B** FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program.

Overview: This vulnerability assessment is needed to benchmark the local jurisdictions current vulnerability profile with regard to a WMD terrorism incident as stated in the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. This assessment is to be retained by the jurisdiction and is not intended for submission to the state.

Assumptions: There are two key assumptions that should be used as you proceed through the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment process. They are:

- Use the concept of the Amost likely scenario@occurring in your jurisdiction when completing the vulnerability assessments for each vulnerability assessment factor. The most likely scenario is one that is not the worst case but represents the most probable kind of WMD event that may occur in your jurisdiction based upon the unique infrastructure and their attractiveness to any potential terrorist elements or individuals as a lucrative target to attack.
- An attack against such a target (facility, site, system, or special event) within your jurisdiction would produce death, injuries, or infrastructure damage that would overwhelm the jurisdiction=s emergency response capabilities including any mutual aid agreements/assistance pacts.

Jurisdictional Vulnerability Assessment

The following diagram and four listed steps provide general directions for completion of the jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment.

Vulnerability Process




Figure 2-1

STEP I - Formation of the Planning Team

Assembling the Planning Team: The first step is to assemble the jurisdiction planning team that will have a working knowledge of the presence of the following categories of facilities, sites, systems, and/or special events within your jurisdiction:

Government Services	Transportation Centers	Electric Power,
	_	Oil/Gas Storage
Water Supply	Information/Communications	Banking and Finance
Emergency Services	Public Health	Institutions
Recreational Facilities	Commercial/Industrial	Miscellaneous
	Facilities	

It is recommended that the planning team represent law enforcement, fire services, EMS, HazMat, public works, public health services, and emergency management at the local, state, and Federal levels that would be affected or respond to an act of terrorism within a jurisdiction.

STEP II B Compile a list of the Amost important@facilities, sites, systems, or special event activities that are present or take place within the jurisdiction.

Develop an <u>all inclusive</u> list of potential targets using the seven general categories of facilities, sites, systems, and special events. A list of potential targets is located at the appendix (found on page 15) to this task.

Using the initial <u>all inclusive</u> list, develop a priority list that will represent only the highest priority or most critical facilities, sites, systems, or special events located or taking place within your jurisdiction.

Example: If you have 100 facilities within your jurisdiction select ten (10% of 100) of them to appear on your priority list of the most important. If you have less than ten potential targets within your jurisdiction, it is recommended that you assess all of them.

A facility, site, system, or special event selected for the priority list should meet the following criteria:

A facility, site, system, or venue within the jurisdiction that in the wake of a WMD incident would result in any or all of the following:

- Large numbers of death and injuries
- Extensive damage or destruction of facilities that provide or sustain human needs, i.e., power sources, food distribution sites, essential public services, or
- Causes long-term catastrophic consequences to the general local economic well being of the community.

The planning team is now prepared to conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of these facilities, sites, systems, and special events to possible WMD terrorism incidents according to the factors presented in **STEP III.**

STEP III - Conducting the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment

The Seven Vulnerability Assessment Factors: The planning team may use the following seven factors to assess the vulnerability of each individual site listed on your jurisdictional priority list:

Level of Visibility	Criticality of Target Site	Value of Target to Potential Threat Element (PTE)
Potential Threat Element (PTE) Access to the Target	Threat of Hazard	Potential for Collateral Mass Casualty
	Site Population Capacity	•

The seven factors, their definitions, and associated rating are listed later in this section. Use them as a reference sheet for completing the Vulnerability Assessment Worksheets.

Complete a Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet for each individual critical target on your priority list of potential targets according to the following instructions:

Note: Copy the worksheet for each vulnerability assessment performed.

Note: This assessment is based upon the planning teams overall qualitative judgment of each factor. It is not a definitive quantitative assessment.

- Using the **Vulnerability Assessment Factors** (found starting on page 9), select the rating value that most closely represents the facility, infrastructure, event, etc., for each of the seven vulnerability assessment factors.
- Record these ratings in **Table 2-a-1** of **the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet** for each factor assessed. Be sure to provide the information requested at the top of the worksheet.
- Total the score for the seven rating factors values at the bottom of **Table 2-a-1** at the **Total Score** box.
- Compare the **Total Score** of this potential target with the scale provided in the left column of the **Assessment Key** at **Table 2-a-2**.
- Match the **Target Vulnerability Rating** listed in the right column of the **Assessment Key** that falls within the numeric range of your **Total Score**.
- Record this **Target Vulnerability Rating** in the **Individual Target Vulnerability Rating** box at **Table 2-a-3.**
- Repeat the above steps until all facilities, infrastructure, events, etc, (priority target list) you selected (10% most important) have been assessed.
- After completing all of your **Individual Target Vulnerability Assessments** record the **Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings** on the **Jurisdictional Individual Vulnerability Summary** at **Table 2-a-4.**

STEP IV B Determine the Jurisdictional Vulnerability

- Enter the highest **Individual Target Vulnerability Rating** found in **Table 2-a-4** into **Table 2-a-5**. This is your **Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating**. Also record this information on **Table 2-d-2**, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment.
- Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment: Enter the total number of sites (as described below) within the jurisdiction in each classification into **Table 2-a-6**. Also record this information on **Table 2-d-4**, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment.
- 1. Biological **B** Hazardous sites which transfer or receive selected agents listed in 42 CFR Part 72.
- 2. Chemical **B** Hazardous sites which contain Tier II chemicals in either Title 40 or Title 49 CFR.
- 3. Incendiary/Explosive **B** Hazardous sites which manufacture, produce, or store in reportable quantities incendiary and/or explosive materials as delineated in Title 18, USC and 27 CFR 55.
- 4. Nuclear/Radiological **B** Hazardous sites which contain radiological sources as described in 10 CFR 36 (Irradiators), 10 CFR 50 (Production and Utilization Facilities), 10 CFR 70 (Special Nuclear Material), DOE critical facilities, and any other nuclear storage sites.

Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet(s) and the Individual Target Vulnerability Summary are to be retained by the jurisdiction.

Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet is marked AFor Official Use Only.@The planning team should limit its distribution only to those government and private sector officials taking part in this process or who have a professional need to know.

Note: BNICE is an acronym for Biological, Nuclear/Radiological, Incendiary, Chemical, Explosive agents.

Vulnerability Assessment Factors

1) Level of Visibility

Level of Visibility	Rating Value
Addresses the awareness of the existence and visibility of the target.	
Invisible B Classified Location	0
Very Low Visibility B Probably not aware of its existence	1
Low Visibility B Probably not well known existence	2
Medium Visibility B Existence is probably known	3
High Visibility B Existence well known	4
Very High Visibility B Existence is obvious	5

2) Criticality of Target Site to Jurisdiction

Criticality of Target Site	Rating Value
Usefulness of assets to population, economy, government, etc. Deemed critical to the continuity of basic jurisdiction infrastructure.	
(Utilities, communications, water, gas, sewage, electrical, petroleum, transportation, medical facility, government	
facilities, hampers emergency response)	
No Usefulness	0
Minor Usefulness	1
Moderate Usefulness	2
Significant Usefulness	3
Highly Useful	4
Critical	5

3) Value of Target to PTE

Value of Target	Rating Value
Evaluates value of the target to serve the ends of the PTEs identified in the	
Threat Assessment based on Motivations.	
None	0
Very Low	1
Low	2
Medium	3
High	4
Very High	5

Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued)

4) PTE Access to Target

PTE Access to Target	Rating Value
Addresses the availability of the target for ingress and egress by a PTE.	
Fenced, Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access by Pass Only, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet	0
Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff Personnel, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet	1
Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff Personnel, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet	2
Controlled Access of Visitors, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet	3
Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet	4
Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, Vehicle Parking within 50 feet	5

5) Target Threat of Hazard

Target Threat of Hazard	Rating Value
This assesses the presence of WMD Materials (BNICE) in quantities that	
would expend internal response capabilities if released.	
No WMD materials present	0
WMD materials present in moderate quantities, under positive control, and in	1
secured locations.	
WMD materials present in moderate quantities and controlled.	2
Major concentrations of WMD materials that have established control features	3
and are secured in the site.	
Major concentrations of WMD materials that have moderate control features.	4
Major concentrations of WMD materials that are accessible to Non-staff	5
personnel.	

Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued)

6) Site Population Capacity

Site Population Capacity	Rating Value
Maximum number of individuals at a site at any given time.	
0	0
1 B 250	1
251 B 500	2
501 - 1000	3
1001 B 5000	4
> 5000	5

7) Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties

Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties	Rating Value
Addresses potential collateral mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the	
target site. Number ranges indicate inhabitants within a one-mile radius of the site.	
0 to 100	0
101 to 500	1
501 to 1000	2
1001 to 2000	3
2001 to 5000	4
> 5000	5

For Official Use Only

Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Values

Factor	Score
Visibility	
Criticality	
Value	
Access	
Threat of Hazard	
Site Population	
Collateral Mass Casualties	
	Total Score

Table 2-a-1

Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Key

mulvidual Target vulnerability Assessment Rey		
TOTAL SCORE	TARGET VULNERABILITY RATING	
0-2	1	
3-5	2	
6-8	3	
9-11	4	
12-14	5	
15-17	6	
18-20	7	
21-23	8	
24-26	9	
27-29	10	
30-32	11	
33-35	12	

Table 2-a-2

Individual Target Vulnerability Rating

Table 2-a-3

Note: Copy this worksheet to use in evaluating each selected individual target.

For Official Use Only

Individual Target Vulnerability Summary

The following summary form is provided to consolidate the list of potential targets evaluated. The ranking indicates, from highest to lowest, the Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings from the Individual Target Assessments conducted.

Ranking	Potential Target Name	Individual Target Vulnerability Rating
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		

Table 2-a-4

Instructions: The overall AJurisdiction Vulnerability Level@is the highest Individual Target Vulnerability Rating assessed. Use the highest rated Potential Target listed on the Individual Target Vulnerability Summary at Table 2-a-4, record this information below in Table 2-a-5.

Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating	(highest rating recorded on 2-a-4)	Table
-----------------------------------	------------------------------------	-------

Table 2-a-5

Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment

Hazard	Total number of hazardous sites located in jurisdiction
Biological (Infectious Only)	
Chemical (Tier II)	
Incendiary & Explosive	
Nuclear & Radiological	
Total	

Table 2-a-6

Appendix to Section 2, Tab a

Potential Targets

Continuity of Government Services

Government office buildings/Courthouses

Military installations (including reserve components)

Embassies /consulates

Electric Power, Oil/Gas Storage

Electric power production

Electric power distribution

Gas storage and shipment

Petroleum storage and shipment

Telecommunications

Information and Communications

Newspapers

Radio stations

TV broadcast facilities

Trunking stations for communications / switching / CATV

Emergency Services*

Law emergency services

Fire emergency services

State / local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC)

Emergency responder stations

Emergency Medical Services

Institutions **

Science research facilities

Academic institutions

Museums

Schools

Commercial / Industrial Facilities **

** Additional categories to those listed in PDD 63.

Chemical plants

Industrial plants Petroleum plants

Business / corporate centers

Malls / shopping centers

Hotels / convention centers

Apartment buildings

Transportation

Seaports/river ports

Bus terminals

Railheads /rail yards

Interstate highways Tunnels

Tunnels Bridges Subways Ferries

Airports Truck terminals

Oil pipelines Gas pipelines

Water Supply

Water supply plants

Water purification systems

Water distribution systems

Wastewater plants

Banking and Finance

Banks

Financial institutions

Public Health

Hospitals

Emergency medical centers

Recreational Facilities **

Sports arenas / stadiums

Auditoriums

Theaters

Parks Casinos

Concert halls / pavilions

Restaurants frequented by a target population

Miscellaneous **

Special events

Parades

Religious services

Festivals Celebrations

Scenic tours

Abortion clinics

Agriculture

Note: Examples are not exhaustive. Local jurisdictional criteria should be added as required. Categories are from PDD 63 with the following notes. *Combined PDD 63 Categories for Fire and Law.

Section 2, Tab b Task B: Threat Assessment

A. Assessment Overview

For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP-FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program.

Purpose: In June 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39) which reaffirmed the FBIs lead law enforcement and crisis management role in the U.S. Governments response to domestic terrorism. In May, 1998, the President signed PDD-62 which charged the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as lead agency for Federal operational response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. Pursuant to both of these directives, the FBI is continuing to increase its involvement with state, local and Federal agencies who have both a crisis and consequence response role in responding to a WMD threat or incident.

To address domestic terrorism prevention, response, and recovery efforts, it is necessary to assess the risk, capabilities, and ultimate needs of the state and local response to a terrorist incident. This assessment process is the first step in ensuring nationwide preparedness. The DOJ, through the OJP and FBI, has taken the lead in providing this assessment as mandated by the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998, and as stated in the OJP FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. This WMD Terrorist Jurisdiction Threat Assessment has been developed as one portion of a larger vulnerability and risk assessment. The entire process is intended to serve as a benchmark establishing the local jurisdictions current risk profile as it pertains to a domestic WMD terrorism incident. The comparison of local risk and existing capabilities profiles may be used by the jurisdictions to identify and prioritize needs.

Objective: The following is a list of objectives of the assessment process.

- Promote interagency collaboration/coordination of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD terrorism.
- Assess the threat to particular targets, enabling a jurisdiction to better focus its prevention and preparedness efforts, and also to enhance response capabilities.
- Identify the types of weapons of mass destruction likely to be produced and/or developed by the existing potential threats to better identify equipment and training needs necessary to respond to the particular types of hazards.

Direction: This assessment is to be completed by jurisdictions in coordination with the designated state agency for the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Should the jurisdiction require assistance completing the assessment, it should coordinate with the designated state agency. It is recommended that the jurisdiction identify other pertinent local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the assessment process. Once completed, the local jurisdiction must return the Jurisdiction Threat Profile to the designated state agency [also known as the State Administrative Agency (SAA). The SAA will then forward the completed profile to OJP.

B. Introduction

Terrorist events such as the World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the pipe bomb detonated at the Olympic Games in Atlanta revealed the United States=increased susceptibility to terrorist assaults. These attacks, coupled with the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack, where the weapon was the chemical nerve agent sarin, exposed the threat of use of WMD within the United States. The United States is also experiencing an increased number of hoaxes involving the use of chemical or biological agents perpetrated by individuals wishing to instill fear and disrupt communities. While a conventional attack using bombs/explosive devices has been the weapon of choice domestically, yesterday bomb threat may be replaced with a potential for more exotic biological or chemical threats.

WMD cases, primarily those dealing with the threatened use or procurement of chemical and biological materials, have steadily increased as depicted in the following chart (*Data for 1999 through November 30, 1999; Source-FBI WMDOU):




Figure 2-2

With the threat of domestic WMD terrorist attacks on the rise, there is validity in evaluating jurisdiction threat data to better identify potential terrorist targets and likely WMD hazards. This information, coupled with target vulnerability analysis, is the most comprehensive means by which to evaluate the risk of a WMD terrorist act. The risk to a jurisdiction is then measured against present capabilities to determine a jurisdiction-s needs.

Although threat information is deemed beneficial to the needs assessment process, it should not be given undue weight. There remains insufficient empirical data on domestic terrorist activity to suggest a pattern of particular targeting of a specific region or city. Furthermore, threat conditions are dynamic, limiting accurate threat analysis to a specific moment in time. Henceforth, it must be recognized that the identification of a particular threat is not an absolute predictor that a terrorist incident will occur. Nor should the absence of an identified threat be construed as meaning that a terrorist incident is less likely to occur.

Nonetheless, the FBI believes that efforts to identify and analyze potential threats at the local jurisdiction level is essential to the overall assessment process and promotes necessary interagency collaboration of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD terrorism. The OJP Integrated Assessment Tool is not intended to take the place of traditional threat and vulnerability analysis utilized by intelligence and law enforcement communities in efforts to prevent, deter, and resolve acts of domestic terrorism. Traditional threat and vulnerability analysis is far more comprehensive. In contrast, the OJP assessment process provides a simple methodology to assist states in prioritizing program investments. The

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OJP Integrated Assessment Tool provides a general profile of the threat, vulnerability, and risk environments of a jurisdiction, and is not to be considered an investigative tool for law enforcement purposes.

C. **Definitions**

For the purposes of this assessment the following definitions apply:

Domestic Terrorism: The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico, without foreign direction, and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or its population, in the furtherance of political or social goals.

International Terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Potential Threat Element (PTE): Any group or individual in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature. Note: This definition provides sufficient predicate for the FBI to initiate an investigation.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Title 18 USC Section 2332a): (1) Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity; (2)(A) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, or a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; (B) poison gas; (C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

D. **Assessment Process**

The Jurisdiction Threat Assessment is designed to accomplish several goals, all using a process that encourages open lines of communication between Federal, state, and local agencies involved in public safety. The assessment utilizes a pre-existing Department of Defense (DOD) terrorist threat analysis methodology to first identify and evaluate the threat level of each potential threat element (PTE) identified in your jurisdiction. This methodology has been revised to meet the requirements of this assessment process.

The threat level of an existing PTE is determined on the basis of its past violent history; intentions to commit a WMD act of terrorism; the capability to carry out a WMD act of terrorism; and any targeting efforts aimed at achieving the specific terrorist act. Each factor is considered when assessing the potential for violent or destructive activity emanating from a terrorist group. However, the accuracy of such analysis is dependent on the availability of intelligence-related information concerning a particular individual or group. Small groups and rogue individuals, whose activities are difficult to anticipate due to limited or nonexistent intelligence information, represent an unpredictable but constant threat.

Threat Factors Defined:

Provided for purposes of consistency are the definitions to be applied for each threat factor:

- \$ **Existence:** The presence of a group or individual, operating within the jurisdiction in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a WMD, against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature.
- \$ **History:** Demonstrated past terrorist activity over time or a recorded, violent criminal history.
- \$ **Intentions:** Credible advocacy/threats of force or violence, or acts, or preparations to act, evidencing the intent to create a WMD, or to carry out a plan to release a WMD, or to participate in a WMD incident.
- \$ Capability: Credible information that a specific PTE possesses the requisite training, skills, financial means, and access to resources necessary to develop, produce, or acquire a particular type of WMD in a quantity and/or potency sufficient to produce mass casualties, combined with information substantiating the PTE-s ability to safely store, test, and deliver the same. All these factors must be met before a group or individual can be justified as possessing the requisite capability necessary to implement a WMD attack.
- \$ **Targeting:** Credible information indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations against identifiable targets within the subject jurisdiction. (Ex. Obtaining of specific floor plans of a target location or surveillance activities, etc.)

Calculation of the PTE Threat Level: Each factor is assigned a corresponding numerical value based on the factor's perceived significance. The threat level is quantified by adding up the values of all existing threat factors for each PTE. A PTE's threat level may range from a low of 1 to a high of 10. Below is a list of the threat factors and the corresponding point value:

THREAT FACTOR VALUES

THREAT FACTOR	VALUE
Existence	1
History	1
Intentions	2
Capability	2
Targeting	4

Table 2-b-1

If the information known to the assessment group does not satisfy the parameters set forth in the definition of any one factor, or the information is not credible, then that factor cannot be included in the valuation process. Examples are charted below:

EXAMPLE THREAT LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Identity of PTE	Existence (1)	Violent History (1)	Intentions (2)	WMD Capability (2)	Targeting (4)	PTE THREAT LEVEL
Example 1	1					1
Example 2	1		2			3
Example 3	1		2	2	4	9
Example 4	1	1		2		4
Example 5	1	1	2	2	4	10
X = FACTORS FOUND TO BE PRESENT						

Table 2-b-2

To achieve the minimum measurable threat level, a jurisdiction must find that a PTE "exists" within the context of the required definition. This definition of the PTE was designed to correlate with the FBIs definitional threshold required to initiate a criminal investigation. Compared to the large number of jurisdictions covered in this assessment, the number of current FBI WMD terrorist investigations where PTEs have been identified is relatively low. Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the cessation of PTE should not be included in this portion of the threat level assessment. The threat assessment requires the current Aexistence@of PTEs operating within the assessing jurisdiction. Past WMD terrorist threat incidents are addressed separately.

The Threat Assessment Working Group should further note that if a threat level of A5@ or above is achieved for any PTE, the situation may likely require immediate action by law enforcement agencies and/or the emergency response community. This is because the capability to produce or develop a WMD and the intent to implement a WMD terrorist act has been established. The threat increases in significance when the PTE is deemed to possess the capability and the requisite intent to carry out a WMD attack. If the existence of a WMD is confirmed or intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists, the threat has developed into a WMD incident as defined in the Federal Response Plan. This requires an immediate response to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal assistance to state and local authorities in response to the potential consequences of the terrorist use or employment of the WMD. Therefore, timely notification and coordination with the FBI is essential.

PTE Target Evaluation:

Recognizing the motivation(s) of the PTEs will enable the assessment working group to more accurately assess the relative threats to specific and/or general categories of jurisdiction targets. For purposes of this assessment, five general motivator categories have been established, along with types of targets historically associated with each motivator. is provided as a general guide and is in no way is meant to limit the identification of other targets that the assessment group may deem equally critical:

Motivator	Examples of Likely Targets
Political	Anything perceived as a symbol or integral part of the governing establishment (government buildings, courthouses, revenue service, political events, campaigns)
Religious	Anything perceived as a symbol of, acting contrary to, or in support of group or individual religious beliefs (banks, newspaper companies, Planned Parenthood facilities, large public venues, etc.)
Racial	Social and legal entities that promote equality among races
Environmental	Organizations or facilities that are perceived to be damaging to the environment (logging industry, nuclear power plants, dams, etc.)
Special Interest	Organizations or entities perceived to be acting contrary to the interest of the PTE (animal rights, anti-technology, etc.)

Table 2-b-3

PTE Weapon Evaluation:

For purposes of this assessment, AWeapons of Mass Destruction@have been broken down into five distinct categories, i.e. biological, nuclear/radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices. Matching a PTE=s threat level with the PTE=s assessed capability to carry out a terrorist attack while employing one or more types of WMD is a necessary step in predicting which WMD(s) will be of most concern to a given jurisdiction.

Historical Data:

Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the cessation of PTE operations, or incidents that were later determined to be hoaxes, are important factors when assessing the needs of a given jurisdiction. Areas that have experienced a higher than average number of threat incidents where assets were expended in response to these events should be recognized. Therefore, this information is collected as part of the jurisdictions threat and risk assessment profiles.

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E. **Assessment Instructions**

[STEP ONE] Formation of the Threat Assessment Working Group:

The first step is to assemble a Threat Assessment Working Group. The key is to review and evaluate threat information known to other Federal, state, and local organizations that possess such information. If your jurisdiction is a member of a FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Joint Terrorism Working Group, this would be the appropriate venue for the assessment process, especially in light of the pre-clearance to review sensitive information and the FBI_s participation in each group. If no Joint Terrorism Task Force or Joint Terrorism Working Group exists in your jurisdiction, coordinate your efforts with the FBI WMD coordinator(s) assigned to your jurisdiction. Federal, state and local jurisdictions need to share and compare information on a continuing basis during and well after the completion of this assessment.

The FBI WMD coordinators, having been briefed on this process, stand ready to assist and will review the assessments to ensure that they are consistent with any intelligence known at the Federal level. However, the FBI WMD coordinators may or may not be in a position to physically participate in the assessment process at each jurisdiction level. If no FBI representation is readily available in your jurisdiction, look to a member of your law enforcement community to gather officials of other law enforcement agencies to participate in the assessment process. In other areas there are existing criminal intelligence consortiums that can be used for comparison and validation. There is much valuable, unclassified information that will benefit the assessment on the Internet, in publications, and in the media.

As this information will be of a sensitive nature, it is suggested that only individuals privy to such information as a part of their routine responsibilities be allowed to participate. It must also be recognized that legal and operational constraints associated with the collection and sharing of certain criminal intelligence information exists. Therefore, it is understood that situations will occur where ongoing investigations cannot be disclosed. It is further understood that for purposes of avoiding any legal issues, certain restrictions do apply.

In order to protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information on specific groups or individuals, and in order to comply with certain legal principles and privacy laws circumscribing the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence on individuals or groups who may be identified as a PTE, no specific identity of the PTEs evaluated in the assessment process will be included in the information forwarded to the designated state agency. Since this process is focused on determining training and equipment needs and is not intended as an intelligence-gathering tool, such information is not necessary to the process. However, for audit purposes, a jurisdiction should be prepared to justify its responses. After this information is submitted to the designated state agency, FBI WMD coordinators assigned to the state will review the rolled-up data for consistency with existing information files.

[STEP TWO] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F):

The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F) is to be completed by the assessment working group. Record all relevant information onto the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet will be used to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G). The Jurisdiction Threat Profile is the only portion of the threat assessment to be forwarded to the designated state agency.

Dissemination of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is restricted in order to protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information, and in order to comply with certain legal principles and privacy laws circumscribing the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence on individuals or groups who may be identified as a potential threat element (PTE), as defined in Part C of this document.

[STEP THREE] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G):

The Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G) will constitute the returnable portion of the assessment to the designated state agency. Begin the Jurisdiction Threat Profile by answering the preliminary questionnaire. Thereafter, utilize the information recorded on the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, Table 2-b-4, to complete Tables 2-b-7 through 2-b-8 of the profile. Once the profile is complete, return it to your assessment coordinator. Retain a copy for your records.

[STEP FOUR] Complete the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Profile:

Submit the Threat Assessment Profile (Part G) to the jurisdiction for integration into the Risk Assessment Profile.

F. JURISDICTION THREAT WORKSHEET

Task I: Identify no more than 15 PTEs operating in your jurisdiction. *It is important to note that the number of PTEs identified does not affect the jurisdiction ⊤ risk factor. Only the PTE with the highest threat level is considered in the risk factor equation.* Follow the instructions below to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet.

- A. EVALUATE THE PRESENCE OF EACH THREAT FACTOR: Evaluate each threat factor (Existence, Capability, Intentions, History, and Targeting) attributable to each PTE identified in your jurisdiction. For each PTE, identify the threat factor(s) whose presence has been established, and record the corresponding numerical value in the appropriate threat factor column to the right of the PTE on the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (examples are provided). The assessment working group should only consider factors where information concerning the PTE has satisfied the definitional standards of the threat factors previously set forth in this assessment. If the intelligence information does not meet those standards or the information is not deemed credible, then the respective threat factor cannot be justified to exist and must be left blank.
- B. CALCULATE THE THREAT LEVEL OF EACH PTE: Add the corresponding point values of each threat factor whose presence has been established and insert the value in the AThreat Level@column for each PTE. The corresponding point values are listed under each threat factor at the top of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. Threat levels may range from one to ten.
- C. IDENTIFY THE MOTIVATION(S) OF EACH PTE: If one or more motivators are established for a PTE, list the particular motivator(s) associated with the corresponding PTE under the AMotivation@column in the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet.
- **D. IDENTIFY THE WMD CAPABILITY OF EACH PTE:** For each PTE assessed to have the capability to produce or develop a WMD, identify the particular type(s) of WMD. List these WMD types in the far right column of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. List only capabilities that have been substantiated. The mere threat to utilize a WMD of a certain type, or an assertion that the capability exists is not sufficient.

The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing jurisdiction. Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and should not be shared outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group.

THREAT FACTORS			Threat Level (1-10)	Motivation P=Political R=Religious E=Environmental Ra=Racial S=Special Interest Choose one or more	WMD Categories B=Biological N=Nuclear/ Radiological I=Incendiary C=Chemical E=Explosive U=Unknown Choose one or more			
PTE	Existence (1)	Violent History (1)	Intentions (2)	WMD Capability (2)	Targeting (4)			
Ex. ABC Group	1		2			3	S=Anti-Tobacco	U
Ex. DEF Group	1	1	2			4	Е	C/E/I
1.								
2.								
3. 4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								
11.								
12.								
13.								
14.								
15.					-			

Table 2-b-4

The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing jurisdiction. Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and should not be shared outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group.

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Task II: Complete the WMD Threat/Incident History Table

- 1. List the number of terrorism-related threat incidents, by WMD category, that occurred in your jurisdiction since January 1, 1998, which resulted in the activation of emergency response assets.
- 2. List the number of incidents (derived from Aa@) that were subsequently determined to be hoaxes.

Note: The Threat Assessment Working Group should share this information with the planning group to ensure that this information is correct from both the crisis and consequence responder perspective. This information should also be included as part of the Jurisdiction Risk Profile.

Threatened WMD Hazard	Total Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents	Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Determined to be Hoaxes
Biological		
Nuclear/Radiological		
Incendiary		
Chemical		
Explosive		
Total #		

Table 2-b-5

Use information collected in Tasks I and II above to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile, Paragraph G.

G. JURISDICTION THREAT PROFILE

To be forwarded to the designated state agency

1) PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

State:	_	
Jurisdiction of the Threat Asses	sment Working Group:	
Population of Jurisdiction:		
Coordinating Agency:		
□City Police	□County Sheriff/Police	□State Police/Patrol
Other		
Name of POC:Agency of POC:POC Telephone Number :POC E-Mail Address:List All Agencies Represented v		
What FBI Field Division serves	s your jurisdiction?	
	te in a Joint Terrorism Task Force	

G. JURISDICTION THREAT PROFILE (Cont.)

2) NUMBER OF PTEs ASSESSED

Using information in **Table 2-b-4** of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, list the total number of PTEs assessed in your jurisdiction.

Total Number	r of PTEs
B) EXISTING CAPABILITIES	
Designate the types of WMD capabilities asse	essed to exist in the jurisdiction (Table 2-b-4)
□None	□Incendiary
□Biological	□Chemical

4) WMD THREAT HISTORY

Record the <u>total</u> number information for ANumber of Threat Incidents@which have occurred in your jurisdiction since January 1, 1998. (Below table is same as Table 2-b-5.)

WMD Threat/Incident History

(January 1, 1998 to present)

Threatened WMD Hazard	Total Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents	Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Determined to be Hoaxes
Biological		
Nuclear/Radiological		
Incendiary		
Chemical		
Explosive		
Total #		

Table 2-b-7

5) JURISDICTION THREAT RATING

Utilizing Table 2-b-4, select the highest threat level obtained of all PTEs identified within your jurisdiction. Record this number in the right hand portion of Table 2-b-8, below. This number represents your jurisdictions highest threat level. This is the Jurisdiction Threat Rating and will be used in Task D to determine the Jurisdiction Risk Rating, i.e., a combination of threat and vulnerability.

Jurisdiction Threat Rating	
Table 2-h-8	

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Section 2, Tab c

Task C: Public Health Performance Assessment Instrument for Emergency Preparedness



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Atlanta, GA 30333

Dear Colleague, October 4, 1999

The attached Public Health Assessment Instrument for Public Health Preparedness will assist you in determining the ability of your State and/or Local Public Health System to rapidly and effectively respond to biological and chemical agents, as well as other acute public health emergencies.

This instrument was developed as a collaborative effort of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers For Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Public Health Performance Standards Program, Public Health Practice Program Office, CDC; and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch, National Center For Environmental Health, CDC; with the full collaboration of other CDC Centers, Institutes and Offices having public health bioterrorism preparedness and response responsibilities. Our public health constituency partners at the national, state, and local levels include the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). They have all been actively involved in the development of this tool and implementation plan.

In addition, this instrument is part of a Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice national project to develop an integrated statewide assessment of emergency response activities. The Department of Justice requested assistance from CDC to include a public health component for this overall survey instrument.

We believe that this will be is an excellent opportunity for you to determine your public health systems capability to respond. We strongly encourage you to complete this assessment in your local jurisdictions following the regional training sessions (to be held over the next few months by the Department of Justice and their assessment partners). Your inputs and feedback will be invaluable. CDC and its public health partners look forward to working with you as we collaborate to improve our nations public health capacity to respond to the threat of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.

Sincerely,

Scott R. Lillibridge, M.D.

Director, Bioterrorism Preparedness and

Response Program (Proposed)

Office of the Director

National Center for Infectious Diseases

Paul Halverson, Dr.P.H.

Director, National Public Health Performance Deputy Director, Division of Public Health

Systems

Public Health Practice Program Office

Public Health Performance Assessment - Emergency Preparedness

A. Public Health and the Department of Justice Assessment Process

In order to assess the baseline of readiness to respond to the threat of biological, chemical and radiological emergencies, CDC, in collaboration with public health partners has developed the attached **public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument**. This tool is integrated with the threat assessment tool developed by the FBI and the risk, capabilities, and needs assessment instruments developed for the US Department of Justice. These instruments together form an integrated assessment instrument for state and local jurisdictions.

The public health assessment is organized according to the ten essential services of public health which were developed in 1994 by representatives of ASTHO, NACCHO, the Institute of Medicine, the Association of Schools of Public Health, the Public Health Foundation, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, and the U.S. Public Health Service (http://web.health.gov/phfunctions/public.htm).

The terms local public health system (LPHS) and local public health agency (LPHA) are used frequently in the assessment.

The local public health system (LPHS) is the collection of public and private organizations contributing to public health at the local level. In some cases, organizations headquartered outside the local jurisdiction may be included in the LPHS if these organizations contribute to public health at the local level. The contribution need not be permanent or ongoing, so long as it contributes to public health at the local level. Components of the LPHS may include:

- Governmental entities--including local public health agency (LPHA) or department, board of health, local or regional branch of state health department bearing responsibility for the delivery of any public health service to the jurisdiction
- Hospitals serving the jurisdiction
- Managed care organizations serving the jurisdiction
- Clinics and physicians serving the jurisdiction
- Social service providers
- Civic organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Professional organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Local businesses providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Neighborhood organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Faith institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Transportation providers providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Educational institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction
- Public safety and emergency response agencies and organizations
- Environmental or environmental-health agencies
- Non-profit organizations/advocacy groups providing public health services to the jurisdiction

The local public health agency (LPHA) may vary in different jurisdictions, but usually includes the local health department, local board of health, and/or other local governmental entity designed to provide public health services to the jurisdiction.

In many communities, the LPHA is one of many participants--although a major player--in the LPHS. The State may provide services, which comprise a part of the local public health system. These concepts should be discussed by the team that will complete the assessment instrument.

B. Completing the Assessment

- 1. <u>Defining the jurisdiction</u> The jurisdiction under assessment may be a city, a county, multiple counties, a metropolitan area or a region. All are acceptable for assessment purposes. To facilitate analysis, please provide a list of all geographic areas included in the surveyed jurisdiction.
- 2. Identifying the team of respondents A single person or organization will not be able to adequately complete the assessment. During pilot testing, the instrument was best completed when the head of the local public health agency assembled a team from the LPHS who represented the range of services required to respond to public health emergencies. As guidance, we highly recommend that representatives from: the local public health agencies, hospitals, emergency medical services; fire department, law enforcement, media and others involved in local emergency planning, be involved in the completion of the assessment. Page three of the assessment instrument contains a sign-up sheet for those person participating in the assessment.
- 3. <u>Answering the questions</u> **B** We have tried to make all questions answerable with a definite YES or NO. However, there will be certain questions that respondents may be uncertain how to answer. Respondents should answer YES to any question that is partially met.

C. Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction

The set of questions on page 35 titled 'Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction' are a set of consensus indicators frequently used for measuring community-level public health capacity. Because these indicators have been used in prior assessments of public health performance, completing this survey in addition to the public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument will contribute to the science-base of performance measurement in public health practice.

Performance Assessment – Public Health Emergency Preparedness

This should be completed by staff of the local public health agency or agencies being assessed

Assessment Completion Date:					
Name of Health Agency Coordinating Completion of Assessment:					
Mailing Address:					
City:	State:		Zip Co	de:	
Telephone:	FAX:	FAX:		Web site or email address:	
Public Health Agency Director Coordinating Completion of Assessment:					Title:
Degree(s):		Email Addr	ess:	 	
Telephone:		Pager:		Cell Phon	e:
		1			
Emergency Response Representative Coordinating Completion of Assessment:				,	Title:
Degree(s):		Email Addr	Email Address:		
Telephone:		Pager:	Pager: Cell Phone:		e:

Person in charge of completing and submitting this assessment to the statewide coordinator:			Title:		
Email Address:	Telephon	ie:	<u>.</u>		
Categorize your jurisdiction by selecting	one of the followin	g, or describe its	s structure under	r "other":	
☐ County	☐ City/Municipal	☐ City/Co	ounty		
□ Distr	rict 🖵 Regiona	al 🖵 State			
☐ Other (Specify):					
For purposes of identifying the coverage area for this assessment, please list the geographic area(s) included in this assessment e.g. Henry County. Geographic area can include one or more counties, township, individual city or town. (If more than one county is included, please list all counties.) If the description of your jurisdiction is NOT a county, city, or multiple counties, please list ALL zip codes for the geographic area the assessment covers.					
What is the most recent population of the jurisdiction reported in this assessment?	Population		Mo./Yr.	1	
Total number of employees working in	the local public hea	lth agency	.	G .	
(or agencies) being reported			Number by	Category	
Full time employees					
Contractual					
Part time					
Other					
Total Employees					

Public Health Emergency Preparedness Assessment Team

Please list all persons who contributed to this assessment*

Name	Jurisdiction Represented	Job	Area of Expertise	Phone	E-mail Address
1. (Facilitator)			•		
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

*NOTE: Can use hyperlink to a list.

	Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction		
1.	For the jurisdiction served by your local health department, is there a community needs assessment process that systematically describes the prevailing health status in the community?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵
2.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency surveyed the population for behavioral risk factors?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵
3.	For the jurisdiction served by your local health agency, are timely investigations of adverse health events, including communicable disease outbreaks and environmental health hazards, conducted on an ongoing basis?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖
4.	Are the necessary laboratory services available to the local public health agency to support investigations of adverse health events and that meet routine diagnostic and surveillance needs?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
5.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has an analysis been completed of the determinants and contributing factors of priority health needs, adequacy of existing health resources, and the population groups most impacted?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖
6.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency conducted an analysis of age-specific participation in preventive and screening services?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
7.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, is there a network of support and communication relationships that includes health-related organizations, the media, and the general public?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
8.	In the past year in your jurisdiction, has there been a formal attempt by the local public health agency at informing elected officials about the potential public health impact of decisions under their consideration?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵
9.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has there been a prioritization of the community health needs that have been identified from a community needs assessment?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
10.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency implemented community health initiatives consistent with established priorities?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
11.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has a community health action plan been developed with community participation to address community health needs?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵
12.	During the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency developed plans to allocate resources in a manner consistent with community health action plans?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
13.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have resources been deployed as necessary to address priority health needs identified in the community health needs assessment?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖
14.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency conducted an organizational self-assessment?	Yes 🗆	No 🖵

15.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, are age- specific priority health needs effectively addressed through the provision of, or linkage to appropriate services?	Yes 🗖	No 🖵
16.	Within the past year in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency provided reports to the media on a regular basis?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖
17.	For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have there been regular evaluations of the effects of public health services on community health status?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖
18.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency used professionally recognized processes and outcome measures to monitor programs and to redirect resources as appropriate?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖
19.	In your jurisdiction, is the public regularly provided with information about current health status, health care needs, positive health behaviors, and health care policy issues?	Yes 🗖	No 🖵
20.	In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has there been an instance in which the local public health agency has failed to implement a mandated program or service?	Yes 🗖	No 🖵

Essential Ser	Essential Service #1: Monitor health status to identify community health problems							
1.1	Indicator: Monitoring for Rapid	detection	n					
1.1.1	Does the LPHS monitor community may signal biological, chemical and				Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗅	
]	DK = Do	n't know	
	If yes, how frequently are the	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Other Freq	Not at all	Don't Know	
	following rates monitored:	(D)	(W)	(M)	(O)	(No)	(DK)	
1.1.1.1	Hospital admission	D□	W□	М 🗖	0 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
1.1.1.2	ICU occupancy	D□	W 🗖	М 🗖	0 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🖵	
1.1.1.3	Unexplained deaths (including medical examiner/coroner cases)	Dū	w 🗅	М□	0 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
1.1.1.4	Unusual syndromes in ambulatory patients	D 🗖	w 🗅	М 🗖	O 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
1.1.1.5	Influenza-like illness	D□	W 🗖	М 🗖	O 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖	
1.1.1.6	Ambulance runs	D□	W 🗖	M□	O	No 🖵	DK 🖵	
1.1.1.7	911 calls	D□	W 🗖	М 🗖	0 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖	
1.1.1.8	Poison control centers calls	D□	W□	М□	0 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖	

1.1.1.10	1.1.1.0	T		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			1	
1.1.1.10 Emergency department utilization	1.1.1.9	Pharmaceutical demand		_	_		_	
1.1.1.10		(antimicrobial agent usage,	D□	W 🗖	Μū	ΟŪ	No 🗖	DK 🗖
1.1.1.11		etc.)						
1.1.1.11	1.1.1.10	Emergency department	DΠ	w 🗅	мп	οП	NoΩ	DK 🗆
1.1.1.12		utilization	D =		171 🛥	-	110 -	
1.1.1.12 Absenteeism in large worksites	1.1.1.11	Outpatient department	рΠ	wn	мп	ОΠ	No 🗆	DK 🗆
No DK No		utilization	D =		171 🛥	-	110 -	
1.1.1.13 Absentesism in schools D□ W□ M□ O□ No□ DK□ 1.1.1.14 Others (specify) 1.2 Indicator: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 1.2.1 Does the LPHS perform, or have access to, hazard assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction?	1.1.1.12		D□	w□	м□	$o \square$	No □	DK 🗆
1.1.1.14 Others (specify) 1.2 Indicator: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 1.2.1 Does the LPHS perform, or have access to, hazard assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction? If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed: 1.2.1.1 Academic institution and other laboratories Yes No DK NA DK NA DEL. N								
Indicator: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment		Absenteeism in schools	D□	W 🗖	Μ□	O 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🖵
1.2.1 Does the LPHS perform, or have access to, hazard assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction? If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed:		` 1 2						
assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction? If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed: 1.2.1.1								
If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed: 1.2.1.1 Academic institution and other laboratories Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.2 Agriculture co-op facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.6 Firework factories Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturiers or storage depot Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for hig	1.2.1	Does the LPHS perform, or have ac	cess to, h	azard				
1.2.1.1 Academic institution and other laboratories Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.2 Agriculture co-op facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.6 Firework factories Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.16					Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DI	K 🗖
1.2.1.2 Agriculture co-op facilities 1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage 1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste 1.2.1.6 Firework factories 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \cap No \cap DK \cap NA								T
1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage 1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste 1.2.1.6 Firework factories 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\)		Academic institution and other	laborator	ies	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.6 Firework factories Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\) 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\) No \(\) DK \(\) NA \(\)		Agriculture co-op facilities			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □	NA 🖵
1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste 1.2.1.6 Firework factories 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes No DK NA	1.2.1.3	Chemical manufacturing and st	torage		Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🗖
1.2.1.6 Firework factories 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\begin{array}{c} \text{No} \\ \DK \\\ \DK \\ \DK \\ \DK \\ \DK \\ \DK \\\ \DK \\ \DK \\ \DK	1.2.1.4	Dams, levies, and other flood of	control me	echanisms	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes No DK NA DK	1.2.1.5	Facilities for storage of infection	ous waste		Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	NA 🗖
1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □	1.2.1.6	Firework factories			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
Reserves) 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers No DK NA DK	1.2.1.7	Food production/storage plants			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗆	NA 🗆
& Reserves) Ies Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes Ino Ino Inval 1.2.1.16 No Ino Inval NA Ino Inval	1.2.1.8	Military installations (includes	National	Guard uni	ts v	NI. D	DIZ 🗖	NTA 🗀
1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes No DK NA D					res 🖵	No 🖵		NA 🖵
1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes No DK NA DK N	1.2.1.9	Munitions manufacturers or sto	orage dep	ot	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵	NA 🖵
1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes No DK NA D 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes No DK NA D	1.2.1.10	Pesticide manufacturing/storag	e		Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA □
1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □ 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes □ No □ DK □ NA □	1.2.1.11				Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes No DK NA	1.2.1.12				Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
processing facilities 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\begin{array}{c c} No \(\beta\) DK \(\beta\) NA \(\beta\) 1.2.1.16 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes \(\beta\) No \(\beta\) DK \(\beta\) NA \(\beta\)	1.2.1.13	-			Vac	No D	DV 🗅	NA 🗆
1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes \(\begin{array}{c ccccc} No \(\beta\) DK \(\beta\) NA \(\beta\) 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\beta\) No \(\beta\) DK \(\beta\) NA \(\beta\)					res 🖵	110		
1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\sigma\) No \(\sigma\) DK \(\sigma\) NA \(\sigma\)		Reproductive health clinics			Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖	NA 🖵
1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes \(\bigcup \) No \(\bigcup \) DK \(\bigcup \) NA \(\bigcup \)	1.2.1.15	Ventilation systems for high or	ccupancy	buildings	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	NA 🗖
1.2.1.17 Others (Specify)	1.2.1.16				Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖	NA 🗖
	1.2.1.17	Others (Specify)						1

Essential Se	ervice #2: Diagnose and investigate health problems and health h	azards in	the comm	unity
2.1	Indicator: Information System Capacity			
	Some questions Section 2.1 apply to the Emergency Response Coo LPHA. This is the person who would lead the local health departme bioterrorism incident (e.g. health officer, LHD Director, environment actual title of this person will vary from locality to locality.	ent's effort	in the ever	nt of a
2.1.1	Does the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) have a computer at work (e.g. primary or exclusive use of computer)? If yes,	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.1	Does the ERC have a CD-ROM reader?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 📮
2.1.1.2	Does the ERC have internet e-mail? If yes,	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.2.1	Does the ERC (or someone they authorize) check his/her e-mail at least once each workday?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.2.2	Has the internet email system for this jurisdiction failed for more than 5 consecutive working hours during the last month (excluding scheduled downtime)? If yes,	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.2.2.1	Was the Internet e-mail system repaired within one (1) working day the last time it failed?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.3	Does the ERC have an internet connection of at least 56 kbps speed to his/her desktop?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.4	Does the ERC have CONTINUOUS Internet access at work (e.g. "always on", not dial-up)?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.1.1.5	Has the Internet connection for this jurisdiction failed for more than 5 consecutive hours during the last month (excluding scheduled downtime)? If yes,	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.5.1	Was the Internet connection for this jurisdiction repaired within one (1) working day the time it last failed?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.6	Can the ERC browse the World Wide Web? If yes,	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.1.6.1	Is this browser Netscape Communicator v4.07 or newer or Microsoft Internet Explorer v4.04 or newer?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.2	Can your local health jurisdiction receive urgent health alerts from the state department of health within one (1) working day?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.2.1	Has the state used or tested the health alert system within the past three months?	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.2.2	By what technology (or technologies) do you receive health alerts from your state health department?			
2.1.2.2.1	Telephone (individual call)	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
2.1.2.2.2	Auto-dial (computer generated telephone call)	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
2.1.2.2.3	E-mail	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗆
2.1.2.2.4	None	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.2.2.5	Other (please specify)			

2.1.3	Does the level jurisdiction have a system for breadessting health			
2.1.5	Does the local jurisdiction have a system for broadcasting health alerts to targeted community groups? If yes,	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.3.1				
2.1.5.1	What technology (or technologies) does the local health jurisdiction currently use to broadcast health alerts?			
2.1.3.1.1	Telephone (Individual call)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
2.1.3.1.2	Auto-dial (computer generated telephone call)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.3.1.3	Regular Fax	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
2.1.3.1.4	Broadcast Fax	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.3.1.5	E-mail	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.3.1.6	None	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗆
2.1.3.1.7	Other	i es 🗀	NO 🖵	DK 🗀
2.1.3.1.7				
2.1.3.2	Can the system be used 24 hrs. a day, 7 days a week, if necessary?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.3.3	Has someone tested or used the system to send health alerts	** 5	N7 [7	DII 🗆
	to members of the community within the last 3 months?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.3.4	Is the system adequately maintained (at least one person			
	assigned to maintain and update at least quarterly the list of	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
	community health alert recipients)?			
2.1.4	Does the LPHA have written computer security policies?	V D	NT D	DIZ 🗖
	If yes, do the policies address the following:	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.1.4.1	Intruder detection	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.1.4.2	Virus scanning	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.1.4.3	Digital certificate or other means for authentication	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.1.4.4	Firewall(s) to the Internet	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.1.5	Does the LPHA have systems for safeguarding against data loss?	N D		
	If yes, do they include:	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.1.5.1	Backup electrical power	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗆
2.1.5.2	On-site data backup arrangements	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗆
2.1.5.3	Off-site data backup arrangements	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗆
2.1.5.4	Power surge protection systems in place	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2	Indicator: Epidemiologic capacity to assess, investigate and ana	lyze a biol	logical, ch	emical or
	radiological threat or emergency			
2.2.1	Does the LPHS have access to Masters or Doctoral level	Yes □	No □	DK □
	epidemiologists for on-site consultation? If yes:	168 🗀	NO 🗀	DK 🗖
2.2.1.1	Do the epidemiologists have access to portable computers	Yes □	No 🗖	DK 🗖
	with modem access during their fieldwork?	i es 🗀	NO 🗀	DK 🗖
2.2.1.2	Can data be entered into a centralized database from the field?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.2.2	Does the LPHA transmit reportable disease information	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
	electronically to the state health department?	100 🛥	110	
2.2.3	Do community health professionals receive reportable disease	Yes 🗖	No □	DK □
	summary information at least quarterly from the State or LPHA?	100 -	110 🛥	
2.2.4	Does the LPHS receive electronic surveillance reports at least	Yes 🗖	No □	DK □
	quarterly from the state health department?	100 =	1,0 =	Z.1. =

2.2.5	Are computer-based statistical tools used by the LPHA to detect changes in disease patterns?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.6	Are sample epidemiologic case investigation protocols available for the investigation of possible terrorist incidents? If yes, do they address:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.6.1	Biological incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.2.6.2	Chemical incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.2.6.3	Radiological incidents	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
2.2.7	Are sample protocols available that integrate human and veterinary epidemiologic investigations?	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.2.8	Has a roster of personnel with the technical expertise to respond to a potential biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist event been developed? If yes, do you have access to the following personnel within 1 hour:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.1	Chemists	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
2.2.8.2	Emergency management	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 📮
2.2.8.3	Emergency Medical Technicians / paramedics	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.2.8.4	Environmental health scientists	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK □
2.2.8.5	State Epidemiologist (or designee)	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
2.2.8.6	Hazardous Material Response Teams	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.2.8.7	Health physicist	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.8	Industrial hygienists	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.9	Infectious disease specialists	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.10	Law enforcement	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.11	Medical examiners/Coroner	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.12	Microbiologists	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.13	National Guard	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.14	Occupational health physicians	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.15	State Public Health Laboratory director (or designee)	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.16	Toxicologists	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.2.8.17	Veterinarians	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
2.2.8.18	Other (Specify)			
2.3	Indicator: Laboratory capacity, both public and commercial, to	investigat	e and iden	tify the
	cause of biological, chemical, or radiological threat or public hea	alth emerg	ency.	
2.3.1	Are laboratory services available to investigate emergency incidents within 4 hours of notification. If yes, are laboratory services available to investigate the following incidents:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🖵

2.3.1.2 Chemical	2.3.1.1	Biological	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.3.1.3 Radiological 2.3.2 Does the LPHS have guidelines or protocols in place to address the handling of laboratory specimens in the event of a biological, chemical or radiological incident? If yes, do they include: 2.3.2.1 Collection 2.3.2.2 Transportation/storage 2.3.2.3 Safe disposal 2.3.2.4 Labeling 2.3.2.5 Chain of custody 2.3.2.5 Chain of custody 2.3.2.6 Referral to 3 Federal Laboratory 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory 2.3.3.1 Do you have at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can rule out agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to rule-out by culture methodology: 2.3.3.1 Bacillus anthracis − agent of tularemia 2.3.3.2 Brucella sp. − agent of plague 2.3.3.4 Versinia pestis − agent of anthrax 2.3.3.4 Prancicella tularensis − agent of anthrax 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis − agent of anthrax 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. − agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis − agent of ularemia 2.3.4.4 Presinia pestis − agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.5 Brucella sp. − agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.7 Prancicella tularensis − agent of ularemia 2.3.4.8 Prancicella tularensis − agent of ularemia 2.3.4.9 Prancicella tularensis − agent of ularemia 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis − agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. − agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis − agent of ularemia 2.3.4.4 Versinia pestis − agent of brucellosis 2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terroris acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis − agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. − agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis − agent of tularemia 2.3.5.4 Versinia pestis − agent of plague 2.3.5.5 Prancicella tularensis − agent of plague 2.3.5.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory					
Does the LPHS have guidelines or protocols in place to address the handling of laboratory specimens in the event of a biological, chemical or radiological incident? If yes, do they include: 2.3.2.1					1
the handling of laboratory specimens in the event of a biological, chemical or radiological incident? If yes, do they include: 2.3.2.1					
chemical or radiological incident? If yes, do they include: 2.3.2.1 Collection Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.2 Transportation/storage Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.3 Safe disposal Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.4 Labeling Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.5 Chain of custody Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.6 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.1 Do you have at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can rule out agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to rule-out by culture methodology: 2.3.3.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.2 Brucella sp. – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.4 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of lularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.5 Francicella tularensis – agent of lularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.6 Francicella tularensis – agent of lularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of lularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of hularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □			Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK□
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2.3.2.4 Labeling Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.5 Chain of custody Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.6 Referral to State Public Health Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.3 Do you have at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can rule out agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to rule-out by culture methodology: 2.3.3.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.3.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can confirm identification of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to confirm the following: 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.4.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.5 Prancicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.5 Prancicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory presonnel	2.3.2.2	Transportation/storage		No 🖵	DK 🗖
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2.3.2.5 Chain of custody 2.3.2.6 Referral to State Public Health Laboratory 2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory 2.3.3.1 Do you have at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can rule out agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to rule-out by culture methodology: 2.3.3.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax 2.3.3.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.3.3 Francicella ullarensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.4 Versinia pestis – agent of plague 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella ullarensis – agent of anthrax 2.3.4.4 Versinia pestis – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.5 Francicella ullarensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.4.6 Prucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.7 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax 2.3.4.8 Prucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.9 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of ularemia 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella ullarensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.4.4 Versinia pestis – agent of plague 2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella ullarensis – agent of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Prancicella ullarensis – agent of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Prancicella ullarensis – agent of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Prancicella ullarensis – agent of plague 2.3.5.2 Prucella sp. – agent of plague 2.3.5.3 Prancicella ullarensis –			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
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2.3.2.7 Referral to a Federal Laboratory Yes No DK	2.3.2.6	Referral to State Public Health Laboratory	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK□
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2.3.3.3	2.3.3.1	Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.3.4.	2.3.3.2	Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can confirm identification of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to confirm the following: 2.3.4.1	2.3.3.3	Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
jurisdiction that can confirm identification of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to confirm the following: 2.3.4.1	2.3.3.4	Yersinia pestis – agent of plague	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to confirm the following: 2.3.4.1	2.3.4	Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your			
terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to confirm the following: 2.3.4.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax 2.3.4.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.4.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.4.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague 2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis – agent of anthrax 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory personnel Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory personnel Yes No DK		jurisdiction that can confirm identification of agents of possible	Vec 🗀	No 🗇	DK 🗆
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2.3.4.4			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
2.3.5 Is there at least one microbiology laboratory available to your jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis - agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes □ No □ DK □	2.3.4.3	Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
jurisdiction that can use molecular diagnostic methodologies (i.e. PCR, or other DNA-based methodologies) to make a rapid and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1	2.3.4.4	Yersinia pestis— agent of plague	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
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and accurate diagnosis of agents of possible terrorist acts? If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis - agent of anthrax Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp agent of brucellosis Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis - agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis - agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes □ No □ DK □					
If yes, is the laboratory able to diagnose the following: 2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis - agent of anthrax 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague 2.3.5.4 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes \(\begin{array}{c} \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \		-	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.3.5.1 Bacillus anthracis - agent of anthrax 2.3.5.2 Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosis 2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague 2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes □ No □ DK □ No □ DK □ No □ DK □ No □ DK □					
2.3.5.2Brucella sp. – agent of brucellosisYes □No □DK □2.3.5.3Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemiaYes □No □DK □2.3.5.4Yersinia pestis – agent of plagueYes □No □DK □2.3.6Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnelYes □No □DK □				_	
2.3.5.3 Francicella tularensis – agent of tularemia Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.5.4 Yersinia pestis – agent of plague Yes □ No □ DK □ 2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes □ No □ DK □					
2.3.5.4 <i>Yersinia pestis</i> – agent of plague 2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes □ No □ DK □ No □ DK □		1 0			
2.3.6 Are guidelines in place to indicate when laboratory results require attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes No DK D					
attention of LPHS medical, epidemiology, or laboratory personnel Yes No DK			Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
	2.3.6				
(i.e., for human anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia or plague)?			Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
		(i.e., for human anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia or plague)?			

2.3.7	Does the LPHS receive electronic laboratory reports from diagnostic service providers? If yes, are reports received from:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.3.7.1	Private laboratories	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.3.7.2	Commercial laboratories	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
2.3.7.3	Hospitals	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
2.3.7.4	Veterinary diagnostic laboratories	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖

Essential Service #3: Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues				
3.1	Indicator: Public Information			
3.1.1	Have protocols been established for releasing information to the community on potential hazards resulting from a biological, chemical or radiological release? If yes:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.1.1.1	Does this protocol have provisions for informing the public of population prevention measures? If yes do these measures include:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.1.1.1.1	Hazards to expect	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.1.1.1.2	Precautions to take	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.1.1.1.3	Requirements for evacuation or shelter-in-place	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.1.1.2	Has the protocol for the release of public information been discussed in advance with the press/media?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.1.1.3	In the event of a possible terrorist incident, does the LPHS have a designated public information officer?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2	Indicator: Communication Systems for Responders and Agencies			
3.2.1.	Can the LPHA disseminate information to the LPHS on a threat or event within two hours? If yes, can information be disseminated to:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.1.1	Ambulatory care facilities	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.1.2	First responders	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
3.2.1.3	Health care providers	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.2.1.4	Hospitals	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
3.2.1.5	Laboratories	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
3.2.1.6	Pharmacies	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
3.2.1.7	Community decision-makers, (i.e. Mayor or county health officials)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.2.1.8	Veterinarians	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
3.2.1.9	Others (specify)			
3.2.2	Does a protocol exist for communicating with the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.2.3	Have radio systems been established for communication among organizations (including the LPHS) ? If yes:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.3.1	Have radio frequencies been established?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.3.2	Is back-up power in place to operate these systems?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵

3.2.3.3	Is staff trained in the use of these systems?	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.4	Is 24-hour contact information for all critical local/state public health, medical, law-enforcement, and emergency management personnel updated at least monthly by the LPHA?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.2.5	Does the LPHS have medical management protocols to disseminate to health care providers who are caring for patients with illnesses due to biological, chemical, or radiological agents?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.3	Indicator: Communication Systems and Equipment			
3.3.1	Has a communication link with the Emergency Alert System been established?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.3.2	Has a protocol for notification of the LPHS been developed in the 911 activation system?	Yes 🗅	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.3.3	Has the LPHS arranged with an emergency telecommunications service to receive calls when phone circuits are overloaded in an emergency or disaster?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
3.3.4	Have back-up systems/methods of communications been identified?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
3.3.5	Are emergency communications networks/equipment tested at least quarterly?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

Essential Service #4: Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems				
4.1	Indicator: Mobilize Community Partnerships for Emergency Prep	paredness	and Resp	onse
4.1.1	Do entities within the LPHS participate in a task force or coalition of community partners that addresses emergency preparedness and response issues? If yes:	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.1.1	Does the LPHA have a designated representative to this task force?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.2	Has an organization(s) been given the command and control responsibility for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery efforts in your jurisdiction?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.3	Have facilities within the jurisdiction been identified that are suitable for command centers (Emergency Operations Center)?	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.4	Have individual organizations' responsibilities been determined for emergency management? If yes, do those organizations include:	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.1	LPHA	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK □
4.1.4.2	City/County/State Government (other than the LPHA)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.3	Education system: public education	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
4.1.4.4	Emergency Management Agency	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.5	Environmental agencies with responsibilities for fire, health, water, air quality, and consumer safety	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

4.1.4.6	Health organizations other than the LPHA (including urgent care centers, private physicians offices, nursing homes, custodial care facilities, home health care provider agencies, hospitals, poison centers, pharmacies, mental health and occupational health)	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.7	Local Emergency Planning Committee	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.8	National Guard	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.4.9	Private sector: trade and business organizations, industry and labor	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.4.10	Public information office for local jurisdiction	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
4.1.4.11	Public safety: fire, police	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.12	Public Works/Sanitation	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.13	Transportation systems	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.14	Volunteer Organizations (e.g. Red Cross)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
4.1.4.15	Veterinarians	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.5	Does the LPHS have procedures for both organizing and coordinating volunteers during a disaster? If yes,	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.5.1	Is insurance coverage extended to volunteers?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
4.1.6	Have local organizations been identified (e.g. chemical manufacturers, radiological sites, commercial cleanup contractors) that may be of technical assistance once an emergency public health response is required?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

Essential Service #5: Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts						
5.1	Indicator: Policies and plans related to emergency preparedness					
5.1.1	Does your jurisdiction have an emergency preparedness and response plan? If yes, does the plan include the following:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗅		
5.1.1.1	Organizational responsibilities and relationships among local, district, State, and Federal response agencies	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🖵		
5.1.1.2	Identification of community organizations that have a role in responding to biological, chemical, or radiological exposure	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗅		
5.1.1.3	Alternative treatment facilities to accommodate increased patient loads in the event of a mass casualty incident	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.4	Roster of local medical facilities capable of handling laboratory specimens	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.5	Roster of local medical facilities capable of handling victims of exposure	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.6	Roster of local veterinary facilities capable of handling laboratory specimens	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.7	Roster of local veterinary facilities capable of handling affected animals	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.8	Coordination with the local poison control center	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗆		
5.1.1.9	Procedures for updating the emergency preparedness and response plan	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.9.1	If yes, have plans been reviewed within the past 12 months	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.10	Guidelines for addressing environmental decontamination issues	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.11	Guidelines for worker safety for those dealing with humans and animals exposed to biological, chemical, or radiological agents (e.g., the use of personal protective equipment and documentation of adequate antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis)	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.12	Guidelines for reviewing activities conducted during a response or exercise to correct deficiencies	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.13	Protocol for convening police, fire, EMS, local hospitals, public health officials, members of the local emergency planning committee, Emergency Operations Centers, and other relevant parties on a periodic basis to review the content of the plan	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.14	Protocol for coordinating public health responsibilities with law enforcement responsibilities	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.15	Protocol for mutual aid agreements	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK □		
5.1.1.16	Protocol for implementing an emergency epidemiological investigation for human and animal exposures	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖		
5.1.1.17	Protocol for implementing evacuation and mass casualty transportation	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖		

5.1.1.18	Protocol for initiating the public health response when a device is found that may contain a biological, chemical, or radiological agent	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.19	Protocol for critical incident stress counseling for victims or response personnel, including public health and medical professionals	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.20	Protocol for protecting care-providers and victims from secondary exposures	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.21	Protocol for decontamination of patients upon their arrival at the treatment facility	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.22	Protocol for ensuring that contamination of treatment facilities does not occur when patients are evaluated or treated	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.23	Protocol for decontaminating mass casualties (pre-hospital)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
5.1.1.24	Protocol for instituting mass isolation within a health facility	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
5.1.1.25	Protocol for transferring patients outside of the LPHS	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
5.1.1.26	Protocol for incorporating state and federal assets into the local response efforts (ie. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance teams (DMAT), etc.)	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.27	Protocol for instituting mass vaccinations or medication distribution. If yes:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.27.1	Does it address distribution of vaccines and medications to the first responders?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.27.2	Does it address distribution of vaccines and medications to the medical/health care providers?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.1.28	Protocol for responding to mass mortuary needs	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
5.1.2	If the LPHS has an emergency response plan, has it been implemented or exercised within the past 12 months?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.2.1	If yes, was the local emergency management agency (or Local Emergency Planning Committee) involved in the process?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.3	Is the LPHS emergency response plan integrated with the state emergency response plan?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
5.1.4	Is the local public health agency integrated into a community-wide emergency response plan?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

6.1	Indicator: Review and evaluate laws and regulations including	<u>statut</u> ory	basis for a	ction
6.1.1	Does the LPHS have a current compilation of Federal, State, and local laws and regulations regarding emergency preparedness and response in the event of biological, chemical agents, or radiological incidents? If yes, has there been a review of regulations addressing:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.1.1.1	"State of emergency" declarations	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🖵
6.1.1.2	Clean air	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
6.1.1.3	Exposure-related disease	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
6.1.1.4	Food handling	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
6.1.1.5	Injury prevention	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
6.1.1.6	Mortuary services	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗆
6.1.1.7	Toxic waste and chemical treatment	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
6.1.1.8	Water quality	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
6.1.1.9	Worker safety	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
6.2	Indicator: Involvement in improvement and enforcement of la	ws and reg	ulations	
6.2.1	Does the LPHS have the legal authority to enforce public health laws and regulations? If yes, does it include authority to:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.1.1	Close facilities in a health emergency	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
6.2.1.2	Declare appropriate procedures for the management of fatalities and safe handling of dead bodies (both human and animal)	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.1.3	Detain persons exposed to a biological agent	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
6.2.1.4	Establish quarantine in the event of a suspected biological, chemical, or radiological release (Federal, State, county and local laws, ordinances and policies),	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.1.5	Order evacuation of the community	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
6.2.1.6	Require exposed persons to accept mandatory vaccinations and/or drug therapy	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.1.7	Require mandatory medical examination of exposed persons	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK □
6.2.1.8	Require mandatory tracking and follow-up of exposed persons	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
6.2.1.9	Require the collection of specimens and the performance of tests on exposed persons and animals	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.1.10	Require the decontamination of exposed property	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
6.2.1.11	Require the reporting of new diseases and illness clusters	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK □
6.2.1.12	Seize and destroy contaminated property	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.2	Does the LPHS identify local public health issues (related to emergency preparedness and response) that are not adequately addressed through existing laws and regulations?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

6.2.3	Does the LPHS participate in the modification of existing laws and regulations designed to protect health and ensure safety in case of a public health emergency or hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological event?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.4	Does the LPHS participate in the formulation of new laws and regulations designed to protect health and ensure safety in case of a public health emergency or hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological event? If so, does the LPHS:	Yes □	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.4.1	Draft proposed legislation or regulations?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.4.2	Get involved in public hearings?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
6.2.4.3	Communicate with legislators and regulatory officials?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵

Essential S	Essential Service #7: Link people to needed personal health services and ensure the provision of healthcare when otherwise unavailable				
7.1	Indicator: Assuring community access to critical health service	s during a	threat or	event	
7.1.1	Has the LPHS identified special populations who may encounter				
	barriers to health services during an emergency due to a	Yes □	No □	DK □	
	biological, chemical, or radiological agent?	103 🛥	110 🛥		
	If yes, have needs of the following groups been identified:				
7.1.1.1	Children	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.2	Elderly persons	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.3	Homeless population	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.4	Remote populations	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.5	Those who are chronically ill and require access to critical services, e.g. kidney dialysis and pharmacy services	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.6	Those who encounter barriers due to culture or language	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵	
7.1.1.7	Underinsured and uninsured	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🖵	
7.1.1.8	Physically and mentally disabled, including homebound	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗖	
7.1.1.9	Others (specify)				
7.1.2	Have resources been designated to reduce barriers and meet the				
	health needs for all these special populations within your	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🖵	
	jurisdiction in the event of a threat?				
7.1.3	Does the LPHS have access to logistical assets to transport mass				
	casualties within and outside of the local jurisdiction if local	Yes □	No 🖵	DK □	
	hospitals become filled?	168	110	DK 🗀	
7.2	Indicator: Assuring effective medical management during an e	mergency			
7.2.1	Has the LPHS assessed the ability to increase capacity in the case				
	of a five-fold increase in patient admissions to the health care	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵	
	sector?				
7.2.2	Have you assessed the ability to increase capacity five-fold for				
	the following services?				
7.2.2.1	Adult medicine beds	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 📮	

7.2.2.2	Burn unit beds	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 📮
7.2.2.3	Intensive Care Units (ICU) beds	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.2.3	Medical treatment vehicles	Yes 📮	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.2.4	Mortuary Space	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
7.2.2.6	Multiple trauma beds	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.2.7	Pediatric beds			DK 🗖
		Yes 🗆	No 🖵	
7.2.2.8	Respiratory isolation units	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.2.9	Respiratory ventilators	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 📮
7.2.3	Has the LPHS assessed pharmaceutical inventories at area pharmacies, pharmaceutical supply vendors or treatment facilities (including hospitals)? If yes, have the inventories been assessed for the following:	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.3.1	Bacterial agents: e.g. Ciprofloxacin, Doxycycline, Penicillin, Chloramphenicol, and Azithromycin	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.3.2	Botulinum toxin: Mechanical respiratory ventilators and associated supplies	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.3.3	Burn care / Vesicants: Sterile bandages, intravenous fluids, and broad spectrum antibiotics	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.3.4	Cyanides: Cyanide antidote kits containing amyl nitrite, sodium nitrite, and sodium thiosulfate	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.3.5	Lewisite: British Anti- Lewisite	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.3.6	Nerve agents: e.g. Atropine, Pralidoxime chloride, and Diazepam (or lorazepam)	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.3.7	Pulmonary agents: Oxygen ventilators, and respiratory care supplies	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.3.8	Radiological exposure: Potassium iodide	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.3.9	All agents: Resuscitation equipment and supplies; vasopressors	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖
7.2.4	Does the LPHS have access to dosage requirements for antidotes and therapies for children?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.5	Is the necessary drug administering equipment available for the on-hand quantities of antidotes and therapies?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.6	Has the LPHS established protocols for requesting State or Federal (civilian or military) pharmaceutical stockpiles?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.7	Do you now have, or will you have within the next 12 months, a person in charge that will be officially designated to accept deliveries from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile if there is a bioterrorist event?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.8	Does your LPHS have mutual aid agreements with other localities (in or outside your state) to share pharmaceuticals and medical devices?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗅
7.2.9	Does the LPHS have procedures in place for people needing medical care? If yes:	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.2.9.1	Does the LPHS have a procedure to triage patients to appropriate treatment facilities?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗅
7.2.9.2	Do procedures address the need for confidentiality?	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🗖

7.2.10	Do the majority of the hospitals in your jurisdiction have the			
7.2.10.1	following respiratory protective equipment available? Self-contained breathing apparatus (with tank and full mask)	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.10.2	Supplied air respirators (full mask and air line from hospital air System)	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.10.3	Chemical cartridge air purifying respirators	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.10.4	HEPA masks (OSHA/NIOSH-approved High efficiency particulate)			
7.2.10.5	Chemical protective clothing	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.11	Does the local medico-legal death investigation system have responsibility to investigate fatalities from biological, chemical and radiological terrorism? If yes, does that system have access to:	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗖
7.211.1	Appropriate microbiological and toxicological testing	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.11.2	Biosafety cabinets and fume hoods to handle contaminated autopsy tissue	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.11.3	Facilities where autopsies can be performed on contaminated victims	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.11.4	Established links to the local and state health department	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
7.2.11.5	Medical records of victims	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
7.2.12	Are medical examiners/coroners included in the LPHS hazardous materials emergency preparedness activities?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖

Essential Service #8: Assure a competent public and personal health care workforce					
8.1	Indicator: Workforce Capacity and Assessment				
8.1.1	Has the LPHS assessed the workforce for emergency preparedness and response capabilities in the past tw yes, provide the numbers below in 8.1.2 in column 1	o years? If	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.1.2	Has the LPHS estimated the numbers of practicing p and personal healthcare workers trained 8 hours or m last year in emergency preparedness and response? If yes, please provide numbers for the following:		Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
		# In	# Tra	ined	
		Workforce	(8 hrs or	more)	
8.1.2.1	Physicians				DK 🗖
8.1.2.2	Nurses				DK 🗖
8.1.2.3	Physician assistants				
8.1.2.4	Environmental health workers				DK 🗖
8.1.2.5	Mental health/Social workers				DK 🗖
8.1.2.6	Epidemiologists				DK 🗖
8.1.2.7	Laboratory personnel qualified to analyze biological, radiological, or chemical agents				DK 📮

8.1.2.8	Respiratory therapists			DK 📮
8.1.2.9	Medical examiners			DK 📮
8.1.2.10	Pharmacists			DK 🖵
8.1.2.11	Emergency medical technicians			DK 📮
	(EMTs)/paramedics			עע 🗖
8.1.2.12	Veterinarians			DK 🖵
8.1.2.13	Health administrators/managers			DK 🖵
8.2	Indicator: Training and Continuing Education			
8.2.1	Does the LPHS have a method for assessing training and			
	continuing education needs based on roles/responsibilities of	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
	response personnel?			
0.2.1.1	If yes,			
8.2.1.1	Does the LPHA have a method for assessing training and	Yes □	No 🖵	DK 🗖
	continuing education needs based on roles/responsibilities of response personnel?	i es 🗀	No 🖵	
8.2.2	Have resources to provide training been identified?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
8.2.3	Have organizations to provide training been identified?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖸
8.2.4	Have the first responders had training on selection and use of			
0.2.4	appropriate Personal Protective Equipment?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.5	Has the LPHS implemented activities to educate health care			
0.2.0	providers (including EMS) and laboratory workers in your			
	jurisdiction on topics regarding radiological, biological, and	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
	chemical incidents?			
	If yes, do the training topics include:			
8.2.5.1	Acquisition and handling of laboratory specimens	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.5.2	Contact telephone numbers for reporting/consultation	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.5.3	Guidelines for immediate reporting/consultation with public	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🖵
	health officials			
8.2.5.4	Medical management of patients	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
8.2.5.5	Patient decontamination procedures (including those to be	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🖵
9256	used when outside temperatures are extreme)	Vac	No D	DK 🗖
8.2.5.6	Identification of hazardous biological agents	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	
8.2.5.7 8.2.5.8	Identification of hazardous chemical agents Identification of radiological hazards	Yes □ Yes □	No □ No □	DK 🖵
8.2.5.9	Role of the healthcare providers in recognizing/suspecting	168 🗀	NO 🗀	DK 🗀
0.2.3.9	the beginning of an outbreak	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
8.2.6	Does the LPHS ensure provision of training to prepare response			
0.2.0	personnel for decontamination procedures and contagion hazards			
	that may accompany a biological, chemical, or radiological	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □
	incident?			
	If yes, is training for the following personnel addressed:			
8.2.6.1	First responder community (EMS, fire, law enforcement)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
8.2.6.2	Emergency department personnel	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.6.3	Health care providers	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.6.4	Laboratory workers	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.6.5	Medical examiners/Coroners	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.6.6	Morgue personnel	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵

8.2.6.7	Mortuary professionals	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.6.8	Pathologists	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🖵
8.2.6.9	Veterinarians	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖
8.2.7	Is the public health workforce cross-trained with other organizations within the emergency response system?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.8	Do training programs for first responders include preparation for the emotional and mental health impacts of a terrorism event?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.9	Do training programs for first responders include description of the incident command system, i.e. organizations involved in response actions?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.10	Do participants evaluate training and continuing education activities? If yes:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.10.1	Is this feedback used to identify future training needs?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.11	Does your LPHS use distance based learning technology for training and continuing education?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖
8.2.12	Are Continuing Education Units (or equivalent) available for emergency preparedness training?	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🖵

Essential S	Essential Service #9: Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health services									
9.1	Indicator: Drills/Simulations/ "Tabletop exercises"									
9.1.1	In the last 12 months, has the LPHS participated in tabletop									
	exercises to assess response readiness, responder continuity, and	Yes □	No □	DK□						
	overall integration of services?	103 🛥	110 🛥	DK 🛥						
	If yes, did these exercises address:									
9.1.1.1	Biologic terrorism or incidents	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗖						
9.1.1.2	Chemical terrorism or incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
9.1.1.3	Radiological terrorism or incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
9.1.2	In the last 12 months, has the LPHS participated in functional									
	exercises to assess response readiness, responder coordination	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK□						
	and overall integration of services and responsibilities?	103 🛥		DK =						
	If yes, did these exercises address:									
9.1.2.1	Biological terrorism or incident	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖						
9.1.2.2	Chemical terrorism or incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
9.1.2.3	Radiological terrorism or incidents	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK □						
9.1.3	If the LPHS has participated in tabletop or functional exercises in									
	the past 12 months, did multiple organizations and individuals	Yes □	No □	DK □						
	participate?	i es 🗀	No 🖵	DK 🗀						
	If yes, were the following included:									
9.1.3.1	Local Public Health Agency (LPHA)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
9.1.3.2	911 centers	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
9.1.3.3	Acute care hospitals	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🖵						
9.1.3.4	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)	Yes 🖵	No 📮	DK 🖵						

9.2.2	Has your LPHS responded to a "hoax" bioterrorist event, such as a	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵					
7.2.1	Is there a plan to revise the LPHS emergency response plan at least once every 12 months to keep procedures current?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.2 9.2.1	Indicator: Presence of Continuous Quality Improvement for Ev	valuation () Services	1-9					
0.2	jurisdiction?								
	from exercises to participants and other colleagues within the	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.5	Is a formal mechanism in place to disseminate knowledge gained								
	emergency preparedness plan?								
	knowledge gained from exercises to correct deficiencies in the	Yes 🗆	No 🖵	DK 🗖					
9.1.4	Does the LPHS have a mechanism to review the experiences and								
9.1.3.35	Others (Specify)	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵					
9.1.3.34	Volunteer medical and rescue groups	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵					
9.1.3.33	Veterinarians	Yes 🗖	No 🖵	DK 🗆					
9.1.3.32	State Health Department	Yes 🗖	No 📮	DK 🖵					
9.1.3.31	State Environmental Health	Yes 🗖	No 📮	DK 🖵					
9.1.3.30	State Emergency Management	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵					
9.1.3.29	Red Cross	Yes 🖵	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.27	Public works	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.20	Poison control	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.25	Physicians/health care providers	Yes □	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.24	National Guard	Yes □ Yes □	No 🖵	DK □					
9.1.3.23	Military personnel		No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.22	Mental health agency / services	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.21 9.1.3.22	Medical examiners/coroner	Yes □ Yes □	No □ No □	DK □ DK □					
9.1.3.20	Managed care organizations Media	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.19	Long-term care facilities Managed core organizations								
9.1.3.18	Law enforcement (local, county, and State)	Yes □ Yes □	No □ No □	DK □ DK □					
9.1.3.17	Laboratories (clinical / public health) Lavy enforcement (level county and State)	Yes 🗆		DK 🗖					
9.1.3.16		Yes 🗆	No □ No □	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.15	Fire department Funeral directors	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗆					
9.1.3.14	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.13	FBI	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.12	Environmental Protection Agency	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.11	Emergency Medical Services	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.10	Emergency Management Association	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.9	Education system Emergency Management Association	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.8	County emergency management	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.7	Community health centers	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
9.1.3.6	Civilian amateur radio groups	Yes 🗆	No 🗖	DK 🗖					
0126	City/county government officials	Vac 🗖	N ₂ □	DV 🗖					

	letter or package threatening to contain anthrax or another potentially harmful biological agent, within the past 12 months? If yes,			
9.2.2.1	Do current policies reflect the lessons learned from the event?	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵

Essential Service #10: Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problem										
10.1	Indicator: Capacity to Conduct Research/Surveillance for Potential Health Threats									
10.1.1	Does the LPHS have researchers on staff or ready access to									
	researchers? If yes, are one or more of these researchers trained in:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖						
10.1.1.1	Basic sciences	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖						
10.1.1.2	Epidemiologic research methods	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖						
10.1.1.3	Health services research methods	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖						
10.1.1.4	Veterinary research	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK □						
10.1.2	Does the LPHS have links with academic, healthcare, and/or research institutions that conduct research in emergency preparedness for terrorism?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖						
10.2	Indicator: Access to and Sharing Research and Innovation									
10.2.1	Does the LPHS have a designated individual responsible for researching, collecting and updating information on emergency preparedness?	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖						
10.2.2	Has the LPHS disseminated research information in the field of emergency preparedness? If yes, has this been:	Yes 🗖	No 🗖	DK 🗖						
10.2.2.1	Throughout the local LPHS	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🖵						
10.2.2.2	To colleagues outside the jurisdiction	Yes 🖵	No 🖵	DK 🗖						

Section 2, Tab d Task D: Integration of Jurisdiction Vulnerability, Threat and Public Health Assessments

For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP – FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program.

Overview: The final step in the jurisdiction risk assessment process is to integrate results of the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment (**Task A**), the Jurisdiction Threat Assessment (**Task B**), and the Jurisdiction Public Health Assessment (**Task C**) to assess the overall level of risk for the jurisdiction (See **Figure 2-3** below). This level of risk is referred to as the **Jurisdiction Risk Rating**. The results of this assessment process are recorded on the **Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Profile**. This profile consolidates jurisdiction risk information and is submitted to the designated state agency.

Integrating Vulnerability, Threat, and Public Health to Determine Risk




Figure 2-3

This integration of assessment processes is accomplished by completing the following steps:

- G Enter the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating, recorded in Section 2, Tab a, Table 2-a-5 from the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet in the appropriate box on Table 2-d-2.
- G Match the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating just entered with the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating vertical column on the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Matrix, at **Table 2-d-1**.
- G Enter the Jurisdiction Threat Rating recorded in Section 2, Tab b, Table 2-b-8, in the appropriate box on Table 2-d-2.
- **G** Match the **Jurisdiction Threat Rating** just entered with the Jurisdiction Threat Rating horizontal row in the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Matrix.
- G Plot the intersection of the two entries on the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Matrix to arrive at the **Jurisdiction Risk Rating.**
- G Record the **Jurisdiction Risk Rating** below the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Matrix in the space provided on **Table 2-d-2**.

Record all requested information on the **Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Profile** and submit to the state designated agency.

- A. Fill in the requested administrative data.
- B. Part I: Enter the same results as in **Table 2-d-2**
- C. Part II: Enter the data from **Table 2-a-6**, **Section 2**, **Tab a**, **Task A**: **Vulnerability Assessment**.
- D. Part III: Enter the data from **Table 2-b-6**, **Section 2**, **Tab b**, **Task B: Threat Assessment**.
- E. Part IV: Enter the total "Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents" from **Table 2-b-7**, **Section 2, Tab b,Task B: Threat Assessment**.
- F. Part V: Enter the information referenced from **Section 2**, **Tab c**, **Task C: Performance Assessment Public Health Emergency Preparedness.**

Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Matrix

			Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating										
	Rating	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
	10	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11
50	9	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10
Jurisdiction Threat Rating	8	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9
at R	7	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8
Thre	6	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7
tion '	5	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6
sdic	4	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5
Juri	3	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4
	2	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3
	1	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2

Table 2-d-1

Jurisdiction Risk Assessment

Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating (from Sec 2, Tab a, Figure 2-a-5)	
Jurisdiction Threat Rating (from Sec 2, Tab b, Figure 2-b-8)	
Jurisdiction Risk Rating	

Table 2-d-2

JURISDICTION RISK ASSESSMENT PROFILE

Submit this form to the state

Jurisdiction: Prepared by:		
<u>Profil</u>	e Part I - Jurisdiction Risk Rating	
JURISDICTI	ON VULNERABILITY RATING	
JURISD	ICTION THREAT RATING	
JURI	SDICTION RISK RATING	

Table 2-d-3

$\underline{Profile\ Part\ II}\ -\ Legal\ WMD\ (BNICE)\ Hazard\ Environment$

Hazard	Total number of hazardous sites located in jurisdiction
Biological	
(Infectious Only)	
Chemical (Tier II)	
Incendiary &	
Explosive	
Nuclear &	
Radiological	
Total	

Table 2-d-4

Profile Part III – Jurisdictional Threat Environment

Total Number of PTEs Table 2-d-5

<u>Profile Part IV</u> – Number of WMD/Terrorism-related incidents to which the jurisdiction responded since Jan. 1, 1998 (include the number of hoaxes in this count)?

Profile Part V – Jurisdiction Public Health Assessment

(Information from the Performance Assessment – Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Section 2, Tab c, as referenced below)

- 1. What is the most recent population of the jurisdiction reported in this assessment (Ref: Performance Assessment, second page)
- 2. Does the LPHS monitor community and health indicators which may signal biological, chemical, and radiological incidents? (Ref: Performance Assessment, Question 1.1.1) (YES/NO)
- 3. Does the LPHS have access to Masters or Doctoral level epidemiologists for on-site consultation (Ref: Performance Assessment, Question 2.2.1)

(YES/NO)

4. Are laboratory services available to investigate emergency incidents within 4 hours of notifications? (Performance Assessment, Question 2.3.1)

(YES/NO)

a. For Biological Incidents? (Question 2.3.1.1)

(YES/NO)

b. For Chemical Incidents? (Question 2.3.1.2)

(YES/NO)

c. For Radiological Incidents? (Question 2.3.1.3)

(YES/NO)

5. Does the LPHS have access to logistical assets to transport mass casualties within and outside of the jurisdiction if local hospitals become filled? (Ref: Performance Assessment, Question 7.1.3)

(YES/NO)

Note: Use other information from the Threat Profile or Public Health Assessment deemed appropriate and useful.

Section 3

Capabilities and Needs Assessment

Brief Description of the Process:

Jurisdictions are requested to conduct a three-step WMD capabilities and needs assessment of their emergency responders=(Fire Services, HazMat, EMS, Law Enforcement, Public Works, and Public Health) ability to respond to a WMD incident.

The purpose of these capabilities and needs assessments is to assist jurisdictions in identifying equipment, training, exercises, and technical assistance they need to enhance their capability to respond to WMD incidents. It will also be used by your state in the preparation of a three-year statewide domestic preparedness strategy, as required by the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program.

There are three macro steps in this assessment process. These three steps are described below:

STEP 1: Conduct a *Arequired response capabilities* assessment of your existing emergency responders= capabilities based on the operational imperative of properly equipping, training and exercising these assets to:

- \$ Respond to a WMD incident in a safe and effective manner and,
- \$ Perform emergency responder Aduties and functions@ as specified in your jurisdictions emergency or WMD response plans.
- **Table 3-1, Required Response Capabilities**, is provided to record the results for this assessment

STEP 2: Conduct a *Acurrent response capabilities@* assessment of your existing emergency responders= capabilities to respond to a WMD incident, based upon existing levels of equipment, training and exercises. **Table 3-2, Current Response Capabilities**, is provided to record the results for this assessment.

STEP 3: Compare the results of your assessments of Arequired response capabilities@ in Step 1 to your assessment of Acurrent response capabilities@ in Step 2. This comparison will allow you to define your Aresponse needs@ (shortfalls or gaps) that must be attained in order to enhance your jurisdictions capabilities to the necessary levels to respond to a WMD incident in a safe and effective manner. Table 3-3, Current and Required Tier Level Capabilities, is provided to record the results for this assessment.

These Aresponse needs@(shortfalls or gaps) provide performance goals for your emergency responders that can be translated into a three-year equipment, training, and exercise plan needed to reach your Arequired operational capabilities@ in the year 2001.

Assessment Aids: Five assessment aids are provided to assist you in conducting ths three-step process. They are:

- G Sample Response Capabilities for Emergency Responders (Tab a) B provides an example of duties and functions typically performed by emergency responders in jurisdictional response plans.
- **G OJP Tier Levels (Tab b) -** provides definitions of the four different levels of response capabilities (Tiers I, II, III, and IV) of emergency response elements in a WMD incident
- **G** Tier Level Competency Information Sheet (Tab c) B Summarizes, in bullet fashion, the definitions of Tier Levels given in **Tab b**, presented in three columns: Response Capabilities, Equipment, and Supporting Training Courses.
- G FY 1999 OJP Authorized Equipment Purchase List (See Appendix E, FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)
- **G** WMD Related Training Courses (Tab d)

The next portion of this section will guide you through the conduct of the Jurisdiction Capabilities and Needs Assessment Process.

STEP 1: Required Tier Level Capability Assessments

1A. Required Response Capabilities:

Using **Table 3-1** below, list the required response capabilities of your emergency responders to operate in response to a WMD incident or in a hazardous materials emergency as required by existing jurisdiction plans and operating procedures. Use the Sample Response Capabilities for Emergency Responders at **Tab a** of this section to assist you.

Required response capabilities should address duties and functions in the following four areas: personal protection, detection, decontamination, and communications capabilities as well as any other key functional capabilities performed in WMD or other emergency circumstances.

Required response capabilities are defined as those duties and functions in which emergency responders must be proficient. The emergency responder must be able to perform all assigned duties and functions in a safe and effective manner in a WMD environment, according to jurisdictional emergency response plans and procedures.

Required Response Capabilities

	Fire Services	HazMat	EMS	Law Enforcement	Public Works	Public Health	Emergency Management
Response							
Force Capabilities							

Table 3-1

1B. Required Tier Level Capability

Using **Table 3-1** you are ready to proceed to the second part of this step.

Assess the **Tier Level** Arequired@ of your emergency responders (Fire Service, HazMat, EMS, Law Enforcement, Public Works, and Public Health) to respond to a WMD incident as you have listed them in **Table 3-1**. Refer to the definitions of ATier Levels@ as provided in OJP Capability Tier Levels (**Tab b**) and Tier Level Competency Information (**Tab c**).

After determining the ATier Level@<u>required</u> of your respective emergency response elements, enter an AO@adjacent to that Tier Level in **Table 3-3**, located at the end of this section.

The required capability Tier Levels depicted by these **LOs**@ will identify and assist in the development of jurisdictional needs for equipment, training, exercises, and other areas you plan to attain by the end of FY 2001.

Proceed to **Step 2** to assess the **A**Current Tier Level Capabilities@ of jurisdictional first responder capabilities.

STEP 2: Current Tier Level Capability Assessments

2A. Current Response Capabilities:

Using **Table 3-2** below, assess your **A**current@emergency response capabilities. A sample response capabilities assessment tool is provided in **Tab a**.

Capability assessments should consider the types of equipment, such as personal protection, detection, decontamination, and communications equipment, first responders require in order to respond to a WMD incident.

Current response capabilities are defined as those duties and functions which emergency responders are proficient in at this time. The emergency responder must be able to perform all these assigned duties and functions in a safe and effective manner in a WMD environment, according to jurisdictional emergency response plans and procedures.

Current Response Capabilities.

	Fire	HazMat	EMS	Law	Public	Public	Emergency
	Services			Enforcement	Works	Health	Management
_							-
Response							
Force							
Capabilities							
_							
							-

Table 3-2

2B. Tier Level of Current Capability:

Using **Table 3-2**, you are ready to proceed to the second part of this step.

Determine the Acurrent@ Tier Level for emergency response (Fire Service, HazMat, EMS, Law Enforcement, Public Works, and Public Health) to a WMD incident. Refer to (Tab b) and (Tab c) of this section to complete your determination.

After determining the <u>current</u> ATier Level@ for your respective emergency response elements, enter an **AXe** adjacent to that Tier Level in **Table 3-3**, located at the end of this section.

The current capability Tier Levels depicted by these **Mxs**@ will identify and assist in the development of jurisdictional needs for equipment, training, exercises, and other areas you plan to attain by the end of FY 2001.

The information displayed in **Table 3-3** will allow jurisdictions to identify gaps in jurisdictional response capabilities. Using this information, proceed to **Step 3** to assess the **A**Response Needs (Shortfalls or Gaps) for Operating Safely and Effectively in a WMD Environment@ for jurisdictional first responders. In this step, you will determine the needs (shortfalls or gaps) that exist for equipment, training, exercises, and in other areas. The resulting difference between **A**current operating@ and **A**required operating@ capabilities should equate to gaps in equipment, training, and exercise needs. State projections for equipment, training, exercise technical assistance needs should incrementally, over a three-year period, address how this funding and other program resources provided by OJP/OSLDPS, will be used to fill existing gaps.

STEP 3: Response Needs (Shortfalls or Gaps) for Operating Safely and Effectively in a WMD Environment

When you have **response capability needs** (shortfalls or gaps), refer to the Tier Level Capability Information (**Tab c**) under the columns for AAssociated Equipment@and ASupporting Training Courses.@ Use this information as a guide in identifying your needs to enhance response capabilities to the required levels over the three year period - FY99, FY00 and FY01.

Once equipment shortfalls (By equipment item) and training shortfalls (by course) have been identified, calculate the quantities of equipment and training courses needed to increase tier level response capabilities to meet required response operating capabilities in FY01.

Examples of equipment which can be funded through the OJP/OSLDPS equipment grant program and are provided in the FY99 OJP Authorized Equipment Purchase List (See Appendix E, FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit). A listing of preparedness courses available to meet your training needs for WMD is found in the Compendium of Federally Conducted WMD Courses (Tab d).

Forms for recording the current status and projections for FY99, FY00 and FY01 for equipment, training, exercises, and other requirements are provided in **Section 5.** Your designated state agency will provide instructions on the media and format for submission of this information to the state.

Summary

This simple three-step process should provide you with the analytical basis to develop and justify a three-year equipment, training, and exercise plan which enhances your WMD response capabilities.

Current and Required Tier Level Capabilities

This form is for submission to the designated state agency

Jurisdiction:	Jurisdiction Population:
	•
Prepared by:	Date:

Tier Level	Fire Service	HazMat	EMS	Law Enforcement	Public Works	Public Health	Emergency Management
Tier IV							
Tier III							
Tier II							
Tier I							

Table 3-3

Legend:

- \$ \$ **AX** Current Response Capability
- **AOP** Required Response Capability
- \$ Difference between AXe and AOe reflect response capability needs (shortfalls or gaps)

Form to be submitted electronically via OJP Web Page

Section 3, Tab a

Sample Response Capabilities for Emergency Responders

Agency	Fire	HazMat	EMS	Law	Public	Public	Emergency
	Service			Enforcement	Works	Health	Management
	Recognize	Stop Leak	Recognize	Recognize	Recognize	Conduct	Command
	HazMat	0 0	HazMat	HazMat	HazMat	Mass	Post
	Situations	Contain Spill	Situations	Situations	Situations	Casualty Operations	Operations
Duties &	Self	Consultation and	Self	Self	Self	Operations	Consultation
Functions	Protection	Support to	Protection	Protection	Protection	Care for	and Support to
	Trotection	Unified	Trotection	Trotection	Trotection	Grossly	Unified
	Unified	Command	Care and	Scene	Unified	Decontam-	Command
(sample-	Command		Transport of	Security	Command	inated	
not an all inclusive list)		Decontaminate	Grossly De-			Patients	Communi-
inclusive list)	Access Data	own Employees	contaminated	Unified	Consultation		cations
	about Material	(HazMat Team)	Patients	Command	and Support	Diagnose	
	Involved	D	D (*)	N/ 1.1	to Unified	and Treat	Recognize
	Access	Decontaminate Victims	Patient Decontam-	Mobile Command	Command	Chemical,	Potential WMD
	HazMat Team	Vicuitis	ination	Post	Communi-	Biological and	Terrorism
	Haziviat Team		mation	Operations	cations	Radiological	Incident
	Patient	May Provide	Triage WMD	Operations	Cations	Injuries	
	Decontam-	EMS Support for	Patients	Communi-	Recognize	3	
	ination	Own Team		cations	Potential	Self	
			Immediate		WMD	Protection	
	Communi-	Communications	Treatment of	Recognize	Terrorism	**	
	cations	D	WMD	Potential	Incidents	Unified	
	Mobile	Recognize Potential WMD	Patients	WMD Terrorism		Command	
	Command	Terrorism	Transport	Incidents		Consultation	
	Post	Incidents	WMD	meidents		and Support	
	Operations		Patients			to Unified	
	1	Identify				Command	
	Recognize	Contaminated					
	Potential	Area				Medical	
	WMD					Surveillance	
	Terrorism Incidents					Agant	
	meidents					Agent Diagnosis	
						Diagnosis	
						Communi-	
						cations	

Section 3, Tab b

Office of Justice Programs Capability TIER Levels

Tier One (Baseline Capability Level): This category is described as the basic level of equipment and operational capabilities that jurisdictions require to conduct certain defensive operations to perform in a contaminated environment. This can be generally defined as "Basic HazMat Equipment Capability Level." This level will be evidenced by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120 levels) certification, which agencies must meet to operate in hazardous environments, and by the certification, which agencies must meet to operate in hazardous environments, and by the status of current operations-level training. In these instances, applicants should know when to take self-protective measures and when to take steps to protect the general population from further contamination. The ability to make on-scene assessments and call for mutual aid, as needed, is also consistent with the requirements at this tier level.

Tier Two (Hazardous Materials Operations Capability Level): In addition to meeting the requirements set forth in Tier One, the Tier Two level will require the applicant to meet a hazardous materials equipment capability need, and to have the requisite personnel trained and certified in accordance with OSHA. This can be generally defined as a "Modest Increase in HazMat Equipment Capability Level." This level will usually involve equipment needed for hazardous materials teams that are appropriately trained for using personal protective equipment (PPE) and are highly competent in using advanced personal protective measures and hazard mitigation techniques. They will have the ability to implement evacuation measures, use decontamination and basic detection equipment, perform basic life support functions, and be able to recognize and preserve crime scene functions. This level will also require teams/individuals to know how to operate in a unified command environment.

Tier Three (Technicians Capability Level): This can be generally defined as a "Moderate Increase in HazMat Equipment Capability Level." Applicants will have achieved the capabilities set forth in each of the previous two tier levels and meet or surpass the standards associated with Tier Three. As such, emergency responders will have the necessary equipment and have advanced knowledge of operations to carry out personal protective measures, initiate advanced detection and monitoring techniques, demonstrate a capability to establish mass casualty decontamination systems, provide medical triage, and set up a transport system for definitive medical care. Applicants will also have the ability to use safe sampling techniques in contaminated areas and sufficient levels of expertise to conduct hazard mitigation operations in contaminated areas.

<u>Tier Four (Advanced Operations and Technicians Capability Level):</u> This can be generally defined as a "High Level of HazMat Equipment Capability Level." Applicants who have met or surpassed the equipment requirements associated with the capabilities found in Tiers One, Two, and Three will meet

or surpass all emergency response equipment requirements for their jurisdiction. In this case, states can then request equipment that may give them an added level of capability that would allow them to operate unhindered without equipment shortfalls in any number of environments affected by weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, and improvised explosive and incendiary devices).

Section 3, Tab c

Tier Level Competency Information

Instructions: Use these general guidelines to establish your current and potential Tier Levels.

	Response Capability	Associated Equipment	Supporting Training Courses
Tier IV (Specialized Capability)	Tier III competency plus: • Ability to operate unhindered by equipment shortfalls in any contaminated environment	 High Level Equipment Advanced detection Computer database references Computer programming for detection equipment Responder protected detection equipment 	Specialist level HazMat Specialist level Physician, Nurse, and Public Health
Tier III (Technician Capability)	Tier II competency plus: Advanced knowledge of operations Initial detection and monitoring Establish mass casualty response/treatment systems Establish transport for mass causalities Conduct safe sampling procedures in contaminated environment	 Moderate Increase Level Equipment Level A, B, & C PPE 	 Technician Level HazMat Selected EMS personnel Selected Physician, Nurse, and Public Heath personnel
Tier II (Operators Capability)	Tier I competency plus: Operate with HazMat teams Advanced PPE measures Implement evacuation plans Use decontamination and basic detection equipment	 Modest Increase Level Equipment Level B & C PPE Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 	 Tactical Emergency Medical Service Operations Operations Level B Selected Fire, HazMat, EMS, Law, Public Works, and Public Health
Tier I (Basic Defensive Capability)	 Conduct defensive operations in a contaminated environment Self protective measures Protect general population from further contamination 		Terrorism Awareness Course Awareness Level B All disciplines

Section 3, Tab d Compendium of Federally Conducted WMD Courses

This US ARMY Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has compiled a compendium of courses to inform state and local agencies of federal training that is available in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This compendium is maintained in its entirety on SBCCOM's Domestic Preparedness website: http://dp/sbccom.army.mil/fr/compendium/.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's website for the Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) (www.rris.fema.gov/) also contains an abbreviated compilation of the Federal Training Courses listed in SBCCOM's compendium. These courses, directed for focus on counter-terrorism, have been organized into the following subject areas:

- NBC Counter-Terrorism Training
- General Counter-Terrorism Training
- Counter-Terrorism Training NBC Domestic Preparedness Training: Radiological
- Counter-Terrorism Training: Chemical and biological Medical Training for NBC Incidents

Below is an extract of titles of federally sponsored weapons of mass destruction (WMD) courses:

Department of Defense

- Biological Warfare and Terrorism: The Medical and Public Health Response
- Chemical/Biological Countermeasures Training (CBCT)
- Community Response Emergency Simulation Training (CREST)
- Field Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties
- Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR)
- Medical Management of Biological Casualties
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Basic Awareness (Employee)
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Incident Command Course
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Responder Awareness Course
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Responder Operations Course
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Senior Officials' Workshop
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Technician Emergency Medical Services Course
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Technician HazMat Course
- NBC Domestic Preparedness Training Technician Hospital Provider Course
- Operational Radiation Safety

- Preparing for and Managing the Consequences of Terrorism
- Radiological Accident Command Control and Coordination (RAC3)
- Radiological Emergency Team Operations (RETOPS)
- Radiological Hazards Training Course
- Toxic Aid Automatic Training
- Toxic Chemical Training for Medical Support Personnel

Department of Energy (DOE)

- ALARA for Design and Operations Engineers Instructor Manual
- Applied Health Physics
- Crisis Management Program for Senior Officials
- Handling of Radiation Accidents by Emergency Personnel
- Hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations (HAZWOPER)
- Health Physics for the Industrial Hygienist
- Health Physics in Radiation Accidents
- Introduction to Radiation Safety
- Medical Planning and Care in Radiation Accidents
- Occupational Health in Nuclear Facilities
- Radioactive Material Basics for Emergency Responders
- Radiological Emergency Response
- Transportation Public Information Training

Emergency Management Institute (EMI)

- Advanced Radiation Incident Operations (ARIO)
- Consequences of Terrorism, Integrated Emergency Management Course
- Emergency Response to Criminal/Terrorist Incidents
- Exercise Design Course
- Exercise Evaluation Course
- Fundamentals Course for Radiological Monitors
- Fundamentals Course for Radiological Response Teams
- Incident Command System/Emergency Operations Center (ICS/EOC) Interface
- Incident Command System for Law Enforcement Agencies
- Incident Command System for Public Works
- Mass Fatalities Incident Course

• Radiological Emergency Response Operations (RERO)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

- Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP)
- Agent Characteristics and Toxicology First Aid and Special Treatment (ACTFAST) and Use of Auto-Injectors
- An Introduction to Protective Action Decision Making
- Chemical Accident/Incident Response & Assistance
- Chemical Hazard Prediction
- Chemical Hazard Prediction for Decision Makers
- Chemical Stockpile Agent Characteristics
- CSEPP Chemical Awareness
- Emergency Management Information Systems (EMIS)
- Emergency Planner's Companion
- How Do I Know?
- Limited Exposure
- Management of Chemical Warfare Injuries
- Personal Protective Equipment
- Response Phase Decontamination for CSEPP
- Technical Planning and Evaluation
- Use of Auto-Injectors by Civilian Emergency Medical Personnel to Treat Civilians Exposed to Nerve Agent

National Fire Academy (NFA)

- Advanced Life Support Response to Hazardous Materials Incidents
- Basic Life Support and Hazardous Materials Response
- Chemistry of Hazardous Materials
- Command and Control of Fire Department Operations at Target Hazards
- Command and Control of Operations at Natural & Man-Made Disasters
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Incident Management
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Self-Study
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations Company Officer
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations Emergency Medical Services

- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations Hazardous Materials
- Hazardous Materials Incident Management
- Hazardous Materials Operating Site Practices
- Incident Command System for Emergency Medical Services

Environmental Protection Agency

- Air Monitoring for Hazardous Materials (165.4)
- Designs for Air Impact Assessments at Hazardous Waste Sites
- Emergency Response to Hazardous Material Incidents
- Hazardous Material Incident Response Operations (165.5)
- Health and Safety Plan Workshop (165.12)
- Incident Command/Unified Command for On-Scene Coordinators Radiation Safety at Superfund Sites

Department of Justice/Office of Justice Programs (DOJ/OJP)

- Basic Course for Bomb Technicians
- COBRA, WMD Hazardous Material Technician Training Course
- COBRA, WMD Incident Commander Training Course
- COBRA, WMD Responder Training
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Bomb Technicians Emergency Actions Course
- Law Enforcement Response to WMD Incidents: Basic Awareness
- Terrorism Awareness for Emergency First Responders: Internet
- Awareness for Public Works
- WMD: Operations
- EMS Operations and Planning for WMD
- EMS Tactical Operations for WMD
- WMD: Biological Agents
- WMD: Chemical Agents
- WMD: Nuclear and Radiological
- WMD: Explosives and Incendiaries
- WMD: Incident Management/Unified Command
- WMD: Incident Management/Incident Operations
- WMD Threat and Risk Assessment
- WMD Planning and Consequences for Public Works

Department of Transportation (DOT)

• First Responder Training Workshop: Public Transportation Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Incidents

Section 4

Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix

State:	State Population:
Prepared by:	Date:

Instructions: Based upon the risk, capabilities, and needs assessments provided by the jurisdictions, prioritize all the participating jurisdictions within the state according to need. The jurisdiction with the highest priority should be listed first and others should follow in descending order of need. This information will be electronically submitted with the Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy.

Ranking	Jurisdiction	Population

Section 5

Three-Year Projection Forms

Section 5, Tab a

Three-Year Projection **B** Equipment

State/Jurisdiction:	State/Jurisdiction Population:
Prepared by:	Date:
Note: Submit inform	nation electronically via the OJP Web Page.
Instructions: These forms are to be used by the state. They are reflect they can also be used by the jurisdiction for input to the state.	required to be submitted to OSLDPS with the statewide domestic preparedness strategy.
derived from the rolling-up of the jurisdictions=AQuantity (CUR) page), e.g., SCBA 754/ Equipment acquired through the FY Program is part of this current status. Second, develop a state roll jurisdictions=response plan requirements as found in the jurisdictient Equipment (matrix on the following page), e.g., SCBA 754/190	current status roll-up of on-hand/on-order equipment, by discipline. This is information @submission on the ACurrent/Required Status of Equipment@ (matrix on following Y 1999 County and Municipal Agency Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support l-up of all types and quantities of equipment, by discipline, required to fulfill the ions=submissions of AQuantity (REQ)@on the ACurrent/Required Status of 00. Third, project the shortfall or gap in equipment, by discipline, and program the coll (use the example matrix for equipment projections on the last page of this Tab, er fiscal year.
Capabilities matrix, Section 2, Table 3-2 in the jurisdictional C Equipment Type designating AQuantity (CUR) for the on-hand of (matrix on the following page), e.g., SCBA, 10/ Include equipment Support Program as part of this current required to fulfill the jurisdiction-s response plan requirements an Current/Required Status of Equipment matrix (on the follow Capabilities matrix, Section 2, Table 3-1. Third, project the short	rder equipment, by discipline. This is information derived from the Current Response Capabilities and Needs Assessment (Section 2). Enter this information in the box for each or on-order current equipment amount on the Current/Required Status of Equipment quipment acquired through the FY 1999 County and Municipal Agency Domestic status. Second, develop a list of all types and quantities of equipment, by discipline, and record this AQuantity (REQ)@under the appropriate Equipment Type on the wing page) e.g., SCBA, 10/25. This is information derived from the A Required Response rtfalls or gaps in equipment, by discipline, and program these needs over the funding pment projections on the last page of this Tab, Equipment Projections for FY).

CURRENT/REQUIRED STATUS OF EQUIPMENT

Category	Fire Service	HazMat	EMS	Law Enforcement	Public Works	Public Health	Emergency Management
PPE							-
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
CB DETECTION							
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
CB DECON							
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
COMMO		I	1	I			
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/				_		_	
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equipment Type/							
Quantity (CUR/REQ)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

EQUIPMENT PROJECTIONS FOR FY ____

Categories	Fire Service	HazMat	EMS	Law Enforcement	Public Works	Public Health	Emergency Management
PPE							
Equipment Type							
Quantity							
Unit Price							
Total Cost							
CB DETECTION							
Equipment Type							
Quantity							
Unit Price							
Total Cost							
CB DECON							
Equipment Type							
Quantity							
Unit Price							
Total Cost							
COMMO							
Equipment Type							
Quantity							
Unit Price							
Total Cost							

Section 5, Tab b

THREE-YEAR PROJECTION – TRAINING

State/Jurisdiction:	State/Jurisdiction Population:
Prepared by:	Date:
Note: Submit info	ormation electronically via OJP home page.

Instructions: These forms are to be used by the state. They are required to be submitted to OSLDPS with the statewide domestic preparedness strategy. They can also be used by the jurisdiction for input to the state.

STATE: First, based upon jurisdictional assessments, provide a current status roll-up of training, by discipline. This is information derived from rolling-up the jurisdictions= ANumber Trained@entries for each training level on their ACurrent/Required Status of Training@submissions (Matrix on the following page). Second, develop a state roll-up of the jurisdictions= ANumber Requiring Training@entries for each training level on the jurisdictions= ACurrent/Required Status of Training@submissions (Matrix on the following page). Third, calculate the shortfall or gap in training, by discipline, and program requests for training to include the course name desired over the funding years FY99, FY00, and FY01 (Use the example matrix for training projections on the last page of this Tab, Training Projections for FY____). Complete one projection matrix per fiscal year.

JURISDICTION: First, provide a current status roll-up of training, by discipline. This is information derived from the ACurrent Response Capabilities@matrix, Section 2, Table 3-2 in the jurisdictional ACapabilities and Needs Assessments (Section 2). Enter this information in the ANumber Trained@row for each discipline on the ACurrent/Required Status of Training@submission (Matrix on the following page). Second, subtract the ANumber Training@for each training level on the jurisdictions ACurrent/Required Status of Training@submissions (Matrix on the following page). Use the above information with the information derived from the ARequired Response Capabilities@matrix, Section 2, Table 3-1. Third, calculate the shortfall or gap in training, by discipline, and program requests for training to include the course name desired over the funding years FY99, FY00, and FY01 (Use the example matrix for training projections on the last page of this Tab, Training Projections for FY____). Complete one projection matrix per fiscal year.

CURRENT/REQUIRED STATUS OF TRAINING

Awareness Number in Discipline at Operations Number Trained Number Trained Number in Discipline at Operations Number Requiring Training Number Requiring Training Number in Discipline at Operations Number Requiring Training Number Requiring Training	nergency		Public Health	Public Works	Law	EMS	HazMat	Fire Service	Category
Number in Discipline at Awareness Level Number Trained Number Requiring Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring	nagement	Mana	1 0.0110 1100111	1 00010 ((01110	Enforcement				
Discipline at Awareness Level Number Trained Number Requiring Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Awareness Level Number Trained Number Requiring Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Number Trained Number Requiring Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Number Requiring Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Training Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Operations Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Number in Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Discipline at Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Operations Level Number Trained Number Requiring									
Number Trained Number Requiring									
Number Requiring									
Technician									
Number in Supplied the supplied to the supplined to the supplied to the supplied to the supplied to the suppli									
Discipline at									
Technician Level									
Number Trained									
Number Requiring									
Training									
Incident Command									
Number in Summaria									
Discipline at									
Command Level									
Number Trained									
Number Requiring									
Training									

TRAINING PROJECTIONS FOR FY ____

Category	Fire Service	HazMat	EMS	Law	Public Works	Public Health	Emergency
				Enforcement			Management
Awareness							
Course Name							
Students							
Delivered by							
Delivery Location							
Course Cost							
Operations							
Course Name							
Students							
Delivered By							
Delivery Location							
Course Cost							
Technician							
Course Name							
Students							
Delivered By							
Delivery Location							
Course Cost							
Incident							
Command							
Course Name							
Students							
Delivered By							
Delivery Location							
Course Cost							

Section 5, Tab c

Three-Year Projection – Exercises

State/Jurisdiction:	State/Jurisdiction Population:	_
Prepared by:	Date:	

Note: submit information electronically via OJP Web Page.

Instructions: These forms are to be used by the state. They are required to be submitted to OSLDPS with the statewide domestic preparedness strategy. They can also be used by the jurisdiction for input to the state.

STATE: The first form on the next page is used as the format for the "**Current Status of Exercises**" and also as the format for the "**Required Status of Exercises**." First, based upon jurisdictional assessments, provide a current status roll-up of scheduled and funded exercises in the format shown on the top chart on the following page (**Current Status of Exercises**). This is information derived from rolling-up the jurisdictions' "**Current Status of Exercises**" submissions. Second, develop a state roll-up of exercises required to fulfill the jurisdictions' response plan requirements as found in the jurisdictions submissions of the "**Required Status of Exercises**" (Use the first chart on the following page as the format). Third, project the shortfall or gap in exercises and program the exercise requested over the funding years FY99, FY00, FY01 (Use the second example matrix on the next page of this Tab, **Training Projections for FY**...). Complete one projection matrix per fiscal year.

Status of Exercises." First, provide a current status of scheduled and funded exercises in the format shown on the top chart on the following page (**Current Status of Exercises**). This is information derived from the "**Current Response Capabilities**" matrix, **Section 2, Table 3-2** in the jurisdictional Capabilities and Needs Assessments (Section 2). Second, develop a list of exercises required to fulfill the jurisdictions' response plan requirements and record this information on the "**Required Status of Exercises**" matrix (Use the first chart on the next page as the format). Third, project the shortfall or gap in exercises and program the exercise requested over the finding years FY99, FY00, FY01 (Use the second example matrix on the next page of this Tab, **Training Projections for FY**...). Complete on projection matrix per fiscal year.

CURRENT STATUS/REQUIRED STATUS OF EXERCISES

						Participating Disciplines						
Jurisdiction	Type of Exercise	Hazard	Number of Participants	Date	Cost	Fire	HAZ	EMS	LEA	PW	PH	EMA
	COMMENTS:											

EXERCISE PROJECTIONS FOR FY_

						Participating Disciplines						
Jurisdiction	Type of Exercise	Hazard	Number of Participants	Date	Cost	Fire	HAZ	EMS	LEA	PW	PH	EMA
	COMMENTS:											

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. States: List the jurisdiction conducting the exercise and/or state agency responsible for conducting the exercise.

2. Type of Exercise: TT **Tabletop Exercise**

> **Command Post or Staff only Exercise** CPX

Functional Training Exercise FTX

Func Functional Exercise

3. Hazard: В **Biological**

> N Nuclear/Radiological

Ι **Incendiary** Chemical

 \mathbf{C}

 \mathbf{E} **Explosive**

- 4. Number of Participants: Enter the total or estimated total participation for the exercise.
- 5. Date: Enter the date or projected date of the exercise.
- 6. Cost: Enter the cost or estimated cost for the exercise (for purposes of federal funding).
- 7. Participating Disciplines: Enter the disciplines that will be participating in the discipline
- 8. Comments: Enter any pertinent comments on the exercise. Use this to indicate agencies external to the jurisdiction that will be participating in the exercise.

NOTE: Legend for Matrix: Fire - Fire Service, HAZ - HazMat, EMS - Emergency Medical Services, LEA - Law Enforcement Agencies, PW -Public Works, PH - Public Health, EMA - Emergency Management Agencies

Section 5, Tab d

Technical Assistance – Projections

State/Jurisdiction:	State/Jurisdiction Population:
Prepared by:	Date:

Note: Submit information electronically via OJP Web Page.

Instructions: Technical Assistance (TA) is the direct assistance to state and local jurisdictions to improve capabilities for program development, planning, and operational performance related to response to WMD terrorism incidents. These forms are to be used for state roll-up and submission to OSLDPS with the statewide domestic preparedness strategy. They can also be used by the jurisdiction for input to the state. The main types of TA are: Develop/Update Response Plans, Develop/Sustain Three-year Strategy, Identify additional Available Resources, Conduct Risk and Needs Assessments, Identify Latest Technology/Training, Develop Standardized Equipment List, Training on Maintenance and Use of Equipment, Develop Response Protocols, and assist with Emergency Services Organizational Assessments.

STATE: First, based on jurisdictional projections, provide a current status roll-up of scheduled and funded TA in the format shown on the first chart on the following page (**Current Status of Technical Assistance**)... Second, based on jurisdictional projections, provide a required status roll-up of TA in the format shown on the second chart on the following page (**Required Status of Technical Assistance**). Third, project the shortfall or gap between "current" and "required" TA. This forms the basis for state three-year projections in TA. Project TA requirements for funding years FY 99, FY 00, and FY 01 (use the last chart on the following page, **Technical Assistance Projections for FY__**). Complete one projection matrix per fiscal year. Using jurisdictional assessment information, provide the names of the jurisdiction that will use the requested TA.

JURISDICTION: First, identify your "current status" of TA (that TA already scheduled and funded) within the jurisdiction using the first form on the following page (**Current Status of Technical Assistance**). This is information developed from the "Current Response Capabilities" assessment, **Section 2, Table 3-2.** Second, identify the types of TA necessary for the performance of tasks required in jurisdictional response plans and procedures. This is information developed from the "Required Response Capabilities" assessment, **Section 2, Table 3-1.** Enter this on the middle chart on the following page, **Required Status of Technical Assistance**). Third, the shortfall or gap between "current" and "required" TA is the basis for the jurisdictional three-year projection. Project the TA requested over the funding years FY 99, FY 00, and FY 01. Complete one projection matrix, **Technical Assistance for FY__**, per fiscal year.

CURRENT STATUS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

JURISDICTION	TYPE OF/PURPOSE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDER	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNDING SOURCE

REQUIRED STATUS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

JURISDICTION	TYPE OF/PURPOSE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTIONS FOR FY __

JURISDICTION	TYPE OF/PURPOSE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Section 6 Additional Training Information

State/Jurisdiction:	State/Jurisdiction Population:
Prepared By:	Date:
1. What type of training media is your state/juri	isdiction capable of supporting?
Computer-Based Training Software	Computer Training, CD-ROM Based
Internet Training	Training Manuals and Slides
Satellite/Cable Broadcast Training	Videotape Training
Video Teleconferencing	Other
2. What type of infrastructure do you have for i	responder training?
Local Academy Training	
State Training Academy (State Only)	
University/Comm. College Program (identify in	astitution)
Training Program (<u>identify organization</u>)	
Federal Training Program (<u>identify program</u>)	
3. List any WMD-specific equipment that you	must acquire that requires specialized training.
	r each of the following responder groups. Police Officer Public Works Personnel Firefighter Nurses
HazMat Tech F	Physician Public Health

Section 7

Emergency Response Team Survey

Jurisdiction/State:	Jurisdiction/State Population:
Prepared by:	Date:

Instructions: The included forms are to be used by the state to roll-up jurisdiction Current Emergency Response Team Capability (first form) for the state and the jurisdictions to record Current Emergency Response Team Capability input for the state (second form).

STATE: The following information is requested to determine the number and composition of emergency response teams within your state. This information is a compilation of jurisdiction assessments plus those assets that you may have at state-level that are not included in the jurisdictions=submissions. Please list the number of teams, the number of personnel currently working in the state, and jurisdictions without any support by type on the **State Current Capabilities** form. **Submit this information electronically.**

JURISDICTION: Please list the number of teams and the number of personnel currently working on the listed emergency response teams in your jurisdiction on the **Jurisdiction Current Capabilities** form. Do not list state-level assets on this form. If you do not have a team current capability listed in column 2, indicate if you have mutual aid or state-dedicated coverage in column 4. Column 4 is intended to show shortfalls in coverage in the jurisdiction for these type teams. **Submit this information electronically**.

State:	

STATE CURRENT CAPABILITIES

	State Level				Iurisdiction- er of Jurisdic	
Туре	Number of Teams	Personnel	Mutual Aid Agreement (Yes/No) ¹	Number of Teams	Personnel	Jurisdictions Not Provided Support ²
HazMat						
SWAT						
Bomb Squads						
EMS						
US&R						
Heavy US&R						
NG-CSD						
Other						

 $^{^{1}}$ Refers to mutual aid agreements among states not reflected in jurisdiction information.

²Refers to jurisdictions without capability and without mutual aid or state coverage.

tate:	Jurisdiction:	
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JURISDICTION CURRENT CAPABILITIES

	Number of Teams	Personnel	Coverage by a Mutual Aid Agreement (Yes/No)
HazMat			
SWAT			
Bomb Squads			
EMS			
US&R			
Heavy US&R			
(Other)			
_	_		

Section 8

Recommendations for State and Local Response to WMD Terrorism Incidents

State/	State/			
Jurisdiction:	Jurisdiction Population:			
Prepared by:	Date:			
Please outline recommendations on Federal level or multi-level (Federal, state, and local) cooperative activities which should be implemented, enhanced, or changed to assist the domestic preparedness efforts in the state/jurisdiction. Include: 1) recommendations that will assist OJP with its R&D efforts to enhance emergency first responder capabilities; 2) any other recommendations that will assist OSLDPS with its equipment, training, and exercise programs. These recommendations will be provided to the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS), Office of Justice Programs (OJP) for consideration in the development of the National Domestic Preparedness Strategy. Note: Record recommendations with supporting justification narrative below.				

Section 9 Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy

Section 9, Tab a Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy Format

- I. Address Jurisdiction Identification and Coordination Issues
 (See Paragraph III A and B, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)
- II. Statement of the Problem

(See Paragraph III C, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)

III. Current Capabilities and Needs

(See Paragraphs III D, E, F and G, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)

- A. Equipment Priorities
 - 1. Statement of Current Response Capabilities
 - 2. Projection of Required Response Capabilities
 - 3. Impact of going from Current to Required Response Capabilities
- B. Training Priorities
 - 1. Statement of Current Training Levels
 - 2. Projection of Required Training Levels
 - 3. Impact of going from Current to Required Training Levels
- C. Exercise Priorities
 - 1. Statement of Current Exercise Programs
 - 2. Projection of Required Exercise Programs
 - 3. Impact of going from Current to Required Exercise Programs
- D. Technical Assistance Priorities
 - 1. Statement of Current Technical Assistance Status
 - 2. Projection of Required Technical Assistance Requests
 - 3. Impact of going from Current to Required Technical Assistance
- E. Research and Development
 - 1. Statement of Current Research and Development Status
 - 2. Projection of Required Research and Development Requests
 - 3. Impact of going from Current to Required Research and Development
- IV. Goals and Objectives

(See Paragraph III H, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit) (Format for Goals and Objectives is at Section 9, Tab b)

V. Evaluation Plan for the Three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy (See Paragraph V, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)

Section 9, Tab b

Three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy Matrix (See Paragraph III H, Appendix C, Program Guidelines and Application Kit)

GOALS	OBJECTIVES	IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
I.	Α.	1.
		2. 3.
		1.
	В.	2.
ш.	Α.	1.
	В.	2. 1.
	В.	2.
		3.
III.	A.	1.
		2.
	В.	1.
	С.	2. 1.
		2.
		3. 4.
IV.	A.	1.
		2.
	В.	1. 2.
		3.

A Tool to Assist with Plan Development

Glossary

Acronyms

AAR After Action Report

APHL Agency for Public Health Laboratories

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
ASTHO Association for State and Territorial Health Officials

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CPX Command Post Exercise

CSTE Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists

CT Counter-Terrorism

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

EFR Emergency First Responder

EMAC Emergency Medical Assistance Compact

EMS Emergency Medical Services
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FOIA Freedom of Information Act FTX Functional Training Exercise

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

ICDDC Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
JTWG Joint Terrorism Working Group
LPHA Local Public Health Agency
LPHS Local Public Health System

NACCHO National Association for County and City Health Officials

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office

OES Office of Emergency Services

OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

OJP Office of Justice Programs
PHS Public Health Service
PTE Potential Threat Element
SAA State Administrative Agency
SEL Standardized Equipment List
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
TEA Threat Environment Assessment

US&R Urban Search and Rescue WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Glossary (Cont.)

Definitions

<u>Assessment</u>: The evaluation and interpretation of measurements another information to provide a basis for decision-making.

<u>Consequence Management</u>: Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and produce emergency relief to governments, business, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

<u>Critical Assets</u>: Those assets essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government, and ensure the general public health and safety.

<u>Domestic Terrorism</u>: Involves groups or individuals who are based and operate widely within the United States and are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.

<u>First Responder</u>: Local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel who first arrive on the scene of an incident and take action to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.

<u>Jurisdiction</u>: Typically counties and cities within a state, but states may elect to define differently in order to facilitate their assessment process. (State-specific definition other than counties or cities should be specified.) The responsible entity for providing coordinated responses to a WMD terrorist incident.

<u>Potential Threat Element (PTE)</u>: Any group or individual about whom there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature.

<u>Technical Assistance</u>: The provisioning of direct assistance to states and local jurisdictions to improve capabilities for program development, planning, and operational performances related to responses to WMD terrorist incidents.

<u>Terrorism</u>: The unlawful use of force or violence committed by an individual or group of individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

<u>Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)</u>: Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge or more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the above; poison gas; any weapon involving a disease organism; or any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.