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At corps level a similar pattern emerged. Usually a corps used a reinforced tank brigade as a forward detachment. This was the case in the 5th Guards Rifle Corps and 113th Rifle Corps of 39th Army, in the 26th Rifle Corps and 59th Rifle Corps of 1st Red Banner Army, in 5th Separate Rifle Corps, and in both columns of 10th Mechanized Corps. Each corps of 6th Guards Tank Army used a reinforced tank regiment or battalion as a forward detachment. Rifle divisions also used forward detachments. On main attack axes of 5th Army, each rifle division received in support a tank brigade and a heavy self-propelled artillery regiment. After penetration of enemy defenses, these units performed the function of forward detachments and moved deeper into the rear of the enemy defenses.
Forward detachments operated in great number at every level with great effect. They perpetuated the momentum of initial assaults, created a momentum of their own, and imparted that momentum to army and front operations as a whole.
Soviet commanders used natural environmental conditions to achieve surprise, just as the 1944 regulations recommended. They had exploited terrain before, though not with such good effect. In particular, the Soviets conducted operations in adverse weather and in darkness, initially and throughout the campaign. The initial assault of the 1st Far Eastern Front units occurred during heavy thunderstorms in the dark of night. The merciless weather prevented both the firing of any artillery preparations and the planned use of searchlights to support the advance of 300th Rifle Division in its zone of operations (reminiscent of the use of searchlights in the Berlin campaign).11 Particularly near large and small rivers, the weather impeded the advance of units, but it also had the beneficial effect of lulling the Japanese into a deeper sense of security. Several Japanese commanders, in debriefings after their surrender, noted their disbelief when the attacks occurred during such miserable weather.12 Soviet initial attacks in darkness and bad weather were major successes due largely to the complete surprise they achieved.
Units of the Trans-Baikal Front and the 2d Far Eastern Front also operated in difficult weather. Under rain-laden skies, 6th Guards Tank Army crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains in the dark. The 5th Guards Rifle Corps and 113th Rifle Corps of 39th Army advanced in miserable weather conditions after 15 August. The 15th Army's assault battalions took Amur River islands at night during heavy rains.
Even in clear weather units used darkness to mask advances. Much of the initial deployment for attack occurred at night, as did initial assaults. The attack of the 205th Tank Brigade and the 152d Rifle Regiment on Hailar involved an attack from the march by the tank brigade and an envelopment operation by the rifle regiment during the hours of darkness. The 76th Tank Brigade conducted its costly march down the road toward Mutanchiang on the night of 11-12 August. This willingness to use the cover of night and to operate with total disregard for weather conditions caused some difficulties for Soviet unit commanders. But it paid even greater dividends in terms of the surprise achieved and the continued, unexpected pressure placed on Japanese defenders.
The 1944 regulations recommended varied use of tactical formations tailored to mission, terrain, and enemy in order to achieve surprise and to confuse the enemy. To one who would oversimplify or stereotype Soviet combat echelonment, Manchuria should stand as a corrective lesson, representative of Soviet practices late in the war. Combat formations by that time were flexible and varied. As stated in the regulations, the primary determinant of formations was the set of various concrete conditions a unit had to overcome. That flexibility was evident in Manchuria. The general rule Soviet commanders at every echelon followed was the stronger the defense, the deeper the echelonment (see fig. 3).
The Trans-Baikal Front deployed in two echelons of armies weighted heavily forward to bring maximum pressure on the entire front and project power rapidly forward to great depths. The first echelon had four combined arms armies and one tank army, while the second echelon had but one combined arms army. The front retained a reserve of two rifle divisions, one tank division, and one tank brigade. Trans-Baikal Front armies likewise tailored their formations to concrete conditions. The 36th and 39th Armies each deployed in one echelon of three rifle corps (or operational groups) abreast. The 17th Army formed in a single echelon of three rifle divisions, while the 6th Guards Tank Army, with its requirement to sustain operations to a great depth, deployed in two echelons of tank and mechanized corps. Rifle corps confronting fortified zones deployed in two echelons of divisions. Those facing limited opposition deployed in one echelon of divisions (e.g., 94th Rifle Corps and the operational group of 36th Army). Virtually all tank forces of the Trans-Baikal Front, whether tank armies, tank divisions, or separate tank brigades, were in first echelon in order to increase speed.
The four armies of 1st Far Eastern Front deployed in single echelon to bring maximum pressure to bear on the
Japanese throughout the entire zone. The 10th Mechanized Corps served as the front mobile group for ex ploitation, while
the 88th Rifle Corps and the 84th Cavalry Division were in reserve. Most front armies used single echelon formations
consistent with the front commander's plan to advance on as many axes as possible. The 25th Army formed one echelon of
a rifle corps, a rifle division, and several
SOVIET FAR EAST COMMAND ECHELONMENT |
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CORPS: IN TWO ECHELONS OF DIVISIONS |
Figure 3. Soviet Echelonment of Forces in Manchuria |
The 2d Far Eastern Front, with forces operating on an extremely wide frontage in support of the theater main effort, deployed in a single echelon of two armies and one rifle corps operating on widely separate axes. The 15th Army used a single echelon of three rifle divisions for the attack and retained only an extremely small reserve. The 2d Red Banner Army also deployed its three rifle divisions in single echelon. The 5th Separate Rifle Corps of two rifle divisions, operating on a narrow and lightly defended front, employed a single echelon formation. In all areas of Manchuria, rifle divisions employed their rifle regiments in two echelons. Thus, echelonment patterns varied to match terrain and enemy resistance. These tactical formations were yet another element adding to the surprise of the Japanese.
In addition to their use of maneuver in all weather conditions and flexible tactical formations to confound their opponents, the Soviets used other noteworthy tactical techniques. During the opening phases of the operation, in several sectors of the front, the Soviets had to conduct frontal assaults on fortified zones. In so doing they adhered fairly closely to the field regulations of 1944. They made maximum use of bypass and neutralization by fire. If assault proved unavoidable, commanders paid considerable attention to the tailoring of forces to insure that they precisely suited the mission. They committed forces to combat in a carefully timed buildup of combat power in a given sector in order to accomplish missions with as little loss of manpower as possible. Operations of the 5th Army and the 39th Rifle Corps of 25th Army demonstrated the preciseness of formations and the state of tactical skill evident in Soviet forces by 1945. Both units deployed in narrower than usual sectors with rifle corps on a 4.5-5-kilometer frontage and rifle divisions on a 2.5-3-kilometer frontage. Division assault elements operated on even narrower frontages. Extremely heavy densities of fire supported the assault forces. A frontal attack on a fortified position required 200 guns and mortars per kilometer for support, and thirty to forty tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer, integrated into attack formations.13 Even in such frontal attacks, the Soviets used envelopment to isolate the fort, instead of using frontal mass attacks to batter it. Massed firepower permitted economies of manpower.
Assault groups of about 100 men each from first echelon advanced rifle battalions led the attack. These assault
groups had maneuver elements, support elements, sappers, flame throwers, antitank guns, automatic weapons, and two or
three tanks or heavy self-propelled guns (see fig. 4). Assault groups comprised forces from regular divisional rifle
battalions (in the case of 5th Army) or from border guards units or fortified regions (in the case of 39th Rifle Corps
and 25th Army).14 The main force of first echelon rifle
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Figure 4. Soviet Assault Group Configuration |
Table 19. Time-phased Commitment of Forces to Battle (1st Far Eastern Front) | |
---|---|
Units | Time of Attack |
Assault unit (platoon/company), 100+ men (TO&E or border guards units) Advanced battalion (I per regiment) with tank company (first echelon tank brigade) Division main (2 regiments) force with tank brigade Division second echelon (1 regiment) Corps second echelon (1 division) | 0010-0100 H 0300-0830 H 0830 H 0930-1100 H 1600+H |
While second echelon rifle regiments subdued strongpoints, main forces initiated pursuit. Forward detachments made up of separate tank brigades, reinforced by a rifle battalion and sapper and artillery battalions, led the pursuit on the basis of one forward detachment per rifle division or one per rifle corps. Soviet commanders designated the makeup of the forward detachment before the conduct of the frontal assault. Armies attacking fortified zones throughout Manchuria followed this assault pattern with minor variations. In areas where armies or corps made frontal attacks against lighter opposition, reconnaissance groups led the attack, followed by advanced rifle battalions (one per regiment), usually with engineer, tank, and artillery support. Advanced battalions in fact acted as forward detachments of rifle regiments during the assault phase of combat. Those Soviet units not involved in frontal attacks on heavy fortifications or not advancing in march column formation used the advanced battalion technique with marked success. Notable examples were the 300th Rifle Division of 1st Red Banner Army in its advance toward Pamientung, the 363d Rifle Division of 35th Army attacking across the Sungacha River, and the lead rifle divisions of 36th Army in their crossing of the Argun River.
Pursuit operations invariably followed completion of the frontal attacks. Successful pursuit had been a long-term problem for Soviet forces. Soviets had learned by harrowing experience the mixture of forces required to conduct a successful pursuit and to survive in the depth of the enemy defense. They also had developed an appreciation of the amount of support required to sustain pursuit operations. By late 1943 and early 1944, the Soviets had successfully mastered the art of task organizing their units for survival in a pursuit. As late as 1945, however, Soviet pursuit operations were still suffering from a lack of logistical support. In Manchuria, pursuit generally required small units to travel great distances. The extensive use of forward detachments followed by a great number of divisions in march columns strained the Soviet command and control and logistical systems to the extreme. The initiative shown by Soviet commanders added to this pressure. In general, the Soviets devoted greater than normal efforts to supporting successful pursuit. They provided additional engineer and bridging units to rapidly moving forces and used imaginative measures to give support. For example, engineer bridging units attached to the 66th Rifle Division and the 175th Tank Brigade of 35th Army used inverted pontoons to transport fuel across flooded open country in order to facilitate the advance of units in their sectors.15 Aerial reconnaissance provided to the 6th Guards Tank Army gave an added measure of support to rapid pursuit in that sector.
If the scope of pursuit operations was unique to Soviet operations in Manchuria, so was the degree of Soviet reliance on an advance in march formations throughout the operation. In fact, most units spent the bulk of the time during the campaign in march formation. The success of Soviet units in battle and their survivability depended in large measure on how well the commanders organized those columns for mutual support, for defense, and for the ability to deploy quickly (see figs. 5-7).
Trans-Baikal Front conducted most of its operations in march formation. The 6th Guards Tank Army, the 17th Army,
and the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group scarcely deployed for combat. Even the crossing of the Grand Khingan
Mountains was in constricted march formation. The 39th Army, aside from the siege of Halung-Arshaan and the attacks at
Solon and Wangyemiao, constantly moved in column. On its march to Hailar and to the Grand Khingan passes at Yakoshih,
36th Army used column formation. In the restricted area of 1st Far Eastern Front, 5th Army was in column formation from
its breakout from the border fortifications to Mutanchiang, as was 1st Red Banner Army from the border to Pamientung
and from Pamientung to Mutanchiang. The 25th Army and 10th Mechanized Corps advance from Tonguing to Wangching, except
for limited deployments in engagements at Heitosai and Taipingling, was in march column. The 35th Army units advancing
from Hutou to Mishan and Linkou spent little time in deployed formation. Such was the case in the 2d Far Eastern Front
area, except where enemy resistance made column movement less feasible, as it did for 2d Red Banner Army. The excessive
time spent in march column is explained not only by the limited opposition, but also by the effectiveness of the column
organization. Forward detachments and advanced guards generally dealt with enemy resistance before the columns had to
deploy in order to accelerate the Soviet advance.
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Figure 5. March Column Formation: 6th Guards Tank Army | Figure 6. March Column Formation: 10th Mechanized Corps |
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Figure 7. March Column Formation: 22d Rifle Division |
Soviets tailored their march columns to conduct successful combat and to sustain the momentum of operations. In this venture they were successful, though on occasion a column would run into difficulty. Careful task organi zation and balanced mixtures of combat elements for mutual support and all-around defense characterized Soviet march column composition. Columns contained field, antiaircraft, and antitank artillery interspersed throughout their length. Tank units led and were often interspersed throughout the columns so that any portion of the column could operate on its own as a balanced force.
The Soviets also paid considerable attention to mixing engineer support throughout the columns, particularly in the case of units traversing difficult terrain. The 6th Guards Tank Army in its desert and mountain crossing, 25th Army and 1st Red Banner Army in their crossing of mountainous taiga terrain, and 35th Army in its crossing of the marshy area north of Lake Khanka all received considerable engineer support artfully woven into the fabric of the march column. The attention the Soviets paid to forming viable march columns in part explains their ability to achieve rapid movement successfully throughout the campaign.
Close coordination among Soviet naval, air, and ground forces also helped the Soviets achieve tactical success. Creation of a theater of military operations command, under which all services operated, virtually as sured close coordination at the highest levels. Air support primarily involved bombing cities and towns, reducing fortifications, providing some tactical air support, and performing basic reconnaissance and logistical services. At the end of the operation, the air forces landed small air assault detachments in the major cities where Japanese headquarters were located.16
Naval-ground force cooperation was notable, and in fact critical in a number of sectors. For 15th Army of 2d Far Eastern Front, the Amur Flotilla provided the transportation and fire support the army needed to fulfill its mission. For 2d Red Banner Army and 5th Separate Rifle Corps, naval forces provided river crossing assault means and ferrying capability. Operations against Korean ports and against southern Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles depended for their success on close cooperation with the navy.
If these aspects of Soviet tactical operations in Manchuria resulted in success, they also produced some difficulties. Generally, the difficulties were products of audacious movement and offensive abandon. Soviet attempts to surmount all terrain obstacles and to achieve high speed in all sectors led to some limited operational failures. In some cases, units became overextended and vulnerable to enemy attack. In other cases, the terrain simply turned out to be insurmountable. In the 25th Army sector of operations, the Soviets committed the 10th Mechanized Corps in an area almost totally lacking roads. The congestion of 10th Mechanized Corps units on the two available roads was so bad that the corps ultimately stretched a distance of 200 kilometers west from Wangching to the rear.17 The long march column and limited space for deployment meant that only the forward detachments maintained contact with the withdrawing enemy. And when the enemy resisted, only the forward detachments could bring their forces to bear. The same sort of problem occurred on a minor scale in the operations of 15th Army on its march to Chiamussu. Often the length of march columns and the overextension of units prevented full concentration of artillery firepower. Such was the case in 39th Army sector, where heavy artillery units lagged behind advancing rifle and tank units.
In some instances, overextended forward detachments were forced to operate outside the supporting distance of follow-on units. The 76th Tank Brigade advance on the road to Mutanchiang was just such a case. Until additional Soviet units came to its support, the brigade was rebuffed by the Japanese 124th Infantry Division. The 257th Tank Brigade, leading by a considerable distance the march of the 300th Rifle Division of 1st Red Banner Army from Pamientung to Mutanchiang, attempted to secure the rail bridge at Hualin. The Japanese repulsed the unsupported attacks of 257th Tank Brigade repeatedly, and Japanese counterattacks forced the brigade to withdraw to defensive positions north of Hualin until the Soviets reinforced the tank brigade.
Terrain disrupted the Soviet plans on a few occasions. In the southern portion of the 35th Army sector, the 209th and 125th Tank Brigades had the mission of leading the 66th and 363d Rifle Divisions on their march to Mishan. The flooded marshlands proved too great an obstacle for the tanks and for fuel resupply. Even the field expedience of using inverted pontoons as fuel carriers failed. So both brigades were withdrawn and redeployed to other areas on the front.18
In at least one instance, a unit crossing barren terrain simply got lost. On 11 August, the 192d Rifle Division of 113th Rifle Corps of 39th Army lost its way while crossing the Grand Khingan Mountains. For two days the unit floundered in the mountains until an army reconnaissance aircraft sent to retrieve it put it back on its correct route. The general absence of good maps led to disorientation of some units. The ensuing reversal of direction and false starts had a negative impact on fuel consumption and strained logistics.19
The most serious difficulties the Soviets encountered were in the realm of logistics. The Soviets had foreseen problems and done all in their power to alleviate them. The logistical factor was simply part of the risk the So viets took. Fuel shortages headed the list of problems. Even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, the 6th Guards Tank Army was low on fuel. After the crossing, the chronic problem persisted until the day the unit arrived in Mukden. Any resolute-or even token-Japanese resistance could have compounded 6th Guards Tank Army's difficulty regarding fuel and ammunition resupply. Other units, including the 39th Army and 35th Army, experienced similar problems on a lesser scale.
Problems also surfaced regarding the supply of river crossing and ferrying equipment in 2d Red Banner Army, 15th Army, and 5th Separate Rifle Corps. Shortage of such equipment led to lengthy crossing times and piecemeal commitment of forces to battle.
Yet, when all was said and done, the problems resulted from Soviet action-not inaction. And the Japanese did
little to capitalize on the problems. Vulnerabilities are only valid if someone takes advantage of them. In this case
the Japanese did not. That negligence magnifies the scope of the Soviet victory.
Conclusions | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Soviet High Command projected that operations in Manchuria would last about one month and prepared accordingly. Preparations for a short, victorious campaign involved massive redeployments of forces in lim ited time under conditions of secrecy. Carefully selected commanders manned a unified command structure to control the massive forces operating on such a wide front. Commanders at all levels selected strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and tailored their forces to secure them in the shortest possible time. A vast array of support units of all types prepared to support the combat forces. As planned, operations exploited terrain and dynamically used all elements of combat power, especially armor. Flexibility and audacity characterized the operation. Commanders at all levels displayed initiative to achieve success. Challenging the Soviets in Manchuria were stringent time requirements, terrain obstacles, and Japanese resistance. The Soviet Army met the first two challenges itself, while Japanese dispositions and plans helped it meet the third. Essentially, the Soviets completed the operation in seven days (by 16 August). Subsequent engagements and movements were pro forma. The Soviets exceeded their timetable by three weeks, suffered light casualties, and overwhelmed the Kwantung Army.1 Why the Soviet victory? In essence, ultimate Soviet victory was inevitable. The preponderance of Soviet forces, the crumbling Japanese strategic posture in the western Pacific, the devastating bombing offensive against Japan (including the atomic bomb), and the weakened condition of the Kwantung Army all spelled inevitable defeat for Japan. So the real question then becomes why did the Soviet victory come so quickly? Although it is convenient to use the oversimplifications cited above, they mask other reasons for quick Japanese defeat. The Soviets expected a difficult campaign when they entered Manchuria, so they prepared accordingly. The result was a bold plan of operations. The Soviets respected the prowess, at least in name, of the Kwantung Army; they had, after all, battled the Japanese forces before and knew the individual strength and bravery of the Japanese soldier. Even the knowledge that the Kwantung Army of 1945 was not the same as the one of 1941 did not measurably lessen that respect. The Soviets apparently had a fairly good knowledge of Japanese defensive plans and adjusted forces accordingly. Nevertheless, they probably overassessed the strength of Japanese covering units on the border, hence the massiveness of initial Soviet attacks. The Soviets also expected greater Japanese resistance in the redoubt area of southern Manchuria. Soviet planning reflected this overestimation in several decisions: to gain the central Manchurian plain, to inflict piecemeal defeat on Japanese forces, and to divide them before they could consolidate. Thus, the attack occurred on many axes, including the thrusts into Korea. But even Soviet commanders were surprised at the scope and speed of their own successes. In terms of leadership, equipment, and manpower, the Kwantung Army of 1945 certainly was not the same army as it was in 1941, but it was also not so ineffective as some analysts have claimed. In many instances, the marginal replacements of 1945 performed well on the battlefield, whenever they were permitted to fight. Even in reduced state, Japanese divisions outmanned their Soviet equivalents and fought well. Thus, the Japanese 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Infantry Division did a remarkable job at Hailar and on the road through the Grand Khingan Mountains to Pokotu. The 135th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 123d Infantry Division acquitted themselves well at Aihun and Sunwu. Many border garrisons, holed up in fortified regions against overwhelming numbers, performed heroic defenses and earned the respect of their adversaries, who perhaps thought of similar Soviet sacrifices at Brest and Sevastopol. The Soviets viewed with awe the Japanese "death units," which threw their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks.2 In fact, where Japanese forces stood and fought under competent leadership, they did a credible job and gave the Soviets the opposition they had expected. In reality, it was the higher echelon leadership of the Kwantung Army who engineered the army's overall mediocre performance. Unquestionably, the cease-fire rumors and the ultimate surrender decision disrupted Japanese operations and forestalled possibly greater Japanese resistance in southern Manchuria. Yet much of the damage had already been done and could not be undone. Setting aside Soviet actions, the Japanese High Command reacted sloppily and indecisively, whether because of overconfidence, complacency, confusion, or pessimism. Japanese overconfidence and complacency regarding the Soviets had persisted for years, if not decades, before the Manchurian campaign. The Khalkhin-Gol defeat at the hands of the Soviets was surprising to Japanese commanders in 1939, but even more surprising was how little they had learned from it. Perhaps the Soviet defeats of 1939 and 1940 in Finland and in 1941 at the hands of the Germans gave rebirth to that Japanese complacency and overconfidence. Yet, five years later, by 1945, little had been done to modernize the Japanese infantry division to make it capable of engaging a modern Soviet rifle division, much less a tank or mechanized unit. Antitank weapons were lacking, and although the division was heavy in manpower, it was lighter in firepower than the Soviet equivalent. In mechanized and tank forces, the Japanese also compared badly: they had no tank comparable to the Soviet medium T-34. The Kwantung Army was scarcely better equipped to conduct mobile war in 1945 than it had been in 1939. At least in part, this deficiency was a measure of complacency and overconfidence. Japanese plans forgot or ignored another lesson from 1939: the Soviets had a penchant for doing the seemingly impossible, such as using the arid wastes of eastern Mongolia as a launching pad for a major invasion of Manchuria. Whether through complacency or overconfidence, the Japanese demonstrated a traditional tendency to underestimate the Soviets. That underestimation spelled doom for the Kwantung Army. For whatever reasons, Japanese commanders failed their army. Confusion reigned at the top, and area army and army orders conflicted. Thus, many units withdrew from combat, while others were swallowed up by it. Compounding the Japanese difficulties was the nature of the Soviet offensive. Japanese plans might have succeeded to a greater degree against a lesser foe. Unfortunately, the Japanese High Command faced a highly professional force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war. Far East Command units were among the best in the Soviet Army, and their equipment had been tested against the best weaponry European arsenals could produce. For the Soviet Army, this was the last campaign in a long war, quite literally one last opportunity to excel. And excel it did. The Manchurian operation qualified as a postgraduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in western Russia in June 1941. Historians must exercise care when projecting lessons from the study of any military campaign, for the value of such a study derives from viewing that campaign against the concrete conditions that affected its conduct. The Manchurian campaign may hold tactical lessons to be learned and applied in similar contemporary situations, basic techniques that transcend the technological changes that have occurred since 1945. If in fact such constants, or tactical techniques derived from battle that apply to any period, do exist, then Manchuria is worthy of study. The concrete conditions Soviet forces faced in Manchuria presented Soviet planners a unique set of problems associated with how to attack and win quickly in the beginning period of war. The Soviets adopted tech niques formulated to solve those precise problems. For example, speedy advance would preempt initial or subsequent Japanese establishment of a solid defense and would secure strategically critical territory before the Japanese could decide to abandon the war effort. Speedy advance, of course, required the Soviets to crush any opposition that might threaten their ability to adhere to that timetable. Thus, the Soviets structured their forces to squelch the opposition and to generate the requisite speed. They also adopted tactical methods to maintain that momentum. Using cover and deception, they assembled and de ployed their forces in secret. These precautions bolstered the effectiveness of other combat techniques. Soviet forces attacked on multiple axes-in fact along every possible axis-with a majority of forces well forward in the first echelon as a means of bringing maximum pressure to bear on an already overextended foe. On each axis, the Soviets massed at the critical point and artfully maneuvered those massed forces over terrain considered impassable, much less suitable for maneuver. In order to generate initial success and to maintain offensive momentum, the Soviets carefully timed application of their offensive power by attacking with assault units, advanced units, and then main force elements. Consequently, from the very beginning, Japanese forces were off balance, and they remained off balance throughout the short campaign. These creative Soviet methods sowed confusion in the Japanese command structure, and that, in turn, ruled out effective Japanese response. In order to exploit these initial efforts and to preempt Japanese plans, the Soviets used armor-heavy forward detachments of every size to drive deep into Japanese positions. With limited combat power forward, Soviet main force units could advance almost unhindered. Each detachment worked in a manner similar to an awl, boring a hole into hard wood and preparing the wood for subsequent penetration by a screw. Punctured in numerous sectors, the Japanese defense lost all coherence and never regained it. Soviet main force units and the forward detachments were tailored combined arms entities suited to the terrain over which they operated. They tore into the disrupted defense, fragmented it, left it paralyzed, and raced on to their next objective. Soviet success in the campaign underscored the effectiveness of their strategic, operational, and tactical techniques. Recent Soviet studies on the beginning period of war and the concrete nature of combat have emphasized certain of these techniques. Deception has never lost its attractiveness and currency, nor has the necessity for creating self-sustaining balanced combined arms entities at all levels. Three other techniques the Soviets used in Manchuria are still relevant on today's battlefield: . Echelon forces imaginatively, especially against a defense that may take time to gel. In Manchuria, single echelon formation at theater, front, and army level operating on multiple axes across a broad front col lapsed and fragmented the Japanese defense before that defense could effectively establish itself. Today, applying pressure all along a broad front could rupture a partially formed defense. . Commit forces to battle in timed phases. In Manchuria, steady, relentless hammering destroyed Japanese equilibrium and accelerated Japanese collapse. In a contemporary context, multiple penetrations and the resultant intermingling of forces would also make it difficult for defenders to use tactical nuclear weapons discriminately. . Lead with forward detachments at every command level. In 1945, probing forward detachments perpetuated confusion in the defense and carried the battle to tactical and operational depths, thus preempting effec tive defense. Besides producing similar offensive successes, forward detachments today could also attack a defense's tactical nuclear weapons delivery systems. A concrete legacy of the Manchurian campaign, these three techniques offer prospects for success against even a relatively prepared enemy defense. Against an unprepared or partially prepared opponent, the use of these tech niques could be devastating. The techniques worked in 1945, when mobility was in its infancy (or adolescence). So they certainly apply today, when mobility extends to virtually every aspect of a force. And they may even prohibit any rational use of tactical nuclear weapons. What is certain is that these techniques are of more than simple historical interest to Soviet tactical writers. They should be of more than historical interest to U.S. tacticians as well. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appendix 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
30 July 1945* KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() FIRST AREA ARMY: General Kita Seiichi
3d Army: Lt. Gen. Murakami Keisaku
5th Army: Lt. Gen. Shimizu Noritsune
THIRD AREA ARMY: General Ushiroku Jun
30th Army: Lt. Gen. Iida Shojiro
44th Army: Lt. Gen. Hongo Yoshio
4th Army: Lt. Gen. Uemura Mikio
34th Army: Lt. Gen. Kushibuchi Senichi
Appendix 2
| August 1945 TRANS-BAIKAL FRONT: Commander in Chief, Marshal
17th Army: Lt. Gen. A. I. Danilov
36th Army: Lt. Gen. A. A. Luchinsky
39th Army: Col. Gen. I. I. Lyudnikov
53d Army: Col. Gen. I. M. Managarov
6th Guards Tank Army: Col. Gen. A. G. Kravchenko
Cavalry-Mechanized Group: Col. Gen. I. A. Pliyev
Front Units:
Added to the front on 16 August:
12th Air Army: Marshal S. A. Khudiakov
2d FAR EASTERN FRONT: Commander in Chief, General M. A.
2d Red Banner Army: Lt. Gen. M. F. Terêkhin
15th Army: Lt. Gen. S. K. Mamonov
16th Army: Maj. Gen. L. G. Cheremisov
Front Units:
10th Air Army: Col. Gen. P. F. Zhigarev
1st FAR EASTERN FRONT: Commander in Chief, Marshal K. A.
1st Red Banner Army: Col. Gen. A. P. Beloborodov
5th Army: Col. Gen. N. I. Krylov
25th Army: Col. Gen. 1. M. Chistyakov
35th Army: Lt. Gen. N. D. Zakhvatayev
Chuguevsk Operational Group: Maj. Gen. V. A. Zaitsev
Front Units:
AMUR FLOTILLA: Commander, Rear Adm. N. V. Antonov
Appendix 3
| Tempos
Notes
|
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