Most people, including those in law enforcement, would agree that the countries and peoples around the world have been forming alliances and sharing information for centuries. This occurs whenever and wherever an issue of common interest develops between two or more entities. This is not only true for things that are of common benefit, but also against things that are a common threat. The military has always been good at forming such alliances. However, unlike the military, which both defends against and attacks an enemy, law enforcement primarily relies on a reactive, defensive posture in dealing with criminals. Law enforcement rarely assumes an offensive, attacking posture, despite a significant amount of rhetoric to the contrary. With minimal exception in law, such as conspiracy, the nature of the United States judicial system is such that an individual can not be charged with a crime unless there is probable cause to believe that an individual has already committed a criminal act.

Hence, information gathering becomes critical if law enforcement is to ever to build a case for conspiracy to commit a crime and thereby preempt the criminal act. Gathering information is only one element of the intelligence cycle. But, all the collection in the world is of little value if the information is not analyzed and then shared with those who can learn from it or act upon it. In today’s environment, once a police organization has made the fundamental decision to participate in transnational policing, information-sharing then becomes a requirement not only within the United States’ national law enforcement community, but also with DEA’s international law enforcement counterparts. Though the simplicity of this concept is intuitively and academically pleasing, it is neither easy nor risk free in the real world.

Risk is inherent in this sharing of information. In many meetings with its own agents and its drug law enforcement counterparts, DEA has often heard it said that the main concern of individual agents on the front lines is the stealing of cases. The threat of case stealing, the lack of credit for accomplishments, and the ultimate penalty of loss of budget resources due to unremarkable performance, all make information-sharing a high-risk proposition for these agents and their organizations. But this mindset must be overcome if transnational policing is to be a reality. To do this, the sharing of real-time, current, or strategic information must be the first consideration in building the trust that is needed. Getting the agents, analysts, and support personnel from different agencies to accept both information- and case-sharing is certainly a problem of leadership for the executive manager. The executive manager must create personal ownership and encourage working-level personnel buy-in, rather than simple compliance, if this is to succeed at any but the most cursory of levels. Many personal opinions and attitudes detrimental to cooperation run deep and are often based on bad experiences. Organizational attitudes such as pride in one’s agency, an acceptable, expected attitude, can also impede the cooperative relationship if not handled properly. In both the personal and organizational realms, when these attitudes rise to the point of damaging the ultimate goal of law enforcement—putting criminals in jail—it must be refocused into something useful. These attitudes must be refocused into cooperative team perspectives.

It is the job of the executive manager to build confidence within his/her own ranks before trust can be extended outside the agency. Only when security in the joint venture and confidence in their own leadership is achieved will the agents, analysts, and support personnel of one agency be willing to risk trust in another agency to the extent that a team perspective is possible. Trust and confidence must be “sold” from the top down. Building trust and confidence is a challenge for the executive manager, although not as much of a challenge as the risk the manager takes when extending trust to another agency. Unfortunately, change and risk-taking are usually far less attractive to the executive manager than it is to the rank-and-file personnel that they supervise.

So then how do two countries, two separate jurisprudence systems, two different law enforcement agencies arrive at the decision to take this risk, to extend the trust, and to cooperate in a high-stakes venture?

There are many factors that must be considered by an executive manager and an organization prior to initiating any action. For the organization, resource implications, while not necessarily the most important factor, are certainly a driving force in allowing this relationship to happen. From a executive manager’s standpoint, it takes personal fortitude, and even some humility, to propose such a venture and hope it is received favorably by another agency. Also, from the executive manager’s perspective, personal commitment to this venture must be considered. A lack of personal commitment on the part of the initiator of this program will show through any facade, and will be transferred irrevocably to working-level personnel, damning the venture from its onset. Commitment is the basis for deciding to proceed. And, once committed, the executive manager must proceed with vigor and determination to make the relationship a reality.

The next consideration is an organizational responsibility of the executive manager’s agency. It is imperative that the executive manager’s organization ensures that the person who will represent the agency to the counterpart agency is personable, knowledgeable, able to speak for the agency, and diplomatic enough to enable friendly, open discussion with the hosts regarding the realities of the current relationship. This person, as well as representatives from the counterpart agency, must be of senior executive level and possess sufficient influence and power within the agency to make binding decisions. Ideally, the selected person is one and the same as the initiator.

The next factor in initiating this cooperative relationship is an extension of a proposal of cooperation to the counterpart law enforcement agency. This overture is actually the initial stage of institution-building where it is imperative that the initiating agency travel to the counterpart agency to personally introduce the concept of a bilateral intelligence and, ultimately, an operational relationship. Traveling to the responding agency to present the proposal on their “turf” will make the responding agency comfortable. The responding agency should be encouraged to invite whomever they need to hear this proposal at their home base, minimizing the concern of cost, time, and travel. The goal of this is to use the executive manager’s position to make contact at the highest possible level of the counterpart law enforcement agency. This accesses a critical decision level and will demonstrate both the determination and sincerity of the executive manager’s agency in offering to work together to change and improve the current approach to law enforcement. Eye-to-eye contact is far superior to the exchange of paper for building the trust and momentum for change if this new relationship is to develop.

Finally, each agency should be prepared to provide frank input and responses that give alternatives to the current situation. This is delicate and requires tact so that the developing relationship is not degraded. Open and frank discussions provide an understanding of each other’s requirements, operating procedures, common threats, and to list possible solutions to achieve common goals and thereby erode the walls of distrust that may have built up over the years. These discussions should take place over a two-day timeframe with time built in for out-of-office activities that promote personal contact.

Open, friendly discussions, preferably with a working lunch or official dinner, can enhance a personal bonding between the two executive managers that goes beyond the professional relationship. The symbolism of “breaking bread” with people relaxes the atmosphere and allows personalities to have an influence on the developing relationship. A personal relationship, once established, raises the bar on the professional commitment to work together, and moves it to a higher level so that the commitment is now to another human being, and not just to an initiative written in an official document.

Upon completion of these first meetings—after building the initial personal and professional relationships—detailed planning for the next phase can begin. This phase should be to conduct a formal bilateral meeting at one of the participating agencies’ headquarters. Planning now should be made to bring representatives of one of the agencies into the “home” of the other agency, providing these representatives with high-level briefings and tours, hosted over a two-day timeframe. The main focus of this meeting is to get to know each other, but also to determine the direction of the relationship for the next six months, set the goals, and determine the steps needed to attain those goals. This can be accomplished during an open discussion time, which should be part of the agenda. Achievable directions and goals should be proposed. A necessary goal, and one that is easily achieved and builds excellent worker-level relationships, is an exchange of analytical personnel. Both agencies should determine the details of the personnel exchange, including the duration of the exchange, the focus of briefings, the timing of the visit, etc. Achieving this or a similar simple goal is critical in initiating momentum for continued successes. Each success reinforces the commonality of the organizations, emphasizes team building, and creates a “trust to success” correlation that will carry over into future endeavors.

DEA and participating agencies have also found it useful to sign an official document discussing the terms of the exchange (see Appendix A). This document is designed to be uncomplicated and brief. It should also serve to take the idea of a personnel exchange beyond the driving personalities of the two executive managers to the agencies’ organizational levels and create a commitment by the organization that can be referred to and sustained, even after the current leadership is no longer involved. It is not intended to be a binding accord that covers every contingency possible in the relationship, and that would be used as a bludgeon by one party on the other in the case of a disagreement. It is an official document that can guide the new cooperative effort and, most importantly, show the working-level staff the agency’s level of commitment that has been made on behalf of the agency. Other agenda items for open discussion at the initial bilateral meeting could be computer connectivity via e-mail, protocols of information-sharing, personnel security clearance and document classification similarities and differences, and the depth of the commitment of the participating agencies, rather than the individuals, to this process. In any case, the finalization of agreements or the reaching of decisions is not essential at this meeting. It is the meeting, the interaction, and the bonding of the attendees that are most important.

DEA has found that any bilateral relationship needs constant nurturing, coordination, and reiteration at the executive level. Attention to the relationship can be successfully administered on a biannual basis to keep the relationship effective and focused on the original intent of the venture—institution building, information-sharing, and joint operations.

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Information-Sharing “There are risks and costs to a program of action, but they are far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction.”                                                                         - John F. Kennedy

Information-sharing is the passing of useful knowledge from one party to another, so that the receiving party can act upon it or enhance it. In sharing information, it is critical that any collector of information not prejudge the value of the information to the recipient, nor limit the information to be shared for tactical use only. Operational and strategic information have equal relevancy. Most law enforcement entities around the world have a specific area of expertise and lack the resources to be experts on the entire world. Additionally, these entities cannot enforce laws outside of their own jurisdiction. DEA is no different.

Information-sharing, then, becomes the initial step in the development of a transnational policing relationship. By passing useful information to counterpart agencies that have the resources in place to address such information, the information could actually be acted upon or used in future reporting—not just placed in an agency file, or worse, in a drawer. Of course, this means relinquishing control of the information and possibly the enforcement activity as well. This involves risk, and requires trust in the newly founded relationship to justify taking the risk. Taking this risk and sharing the information are the essence of transnational policing.

The next step is for the two agencies to build trust and reduce the sense of risk involved in this type of initiative. To do this, the agencies should exchange working-level analytical personnel in order to bring the personal relationship, and hence the beginning of a trusting relationship, into the professional atmosphere of information-sharing. An exchange of personnel for approximately 60 days is the best way to open the avenues of communication between the two law enforcement agencies.

In this initial 60-day detail, the first few weeks should be very structured to ensure a complete and accurate introduction of the individuals to the organization. Inevitably, personal contacts and relationships occur during this process. The remaining weeks can be less formal, allowing both the professional relationships to develop and personal relationships to be enhanced through day-to-day working contacts. Again, the face-to-face daily contacts introduce the human factor into the professional process, this time at the working level. The objective of this initial exchange of personnel should be to introduce the host agency to the practices, beliefs, approaches, methodologies, and policies of the detailed personnel’s agency. Most importantly, this initial exchange should encourage a mutual trust and a free flow of information from person to person, and ultimately from organization to organization.

Another consideration that should be taken into account that will also enhance the initial bonding process of the exchange is to include the visitor in tours, outings, and personal get togethers with the host personnel. Gaining a general knowledge of the organization, its people, and the operating environment, through the initial exchange, allows the exchange individuals to better understand what each organization does and what it has available that can enhance both agencies’ operations and programs.

During the initial visit, the detailees should receive personal briefings on areas of expertise from a range of intelligence and operational personnel. It is imperative that the personnel who are selected to represent the host agency in these briefings be not only subject matter experts, but also representatives who possess excellent interpersonal skills. They must have the necessary experience to make them familiar with the aspects of their own agency; the maturity to objectively look at the overall information situation; and the ability to compare and contrast the positive and negative aspects of both agencies—objectively.

Exchange personnel should be in regular contact with their respective headquarters to give updates on the exchange. These updates also should serve to provide the management “back home” with an understanding of the level of access to information and people that their personnel are being given, thereby fostering good will and building more trust and confidence in the overall process.

At the conclusion of each exchange, a summary report of findings should be done that lays out the strengths and weaknesses of the other agency. From this report, a strategy for subsequent exchanges, joint targeting, and ultimately joint operations can emerge. The summary report can assist in tailoring subsequent analytical personnel exchanges to focus on obtaining specific information, profiting from specific expertise, or participating in a specific target investigation or region of the world. Upon return to their parent agencies, detailees should share their findings with their superiors, peers, and subordinates. It would provide valuable awareness training and also show the working-level analytical personnel the level of personal, professional, and organizational commitment that is involved in the relationship.

Joint Targeting “A good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.”                                                                                                                                       - George S. Patton

As a segue from an analytical personnel exchange to an actual multinational law enforcement operation, joint targeting brings both the intelligence and the operational elements to the table to proactively pursue a goal. Joint targeting can be defined as two or more parties agreeing to investigate targets of mutual interest and to pursue prosecution. Prior to commencement of a joint targeting venture, there must be a mutual level of trust that allows for the open sharing of pertinent strategic and active case information that defines the mutual threats, and which will ultimately benefit both parties. The research, planning, and coordination involved in such a mutually beneficial project are necessary to further enhance this sharing of information and provide an open forum of discussion and ideas to compose a list of information-driven targets. This phase of institution-building minimizes the risk of participating by creating an equal-stakes environment whereby participants simultaneously share information. Neither agency has an advantage over the other.

Once the organizations have agreed to joint targeting, they must determine several factors: the location of the targeting meeting, geographic areas of vital concern, which in turn will determine who will represent each agency at the meeting, and what drug is important enough to both countries. Again, it is imperative that the persons who will represent each agency be personable, diplomatic, and understand the importance of the bilateral relationship. Once a type of drug or geographic area has been selected, a group of drug or area experts from each agency should meet. Until a protocol is established and there is a success to build upon, the executive managers who were involved in building the bilateral relationship should remain intricately involved in the entire process. The experts should be prepared to bring a list of possible targets and the information on each, to this meeting. The experts need to determine if mutual targets of interest exist, and decide which one has the greatest potential or the greatest impact for one or, ideally, both countries.

Each agency should come out of the targeting meeting with the name of the subject to be targeted, a preliminary plan of attack that can be given to the personnel who will eventually work the investigation, a start-up date for the commencement of operations, and an agreement as to which agency is the coordinating agency. The coordinating agency should be the agency that would maintain more information on the target and would be closer in proximity to the geographic area of concern.

Information-driven targeting would eventually allow the parties to investigate and disrupt suspected criminals and criminal organizations at the conspiratorial phase—prior to the actual criminal act. By working together, the participating agencies increase their sources of information, and thus increase the input and perspectives of an investigation. In conjunction with an increase in manpower and funding resources, the chance of disrupting or dismantling the drug trafficking organizations on the final list of targets will increase. The acts of sharing information and jointly building an investigative case serve to lower the perceived risk and thus enhance the trust among those involved. This process is cyclical; whereby, each small success builds exponentially upon itself and takes the relationship to a higher level. History has shown that a tremendous advantage for success is built by law enforcement when two or more organizations put their planning, experiences, and resources together against an agreed upon criminal target.

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Multinational Task Force Operations “Be willing to make decisions. That is the most important quality in a good leader. Don’t fall victim to what I call the ‘ready-aim-aim-aim-aim syndrome.’ You must be willing to fire.”                                                           - T. Boone Pickens

Multinational task forces can be described as two or more countries’ police organizations coming together to investigate, arrest, and prosecute criminal organizations by utilizing the judicial systems of each to maximize the impact on targeted criminal organizations. After the joint targeting plan has been developed, the next step is to bring that plan to fruition by pulling together a task force of participating agency personnel. This phase of the transnational policing model must determine the best location for the task force, the best location for the culmination of the investigation, and when and how media releases should take place.

After the joint targeting meeting, each agency needs to determine who from their respective agencies should be involved in the task force operation. It should be a combination of personnel from operations, intelligence, headquarters, pertinent field offices, pertinent foreign offices, and administrative support. It is imperative that all members of the task force understand that they are equal partners in a joint venture and that no one agency has more authority over the other. The team concept must be recognized by all individuals involved.

The location of the task force should be determined by where the majority of the illegal activity is taking place, not by the location of the coordinating agency. For example, it may be that one agency is chosen as the coordinating agency but the illegal activity is taking place in another country and, therefore, the task force needs to be located in the third country. However, while preferable, it may not be possible to physically collocate the personnel assigned to the task force and it may not be necessary in this age of the Internet and expanded communication. Many drug trafficking organizations operate in multiple countries and the investigation of such might be better served by keeping law enforcement personnel in place where their networks and access to criminal information are established. If the participating agencies try to move their law enforcement personnel to a central location, the access to certain sources of information may be eliminated. However, if the trust in the new relationship is still in a state of flux, it may be beneficial to assign one or two people to the coordinating agency for the duration of the investigation.

The location of the culmination of the investigation should largely be determined in concert with legal personnel from both agencies. The goal of such a venture would be to inflict greater damage than individual countries could impose alone, reaping a synergistic value. The participating agencies must keep in mind that while trying to inflict the greatest impact with maximum use of the law and penalties, they also must be sensitive to such legal parameters as agent provocateur, wiretapping laws, money laundering legislation, undercover operations, and other such considerations in each country. This is the step in the process where it would become apparent that a need exists to push for judicial or legislative changes to benefit law enforcement actions or prosecution (i.e. legalizing wiretaps and undercover operations).

While getting two agencies together to jointly work an investigation is a milestone in and of itself, jointly taking credit for it, as a team, is the true test of faith in the trust that has been established up to this point. Media releases need to be coordinated between the two agencies to ensure that there are no superceding issues that will negatively affect the release of investigative information or no legal issues that will raise the level of concern within the judicial or public sectors in either country. Ideally, media releases and press conferences should be done together, or at least simultaneously – one particular agency should not be mentioned or shown without the mention or appearance of the other.

The multinational task force is the ultimate test of trust in this process. Once the task force operation has taken place, the two agencies can assess the work that was done and suggest ways to improve the mechanism for better collaborative efforts in the future.

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Transjudicial Proceedings “Justice delayed is justice denied.”                                                                                - William Gladstone The judicial portion of an investigation, the criminal trial and sentencing, could take place in at least three different locales. The investigation could culminate in either of the bilateral task force countries, or even in a third country where crimes were committed. Many of the details, in terms of prosecution and trial, may not be possible to determine in advance, due to the complexity of the multinational investigation, and the nature and level of involvement of the members of the criminal organization in question.

It is important that legal personnel from each of the participating task force countries be involved in the judicial proceedings phase from early in the planning process, through to the end of the trial and sentencing. They will need to consult with each other, advise case agents, and provide legal guidance to investigative personnel during the course of the investigation. Legal personnel also could recommend extradition for prosecution by a separate sovereign, especially in the case of a loss in one court system.

These different scenarios will have to be weighed to determine which one will inflict the greatest impact upon the criminal organization. The purpose of planning which judicial system to use allows the law enforcement partnership to take advantage of the “best” system in terms of the ease of prosecution for specific crimes, possibility and/or ease of greater maximum penalties during the sentencing phase, and ease of asset seizure and sharing of the proceeds with counterparts. It may be feasible to bring the entire organization to trial in one location or break up the organization for prosecution in many different locales to maximize the outcomes.

A main consideration that cannot be overlooked is the extradition treaties held between two nations. There may be countries that logistically seem to be the best place to affect arrests. However, the existence of extradition treaties between the bilateral participating countries must also be considered to ensure that maximum prosecution is not adversely affected.

The transjudicial proceedings phase is an integral part of the entire bilateral process. The overarching theme of working together for the betterment of law enforcement is exemplified in this phase of cooperation. To ascertain the value of the transjudicial prosecutorial process in terms of a specific investigation, a post-trial assessment should be performed by the bilateral task force participants with considerable input from legal personnel from each agency. This assessment will point out any shortcomings, and will suggest changes for the next investigation.

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Measures of Effectiveness “It is hard to go beyond your public. If they are satisfied with cheap performance, you will not easily arrive at better. If they know what is good, and require it, you will aspire and burn until you achieve it.”                                                        - Ralph Waldo Emerson

The response of law enforcement entities worldwide to the new challenge posed by criminal entrepreneurs has been slow and uncoordinated at best. New policing techniques and activities have traditionally been “after the fact” in response to social and criminal changes. Minimal assets or attention have applied to proactively identifying future challenges of crime, and addressing concerns before they actually occur. Police structures, by their traditional and paramilitary nature, are slow to react to change or to identify future threats to their jurisdictions. Nevertheless some policing groups are recognizing global changes and the implications they hold for the future of law enforcement. In response, these law enforcement agencies have made two significant changes in philosophy with regard to the new millennium criminal.

First, some law enforcement agencies have recognized the fact that crime cannot be addressed by placing all of their efforts and resources within their individual borders. The United States and other countries cannot adequately handle their crime problem by simply acting, or executing the judicial process, within their borders or areas of government control. This recognition has been slow in developing. Over the last decade, policing organizations have crossed borders in order to interact with regional partners to discuss areas of mutual concern. This is continuing to expand. Now, most major police groups recognize the need to enter into discussions with other law enforcement agencies throughout the world—not just in their regions or hemispheres. The need to create a “no place to hide” reality, is driving this global approach. In adopting this idea, law enforcement agencies also face the challenge of convincing their political overseers, and their sources of support and revenue, that successes should not just be measured by what they accomplish within their geographic boundaries. It must be realized that law enforcement success anywhere in the world can provide a service and protection for all peoples of the world, including their own constituencies.

Second, law enforcement agencies have recognized that the traditional measures of effectiveness in combating crime are truly not relevant as a measure of success or impact on criminal activities. Using statistics such as numbers of arrests, amount of contraband seized, or criminal assets forfeited are poor, if any, help in determining the correct actions to be taken in policing or as a measure of success. The public, too, no longer feels comfortable with judging its community’s safety, or its police’s efficiency, based on these traditional quantitative measures. The public has been desensitized to this measure of effectiveness by too many news conferences and reports hyping “the largest seizure” or “arrests have risen.” This type of data means little to the average person who does not participate in the policing process. What is important to them is the feeling of security and the experience of safety that is generated from within themselves. This is the touchstone that law enforcement must strive to achieve.

While figures are easily obtained or tracked, they provide little if any guidance concerning the quality of an investigation or its impact on the global crime issue or on a community. Quality and impact are key factors but neither is easy to document or rate. Police recognize that seizures alone have little if any impact on criminal organizations. The old measures of effectiveness need to be thrown out and new ones must be adopted. So, too, in a transnational policing relationship, there are different types of measures of effectiveness. Three elements of the overall bilateral transnational policing relationship should be examined for their effectiveness, while at the same time, measuring the effectiveness of the policing itself by determining the level of disruption or even complete dismantlement of an organization.

The first element should be the effectiveness of the intelligence portion of the relationship. This can be measured by taking a snapshot of the amount of information-sharing taking place prior to the original proposal, and then again after several bilateral meetings, after a joint targeting meeting, and again after a joint investigation. It could then be ascertained whether the channels of communication are open, and if the relationship is progressing.

The second element should be the effectiveness of the operational successes achieved by the coalition. Again, it needs to be determined if the agencies worked joint investigations previously and, if so, how successful were they. Operational effectiveness also needs to be examined after each joint investigation to determine strengths and weaknesses that will ultimately and continually enhance the operational relationship. This can best be achieved by doing a post-operational assessment that includes looking at such things as the objective of the case, the major modus operandi and organizational structure. But, lessons learned, suspects not charged, and future recommended actions and strategies should also be looked at. This post-operational assessment also can determine whether an organization was dismantled or disrupted. There is a simple snap-shot method of measuring operational success: if an organization changed its method of operation due to the actions of law enforcement then the law enforcement action was successful on some level.

The third measure of effectiveness for a successful transnational policing is key. It is the relationship that is forged between the agencies involved. Institution-building is paramount in the success of this program. The quality of the relationship is the catalyst for information-sharing, which in turn is the driving force of joint targeting and joint investigations. But, how do you rate the quality of a relationship? How do you rate whether the dynamic is working or not? Again, the post operational assessment approach would give an idea of whether the relationship is working, if it is progressing, and if it is growing after each success or joint initiative.

This third measure of effectiveness must be examined from another perspective as well. This type of bilateral relationship is built by holding face-to-face meetings in increments of approximately six months. Every increment, as well as every case, should elevate the level of transparency of the relationship between the two agencies to a higher level than what it was at the previous meeting. Once the level of transparency has stalled, then the parties need to step back, determine the hindrance, and take steps to correct it. This can be accomplished via the post operational assessments, conferences with working-level personnel, or changes in policy and procedure that enable the relationship to move on.

Tactically, effectiveness can be measured in the level of disruption, including complete dismantlement, caused to a criminal organization. Disruption occurs when the normal effective operation of an identified criminal organization is significantly impacted so that it is unable to conduct criminal operations as effectively and efficiently as before. Dismantlement occurs when an identified organization is incapacitated and is no longer capable of operating as a coordinated criminal enterprise. Also, the organization must be impacted to the extent that it is incapable of recovering. Both disruption and dismantlement must be the result of an affirmative law enforcement action, including but not limited to, the arrest, indictment, and conviction of all or most of its principal leadership, the elimination of its criminal enterprises and supporting networks and the seizure of its assets. Each criminal organization should be evaluated to determine its impact on not only the countries participating in the bilateral relationship in terms of local and national breadth, but also on its impact on a specific region or even the world.

Since the relationships themselves are evaluated every six months, it would be cost effective to also look at the organizations under investigation on a regular basis as well. Investigative targets should be continually evaluated by operational personnel, but the management of joint targeting task forces needs to be aware of the amount of impact this relationship is having on criminal organizations.

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The Future “The Wright brothers’ design allowed them to survive long enough to learn how to fly.”                                                                   - Michael Potts The future of law enforcement in today’s global market of goods and services, is in transnational policing. The model set forth in this paper is dynamic—a model that can be modified or expanded to cover a broad range of both intelligence and operational bilateral and multilateral law enforcement initiatives. The operational elements contained in this document—information-sharing, personnel exchanges, joint targeting, and multinational task forces—can be taken to a multilateral level at either a national or international scale. The main pitfall is finding threats that are important enough to all of the participating agencies to justify the allocation of resources to such a project. Another aspect to consider is ensuring that each bilateral relationship is developed enough to handle being taken to a multilateral level.

DEA has already expanded this idea beyond the bilateral level to a multilateral intelligence working group whereby several countries with similarly structured judicial systems and common policing philosophies come together to discuss issues of common interest. However, this approach does not have to stop there. Once bilateral relationships are established and working well, it is feasible that all, or at least regional participants, would come together annually to confer on new information-sharing initiatives and/or to discuss regional operational issues.

Operational initiatives, such as Regional Tactical Enforcement Centers where two or more agencies collocate personnel in order to truly police a geographic area would be a logical next step. Another extension of the operational application of this methodology is to establish an international deconfliction pointer index system to be used by participating countries to enhance information-sharing and cooperation, and eliminate duplication of effort. This system need not contain any investigative information other than the subject’s name, whether there is an active investigation on the subject, and a point of contact for the open investigation.

The bilateral relationship approach to transnational policing can easily be molded into more complex initiatives. Transnational policing is here to stay and will be paramount to law enforcement endeavors in the future.

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Conclusion “Take a chance! All life is a chance. The man who goes the furthest is generally the one who is willing to do and dare. The ‘sure thing’ boat never gets far from shore.”                                                                                                         - Dale Carnegie

Everyone knows that, to cure a sickness you cannot just treat the symptoms, you have to treat the disease. So, too, it is with the criminal enterprise. Law enforcement must attack the organizations, and not just the crime, if it is to have the greatest effect. Law enforcement’s goal has to be to disrupt or dismantle the criminal enterprise at every opportunity. To do this, law enforcement must use its limited resources to the very best of its abilities to target those criminal enterprises and their members, and pursue them relentlessly across any borders and through any legal systems.

Crime is a continuum. It runs the gamut from international exploitation to local and community level abuse. Fortunately, crime is not an exact science, nor are its perpetrators perfect in their execution of it. Both have weaknesses that law enforcement must recognize and exploit, in order to protect the general public for whom it works.

DEA and its partners in transnational policing are making the effort to maximize limited law enforcement resources. Through bilateral intelligence relationships, DEA and its partners are not only fostering stronger ties between their countries and their agencies, but also making a larger and longer lasting impact on transnational crime. Together they are enhancing the quality of transnational policing by breaking down barriers and improving capabilities by building mutual trust and respect, and by pooling resources. Joint efforts are synergistic in their effect; the combined whole is certainly greater than the sum of its parts. Bilateral relationships improve investigations by better filling information gaps, sharing best practices, leveraging expertise, minimizing redundancies, and improving the efficiency of limited resources. Bilateral relations are improving not only the success rate of operations, but the overall scale of investigations, arrests, seizures, and asset forfeitures.

All of this is working and is successful now. But the key to continued success is the building of an enduring trust that surpasses the current personalities involved, and stretches across the organizational boundaries of the agencies to deep within all of their people, to the very fiber of the organizations. Egos, case ownership, and individual insecurities and distrust must be left behind if these relationships are to keep working. Trust is paramount in achieving this. Trust minimizes the perceived risk of joint ventures and trust translates into teamwork, partnership, ownership, and a belief in the bilateral process all the way down to the working-level individual. It is what makes transnational policing happen. But trust does not happen without constant reaffirmation and nurturing. Trust must continually be nurtured by the leadership of the organizations.

Together, law enforcement organizations have to continue to take the chance. They have to take the chance that the bilateral relationship and, in the future, that the true multilateral relationship, is a better answer to the challenge of transnational crime. These will ultimately become the most efficient and effective ways to address transnational crime—at least for the foreseeable future. The time is now for law enforcement leaders to take transnational policing out of speeches and off chalkboards, and put it into the operational planning and execution of their organizations. Only then will law enforcement really begin to feel the potential, and exercise the strength that it has, to decisively impact the transnational criminal organizations of the world.

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Appendix A: Sample Memorandum of Understanding

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

AND

XXX

ON THE

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

A. PURPOSE: This agreement establishes the relationship and responsibilities concerning the exchange of intelligence personnel between the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and xxx. The intent of this agreement is to strengthen headquarters-to-headquarters intelligence links and liaison activities through the exchange of intelligence personnel between DEA and xxx.

B. BACKGROUND: At the first Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group (BDIWG), meeting held on xxx, it was agreed that the working group concept could enhance intelligence programs in DEA and xxx. In addition, BDIWG participants agreed to initiate an intelligence exchange program between DEA and xxx.

C. OBJECTIVES: Within the parameters of the BDIWG and essential to the continuing effectiveness of the concept, DEA and xxx agree to the exchange of intelligence personnel in order to achieve the following objectives:

D. LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENT: Intelligence personnel will be assigned for a period of not more than ninety (90) days without prior written approval of the hosting agency.

E. SUPERVISION: DEA Intelligence Analysts on temporary assignment to xxx will be under the administrative direction of the DEA Country Attaché in xxx. xxx intelligence personnel on temporary assignment to DEA will be under the administrative direction of xxx in xxx. Exchange personnel will be expected to report to their respective Country Attaché/Liaison Officer as directed to provide updates on the progress of the exchange.

F. DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED: The basic scope of duties for each exchange will be to observe structure, protocols, procedures, reporting mechanisms, and best practices of the host agency’s approach to drug law enforcement intelligence and information sharing. Each intelligence exchange will focus on a specific assignment mutually agreed to by the BDIWG participants at the preceding meeting of the BDIWG. Within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the exchange, the exchange personnel will prepare a written report discussing his/her observations that will be presented at the next meeting of the BDIWG. The reports are intended to foster discussion and agenda items for the BDIWG and to help focus topics for the following exchange.

G. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITES: The signing of this agreement by DEA and xxx shall constitute acceptance of the following conditions:

H. SECURITY CERTIFICATION: The sending agency certifies that the following conditions will be met with respect to the exchange personnel and any information the exchange personnel receives on behalf of the sending agency: