

Errata

Thirtymile Fire Investigation Report: Factual and Management Evaluation Reports

Released September 26, 2001

as amended October 16, 2001

The following errata sheet describes the changes that have been made to the September 26, 2001 version of the Thirtymile Fire Report. These changes consist of modifications to the report that were identified by the Board of Review on October 16, 2001 and other edits. The Board of Review modifications were made in response to the Chief's directive to revisit the issue of why some of the victims and survivors remained on the rock scree above the road even though some of the witness statements confirmed that there was an attempt to get everyone on the road.

Page	Location	Original Statement	Changes
Title Pg.		Winthop	Winthrop
Title Pg.			<u>as amended October 16, 2001</u>
Reports' Title Pgs	Factual & MER Title page		<u>as amended October 16, 2001</u>
Factual & MER	Various locations	Dark blue section headers	Gray section headers
5, 6,8, 14, 49	Various locations	Marshal	Marshall
6	Forest Management Diagram	Pete Ellinger	<u>Jack</u> Ellinger
13	4 th paragraph, 2 nd sentence	They drove almost to the end of the road and then headed back down looking for spots.	<u>Engine #704</u> drove almost to the end of the road and then headed back down looking for spots.
15	1 st paragraph, 2 nd sentence	... continue	... <u>continued</u>
15	3 rd paragraph, 1 st sentence	At 4:34 p.m., as Squad 3 retreated, Kampen radioed Ellreese Daniels to get the people out of the area.	At 4:34 p.m., as Squad 3 retreated, Kampen <u>and others</u> radioed Ellreese Daniels to get the people out of the area.
15	8 th paragraph, 2 nd sentence	Several times the IC told the people to come down from the rocks since the road was "the safe place to be." ⁽⁹⁰⁾	Several times the IC <u>tried to tell the people on the rocks to come down to the road.</u> ⁽⁹⁰⁾
16	3 rd paragraph, 1 st sentence	(73)	(<u>93</u>)
19	Figure 14	Deployment Spot on the Road Between Two Burnt Packs that Burned	Deployment Spot on the Road Between <u>Two Packs that Burned</u>
20	Reference 44	Dispatch and G. Jasso	<u>E. Hurd</u>
31	Finding #9, 1 st sentence	At approximately 2:45 p.m. the fire ...	At approximately <u>3:35</u> p.m. the fire ...

Page	Location	Original Statement	Changes
31	Finding #20, 2 nd sentence	One Naches Ranger District crewmember left the group of five in the rocks to join the people on the road because they "seemed calmer," the road looked like a safer place to be, and the IC said, "to come down."	One Naches Ranger District crewmember left the group of five in the rocks to join the people on the road.
32	Finding #22	The IC attempted to bring separated crewmembers back to the group by warning and instructing -- at least three times -- to leave the rocks (as that was not the place to be) and return to the road.	The IC attempted to bring the separated crewmembers <u>on the rock scree back to the group on the road, but it is unknown whether they all heard the directive.</u>
38	Finding #31	The IC informed the crewmembers that the road was the safe place to be and repeatedly told those in the rocks above the road to come to the road.	The IC informed the crewmembers that the road was the safe place to be and repeatedly <u>attempted to tell those in the rocks above the road to come to the road, but it is unknown if they all actually heard the directive.</u>
38	Finding #33	The crew did not physically gather together on the road even after repeated directions by the IC.	The crew did not physically gather together on the road even after repeated <u>attempts by the IC to bring them together; however, it is unknown if all those on the rocks actually heard the instructions.</u>
40	Standard Fire Order 4, 2 nd bullet	At the deployment site instructions were given but not adhered to.	At the deployment site instructions were given <u>and not all were adhered to, but it is unknown whether they were heard or understood by all.</u>
42	Watch Out Situation #6, 2 nd bullet	At the deployment site, instructions were given but not adhered to.	At the deployment site instructions were given <u>and not all were adhered to, but it is unknown whether they were heard or understood by all.</u>
44	2 nd paragraph, 3 rd sentence	But at a critical moment she decided to leave her friends who were gathered in a rocky area and she went to the road in response to repeated requests and orders from the crew leader.	But at a critical moment she decided to <u>move to the road.</u>
47	Logistics	Suvan Lake	<u>Swan Lake</u>
47	Information Officer	Mt Lake-Tarrace	<u>Mountlake Terrace</u>
47	Documentation		<u>Esther Woodward USFS Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forests Okanogan, WA</u>
49	Table Header	List of Individuals Interviewed	List of Individuals Interviewed <u>& Contacted for Information</u>
49	Anderson	Dwain Anderson	<u>Dewane Anderson</u>
49	Bennett	Fire Weather Program Leader	Fire Weather Program Leader, <u>Spokane National Weather Service</u>
49	Cannon	Member Entiat IHC	<u>Assistant Superintendent, Entiat IHC</u>

Page	Location	Original Statement	Changes
49	Dunn	Engine #704	Engine #701
49	Hammer	Meteorologist	Meteorologist, <u>Spokane National Weather Service</u>
49	Jasso	Forest AFMO, Lake Wenatchee	AFMO, Lake Wenatchee <u>Ranger District</u>
49	Marcott	FMO Lake Naches RD	<u>District</u> FMO, Naches <u>Ranger District</u>
49	Newcom	District Ranger, Twisp	District Ranger, <u>Methow Valley Ranger District</u>
49	O'Neal	Forest Supervisor Okanogan-Wenatchee NF	Forest Supervisor, <u>Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forests</u>
49	Quan	Deputy Forest Supervisor Okanogan-Wenatchee NF	Deputy Forest Supervisor, Okanogan-Wenatchee <u>National Forests</u>
49	Reed	Methow Valley Ranger District Duty Officer 7/10/01	<u>Dispatcher, Okanogan National Forest</u>
49	Soderquist	District FMO	District FMO, <u>Methow Valley Ranger District</u>
49	Smith	Pierce Aviation	<u>Pilot, Single Engine Air Tanker (SEAT)</u>
49	Tackman	Lead Pilot, Libby South Fire	Lead <u>Plane</u> Pilot, Libby South Fire
49	Taylor	Tom	<u>Thom</u>
49	Thomas	Forest FMO	Forest FMO, <u>Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forests</u>
49	Wallace, Roger	Fire Management Officer, Lake Wenatchee & Leavenworth RD	<u>District FMO, Lake Wenatchee & Leavenworth Ranger Districts</u>
52	11:00 a.m.	From 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. ...	From 11:00 <u>a.m.</u> to 12:00 p.m. ...
52	11:00 a.m.	...river (~11:00 p.m.)	... river (~11:00 <u>a.m.</u>)
52	1:00 p.m.	...campground (~1:00 a.m.)	...campground (~1:00 <u>p.m.</u>)
54	2 nd paragraph, 1 st sentence	Fire Weather Forecast, issued 8:30 a.m. July 10 th was not transmitted to the Thirtymile Fire.	<u>National Weather Service issued two Fire Weather Forecasts on July 10th. The morning forecast was transmitted to the Thirtymile Fire personnel but the afternoon forecast was not.</u>
54	Fire Behavior Figure 1	...the Phases of the Thirtymile Fire Phases.	...the Phases of the Thirtymile Fire.
54	2 nd paragraph, 2 nd sentence	The Spot Weather Report for the Libby South Fire, issued 7:36 p.m. July 9 th was the only Forecast delivered to firefighters on the Thirtymile Fire (See Appendix: Weather).	The Spot Weather Report for the Libby South Fire, issued 7:36 p.m. July 9 th was the only <u>Spot Weather Forecast</u> delivered to firefighters on the Thirtymile Fire (See Appendix: Weather).
63	4 th pagagraph, 2 nd sentence	Figure 6	Figure <u>13</u>
63	5 th paragraph, 1 st sentence	...94) on the day of deployment...	...94° F) in the Chewuch River Valley on the day of deployment...
67	1 st paragraph, 3 rd sentence	...Thirty Mile Fire.	... <u>Thirtymile</u> Fire.
69	Photo caption	The Thirty Mile...	The <u>Thirtymile</u> ...

Page	Location	Original Statement	Changes
71	Table	Time	<u>Date/Time</u>
75	Figure 1	Figure 1 - 07/11/0040Z or 07/10/1740 PDT	Figure 1 - 07/11/00 <u>30</u> Z or 07/10/ <u>1730</u> PDT
75	Figure 2	Figure 2 - 07/11/0030Z or 07/10/1730 PDT	Figure 2 - 07/11/00 <u>40</u> Z or 07/10/ <u>1740</u> PDT
81	Item #4, 1 st bullet, 4 th sub-bullet	...fire line on the afternoon.	... fire line <u>in</u> the afternoon.
81	Item #4, 2 nd bullet, 1 st sentence	This led to a somewhat and ill-defined strategy...	This led to a somewhat ill-defined strategy...
82	Headings	1, 2, 3	<u>5, 6, 7</u>
84	Table	Entiat IHD	Entiat <u>IHC</u>
87	1 st bullet, 2 nd sentence	Thomas	<u>Thom</u>
94	Deployment sites list	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Beau Clark 2. Scott Scherzinger 3. Rebecca Welch 4. Nick Dreis 5. Armando Avila 5a. Jason Emhoff location after moving from Upper Deployment site 6. Elaine Hurd 6a. Thom Taylor Location after moving from Upper Deployment site 7. Matthew Rutman 8. Ellreese Daniels 9. Paula Hagemeyer 10. Bruce Hagemeyer 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5a. Jason Emhoff location after moving from Upper Deployment site 6a. Thom Taylor Location after moving from Upper Deployment site <u>7.</u> Beau Clark <u>8.</u> Scott Scherzinger <u>9.</u> Rebecca Welch <u>10.</u> Nick Dreis <u>11.</u> Armando Avila <u>12.</u> Elaine Hurd <u>13.</u> Matthew Rutman <u>14.</u> Ellreese Daniels <u>15.</u> Paula Hagemeyer <u>16.</u> Bruce Hagemeyer
95	Item #5	Because Naches RD does not keep training records...	Because the <u>Lake Leavenworth</u> Ranger District does not keep training records...
MER-3	4 th paragraph, 3 rd sentence	The firefighters on the rock scree were ordered to return to the road; however, these orders were disregarded.	<u>The IC tried to get the firefighters sitting on the rocks to move to the road, but it is not known if they heard his directive.</u>
MER-10	5 th paragraph, 2 nd sentence	Failure to deploy before conditions completely deteriorated, failure to follow directions to move to the most desirable deployment location on the road, and failure to deploy using the proper techniques, significantly contributed to the fatalities and injuries.	Failure to deploy before conditions completely deteriorated, failure to move to the most desirable deployment location on the road, and failure to deploy using the proper techniques, significantly contributed to the fatalities and injuries.