|
EACH year, some 48 million cargo
containers move between the world’s ports. More than 6 million
of these enter the U.S., but only about 2 percent are opened and
inspected when they arrive at U.S. seaports. The West Coast ports
of Los Angeles–Long Beach, Oakland, and Seattle alone process
11,000 containers per day, or about 8 containers per minute.
Because
of this high traffic volume, U.S. seaports are especially vulnerable
to a terrorist attack. Illicit radioactive materials
could be hidden in any one of the cargo-filled containers that
arrive at U.S. ports. Yet, searching every shipment would bring
legitimate commercial activities to a halt. Improving security
at U.S. ports is thus one of the nation’s most difficult
technical and practical challenges because the systems developed
for screening cargo must operate in concert with ongoing seaport
activities.
Working
at this intersection of commerce and national security, Lawrence
Livermore researchers are applying their expertise in
radiation science and detection to develop improved technologies
for detecting hidden radioactive materials. One new technology
being designed and tested at the Laboratory is a neutron interrogation
system for cargo containers. This system will quickly screen incoming
shipments to ensure that nuclear materials such as plutonium and
highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not smuggled into the U.S.
Balancing Security and Commerce
The
Livermore system would bathe suspicious containers in neutrons
to actively search for nuclear materials. A truck carrying a container
laden with suspicious cargo would be towed over a generator that
would bombard the container with neutrons. It would then be towed
through an array of detectors, much like driving through a car
wash. If the neutrons encountered any fissile material shielded
and hidden
among the container’s contents—whether produce, clothing,
electronics, lumber, automotive parts, or other consumer goods—the
interaction would induce tiny fission reactions. These reactions
would produce the telltale delayed gamma rays of nuclear materials,
which would be picked up by the detectors.
The Livermore system is not intended to screen every container
entering a U.S. seaport. Instead, it will be used on the suspect
cargo identified by screening procedures, such as radiography or
passive radiation inspection, that show some of a container’s
contents.
The
19-member project team draws on the talents of personnel from Livermore’s
Engineering Directorate as well as the Physics and Advanced Technologies;
Chemistry and Materials Science; Safety
and Environmental Protection; Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and
International Security (NAI); and Computation directorates. “To
some approximation, we work like a soccer team of 8-year-olds,” says
project leader Dennis Slaughter, technical director of Livermore’s
100-megaelectronvolt (MeV) electron linear accelerator (linac). “By
that, I mean we all follow the ball. There are no established positions.
Everyone ‘turns to’ the urgent task, and we all help
each other without disciplinary distinctions.”
Originally
funded by Livermore’s Laboratory Directed Research
and Development Program, the detection project was picked up by
the Department of Energy (DOE) in 2003 and is now supported by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Livermore team is
focused
on developing
a system that is not only reliable but
also commerce-friendly.
“Our
goal is to develop a system that can detect small targets of nuclear
material—about 5 kilograms of HEU and 1 kilogram
of plutonium—with low error rates of about 1 percent
false positive and false negative,” Slaughter says. “The
system we’re developing would permit rapid scanning so it
wouldn’t disrupt commerce. Our goal is to complete the scan
and report in about a minute.”
An Active Interrogation System
Slaughter and his colleagues consider active interrogation to be
the most promising option for detecting HEU in containers. Even
moderate amounts of shielding make it difficult to passively detect
radiation emanating from hidden sources. The high-energy, gamma-ray
signature produced when neutrons interact with nuclear material
is unique, so the liquid scintillation detectors can readily distinguish
it from the signature for normal background radiation.
The neutron scan would pose few risks to cargo. Most residual radioactivity
would dissipate within seconds after the scan. In the team’s
experiments, radiation dose rates are low.
The team is also working to minimize potential risks to the people
who will operate the equipment. The project goal is to limit radiation
exposure to the normal allowable doses specified in federal standards
for the general public. “Because people might be inside a
container during irradiation,” says Slaughter, “we
want the radiation dose to be too small to cause harm.”
Slaughter
hopes to see such a system as a regular part of cargo container
security at U.S. ports. Eventually, it might also be
used at foreign ports to scan containers before they are loaded
aboard U.S.-bound ships. Since 2002, the Livermore team has done
considerable work related to basic science and engineering of the
system, developing the detector and establishing requirements for
the neutron generator. Research has been conducted at Livermore
and at the 88-inch cyclotron at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL). The team’s timetable is to build a research prototype
and evaluate it in a laboratory setting during 2005 and to
field a vendor prototype at a container port in
2006.
Detecting the Gamma-Ray Signature
Use of a high-energy, gamma-ray signature to detect nuclear materials
in containers was proposed by Stanley Prussin, a professor of nuclear
engineering at the University of California (UC) at Berkeley, and
Eric Norman of LBNL. Prussin, now the chief scientist for the cargo
container project, has long consulted with the Laboratory’s
NAI Directorate. He became involved with the cargo container effort
in the summer of 2002 while on sabbatical at Livermore to work
on an unrelated project.
Prussin was familiar with Slaughter’s work and attended a
meeting at which modelers discussed the container effort. He says, “It
didn’t take too long for me to become convinced that, under
their defined worse-case condition, we ought to take another look
at the technique they were modeling.”
Rather than high-energy gamma rays, the Livermore team originally
considered a system that counted delayed neutrons emitted by neutron-induced
fission. Delayed neutrons are emitted from a fraction of a second
to a few minutes after fission and have lower energies than the
fast prompt fission neutrons. Although delayed neutrons can be
a reliable indication of nuclear materials, their yield is low.
Prussin noted a difficulty with using delayed neutrons: Hydrogenous
cargo—fruits and vegetables, canned meats, wood, plastics—can
absorb the short-lived neutrons and thus might interfere with the
delayed neutron count.
“Any
system we develop must look for fissionable materials that will
be well shielded,” says Prussin. “If the
material is shielded by hydrogenous material, the probability for
the delayed neutrons to actually escape from the container into
an external detector is very small. In the U.S., we import almost
everything under the sun, and many of those imports are hydrogenous.”
Instead of the delayed neutron count, Prussin suggested the team
measure the gamma rays emitted. Fission products make numerous
gamma rays that have comparable decay characteristics of delayed
neutrons. Yet, says Prussin, the probability of the neutron-induced
gamma rays escaping from the container through hydrogenous material
is about 1,000 times greater than it is for delayed neutrons.
In
2003, Prussin and Slaughter worked with Norman to arrange for a
series of experiments, funded by the DOE’s
Office of Science, at LBNL’s 88-inch cyclotron. The first
experiment was conducted using a deuteron beam on a beryllium target.
The researchers also bombarded well-shielded sample targets of
uranium-235 and plutonium-239, irradiating each sample for 30 seconds,
going back and forth to get enough statistics for a relevant evaluation.
“The
high-energy gamma rays essentially represent a unique signature
that fission has occurred,” says Prussin, “both because
of their energies, which are above 3 MeV, and because of their
temporal behaviors.”
Researchers
followed up the LBNL scientific measurements with signature
verification experiments at a new laboratory commissioned
at Livermore for scanning cargo containers. The laboratory houses
a 6-meter container provided by APL, one of the world’s largest
container transportation companies, and gives the researchers
a realistic testing environment. In these experiments, they irradiated
a 22-kilogram target of natural uranium with a beam from a 14-MeV
neutron source. Their results confirmed the intensity of the signature
in a realistic cargo-scanning configuration using 150 grams
of HEU and a low-intensity source.
|
The design for the detector system
calls for a belowground neutron generator that would bathe
containerized cargo with neutrons. Interaction of the neutrons
with fissile material inside the container would produce
fission, followed by delayed gamma rays detected by an
array of liquid scintillators as the container moves through
the system.
|
Good Results with Simulated Cargo
In
studies using simulated cargo stacked around the target, the gamma
rays produced were very intense, between 2.5 and 4 MeV. The
neutron beam energy must be high enough to penetrate the cargo
but low enough to avoid interfering activation. (The research indicates
the neutron source should be between 5 and 8 MeV.) Although gamma
radiation is 10 times stronger than delayed neutrons, it is weak
but detectable, and high-resolution detectors are not required
to measure it. Large arrays of low-resolution detectors, such as
liquid scintillators, can be cheaply produced and easily deployed.
One
question the team must resolve is what accelerator characteristics
are required for practical field applications. “Accelerators
that can give the appropriate deuteron beam energy intensity on
the appropriate target can, in principle, be manufactured commercially
and for a reasonable amount of funding,” Prussin says. “We
don’t know that one has been constructed for the exact conditions
we'll specify, and we may have some technical issues to
address. But our requirement is not for a scientific system. What
we will want is a much simpler device.”
Meanwhile,
the team wants to resolve some problems found when using Monte
Carlo codes to mock up experiments and test them on the computer. “We
are developing a method that seems likely to serve our purpose,” says
Prussin. Experiments on irradiation of uranium, which will be conducted
at Berkeley, are being designed to help the researchers understand
how well the computational procedures can represent the experimental
data.
Simultaneously,
efforts are moving forward to develop a large array of liquid scintillators
that are sensitive to both neutron and
gamma rays. As currently envisioned, the design includes a bank
of 20 liquid scintillator–filled tubes spanning each side
of the car wash.
|
APL, one of the world’s largest container
transporation companies, provided Livermore researchers
with a 6-meter container, which gives them a realistic
test environment in the container laboratory.
|
Benefits of Liquid Scintillator
Liquid
scintillator is a good candidate material for the cargo interrogation
problem. It has a fast response time, and it can
be inexpensively instrumented to scan a large volume of material,
which helps to ensure that a large fraction of the particle flux
emitted by the neutron-irradiated nuclear material will be detected.
Livermore physicist Adam Bernstein, who leads the detector design
team, says, “Neutrons and gamma rays create a 20-nanosecond
pulse of blue light when they scatter in the medium, and this fluorescent
pulse can be detected in photomultiplier tubes.” Such detectors
can be used in various cargo detection and interrogation scenarios.
For example, even with the neutron source off, the detector array
may still be sensitive enough to scan cargo for some types of radioactive
materials of concern.
The
segmented array, which has a response time of about 100 nanoseconds
or better, would indicate the location or spatial extent of radioactive
material hidden in the cargo. “By establishing
the geometric extent of the radioactive material," says Slaughter,
"we can better differentiate cargo with small amounts of uranium
distributed
throughout
from normal cargo with a small component of nuclear material hidden
in it.”
"The
liquid scintillator project dovetails nicely with the Laboratory’s
mission," says Bernstein. “Livermore in general is a
center for radiation detection because of nuclear weapons and other
nuclear
physics research.” He adds that the liquid scintillator work
is building on a detection technology that has been used for years
in high-energy physics. “These types of detectors are often
used in fundamental physics research, where we engage in neutrino
physics and dark-matter searches, but not for practical applications
such as fissile material detection. In this project, we’re
taking a technology that’s a workhorse in high-energy physics
and applying it in the real world.”
Using
liquid scintillators in such applications brings its own challenges
for detector designers. “We have a lot
of work to do in developing the algorithms for the gamma-ray signal
that comes out of cargo containers,” says Bernstein. “We
want to process the signal in a different way than we do in a physics
experiment where we don’t have any time constraints and we
can wait to obtain data. In this application, we have about a minute
to make a decision on whether the cargo container is suspicious
or not.”
Keeping
the false-positive and false-negative rates low is another technical
issue facing the designers. “We want to optimize
the signal-to-background ratio as best we can,” says Bernstein, “and
we’ll have to establish the number of false positives that
are acceptable. For example, if a few hundred cargo containers
go through the car wash each day, a false-positive rate of 1 percent
might be unacceptable because that could mean you stop the chain
once a day to remove a container for closer inspection.”
Another
challenge is to develop a robust system, one that can work continually
for months or years and that can be operated by people
who are not experts in radiation detection. “People frequently
underestimate that aspect of the development process,” Bernstein
says.
Members
of the team
built a small prototype of a 0.6-meter-tall detector, which they
successfully tested. This spring, they are working with
an array of four detectors, each 2 meters tall and 20 centimeters
in diameter, and according to Bernstein, the team expects this
testing to result in some iterations of the design. By the end
of 2004, the team hopes to be working on a larger array that would
cover one side of the car wash.
“By
January or February 2005, we should have the full array,” says
Bernstein. “We most likely will build it at Livermore. While
we’re designing the prototype, we’ll also try to make
the system portable, so we can take it into the field—and
possibly test
it at a port.”
Slaughter
is hopeful that by 2005 the Laboratory team will add a commercial
partner to develop a system that could eventually be deployed in
the fight against global terrorism.
—Dale Sprouse
Key Words: cargo containers, gamma rays, highly enriched uranium
(HEU), homeland security, liquid scintillator, nuclear materials,
neutron generator, plutonium, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction.
For further information contact Dennis Slaughter
(925) 422-6425 (slaughter1@llnl.gov).
Download
a printer-friendly version of this article. |