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Updated: 14 Jan 2003
DefenseLINK Transcript

Background Briefing
Wednesday, October 2, 1996 - 11:45 a.m.

Subject: Latin American Trip


Senior Defense Official: I thought I might just begin with a few facts about the trip and what we're going to do and so forth. We will leave on Saturday morning, [October] the 5th. The Secretary will stop in Panama with the delegation for that evening. While we're in Panama, we will observe a special operations exercise called Cabanas, and we will meet with troops. We'll visit the Combined Counter Drug Air Operations Center that is at SOUTHCOM, and the Secretary will pay a courtesy call on President Perez Balladaras in Panama while we are there.

We'll then leave the next morning to travel to Bariloche. With the time zone change and a long trip, it will be evening when we arrive there. He will have some bilateral meetings upon arrival, and there will be an opening dinner that night. Then Monday and Tuesday will constitute the actual ministerial meeting.

The Secretary will be accompanied in his official delegation by General Clark, by Senator Bob Graham, who also attended the DMA last year in Williamsburg, and Jeff Davidall, Assistant Secretary of State, will be with us.

The basic structure for the meetings is that on Tuesday there will be a plenary meeting in the morning with some presentations. The Secretary will make a short presentation himself, along with short presentations from several other defense ministers. There will be a longer opening presentation from the Argentine Defense Minister, Minister Domingas who was, until a few months ago, the Mayor of Buenos Aires and is the new Defense Minister, and was here six weeks ago or so, some of you will recall, to meet with Secretary Perry, and has taken the lead in pulling together the DMA and really has done an outstanding job, in our view, and put a lot of effort into this early on, while he has many other challenges to deal with at the same time. He's really made a big commitment to the DMA.

So he will make an opening statement, opening speech. The others will make some short comments. Then there will be some discussions.

That afternoon, the Ministers will have some informal time together to get to know each other and talk. We have a couple of other bilaterals, I think, on Monday as well. Then on Tuesday, the Ministers will break up into three working groups, organized around three different themes for more focused discussions.

The Secretary will return to Washington on Tuesday night.

There will be a closing session on Wednesday. Some of the delegation will stay behind for that. President Mena of Argentina will make a speech at that closing ceremony. Unfortunately, Secretary Perry's schedule will not allow him to stay until Wednesday morning. He'll have to come back Tuesday night and miss the closing ceremonies on Wednesday morning.

That's the overall picture.

In terms of the substance of the meeting, let me emphasize that it's being organized by the Argentines, and they have done a superb job of coordinating throughout the region with all the other countries, the 34 countries that will be attending, and getting the views of all the countries and bringing them together. That hasn't been a trivial process for them. There have been different views, and they've done a good job of bringing them together.

We will start out, in terms of our approach to this, where we left off at Williamsburg, with the so-called Williamsburg Principles which were published in this book that we put out after the Williamsburg meeting last year, promoting democratic values being principle number one. In that context, subordinating the military to democratically constituted governments -- civilian control, in other words -- and also relying on negotiations to resolve outstanding disputes and to prevent new disputes. The fourth principle being the recognition of the legitimate role of armed forces in defending the sovereignty of democratic states. The fifth one being increasing transparency in defense matters -- published defense plans and programs and budgets, notifications of major exercises, other types of confidence building measures. Then finally, cooperation in international peacekeeping and combating narco-terrorism. So those Williamsburg Principles we believe still remain completely valid for the region and are the best statement of how the Defense Ministers should work together to foster continued progress in the region.

The organization this year is somewhat different. The three main working groups are; the first one, called New Dimensions in International Security, which is focused on the questions of what are the threats to security, and what is the role of defense establishments, especially in this hemisphere; contribution of bilateral/multilateral cooperation, and so forth.

The second one is overlapped somewhat, but it's focused on the actual role of the defense establishments: [in areas such as] Peacekeeping, emergency response, demining, so forth. Cooperation of science and technology.

The third one is focused on the institutional framework and the relations between defense systems. Here's where the focused discussion will be on enhanced transparency, on civilian structures, education for modern defense organizations and so forth.

The Secretary of Defense will participate initially in that third group and offer some opening comments in the third group and will be one of the chairs of that group. The Ministers themselves will have the flexibility to move between the three groups. The Secretary will also be involved during the day in these working groups and with some bilateral meetings, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Caribbean nations. So he'll have quite a heavy schedule of bilateral meetings in the course of the Ministerial.

So we're very optimistic that this meeting will further encourage and strengthen democracy in the hemisphere, continue the Williamsburg process, help strengthen effective civilian direction of military establishments, and increase understandings of the new risks to regional security.

We're also very sensitive to, and sympathetic with, the views of many of the countries in the region, that they need to continue to develop their own civilian-led defense establishments and get them to stand on their own two feet. While there's a role for the United States to play in this, and while we can be cooperative and helpful to them, that's something they have to do on their own. That cannot be done, in any sense, by the United States, or for them by any outside power.

So I want to emphasize here that we have no objective to create an institution of Defense Ministers, an alliance, anything like that at all. The purpose of this meeting is not to move in that direction. In fact the purpose of it is to make sure there can be communication amongst sovereign, independent countries in such a way that these problems can be dealt with through cooperation, through transparency, through communication, obviating the need for any additional structures in the hemisphere. We do not see the need for any additional structures ourselves.

With that introduction, I'll be happy to answer almost any questions.

Q: Are there any particularly outstanding conflicts between countries that you're worried about that you might try to mediate, like the agreement that was signed last year?

A: No. I don't think so. Of course there will be some discussions of the situation in Peru and Ecuador, that's inevitable. But there is a good process underway to deal with that, and we don't want this to, in any way, interfere with the existing process. To the extent that some of these discussions can facilitate that, move it forward, it will be a convenient forum for doing that.

There will be an opportunity for the guarantors to meet together for a short meeting to discuss, at the Defense Ministerial level progress on that, and there may be an opportunity to meet with Peru and Ecuador. The last time I checked on it that wasn't set yet. We're still working on that, so that's still open as to whether the guarantor nations will meet also with Peru and Ecuador themselves. But this will not be an attempt to negotiate or to supersede any other process, but merely a convenient time for the Ministers to coordinate and share views on how to proceed there.

Q: The guarantees were Brazil...As I remember...

A: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States.

Q: In Williamsburg last year, in fact you didn't get all the Defense Ministers, and Mexico, in particular, was an observer rather than a participant. This year that's the same situation. They are also an observer this year, we understand, from the Mexicans. Do you see any advancement on their participation?

And secondly, what is the U.S. offering for the countries of Latin America in terms of trying to remove some of the conditionalities on U.S. assistance that Congress has been imposing over the last year. There's been a lot of new conditionalities and sort of prescriptions to Latin American military, congressional legislation on counternarcotics aid, for instance, among other things.

A: On participation, we're quite happy with the participation. I think there is a higher level of participation, generally speaking, although I haven't statistically counted it so don't hold me to it.

Senior Defense Official To Assistant: Have you gone through? Is that a supportable statement, that we're a little bit higher than last year? We're certainly as good as last year.

Assistant: I think we have basically the same countries that were represented last year. It's just a matter of different delegations based on the different positions that people are holding now.

Senior Defense Official: But the question is whether we have more Ministers. We'll have to count them up.

With regard to Mexico, you'll have to ask Mexico how they want to characterize this. I personally spoke to the Mexican Foreign Minister about this while I was in Mexico a couple of weeks ago, and they're sending a very senior person, one of the Deputy Foreign Ministers -- Mr. Gonzalez Galdez from Mexico. The Foreign Minister made it clear to me that he was authorized to be a full participant in the meeting. He was not required to say anything if he had nothing to say, but he was fully authorized to be a participant. So whether they want to call him an observer or call him a participant, you'll have to ask them. But our understanding is he's coming with full authority as a Deputy Foreign Minister.

Mexico has an interesting approach to civilian control of their Defense Ministry. They do not have a civilian Defense Minister. In fact Minister Cervantes does not have the Navy under him. The Navy is a separate institution in Mexico. So what they have done is they have organized an approach whereby the Foreign Ministry serves as staff to the President, civilian staff to the President, with the Foreign Minister having a special role in this in terms of the civilian oversight of the military in Mexico. That's why you see their Foreign Ministry providing the representatives here. Just like the Mexican Deputy, another Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Veriledo, is the co- chairman with me of the bilateral working group with Mexico, even though he's in the Foreign Ministry, because he has this responsibility.

Q: Do you know if there's going to be any high ranking military official attending this meeting from Mexico as part of the delegation?

A: I don't believe so.

Q: When you say new risks that are going to be addressed in this meeting, do you, are you thinking about like armed groups like the ones that we have in Mexico, will that be something that will be addressed as part of the risks that the Latin American countries face?

A: I don't think so. These are internal problems, so they're not problems that cut across... Obviously they'll be on people's minds, and certainly to the extent there are terrorist groups, terrorism will be discussed, and terrorism as a risk and a threat, but certainly not particular groups in this sense.

Q: Is this going to be the forum for unleashing this new arms sales policy that's been in the works for a long time? And secondly, on Panama, is there going to be any substantive talks with Valaderez about what facilities the United States might want to remain in and the ones that maybe Panama will be amenable...

A: No, and no.

Q: You don't expect any substantive talks with the Panamanians about...

A: I think there will be some substantive discussion about the future, but it's a courtesy call. There's always substantive discussion when you have a President and an American Cabinet Officer there, but I don't think the substantive discussion is intended to go beyond the discussions that we've had in other channels. It will be merely clarification of those discussions. There's no attempt here for this to be a furthering of any process with Panama. It's really a courtesy call.

Q: The arms sales policy is not ready?

A: The arms sales policy is, as you know, a fairly complex question, and I think several of us have been trying to say for awhile that there's not really here an effort to change the fundamental arms sale policy which has been established in a presidential decision document a year and a half ago or so. I think that's going to continue to govern things. So nobody's anticipating, now or in the future, a change to be announced in that sense. We're looking at our rules, we're looking at our process, and we're continuing to work on both the criteria that we apply to requests and the process.

At the moment, we don't have specific cases that are particularly impacted by our process. But I will say that the principles that others in the Administration have articulated are widely agreed. We are very appreciative of the change that has occurred in the region. The fact that we now deal, with one exception, with democratic governments, with governments to continue to have legitimate defense needs, they have severe economic constraints in many cases, in terms of the size of their budget, and they have very limited missions that make sense for their defense forces compared to certainly some of the broader missions that a country like the United States has to deal with.

So there are limits there, and therefore, a policy of restraint is an appropriate one. We don't have any interest ourselves in seeing arms races in the hemisphere or any tensions arise out of any legitimate armaments modernization processes which will inevitably occur as time goes on.

So what's at issue with regard to Latin America inside the Administration is merely the details of the process by which we listen to any requests that might or might not show up and deal with them and the particular criteria that one applies in each circumstance.

Whether we have anything new to say on those at this meeting or not, I doubt that we will have much new to say, but we may want to clarify something.

Q: A little bit earlier, (inaudible)... If I understand what you're saying then, the policy probably would not be changed.

A: The question is to what's the policy and what's the mechanics of the policy here. And trying to not get into too much of a scholastic debate over the words here.

I think the reality is that the situation is changing in the hemisphere. Their militaries are aging, and in some cases some of these countries face modernization decisions not today, not even tomorrow, not even probably next year, but in the coming several years that were inevitable because they are running out the end of the natural lifetime of some of their major systems. We see no reason why the United States should exclude itself from this process. We think it will be healthy for us to be involved in this process. We want to be involved and engaged in this process. So that's different from the situation we've faced in the past.

The second thing that's different, of course, is that these countries are now democracies, and they are developing civilian control structures for their military.

The third thing that's changed, of course, is the nature of the threat has changed. Certainly the narco-terrorist threat has increased over recent years, and finally the Cold War is over, so whatever affect that might have had has ended. So all of these are changes, and therefore, we need to reevaluate the way we deal with this situation in light of those changes, and that's what we're doing. I think we will at some point -- my guess is probably not at this meeting -- but at some point in the not too distant future, be able to articulate more consistently and more thoroughly for all of you how we want to deal with all those things.

I'm going to do one more question on this subject, and then I'm happy to talk about other subjects, but this is not going to be part of the DMA, so since this is going to be a backgrounder on the DMA, I don't have a whole lot more to say about that. I just want to warn you guys, I'm going to pick at random... And since you took the first question, it would be terribly unfair for me to give you the very last.

Q: I understand the policies in the Defense Department supports (inaudible) arms embargo in Latin America...

A: there is no arms embargo on Latin America. We export a considerable number of arms to Latin America.

Q: (Inaudible.) The policies under the (inaudible) of the State Department right now. The other thing is, if you can comment on Chile. Because actually, you talk about arms races and Chile is the only country that wants to buy arms right now.

A: I don't want to debate that in too much detail, but I think there's a lot of wrong things in there.

First of all, the United States has been exporting a couple of hundred million dollars worth of arms to Latin America each year, consistently, number one. Number two, you'll have to ask the countries involved, but it's certainly our understanding from informal discussions that quite a few of the countries face the need for additional equipment. In fact we're working with Mexico as it is to deal with some of their needs in the counter- narcotics area, and we have described some of the programs we have there. The Brazilians have needs. All the countries have some needs in these areas. In fact countries are making purchases all the time. They're buying equipment and they are modernizing their forces. So I think this process is going forward.

Let me go back and take a few more questions on other aspects of the DMA because like I said, this is...

Q: ...regarding the narco-terrorist threat. The United States in Williamsburg, I remember that expressed in the creation of a task force, military continental force to combat drug trafficking and investigation. Are you going to use the same thing again to promote this idea, or is this something that has finally being discarded?

A: I have to admit I was not at the Williamsburg meeting. I don't believe it's ever been the policy of the United States to promote the idea of a combined task force for counter-narcotics. It's certainly not been our policy, to my knowledge, ever to do that. And it's certainly not our policy now to do that. We believe cooperation is the approach that makes sense here, not combined efforts or combined operations, but just cooperation is the right way to go on that.

Q: With this (inaudible) of change, will we find more special operations soldiers on the ground in Central and South America?

A: I don't know. I don't think so. In the counter- narcotics area, I think it's crucial to remember that the military everywhere in the world can at best be in a support position. This is, inherently, for each country, a law enforcement matter. These narcotics organizations are criminal organizations. They're not sovereign states. There are things that the military can do. Each country has a different approach to how it uses its military and the extent to which it uses its military. We have very strict restrictions, for example, in the United States on how we do it, as do some other countries internally. So I don't think you'll see a big shift in this, but I do think that in terms of protecting borders, countering interdiction, in some cases using the military for eradication and some of these other matters, that they can be of help, and certainly we'll want to do that.

Again, at the ministerial level in Bariloche, there will not be a lot of focus on the mechanics of how to do this, but there will be some discussions, of course, about this threat and the problem.

Q: There was some sense at Williamsburg at the lack of official statements coming out at the end of it reflected inability to resolve certain disagreements and so on. Do you expect statements to come out of at the end this meeting, or are you just...

A: No. We don't expect statements, and we don't think it's appropriate for this kind of a consultative meeting which is its purpose, to try to issue statements, because it is merely meant to be a consultative opportunity for these Ministers.

By the way, we did not have that sense at all after Williamsburg at the time, and we don't have that sense now. Everyone was very pleased with Williamsburg and there were, of course, in the press statement that was issued and in the wrap- up, quite a bit said about Williamsburg and the Williamsburg Principles were enunciated, and we published the reports of the three working groups in here. So there was a lot said about the substance, but there was not some attempt to issue some kind of an official statement from the meeting. And there will be an attempt here to do the same sort of thing. To describe the substance, talk about the discussions, and if there are consensus views that need to be expressed, to get those things expressed. But this is a consultative meeting, so that's the reason that we'll have that kind of focus.

Q: How much of the bill is the U.S. picking up? At the last meeting in Williamsburg, the U.S. said it would help Argentina with the discussion. What's the dollar value of the U.S. contribution?

A: I don't know. Let me ask ______ if we know. If not, we can get you an answer.

Q: What percentage anyway?

Assistant: I don't think we're making any kind of financial contribution to the conference itself. The attendees, to a certain point, will be paying for their own...

Senior Defense Official: I think that's it. I think we're just pretty much paying our own expenses. In fact we, the Argentines have done a terrific job. We have, on a couple of occasions, made clear our willingness to consider requests for specific assistance in kind or whatever, and they've been able to do it without any additional material assistance from us. So I don't think it goes beyond pretty much whatever our delegation costs. Even there, we're not paying for all of it because they're buying us a lot of nice meals and paying for part of that on their nickel.

Q: On a different subject. Were the 20 helicopters already delivered to Mexico?

A: No, we have not delivered, the 20 that were notified. No, and the notification period has not quite yet expired on those, so we have a few more days to go before the notification period has expired with Congress, and then we'll work the details out with the Mexicans on how to...

Q: What is the status of the additional 53 helicopters requested last month? Do you know...

A: Yes. They've been notified. They were notified. They were officially notified...

Q: And there were unconfirmed reports that they had asked...

A: ...That can be done under the fiscal year '97 authorities. So that means it's a little bit complicated, and I apologize to the rest of you. I'll just clarify this one thing for my Mexican friends. That means because the Congress actually adjourned here in order to get the number of notification days in after the beginning of the fiscal year, we have to wait until the Congress reconvenes and the clock runs some more before we have the authority to do that, and there will be some hearings and so forth on the additional ones, I'm sure. So those won't happen until next year because we'll have to wait for the Congress to come back, but they are officially notified.

Q: There were also reports that the Senate subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere has asked the State Department to hold the request.

A: I think only in the sense that it gets... Whether they ask for it to be held or not, just under the rules, my understanding is it gets held until they come back.

Q: From the 100 million (inaudible) United Nations was going to give to Central America, Mexico and South America to fight the drugs, how much longer is (inaudible)?

A: I apologize. I just don't know the details of that.

Press: Thank you very much.