INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency). I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in the discussion of drug related adverse events, FDA's role in
addressing these events, and what the Agency is doing and can do to reduce their occurrence. As you may know, one of Dr. Jane E. Henney's first initiatives after being sworn in as Commissioner of Food and Drugs was to establish a Task Force1 to evaluate the system for managing the various risks of FDA-approved medical products. This Task Force focused particularly on FDA's part in that system. As a result of this evaluation, the Task Force prepared a report for the Commissioner in May 1999, entitled "Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use".2 The Agency has been proactive in addressing this issue and recognizes that FDA is but one of many players that can and must have an impact on the safety of healthcare in the United States (U.S.). As you may know, in
addition to FDA, there are many other Federal agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services, such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Healthcare Financing Administration, that are concerned with the issue of medical errors and have relevant reporting systems in place.
Today I would like to address how FDA sees its role in this
complex system of managing medical risks. I will describe the
problem as we see it, explain FDA's historic role and how that
role has evolved in the changing circumstances of healthcare,
particularly the increasing use of pharmaceuticals. Finally, I
would like to present recommendations made by our Task Force on
Risk Management, some of which the Agency is in the process of
adopting. While today's hearing is focusing on adverse events
associated with human drugs, I would like to note that use of
other medical products such as medical devices and biologicals,
also involves risk.
In addition, it is important to note that the President's
Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 budget, which will be released on Monday,
February 7, 2000, will aggressively deal with the issue of
medical errors and adverse events.
The Problem
There is no doubt that the availability of medications to
treat, diagnose, and prevent disease has brought great benefit.
Many previously fatal diseases - such as tuberculosis and
certain cancers--are now curable. Other potentially fatal
conditions, such as diabetes and severe high blood pressure are
controllable, as are other serious conditions such as epilepsy
and rheumatoid arthritis. Medicines are available to help
prevent deaths from stroke or heart attacks, improve the
quality and longevity of life in patients infected with HIV,
and even to reduce the risk of certain cancers. Finally, a
whole array of drugs are available to prevent or ease the
symptoms of the many less serious problems that affect us all
from stomach upsets and sunburn to colds and headache. But all
these benefits come at a cost.
No drug is 100 percent safe; no pharmacologically active
medicine exists that does not have side effects. These side
effects can, and often do, lead to harm in certain people, and
thus decrease the overall personal and societal benefit from
medicines. Today's discussion involves both understanding the
current system for managing the risks of these side effects, as
well as estimating their impact on the public health.
A major obstacle to our understanding of these important issues
is the lack of a common understanding and terminology for the
various types of bad outcomes that can occur during medical
care. As the General Accounting Office (GAO) points out in its
report being released today, "Adverse Drug Events: The
Magnitude of Health Risk is Uncertain Because of Limited Incidence Data," and as was also discussed by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in their recent document on medical errors, "To
Err is Human," the lack of agreed upon definitions makes
comparisons between reports and studies quite difficult. I
would like to discuss some of the definitions I will use as
part of this testimony.
I will use the term "adverse event" to refer to a bad or
undesired outcome that occurs during healthcare. An adverse
event can be caused by many things, including a patient's
disease process, a side effect of a drug, poor hospital care or
improper surgical technique, or even some random happening
unrelated to healthcare. As such, the term "adverse event"
does not itself have any cause-and-effect implication -- it
simply describes some sort of harm that occurs during
healthcare. In contrast, "adverse drug reaction" (ADR or side
effect) connotes some potential relationship between the
undesired outcome and a medication. One of the tasks of FDA's
safety evaluators is to determine the probability that a reported adverse event is actually an adverse drug reaction. Often, a definite cause-and-effect relationship cannot be
established. Often the best one can do with the available data
is conclude that the adverse event is "possibly" or "probably"
related to the drug (i.e., a suspected ADR). For example, some
drugs can cause liver failure; however, very ill patients can
develop liver failure for other reasons, even if they are
taking a drug known to cause liver failure in some people.
Sometimes it is simply impossible to determine with certainty
the cause of harm.
If an ADR does occur, a significant question that must be asked
relates to preventability. Some ADRs are simply not avoidable,
even with the best medical care. For example, some patients
undergoing chemotherapy for cancer will develop lowered blood
counts, causing them to be susceptible to overwhelming and,
perhaps, lethal infections. This is a very real risk of such
drugs. This very serious risk does not mean that people with
cancer should not receive chemotherapy. Rather, it is simply
the reality of the state of pharmaceutical science at the
present time. Only the further advance of biomedical science
will foster the development of safer, more targeted therapies
that will lessen the incidence of such unavoidable side
effects.
In contrast, many ADRs are avoidable if the best standards of
medical care and available medical knowledge are communicated
and utilized. Preventable ADRs can be classified into a number
of categories depending on their cause.
A defective drug product can cause ADRs. Currently, in the
U.S., few injuries or fatalities are attributable to this
cause, due to pharmaceutical manufacturers' compliance with and
FDA enforcement of FDA quality standards for the manufacture,
holding, and shipping of drugs.
A second preventable cause of ADRs is "medication error." In
this testimony, "medication error" refers to mistakes in the
medication prescribing and dispensing process -- for example, in
calculating dosage, reading a prescriber's handwriting, understanding a verbal medication order, dispensing the proper medication, or administering the medication. (Some groups,
including the GAO in its report, use a broader definition of
"medication error.") Many studies in the U.S. have documented
that a large number of medication errors occur annually. Many
of these cause no harm, either because they are caught before
the patient gets the medicine, or because the mistake is
harmless, in the end, to the patient. Nevertheless, a
substantial number lead to ADRs.
A third cause of preventable ADRs was referred to in the recent
IOM report as "medical error" (note: the IOM report also
included medication errors in this category). Broadly, this
means an outcome that could have been avoided had optimal
medical care been provided. Medical errors include
misdiagnosis, improper choice of treatment, failure to avoid
drug interactions with other products, failure to monitor
therapy properly, inadequate recognition of or response to side
effects, and so forth. Categorization of an ADR as due to a
medical error can be straightforward, but in many cases is a
matter of judgement.
A final cause of preventable ADRs is patient or consumer error.
This may be due to failure to understand instructions (failure
to fully instruct the patient is a medical error) or failure to
follow instructions (for example, giving one's own prescription
medications to a friend or family member).
Whether an ADR is preventable or not is one way of looking at
these events. Another important way of analyzing ADRs is
whether or not they were expected (that is, whether or not the
ADR was previously identified). This categorization of ADRs
relates to scientific uncertainty and the limits of our ability
to predict.
A degree of uncertainty always exists about the benefits as
well as the risks of all drugs. As the GAO report points out,
medical scientists may find major new uses for drugs that have
been marketed for decades. Likewise, unexpected side effects
(those not included in the product's label) may not be detected
for many years after a product is first marketed, particularly
if the side effect is rare or unusual. More frequent adverse
reactions (both serious and trivial) are usually detected in
clinical trials before drugs go on the market. However, these
premarket studies conducted for drug approval typically expose
only 2-5,000 patients, many of them for fairly short durations
of time. These are not enough subjects to reliably detect a
type of ADR that occurs only once in 5,000 or more exposures.
Once a drug is approved, it may be administered to millions of
people the first year, and thus previously unknown, rare types
of ADRs may occur. In addition, despite a strong attempt by
FDA to broaden the patient population in clinical trials, there
will inevitably be many circumstances of use once a drug is
marketed that are quite different from the premarket testing.
Drugs may be used in different populations (children, pregnant
women), or with combinations of different drugs or other
products, or for different conditions (so-called "off-label"
use) than those evaluated in the clinical trials. There is
more uncertainty about both risks and benefits in these less-studied circumstances, and unexpected ADRs may arise. Although
serious, unexpected adverse reactions represent only a very
small proportion of the overall scope of ADRs, they are
historically particularly unacceptable to the public and, if
not properly understood, could undermine confidence in the drug
approval process.
The definitions discussed above are not standardized and
different meanings have been used in various studies and
analyses of the problem. Understanding of the epidemiology of
the problem has similar challenges that limit our knowledge of
the scope of harm caused by ADRs.
Scope of the Problem
The GAO report describes what is known about the scope of ADRs.
I believe the report accurately describes current knowledge,
including the major gaps and deficiencies. Although the
published estimates of drug-related deaths and injuries vary
widely, all point to a national problem of very serious
magnitude. It is generally agreed that tens of thousands of
people die every year from adverse effects of the medicines
they are taking. It is estimated that 7,000 people die yearly
from medication errors (as defined in this testimony) alone.
Because most ADRs are not fatal, the overall personal and
economic cost to society is much larger than the mortality
figures alone would indicate. For example, it is estimated
that up to ten percent of hospital admissions to medical wards
are drug-related, and 50 percent of those are preventable.
Using a consensus panel method, Bootman et al estimated that
the cost in the U.S. from ADRs incurred in the outpatient
setting exceeds 75 billion dollars annually. However, as noted
by the GAO, all the existing literature is fraught with
methodological problems. It is difficult to compare rates
among studies because of differing definitions. There is a
paucity of information about ADRs in outpatient or nursing home
settings.
Very little is known about what proportion of all ADRs are
preventable. However, it is certain - and it is important to
note - that the vast majority of ADRs referred to in the
various studies cited by GAO are side effects that have already
been identified, recognized and are described in the product
label, that is, they are expected ADRs. Given the scope of the
problem, and its potential to increase with the ever-growing
use of pharmaceuticals and the aging of the population, a
mechanism for systematic data collection is urgently needed to
gain a comprehensive understanding of the incidence and scope
of ADRs. Current data systems are not adequate to define the
scope of the problem.
FDA's Role in Preventing ADRs
As described in FDA's Report "Managing the Risks of Medical
Product Use," the U.S. has an extensive system for managing drug risks and maximizing benefits. Participants in the system include FDA, other government agencies, healthcare practitioners, patients, State accrediting boards, healthcare facilities, professional societies, academic centers, and increasingly, healthcare plans and payers.
Traditionally, one of FDA's primary roles within this system
has been in the premarket phase. FDA sets requirements for the
quality, safety, efficacy, and labeling of pharmaceuticals and
reviews marketing applications against these requirements.
FDA only approves a drug for marketing if the product's
manufacturing quality is reliable and if the scientific data
from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials demonstrate
the safety and efficacy of the product.
After a drug is approved, the prescriber (the "learned
intermediary") assumes primary responsibility for managing the
product risks (and benefits) for the individual patient because
of his/her specific knowledge of the unique circumstances
surrounding each individual patient. In this situation, FDA's
role has been to assist the prescriber by requiring that all
risks and benefits are honestly described in the label and
promotional materials, and to assure, through postmarketing
surveillance of reports of potential new safety information,
that this new information about risks is relayed promptly to
clinicians. To minimize risks, product labeling often
describes how to select patients, how to select and modify the
dose schedule for individual patients, how to avoid interacting
treatments, how to monitor for drug toxicity, and what measures
to use to avoid or mitigate drug toxicity. FDA and
manufacturers rely on practitioners to prescribe products with
full knowledge of the prescribing information and limitations
detailed in the product labeling. Likewise, practitioners
presume their patients will use their medications according to
directions given. However, we know this does not always
happen.
FDA's other traditional primary role within this overall system
is its postmarketing surveillance systems for detecting rare,
serious, unexpected ADRs (i.e., serious ADRs not described in
the label). These include, for example, adverse reactions not
previously observed, increased severity of previously
anticipated risks, side effects resulting from previously
unknown drug interactions or drug effects in particular
populations.
FDA postmarketing surveillance programs have not routinely
addressed the epidemiology of known (expected) drug side
effect. In addition, ADRs resulting from serious errors in the
practice of pharmacy, medicine, or nursing have been considered
the purview of the State regulatory boards, not the FDA.
However, medication errors resulting from similarities in
product names or confusing packaging of products have been
areas of increased FDA oversight in recent years. There is no
national program devoted to the study and understanding of
known adverse drug reactions (expected). The absence of such a
program has led to the dearth of standard definitions and
reliable data as described above and in the GAO report.
Current FDA Systems
Although FDA's current systems are designed to focus primarily
on rare, unexpected adverse events, this activity, nonetheless,
represents a significant undertaking and resource commitment.
The following is a brief description of the highlights of the
postmarketing medical products safety surveillance programs
currently operated by FDA.
Reporting Systems FDA maintains several databanks that are
populated with reports from consumers and healthcare
professionals of individual cases of suspected adverse
reactions involving medical products. A report does not mean
that the medical product definitely caused the reaction;
rather, is simply means that the reporter (whomever that may
be) believes that there is at least the possibility that the
medical product caused the reaction. It is not uncommon to
have duplicate reports involving the same "case" as it may be
reported by the patient, by a pharmacist, and by the patient's
prescriber. Thus, in these systems, the number of "reports"
does not necessarily equal the number of "cases." FDA must
carefully scrutinize the reports and often calls reporters and
practitioners back for further information in order to most
fully understand the report and in order to determine as
accurately as possible whether a new report is actually a
duplicate of an old report.
These reports come to FDA in one of two ways. First,
individuals (both consumers and healthcare professionals)
report directly to FDA via letters, faxes, telephone calls,
emails, or directly over computer modems. These are called
"direct reports" and can include anything from a report of a
serious, unexpected ADR to a report of a well-known, trivial
ADR. Approximately 6 percent (approx. 16,000) of the reports
FDA presently receives annually are obtained in this manner.
Second, manufacturers are required to submit to FDA certain
voluntary reports they receive from consumers and healthcare
professionals. Manufacturer reports account for approximately
90 percent of reports received by FDA. The requirements for
these submissions are delineated in FDA regulations (Title 21,
Code of Federal Regulations section 314.80) and are generally
consistent with reporting requirements agreed to in various
international forums. Reports of cases that represent serious,
unexpected ADRs (approximately 30 percent of the reports
received annually) must be submitted to FDA within 15 calendar
days of the manufacturer becoming aware of it. As illustrated
in Attachment 1 (enclosed), the number of serious, unexpected
reports has risen dramatically over the last several years.
FDA has worked closely with counterpart regulatory agencies in
the European Union, Japan, and Canada and with the innovator
pharmaceutical industry to develop reporting standards (for
both content and electronic formatting) so that these reports
can be submitted more expeditiously in the very near future.
The Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) is FDA's new adverse
event database for drugs and therapeutic biological products
described above. It includes about two million reports to
date, including approximately 261,000 reports received in Calendar Year 1999 and we expect to receive 345,000 reports
annually by 2001. FDA safety evaluators, epidemiologists, and
medical and statistical review officers use the data from AERS
to identify serious, rare, unexpected adverse events or
increased incidence of various reactions. When a "signal" of a
potential adverse reaction is detected, the review team reviews
available data from AERS and other sources (other databases,
other study reports, counterpart agencies in other countries,
academic centers) to try to determine more definitively the
relationship between the harm and a medical product. Based on
the results of the evaluations, FDA has several tools for
managing the new risk including requesting further definitive
studies from the manufacturer of the product; disseminating new
risk information via Internet, Dear Healthcare Professional
letters, Public Health Advisories; revising labeling to add new
information or make information more prominent via so-called
"black boxes"; requiring formal risk management plans from
companies; restricted distribution schemes; required patient
registries; required written patient informed consent prior to
use of the product; MedGuides or other patient oriented
information leaflets; or withdrawal of the product from the
market.
As with its predecessor system, AERS was never intended or
designed to be a registry of all suspected adverse reactions
that occur to all Americans with all pharmaceutical products.
The system is designed to detect rare, serious, unexpected drug
reactions that cannot be detected in routine premarketing
clinical trials. Since 1961, FDA's surveillance systems have
performed this function extremely well. They are, however, by
design, not able to calculate the incidence of ADRs or provide
a national overview of the scope of the ADR problem.
MedWatch. In June 1993, FDA initiated a new program called MedWatch. Through the MedWatch program, FDA encourages consumers and healthcare practitioners to report suspected ADRs
that are serious and unexpected either directly to FDA or to
the manufacturers. A major message from MedWatch continues to
be that such reporting, although currently voluntary, is a
responsibility of all healthcare professionals. In addition, the MedWatch program has established MedWatch Partner collaborations with several hundred consumer and healthcare
professional organizations in this country and internationally.
Through these collaborations, FDA is able to quickly provide
feedback to specific organizations and their members when new
risk information is learned about drugs that are of particular
interest to those in that organization. This intake and
feedback loop on new risk information is an integral component
of FDA's overall management scheme for communicating new
information about risks associated with FDA-regulated products.
Clear and effective communication about risk is a key component
in successful risk management. FDA is increasing our
activities in this area to promote an effective exchange of
information with all responsible partners.
The Drug Quality Reporting System (DQRS). The DQRS receives
reports of deviations from good manufacturing practices (GMPs)
that occur during the manufacturing, shipping, or storage of
prescription or over-the-counter (OTC) drug products. Drug
quality concerns include a number of hazards, which may be due
to improper formulation, packaging, or labeling. In FY1999,
2,050 reports were received resulting in the initiation of
eight recalls. Most of the recalls were due to inappropriate
labels being placed on products or other specific problems with
the manufacturing of the product. Manufacturers of
prescription medical products are required to submit reports
when certain problems in manufacturing occur. FDA field
personnel inspect the manufacturers to ensure that they file
these reports as required by regulations.
Medication Error Reports. FDA also receives reports of
medication errors from consumers and healthcare practitioners
directly or via the manufacturers involving prescription drugs,
generic drugs, and OTC drugs. Medication errors can occur when
prescribing, dispensing, or administering a product. Common
causes of medication errors include confusion in the labeling
of products, poor communication, patient misunderstanding, and
ambiguities in product names or directions for use. Medication error reports are also
voluntarily forwarded to FDA from the United States
Pharmacopoeia and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices.
The Agency maintains a central database for all reports
involving an actual or potential medication error. The
database currently contains some 15,000 reports.
Additional data sources. The "signals" detected from the
reports described above are often not definitive enough for
drawing conclusions and taking action. FDA needs access to
other data sources to aid in analysis and support regulatory
decisions. Currently, under a grant program, FDA has
cooperative agreements with several investigators who have
access to large healthcare administrative databases wherein
product use is linked to subsequent diagnoses, hospitalizations, and other adverse events. Through this arrangement, FDA can conduct a limited number of cohort and
case-control studies conducted as needed to investigate a
specific safety issue. In addition, the Agency can obtain data
on the extent of use of pharmaceuticals through contracts. The
Agency is a long-time user of the National Disease and
Therapeutic Index (NDTI), the National Prescription Audit Plus
(NPA), Provider Perspective (PP), and Retail Perspective (RP)
for postmarketing surveillance activities.3 FDA must rely on
multiple approaches because no single approach is sufficiently
comprehensive to permit full evaluation of all-important
problems.
Agency Infrastructure. In the winter of 1998, CDER expanded an
existing division to create a new of Office of Postmarketing
Drug Risk Assessment (OPDRA), to reflect the increasing
importance of postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment.
The purpose of this office is to plan, direct, and collaborate
in the conduct of epidemiological studies to detect, explore
and confirm safety signals, assess risk, and provide oversight
for the monitoring of medication errors and other drug
surveillance strategies.
OPDRA involvement with the reviewing divisions begins even
prior to the approval of the drug product. In meetings with
the review division several months prior to planned approval of
the product, OPDRA staff and staff from the review division
share information on the product and concerns about
outstanding, unresolved safety issues. Plans for the oversight
and surveillance of the product during its first year of
marketing are made and specific postmarketing studies to be
requested of the manufacturer are agreed. Once the product is
marketed, OPDRA and the reviewing division meets on an ad hoc
basis for emergent safety issue and often on a routine basis to
discuss emerging safety concerns. Formal consults are provided
the reviewing division on safety concerns with suggestions on
how the new information might be conveyed and any new risk
managed.
For serious and life-threatening concerns, a CDER-wide team
with representation from the reviewing division, OPDRA, the
appropriate Office of Drug Evaluation and the Office of the
Center Director is usually assembled to decide what regulatory
action, if any, is appropriate. In addition to OPDRA
personnel, individuals in FDA's CDER Office of Compliance
operate an inspection program to assure manufacturers'
compliance with reporting requirements.
Responsibilities of Other Parts of the Healthcare System.
FDA must constantly balance the public desire for access to as
many promising therapies as possible with the risks associated
with both unapproved therapies, as well as products that have
been approved. In addition to tools the Agency may use in
allowing a product on the market, we also depend on other parts
of the healthcare delivery system to monitor and prevent risks
as well. For example, in July 1998, FDA approved thalidomide
for marketing as a treatment for erythema nodosum leprosum
(ENL), a serious inflammatory condition in patients with
Hansen's disease (also known as leprosy). At the same time FDA
imposed unprecedented restrictions on the drug's distribution.
Because of its well-known potential for causing birth defects,
thalidomide is among the most tightly restricted drugs ever to
be marketed in the U.S. Thus far we believe this system of
restrictions has worked as planned. However, it is a resource
intense system that requires the ongoing vigilance and commitment of not only FDA and the
manufacturer, but also patients, pharmacies, the national
patient registry program, payers, and the prescribers.
FDA Task Force on Risk Management.
In its May 10, 1999, FDA's Task Force on Risk Management issued
its report. The Task Force found that FDA's postmarketing
surveillance and risk assessment programs are, for the most
part, accomplishing the purposes for which they were designed.
However, it noted that these systems were not aimed at
understanding the epidemiology and root causes of known side
effects. The Task Force issued a number of findings and
recommendations directed at improving the current systems for
preventing adverse events. These included:
Premarket Review Programs
The Task Force found no evidence that drugs reviewed under the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) has resulted in higher
rates of postmarketing serious, unexpected adverse reactions.
In fact, they found that rates of serious adverse reactions
identified after approval were lower for drugs reviewed under
PDUFA. Regardless of that positive finding, they did offer
recommendations to enhance the application of FDA's quality
control system.
- Initiate steps to have each Center establish separate QA/QC
units to support the QA/QC system as a normal part of all
activities;
- Ensure and document ongoing professional education and
current core competency training for all reviewers;
- Complete the Good Review Practice (GRP) documents and keep
them current; and
- Systematically analyze significant postmarketing events and
incorporate them into GRP as lessons learned.
Postmarket Surveillance Programs
The Task Force found that FDA's postmarket surveillance
programs were performing as intended. A number of enhancements
to the current system were recommended.
- Rapidly complete the AERS system;
- Integrate existing postmarketing information systems so
analytic tools, data entry, and editing can be uniformly
applied, and all information is readily available to every
reviewer;
- Enhance and intensify surveillance of newly marketed
products;
- Enhance clinical and laboratory studies to develop new
methods to improve product safety; and
- Develop new methodological tools for improving inference from
available databases.
CDER is in the process of implementing these recommendations,
which will also be responsive to the recommendations of the
Department of Health and Human Services' Inspector General in
her December 1999 report.
FDA's future role in pharmaceutical risk management.
If the findings of the IOM's report on medical errors are
accepted, it must be concluded that the current U.S. system for
pharmaceutical risk management is not achieving a level of
safety acceptable to our society. Unless targeted improvements
are made, the situation is likely to worsen over the next
decade. The increasing prominence of pharmaceuticals in
healthcare, the increasing complexity of drug products and of
the healthcare delivery system, and the aging of our population
will all combine to increase the difficulties of safe drug
prescribing, dispensing, and consumption and increase the
complexities of an effective risk management and risk
communication system.
While policymakers will undoubtedly feel spurred to action by
these reports, all would do well to remember a cardinal
principle of medicine - diagnosis before treatment. As pointed
out by the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF), official
reaction to medical errors has long been a counterproductive
course of "blaming and shaming" (finding some person or entity
who could be held accountable, and holding them up to public
criticism). Such actions mislead the public and others into
believing the problem is "fixed" when the root causes have not
even been recognized, much less appropriately addressed. FDA's
drug approval process has been part of this dynamic for many
years. For example, a drug withdrawal or relabeling most often
indicates a safety net that is working properly. A realistic
understanding of the pharmaceutical risk management system,
including recognition that all drugs will have adverse effects,
is essential to formulating effective policy.
Pharmaceutical safety is best understood within a systems
perspective. While FDA's premarket and review processes play
an important part in the overall system, they are by no means
the only factors in pharmaceutical risk management. FDA's
safety assessment is predicated upon an understanding that the
healthcare delivery system will be able to manage identified
risks, provided those risks are reasonable. If the Agency
misjudges the ability of delivery systems to manage a
particular problem, then the safety of the product will be
compromised. The lack of adequate data on ADRs in various
settings means that FDA has to rely on assertions rather than
data in determining how well the healthcare delivery system can
manage all types of pharmaceutical risks.
Improving the safety of pharmaceuticals will require a
concerted and systematic effort by all participants in the
medical care delivery system -- including manufacturers, FDA,
State and other Federal agencies, healthcare professionals,
healthcare facilities, patients, consumers, and care delivery
systems. In its report on "Managing the Risk of Medical
Product Use," FDA put forth a number of options that the Agency
could pursue to improve pharmaceutical safety and risk
management. As a first step in evaluating these options, FDA
is engaging in extensive dialogue with the stakeholders in this
process. In March, FDA, in conjunction with the NPSF, will
hold a national workshop for representatives of patient and
consumer groups. We believe that the voices of patients and
consumers must be heard as policy in this area is shaped. FDA
is also participating actively in the pharmaceutical safety
initiative of the NPSF. This activity includes representatives
of all groups involved in or impacted by the safety of
medicines. Finally, we feel the discussions and activities
resulting from the publication of the IOM report on medical
errors will do much to inform the debate. FDA stands ready to
play an even more active role in the assurance of drug safety
through its risk detection, analysis, management, and
communication programs. However, it must be recognized that
our resources are severely constrained even within the context
of our current activities.
Conclusion.
Mr. Chairman, medical products provide great benefit to the
public, but they can also cause injury - sometimes preventable,
sometimes not, sometimes expected, sometimes not. FDA and the
many other participants in healthcare delivery act to maximize
benefit and minimize risk, but often the actions of each of the
participants are not effectively integrated. FDA looks forward
to working collaboratively with all other parties involved in
the healthcare delivery system to address this very critical
issue. And, of course, FDA will conduct its activities to
reduce medical errors in a way that protects patient privacy.
We are proud that FDA-approved medicines are considered to be
among the safest in the world and to the extent we can, we want
to fulfill our mandate to assure that drugs marketed in the
U.S. offer patients real benefits in as safe a manner as
possible.
1 The Task Force was led by Drs. Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Kathy Zoon, Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), and Bruce Burlington, Former Director, Center for Device Evaluation and Research (CDRH). Members included representatives from CBER, CDER, CDRH, the Office of the Chief Counsel, the Office of the Commissioner, and MedWatch.
2This report is available on FDA's website at www.fda.gov.
3FDA accesses these databases through IMS Health Products and Services.
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