Good morning, madame chairman, and members of the Subcommittee. I am
Richard Klausner, Director of the National Cancer Institute (NCI). I am pleased
to testify before you today about NCI's role in radiation research, specifically
about studies of exposure to Iodine 131 and its relationship to thyroid cancer. In
my testimony I will describe NCI's mission, the process for scientific discovery,
the management of complex scientific studies, the NCI study of I-131 exposures,
our role in studies associated with the aftermath of the Chornobyl accident, and
actions I have taken to strengthen oversight, management, and communication of
NCI's radiation studies.
Introduction
The National Cancer Institute has a long and distinguished history in radiation
research including studies of how radiation is involved in the causes of cancer and
how it is used most effectively in the treatment of cancer. Today, NCI is staffed
with several of the world's leaders in the field of radiation epidemiology and
radiation dosimetry. When Public Law 97-414 instructed the Department of
Health and Human Services to estimate the thyroid doses of iodine-131 received
by people exposed to fall-out from the Nevada nuclear tests, NCI was asked to
take on this responsibility. In October 1997, I testified before the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and
Education and presented the results of that study. Following that hearing, and at
the request of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Institute of Medicine (IOM) reviewed
the data and prepared a report entitled "Exposure of the American People to
Iodine-131 from Nevada Nuclear-Bomb Tests: Review of the National Cancer
Institute Report and Public Health Implications." Their report focused on (1)
assessing the soundness of the NCI analyses and estimates including those
developed separately from the main report, (2) the risk of thyroid
disease from iodine-131 fallout, (3) evaluating the benefits and harms of
recommending a program of routine screening for thyroid cancer, and (4)
identifying strategies for communicating with the public about risks and
responses. We are in the process of carefully studying the report,
findings, and recommendations and are working with the Department of Health
and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its
Advisory Committee on Energy Related Epidemiologic Research (ACERER) to
implement their advice most effectively.
In April of 1986, a nuclear reactor accident took place at Chornobyl in Ukraine.
Following the accident, large numbers of people were exposed to iodine-131 and,
for many of them, actual measurements were made of radioactivity in their
thyroid glands. With the availability of such measurements, the Department of
Energy (DOE) felt that if a study of the exposed children in Ukraine and Belarus
could be designed and implemented, it might be extremely valuable for
determining the risk of thyroid cancer as a function of the dose of iodine-131
received. Because of NCI's experience and expertise in this field, in 1990 the
DOE asked the NCI to take responsibility for planning and working with
scientists of the then Soviet Union to develop long-term studies of health effects,
specifically in the thyroid, that might result from exposure to I-131
from the Chornobyl accident. DOE asked that Dr. Bruce Wachholz, the Chief of
our Radiation Effects Branch, manage the scientific aspects of the program. We
were pleased to be able to actively participate in this study, because of the unique
opportunity this tragic accident afforded us to complete the risk assessment of
I-131 and thyroid cancer that was called for in P.L. 97-414.
I will discuss this study in greater detail later in my testimony. Shortly after this
request, the dissolution of the Soviet Union took place, and we have subsequently
been working with the new independent governments in Belarus and Ukraine. In
close cooperation with scientific colleagues in Belarus and Ukraine, a U.S.
working group has worked with comparable working groups in each country to
develop research protocols for studies of thyroid cancer in large cohorts of
children and adolescents in both countries. These studies are now in progress.
NCI's Mission
The ultimate goal of the National Cancer Institute is to prevent or cure cancer.
The United States Congress in 1937 established the National Cancer Institute and
in 1971 reaffirmed its commitment to cancer research with the passage of the
National Cancer Act. Today, as we approach the 21st century, we can take pride
in our accomplishments, but our pride is tempered by the knowledge that we still
have much to do to achieve our goal.
We have reached a turning point in our fight against cancer. Between 1991 and
1995, the cancer death rate and the incidence rate showed their first sustained drop
since record keeping began in the 1930s. For several types of cancer - children's
cancers, breast, colon and rectal, Hodgkin's and testicular - the decreasing death
rates reflect cumulative research successes over the past several decades.
Continued advances in our knowledge base have been a vital component in the
recent decline in the cancer death rate - a decline that has translated into thousands
of lives saved. However, while the decline in the cancer death rate is evidence of
our successes and reflects the collective knowledge and technical advances
achieved, we still face an enormous challenge to more fully grasp the underlying
causes of cancer - an understanding that is the keystone of further progress. Our
success will continue to be measured in terms of fewer deaths, fewer new
cases, increased life expectancy, and improved quality of life for cancer survivors.
Our goal of a reduced cancer burden can only be achieved through continued
expansion of our knowledge base that supports the successful translation of
discoveries into treatments that benefit all people who are at risk for and who have
cancer.
Clinical Studies in an International Setting
The NCI is an institution of science, and our operations are driven by the
processes of science. The culture of science is one of continued questioning,
testing of hypotheses against evidence, critique by peers, validation of research
results, and modification and extension of results as new findings emerge from the
community of researchers. In this culture the pursuit of new knowledge must be
the primary goal.
Importantly, much scientific research is conducted in a collaborative manner.
Complex projects require the collective wisdom of multidisciplinary teams of
experts and are never performed by individuals working in isolation. Members of
these research teams provide the diverse and broad expertise that is necessary to
ask and answer major questions relating to human health.
International collaborations are particularly challenging. Culture, local customs,
and languagedifferences must be surmounted; administrative, legal, and logistical
barriers overcome; and effective communication and trust established before the
collaboration can even address its scientific goals.
Complementing scientific excellence, we must also have scientific and
administrative mechanisms that provide oversight and accountability to our
research projects and programs. Oversight of NCI activities is provided by various
groups, including the Presidentially-appointed National Cancer Advisory Board,
the Board of Scientific Counselors (for intramural research,conducted by NCI
staff), and the Board of Scientific Advisors (for extramural research). In
addition, certain individual projects, such as major clinical studies, often require
specific oversight, in the form of data monitoring committees or advisory groups.
These committees, functioning independently of those directly involved in the
project, protect the interests of the people participating in the research and provide
advice to project leaders on the future conduct of the study. They are integral to
safeguarding the scientific integrity and ethical foundations of major clinical
studies. Thus, it is crucial that the administrative and procedural requirements
associated with clinical research serve the needs of the particular project and, in
essence, be tailored to them.
The Chornobyl experience shows much about the complexity of organizing and
conducting a major clinical research study in an evolving and fluid international
context. This study is a comprehensive clinical epidemiologic investigation
requiring an effective integration of scientific, ethical, legal and regulatory
requirements in a highly volatile political environment. The project directors are
Ukrainian and Belarussian scientists, and they are studying the
incidence of thyroid cancer in residents of these two countries who were exposed
to radiation from the Chornobyl disaster. U.S. contributions include scientific
expertise, guidance, training, advice, equipment and supplies, and partial funding.
Clinical studies conducted in the U.S. must adhere to the highest ethical standards
and must guarantee that patients and subjects are fully informed of the potential
risks and benefits of their participation in the study. In this country, we have
policies and procedures, based in law and regulation, to ensure that all clinical
studies satisfy these requirements. Approval and oversight for research protocols
are vested in Institutional Review Boards (IRB) in each research center
involved in such studies, whether in the U.S. or abroad, which are responsible for
ensuring the ethical conduct of the study. In other countries, these processes often
are not as well defined; sometimes they are actually non-existent and must be
established before a clinical study can start. In newly democratic countries, the
concept of voluntary participation in a government-sponsored study is not always
clearly understood, either by the sponsors or by the participants.
In the case of U.S. involvement in the Chornobyl studies being conducted by
scientists in Ukraine and Belarus, as in other foreign countries where we are
working, all of the regulations and procedures that apply to clinical research in the
U.S. must be followed, and we therefore had to educate our foreign collaborators,
as necessary, on these processes. Our ability to effectively accomplish this
training had a direct impact on project implementation and execution, effective
management of protocol benchmarks, and realistic achievement of proposed study
outcomes.
Additionally, effective international cooperation requires significant lead time for
establishing the critical interpersonal relationships needed to work together
effectively and surmount the barriers already noted. NCI staff and their foreign
partners have successfully established these relationships, which now constitute a
firm basis for moving forward with the Chornobyl investigations.
Management
This committee has asked about how NCI manages its research programs, with
particular focus on radiation studies. My understanding of the questions and
concerns directed toward NCI is that they focus on oversight and management of
the Chornobyl study, rather than the scientific questions being asked. With the
Chornobyl project, the management approach must and does reflect the inherent
characteristics of this type of a comprehensive, complex clinical study. It is
designed to respond to changing parameters that require flexibility to address
myriad issues that will inevitably arise purely because of the nature of the study
itself. In our large, complex clinical trials, we often use a team approach to
address specific problems as they arise, while at the same time providing for
proper oversight that is removed from the day-to-day operations.
Decisions are generally made by consensus, and we draw the necessary pool of
talent, expertise, and experienced individuals in building these teams. Collective
oversight may look sloppy or chaotic to those who are used to a simpler, more
defined, hierarchical management structure, but past experience has proven that
this process works. The aforementioned model has been applied
to the Chornobyl studies in Belarus and Ukraine, although it is important to
emphasize once again that we are not running these studies. We are cooperating
with the scientists and physicians in those countries who are responsible for
carrying them out. We provide guidance, financial assistance, training, and other
assistance, but ultimately one must remember that we cannot and should not be
making unilateral decisions. As I mentioned previously, the complexity of doing
a large clinical study is further complicated by the many cultural, economic,
political, and fiscal challenges of working in these countries.
It may be helpful to try to explain why the involvement of real people in clinical
studies poses such challenges. Our "management" plan for a clinical study is the
clinical research protocol. Among other things, a clinical research protocol defines
the patient accrual rate necessary to achieve numbers that will support the
rigorous statistical analysis needed to substantiate a finding. We know from years
of experience that a certain number of patients will drop out of a
study, will be unable to complete the intervention, or that we will be unable to
enter sufficient patients on the study because of an inability to obtain a sufficient
supply of a drug, or due to a lack of interest among the cancer community for the
particular study. One example of a clinical trial that has presented major obstacles
is bone marrow transplantation, where the wide availability of this technology as
routine patient care has greatly reduced our ability to attract patient volunteers
into a research setting. Protocols have been in place for years that attempt to
compare existing treatment approaches to state of the art therapy; but because the
study design requires that patients be randomly assigned to one treatment arm or
the other, we have not been able to enter sufficient numbers of patients onto the
study. When treatments are offered outside a research setting, patients don't have
to risk randomization - they can simply choose whether or not to receive bone
marrow transplantation. Does that mean we should give up trying to get an
answer? Absolutely not. But delayed patient accrual has forced us to drastically
alter our projections as to how long it will take us to complete this incredibly
important study. Therefore, it is critical to understand the impact that patient
accrual and follow-up has on the conduct of even the most simple clinical study,
and why the management of the study must be flexible enough to accommodate
such events.
The I-131 Study: Estimating Exposure to Fallout
In late 1982, Congress enacted a requirement, as part of the Orphan Drug Act
(P.L. 97-414), that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
undertake three studies: 1) to conduct scientific research and prepare the analysis
necessary to develop valid and credible assessments of the risks of thyroid cancer
that are associated with thyroid doses of Iodine 131; 2) to develop valid and
credible methods to estimate the thyroid doses of I-131 that are received by
individuals from nuclear bomb fallout; and 3) to develop valid and credible
estimates of the exposure to I-131 that the American people received from the
Nevada atmospheric nuclear bomb tests. Parts 2 and 3 were addressed in a report
released last year by NCI. The first part of the mandate is still the subject of
ongoing research, and I will come back to this point a little later in
my testimony. However, I would like to point out that this legislation was very
specific in its charge to "...conduct scientific research and prepare analyses
necessary to develop valid and credible assessments of the exposure to Iodine
131."
Almost one year ago, I appeared before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on Labor, Health and Human Services and Related Agencies to deliver to
Congress the long-awaited NCI report, "Estimated Exposures and Thyroid Doses
Received by the American People from Iodine-131 in Fallout Following Nevada
Atmospheric Nuclear Bomb Tests." Because this committee has also expressed
interest in many of the same issues that were raised last year, I have appended to
this statement last year's testimony and ask that it be entered into the hearing
record. I said last year, and I will repeat before you today, that a more clear, more
rapid, and more aggressive plan for dissemination of the results to the public was
called for. That said, I also believe the dissemination we made was
unprecedented for a study of this magnitude and complexity. Further, we were
able to take advantage of a new technology, the Internet, to provide access to over
100,000 pages of data that would otherwise have been inaccessible to most
individuals.
As I also stated last year, this delay in publication did not have an adverse impact
on public health, a position reaffirmed recently by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
in the report issued on this topic September 1. As I mentioned in my testimony
last year, DHHS had requested that the IOM undertake a review of the findings in
NCI's I-131 report and that it make recommendations on appropriate public health
measures. To carry out this evaluation, the IOM assembled two groups of expert
scientists, clinicians, public health representatives and members of the public,
and after several months of open meetings, committee deliberations, and
consultation with other experts in many scientific and medical disciplines,
released their findings and recommendations. I was impressed with the
thoroughness and completeness of their process, the clarity of the
recommendations, and the recognition of and sensitivity toward the need for better
ways to communicate information about radiation risk to the public. This latter
point is probably the most daunting challenge we face as a federal entity: how to
provide complex information to the public in a clear, relevant, and understandable
way. We at NCI face this challenge repeatedly. For example, many women, even
those without any risk factors, fear that they will develop and die from breast
cancer. However, most women don't know that more women die from lung
cancer than breast cancer, and even more women die from heart disease than
either of these two cancers. Environmental exposures, such as pesticides, radon,
and others that are involuntary, are often viewed as being more hazardous than
voluntary exposures that we often don't even think about as being hazardous. One
of the IOM recommendations was that the Department of Health
and Human Services undertake the research necessary to determine how to most
effectively present information about risk so that it will be better understood by
the public. I agree that this is a most worthwhile endeavor, and what is learned
will almost certainly be of assistance to NCI in communicating to the public about
cancer risk in general.
Chornobyl
I would like to return to the first portion of the Congressional mandate regarding
research related to the risk of developing thyroid cancer as a result of exposure to
I-131. The best way to determine the link between exposure to I-131 and the
development of thyroid cancer is to actually find people who have been exposed
and monitor their health. In the scientific literature, it has long been questioned
whether exposure to I-131 leads to thyroid cancer. It was not until
the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the Chornobyl accident, that notable increases
in cancers began to be reported. Even after these reports began to appear,
however, we still did not know the relationship between the dose of I-131
received and the risk of developing thyroid cancer. All of our previous
"estimates" of that risk are based on extrapolating what we know about
external radiation, which is based on many assumptions and is a very crude
method for making such an estimate. NCI attempted to obtain more precise and
valid data about exposure to I-131 and thyroid cancer from the population in Utah
that was downwind from the Nevada Test Site, but these studies were
inconclusive. However, children exposed to radiation from the Chornobyl
accident may have received hundreds of times the dose received by children in the
U.S. As I noted earlier in my statement, the exposures resulting from the
Chornobyl accident, unfortunate as they were, now provide us with the
opportunity to attempt to correlate exposures to and thyroid doses from I-131 with
the onset of thyroid cancer and other health outcomes. We want to
understand the dose relationship so that we can extrapolate back to a range of
doses, specifically those in the U.S.
I have been asked many times to explain the difference between the risk estimate
that was prepared last year when we released the I-131 report and the risk
assessment we are trying to obtain from the Chornobyl study. Essentially, the
difference is that the estimate prepared last year was not based on actual exposure
of individuals to Iodine 131; it was rather an approximation of the number of
cancers one might expect based on what is known and published
about the relationship between exposure to radiation and the effect or outcome
(thyroid cancer). This type of risk estimate can be prepared at any time using data
available and already published in the scientific literature from many sources.
The most important thing to remember about a risk estimate is to pay attention to
all of the qualifiers, or limitations, that accompany it. The less that is known
about an exposure, the broader the estimate will be, and the more uncertain the
ability to validate its accuracy.
We knew people were concerned about their risk of developing thyroid cancer as
a result of the fallout from the Nevada Test Site. I asked NCI staff to review and
evaluate all available data on thyroid cancer, including incidence and mortality
data, to see if there was any way to identify a change that might be related to
I-131 exposure. These analyses did not find any such relationships that were
statistically significant. NCI scientists were able, however, to obtain risk
estimates for I-131 indirectly, based on the known relationships between thyroid
cancer risk and exposure to radiation from external sources. To do this, they had
to make reasonable assumptions about the relative effectiveness of radiation from
these two types of radiation. This method resulted in a very broad estimate that
ranged from 11,300 to 212,000 excess cases of thyroid cancer that might have
been caused by exposure to I-131, but without a risk coefficient, the cause and
effect relationship was based on assumptions. In their report, the IOM stated that,
based on their own epidemiologic analyses, the excess of cancer cases is probably
in the lower part of the range estimated by NCI. If the Chornobyl studies are
successful, a much better estimate, with less uncertainty, will be possible because
we will have direct evidence about thyroid cancer risk in persons exposed to I-131
that we can combine with the estimated doses from the Nevada Test Site.
How did NCI get involved in the Chornobyl study? As I mentioned in the
beginning of my testimony, the Department of Energy (DOE) requested that one
of our scientists, Dr. Bruce Wachholz, manage the scientific aspects of a large
clinical radiation epidemiology study to be conducted in the former Soviet Union.
This study grew out of an international agreement between Soviet President
Gorbachev and President Reagan that called for bi-national cooperation
in undertaking research to better understand the health consequences of radiation
exposure resulting from the Chornobyl release. Dr. Wachholz's background in
radiation biology, his experience with radiation dosimetry, and his familiarity
with similar multi-disciplinary studies made him an obvious choice to lead this
project on the U.S. side. Drawing from a pool of consultants who had previously
served as advisors on other radiation studies, Dr. Wachholz assembled a
prestigious working group to assist in the development and management of this
activity. As a result of collaboration between U.S. and Belarus and Ukraine
scientists and discussions with international organizations, the study was framed,
the protocol was designed, and an assessment of available resources in the host
countries (Ukraine and Belarus) was pursued. It is important to remember that
this is a study of exposed individuals in Belarus and Ukraine, being carried out by
scientists and physicians in those countries, with advice and assistance from U.S.
collaborators.
These studies are large, complex, and long term. We estimate that they may
continue for 10-15 years. A timetable with target completion dates was developed
as part of the protocols, and in addition a management plan was developed to
assist us in guiding the overall project. The primary objective of the study is to
carry out valid and credible assessments of the early and late morphologic and
functional changes in the thyroid glands of persons exposed to radiation from
radioactive materials released as a consequence of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power
Plant accident. The emphasis is on obtaining data that allow us to develop a risk
coefficient for thyroid cancer as it relates to dose, sex, and age in 1986 and on
comparing the relative effectiveness of I-131 with that of x-ray and gamma
irradiation in inducing thyroid cancer and other thyroid conditions.
From early 1991 through early 1994 (Belarus) and early 1995 (Ukraine), a U.S.
working group, several members of which had previous experience with these
types of studies, collaborated with working groups in Belarus and Ukraine,
respectively, to develop the research protocols. Specific tasks were clearly spelled
out, and approximate time lines were included. At the same time,
government officials in Belarus and Ukraine were informed about the role of and
need for an IRB and, following a period of training and education, established
IRBs in their respective countries. During this period, another challenge facing the
working groups was the need to interpret and translate all documents between
Russian or Ukranian and English. The protocols were negotiated and approved by
the international working groups and subsequently approved by
IRBs in each country and by the NIH Office of Protection of Research Risks
(OPRR). The Belarus protocol was signed and implemented in May 1994; the
Ukraine protocol followed a year later, and was signed in May 1995. The delays
in Ukraine arose due to a number of problems, including initial difficulties at the
Ministerial level, including a hesitation to identify specific officials or agencies
that would be responsible for the study. Once these difficulties were resolved, the
degree of cooperation began to improve. However, we found that at times
limited progress was made between NCI's visits, although these visits were
pivotal in stimulating further activity. In 1997, the first study participants were
screened at clinics set up for this purpose in Minsk and Kiev, and in mobile
facilities. From 1994 through 1996, and following the signing of the protocols,
work was carried out on the development of the operational infrastructure as
spelled out in the protocols. This included such efforts as the development of
operating manuals; exploring and developing methods to identify and locate the
cohorts in each country; establishing data coordinating centers, data management,
and creating data flow sheets; obtaining tax exemptions on equipment and
supplies; and developing appropriate financial transfer arrangements; and putting
in place a program of quality assurance;. Completion of these tasks was further
complicated by the need to integrate various organizational entities and
operating units into a cohesive project in order to undertake a study of this
complexity with its need for rigor and absence of bias. Again, there was a need to
translate additional critical documents between Russian or Ukranian and English
and, very importantly, also adjust to several changes in Ministers in both
countries. It is also fair to mention that, especially in the earlier years of the
project, efforts were expended to overcome both the legacies of the Cold War
as well as the significant scientific and cultural disparities.
My first meeting with DOE arose because of concerns they had about the progress
and management of the study. I met with Dr. Paul Seligman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, DOE in July 1996, and we agreed
on a plan of action, including the establishment of a research support contract to
develop and provide scientific and technical assistance in the project. In
September 1997, NCI awarded such a contract to Columbia
University following a full and open competition. The NCI official who serves as
the Project Officer for this contract is Dr. Ihor Masnyk, who in recent years also
has been the U.S. Associate Project Director.
Due to the considerable and complex pre-study activities that had to take place, it
may appear that the Chornobyl studies have been slow to get underway.
However, there were innumerable scientific, political, economic, and practical
considerations and obstacles that were faced. These included changes in key
government personnel (Ministers of Health) in Belarus and Ukraine,
senior staff changes in Belarus, new laws and restrictions (such as import duties
on technical equipment and financial transaction obstacles), changes in the
physical location of key components, complex and changing organizational and
interpersonal dynamics, delays in delivery of equipment and supplies due to the
establishment of new foreign government oversight agencies, and many others.
Despite these delays, the study is moving forward. The cohorts have been
established, study participants have been selected, methods for location of
individuals are being evaluated, and feedback from individuals who have been
invited to be screened is being gathered for evaluation. As of August 1998, in
Belarus 2,869 patients have been screened, which is very close to the
first year target of 3,000 screenings. In Ukraine, where screenings began three
months ago, 529 study participants have been screened. Much of the credit for
this progress is due to the ongoing activities of the working groups of consultants,
whose members have provided regular and continuing guidance on these studies
and have assisted in surmounting significant operational obstacles facing project
execution. This U.S. assistance was provided by NCI staff and consultants
(members of the working groups) through frequent trips to the study sites and
regular monitoring of progress.
One of the specific milestones that is included in the protocols, and one that we
have been asked to address, is the appointment of Bi-National Advisory or
Oversight Committees. Such committees are required in each of the protocols,
and based on the assumption that the studies would progress much more quickly,
members were scheduled to be appointed during the first six months following the
final approval (signing) of the protocols. Members are appointed by each
national participant (five each from the U.S. and either Ukraine or Belarus),
representing specific areas of expertise (endocrinology, radiation biology,
radiation dosimetry, radiation epidemiology, and clinical sciences/pathology).
The responsibilities of these oversight groups include those normally found in
such studies done in the U.S., including recommending modifications of the
protocols to the national authorities; approval of protocol modifications that
have been agreed upon; review and approval of budgets prior to presentation to
the national authorities; scientific and administrative oversight, including on-site
visits and written scientific critiques; and developing a publication policy. All of
these functions relate to the main activity of the studies, i.e. screening of
participants. In addition, the Bi-National Advisory/Oversight
Committees were given the responsibility to ratify the appointment of the Project
Director in the study country. The process of identifying and appointing members
for these committees has been quite slow, but all of the members of these
committees have now been identified and we hope to schedule the first meetings
in the near future. Has the absence of these committees had a negative impact on
the conduct of the studies? We believe the answer, up to this point, is no;
however with the accrual of study subjects, we have reached a point where the
advice of the committees becomes important. Again, I must point out that these
studies are cooperative, with NCI providing assistance but with the ultimate
responsibility and authority resting with the Project Directors in the study
countries. We believe that the study teams in Belarus and Ukraine match our own
commitment to see the studies through to completion.
Interagency Coordination
There is a wealth of expertise and experience among Executive Branch agencies
from which we can learn. Among the steps I have taken since becoming NCI
Director have been efforts to improve communications with other federal
agencies, especially with our collaborators. As I mentioned earlier, in July 1996 I
and several other NCI staff met with our colleagues from the Department of
Energy to reach an agreement on the future management of the Chornobyl studies.
This was an important meeting as it addressed many of the issues under
consideration today, and it was intended to provide a template for future open,
honest discussions about our progress on these very important studies. Last
September, I met with my counterpart at the National Center for Environmental
Health at CDC, Richard Jackson. We discussed the many areas in radiation
research where we could learn from each other, and we signed a joint
memorandum committing our agencies to work more closely together, to identify
new opportunities to collaborate on research initiatives, and to provide a forum for
our staff to regularly exchange information on our progress. I am extremely
pleased with the success of our renewed commitment, and I am
confident that this will quickly translate into better, faster dissemination of
important health information to the public.
Summary
An organization must be flexible to respond to changing needs and correct
problems as they are encountered or identified. Last year, following the release of
the I-131 report, I put in place several mechanisms to correct weaknesses I had
identified in the process of trying to understand why this report took so long to
complete. First, I assigned to the Deputy Director, NCI, the responsibility for
monitoring and oversight of all radiation research conducted or supported by
NCI. This placed the central coordination and monitoring function directly in my
office where I could be immediately informed of any delays in or impediments to
this area of research. Second, I directed that a comprehensive tracking system be
developed to ensure that Congressional mandates such as this one would be
monitored regularly and status updates provided periodically for better oversight
and monitoring. This system has been developed and will be fully operational
this fall. Third, over the past two years I have had ongoing conversations with
key DOE staff, and with the Minister of Health in Ukraine, and have received
only positive feedback about the conduct and progress of these studies. There is
ample evidence to show considerable activity on these studies, including frequent
trips overseas, frequent communications with project directors in Belarus and
Ukraine, meetings with the contractor, and increased ability to
successfully deliver needed equipment and supplies overseas to the appropriate
recipients. My staff meet regularly with DOE staff to discuss progress on this
study and have been informed that progress is satisfactory. We presented an
update of the Chornobyl study to the National Cancer Advisory Board last week,
and we are planning a presentation to the ACERER in November.
With all of these mechanisms in place, was there more we could have done or
should have done in monitoring the Chornobyl study? A more detailed reporting
of protocol benchmarks versus actual progress may have brought greater visibility
to the delays associated with this study. However, because of the nature of the
delays, it remains unclear to me whether this reporting in itself would have
expedited progress. It is the complexity of conducting an international study in
an unstable climate that has impacted progress. Time lines, milestones, and
targets are all in place and significant progress has been made. I will readily
admit that the study milestones may have been overly optimistic, especially
knowing today what we do about the political, economic,
and regulatory difficulties we have encountered. For those who focus on meeting
milestones, this perhaps is viewed as a fundamental flaw. However, I believe that
the optimism was based on our experiences here in the U.S. and the understanding
that in clinical studies there are many contingencies that cannot be anticipated.
Finally, I have asked the question myself: would functioning Bi-National
Advisory Committees have made a difference in progress on these
studies? After discussing this question with many of my own advisors, I have
concluded that the guidance and advice provided by the working groups were
sufficient to identify problems, issues and solutions as quickly as possible. This
advice came from multiple sources, including our consultants on the project and
more recently the staff on the Columbia contract. Many of these consultants have
been affiliated with the project in varying capacities over the years and bring
very different perspectives and valuable advice. The formal Bi-National Advisory
Committees were not intended to function in such an operational mode, and their
most valuable role relates to issues that are beginning to confront us now: issues
of cohort identification; statistical strength; and our ability to complete the study
as was originally conceived. I look forward to having these committees in place
in the very near future so that they can begin their work.
I remain committed to ensuring that as long as NCI has responsibilities for these
studies, they will be done well, in as timely a fashion as possible, and the results
will be disseminated widely to the public and the scientific community. NCI
clearly has the expertise needed to carry this out, and the responsibility to ensure
that it is done well rests both with the scientific staff who manage the day to day
issues and also with NCI management, where proper oversight must be
maintained. I hope this testimony has clarified some of the issues of concern to
the Subcommittee, and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.