



G A O

Accountability \* Integrity \* Reliability

United States Government Accountability Office  
Washington, DC 20548

September 14, 2004

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on Government Reform  
House of Representatives

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on the Judiciary  
House of Representatives

Subject: *Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities*

Election-day problems in Florida and elsewhere in November 2000 raised concerns about voting systems that included, among other things, alleged voting irregularities that may have affected voter access to the polls. The term voting irregularities generally refers to a broad array of complaints relating to voting and/or elections that may involve violations of federal voting rights and/or federal criminal law for which the Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforcement responsibilities.

You requested that we review activities at DOJ to help ensure voter access to the polls and actions to address allegations of voting irregularities. This report (1) identifies and describes changes DOJ has made since November 2000 to help ensure voter access to the polls; (2) identifies and describes actions that the Voting Section in DOJ's Civil Rights Division has taken to track, address, and assess allegations of election-related<sup>1</sup> voting irregularities received between November 2000 and December 2003; and (3) assesses the Voting Section's internal control<sup>2</sup> activities

---

<sup>1</sup>Election-related refers to a preliminary investigation, matter, or case that the Voting Section initiated based on allegations about a specific election. A matter is an activity that has been assigned an identification number but has not resulted in a court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information. A case is an activity that has been assigned the same identification number that it had as a matter and has resulted in the court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information.

<sup>2</sup>Internal controls are integral components of an organization's management that provide reasonable assurances of objectives that include, among other things, efficient operations. They comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, support performance-based management. For additional information on internal controls, see GAO *Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.:November 1, 1999).

to help ensure relevant, accurate, and reliable recording and documentation of allegations of voting irregularities to accurately track actions taken in response to allegations and provide accurate and complete information to the public and congressional committees.

We primarily performed our work at DOJ's Civil Rights Division, Voting Section. We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials regarding DOJ's activities to help ensure voter access to the polls. To identify and describe changes made since November 2000, we reviewed documentation on DOJ's efforts to monitor and observe elections, increase emphasis on enforcement of minority language and overseas voters' rights, disseminate election-related guidance, and increase its resources to address voting issues. To identify and describe actions that the Voting Section took to track, address, and assess allegations of voting irregularities, we reviewed telephone logs and 34 files with information on a preliminary investigation, matters, and cases that the Voting Section considered to be election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003. To assess the Voting Section's internal controls, we obtained available documentation of policies, procedures, and techniques the Voting Section has to manage allegations of voting irregularities and considered them in relation to GAO's internal control standards. We also interviewed officials and obtained documentation from DOJ's Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section (PIN), in relation to the coordination between the Voting Section and PIN to address voter access to the polls.

On August 31, 2004, we provided your staffs a briefing document on the results of our work. Enclosure I contains the materials we presented at that time. Our audit work was performed in Washington, D.C., from May 2003 through August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

## **Background**

The Voting Section in the Civil Rights Division is charged with the responsibility of enforcing federal voting rights statutes that are designed to safeguard the right to vote of racial and language minorities; disabled, elderly, and illiterate persons; and military and overseas voters, among others. The Voting Section is also charged with the responsibility of enforcing federal statutes that, among other things, address issues such as voter registration, provisional voting, and voter information. Provisional voting permits eligible persons to vote on election day if their names are not on voter registration lists, with the understanding that each person's eligibility will be verified after the election and their votes counted, if eligible. (See enc. I, and attach. I, for more information on statutes that the Voting Section enforces.)

The Voting Section, among other things, monitors election-day activities to ensure voting rights are protected and initiates investigations and opens matters—an activity that has not resulted in a court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information—to examine allegations of voting irregularities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case—an activity that has resulted in the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information with a federal court.

The Voting Section also may initiate matters to monitor private lawsuits. Voting Section attorneys are generally responsible for conducting investigations and prosecuting cases.

The Voting Section also coordinates with PIN to refer allegations the Voting Section receives that involve violations of criminal statutes related to voting fraud. For example, in relation to the 2002 federal election, the Voting Section referred three matters deemed to be potential violations of criminal laws to PIN, which assumed responsibility for the investigations. In addition, the Voting Section and PIN have provided joint training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, with the Voting Section presenting information about civil rights statutes that are to protect the right to vote and PIN presenting information about criminal statutes that are to prevent election fraud.

## **Results**

Since November 2000, DOJ has implemented changes to help ensure voter access to the polls. The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election-day activities and increased its monitoring of these activities. In 2000, DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored elections in 5 counties in 5 states. By 2002, the number of election jurisdictions monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff increased to 19 counties in 10 states, with monitoring of elections in counties in Florida accounting for the bulk of the increase. The Voting Section also (1) placed a greater priority on protecting the voting rights of language minority voters by helping to ensure that certain covered jurisdictions provided bilingual voting materials for elections; (2) placed a priority on enforcing and preparing for compliance with the federal statute to help ensure voting rights of overseas voters; (3) provided additional training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys on civil rights statutes to educate them about voters' rights; and (4) provided guidance to states regarding the implementation of sections of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) that DOJ enforces.<sup>3</sup> For example, the Voting Section provided guidance to states by issuing a press release that outlined provisions of HAVA that took effect on January 1, 2004, such as provisional voting and identification requirements for new voters who register by mail.

The Attorney General directed the Civil Rights Division to work with civil rights leaders, state and local election officials, and U.S. Attorney Offices prior to election day in an effort to help ensure that citizens' voting rights are protected. The Attorney General also directed the Criminal Division to work with these same groups in helping to preserve ballot integrity and prevent election offenses. Almost all of the U.S. Attorney Offices reported that they had contacted various state or local officials prior to the November 2002 election. Voting Section officials reported that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and staff from that division met with various civil rights organizations.

---

<sup>3</sup> 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545.

According to Voting Section officials, DOJ plans to help ensure voter access for the upcoming November 2004 election include increasing its monitoring of elections, coordinating with civil rights organizations, and establishing procedures for bringing the concerns of civil rights organizations about specific issues or jurisdictions to DOJ on or before election day in November 2004. Voting Section officials also said that final decisions as to where monitoring will be conducted are not made public until shortly before an election. (See enc. I for more information.)

The Voting Section has used several means of tracking allegations of voting irregularities and the Section's actions with regard to those allegations. First, the Voting Section used telephone logs to track telephone calls regarding allegations of voting irregularities it received related to the November 2000 and 2002 elections. According to the Voting Section, contractors were hired to help handle the unprecedented number of calls that were received concerning the November 2000 election situation to help ensure that the public would be able to voice opinions and concerns. Second, DOJ tracks matters and cases through its Interactive Case Management (ICM) system—its formal process for tracking and managing work activities. Prior to opening a matter, the Voting Section may make a determination that an allegation does not fall within DOJ's jurisdiction or may initiate a preliminary investigation about an allegation. Third, the Voting Section tracked monitoring of elections using logs and for some election-monitoring activities they opened matters; thus, it has not routinely tracked election-monitoring activities through the ICM system. (See enc. I for more information.)

Actions that Voting Section attorneys took to address allegations of voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 included contacting cognizant election officials at the state and local levels; obtaining data as appropriate; interviewing voters affected by alleged voting irregularities; meeting with minority groups; and assessing the merits of the allegations to determine what, if any, further action was needed. Attorneys in the Voting Section addressed allegations of voting irregularities by first determining whether the allegations were related to violations of federal civil rights statutes and then, if warranted, initiating a preliminary investigation or matter to determine whether an allegation had merit. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case that is filed with a federal court. We reviewed files for 1 closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 open and closed cases that the Voting Section considered election-related. The preliminary investigation and 13 matters were closed because they lacked merit. The remaining 12 matters were closed because the state or voting jurisdiction took action to remedy an issue, a state court issued an order addressing the issue, the voting jurisdiction implemented changes for future elections, or Voting Section attorneys provided election officials feedback following the on-site monitoring of elections. Six cases remain open pending fulfillment of consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the jurisdiction in alleged violation of federal statute, and two cases were closed because states had taken action in response to consent decrees. Enclosure I and attachment IV provide detailed information on actions taken regarding selected matters and cases that the Voting Section considered as involving election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003.

Regarding internal controls, we found that the Voting Section did not have a reliable method to consistently record and document telephone calls received alleging voting irregularities. According to Voting Section officials, the number of calls received following the November 2000 election far exceeded the number received in past elections. As a result, the Voting Section used a contractor to assist in handling the telephone calls. To track some of the telephone calls related to the November 2000 election, Voting Section and contractor staff used telephone logs that had several broad categories to capture the subject of the allegation, rows for states from which the calls originated and, for the most part, tabulated the numbers of calls using tick marks. Voting Section staff also kept two other types of logs to record some telephone calls, which included columns to record a caller's name, state, telephone number, and description of the call. Our analysis of the contractor telephone logs found, among other things, that these logs did not include a way to record calls from 4 states—Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota. According to Voting Section officials, these 4 states were left off the contractor logs inadvertently, although these officials noted that they were unaware of any calls received from these states. Our analysis of logs that Voting Section staff completed found that Voting Section staff recorded having received calls from some of these states. The Voting Section improved upon the telephone log for the November 2002 election by having one log that consistently provided for documenting the caller's name, telephone number, and action taken. Compared with the telephone log that contractor staff maintained and one of the three types of logs that Voting Section staff maintained after the November 2000 election, which had several columns to broadly categorize the subject of the telephone calls, the November 2002 log included one column to capture the subject of the telephone calls. The Voting Section plans to take several actions to address voting irregularities for the November 2004 election, including, among other things, using a telephone log similar to the one used for the November 2002 election. The Voting Section did not provide written instructions to contractors for completing the telephone logs related to the 2000 election. However, for the November 2002 federal election, the Voting Section provided instructions to DOJ staff for how to handle calls from citizens, the press, members of Congress, and others. In addition to its method for recording and documenting telephone calls received regarding voting irregularities, we found that the Voting Section did not routinely track its election-monitoring activities through its ICM system. The Voting Section said that it has plans to assign one identification number to track these activities in the future. (See enc. I for more information.)

In conclusion, lack of specifics about allegations and actions limits DOJ's ability to have accurate and clear information to share with the public or Congress about the types of allegations received and actions taken. Predictions of another close presidential election in November 2004 combined with possible voter confusion over new requirements in the Help America Vote Act—such as the implementation of provisional voting in states that had not previously used provisional voting—and possible questions regarding voting equipment could result in the Voting Section again receiving a very large number of telephone calls. This could result in the need to use contractors to record voter allegations because much of the Voting Section staff will be monitoring election sites on election day. It is important that the

information collected be as complete, accurate, and specific as possible regarding specific allegations. If the Voting Section collects more precise information about voter allegations, it is in a better position to assure the public that it has addressed allegations of voting irregularities. Moreover, if it documents actions taken more precisely, it is better able to reassure the public and Congress of its commitment to enforce federal voting rights statutes.

The Voting Section emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election-day activities, but the monitoring program has not been routinely tracked in the Voting Section's ICM system. We believe the significance of this program warrants a more formal tracking of monitoring efforts and resources dedicated to the program to allow for reliable, relevant, and timely information for management decision making and for external reporting purposes.

### **Recommendations for Executive Action**

Confidence in our election processes is of utmost importance. To help ensure confidence in the integrity of voting processes, the Voting Section plays an important role in addressing voting irregularities. By accurately recording and documenting its activities in as clear a manner as possible, the Voting Section contributes to assuring the public and Congress of the integrity of our voting processes and that allegations of voting irregularities have been addressed.

To reassure citizens of the integrity of our election processes and to reassure the public and Congress of DOJ's commitment to its responsibility to enforce federal voting rights statutes, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Chief of the Voting Section to take the following two actions

- develop and implement procedures for the November 2004 election to help ensure that the Voting Section has a reliable method of tracking and documenting allegations of voting irregularities and actions taken to address them. Procedures could include more precise categories to record types of allegations and actions taken; development of instructions on completing the telephone logs; and development and implementation of training for contractors, should they be needed; and
- implement a method to track and report on election-monitoring activities in the ICM system.

### **Agency Comments**

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for review and comment. The draft report sent to DOJ for comment reflected changes made as a result of DOJ's prior detailed review of attachment IV in enclosure I and changes DOJ requested in writing following our exit conference with them. In commenting on the draft, DOJ generally agreed with the report and recommendations. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division accepted both recommendations and said that the

Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division has directed their implementation.

In commenting on our recommendation for the Civil Rights Division to track and report on election-monitoring activities in the ICM system, DOJ noted that it currently has procedures that effectively track election-monitoring activities. Our report acknowledges that the Division had information on election monitoring. However, the Voting Section told us that they did not routinely track election-monitoring activities in the ICM system—its formal process for tracking and managing work activities. Because we had asked for clarification of the confusing and unclear information previously provided on election monitoring and tracking, the Civil Rights Division, in a May 25, 2004, written response provided clarifying information that explained the different databases and data from logs that were used to capture information on election monitoring. In this written response, the Civil Rights Division included four charts on election monitoring that had been recently created, one for each calendar year from 2000 through 2003 (but not for 2004, as the Division states it did). In addition, the Civil Rights Division said that it had asked for a program that would provide the types of reports and data that the Division is routinely asked to provide regarding the election-monitoring program. Our recommendation is directed toward improving the Voting Section's tracking of election-monitoring activities, which the Voting Section has emphasized as being a very important part of its efforts to help ensure voter access to the polls. Tracking election-monitoring activities in the ICM system would ensure that this important component of the Voting Section's work is incorporated into the Division's formal process for tracking and managing work activities.

After we provided DOJ with a copy of the draft report that included this correspondence and its enclosure for review and comment, Civil Rights Division officials realized they had not provided us with information on all of the telephone logs used following the November 2000 election. The Civil Rights Division subsequently provided that additional information, which showed that Voting Section staff used two additional types of logs for the November 2000 election. These logs included columns to record callers' names, telephone numbers, states, and descriptions of the calls. This new information was incorporated into our report to accurately reflect the Voting Section's activities to track telephone calls following the November 2000 election. (See p. 5 in this letter and p. 42 in enc. I.) According to the Civil Rights Division, the November 2002 log, which it proposes as the basis for documenting telephone calls related to the upcoming November 2004 elections, was the only one used by Voting Section staff for the November 2002 election.

DOJ noted that the draft report discussion of the Civil Rights Division's use of telephone logs focused almost exclusively on the logs maintained by contractors, that the draft report failed to note that these logs were only a small portion of all the records of telephone calls received by the Division, and that any shortcomings in these logs were extremely unlikely to have changed the course of subsequent investigations. As we note in our report, it was difficult to obtain precise information on the number of calls or the specific nature of alleged irregularities from the

telephone logs on the November 2000 election. The information that the Voting Section collected on its telephone logs was not precise enough to support the Division's statements that upwards of 95 percent of the calls received regarding the November 2000 election reflected citizen frustration or anger over the election, that the vast majority of the calls that contractors received came from New York and California, or that the vast majority of the calls from those two states expressed frustration over the situation in Florida. Moreover, it is important to note that our recommendation with regard to recording complaints about voting irregularities for the November 2004 election is based on the limitations of the log used in November 2002 and the lack of a clear plan for accurately recording a potentially large volume of complaints that may arise from the November 2004 election. For example, November 2004 will be the first national election in which all states will be implementing HAVA's new voter identification and provisional voting requirements with which many voters may be unfamiliar.

In its comments, DOJ said that the Civil Rights Division invited us to meet with Voting Section staff who worked during the time of the November 2000 election and that we declined this invitation. We did not receive an invitation from officials in the Civil Rights Division, who arranged our meetings with Voting Section staff, to meet to discuss the November 2000 election logs. Throughout this review, we requested meetings with Voting Section and Civil Rights Division officials. It is always our preference, as part of our work, to meet with agency officials to discuss issues and questions we may have about agency processes, procedures, and documentation. However, Civil Rights Division officials preferred that we provide questions in writing and to respond to those questions in writing. The Civil Rights Division sometimes took weeks to respond in writing, which contributed significantly to the length of time it took us to complete our review. Had Civil Rights Division officials been more willing to meet with us to explain the Voting Section's processes and discuss the documentation provided to us, rather than rely on written questions and responses, the time required for this review could have been significantly reduced.

DOJ's written comments are in attachment V. DOJ also provided technical comments from the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section and from the Civil Rights Division, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Civil Rights Division provided additional information on cases initiated for calendar years 2002, 2003, and 2004. The 2002 and 2003 cases involved enforcement under Sections 2 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act and were not clearly identifiable in the ICM system as also involving language minority issues under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. The Civil Rights Division subsequently identified these cases as including enforcement of language minority violations, and we have included them in our report. Information on cases initiated in calendar year 2004 had not been included because our review covered complete calendar years, but we have added information on cases initiated in 2004 as of August 2004 as a courtesy to the Division.

---

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we



will send copies of this report to the Attorney General, Department of Justice; Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform; Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on House Administration; and Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Copies of this report will be made available to other interested parties upon request. This report will also be available on GAO's Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [jenkinswo@gao.gov](mailto:jenkinswo@gao.gov) or Linda Watson, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-8685 or by e-mail at [watsonl@gao.gov](mailto:watsonl@gao.gov). Key contributors to this report were Katherine Davis, Gina Flacco, Evan Gilman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Mary Martin, Maria Santos, and Daniele Schiffman.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William O. Jenkins, Jr.", with a long horizontal flourish underneath.

William O. Jenkins, Jr.  
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Enclosures



---

## DOJ Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities

---

Results of work completed for the  
Ranking Minority Member of the  
House Committee on Government Reform,  
Ranking Minority Member of the  
House Committee on the Judiciary, and  
Ranking Member of the  
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

August 31, 2004

---

## Enclosure I



## Contents

---

- Objectives
  - Results in Brief
  - Scope and Methodology
  - Background
  - Changes to Ensure Voter Access
  - Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations
  - Assessment of Internal Controls
  - Conclusions
  - Recommendations
  - Attachment I—Federal Voting Rights Statutes
  - Attachment II—Role of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section
  - Attachment III—Election Jurisdictions Monitored during 2000-2003
  - Attachment IV—Election-Related Preliminary Investigation, Matters, and Cases Initiated from November 2000 to December 2003
  - Attachment V—Agency Comments
-



This briefing addresses the following objectives:

1. Identify and describe any changes the Department of Justice (DOJ) has made since November 2000 to help ensure voter access to the polls.
2. Identify and describe any actions that the Voting Section in DOJ's Civil Rights Division has taken to track (monitoring work initiated and actions taken), address, and assess allegations of election-related voting irregularities received between November 2000 and December 2003.
  - Election-related refers to a preliminary investigation, matter, or case that the Voting Section initiated pursuant to an allegation about a specific election.

## Enclosure I



## Objectives

- A **preliminary investigation** is an investigation into an allegation that has not been assigned an identification number. A **matter** is an activity that has been assigned an identification number but has not resulted in a court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information. A **case** is an activity that has been assigned the same identification number that it had as a matter and has resulted in the court filing of a complaint, indictment, or information.
  - Voting irregularities, for purposes of this review, generally refer to a broad array of complaints relating to voting and/or elections that may involve violations of federal voting rights and/or federal criminal law for which DOJ has enforcement responsibilities.
3. Assess the Voting Section’s internal control activities to help ensure relevant, accurate, and reliable recording and documentation of allegations of voting irregularities for management decision-making and external reporting purposes.
- Internal controls are integral components of an organization’s management that provide reasonable assurance of objectives that include, among other things, efficient operations. They comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, support performance-based management.



1. Since November 2000, DOJ has increased its monitoring of election activities on election day, provided additional training to Assistant U.S. Attorneys on civil rights laws, placed a greater priority on protecting the voting rights of language minorities and overseas voters, and provided guidance to states regarding implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
2. The Civil Rights Division tracks matters and cases through a case management system. Telephone calls related to the 2000 and 2002 federal elections were tracked using telephone logs. The Voting Section addressed allegations of voting irregularities by contacting cognizant officials, obtaining data if deemed appropriate, and assessing the merits of the allegation to determine what, if any, further action was needed.
3. The Voting Section tracked the unprecedented volume of telephone calls related to the November 2000 election by using logs. Some logs had several broad categories to capture the subject of the calls and rows for states from which the calls originated, while other logs contained callers' names, contact information, and description of the calls. The Voting Section improved upon the telephone log for the November 2002 election by including categories to capture the action taken on each call and to record the caller's name, telephone number, and subject of the call. The Voting Section tracked some monitoring of elections by assigning matter identification numbers.

Enclosure I



---

## Scope and Methodology

---

## Enclosure I



## Scope

---

To address our objectives, we performed work at DOJ's:

- Civil Rights Division's Voting Section,
- Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section (PIN),
- Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Public Corruption Unit, and
- Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA).





To identify changes in DOJ's efforts to help ensure voter access to the polls, we

- gathered documentation on DOJ's efforts to
  - monitor and observe elections,
  - increase emphasis on enforcement of minority language and overseas voters' rights,
  - disseminate election-related guidance, and
  - increase its resources to address voting issues, and
- interviewed responsible officials primarily in DOJ's Voting Section and PIN.



To identify DOJ's actions to track, address, and assess allegations of voting irregularities, we

- interviewed officials in the Voting Section about procedures for tracking, addressing, and assessing allegations of voting irregularities;
- analyzed information on the approximately 11,000 reported telephone calls made to the Voting Section about the November 2000 election; and
- reviewed all files that the Voting Section identified as those it considered to be election-related voting irregularities that were initiated from November 2000 to December 2003. This included 1 closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 closed and open cases. The Voting Section tracks its matters and cases based on statutes it enforces and not on whether an allegation relates to a specific election. Consequently, the Voting Section had to identify for us the preliminary investigation, matters, and cases that it considered to be election-related voting irregularities.

Enclosure I



---

Background

---

Voting Section

---



Voting Section responsibilities include:

- enforcing the Voting Rights Act, which is designed to safeguard the right to vote of racial and language minorities and illiterate persons, among other provisions;
- enforcing federal statutes designed to safeguard the right to vote of disabled, elderly, military, and overseas voters; and
- enforcing provisions of the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) which address issues such as voter registration, provisional voting, and voter information.

Attachment I provides more information on statutes that the Voting Section enforces.

## Enclosure I



## Background Voting Section

The Voting Section, among other things, monitors election-day activities to ensure voting rights are protected and initiates investigations and opens matters to examine allegations of voting irregularities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division. If warranted, a matter may culminate in a case that is filed with a federal court.

Voting Section attorneys are generally responsible for conducting investigations and prosecuting civil cases. The Voting Section also may initiate matters to monitor private lawsuits.

The Voting Section coordinates with the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section (PIN) to help ensure voters' rights are protected, such as referring three allegations to PIN about possible election crimes related to the 2002 election. (See attach. II for more information about PIN's election-related responsibilities.)

Enclosure I



Background  
Voting Section

The following table provides information on all matters and cases initiated by the Voting Section in calendar years 2000 through 2003.

Year initiated	Matters	Cases	Total
2000	70	18	88
2001	53	6	59
2002	127	18	145
2003	99	4	103
<b>Total</b>	<b>349</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>395</b>

Source: GAO analysis of data from DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section.

According to Voting Section officials, the number of matters was higher in 2002 because the Voting Section initiated new matters for each of the over 80 newly covered jurisdictions required by the Voting Rights Act to provide bilingual election materials and assistance to language minority citizens. Following the 2000 Census, DOJ, in conjunction with the U.S. Census Bureau, identified these 80 jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions to provide language minority assistance when certain criteria are met, such as when more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age, or more than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age, are members of a single language minority group, and are unable to speak or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process.

Enclosure I



**Background  
Voting Section**

As shown in the following table, the Voting Section’s positions for attorneys (authorized and on-board) increased since the beginning of fiscal year 2000.

Time period	Authorized attorney positions	Attorneys on-board
Start FY 2000	34	31
End FY 2000	36	35
End FY 2001	47	40
End FY 2002	47	42
End FY 2003	41	38
As of April 16, 2004	41	39

Source: DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section.

The number of authorized and on-board attorneys declined at the end of fiscal year 2003 because the number of submissions to the Voting Section for redistricting changes following the 2000 Census began to decline that year, according to Voting Section officials. Every 10 years, after the federal census, states redraw their legislative election districts to make these districts equal in population. The process of drawing new election district boundaries is called redistricting.

Enclosure I



---

## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access

---





Since November 2000, DOJ focused on ensuring voter access to the polls by

- placing more emphasis on its election-monitoring program,
- providing additional training for certain Assistant U.S. Attorneys who handle election-related issues that included placing more emphasis on handling civil rights issues,
- directing U.S. Attorney Offices to contact election and other officials at the state and local level to offer assistance prior to election day,
- placing greater priority on enforcing the voting rights of language minorities and overseas voters, and
- providing guidance to states regarding HAVA implementation.



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Emphasis Placed on Election Monitoring

In March 2001, the Attorney General announced that DOJ was placing more emphasis on its election-monitoring program. The Attorney General is authorized by law to notify the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) of the need to assign federal observers to monitor polling place activities on election day in counties that the Attorney General has certified under the Voting Rights Act and in counties authorized by federal court orders. The Attorney General delegates the authority with respect to federal observers to the Voting Section. The Voting Section's decision to request federal observers is based on past experience or investigations that indicated observers may be needed to protect voting rights. (See attach. I for information on the law authorizing federal observers.)

In addition to OPM federal observers, the Voting Section assigns DOJ attorneys and professional staff to monitor election day activities in local jurisdictions throughout the United States, whether or not the locations have been certified under the Voting Rights Act. This additional monitoring is part of the Voting Section's investigations of possible voting rights violations. Unlike OPM observers, DOJ attorneys and professional staff do not have specific statutory right of access to polling places and must get authority from the appropriate state and/or local officials for them to enter polling places.



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Emphasis Placed on Election Monitoring

---

DOJ attorneys and professional staff are assigned to these jurisdictions when there may be insufficient time to arrange for federal observers in covered jurisdictions, or when the results of Voting Section staff's pre-election investigations indicate the need for some limited federal presence.

The Attorney General directed the Voting Section to increase resources devoted to the election-monitoring program through the use of OPM federal observers and DOJ attorneys and professional staff.

The level of resources used and number of elections monitored were greater in federal election years (even-numbered years) than other years, as shown in the next figure.


Enclosure I




**Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access  
Emphasis Placed on Election Monitoring**

The number of OPM federal observers and DOJ attorneys and professional staff were greater in the 2002 elections than in the 2000 elections. Similarly, more elections were monitored in 2002 than in 2000.

Number of observers/monitors



Number of elections monitored



Number of observers/monitors in relation to the number of elections monitored

OPM federal observers  
DOJ monitors

Source: GAO analysis of Civil Rights Division data.

Note: DOJ monitors are attorneys and professional staff.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Emphasis Placed on Election Monitoring

OPM federal observers are always accompanied by DOJ attorneys and professional staff when monitoring elections and were present for elections held during calendar years 2000 through 2003 in Attorney General-certified and court-ordered counties and jurisdictions in several states. In a few instances, DOJ attorneys and professional staff independently monitored elections in these Attorney General-certified and court-ordered counties and jurisdictions.

DOJ attorneys and professional staff also independently monitored elections in counties and jurisdictions that were not Attorney General-certified or under court order during this 4-year period. In 2000, DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored elections in 5 counties in 5 states. By 2002, the number of election jurisdictions monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff increased to 19 counties in 10 states, with monitoring of elections in counties in Florida accounting for the bulk of the increase.

According to the Voting Section, election monitoring is a high-priority program of DOJ and a very important part of the Section's efforts to address voting irregularities.

See attachment III for more information on election monitoring in Attorney General-certified and court-ordered election jurisdictions and election jurisdictions that DOJ monitored independently.



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Training

Officials in the Voting Section and PIN said that Assistant U.S. Attorneys can attend annual public corruption conferences, where they receive (1) training on handling election crime investigations and prosecutions and (2) periodic updates to DOJ's manual on prosecuting election crimes. Starting in October 2002, additional annual training, referred to as the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference, was provided to Assistant U.S. Attorneys who, in coordination with DOJ headquarters, handle election-related matters for the 93 U.S. Attorneys.

The Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference training, according to Civil Rights Division officials, included civil rights issues that had not been covered in the training offered to Assistant U.S. Attorneys prior to October 2002 and was designed to provide them a better understanding of what the Voting Section does to enforce federal voting rights statutes. Also, according to the Civil Rights Division, the presentations that the Voting Section made at this annual training conference placed special emphasis on the election-monitoring program and solicited the Assistant U.S. Attorneys' involvement in helping to enforce federal voting rights laws, ballot access, and the election-monitoring program. According to PIN, this training, which was mandatory for the Assistant U.S. Attorneys designated as district election officers, also covers voting integrity issues important to election crime matters.



**Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access  
Training**

The Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference training was provided to Assistant U.S. Attorneys in October 2002, September 2003, and July 2004.

The training materials for 2002 included topics related to federal voter registration and election-day statutes that the Voting Section enforces, which include the Voting Rights Act, National Voter Registration Act, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, and topics related to handling election crime investigations, trials, and the statutes and theories used to address election crimes.

The 2003 training materials included, in addition to the same topics covered in 2002, information on HAVA and election monitoring by federal observers. According to PIN and the Voting Section, the content of the 2004 training was similar to that provided in previous years.



**Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access  
Contacts with State and Local Election Officials**

---

In October 2002, the Attorney General directed each U.S. Attorney to coordinate with state and local election and law enforcement officials prior to the November 2002 elections to, in part, explore ways that they could work more closely together to deter and detect discrimination and to deter and prosecute election crimes.

According to PIN officials, the Attorney General's October 2002 directive (1) formalized an ad-hoc practice that had existed in DOJ for many years of coordinating elections and election-related matters with state officials and (2) led to a systematic effort to coordinate election issues and matters with these officials.



## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Contacts with State and Local Election Officials

---

Prior to the November 2002 federal elections, almost all of the U.S. Attorney Offices reported to PIN that they had contacted various state or local officials either by telephone, in writing, or in person.

The state and local officials contacted varied by each U.S. Attorney Office. For example, according to PIN,

- the three U.S. Attorneys in the state of Florida reported having met with the Florida Secretary of State and
- the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California reported having met with the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, Election Administrator, and Deputy District Attorney, and the Imperial County Registrar of Voters and District Attorney.

Enclosure I



**Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access  
Contacts with Civil Rights and Other Organizations**

The Attorney General directed the Civil Rights Division was to work with civil rights leaders, state and local election officials, and U.S. Attorney Offices prior to election day in an effort to help ensure that citizens' voting rights are protected. The Attorney General also directed the Criminal Division to work with these same groups in helping to preserve ballot integrity and prevent election offenses.

According to the Voting Section, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division has met with representatives of civil rights organizations to discuss the Voting Section's election-monitoring program and its plans for monitoring the November 2004 election and has made other presentations concerning voting rights issues at many of these organizations' meetings and conferences. The Voting Section also said that as this election approaches, it plans to ask civil rights organizations what election jurisdictions they believe the Voting Section should consider monitoring.

The Voting Section also said that since October 2002, staff from the Civil Rights Division have made presentations to, met with, or received presentations from various civil rights and other organizations, such as the NAACP, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, League of United Latin American Citizens, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, AARP, National Association of Secretaries of State, and National Association of State Election Directors.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Language Minority Voting Rights

In 2002, the Civil Rights Division made enforcement of voting rights laws that address access to voting for language minority groups one of the Voting Section's highest priorities. DOJ reported in a civil rights accomplishments fact sheet that the Civil Rights Division conducted an outreach campaign with state and local election officials and local language minority groups to help ensure access to bilingual voting materials for language minority groups. This was begun in July 2002 following the certification of covered jurisdictions based on the results of the 2000 census.

- The fact sheet states that the outreach included a July 2002 letter from the then- Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division to each of the 296 political jurisdictions covered by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act notifying them of their bilingual access obligations in the upcoming and future elections. According to the Civil Rights Division, attorneys from the Division visited many of the 296 counties covered by Section 203.
- In addition, the fact sheet reported that Civil Rights Division attorneys conducted in-person meetings with state and local election officials and local language minority groups in almost all of the more than 80 newly covered jurisdictions.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Language Minority Voting Rights

We analyzed data as of March 15, 2004, on matters and cases related to Section 203 language minority issues recorded in DOJ's Interactive Case Management (ICM) system, which is used to track and manage these data. We found that the Voting Section initiated 7 matters and no cases in 2000, 13 matters and 2 cases in 2001, 94 matters and 1 case in 2002, and 28 matters and no cases in 2003. According to the Civil Rights Division, the Division also initiated the following cases: (1) two language assistance cases in 2002 under Section 2 and Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) two cases in 2003 under Section 2, Section 203, and Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act; and (3) five cases in 2004 under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. Sections 2, 203, and 208 of the Voting Rights Act are described in attachment I.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Uniformed and Overseas Citizens

Given the large number of troops deployed overseas and an increase in concerns about late mailing of absentee ballots, Voting Section officials said that the Voting Section placed increased priority in 2004 on enforcing and preparing to ensure compliance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which only applies to federal elections. These officials cited the following enforcement and preparation activities during 2004.

- Obtained a court order in April for emergency relief to remedy an UOCAVA violation committed during the Pennsylvania primary election.
- Negotiated with the state of Alabama in May to obtain a similar emergency relief order from a state court for a county's failure to provide enough time for the mailing to and return of ballots from overseas voters for its primary election.
- Obtained a court order in an UOCAVA lawsuit in July against the state of Georgia for similar emergency relief for its primary election.
- Established a working group of Voting Section attorneys to facilitate communications with the Department of Defense's Federal Voting Assistance Program, which is charged with administering UOCAVA, and to plan for the possibility of more UOCAVA litigation during 2004.

Our analysis of matters and cases in DOJ's ICM system as of March 15, 2004, showed that the Voting Section initiated 3 matters and 2 cases during calendar years 2000 through 2003 involving the issue of absentee voting by uniformed and overseas citizens. All 5 of the matters and cases were initiated in 2002.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Guidance to States on HAVA

In October 2002, HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission to, in part, serve as a national clearinghouse and resource to compile information and review procedures related to federal election administration and provide guidance on implementing certain HAVA requirements. Because the Election Assistance Commission was not established until December 2003, the Voting Section provided informal, nonbinding guidance to states on implementing the requirements of HAVA.

The Voting Section's guidance to states on HAVA's requirements included

- interpreting requirements of the law and advising states on how to comply with them based on DOJ's enforcement role under HAVA;
- responding to inquiries from state and local officials;
- making presentations at various meetings and conferences;
- writing letters to the chief state election official, governor, and attorney general in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories offering to assist the jurisdictions in their efforts to ensure compliance with HAVA and summarizing HAVA provisions;
- creating a HAVA information page on its Web site; and
- issuing a press release that outlined provisions of HAVA that took effect on January 1, 2004, such as provisional voting and identification requirements for new voters who register by mail.

According to the Civil Rights Division, the Voting Section also filed its first enforcement action in California in 2004 against a county for violating the voter information provisions of HAVA.

## Enclosure I



## Changes to Help Ensure Voter Access Plans for November 2004 Election

According to Voting Section officials, DOJ's plans for helping to ensure voter access for the November 2004 election include

- increasing its on-site monitoring of elections considerably over prior years through greater use of staff from other sections in the Civil Rights Division. Voting Section officials also said that final decisions as to where monitoring will be conducted are not made public until shortly before an election, but they told us that the Voting Section has prepared a list of jurisdictions for consideration based on consent decrees and will update the list with other jurisdictions being considered for coverage as the election approaches. According to these officials, the Voting Section has not established a specific goal for achieving an increase in staff or elections to be covered, and
- coordinating with civil rights organizations that will be monitoring the election and establishing procedures for bringing their concerns about specific issues or jurisdictions to DOJ on or before election day in November 2004.

Enclosure I



---

## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations

---



## Enclosure I



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Results in Brief

In our review, we found that the Civil Rights Division had formal procedures to track matters and cases to address voting irregularities. Specifically, the Voting Section tracks investigative matters and cases through the Division's ICM system using unique identification numbers. In addition, the Voting Section tracked telephone calls alleging voting irregularities for the November 2000 and November 2002 elections using telephone logs.

Voting Section attorneys addressed and assessed allegations of election-related voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 in various ways, depending on the allegation. Our review of files related to 1 preliminary close investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 open and closed cases generally found that attorneys contacted cognizant officials and assessed the legal merits of evidence of alleged violations of civil rights laws.

In our review of files, we found that Voting Section attorneys generally addressed allegations of voting irregularities initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 through a preliminary investigation or investigative matters and took actions such as interviewing election officials at state and local levels, interviewing voters affected by alleged voting irregularities, and meeting with civil rights groups.

Our review of Voting Section files also found that Voting Section attorneys, in conjunction with supervisory attorneys, assessed information collected and determined whether (1) federal voting rights laws were violated; (2) an investigation should be closed; or (3) further action was needed by the Voting Section, such as filing a complaint with a federal court or continued monitoring.

Enclosure I



**Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations  
Tracking Allegations of Voting Irregularities**

---

The ICM is a database system that the Voting Section uses to track and manage matter and case data for the Section and can be used to generate reports.

Each matter and case is assigned a DJ number, which is a unique identification number. Information on matters and cases can be searched by the identification numbers, statutes, and other information maintained in the system.

The system is set up to automatically enter certain data and has required fields for which data must be entered. Voting Section staff can enter other data into the system, as appropriate.

## Enclosure I



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Tracking Allegations of Voting Irregularities

Officials told us that the Voting Section

- receives numerous citizen calls, comments, and questions daily;
- receives telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, letters, and packages. Most of the calls and written allegations from citizens do not concern issues within the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division and, in such instances, the caller is often notified of this determination over the telephone and referred to other state or federal agencies with possible jurisdiction;
- documented telephone calls received at the Section's toll free telephone number using telephone logs for the 2000 and 2002 elections;
- found that only a small percentage of allegations that it received following the November 2000 election fell within its jurisdiction or presented substantive issues that merited further review. Notations on logs documenting telephone calls related to the November 2000 election indicated that some of the calls— we were unable to quantify the number of calls because of the way calls were recorded— were related to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election or other issues such as general complaints about the election process that contained no specific allegations of violations of federal laws;
- in addition to following up with people who called the Voting Section after the November 2000 election, Voting Section staff pursued other avenues of complaints, such as complaint logs generated by the NAACP Voter Fund, hearings conducted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the NAACP, and incidents receiving a large amount of publicity, to determine if federal laws had been violated; and
- expects attorneys to find new matters for investigation in addition to assignments made by Section management.



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Tracking Allegations of Voting Irregularities

---

Voting Section officials told us that on election day

- in addition to calls received by the Section at its toll-free number, an OPM federal examiner maintains a toll-free telephone number to receive calls. An examiner is a federal employee assigned by OPM to receive complaints of racial or minority language discriminatory voting practices. (See attach. I for the statute related to federal examiners.) Any allegations taken by the examiner that are deemed to require immediate attention are routed to the Civil Rights Division when received, while other allegations are transmitted after the election and reviewed to determine if further action is needed. According to the Chief of the Voting Section, they received few, if any, allegations from examiners in relation to the November 2000 election, and
- a small number of Civil Rights Division staff remain available at the Voting Section on major election days to take citizen calls, with the vast majority of Section staff at various locations around the country for monitoring purposes. Major problems that arise from these calls are routed to attorney supervisors to determine what actions are needed.

Our review of files included five matters that were initiated to monitor elections.

According to Voting Section officials, this activity is not routinely tracked through the ICM, but they plan to designate a single identification number to track this activity.

## Enclosure I



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Actions to Address Allegations

The following presents information on the Voting Section's process for addressing allegations related to voting irregularities.

- If the Voting Section deems that a voting allegation falls within its jurisdiction and appears to have merit, an attorney is assigned to make inquiries about the allegation. The attorney performs some investigative work to determine whether the allegation should be pursued.
- If an attorney believes a matter should be investigated, the attorney discusses this with the Deputy Chief responsible for the state in which the matter rises. The Section Chief and Deputies decide whether or not to formally open a matter. The Voting Section assigns a number to the matter for tracking purposes.
- When Voting Section staff monitor elections and receive allegations of or information about voting irregularities while on site, they make efforts to resolve allegations by contacting local election officials immediately. Further investigation of such irregularities is conducted after an election if the allegation was not resolved on election day or if it is deemed otherwise necessary to prevent such problems from arising in the future.

## Enclosure I



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Actions to Address Allegations

Our file review found that the Voting Section generally took the following actions during its investigations initiated from November 2000 to December 2003:

- Interviewed state and county election officials, other state and county officials who may provide insight into the investigation, state Attorneys General, voters raising the allegations, and representatives from the NAACP and other minority groups.
- Requested documentation detailing certain election procedures.
- Facilitated the resolution of allegations and issues that arose during elections, when monitoring elections. If Voting Section staff monitoring elections received allegations about voting irregularities, they immediately took steps to resolve the allegations by contacting local election officials.
- Where deemed appropriate, filed enforcement actions in federal court against jurisdictions that allegedly violated federal voting rights laws by either obtaining judgments against them or entering into consent decrees with jurisdictions that agree to remedy their alleged violations of federal voting statutes.

## Enclosure I



## **Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Actions to Assess Allegations**

---

Following the investigation of a preliminary investigation or matter, a Voting Section attorney, in conjunction with a supervisor, determines whether the allegation has merit, whether the preliminary investigation or matter should be pursued further, or whether the preliminary investigation or matter should be closed. The determination to close a matter or pursue it as a case is a legal judgment and is often based on whether there is deemed to be a sufficient evidence of violations of voting rights laws and whether the state or local election officials have taken action to correct problems.

The Voting Section identified a total of 34 closed investigations and open and closed cases initiated between November 2000 and December 2003 that it considered to involve election-related voting irregularities: 1 closed preliminary investigation, 25 closed matters, and 8 open and closed cases.

The preliminary investigation was closed because the Voting Section concluded that the allegation lacked merit.

## Enclosure I



## Actions to Track, Address, and Assess Allegations Actions to Assess Allegations

---

For the 25 closed matters:

- 13 were closed because the Voting Section concluded that the allegations lacked merit;
- 5 were closed because the state or voting jurisdictions took actions to resolve the issues (e.g., one state passed an election law, and the Voting Section approved changes to election procedures that one city had proposed);
- 4 were closed following the completion of elections, and the Voting Section provided feedback or observations related to election procedures while monitoring elections;
- 2 were closed because voting jurisdictions implemented changes for future elections; and
- 1 was closed because a state court issued an order addressing the issue.

For the 8 cases:

- 6 are open pending fulfillment of consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the jurisdiction in alleged violation of statute, and
- 2 are closed because consent decrees entered into on behalf of DOJ and the jurisdictions in alleged violation of statutes required states to take corrective actions and states did so by passing legislation, among other actions.

Attachment IV provides detailed information on the results of our file review of the 34 closed preliminary investigation and matters and open and closed cases initiated from November 2000 to December 2003 that the Voting Section considered as involving election-related voting irregularities.



Enclosure I



---

## Assessment of Internal Controls

---



In our review, we found that

- the Voting Section tracked telephone calls related to the November 2000 election by using telephone logs. Some logs had several broad categories to capture the subject of the calls, rows for states from which the calls originated and, for the most part, tabulated the numbers of calls using tick marks. Other logs that the Voting Section used contained information such as callers' names, telephone numbers, and descriptions of the calls. The Voting Section improved upon the telephone log for the November 2002 election by including columns to record the action taken on each call in addition to recording the caller's name and telephone number, but has one column to capture the subject of the call, and
- as mentioned previously, the Voting Section tracked some monitoring of elections by opening matters and assigning each matter an identification number. According to Voting Section officials, it has not routinely tracked election-monitoring activities through the case management system but is considering assigning one identification number to track election-monitoring activities.

## Enclosure I



## Assessment of Internal Controls November 2000 Election Telephone Logs

The Voting Section received an unprecedented volume of telephone calls in November and December 2000 related to the unusual events surrounding the November 2000 presidential election.

- The Voting Section reported to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that it received approximately 11,000 calls related to the November 2000 election. In comparison, the Voting Section told us it received several hundred calls related to the November 2002 election. The Voting Section told us it does not have records of telephone calls related to other elections except to the extent that such telephone calls generated investigations that became matters or cases.
- According to the Voting Section, contractors were hired in November 2000 to help handle the unprecedented number of incoming telephone calls received concerning the November 2000 election to help ensure that the public would be able to voice opinions and concerns. Hiring contractors was not intended as a mechanism to gather specific allegations.
- Voting Section staff and contractors kept telephone logs that consisted of tables with columns identifying broad categories of allegations or comments and rows with the state from which a call originated. Voting Section staff also kept two other types of logs, which included the caller's name, state, telephone number, and description of the call. Calls were recorded on most logs as tick marks, while some logs included limited narrative on the nature of the call.



**Assessment of Internal Controls  
November 2000 Election Telephone Logs**

---

Our analysis of the telephone call logs completed by contractors found the following:

- It was difficult to count how many calls were received because, for example, one caller could have made multiple complaints and some logs appeared to be duplicates.
- The call logs did not include a way to record calls from 4 states—Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota. According to Voting Section officials, these 4 states were left off the contractor logs inadvertently, although these officials noted that they were unaware of any calls received from these states. Our analysis found that Voting Section staff recorded having received calls from some of these states.
- Columns that were used to record callers were labeled voter fraud, irregularities, request investigation, re-vote, and general comments. In some of the logs, the columns were re-labeled manually to tally additional types of comments. The broad nature of these column labels to record information about the nature of the calls and the limited narrative sometimes included on logs did not always provide sufficient information to determine whether the Voting Section should initiate an investigation.
- The telephone logs did not include information on callers' contact information such as telephone numbers.

Enclosure I



**Assessment of Internal Controls  
November 2000 Election Telephone Logs**

---

Some of the telephone logs that Voting Section and contractor staff completed included comments indicating allegations that people may have been prevented from voting. According to the Voting Section, Voting Section personnel reviewed logs on an ongoing basis and efforts were made to contact callers who provided telephone numbers and whose messages indicated possible violations of federal civil rights statutes. The Voting Section does not have records indicating how many such return calls were made and noted that return telephone contact information was not always provided or asked for.

According to Voting Section officials, an assessment of the calls led them to determine that most of the calls focused on concerns about the election situation in Florida, often from citizens in states other than Florida, and that few allegations included substantive information about possible violations of federal law. However, the information on the November 2000 telephone logs is not precise enough to document this assessment.

## Enclosure I



## Assessment of Internal Controls November 2002 Election Telephone Logs

---

For the November 2002 federal election, the Voting Section assigned staff to receive calls; provided instructions for how to handle calls from citizens, the press, members of Congress, and others; and provided state contact information to refer callers to state officials, when appropriate.

According to Voting Section officials, a telephone log was used to record calls received. The telephone log included columns to record time of call; caller information for name, city, state, and telephone number; subject; and action. No instructions were provided with the telephone log about how to complete it regarding the type of information to be included in the subject or action columns.



**Assessment of Internal Controls  
Plans for the November 2004 Election**

According to the Civil Rights Division, the Voting Section plans to ensure that it has full capability to receive and respond, as appropriate, to all calls related to the November 2004 general election in the most expeditious way possible. Division officials further stated that the Voting Section has procedures in place to track and respond to telephone calls that it might receive in relation to the November 2004 general election.

- Specifically, the Civil Rights Division told us that the Voting Section plans to use a telephone log such as the one used for the November 2002 election to record information on the caller's name, time of call, city and state, telephone number, subject of the call, and action taken on the call. The Division noted that the November 2002 log or any log that the Voting Section might use for the November 2004 election is a tool to ensure that the Voting Section does not miss calls raising important concerns over which it has jurisdiction and is not intended to definitively track all election-related allegations received.



**Assessment of Internal Controls  
Plans for the November 2004 Election**

---

The Civil Rights Division also cited other procedures that the Voting Section plans to use to track and respond to possible telephone calls related to the November 2004 general election. These procedures will include the Voting Section

- continuing its practice of assigning its staff to specific states for the purpose of reviewing citizen calls and letters;
- keeping a sufficient number of staff and supervisory attorneys in headquarters on election day to handle calls and to respond to allegations referred from Voting Section staff monitoring elections in the field on that day; and
- using contractors, if needed, to take telephone calls. The Division plans to determine the need to use contractors on a case-by-case basis.



Enclosure I



---

## Conclusions and Recommendations

---



- The Voting Section received an unprecedented number of calls related to the November 2000 election and took steps to document telephone calls. According to the Voting Section, it also documented calls for the November 2002 election for which far fewer calls were received. The 2000 and 2002 election telephone logs differed somewhat in format, and improvements were made regarding how information was collected on the 2002 election telephone log. The Voting Section did not provide written instructions to contractors in November 2000 about how to complete the logs, but did provide written instructions to DOJ staff on completing some of the information for the 2002 logs. However, both logs lack precision for documenting the nature of the call and actions taken because broad categories were used to capture information on the call.



- Predictions of another close presidential election in November 2004, possible voter confusion over new requirements in the Help America Vote Act, and possible questions regarding voting equipment could result in the Voting Section again receiving a large number of telephone calls and possibly result in the use of contractors to handle calls since most of the Voting Section staff are monitoring election sites on election day. If the Voting Section collects more precise information about such calls, it is in a better position to assure the public that it addressed allegations of voting irregularities; if it documents actions taken more precisely, it is better able to reassure the public and Congress of its commitment to enforce federal voting rights statutes.
- The Voting Section has emphasized the importance of its monitoring of election day activities, yet the monitoring program has not been routinely tracked in the ICM system, its formal process for tracking and managing work activities. Voting Section officials told us they were considering tracking this program in the future, and we believe the significance of this program warrants a more formal tracking of monitoring efforts and resources dedicated to the program.

## Enclosure I



## Recommendations

---

Confidence in election processes is of utmost importance. To help ensure confidence in the integrity of our voting processes, the Voting Section plays an important role in addressing voting irregularities. By accurately recording and documenting its activities in as clear a manner as possible, the Voting Section contributes to assuring the public and Congress of the integrity of our voting processes.

To reassure citizens of the integrity of our election processes and to reassure the public and Congress of DOJ's commitment to its responsibility to enforce federal voting rights statutes, we recommend that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division direct the Chief of the Voting Section to

- develop and implement procedures for the November 2004 election to ensure that the Voting Section has a reliable method of tracking and documenting allegations of voting irregularities and actions taken to address them. Procedures could include more precise categories for recording types of allegations, more precise categories to record actions taken, development of instructions on completing the telephone logs, and development and implementation of training for contractors, should they be needed, and
- implement a method to track and report on election monitoring program activities in the Interactive Case Management system.

## Attachment I

### Voting Laws Enforced by the Voting Section Relevant to Contents of Briefing and Its Attachments

According to the Voting Section, to carry out its mission, the Voting Section brings lawsuits against states, counties, cities, and other jurisdictions to remedy denials and abridgements of the right to vote; defends lawsuits that the Voting Rights Act authorizes to be brought against the Attorney General; reviews changes in voting laws and procedures administratively under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and monitors election day activities through the assignment of federal observers under Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act. Provided below are short descriptions of some of the primary voting laws enforced by the Voting Section.

#### Voting Rights Act Provisions

- Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973)

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act establishes a nationwide ban against any state or local election practices or procedures that deny or abridge a citizen's right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.<sup>4</sup> The Voting Rights Act provides that plaintiffs may establish a violation of Section 2 by demonstrating that "the political processes leading to nomination or election" deny members of the protected classes an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. A court, under the Voting Rights Act, may also consider the extent to which members of the protected class have been elected to office in the jurisdiction, though Congress made clear that Section 2 does not confer upon protected classes a right to proportional representation.

- Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1a, 1973b(f)(4))

Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) are the language minority provisions of the Voting Rights Act and require certain covered jurisdictions to provide bilingual election materials and assistance based on census data pertaining to the population of citizens of voting age with limited English proficiency and their rate of illiteracy. With respect to Section 203, the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions to provide language minority assistance when certain criteria are met, such as when more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age or more than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age are members of a single language minority group, and are unable to speak or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process.

---

<sup>4</sup> 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b(f)(2).

## Attachment I

- Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6)

Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes voting assistance for blind, disabled, or illiterate persons. A voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union.

- Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973c)

Under Section 5 of the Act, "covered"<sup>5</sup> jurisdictions may not change their election practices or procedures until they obtain federal "preclearance" for the change. The act provides for either judicial or administrative preclearance. Under the judicial mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the change has neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against protected minorities in exercising their voting rights. Under the administrative mechanism, covered jurisdictions may seek the same determination from the Attorney General. The Attorney General may deny preclearance by interposing and objection to the proposed change within 60 days of its submission.

- Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973d)

Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act provides for the appointment of federal examiners by order of a federal court or, with respect to certain covered jurisdictions, upon certification by the Attorney General. Federal examiners help to register voters by determining whether a citizen meets state eligibility requirements and must therefore be included in the registration rolls. A federal court, under the Voting Rights Act, may order the appointment of federal examiners to any jurisdiction sued under any statute to enforce certain constitutional voting guarantees.<sup>6</sup> In covered jurisdictions, the Attorney General may appoint examiners upon certification that the Attorney General has received at least 20 meritorious written complaints of voting discrimination or that the Attorney General otherwise believes that the appointment of examiners is necessary to protect voting rights.

---

<sup>5</sup> The jurisdictions targeted for "coverage" are those evidencing discriminatory voting practices, based upon a triggering formula, as defined in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1973b). The Attorney General and the Director of the Census have responsibility for determining which jurisdictions are covered by the triggering formula, and their determinations are not reviewable in any court and are effective upon publication in the *Federal Register*.

<sup>6</sup> See also, section 3 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973a).

## Attachment I

- Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973f)

Under Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act, federal observers may be appointed, upon request of the Attorney General, in any jurisdiction where an examiner is serving. Federal observers are to monitor elections and report whether persons entitled to vote were allowed to vote and whether their votes were properly counted.

- Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b))

Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act prohibits persons, whether acting under color of law or not, from intimidating, threatening, or coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce, any person for voting or attempting to vote. Section 11(b) further prohibits intimidation, threats, or coercion of those persons aiding other persons in voting or exercising certain powers or duties under the Act.

### **Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986** (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6)

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), in general, requires states and territories to allow absent uniformed service voters, their spouses and dependents, and certain other overseas voters to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office. UOCAVA requires, for example, that a presidential designee prescribe a federal write-in absentee ballot for all overseas voters in federal elections. The ballot is to be used if the overseas voter applies for, but does not receive, a state absentee ballot.<sup>7</sup> While state law, in general, governs the processing of these federal write-in ballots, UOCAVA requires that states permit their use in federal elections.<sup>8</sup>

### **National Voter Registration Act** (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10)

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) established procedures designed to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections Federal office,” while protecting “the integrity of the electoral process” and ensuring the maintenance of “accurate and current voter registration rolls.”<sup>9</sup> NVRA requires all states to adopt certain federal voter registration procedures, except for those states that have no registration requirements or that permit election-day registration with respect to federal elections.<sup>10</sup> NVRA, for example, requires states to allow applicants for driver’s licenses to register to vote on the same form.<sup>11</sup> NVRA also requires states

---

<sup>7</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(a).

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* § 1973ff-1(3).

<sup>9</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg.

<sup>10</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* § 1973gg-3(a).

## Attachment I

to provide voter registration forms and accept completed applications at various state agencies, including any office in the state providing public assistance, any office in the state that provides state-funded disability programs, and other agencies chosen by the state, such as state licensing bureaus, county clerks' offices, public schools and public libraries.<sup>12</sup> NVRA also contains detailed requirements regarding state removal of names from federal registration rolls.<sup>13</sup>

### **Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984** (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6)

Congress has passed legislation intended to improve access for elderly and handicapped individuals to registration facilities and polling places for federal elections. The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 requires, with some exceptions, that political subdivisions within each state that are responsible for conducting elections assure that polling places and registration sites are accessible to handicapped and elderly voters.<sup>14</sup> If the political subdivision is unable to provide an accessible polling place, it must provide an alternative means for casting a ballot on election day upon advance request by the voter.<sup>15</sup> The act's requirements also include, for example, that each state or political subdivision provide a reasonable number of accessible permanent registration facilities, and that each state make available certain types of voting and registration aids such as large-type instructions and information by telecommunication devices for the deaf.<sup>16</sup>

### **Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act** (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 to 12134) (enforced by the Disability Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division)

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, activities, and services of public entities. It applies to all state and local governments, their departments and agencies, and any other instrumentalities or special purpose districts of State and local governments. According to the Voting Section, as construed by the courts, Title II requires that polling places be accessible to persons with disabilities with certain exceptions.

### **Help America Vote Act** (42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545)

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), among other things, established a program to provide funds to states to replace punch card voting systems, established the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain

---

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* §§ 1973gg-5(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(6)(A)(i).

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* § 1973gg-6(b).

<sup>14</sup> 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.* § 1973ee-1(b)(2)(ii).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* § 1973ee-2, 1973ee-3.



## **Attachment I**

federal election laws and programs, and established minimum election administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of federal elections. Certain HAVA provisions including those relating to voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists are to be enforced by the Attorney General.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 15511.

## Attachment II

### Role of the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section in Federal Elections

The Public Integrity Section (PIN), in conjunction with the 93 U. S. Attorneys and the FBI, is responsible for enforcing federal criminal laws applicable to federal election fraud offenses, among other things. Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the electoral processes for: (1) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; (2) canvassing and certifying election results; or (3) registering voters. Election fraud can be committed with or without the participation of voters. Examples of election fraud that does not involve voter participation are ballot box stuffing, ghost voting, and "nursing home" frauds. Examples of election fraud that involves, at least to some extent, voter participation are vote buying schemes, absentee ballot fraud, voter intimidation schemes, migratory-voting or floating-voter schemes, and voter "assistance" fraud in which the voters' wishes are ignored or not sought. According to a PIN official, its attorneys spend about 10 percent of their time on election fraud investigations and trials.

PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys' and the FBI's investigation and prosecution of federal election fraud, one of the most common types of alleged federal election crimes. PIN's oversight entails (1) advising investigators and prosecutors on the application of federal criminal laws to election crimes, (2) reviewing all major election crime investigations and all proposed election crime charges, and (3) assisting with implementing DOJ's District Election Officer (DEO) program. Under the DEO program, PIN asks each of the 93 U.S. Attorneys to appoint an Assistant U.S. Attorney to serve a 2-year term as a DEO and provides training and guidance to DEOs on carrying out their responsibilities. DEOs, whose responsibilities are performed in conjunction with their other responsibilities, are to

- screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation;
- oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts;
- coordinate their district's (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors;
- coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters;
- issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and
- supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day.

## **Attachment II**

Our analysis of information from PIN on election fraud matters showed that U.S. Attorneys and PIN attorneys initiated a total of 61 election fraud matters, or investigations, related to election years 2000 through 2003. Most of the 61 matters related to elections held in 2002. Matters were initiated in 28 states and 1 U.S. territory (the U.S. Virgin Islands) and ranged from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory over the 4-year period. The most frequent allegations of election fraud were for absentee ballot fraud and vote buying. According to PIN, many of these matters resulted in indictments and subsequent convictions.

According to the Criminal Division, the information provided by PIN does not include all election fraud investigations that the U.S. Attorneys have initiated because (1) U. S. Attorneys are not required to consult with PIN for preliminary investigations as opposed to grand jury investigations, which require consultation; (2) PIN did not track election fraud investigations prior to October 2002; and (3) election fraud investigations are sometimes initiated under non-election statutes.

**Attachment III**

**Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003**

**Table 1: Attorney General-Certified Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003**

State	Election jurisdictions monitored during			
	2000	2001	2002	2003
	Hale County		Hale County	
	Selma (Dallas County) <sup>a</sup>		Chambers County	
	Lowndes County			
Arizona	Apache County		Apache County	
	Navajo County		Navajo County	
Georgia	Randolph County <sup>a</sup>		Randolph County	
	Brooks County			
	Sumter County			
	Twiggs County			
Louisiana	Tensas Parish			
Mississippi	Aberdeen (Monroe County) <sup>a</sup>	Clarksdale (Coahoma County) <sup>b</sup>	Adams County	Greenville (Washington County)
	Bolivar County	Isola (Humphreys County)	Amite County	Humphreys County
	Grenada County	Macon (Noxubee County)	Centreville (Wilkinson County)	Noxubee County <sup>a</sup>
	Neshoba County	Sunflower (Sunflower County)	Drew (Sunflower County)	Neshoba County
	Newton County			Newton County
				Kemper County
		Vicksburg (Warren County) <sup>a</sup>		Leake County
		Webb (Tallahatchie County)		Jones County
			Winston County	
New York	Kings County	Kings County	Kings County	
	New York County	New York County	New York County	
		Bronx County		
South Carolina	Marion County <sup>a</sup>	Ridgeville (Dorchester County)	Ridgeville (Dorchester County) <sup>a</sup>	
Texas	Irving (Dallas County)	Irving (Dallas County)	Titus County	
<b>Total jurisdictions</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>

Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section.

<sup>a</sup>Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers.

<sup>b</sup>Three elections were held in Clarksdale (Coahoma County), Mississippi, in calendar year 2001. Only DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored one of the three elections, held on June 5, 2001. For the remaining two elections held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff accompanied OPM observers in monitoring the elections.

### Attachment III

**Table 2: Court-Ordered Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003**

State	Election jurisdictions monitored during			
	2000	2001	2002	2003
California	Alameda County <sup>a</sup>			
Illinois		Cicero (Cook County)		Cicero (Cook County) <sup>b</sup>
Louisiana	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>	<sup>c</sup>
Michigan	City of Hamtramck	City of Hamtramck	City of Hamtramck	City of Hamtramck
New Jersey	Passaic County	Passaic County	Passaic County	Passaic County <sup>d</sup>
New Mexico	Bernalillo County		Bernalillo County	
	Cibola County		Cibola County	
	Sandoval County		Sandoval County	
	Socorro County		Socorro County	
Pennsylvania		Reading (Berks County) <sup>b</sup>	Reading (Berks County) <sup>b</sup>	Reading (Berks County)
Utah	San Juan County <sup>e</sup>		San Juan County <sup>e</sup>	
<b>Total jurisdictions</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>

Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section.

<sup>a</sup>The court order for Alameda County, California, was in effect until January 22, 2001.

<sup>b</sup>Elections were monitored by DOJ attorneys and professional staff only, not OPM federal observers.

<sup>c</sup>A court order for St. Landry Parish was entered into on December 5, 1979. Data from the Voting Section shows that as of August 26, 2003, the court order was still in effect and that no elections were monitored at this parish during calendar years 2000 through 2003.

<sup>d</sup>Four elections were held in Passaic County, New Jersey, in calendar year 2003. Only DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored one of the four elections, held on May 13, 2003. For the remaining three elections held that year, DOJ attorneys and professional staff accompanied OPM observers in monitoring the elections.

<sup>e</sup>The court order for San Juan County, Utah, was in effect until December 31, 2002.

### Attachment III

**Table 3: Other Election Jurisdictions Monitored during Calendar Years 2000 through 2003**

State	Election jurisdictions monitored during			
	2000	2001	2002	2003
California			San Francisco County	San Francisco County
Connecticut			Waterbury (New Haven County)	
Florida		Osceola County	Osceola County	
			Duval County	Duval County
			Miami-Dade County	Miami-Dade County
			Century (Escambia County)	
			Orange County	
Georgia	Putnam County		Atlanta (Fulton County)	
Hawaii				Honolulu County
Kentucky				Jefferson County
Louisiana			St. Martinville (St. Martin Parish)	Baker (East Baton Rouge Parish)
			Winnsboro (Franklin Parish)	Tangipahoa Parish
Massachusetts		Lawrence (Essex County)		Lawrence (Essex County)
Michigan	Flint (Genesee County)			
Missouri		St. Louis	St. Louis	St. Louis
New Jersey			Hudson County	
			Middlesex County	
New Mexico	McKinley County <sup>a</sup>		San Juan County	
New York		Queens County <sup>a</sup>	Queens County	New York City (Queens County)
		Suffolk County	Suffolk County	Brentwood Union Free School District (Suffolk County)
Ohio		Maple Heights (Cuyahoga County)		
South Carolina	Marion County			
Texas	Forth Worth (Tarrant County)	Bexar County	Kenedy ISD (Karnes County)	Harris County
		Comal County	Seagraves (Gaines County)	Moore County
		Guadalupe County		
<b>Total jurisdictions</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>

Source: GAO's analysis of election monitoring data provided by DOJ's Voting Section.

Note: DOJ attorneys and professional staff monitored the election jurisdictions shown in this table unless otherwise noted.

<sup>a</sup>OPM federal observers also monitored elections in these counties even though the counties are not under Attorney General-certification or court order.

**Attachment IV**

**Summaries of Election-Related Preliminary Investigation, Matters, and Cases Initiated from November 2000 to December 2003**

**Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November or December 2000**

No.	Matter/Case	Jurisdiction	Date matter initiated	DJ No.
1	Matter	Florida	December 2000	No <sup>a</sup>
2	Matter	Hillsborough County, Florida	November 2000	No <sup>a</sup>
3	Matter	Palm Beach County, Florida	November 2000	Yes
4	Matter	Several counties in Florida	November 2000	Yes
5	Matter	DeKalb County, Georgia	December 2000	Yes
6	Matter	Gwinnett County, Georgia	November 2000	Yes
7	Case	St. Louis, Missouri	November 2000 (case filed in August 2002)	Yes

Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division.

<sup>a</sup>For the matters that the Voting Section initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially used a general DJ number for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual DJ number.

**Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Case Initiated during November or December 2000**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
1. The Voting Section received a large number of complaints alleging that Florida voters arrived at the polls expecting to be properly registered to vote, but were told that their names were not on the voter rolls. Some people who tried to vote but whose names were not on the voter rolls were often told to stand in another line so election officials could be called to verify their registrations, but many voters alleged that office phones were busy all day and registrations could not be verified. Some voters apparently left and some remained at the polls until they closed, at which time they were apparently told they could not vote because the polls were closed.	Voting Section staff contacted individuals mentioned in complaints that the NAACP had forwarded to determine the nature of their alleged registration problems. Voting Section staff monitored election-related hearings and lawsuits in Florida to see what steps the state was going to take. The Voting Section reviewed election reform legislation that Florida enacted in 2001.	Interviews by Voting Section staff with individuals mentioned in the complaints did not reveal a distinct pattern of registration problems in any one Florida county sufficient to warrant litigation, but taken as a whole the registration complaints seemed to indicate general problems with the state of compliance with NVRA provisions for clarity and processing of voter registration forms, transmission of the forms to election officials, education of registration personnel, adherence to NVRA registration deadlines, maintenance of registration lists, ability to verify registration at the polls, and education of voters, state registration personnel, election officials, and poll workers.	Florida enacted election reform legislation in 2001 requiring, among other things, that the state implement a statewide voter registration database, permit provisional voting, and provide funds to counties for voter education and poll worker training. The Voting Section reviewed this law under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and precleared it on March 28, 2002. With respect to this investigation, the Voting Section noted that these reforms should help address the problems alleged to have occurred in 2000. While the Voting Section further noted that the

**Attachment IV**

			<p>new state legislation did not appear specifically to address all the NVRA-related issues, such as the voter registration process and education of motor vehicle agency and other state agency employees regarding state registration procedures and requirements in federal law, such issues could be addressed through design and implementation of the forthcoming election procedures to carry out the requirements of the new law. Therefore, the Voting Section determined that it would monitor Florida's NVRA actions in the future in light of the new state legislation and ongoing federal legislative efforts in election reform which might also impact Florida's election procedures.</p> <p>The Voting Section closed the matter because, based on its monitoring of the situation and the provisions in the state law pertinent to registration that had been precleared, it concluded that the problems which occurred in the 2000 election were being adequately addressed.</p>
<p>2. The NAACP National Voter Fund alleged (1) that on Election Day 2000, sheriff's deputies in marked cars in Hillsborough County, Florida, blocked access to a polling place, (2) that their presence</p>	<p>Voting Section staff met with, among others, officials from the county sheriff's office and several local residents, and spoke with a poll watcher to gather additional</p>	<p>The sheriff's office reported that the presence of sheriff's deputies near the polling place was related to a burglary nearby. One of the sheriff's deputies</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because the complaint lacked merit since there was no evidence on any of the</p>



**Attachment IV**

<p>had an intimidating effect on voters, and (3) that at least on one occasion they harassed a voter. An African-American man approached sheriff's deputies after they left the scene of a burglary complaining that he was not allowed to vote.</p>	<p>observations.</p>	<p>learned two days after the election that the same man who had approached the deputies on Election Day returned to the polling place and successfully voted. A poll worker observed the presence of the sheriff's cars around the same time they were responding to the burglary, and observed that no voter had been deterred from voting due to the police activity.</p>	<p>allegations raised.</p>
<p>3. It was alleged that the design of the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County, Florida, violated federal voting rights laws.</p>	<p>The Voting Section opened a matter related to this issue and reviewed federal law for which the Section had enforcement authority to determine if any action was appropriate.</p>	<p>The Voting Section determined that there was no basis for asserting federal jurisdiction.</p>	<p>The Voting Section concluded that because it had no jurisdiction concerning this matter, no further action was warranted. In addition, according to the Voting Section, the new Florida election reform law should help to alleviate faulty ballot design by providing for greater oversight of ballot design.</p>
<p>4. Four state troopers with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ran a driver's license checkpoint on Election Day 2000 in Leon County, Florida. This checkpoint was located near (about a mile from) a voting precinct. Another checkpoint was held in Bay and Escambia Counties. According to a highway patrol official, this checkpoint was not located near a voting precinct.</p>	<p>The Voting Section opened a matter to investigate this issue and asked the Florida State Office of the Attorney General about the checkpoint in Leon County. A Voting Section attorney also spoke with an African-American voter who was stopped at one of the driver's license checkpoints.</p>	<p>The Voting Section's investigation revealed that the Florida Highway Patrol had set up a traffic check stop close to a polling place (about a mile away) located in a predominantly African-American neighborhood. The Voting Section investigation also indicated that the troopers' traffic stop plan had not been pre-approved by their commander, as is the standard procedure. Further investigation revealed that the traffic checkpoint was in effect for about 3 hours, and a higher number of white drivers were stopped than African-American drivers. According the Voting Section, an African-American voter who was</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because there was no evidence of intimidation or racial intent to affect or intimidate voters.</p>

**Attachment IV**

		<p>stopped was treated courteously and proceeded to vote without incident.</p>	
<p>5. A U.S. Representative raised concerns regarding long voting delays in predominantly African-American precincts in DeKalb County, Georgia during the November 2000 election. It was alleged that there were no corresponding delays in majority white precincts. In one predominantly African-American precinct, several hundred voters apparently left the precinct without voting after waiting in line for several hours. In districts with a majority of white residents, voting lines apparently moved quickly with some people being able to vote in less than 15 minutes. In addition, two people complained about possible voting irregularities during a March 2001 election.</p>	<p>A Voting Section attorney met with the following in Georgia to address these concerns: (1) the DeKalb County Elections Supervisor, (2) the Chairman of the DeKalb County Elections Board, (3) the Gwinnett County Elections Supervisor, (4) the president of the DeKalb County NAACP, (5) the Assistant DeKalb County Attorney, and (6) one of the representative's staff members. The Voting Section attorney received and reviewed documents from both counties' elections departments regarding the November 2000 election.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorney requested additional documents from the Assistant DeKalb County Attorney and DeKalb County Elections Supervisor to determine if there was an unequal division of resources among African-American and white districts. These documents outlined the budget for expenses related to the elections from 1998 through 2000. The Voting Section attorney also spoke with the president of the DeKalb County NAACP and the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorney spoke with the two persons alleging fraud during the March 2001 election.</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney's analysis of the documents that DeKalb County provided revealed that most of the county's polling places that stayed open past closing time were located in majority African-American precincts. The polls' extended hours almost uniformly resulted from there being large numbers of people in line as well as insufficient numbers of poll workers and voting machines. The attorney also determined that there had been no unequal division of electoral resources between majority white and majority African-American precincts.</p> <p>According to investigations of the November 2000 election by the county's elections department, the area manager and his assistants at the main precinct of concern failed to contact the precinct office about the long lines and insufficient voting machines. The former area manager also denied the poll workers' requests for additional voting machines, stating none were available. The president of the DeKalb County NAACP, staff in the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, and the DeKalb County Elections Supervisor did not receive complaints related to Election Day in DeKalb County.</p> <p>With respect to the March 2001 allegations, the Voting Section attorney noted that the two</p>	<p>The county implemented the following changes for the March 2001 election: (1) increased the number of voting machines, (2) assigned additional poll workers and managers, (3) assigned at least 10 additional staff members to answer telephones at the Elections Department and installed 10 more telephone lines, and (4) gave the Elections Department and area managers cell phones in case regular telephone lines were busy. The Voting Section determined that a dramatic improvement resulted from these remedial actions and, as a result, closed the matter.</p>

**Attachment IV**

		<p>persons could not identify the precincts where alleged irregularities occurred, and that they did not have allegations of racial intimidation or vote suppression. The Voting Section attorney determined that their complaints seemed to concern Georgia state law, suggested that they explore their state law remedies, suggested that they contact the county elections department and the office of Georgia's Secretary of State, and asked them to keep the Voting Section attorney informed of developments.</p>	
<p>6. The Voting Section received information that people in Gwinnett County, Georgia who had registered to vote via the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) were not on the voter registration rolls and were not allowed to vote. DPS operated vehicle registration sites in Georgia. Subsequently, DPS began the process of transitioning National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) responsibilities to the state's newly created Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). It was alleged that voters were turned away from the polls and were not offered provisional ballots. Some voters were told to go to the county registration office, but officials there told them they were not allowed to vote.</p>	<p>The Voting Section spoke with staff in the Georgia Attorney General's office and the Georgia DPS and DMV, a voter who raised the allegations, and the Deputy Director of Elections in the Secretary of State's Office. The Voting Section monitored the transition of NVRA responsibilities from DPS to the new DMV from April 2001 to April 2002.</p>	<p>The Voting Section's investigation revealed that the problem likely arose from the DPS paperless system to obtain and renew a driver's license. The process seemed to result in people believing they had been registered to vote when they had not. A person who indicated the intention to register to vote did not receive any confirmation at the time of the transaction.</p> <p>The Voting Section's investigation revealed that since DPS implemented a paperless system in 1996, the percentage of those who registered to vote at DPS sites when they applied or renewed their licenses had dropped almost every year. There was also evidence that DPS officials knew of concerns regarding the agency's paperless registration system from its implementation.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter in April 2002 mostly because the state had created a new agency, the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety, to which responsibility for voter registration was in the process of being transitioned. The Voting Section determined this system would remedy the problem.</p>
<p>7. DOJ, on behalf of the United States, alleged that the St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners' (referred to hereafter as the Board) placement of eligible voters on</p>	<p>Following an investigation, DOJ filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2002. On the same date,</p>	<p>The Voting Section alleged that the state was in violation of NVRA and filed a complaint.</p>	<p>The consent order gives court jurisdiction over the proceeding until January 31, 2005. The consent order</p>

**Attachment IV**

<p>inactive status, when combined with election-day procedures that inactive voters were required to follow to restore their active voter status and vote during the November 2000 and March 2001 elections, constituted a removal of those voters from the voter registration rolls in violation of Section 8 of NVRA. As of the November 2000 general election, more than 54,000 registered voters in St. Louis had been designated as inactive and excluded from the lists of eligible voters following a series of mail canvasses that the Board conducted of its voter registration rolls. These mail canvasses did not include the notices required by Section 8(d)(2) of NVRA. The Board did not make an effort to notify inactive voters that their registration status had changed, that their names would not appear on the voter registration lists, or that they would face more administrative efforts on election day before being permitted to vote.</p> <p>As a result, certain eligible, but inactive voters, were not able to vote in the November 2000 general election and March 2001 municipal primary election due to the lack of an adequate infrastructure (i.e., insufficient phone lines, working telephones, and staff) in place to enable voters to complete the verification procedures required by the Board on election day. For the November 2000 election, over 300 eligible inactive voters were able to obtain authorization to vote after going to the Board's headquarters as instructed by the election judges.</p>	<p>DOJ entered into a consent order with the city of St. Louis.</p>		<p>requires the Board to initiate procedures to remedy the problems that occurred during the November 2000 election, such as improved methods of notifying voters who are moved to an inactive status, improved methods of canvassing, and improved resources to process eligible voters not included on the rolls on Election Day. This relief included requiring that every polling place have a complete list of registered voters, including inactive voters, and a polling place locator to assist voters in finding their correct precincts.</p> <p>The consent decree is valid until January 31, 2005. The case remains open to monitor implementation of the consent order.</p>
---	---	--	---

## Attachment IV

**Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001**

No.	Matter/Case	Jurisdiction	Date matter initiated	DJ No.
1	Matter	Florida	March 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
2	Matter	Florida	June 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
3	Matter	Florida	June 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
4	Matter	Florida	August 2001 <sup>b</sup>	No <sup>c</sup>
5	Matter	Broward County, Florida	October 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
6	Matter	Miami-Dade County, Florida	June 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
7	Matter	Miami-Dade County, Florida	June 2001 <sup>b</sup>	Yes
8	Matter (election monitoring)	New York, New York	July 2001	Yes
9	Matter	Georgetown County, South Carolina	April 2001	Yes
10	Matter	Seagraves, Texas	July 2001	Yes
11	Case	Miami-Dade County, Florida	March 2001 (case filed in June 2002) <sup>b</sup>	Yes
12	Case	Orange County, Florida	June 2001 (case filed in June 2002) <sup>b</sup>	Yes
13	Case	Osceola County, Florida	June 2001 (case filed in June 2002) <sup>b</sup>	Yes
14	Case	Berks County, Pennsylvania	March 2001 (case filed in February 2003)	Yes
15	Case	Tennessee	April 2001 (case filed in September 2002)	Yes

Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division.

<sup>b</sup> Each of these Florida matters was initiated in the period shortly after the November 2000 election—i.e., in November or December 2000—and was reported under the general DJ number for Florida discussed previously (see note a under the summary table for November and December 2000 and note c below). The above dates are the dates they received individual DJ numbers.

<sup>c</sup> For the matters that the Voting Section initiated in Florida after the 2000 election, the Voting Section initially used a general DJ number for all work on investigations and inquiries related to the Florida election. This number was opened in November 2000. Subsequently, the Voting Section assigned separate DJ numbers for individual matters. The 2000 matters in Florida and Hillsborough County, Florida, were inadvertently not given an individual DJ number.

## Attachment IV

### Summary of Election-Related Closed Matters and Open Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2001

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>1. There were allegations made by students at Florida A&amp;M University (FAMU) in Tallahassee (Leon County), Florida, and Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach, Florida, regarding discriminatory treatment of African-American students in the registration process or at the polls. First-time voters, apparently unfamiliar with the registration process, had greater difficulty registering to vote. Older students did not seem to have such difficulty.</p>	<p>The Voting Section's investigation consisted of phone interviews with Bethune-Cookman students, on-campus interviews of FAMU students and student government leaders, and a review of statements taken by a representative of the Service Employees International Union legal department working in association with the NAACP.</p> <p>A Voting Section attorney interviewed three students on FAMU's campus who claimed to experience difficulty voting, but were able to vote. The Voting Section attorney left his contact information with FAMU's student government association for any individuals who wanted to give statements regarding voting problems but could not meet with the attorney.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorney attempted to contact all ten students from Bethune-Cookman, but was only able to speak with three. The attorney sent letters to the remaining students but never received responses to the letters.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorney followed up with his contacts at FAMU, but the Voting Section did not receive any response from students to its efforts to conduct further inquiries. The student government association</p>	<p>The Voting Section determined that the problems were likely attributable to voter confusion, not racial animosity. The Voting Section noted that the incidents of the three FAMU students who successfully voted were isolated incidents, and since each student ultimately voted, the problems they suggested did not suggest a pattern of intimidation or attempted vote denial.</p> <p>The Voting Section concluded that most of the allegations were likely to have been the result of students not being familiar with the voting process. Many students had registered at their permanent home addresses and did not understand they had to re-register in Leon County. The Voting Section found that voter inexperience and confusion were to blame at Bethune-Cookman, not any pattern of discriminatory treatment.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because it lacked merit based on the evidence gathered during the investigation.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>also posted and distributed flyers and sent out internet notices with the attorney's contact information. Neither the attorney nor the student association at FAMU received additional allegations of voting irregularities.</p>		
<p>2. Beginning in 1999, under Florida state law, the state contracted with a firm to compare names of registered voters with names of convicted felons who under Florida law were disqualified from voting. The state elections division sent lists of felon names for each of Florida's 67 counties to election officials in those counties for investigation and purging. The Voting Section was concerned that county and state actions with regards to the purging process may have been flawed and impermissible under NVRA. The Voting Section questioned whether eligible voters had been inadvertently removed from the voter rolls.</p>	<p>The Voting Section reviewed testimony from Florida election officials and representatives of the company that compiled the database and obtained information on how the lists of felons' names were matched to voter registration lists. The Voting Section also did extensive additional investigation to determine whether the method in which Florida compiled a list of felons and how they purged these felons violated any of the statutes enforced by the Voting Section.</p> <p>In addition, the Voting Section reviewed Florida's 2001 election reform law pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. This review included provisions of the new law related to the voter purge procedures that were the subject of the investigation.</p>	<p>The evidence gathered by the Voting Section showed that the matching at the state level was set up in a way that it captured names that were less than definite matches. The Voting Section also learned that after receiving the state-generated list, counties' actions varied. For example, some counties refused to use the list because they perceived it to contain many errors. Other counties sent letters to all the people on the state's list telling them that their names were matched to those of disqualified felons, and they would be required to show their eligibility to vote or be removed from the rolls. The Voting Section determined that evidence gathered for this matter was inconclusive, but showed there was a possibility that voters could have been removed in violation of federal law.</p> <p>With respect to the Section 5 review of the 2001 election reform law, this law was precleared on March 28, 2002 after careful review. Preclearance was granted only after receiving explicit assurances from the Attorney General of Florida describing how the law would be implemented with respect to voter purge lists</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter in April 2002. The closing memo noted that the new statute appears to require no additional procedures for accurate name matching compared to the old law. It also noted that the new statute appeared to codify a procedure used by many counties under prior law where voters whose names are matched by the state must affirmatively prove their eligibility to avoid removal.</p> <p>However, the Voting Section closing memo also noted that the new voter purge procedures (which included the assurances made by the Attorney General of Florida to protect voters from erroneous purging) had been precleared on March 28, 2002. It further stated that the Florida felon purge statute in effect at the time of the 2000 election no longer existed and that any litigation against it based on how that law was implemented would be moot. Based on these two factors, the matter was closed. The memo also stated that the Voting Section may open a new investigation depending on any information received regarding the operation of the new statute and related regulations.</p> <p>Finally, the closing memo</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
		<p>generated by the state pursuant to the new state law. These assurances included (1) a statement that there would not be a presumption in favor of the accuracy of the statewide database, and any presumption would be in favor of the voter and (2) the appearance of a voter's name on any voter purge list of potentially ineligible voters generated by the state would not by itself confirm a voter's ineligibility, and that the burden of determining ineligibility was on county supervisors of elections, a burden which must meet the highest degree of proof. These assurances were specifically noted when preclearance was issued by the Voting Section.</p>	<p>also made note of pending litigation in the case of <i>NAACP v. Harris</i>, which included allegations that the voter purge list used in 2000 violated the NVRA. Subsequent to the April 2002 closing of this matter, a settlement was reached in this case which required new procedures for how the state was to complete its voter purge lists in the future. This change in voter purging procedures was precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in 2003.</p>
<p>3. A newspaper article provided to DOJ by a member of the U.S. Senate provided information that officials in several Florida counties disabled a feature in optical scan voting machines used during the November 2000 election to detect ballots spoiled by over-voting and allow voters to correct the error.</p>	<p>A Voting Section attorney analyzed rates of ballot spoilage in counties that had disabled the spoilage detection function in their optical scan machines and compared those rates to those of ballot spoilage in counties that had not disabled this function.</p>	<p>The investigation found that Florida counties with optical scan machines that activated the spoilage detection technology had lower rates of ballot spoilage than counties that did not have or did not use the technology. Some counties that had this detection feature disabled it on their voting machines. There were also isolated instances where the technology was either disabled or failed to function properly. The Voting Section determined that there was no evidence that the disabling of this feature was done with a discriminatory effect or purpose.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed this matter because it found no evidence indicating a violation of federal law. Moreover, election reform legislation enacted in Florida in May of 2001 requires all counties to acquire voting machines with precinct-based spoilage detection technology by September 2002. The election reform law also requires counties to activate this technology during voting. The Attorney General, under Section 5 of the VRA, precleared election procedures provided for in this legislation.</p>
<p>4. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report that posed questions regarding</p>	<p>The Voting Section reviewed the findings of the Commission's report regarding ballot</p>	<p>Several analyses suggested patterns of racial disparity in the ballot rejection practices</p>	<p>The Voting Section concluded that there was no basis for bringing a Section 2 lawsuit against</p>



**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>spoiled ballots in Florida during the November 2000 election. The Commission questioned whether the racial disparity in spoiled ballots that occurred in Florida in 2000 was a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Commission stated that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) should specifically investigate whether the racial disparity in spoiled ballots violated Section 2.</p>	<p>rejection disparity and several newspaper studies of the spoilage issue. It then prepared a factual and legal analysis of issues raised in the Commission's report to determine if a Section 2 violation had occurred.</p>	<p>of a few Florida counties during one election. However, the Voting Section determined that the disparity alone did not meet the standards for a Section 2 lawsuit. The Voting Section noted that more investigation, analysis, and careful thought would have to be given to the causes of ballot rejection problems in Florida, the actual level of racial disparities, and the role played by state and county officials before a decision could be made concerning a Section 2 violation.</p>	<p>Florida on the basis of the evidence of racial disparities found in spoilage rates. Furthermore, it was determined that because Florida's 2001 election reform law required new election machines, significant steps had been taken by Florida towards remedying the election problems with respect to voting machines. The Voting Section also concluded that it would make sense to monitor the actions of Florida and its counties over the subsequent few years to see whether they would follow through in acquiring new voting machines with error detection technologies and educating voters to see what impact such actions would have on ballot rejection rates.</p>
<p>5. DOJ received allegations of inaccessible polling places and voting booths in Broward County, Florida.</p>	<p>The Voting Section opened a matter and looked into the county's compliance with the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (VAEHA). The Voting Section sent a letter to the Broward County Supervisor of Elections requesting specific information regarding procedures in place to ensure the physical accessibility of polling places for federal elections pursuant to VAEHA.</p> <p>Attorneys from the Voting Section and the Civil Rights Division's Disability Rights Section met with the county supervisor of elections and the supervisor's attorney to discuss physical accessibility of polling places and</p>	<p>Based on information that the county provided, the Voting Section found that the county conducted polling place surveys in 1999 and conducted another survey devised to address the problem of disabled voters' access to the polls. The investigation revealed that the people conducting the surveys had no training in accessibility standards. The county provided the Voting Section attorney with a memo and a plan stating that Florida intended to purchase new touch-screen voting machines with an audio component for the blind or visually impaired, with one such voting machine available per precinct.</p>	<p>As a result of the problems experienced in the 2000 election, the Florida legislature enacted changes to its accessibility requirements for polling places and voting machines. In light of this and the Voting Section's determination that the new Florida law went further than the requirements in VAEHA, the investigation was closed.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>purchase of new voting machines. The Voting Section and Disability Rights Section's attorneys requested documentation such as copies of county surveys covering accessibility procedures, a list of polling place changes spurred by accessibility concerns; a list of disability community contacts with whom officials from the office of the county supervisor of elections met, and procedures for reassignment or curbside voting. The county provided both attorneys with a demonstration of the new touch-screen voting machines with an audio component for the blind or visually impaired. The Voting Section attorney also contacted the county supervisor of election's attorney requesting information on VAEHA compliance.</p>		
<p>6. It was alleged that a crowd of persons attempted to intimidate election officials on the canvassing board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, during the presidential vote recount after the November 2000 election. It was alleged that this group's activities at the county courthouse during the recount intimidated the canvassing board into abandoning the recount.</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney reviewed the allegations along with numerous accounts of events that transpired that day.</p>	<p>Based on the information gathered, the Voting Section determined that no cause of action existed under the civil enforcement provisions of the federal voting laws that the Voting Section is charged with enforcing.</p>	<p>The Voting Section concluded that no further investigation was warranted and closed the matter.</p>
<p>7. There were allegations made after the November 2000 election that ballot boxes in two predominantly minority precincts in Miami-Dade County, Florida, had not been picked up on</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney examined voter turnout data for the two precincts in question. The Voting Section attorney also held discussions with the First Assistant County</p>	<p>The discussions that the Voting Section conducted with counsel for Miami-Dade County indicated that all of the county's ballot boxes had been accounted for on that day. According to the county</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because it lacked merit. According to the Voting Section, the evidence that the Voting Section collected made it seem doubtful that there were any missing ballot</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
Election Day, and that they were allegedly later found in the polling places.	Attorney in Miami-Dade County, who in turn contacted the county supervisor of elections.	supervisor of elections, the boxes that were later located in the two precincts contained election supplies, not ballots. Analysis of data from the two precincts indicated that both precincts reported voter turnout rates in the expected range given the county's overall turnout rate.	boxes.
<p>8. The Voting Section opened this matter in August 2001 to initiate the monitoring of an election in New York City in November 2001 on the basis of observations made during the November 2000 election. Thirty federal observers and seven DOJ staff members monitored polling place procedures during municipal general elections in 2001 in Kings County (also known as Brooklyn) and in Bronx County. The Attorney General had previously certified both counties for federal observers pursuant to Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act. Also, 17 federal observers and 5 Voting Section attorneys monitored polling place procedures during the general election in 2002 in Brooklyn.</p>	<p>In pre-election activities, two Civil Rights Division attorneys met with officials from the New York City Board of Elections to discuss concerns about preparations for the election, including the need for poll worker training for the election, the need for voting machines to accommodate the number of registered voters, the need for Spanish-language voter registration materials for poll workers to distribute minority language assistance, and consolidation of polling places. A Voting Section attorney also attended four poll-worker training classes. After the election, the Voting Section attorneys met with several Board of Elections officials to debrief them.</p>	<p>Thirty federal observers monitored activities at 31 polling places in Bronx County and 12 polling places in Brooklyn County during the municipal general elections. Three staff members from DOJ's Civil Rights Division and one AUSA for the Southern District of New York traveled with the observers to provide additional monitoring. Two Voting Section staff members visited six polling places in both counties. During the election, observers found that materials to be displayed to inform Spanish-speaking voters of assistance to interpret the ballot were not always clear or in public view at nearly half of the polling places in both counties. The Board of Election officials were informed of this and took action. These officials noted that it was up to each polling place inspector to display the materials they are given. Poll workers were observed asking voters for identification, which was in violation of New York State law; Board of Election officials were notified of this and went to the polling place to address the issue. DOJ monitors did not witness any Spanish-speaking poll workers at the 12</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because the monitoring of the election was completed. Voting Section staff could not comprehensively identify failure by individual poll workers to post or provide all materials to Spanish-speaking voters because of the large number of election districts—nearly 2,000—and the small number of observers. However, the Voting Section found that the Board of Elections was very responsive to all of the Voting Section's concerns and sent Board officials to places where problems arose, usually within 30 minutes.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
		<p>polling locations visited in Brooklyn; this was discussed with Board of Election officials; however, DOJ officials found that appropriate language assistance was available in both counties.</p> <p>Seventeen federal observers and five attorneys from the Civil Rights Division monitored polling place procedures during the general election in Kings County.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorney who attended four poll-worker training classes found that the classes appropriately addressed minority language issues and assistance.</p>	
<p>9. The Voting Section received an allegation from an African-American voter that a supervisor at a voting precinct in Georgetown County, South Carolina, discriminated against African-American voters during the 2000 presidential election. The voter alleged that the supervisor treated African-American voters in a rude and discriminating manner. In talking to the complainant and others, it was learned that there were also alleged voter registration problems during the 2000 election related to precinct changes and the local DMV.</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney interviewed officials with the Georgetown County Board of Registration and Elections, representatives of the Republican and Democratic parties, voters, and an attorney representing the county. The Voting Section attorney also interviewed an official who managed the Georgetown County DMV office regarding the second-hand allegations from a Democratic party representative regarding possible registration problems at the local DMV.</p> <p>After interviewing the DMV official and examining the forms that the DMV provides to drivers applying for new licenses to simultaneously allow them to register to vote, the Voting Section</p>	<p>Voting Section staff wrote to the Voter Registration and Election Commission for Georgetown County outlining the allegations concerning the rude treatment by the poll worker and the Voting Section's findings and asked the commission how it planned to respond.</p> <p>The county's Voter Registration and Election Commission responded in writing that the election supervisor was informed by letter that she would be reassigned to another precinct and not permitted to serve in a supervisory capacity for the June 11, 2002, election. She decided not to work the June 2002 election.</p> <p>Other issues examined in this investigation were not raised with the county in this letter. With respect to the precinct change allegations, the Voting Section learned that confusion as to proper</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter on March 9, 2004. As of that date, the Voting Section had not received additional complaints concerning the treatment of African-American voters in Georgetown County or about voting registration issues previously investigated. According to the complainant, the election held on June 11, 2002, went smoothly.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>attorney noted that the form on the DMV driver's license application did not contain a box for people to check if they wanted to register to vote and that this might not adhere to the NVRA provision for a simultaneous process to apply for a driver's license and register to vote. In addition, in the interview with the employee in the local DMV office, the Voting Section attorney learned that they may have been only asking people applying for new drivers' licenses, not people renewing their licenses, if they wanted to register to vote. However, this employee further informed the Voting Section attorney that in October 2000 she received instructions from the head of the state DMV to ask every person who was applying for a driver's license whether he or she wished to register to vote, and she followed that instruction through the election.</p>	<p>voting precincts was likely the result of a change in the method of identifying addresses of voters. With respect to allegations about the DMV procedures, the Voting Section received no complaints from voters who indicated that the alleged problems at the DMV existed or resulted in denying them the right to vote. In addition, after the examination of the DMV forms and interview with the local DMV employee, it was concluded that there did not appear to be a violation of the NVRA.</p>	
<p>10. The Voting Section received a complaint alleging that the Seagraves Independent School District and the City of Seagraves, both in Texas, held elections without bilingual judges or bilingual training.</p>	<p>A Voting Section attorney visited Seagraves and the Seagraves Independent School Board. The Voting Section also contacted a newspaper to review published articles regarding the school board election.</p>	<p>Information in a newspaper article indicated that the allegations were untrue, and that all election material was produced in English and Spanish. The Voting Section attorney was told that confusion existed for all voters because of the present districting system.</p> <p>The Seagraves City Secretary wrote a letter to the Voting Section attorney stating that each year the city names a Hispanic judge who is also bilingual. The City</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney suggested that the town should make an effort to educate voters of district boundaries by methods other than newspaper advertising. Subsequent to the election, the city of Seagraves sent a map of district boundaries and candidates running in each district to each city household. The Voting Section closed the matter.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
		Secretary also provided the Voting Section attorney with minutes of prior city council meetings highlighting the nomination and approval of the election judges, and a sample ballot printed in both English and Spanish.	
11. During the November 2000 election, Miami-Dade County, Florida, allegedly engaged in practices that prevented the county's Creole-speaking Haitian-American voters with limited ability to speak English from securing assistance at the polls. In circumstances where the county permitted voter assistance from persons of the voters' choice, the scope of the assistance was limited (e.g., standing next to voters during poll worker demonstrations) and of little value to voters once they entered the voting booths.	After a full investigation, the Voting Section initiated litigation against Miami-Dade County because of its alleged violation of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Prior to initiating litigation, the Voting Section conducted an investigation of the county's voter assistance practices during the 2000 election. DOJ filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court in the Southern District for Florida on June 7, 2002.	Evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated that Creole-speaking Haitian-American voters at several precincts were denied assistance from persons of their choice in violation of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Oftentimes, only poll workers, who did not speak Creole, were permitted to assist the voters, and they limited their assistance to voter demonstrations outside the voting booths. The Voting Section did not find evidence that noncompliance with Section 208 was the result of intentional discrimination. In this regard, it was noted that the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners passed ordinances in 1999 and 2000 mandating that Haitian-Creole ballot translations be available in voting booths located at precincts where "significant" numbers of Haitian-American people vote.	A consent order was entered into on June 17, 2002, that, in part, prohibited the county from denying Haitian-American voters assistance from persons of their choice and mandated that the county take certain steps to prevent violations of Section 208 and to redress the harm caused these voters, such as modifying poll worker training to include instruction on how to handle requests for language assistance. The consent order is in effect through December 31, 2005. The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent order.
12. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that various election practices and procedures in Orange County, Florida, unlawfully denied or abridged the voting rights of Spanish-speaking citizens. The challenged practices concerned the alleged failure of the county to: (1) provide an	After investigating these allegations, DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on June 28, 2002, and entered into a consent decree with Orange County on October 9, 2002.	In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Orange County violated VRA Sections 203 and 208.	The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree permits DOJ to monitor elections in Orange County from October 9, 2002 until January 31, 2005. The consent decree also mandates policies and procedures that Orange County must adopt with

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
adequate number of bilingual poll workers trained to assist Hispanic voters on Election Day; (2) ensure that poll officials allow Spanish-speaking voters to have persons of their choice assist them in casting their ballots; and (3) translate certain written election materials into Spanish.			regards to treatment of Spanish-speaking voters. The consent decree is valid until January 31, 2005. DOJ did not contend that Orange County's failure to adhere to VRA Sections 203 and 208 was the result of intentional discrimination.
13. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that Osceola County, Florida, engaged in various election practices and procedures that unlawfully denied Spanish-speaking citizens an opportunity equal to that of other citizens to vote. The challenged practices concerned: (1) the failure of poll officials to communicate effectively to Spanish-speaking voters necessary information concerning their eligibility to vote, voter registration status, identification requirements, and polling place changes and assignments; (2) the refusal of poll officials to allow certain Spanish-speaking voters assistance in voting by persons of their choice; and (3) hostile remarks by poll officials directed towards Hispanic voters with limited English proficiency.	After investigating the matter, DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on June 28, 2002, and entered into a consent decree with Osceola County on July 22, 2002.	In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Osceola County violated VRA Sections 2 and 208.	The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree allows DOJ to monitor elections held in Osceola County from the date of the consent decree through January 31, 2005. It specifies procedures that the Osceola County Board of Elections must implement with regards to the treatment of Spanish-speaking voters and efforts the county must engage in to facilitate voting by Spanish-speaking voters. The consent decree is valid through January 31, 2005. DOJ did not contend that Osceola County intended to deny Spanish-speaking voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
14. It was alleged that, in conducting elections in Reading City, Pennsylvania, Berks County denied Hispanic citizens with limited English proficiency an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect the representatives of their choice.	After extensive investigation, which included the monitoring of several elections held in the county, the Voting Section initiated litigation against Berks County because of its alleged violation of several provisions of the Voting Rights Act. DOJ filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District	In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that actions contributing to the denial by Berks County to provide Hispanic citizens with limited English proficiency an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect the representatives of their choice included the following: poll officials directed hostile remarks	On July 17, 2003, DOJ filed a motion for (1) permanent injunction and entry of final judgment that sought to permanently enjoin the county's conduct of elections using policies, practices, procedures, and methods that violate certain VRA requirements and (2) the court to issue an order authorizing OPM to appoint federal

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>of Pennsylvania on February 25, 2003.</p>	<p>at, and acted in a hostile manner toward, Hispanic voters to deter them from voting and make them feel unwelcome at the polls; poll officials engaged in election practices including the failure to communicate effectively with Spanish-speaking voters regarding necessary information about their eligibility to vote, voter registration status, identification requirements, and polling place changes and assignments, and turning away Hispanic voters at the 2001 and 2002 elections; and Berks County failed to recruit, train, and maintain an adequate pool of Hispanic and bilingual poll officials despite their knowledge of the needs of Hispanic voters with limited English proficiency.</p>	<p>examiners pursuant to VRA to serve in Berks County through June 30, 2007. The court granted the United States' motion on August 20, 2003. The case remains open for monitoring and several elections have been monitored since entry of the consent decree.</p>
<p>15. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that the state of Tennessee engaged in practices that unlawfully denied certain citizens full and complete opportunities to register to vote in elections for federal office as mandated by NVRA. The challenged practices included the failure of the state and agency officials to: (1) provide applications to register to vote simultaneously with applications for motor vehicle driver's licenses (including renewal applications); (2) request only the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent duplicate voter registration and enable state election officials to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and other part</p>	<p>After investigating this matter, DOJ filed a complaint against the state of Tennessee in the U.S. District Court of Tennessee on September 27, 2002. On that same day, the state of Tennessee entered into a consent decree with DOJ.</p>	<p>In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that Tennessee violated provisions in NVRA.</p>	<p>The case is open to monitor implementation of the consent decree. The consent decree requires the state and state agencies to develop uniform procedures with regards to the voter application process and the implementation of NVRA and report progress to DOJ annually while the consent decree is in effect. The consent decree expires on August 1, 2005.</p>



## Attachment IV

<b>Description based on Voting Section information</b>	<b>Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation</b>	<b>Voting Section's assessment of allegations</b>	<b>Disposition by Voting Section</b>
of the election process; (3) distribute voter registration applications with every application for public assistance or services to persons with disabilities; and (4) transmit completed voter registration applications in a timely manner.			

## Attachment IV

### Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2002

No.	Preliminary Investigation/Matter/Case	Jurisdiction	Date investigation or matter initiated	DJ No.
1	Preliminary investigation	Hinds County, Mississippi	November 2002	No
2	Matter (election monitoring)	Apache and Navajo Counties, Arizona	September 2002	Yes
3	Matter (election monitoring)	Broward County, Florida	November 2002	Yes
4	Matter (election monitoring)	Duval County, Florida	November 2002	Yes
5	Matter	Georgia	October 2002	No <sup>d</sup>
6	Matter	Minnesota	October 2002	Yes
7	Matter	New Jersey	October 2002	Yes
8	Matter (election monitoring)	Bexar County, Texas	October 2002	Yes
9	Matter	Hidalgo County, Texas	December 2002	Yes
10	Case	Oklahoma	August 2002 (case filed in September 2002)	Yes
11	Case	Texas	March 2002 (case filed in March 2002)	Yes

Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division.

<sup>d</sup> According to the Voting Section, this matter did not receive a DJ number inadvertently.

### Summary of Election-Related Closed Preliminary Investigation and Matters and Closed Cases Initiated during Calendar Year 2002

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>1. The wife of a soldier from Hinds County, Mississippi, assigned to Guantanamo, Cuba, alleged that her husband and approximately 50 other soldiers from that county did not receive their absentee ballots in the mail. Hinds County acknowledged receiving their requests in mid-September of 2002, and the circuit clerk confirmed they were mailed in the first week of October 2002.</p> <p>The Mississippi Secretary of State's office suggested that the soldiers fax in federal ballots but was not sure the ballots would be counted. That office also suggested to the soldier's wife that she contact the Voting Section. She reported to the Voting Section that soldiers from Madison and Rankin counties, also in Mississippi, did not receive their ballots until after the election. She also contacted the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) for Hinds County.</p>	<p>A Voting Section official discussed the allegation with an official in the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) under the Department of Defense (DOD), who said that someone in Hinds County told FVAP on November 20, 2002, that about 20 ballots had been sent to soldiers in Guantanamo. Voting Section staff also phoned the AUSA in Jackson, Mississippi, and noted in a memo that the AUSA had directed a local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent to interview the chancery clerk, the registrar, and all others in the chain of custody of the ballots. The Voting Section also discussed asking FVAP to monitor transit of absentee ballots to soldiers from Hinds and Brandon Counties</p>	<p>The AUSA told the soldier's wife that an investigation revealed the ballots had been lost in the mail. The FBI agent concluded that the county officials had mailed the ballots to the soldiers, but they had been lost or disappeared. The private company that processed mail for the county told the FBI agent that they were unable to check the zip codes of mail processed on a particular day.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the preliminary investigation after the AUSA concluded, and the Voting Section agreed, that there was no basis for bringing charges against anyone involved in the handling of the ballots because the ballots had been lost in the mail and no further action was needed.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>during the next election in response to the soldier's wife January 2003 request that the Voting Section keep these counties on its "radar screen."</p>		
<p>2. On November 5, 2002, federal election observers and Voting Section staff monitored polling place activities at 21 locations in Apache and Navajo Counties, Arizona. The Attorney General, pursuant to VRA Section 6, had certified these counties for federal observers. Since then, federal observers have documented problems related to the counties' inability to provide consistently effective Navajo language assistance to voters and other related circumstances affecting the Navajo voting population.</p> <p>The Voting Section was concerned about the following issues related to the primary held in September 10, 2002, and the general election held in November 5, 2002: (1) the counties' provision for Navajo language assistance, (2) voters being turned away at the polls, (3) crossover voting, and (4) polls not opening on time. During the 2000 election cycle and 2002 primary, federal observers documented several problems with the counties' provision of Navajo language assistance to voters. The Voting Section suggested that both counties distribute cassette tapes containing Navajo language ballot translations to poll workers. The counties committed to preparing and distributing the tapes to poll workers. Officials from both counties also informed the Voting Section that they would use updated flip charts for the November election. These charts, which were used for the September primary at the Voting Section's suggestion, displayed pictorial representations and written Navajo translations of each of the offices on the primary election ballot.</p> <p>There had been confusion in previous elections among many</p>	<p>In September 2002, the Voting Section met with the Apache County Election Director, the Apache County Deputy County Attorney, the Navajo County Election Director, the Navajo County recorder, and two Navajo County outreach workers to discuss several issues related to elections in the two counties. The Voting Section provided suggestions on how to prevent prior problems from recurring. The Voting Section observed the November 2002 election.</p> <p>The original poll worker training schedules that the two counties had provided to the Voting Section allotted approximately 2 hours for training. The Voting Section suggested having all-day training sessions, and the schedules were revised to allot 6-½ hours for training.</p> <p>The Voting Section suggested that both counties provide each polling place on the Navajo Reservation with voter registration lists from both counties, and train poll workers to check both lists and check with the appropriate county election department before turning voters away. Both counties agreed to adopt this suggestion. The Voting</p>	<p>The counties' implementation of their Navajo Language election information program was inadequate. While the counties provided language assistance to many voters, the assistance was frequently insufficient and failed to provide consistent and accurate language translation of the offices and propositions on the ballot's 14 propositions. The Voting Section concluded that the counties must improve and expand their training program for interpreters.</p> <p>The federal observers reported that the interpreters and poll workers believed more training in Navajo language translation was necessary. Some poll workers told the observers that the audiotapes containing Navajo translations were too long and confusing.</p> <p>One polling place was not well organized, resulting in very long lines. The Voting Section reported this to the Navajo County Elections Director, who sent an outreach worker to remedy the problem. The line was moving more quickly by mid-afternoon.</p> <p>The number of voters turned away from the polls was less than during the September</p>	<p>A November 22, 2002, memo discussing the monitoring of the November 5, 2002, election indicated that the Voting Section would meet in the future with election officials from both counties to discuss the November 5, 2002, election and develop methods to improve the counties' provision of language assistance and overall Election Day performance. The matter was closed after the election. According to the Voting Section, this is standard Voting Section procedure when irregularities are observed during election coverage.</p> <p>In the case of Navajo language assistance in these counties, the Voting Section stated that such outreach has been continuous for many years. Another memo discussing compliance and outreach efforts since the 2002 election indicates many improvements in Navajo language assistance efforts as a result of this outreach, including: (1) improved poll worker training which included the use of pictorial flip charts to assist voters in</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>elderly Navajo voters who live near the Navajo/Apache county line about polling place and voter registration. These voters often vote in different locations for tribal and state/federal elections. Tribal elections do not recognize county boundaries. Poll workers at polling places near the county line apparently turned away dozens of elderly voters because of voting location confusion during the 2000 primary and general elections and the 2002 primary. In 2000, poll workers gave affidavit ballots to other crossover voters in the mistaken belief that the ballots would be accepted later. However, since these voters were not registered in the counties where they voted, their votes were considered invalid.</p>	<p>Section also expressed concern about polling places that opened late for the September primary. The counties agreed to address this prior to the November 2002 election.</p>	<p>primary. However, while all the polling places had both counties' registration books, poll workers at most locations did not use them. Some did not know the books were available. At one Apache County location, observers reported that the Navajo county list was not present. The Voting Section informed the county elections director, who showed the Navajo County book to the polling place inspector. The poll workers had not removed the book from the elections supply box. The Voting Section felt that more training and practice would make the poll workers more familiar with this new system. There were no complaints about polls not opening on time.</p>	<p>understanding the ballot; (2) outreach and voter registration efforts on the reservation at various events; (3) the opening of new early voting locations on the Navajo Reservation; (4) the opening of a new satellite election office on the reservation to disseminate voter information and register voters; and (5) greater cooperation among the counties providing Navajo language assistance.</p>
<p>3. Voting Section personnel and 2 AUSAs monitored 84 precincts in Broward County, Florida, during the November 2002 election.</p>	<p>Actions taken by DOJ staff included interviewing the clerk of the precinct where a white male precinct worker who allegedly harassed African-American voters was employed about any complaints or problems with the assistant precinct clerk in question. DOJ staff spoke with four voters at this precinct regarding their experience voting and asked election officials to make chairs available for the disabled and elderly waiting in line to vote. They contacted county election officials about a voter who was told he could not vote because he had already sent an absentee ballot; the precinct clerk eventually verified that the voter</p>	<p>Voting Section staff provided assistance to help correct issues that arose during the monitoring. Examples of issues/problems observed were: (1) African-American voters felt somewhat harassed by a white male precinct worker; (2) a poll official did not want to allow a person to vote who said he had requested an absentee ballot but did not receive it; and (3) persons were turned away because of precinct changes due to redistricting, because they moved, and for other reasons.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because the election being monitored was completed.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>had not been sent an absentee ballot, and the voter was allowed to cast his vote on election day.</p> <p>With regard to the absentee ballot issue, DOJ staff advised the poll official to contact the Broward County Election Board. In addition, DOJ staff: (1) gave a voter the toll-free telephone number for the Voting Section because the voter wanted to complain about the lack of voting machines; (2) asked a poll clerk and poll workers if they had received complaints about not having enough voting machines; and (3) spoke with two voters who complained about a precinct being hard to find.</p>		
<p>4. At the request of Florida's Secretary of State, the Voting Section monitored the election in November 2002 in Duval County, Florida.</p>	<p>Voting Section attorneys monitored the election and facilitated the resolution of problems that arose by communicating proper election procedures to the Supervisor of Elections. Prior to monitoring the election, Voting Section attorneys met with the Supervisor of Elections, minority leaders in the community, leaders of the NAACP, and representatives from the local Democratic and Republican parties. They exchanged telephone information and invited each person or group to contact them with details of any problems that they might help address. They also provided guidance on issues that might arise to provide a</p>	<p>While monitoring the election, the Voting Section found various areas of clarification and improvement. One issue involved absentee ballots and Florida law allowing a person who requested an absentee ballot but did not submit it to vote at the polls. There was confusion when absentee ballots were submitted but rejected as being incomplete because they lacked voters' signatures and voters then being able to vote at the polls. Voters who submit absentee ballots are considered to have voted and cannot vote at the polls on election day if the absentee ballot is rejected.</p> <p>Also, poll workers had given incorrect ballots to</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because the election being monitored was completed.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
	<p>common understanding of action that should be taken if a particular problem arose.</p> <p>The Voting Section attorneys worked with the Supervisor of Elections to improve election processes and were invited by the Supervisor of Elections to monitor elections in April and May 2003 to further improve upon their election processes.</p>	<p>some voters. Voters were turned away who lacked signed photo identification and were not allowed to vote by provisional ballot. There were also a few instances of insensitivity to minority voters and voters with disabilities.</p>	
<p>5. Georgia state law requires counties to have absentee ballots on hand 45 days before a general election. Georgia missed the September 20, 2002, deadline for the November 5, 2002, general election because of the compressed election schedule in 2002. The 45-day deadline was set to comply with federal mandates to make it easier for U.S. military personnel stationed outside the United States to vote. Georgia had compressed its 2002 primary and runoff election schedules such that the runoff was held only 49 days before the November 5 general election. This precluded the printing of the general election ballot in time for the mailing deadline required under state law. Georgia election officials had contacted FVAP during the first week of October regarding the state's compliance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).</p> <p>Catoosa County ballots omitted the names of the Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate and the Republican gubernatorial candidate from the ballot. An allegation was made that this, among other absentee ballot irregularities, violated UOCAVA because the correct ballots, even if sent at the time this concern was raised on October 16, 2002, would not be received in time.</p> <p>Georgia's Secretary of State asked DOJ to bring suit against the state to extend the deadline for receipt of</p>	<p>FVAP advised the Voting Section that a senior official in Georgia's Elections Division said that election officials in each of Georgia's counties would photocopy all necessary ballots and send them to every military and overseas citizen absentee voter from whom an application had been received in time. All 154 Georgia counties had done this by October 7.</p> <p>A Voting Section attorney asked the source of the allegation in Catoosa County to keep in touch and gave the person who made the allegation the phone number and Web site for FVAP for additional information about FVAP's role in this process. The Voting Section attorney contacted FVAP, and a FVAP official agreed to contact officials in Catoosa and Ben Hill counties to get copies of their ballots and get back to the Voting Section attorney. The Voting Section attorney also contacted a state election official.</p>	<p>FVAP favored going forward with the suit that Georgia's Secretary of State had suggested, but the Voting Section did not because (1) the number of voters affected was very small, less than 132 overseas; (2) UOCAVA was amended in 1986 to add the federal write-in absentee ballot as a back-up ballot when timely requested ballots do not reach voters in a timely matter (the Voting Section relies on the use of the back-up ballot as a remedy in UOCAVA lawsuits brought in primary elections, and had no reason to believe it was an inadequate remedy); and (3) the Voting Section believed the Secretary of State's true interest in the lawsuit stemmed from the large number of regular absentee ballots that were mailed late, and such ballots could not be part of any UOCAVA remedy.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
military and other absentee ballots.			
<p>6. The Voting Section conducted an investigation under UOCAVA and monitored a lawsuit in Minnesota over absentee ballots used in the November 2002 general election. At issue was the removal of Senator Paul Wellstone's name on the ballots and issuance of new ballots. Senator Wellstone died 11 days prior to the election, and former Vice President Mondale was designated the replacement candidate for the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party. This party argued for mass mailing of new absentee ballots, and the Republican party argued to do the mailing based on requests.</p>	<p>In an e-mail, the Voting Section attorney expressed concern about ballots being mailed, filled out, and returned between October 31 and November 5 (6 days).</p>	<p>The Voting Section monitored state actions to address this issue.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter after the state Supreme Court issued an order addressing the absentee ballot issue. The order specified the procedures for absentee ballots that included various options based on whether a voter had or had not already voted for Senator Wellstone.</p>
<p>7. A suit arose from the resignation of Senator Robert Torricelli from the general election and ballot for Democratic nomination to the U.S. Senate. The New Jersey Democratic party brought suit to secure a declaration that the New Jersey Democratic State Committee was permitted to select a qualified candidate to replace Sen. Torricelli. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state Democratic party and required that a new ballot be prepared under the direction of the state Attorney General and a state court judge. Military and overseas ballots were to be given precedence and an explanatory letter was to be sent to all voters who received the new ballots. The Voting Section was concerned about the late transmittal of ballots to military and overseas voters.</p>	<p>The Voting Section prepared a discussion memo evaluating the impact that the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling would have on overseas absentee voters. The Voting Section monitored the New Jersey Democratic party lawsuit and state remedies to address this issue.</p>	<p>The Voting Section noted that late transmittal of ballots to voters by airmail generally raises concerns that overseas voters would not have sufficient time to receive, mark, and return their ballots to local election officials. The Voting Section staff determined that New Jersey state law contains several unique features that obviate the need for 20-40 days of roundtrip airmailing. In addition, DOD provides a backup ballot available at military installations and U.S. embassies/consulates. This is referred to as a federal write-in absentee ballot.</p> <p>The Voting Section noted that the question might arise regarding how the state would address ballots that had already been transmitted to overseas voters and may have already been returned. The Voting Section determined that this was a question for state officials to resolve, and that the Voting</p>	<p>The Voting Section concluded that New Jersey state law provides for several methods for UOCAVA voters to participate in federal elections over and above the use of regular absentee ballots sent by airmail. The Voting Section closed the matter due to lack of merit.</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
		Section planned to raise this issue when speaking with state officials in October 2002.	
<p>8. An attorney for Bexar County, Texas, requested, in a letter to the Voting Section dated October 18, 2002, expedited review of changes in the county's early voting process in the joint general and special election on November 5, 2002. Changes included: (1) the one-time use of two-page ballots for partisan contested races, (2) procedures for counting ballots with straight-party votes, and (3) one-time use of a single two-sided ballot for partisan contested races supplemented by a separate sheet with duplicate voting instructions for the November 5, 2002, general election. Prior to that request, the League of United Latin American Citizens filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that Bexar County implemented changes to the conduct of the November general election without obtaining preclearance from DOJ.</p>	<p>The Chief of the Voting Section wrote a letter back to the attorney for Bexar County. The Voting Section had telephone discussions with various people regarding the ballot format issues.</p>	<p>In a letter dated November 1, 2002, The Voting Section stated that the Attorney General did not interpose any objection to the specified changes, but noted that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that failure of the Attorney General to object does not bar subsequent litigation to enjoin enforcement of the changes.</p> <p>After the League of United Latin American Citizens filed the lawsuit, Bexar County advised the court that they initiated Section 5 preclearance submission procedures on October 18, 2002, and October 21, 2002. The county had not obtained preclearance from DOJ at the time the lawsuit was filed. The court agreed with both parties that the changes were required and allowed the changes to proceed pending the preclearance. On October 31, 2002, the court decided to retain jurisdiction over the case through the conclusion of the 2002 election process and ordered the parties to advise the court as to their positions on the case on or before December 1, 2002.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because it granted preclearance for the changes.</p>



**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>9. A U.S. Representative sent a letter to the Attorney General regarding possible voter suppression in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In Arkansas, Louisiana, and Maryland, it was alleged that African-Americans were victims of voter suppression. In New Jersey and Texas, allegations of voter suppression involved Hispanics. The victims of voter suppression in the other states were not specified.</p> <p>According to the Voting Section, many of the matters referred to in the letter were matters under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Division and were being investigated by that Division when the letter was received. The Voting Section investigated two of the allegations referred to in the letter, including one in Hidalgo County, Texas, where it was alleged that the Republican party intimidated Hispanic voters countywide to dampen their turnout at the general election. The second allegation that the Voting Section investigated that was referred to in the letter was in New Jersey; the Voting Section opened a matter in 2003 to investigate this allegation (see information provided in this attachment for 2003).</p> <p>The most direct form of alleged intimidation in Hidalgo County was reported to have occurred when two poll watchers for a Republican candidate challenged Hispanic voters at early voting on the basis that a study indicated that 13,000 dead or ineligible voters were in the county's voter registration rolls. The Republican party held a press conference two weeks before the election where party representatives alleged that voter fraud could be a significant problem with the number of people listed incorrectly on the voter rolls.</p>	<p>A Voting Section memo referred to an allegation received from the U.S. Representative regarding possible intimidation at the November 2002 election held in Hidalgo County, Texas. The Voting Section attorney requested several pieces of documentation from the county elections administrator, including newspaper articles, letters between the elections administrator and the Republican elections administrator, and information regarding a study regarding the possibility of 13,000 dead or ineligible voters on the county voter rolls. The Voting Section attorney spoke with Hispanic voters and other minority contacts. The Voting Section attorney also analyzed voter turnout data for Hidalgo County and compared it to the state of Texas for 2002 and previous elections.</p>	<p>The Voting Section determined that Hidalgo County's election administrator handled the situation well by expelling the poll watchers when the voting supervisors alerted the election administrator that two poll watchers for the Republican candidate were making random challenges to Hispanic voters.</p> <p>The Voting Section further determined that efforts on the part of the Republican party did not dampen minority turnout and did not discover instances of voter intimidation at the polls on election day. The Voting Section noted that minority contacts in the county: (1) did not think that the allegations of dead voters on the rolls dampened turnout; (2) did not believe that the challenges made by the two poll watchers caused fewer Hispanic voters to vote; and (3) did not report problems of voter intimidation at the polls. The Voting Section did not find apparent differences between the voter turnout data in the 2002 election compared to other elections.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter on June 25, 2003, because it lacked merit. The Voting Section attorney observed that there was a tense atmosphere in Hidalgo County between some of the white Republicans and the Hispanic citizenry. The Voting Section recommended that this is an area that should be monitored in future elections.</p>
<p>10. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that the state of Oklahoma was not in compliance with UOCAVA. Election</p>	<p>After an expedited investigation, DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the</p>	<p>In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that the state of Oklahoma violated</p>	<p>The consent decree required the state to take corrective actions so that all</p>

**Attachment IV**

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>officials in Oklahoma could not mail absentee ballots to military and civilian overseas voters on a date sufficiently in advance of the September 17, 2002, primary runoff election to allow voters to receive the ballot, cast a vote, and return the ballot to election officials by the deadline established by state law.</p>	<p>Western District of Oklahoma on September 12, 2002, and entered into a consent decree with the state of Oklahoma on September 17, 2002.</p>	<p>UOCAVA.</p>	<p>uniformed military personnel and citizens living overseas who filed a timely request to receive an absentee ballot are given the opportunity to vote. The state did so through, among other things, the passage of UOCAVA compliance legislation in May 2003.</p>
<p>11. As described in DOJ's complaint, DOJ alleged that as a result of the compressed period of time between the Texas primary and runoff elections, election officials in the state of Texas failed to mail absentee ballots to military and civilian overseas voters on a date sufficiently in advance of the April 9, 2002, federal primary runoff election to allow such voters to receive the ballot, cast a vote, and return the ballot to election officials by the deadline established by state law.</p>	<p>After an expedited investigation, DOJ filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas on March 22, 2002.</p>	<p>In the complaint, the Voting Section alleged that the state of Texas violated UOCAVA.</p>	<p>The court entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on March 25, 2002, permitting qualified Texas voters to use federal write-in absentee ballots for the April 9, 2002, election. According to the terms of the court order, the state was required to take actions to remedy absentee ballot issues in the future. This included permitting voters to submit write-in ballots if their ballots are not sent to them in time and counting the write-in ballots as valid as long as the voters living outside the United States are qualified to vote in Texas. A stipulation of dismissal was entered in February 2004 following passage by the state legislature of legislation remedying the United States' complaint.</p>

## Attachment IV

### Election-Related Closed Matter Initiated during Calendar Year 2003

No.	Matter	Jurisdiction	Date matter initiated	DJ No.
1	Matter	New Jersey	January 2003	Yes

Source: DOJ Civil Rights Division.

### Summary of Election-Related Closed Matter Initiated during Calendar Year 2003

Description based on Voting Section information	Voting Section's actions taken to address allegation	Voting Section's assessment of allegations	Disposition by Voting Section
<p>1. This matter was the second matter opened by the Voting Section in response to the November 2002 letter from a U.S. Representative referred to in the previously described 2002 matter for Hidalgo County, Texas. There were allegations of voter intimidation in New Jersey. According to a newspaper article, e-mails were sent to Latino lawyers urging them to engage in an aggressive campaign to ensure ballot fairness. Attorneys for both the Democratic and Republican National Committees presented their case before the U.S. district court. The judge ruled a few days before the November 2002 election that there was "nothing sinister" in the Republican ballot fairness plan and characterized the plan as legitimate campaign activity.</p>	<p>The Voting Section attorney contacted a Latino political activist in the New York metropolitan area, the Treasurer of the New Jersey Hispanic Bar Foundation, and a community activist and attorney based in Newark, New Jersey.</p>	<p>The people that the Voting Section attorney contacted were not aware of the e-mail or any other threats or intimidation tactics against Latino voters. The Voting Section noted that its investigation yielded results similar to the judge's findings—that the ballot fairness plan mentioned in the e-mail did not raise concerns about Latino voter intimidation during the November 2002 general election.</p>	<p>The Voting Section closed the matter because it lacked merit.</p>

Comments from the Department of Justice



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

---

Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 27, 2004

William O. Jenkins, Jr.  
Director  
Homeland Security and Justice Issues  
United States Government Accountability Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Re: *Department Of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities - Draft Report GAO-04-1041R*

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

Thank you for providing the Department of Justice with a copy of a draft of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "Department of Justice: Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities." This letter constitutes the Justice Department's formal comments, and I request that it be included in the final report.

The Department appreciates the GAO's, and the requesting members', interest in this most important issue. Indeed, of all the areas of responsibility charged to the Civil Rights Division, none ranks more highly than protecting the franchise.

Since 2001, the Division has worked steadily to protect federal voting rights. We have directed substantial resources to implementing the electoral reforms of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA"), including working with all states and territories to facilitate their preparedness to comply with the HAVA provisions that took effect on January 1, 2004. We also have taken unprecedented steps to protect the rights of language minority voters. And we have moved strongly to ensure that all American citizens overseas, including our men and women in uniform, have an opportunity to participate in the democratic process. Finally, as your draft report demonstrates, the Division has significantly increased the numbers of monitors and observers deployed to ensure compliance with federal voting rights. In short, this Division has been fully attentive to the challenge of protecting federal voting rights, and we are gratified to see our successful record reflected in your draft report.

With regard to the specific recommendations your draft report has made, we are pleased to accept both. In the Division's view, each will be a salutary addition to the many steps already taken to improve protections of federal voting rights. For that reason, the Assistant Attorney

General for Civil Rights has already directed implementation of your recommendations.

With regard to the balance of the draft report, we appreciate the opportunity to have worked with GAO personnel on this audit. As with any report on an issue of such a critical nature, it is of the utmost importance that the report be both complete and accurate. Accordingly, we also appreciate the opportunity to provide comments. We must, however, register our disappointment that, while GAO took more than fifteen months to investigate and compile its draft report, you offered the Civil Rights Division only one week to review and comment on the voluminous document. Moreover, when the Division explained the difficulties and potential for error raised by such an abbreviated review, GAO offered just one additional week. This restriction has severely hampered our ability to provide the type of thorough review appropriate to such an important document, a particularly unfortunate consequence given that the draft report fails to capture accurately substantial portions of the Voting Section's work. Nevertheless, we have endeavored to provide as detailed and illuminating a set of comments as possible in the permitted time. Our specific comments follow:

1. Tracking Election Monitoring Activities

First, the GAO recommends establishing within the Department's ICM system a mechanism for tracking and reporting election-monitoring activities. As noted, the Assistant Attorney General has already taken steps to implement this recommendation, and the Division will implement an electronic means of tracking such data.

At the same time, however, it is important that the draft report not leave the reader with the suggestion that the Division presently lacks any system for tracking its election monitoring activities. *See* Letter at v; Draft Report at 41. This would be incorrect. The Voting Section does currently have procedures that effectively track election monitoring activities. Since the mid-1980s, the Voting Section has maintained logs detailing this information. As your records should show, the Division provided your investigators with a full explanation of these procedures in its May 25 response to your inquiries. The Division also provided you with the actual charts used for this tracking for the years 2000-2004. These charts provide detailed information about the state, the name of the jurisdiction monitored, the date of election, and the number of OPM observers and DOJ personnel who monitored the election. The Voting Section has found this system to be adequate and effective. Moreover, the existing logs are accurate and easily accessible.

2. Incorrect and Outdated Data Regarding Section 203 Work

It is also important that the final report reflect the most up-to-date information possible about the Voting Section's enforcement activities. Specifically, with regard to the Division's enforcement of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, while the draft report purports to have reviewed data through March 15, 2004, it discusses enforcement of Section 203 only through 2002. *See* Draft Report at 27. We have previously noted to you that the Division undertook a significant number of additional cases related to Section 203 and language minority issues in

2002, 2003, and 2004. Yet, the draft report fails to mention these. The Division thus respectfully requests that the draft report be corrected to reflect our full record. Specifically, Civil Rights Division attorneys contacted all, and personally visited many of, the 296 counties covered under Section 203 to help guide local election officials in complying with the law's dictates. In 2003, the Division also initiated an additional two lawsuits (one under Section 2 and Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act and one under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act) not reflected in the draft report, and we filed an additional 5 cases in 2004 (each under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act). The cases are referenced in Attachment 1 to this letter. To put this in perspective, the Division has filed as many Section 203 cases since May 2004 as were filed in the previous eight years. Moreover, the cases filed since May 2004 have provided comprehensive minority language election programs to more voters than all previous Section 203 cases combined.

In addition to the foregoing filings, a number of additional jurisdictions voluntarily modified their practices after being contacted by the Division. In this respect, it is important to note a substantial restraint on the Division's authority. The remedies provided under the voting rights laws only provide for prospective relief for violations. In other words, even if the Department's investigation reveals that a particular jurisdiction may have violated the law in the past, if the jurisdiction changes its election procedures to comply with the law so it is no longer in violation, our investigation becomes moot and we cannot litigate to ask for remedies that are no longer needed. Unlike private plaintiffs filing litigation in tort cases, the Department cannot obtain relief for past violations that are no longer occurring. This is especially important to keep in mind when reviewing matters in states that passed voting reform legislation changing their election administration.

3. Updated Information on UOCAVA Work

On page 28 of the draft report, the third bullet point about the lawsuit filed in Georgia under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 should be corrected to reflect that a court order was granted:

~~Filed~~ Obtained a court order in an UOCAVA lawsuit in July against the state of Georgia requesting a for similar emergency relief order for its primary election."

4. Updated Information on HAVA Work

On page 29 of the draft report, the summary of the Division's activities under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 fails to mention the first HAVA enforcement action filed by the Voting Section. We respectfully request that the following bullet point be added:

Filed its first enforcement action in California against a county for failing to fully implement HAVA

The case is *United States v. San Benito County, California* (N.D. Cal.). A complaint was filed on May 26, 2004 alleging, in addition to a violation of Section 203, a violation of the voter information provisions of HAVA. A consent decree requiring actions by the county to remedy the violations is pending review and approval by the court.

5. Documentation of Complaints of Alleged Election 2000 Voting Irregularities

As the GAO draft report itself notes, “[c]onfidence in our election processes is of utmost importance.” Draft Report at vi. Moreover, confidence is assisted by “accurately recording and documenting [election related] activities in as clear a manner as possible.” *Id.* This is no less true for your report as for our record-keeping. Accordingly, it is imperative that the final report accurately capture the full facts surrounding the Division’s efforts during the 2000 election. At present, the draft report fails to do so.

Your draft letter to Congress and draft report repeatedly references the Division’s documenting of public telephone calls during the 2000 Presidential election. These references may be construed to imply that an alternate means of documenting such public contacts would have enabled the Division to identify the existence of violations of federal law warranting further investigation. It is important that the GAO be clear that it is reaching no such conclusion, because such a conclusion simply would not be accurate.

The chief difficulty in the draft report’s summary is its nearly exclusive focus on telephone logs maintained by contractors hired by the Department to record calls coming into the Department’s main switchboard in the days after the 2000 election. The draft report contends that these logs were insufficiently detailed. However, the draft report fails to note that these logs made up only a small portion of all of the records of phone calls received by the Division. Therefore, any shortcomings in these logs are extremely unlikely to have changed the course of subsequent investigations.

As we previously advised GAO, (DOJ Response to April 7 Information Request), these contractors were hired to take phone calls from the public only during the weekend following the election, when the Division’s offices would normally otherwise have been closed. The Division decided to afford the public this extra service after the Department’s main switchboard received thousands of calls from around the country inquiring into the situation in Florida. In addition, the Voting Section’s telephone lines received an elevated number of calls.

In focusing almost exclusively on the contractor logs, the draft report overlooks the call logs maintained by the Voting Section itself in 2000. These provided extensive documentation about callers and a description of the callers’ complaints, and have proved reliable and accurate. Moreover, the vast majority of calls received were tracked through these logs. Therefore, the Division respectfully notes that during the 2000 election it did have an effective means of tracking election-related phone calls.

In our April 2004 response, we provided you substantial detail regarding this additional means for tracking public election-related inquiries. Specifically, the Division's 800 number system was modified to permit as many persons as possible to express their views. It was temporarily reconfigured to provide four caller options to: (1) allow persons to express general opinions about the election (which represented the overwhelming majority of the calls); (2) provide specific information about voting-related incidents outside Florida; (3) provide specific information about voting-related incidents inside Florida; or (4) provide specific information about non-2000 election-related matters.

This modified system took effect late in the day on Thursday, November 9, 2000, and was discontinued following resolution of the Presidential election. The calls coming into the temporary 800 system were reviewed regularly by Voting Section personnel beginning on November 13, 2000. Return calls were made when there was some indication that the caller had substantive information about a specific voting rights violation<sup>1</sup>. Separate log forms tracked each of the 800 number options. Calls expressing general views without conveying specific information about voting rights violations were recorded on forms similar to the contractor logs, with category columns listed for each state (although these forms were changed periodically to reflect the changing Florida election situation). Calls made under the other options were recorded on log forms providing for much more specific information, including name, phone number, and a detailed description of the complaint. We recently provided GAO with these logs. In addition, we invited GOA staff to meet with Voting Section staff involved in dealing with the public during the 2000 election. Regrettably, GAO declined this invitation.

6. Nature of the Calls Received After the 2000 Election

In addition to focusing on only a subsection of the calls received, the draft report also fails to properly note the substance of the vast majority of phone calls received by the Department following the November 2000 election.

First, the draft report fails to note the fact that of the thousands of calls received by the Department's switchboard during this period, upwards of 95 percent did not provide specific complaints of possible violations of federal voting rights laws, but rather simply reflected citizen frustration or anger over the ongoing election dispute. This assessment was made by the Voting Section's experienced, career professional staff, including both trial attorneys and management. Moreover, determinations were made by staff only after receiving initial reports from the Department's switchboard operators, engaging in hundreds of conversations with citizens calling into the Voting Section's phone lines, and reviewing the contractor logs that were faxed to the Voting Section on an hourly basis.

---

<sup>1</sup> In our suggested changes to the section entitled "November 2000 Election Telephone Logs" of your draft Statement of Facts, which we sent to you on August 4, 2004, we explained the specifics of this additional call tracking system. Unfortunately, these changes were not incorporated in GAO's draft report.



Second, the draft report fails to note that the vast majority of the calls received by the contractor lines came from New York and California; the number of calls from Florida was relatively small. The vast majority of these expressed frustration over the situation in Florida, and were based on second-hand information and media stories.

The same was also true for the majority of calls originating from Florida. Voting Section personnel followed up with callers from Florida to determine whether they had substantive information about the Florida election. Again, however, the vast majority of these callers were calling to express frustration at the ongoing election dispute and had no specific information about federal law violations. In addition to following up with these callers, Voting Section personnel also pursued other avenues of complaints (e.g., calls made by voters directly to the Voting Section, complaint logs generated by the NAACP Voter Fund, hearings conducted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the NAACP, incidents receiving a large amount of publicity, etc.) to determine if federal laws had been violated.

As noted at the outset, it is imperative that the draft report accurately reflect these facts. At the same time, the Division fully concurs in the GAO's recommendation that an expanded recording system be implemented. For the 2004 election, the Division will continue to refine its tools for recording election-related calls to allow the public access to the Voting Section's complaint process.

#### 7. Criminal Investigations


As you are aware, the GAO audit also examined the work done by the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section, which is responsible, along with United States Attorneys' Offices, for investigating and prosecuting federal election crimes. The Chief of the Public Integrity Section, Noel Hillman, has asked us to include his comments to the portion of the draft report that pertains to the work of the Criminal Division. The first paragraph on page 22 of the draft report provides incorrect information about the training received by Assistant U.S. Attorneys. There are annual public corruption training conferences held by the Justice Department for Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs), and these include presentations on federal election crimes. These conferences are available to all AUSAs, including the AUSAs who are the designated district election officers. Some, but not all, of the 93 AUSAs who are their district's designated election officers may attend these conferences. In addition to these public corruption conferences, the district election officers are now attending the annual Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference, the first of which was held in 2002, to receive training on both civil rights issues important to ballot access as well as voting integrity issues important to election crime matters. Please note that the name of this annual conference is the "Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Conference," not the "Voting Integrity Conference."

In conclusion, we appreciate the opportunity to work with your staff concerning the important work of the Voting Section in enforcing federal voting rights. We are hopeful that the

**Attachment V**

misstatements and inaccurate characterizations in this draft report will be corrected prior to its release.

Sincerely,



Bradley J. Schlozman  
Deputy Assistant Attorney General