

**NARCOTICS: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE**

**GLOBAL  
ISSUES**



ELECTRONIC JOURNALS OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, Vol. 1, No. 7

JULY 1996

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**I S S U E S**



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NOTE ON THE INTERNET AND NARCOTICS/SUBSTANCE ABUSE:  
The Substance Abuse page on the USIS Home Page provides additional information on narcotics and substance abuse, including documents, articles, and many other Internet sites, from the public and private sectors. Readers may visit the Substance Abuse page on the USIS Home Page at <http://www.usia.gov/usis.html> under "Global Issues/Communications".

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## GLOBAL ISSUES

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# f o c u s



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## GLOBAL COOPERATION VITAL IN ADDRESSING DRUG CONCERNS

An interview by Jim Fuller

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*Barry McCaffrey, director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), says that ultimate success against the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking will depend on concerted domestic and international efforts to reduce both the demand and supply of drugs. One priority is to inoculate American youth against drug use by running effective drug education prevention programs based on the family, schools and religious institutions. The other priority is to attack the international drug criminal conspiracy that threatens our democracies and our children.*

*McCaffrey, who serves as President Clinton's chief drug policy spokesman, was confirmed by unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate on February 29, 1996. Prior to his confirmation, General McCaffrey was the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command based in Panama.*

**Q.** Some countries complain that the United States is not doing enough about its own serious drug consumption problem. What is being done to reduce demand?

**McCaffrey.** It's an excellent question. It is essential that we face this terrible menace to the North American people — a problem that kills 20,000 of us a year and costs \$67,000 million in losses. We are pleased to report there has been a 30 percent reduction in cocaine use in the United States in the past three years alone. As a result of aggressive prevention efforts, the number of illegal drug users has fallen by half since 1985, from 22

million people to less than 12 million. Also, the number of new heroin users dropped by 25 percent between 1975 and the early 1990s. So there's no question we've made a dramatic change. We don't see airline pilots, subway drivers, university faculty or the armed forces impaired by drug abuse. They were in the 1970s. So we've come a long way.

The second observation I'd make is that over 50 percent of the President's \$15,100 million drug control budget for fiscal year 1997 goes toward prisons and law enforcement. The United States last year prosecuted 18,000 people in the federal system and convicted 15,000. Two-thirds of the 100,000 people who are in the federal prison system are there for drug-related offenses. Altogether, 250,000 Americans are serving time for drug law violations. There is no question that we will move ruthlessly to attack this threat to the American people.

But it is clear to us that drug addiction and abuse is an international problem. It is not a Colombian problem or a U.S. problem. It's a global problem. We have only four percent of the heroin addicts in the world. The vast majority of illicit drugs consumed in the United States is produced in other countries. So it's something we're going to have to work out in cooperation with one another. The problem isn't Mexico or Colombia or U. S. demand, the problem is drugs and an international criminal business that exploits them. I mean there

are Russian criminal elements involved in this and Colombian criminal elements and many others. And we are absolutely focused on being tough with the international criminal conspiracy that's cost this nation more than 100,000 dead between 1990 and 1995. Success will be achieved through training and assistance programs, efforts at reducing cultivation and production, and strong law enforcement to destroy the trafficking organizations and deprive them of their profits.

**Q.** How do treatment programs fit into the national drug control strategy?

**McCaffrey.** What we want to do is make sure we have a balanced approach that moves to drug treatment, education, and prevention, as well as our current firm, judicial response. There are only 3.1 million hard-core chronic addicts in the United States. There are 260 million-plus Americans. But these three million chronic addicts cause tremendous damage to society. They're consuming two-thirds of the total drugs that come into the country. They commit the majority of drug-related crimes. Two-thirds of them are under arrest, awaiting trial, in prison or on parole in any given year. And the question is, are we going to do something other than arrest and imprison them? The answer is yes. We've got to move to treatment programs. If you invest in that you'll have a safer workplace, safer schools, safer streets. So if you don't like crime and violence you will like drug treatment programs that are effective, perhaps not in eliminating drug abuse but in minimizing the damage it does to our society. While the shortfall of available drug treatment services remains significant, the percentage of those who required and subsequently received treatment increased from 38 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 1994. Additionally, the number of individuals in treatment programs has increased steadily since 1980. Three of four companies with more than 250 employees

have formal anti-drug programs in place.

**Q.** What can be done to halt the rise in teen drug use?

**McCaffrey.** The number one goal of the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy is to motivate America's youth to reject substance abuse. It's one of five goals, but it has clearly got to be the priority. Drug use among adolescents in the United States is skyrocketing. Past-month use of all drugs among youth aged 12 to 17 increased by 50 percent between 1992 and 1994. Marijuana use almost doubled. A third of high school seniors have used illegal substances since last year. And we're also seeing drug use start as early as the sixth grade. So we're seeing young people with a greatly increased predisposition to drug and alcohol abuse. And that's going to predictably yield a giant crop of violence and addiction down the line. We believe that the long-term solution lies in the schools. If you want to get major leverage on drugs in America, you don't go to the end of the equation where you have one-and-a-half million Americans in prisons and local jails. You go to the other end of the equation and talk drug education and prevention to our youth. This is not a hopeless proposition. If you take a credible anti-drug message to children from kindergarten to grade 12, you will make a major impact on youth attitudes. If you run effective drug education prevention programs based on the family, schools, religious institutions, and coaches, you will inoculate young people against the drug menace.

**Q.** You've talked about the demand for drugs in this country. What about supply? What are you prepared to do in cooperation with Mexico to slow the supply of drugs coming into the United States?

**McCaffrey.** Both Mexico and the United States are fundamentally challenged by the

drug issue. Our children are at stake. Our institutions of government and our police forces are challenged. Our national airspace is violated. Our sea space is being penetrated by drug criminals. So it is clear to us that we must work in absolute cooperation with Mexican authorities, with absolute deference to the sovereignty of each nation. The Mexican police, prosecutors, and armed forces are the only ones that are charged with protecting the Mexican people. The Mexican armed forces destroyed more illegal drugs last year than any nation on the face of the Earth, at a cost of their own sweat and blood. We, however, do see a responsibility to provide, where it's deemed appropriate, training, equipment, and cooperation. The cooperation will include a full sharing of intelligence and evidence in the justice system. So the two democracies jointly believe that no law breaker can evade justice in the other person's country.

Also, U.S. Attorney General Reno and I will co-host the Southwest Border Conference July 10 in El Paso, Texas. During the conference top federal officials will listen to state and local officials involved in working along the 2000-mile Mexico-U.S. border in cooperation with Mexican authorities. The successes of the early 1990s in ports of entry like Miami, Florida, have caused the international criminal drug organizations to shift patterns of smuggling so that now we believe more than 70 percent of illegal drugs that enter the United States come in through Mexico. And we're going to have to work in cooperation with our Mexican partners to bring this to a halt or reduce it drastically over the next several years. So we think that the meeting on the southwest border is crucial, and one of the things I hope to get out of it are insights needed to form a more rational concept of U.S. command and control efforts to protect the border

**Q.** You've said we are not going to militarize the peaceful U.S.-Mexican border. So what

do you see as the role of the armed forces in the war against drugs?

**McCaffrey.** The President's budget proposes over 1,500 new border patrol agents, including 700 from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and over 600 from Customs. The budget calls for a seven percent increase in funding for interdiction efforts along the southwest border. But this war will not be won by anybody's armies. This struggle is a matter for legislators and judges, police and prosecutors, religious leaders and school teachers, and most importantly, families. The armed forces must help in appropriate ways, in strict conformity with the laws of each country.

So we are not going to militarize the border, but the armed forces can help and they will. The U.S. Air Force and Navy are involved in detection and monitoring and are contributing enormously. The U.S. Southern Command spent \$153 million on counter-drug operations last year. Some of the operations could only be done by the armed forces. For example, we flew about a thousand flights that year on counter-drug air interdiction. We have F-16s on standby alert, AWACS aircraft, Navy and Customs aircraft, and other intelligence collection efforts. We've put into operation two so-called over-the-horizon back-scatter radars that were originally built, but never installed, to protect us from the Russian Air Force. We've turned them around and they're now looking at the southern approach to the United States. And they're extremely effective. We've also installed a very sophisticated X-ray machine at a major border crossing point for trucks. The machine, originally developed for nuclear arms verification procedures, essentially has stopped Mexican drug smugglers from using that crossing point. We picked up 11 violations in the last 20 months. So we're going to get more mobile X-ray devices that in the coming years will bring to a halt the

smuggling of drugs by land from Mexico into the United States. And over the next five to 10 years there is no question that drug introduction into Mexico and into the United States will go down.

We're also seeing new forms of international criminal behavior. A few months ago we seized a vessel in the Pacific Ocean carrying 12 tons of cocaine. So they are now trying to bypass Mexico. I think we're going to see a new maritime threat as the principal source of entry of drugs into the United States.

**Q.** The greatest increase in the 1997 budget proposal — 25 percent — is for international programs. What will be the main emphasis here?

**McCaffrey.** We need to break up both foreign and domestic sources of drugs. We don't spend much money on this. Only nine percent of the total budget goes toward interdiction — \$26 million for Colombia, \$25 million for Peru, \$50 million for Bolivia. Given the fact that this is a problem that we said in the decade of the nineties killed 100,000 Americans, can we make the case for working in cooperation with the government of Peru to reduce the amount of coca grown there? I think we can. And the same case can be made in Colombia, in Bolivia. And we're going to have to face up to the problem of Burma, which is the source of 60 percent of the heroin that comes into the United States. And we have other goals dealing with these societies. Clearly human rights is at the top of the agenda.

Our interdiction efforts in South America have disrupted the trafficking patterns of cocaine traffickers in Peru, causing them to change flight routes and modes of transportation. A third of the cocaine produced in the region is intercepted before it hits our streets and those of other countries. Information sharing with

allied nations has resulted in interdictions, including multi-ton cocaine shipments. In the past five years the world's authorities have taken over 1,400 metric tons of cocaine out of the system. U.S. authorities captured about half of it. That's about two years worth of supply that isn't on the streets of the United States. Our counter-drug efforts last year dealt the traffickers serious blows. Six of seven ringleaders of the Cali Cartel were arrested, one killed by the Colombian police while resisting arrest. Key Asian countries have begun to arrest heroin kingpins and extradite them to the United States.

**Q.** How will the recent vote by Colombia's lower house of Congress to absolve President Samper of charges that his 1994 election was financed by drug traffickers affect our counter-drug cooperation with that country?

**McCaffrey.** I would just say up front that we are absolutely committed to the Colombian constitution and its own notion of democracy. But we are not satisfied that the parliament's decision has laid to rest these incredible allegations. The U.S. government will act in accordance with our own laws and examine our options over the next few days and weeks and we'll come to logical conclusions about what actions to take. There are economic sanctions being considered. We will look at those. In addition, we will look at the entire range of U.S.-Colombian relations and judge them by our viewpoint on counter-narcotics cooperation.

The U.S. decertification of Colombia earlier this year (a finding by President Clinton that Colombian authorities are not doing enough to combat drug trafficking) does not affect our counter-narcotics cooperation with that country. And so we have continued to act in absolute partnership with the Colombian police and armed forces where they're involved in a counter-drug mission that is limit-



ed, and in cooperation with Colombian judicial authorities. In FY 1996 we provided some \$29 million in assistance to Colombian authorities with their counter-narcotics mission. In the coming budget, we have proposed \$26 million in assistance funding. We have enormous admiration for the hundreds of Colombian police officers and soldiers who have been killed and wounded in this struggle. They are fighting for the survival of Colombian democracy against thousands of narco-guerrilla forces and international cartels.

**Q.** What are we doing to prevent money laundering by the international drug cartels?

**McCaffrey.** We have a very sophisticated international effort that we're building. We had a very useful meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a year ago, and we're trying to ensure that all the democracies have laws that allow them to work on this problem — laws that deal with wire tapping, the introduction of conspiracy evidence, and money laundering techniques. Mexico has just passed significant new legislation that will allow them to start dealing more effectively with money laundering. The Panamanians

are going to, we believe, attempt to confront money laundering. And we have a very important task force effort involving the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and all our law enforcement agencies to go after the money laundering system. We're starting to drive it out of U.S. banks and into marginal banks. So we're doing pretty well at it.

**Q.** You say this country's drug problem cannot be solved overnight and will require a 10-year commitment. What would you like to see in terms of reduction in drug use at the end of that 10 years?

**McCaffrey.** There is no reason why we can't return the United States to a 1960's level, a pre-Vietnam-era level of drug use. We won't achieve a total victory on drugs. We shouldn't expect that. We can't take every heroin or crack addict and cure them of their addiction. But we should expect to reduce by enormous amounts the number of young people using drugs and the damage that this epidemic does. So if you ask me for a target, let's go back to pre-Vietnam-level eras of illegal drugs.

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*Jim Fuller writes on narcotics and other global issues for the U.S. Information Agency.*



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## CLEANING UP THE MONEY LAUNDERERS

An Interview by Jerry Stilkind

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*To carry on their widespread illegal activities and to support the lavish lifestyles of their members, drug cartels need to make the mounds of cash they receive from drug sales appear to be receipts from legitimate businesses. They use banks, export-import businesses, and informal financial intermediaries such as currency exchanges to launder this dirty money.*

*Stanley Morris, director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an agency in the U.S. Treasury Department, is the top U.S. official working directly on how to detect and prevent drug lords and other criminals such as extortionists and arms smugglers, from passing themselves and their “enterprises” off as legitimate businesses.*

**Q.** What is the size of the money laundering issue? We know it encompasses more than just money laundering from the illegal drug trade

**Morris.** Well, it is difficult to estimate the dollar amount of money laundering. It's a criminal activity. Criminal activity is only successful if it is surreptitious, and not measurable. But we do know that organized crime has to launder its money if it is going to be successful, and that the size of the drug trade and other criminal activities is very great. And, therefore, the issue is very important. I've seen used by reasonably responsible people \$100,000 million U.S. and \$300,000 million worldwide. I've also heard the United Nations use numbers up to a trillion. I don't put a lot of basis in it.

Money laundering starts with the initial payment, say, for so much heroin. That money basically has a velocity effect. You can count it and count it and count it, multiple times, as it runs through the criminal organization for payments and the like. So this is a tricky business. We had had some discussions with economics experts at one of the national laboratories and at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to begin looking at a better way to identify the worldwide size of it, but I would be ill-advised to give you a number.

**Q.** Would you agree with estimates that perhaps half of the total comes from illegal narcotics trade and, if so, what would the other half consist of?

**Morris.** Our thinking is that the answer is yes, probably half is a reasonably good estimate. The other half goes everywhere from fraud, to extortion. If you look at the former Soviet Union, the drug business isn't the largest part of the criminal activity. It is, in fact, extortion, stolen vehicles, and the like. Arms trafficking is important and then there is some of the more basic activities such as fencing and prostitution and basic criminal activities. And, if you add all of those pieces together, you come up with another large category of criminal activity.

**Q.** FinCEN's mission is to provide world leadership in prevention and detection of the movement of illegally derived money. How do you do that?

**Morris.** We've got a multiple set of ways that the Treasury moves to provide attention and leadership in this area. There is the G-7 (the seven leading industrial countries) Financial Action Task Force. The Treasury Department is president this year. Its meeting will be held for the first time in the United States at the end of this month.

We have had the last year a fundamental reexamination of the 40 recommendations to combat money laundering for example, banks should know the customers making deposits and receiving transfers of funds, large cash deposits should be reported to officials that serve as the major guideposts for countries, and some of those will be changed and new ones adopted. Also, there are other multilateral vehicles. We have been active in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, which is an affiliated organization dealing with the issues in the Caribbean. Similarly, Secretary [of the Treasury Robert] Rubin chaired a meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina as part of President Clinton's effort to follow up on the Summit of the Americas meeting in 1994.

One of the elements adopted at the Summit was the establishment of an anti-money laundering regime that all of the countries in this hemisphere would adopt. Just two weeks ago, Secretary Rubin hosted a meeting of finance ministers and announced a significant effort on the part of the U.S. and, more specifically, the Inter-American Development Bank, to begin to provide technical assistance and support to various countries, first assessing their needs and then trying to provide the necessary resources to combat laundering.

We also have added to the agenda of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the issue of money laundering. Secretary Rubin has pressed the importance of ensuring that capital markets are free from corruption and illegal activity.

And bilaterally, we have been encouraging the establishment of financial intelligence units, organizations similar to FinCEN. There are now over 20 in the world, and we have been working with them to build more effective relationships. They include countries as small as Slovenia and Panama and as large as the United States and Australia and France. We believe that a multi-jurisdictional organization with a close working relationship with financial institutions is a very important approach to providing the necessary prevention as well as investigative support to try to keep our banks clean and out of the hands of organized criminals.

A team just came back from meeting with senior officials in Mexico, trying to assist them in understanding the various ways that our regulatory and enforcement regimes operate, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

**Q.** You said that the Financial Action Task Force will be meeting here in Washington. Would you tell us something about the agenda, what you hope will come out of the meeting?

**Morris.** Well, the first order of business is a reexamination of the 40 recommendations, and we hope that there will be a consensus on modernizing them, updating them in a number of areas. For example, we clearly believe that we need to look beyond banks because, increasingly, money laundering is going on in less regulated aspects of the financial sector. We clearly believe that governments need to pay attention to money laundering, not just as it relates to drugs, but as it relates to all serious crimes. We think that reporting from financial institutions should be mandatory and that the reporting of suspicious financial transactions should be protected from liability for such reporting.

We believe that we should be looking into the future and that governments should analyze the changing nature of financial services and payment services to make sure that they're not susceptible to new forms of money laundering. We'll also be starting the examination of countries' performances against the recommendations. We've just completed over the last four or five years what we call a mutual evaluation, in which each country submits itself to an assessment by legal, regulatory, and law enforcement authorities from other countries to assess whether the laws are in place to deal with the problem.

The next step, which is beginning now, will go on into the next couple of years and will be an assessment of how those laws are being applied, and several countries have already begun the process. Thirdly, we will be looking at ways of improving our affiliation with other organizations in Asia and the Caribbean, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), with the Council of Europe, Interpol, and the World Customs Organization. All of them play a role here, and we want to try to improve that.

We will also for the first time make public a version of our judgment on the changing nature of money laundering, and issue it at the end of this month. It's important to know that there are 26 countries expected at the meeting and we have to try to arrive at some degree of consensus. This is not as simple as it might sound.

**Q.** The U.S. 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report lists high concern or medium-high concern for money laundering activities in a number of developing as well as developed countries. Why is it important for countries to combat money laundering? After all, if you're a small country or have an economy with deep problems,

as in parts of the former Soviet bloc, can not a fair amount of money be made, by not questioning bank transactions?

**Morris.** It's interesting you asked that, because I think that was, in fact, the view a few years ago. And, indeed, I was in some countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union when I raised the issue that banks should report suspicious activity and not conduct activities of a certain nature. And they sort of looked at me in astonishment, saying, "We need capital of any sort."

That has changed. Indeed, I was quite impressed at the meeting in Buenos Aires that Secretary Rubin chaired, in which the finance and justice and central bankers all came together, and their concern was the following: that if we do not keep our banks essentially protected, that organized crime will flourish and that, given the new efforts, in many cases quite new, to permit free enterprise, that the bad guys, organized crime, will be able to out-compete honest business. They will drive out honest business within the societies. Dirty money does, in fact, drive out clean money, and what that would result in is economic power moving to organized crime. Economic power, of course, is convertible to political power in new, fragile democracies which suddenly find themselves beholden to criminal organizations. So almost without exception — I think without exception — every country indicated this was very important to them if they were going to operate as democracies with free markets. Those markets have to be fair and you couldn't allow organized criminals to pervert them.

So the issue here is not one of, "Well, we'll just let this capital come in." Letting the capital come in means the crooks come in, and it legitimizes the crooks and, pretty soon, the crooks are in charge. That, in the simplest terms, is why this is such a serious matter.

**Q.** Would you say that this feeling is also widespread in the Caribbean, where a number of countries have been accused of permitting money laundering?

**Morris.** I think that there is a growing world consensus that steps need to be taken to deal with this problem. I think that clearly there are varying levels of enthusiasm and political will, both in the Caribbean and elsewhere. I was in Jamaica just a couple of weeks ago, and they are having a busy debate there on some major new legislation. Aruba and The Netherlands Antilles have both created new laws, and Aruba has appointed — I just met her — a new head of the Financial Intelligence Unit. The Caymans have been, I think, taking important steps. The justice minister for Antigua, when he was up here, felt it important enough to come by FinCEN and spend some time here.

So I think that you're seeing a lot of renewed concern and interest among governments now. That doesn't mean that corruption doesn't exist and that government elements wouldn't, perhaps, look the other way or try to encourage this.

And that is, of course, the issue. We have to make sure that the forces of good are stronger than the forces of evil, and we need to make sure that the forces of good have the tools necessary to succeed.

**Q.** Would you include Panama in those countries that are now taking effective action? Along with some of the Caribbean countries, it has been singled out as a laundering haven.

**Morris.** Panama has taken some steps to create a financial intelligence unit, to create some laws against laundering. It has a very vibrant financial sector. They have a

free-trade zone, which creates some problems. But there are clearly senior people in the Panamanian government who have strong commitments to try to ensure that Panama is successful in keeping out any illegal money, who are trying to reduce the size and power of organized crime. And it's important to note that none of these issues just belong to other countries. We may have maybe a tad bit of U.S. arrogance. The fact is that the reason the U.S. knows so much about this problem is that we've had it for so long, and we have our own issues of corruption and our own weaknesses. And so when we present steps that need to be taken, I tell my colleagues around the world that you can look not just at the U.S. successes, but also you can learn from our failures.

**Q.** Looking to some of your concerns about the future, you have voiced a great deal of concern about electronic transactions and how they might be used by money launderers. Would you please outline the problems that this new technology may present and what you're doing to try to head them off?

**Morris.** Well, change provides both opportunities and risks, and we see a major, and I don't think it's too strong to say, revolutionary change occurring in financial services. The nature of banking, I think, is undergoing fundamental reexamination, both in this country and around the world, driven by technology and new forms of payment services. And we have early on begun to see the potential, both in terms of opportunity and in terms of risk, of some of these changes. We've been working with the industry and with the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig, who is coordinating the Treasury Department's efforts, to make sure that we understand what is happening here, and then see what the risks are and what the opportunities are and try to make sure that we maximize the opportunities and minimize the risks.

**Q.** If money launderers can use modern technology, computers, and the Internet to quickly move money most anywhere in the world, doesn't this imply that you will need in the future even more international cooperation than you've needed in the past?

**Morris.** Yes. I think that this area, probably as much as any other, cries out for a close, cooperative arrangement, because money moves at the speed of light through financial institutions almost anywhere in the world. This makes the challenge of following the money very complex. That's why the establishment of these financial intelligence units is an important first step.

We also think these technologies present opportunities. We have developed Internet linkages — I think we now have 14 hooked together so that we can immediately exchange information back and forth as to what we're seeing and what kinds of problems we're identifying and get help from one another. As I say, that can happen literally at the price of a local phone call and the speed of light. And so we have, I think, tried to pay attention to this and tried to view these technologies as opportunities for the good guys, not just opportunities for the bad guys.

**Q.** Have non-banking institutions become important in money laundering efforts?

**Morris.** Well, we find any time we begin to bring pressure in one area, then we begin to bring greater public light and attention to it. Light is not something that criminal organizations like. They like to operate in the dark and they run in areas that have less opportunity for exposure. And, in most of the major countries of the world, we have established fairly effective regimes that deal with traditional banking, and we have effective supervision over banks, financial ministries, central banks and the like.

There's less of a supervisory oversight over the nonbanks, whether we're talking about money transmitters or check cashers or, in some cases, casinos, broker dealers, insurance firms and the like, or the regulatory scheme is different. And so when we become more effective with banks, the bad guys will start moving their money through nonbank organizations who provide financial services — a check casher who probably also has ties to a Western Union agent and maybe even loans money on the side; large casinos will often provide credit for gambling, wire money, issue checks, and the like. So, if you're going to be looked at very carefully at the bank and not looked at so carefully at the casino, you go to a casino.

As I said, one of the changes we hope comes out of the Financial Action Task Force meeting in Washington is a clear statement of the importance of examining the nonbank financial institutions with a rigor similar to that used on financial institutions.

**Q.** Finally, is there something that you would like to add, something that I didn't cover?

**Morris.** I guess I would just add, and I'm sure I've said it earlier, that the issue of dealing with money laundering is complex. The problem does not fit neatly into any particular bureaucratic box. It's important for complex problems to be dealt with with complex solutions, and governments, I think, really need to reexamine how they carry out their activities and build the kinds of cooperation between governmental elements that are necessary to succeed. There's an old quote from H.L. Mencken (a U.S. writer): "For every complex, difficult challenging problem, there's a low-cost, simple, easy solution that's wrong."

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*Jerry Stilkind writes on narcotics and other global issues for the U.S. Information Agency.*



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## THE DEA DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM

A Fact Sheet by the Drug Enforcement Administration

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The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is actively involved in drug prevention and education efforts designed to reduce the demand for drugs in this country. These efforts are coordinated through DEA's Demand Reduction Program, which was formally created in 1986. The Program was created in response to the realization that in order to mount a comprehensive attack against the drug problem, efforts must be undertaken to reduce the demand for drugs and to prevent drug abuse before it occurs. To that end, the mission of DEA's Demand Reduction Program is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating the involvement of law enforcement and the community in drug prevention and education activities.

The DEA's Demand Reduction Program is operated mainly by DEA Special Agents, who are known as Demand Reduction Coordinators (DRCs), located in each of the agency's 22 field divisions. The DRCs' role is to provide leadership and support to local agencies and organizations as they develop drug education and prevention programs designed to meet their specific needs. As Special Agents, the DRCs bring a unique perspective to the drug prevention arena. They have a clear understanding of the overall drug situation, and a broad range of experience in working with other law enforcement agencies, as well as civic and business organizations. The DRCs share this knowledge and expertise with groups which want guidance and direction on how to start and operate drug prevention programs.

With input from the DRCs, the Demand Reduction Section at DEA Headquarters designates priority areas in which to concentrate drug prevention and education activities. The current national priority areas are Anti-Legalization Education, Law Enforcement Training, Youth Programs, Drugs in the Workplace, Sports Drug Awareness, and Coalition Building.

### **Anti-Legalization Education:**

Although polls indicate that the public strongly opposes any move to legalize drugs, legalization continues to be advocated by some and widely discussed among others. As a result, the DEA has become actively involved as opponents in the legalization debate to heighten public awareness about the issues surrounding the misconceptions about legalizing drugs. To provide a better understanding of these issues, DEA has developed a publication called *Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization*, which is a how-to guide that assists law enforcement officials and community leaders in framing arguments against legalization. DEA provides anti-legalization training and workshops to law enforcement groups and community organizations to help them prepare for discussing the legalization issue in a public forum.

**Law Enforcement Training:** DEA has taken a leadership role in providing drug demand reduction training to law enforcement organizations. Through this effort, the DEA seeks to show law enforcement officers how they can impact the drug problem

outside of the enforcement arena by assisting their local communities in developing drug prevention and education strategies. To that end, the DRCs serve as instructors in state and local law enforcement academies and schools and at training programs for Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Officers. They also provide assistance to state demand reduction coordinators and conduct training at state and national conferences for organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, and the National Crime Prevention Council.

**Youth Programs:** The DEA strongly supports well-designed youth programs that help children to stay drug-free. DEA's emphasis is to provide children with the tools that they need to resist the pressure to use drugs. The DEA supports the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program, for example, as a well-organized effort to reach youth with effective prevention messages and to heighten their awareness of the risks of drug use. In addition, the DEA's Network 3 program provides minority and high-risk youth in inner city schools in Camden, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C., with a variety of positive activities as alternatives to drugs. As an active partner of the Law Enforcement Explorer Program of the Boy Scouts of America, DEA also provides structure and direction for youth with an interest in law enforcement careers. The DRCs also participate in school adoption and mentoring programs, as well as programs that recognize the positive accomplishments of young people who remain drug-free.

**Drugs in the Workplace:** Drug abuse costs business and industry billions of dollars each year in lost productivity, accidents on the job, and absenteeism. To help employers understand and identify drug use on the job, as well as develop drug prevention programs for the workplace, the DRCs, in

cooperation with local organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, provide "drugs in the workplace" training conferences and seminars to companies throughout the country. Through this effort, employers can make the workplace safer and more productive by detecting drug abuse and working to resolve it through anti-drug programs in the workplace.

**Sports Drug Awareness:** The DEA's Demand Reduction Program began through this initiative, which utilizes the positive influence of coaches — from youth leagues to professional — on athletes as a tool to combat drug abuse. Through this effort, the DEA provides training for high school coaches to help them develop drug prevention programs for their school athletic programs, and works with high profile sports figures on anti-drug initiatives. In addition, the Demand Reduction Section works closely with the National High School Athletic Coaches Association, the National Federation of State High School Associations, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association in training coaches for prevention leadership roles in their schools.

**Coalitions:** The DEA works closely with communities interested in establishing community coalitions to address the drug problems that plague their neighborhoods. In the development of these coalitions, the DEA stresses the need for the involvement of all segments of the community — law enforcement, schools, government, business and industry, churches, and the media — in order to mount a coordinated response to local drug-related issues. To support local coalitions, the DEA provides guidance in establishing them, and was a major participant in founding coalitions in Los Angeles, Dallas, and Richmond, Virginia. The DEA also provides training on strategy development and resource identification to members of community-based coalitions.





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## CRITICAL TARGETS

By Edmund F. Scherr

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There are many targets in the international struggle against illicit drugs — the growers, the refiners, and the numerous ships, planes, and couriers carrying the illegal substances.

U.S. officials say they have not been able to stop the smuggling of drugs at the country's borders. The drug traffickers can pick and choose their places, times, and methods of entry to thwart interdiction. There are always more drugs, more transports, and more couriers for the drug suppliers.

The United States in recent years has been focusing its international narcotics control efforts against targets that have the greatest impact — the crops, the criminals involved, and the corrupt governments that allow this illicit commerce to continue unchecked. The United States is also working through diplomatic channels to encourage governments that lack the "political will" to make anti-drug efforts a priority.

Officials in the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) argue that the U.S. approach is not the easiest but the "most effective." They made their comments in a background interview with the United States Information Agency.

"We have embarked on a much more courageous policy than in the past," an official emphasized. "We are going after the most critical targets in this trade, not the easiest tar-

gets." Besides targeting the crops, he asserted that the United States "wants to destroy the ability of the top-level traffickers to operate with impunity."

He observed that "politically it is very hard to get some governments to go after these targets, but if you can attack them then you stand a much better chance of undermining and reducing the drug trade."

The United States has become more willing to expose corruption in governments that permit drug trafficking. "The administration has made narcotics corruption a fundamental issue in our bilateral relations with many of these key supply countries," he said.

U.S. officials have been working for many years to build up the ability of countries to respond to drug problems. "But an effective response requires both the ability of a government to do something and their willingness to act. You have to have both elements," according to the INL official.

He said the United States in the past had hoped that action would follow the ability of governments to respond to narcotics problems. "But increasingly, we are putting more effort at getting these governments to have the will, to apply the ability that we've been working to build up."

The official emphasized that the United States continues to place primary emphasis on reducing the use of drugs in the United States. But

without an effort to curb supplies, the flow of drugs into the United States would overwhelm any demand reduction efforts.

In the past five years, an official said, the narcotics trade has been clearly defined as a national security threat to the United States. Previously, drugs was a law enforcement problem, addressed by traditional law enforcement means. As a national security threat, the Clinton administration has involved a wide range of government agencies to address the issues of drug trafficking.

Two factors, the officials said, give drugs a national security status. First, most of the illicit drugs in the United States are produced elsewhere. The United States wants to reduce production and trafficking abroad "to give our domestic demand reduction programs a better chance of succeeding," an official stressed.

Second, narcotics production and trafficking abroad is more and more a threat to governments and economies that are important to the United States. "We want to prevent drug trafficking organizations from becoming so powerful that they, in effect, destroy governments that we deal with," the official said.

One diplomatic tool has been the annual determination by the U.S. President of countries that are major illicit drug-producing or transit countries. This list now includes Colombia, which is a friend and ally of the United States. The other countries on the list are Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.

By law, the President groups countries into three categories:

- Countries or territories that have cooperated fully with the United States in bilateral or multilateral anti-drug agreements, or have taken adequate steps on their own to achieve

full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

- Countries that do not meet the standard for cooperation with the U.S. and compliance with the UN convention, but it would be in the "national interest" of the United States to certify that they have met the standards. This designation waives penalties because of overriding security interests at the time.

- Countries that do not meet the standards for certification. U.S. law calls for most foreign assistance to be stopped to nations in this category. And by law, the United States is required to vote against multilateral development bank lending to these countries.

After a review of the effectiveness of the international narcotics program, President Clinton directed the State Department to raise the certification standards and apply them more aggressively. The more rigorous standards have led to an increase in the number of countries being denied certification.

The official said that the stricter standards "have sent a very strong signal that we take the international problem more seriously, and we are going to hold foreign countries increasingly accountable for their own performance."

He said the results of this effort have brought about intensified efforts by nations to improve their anti-drug record. Countries not certified or given a waiver want to improve their standing and international image, and some countries act because they are worried that they might be denied certification.

"In response to adverse world opinion, we've seen most countries take more effective, more aggressive counter-narcotic efforts," the official said. "The certification

process has become a very effective tool." Those nations demonstrating a commitment to deal with the drug problem have received help from U.S. agencies, particularly in the destruction of drug crops.

"We have more and more countries accepting the concept of drug crop controls, especially in Central and South America," a U.S. official said.

The administrations's emphasis on crop reduction is more effective and less costly than broad, constantly expanding interdiction operations, he said. "Interdiction takes more money and technology. We had to defend all places at all times and in the end interdiction is not going to have a long-term effect.

"Unchecked production would make up for the seized drugs and interdiction could not attack

the growing power of drug lords," he continued.

Cocaine has three major source countries — Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The opium plant, which is the basis for heroin, is produced across the globe and involves many more criminal groups than cocaine does.

An official noted that many countries remain reluctant to go after the drug trade. "They see drugs as a consumer-driven product used mainly in the United States and Western Europe." He said that international cooperation against drug trafficking has made slow progress.

"For the most part, it is still the United States leading the effort," he said.

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*Ed Scherr writes on narcotics and other global issues for the U.S. Information Agency.*

# c o m m e n t a r y



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## THE DRUG POLICY DEBATE: PROHIBITION VERSUS LEGALIZATION

By James A. Inciardi

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*The following is the Postscript Summary of the above titled 153-page essay written by the author and commissioned by the U.S. Information Agency. The essay will soon be available through USIS offices. Its views are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or policies of the United States Information Agency. Portions of this essay previously appeared in: James A. Inciardi, "Against Legalization of Drugs," pp. 139-220 in Arnold S. Trebach and James A. Inciardi, Legalize It? Debating American Drug Policy (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1993).*

The arguments for legalization are seemingly based on the belief that America's prohibitions against marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs impose far too large a cost in terms of tax dollars, crime, and infringements on civil rights and individual liberties. Though the overall argument may be well-intended and appear quite logical, I find it to be highly questionable in its historical, socio-cultural, and empirical underpinnings, and demonstrably naive in its understanding of the negative consequences of a legalized drug market. In counterpoint:

1. Although drug prohibition policies have been problematic, it would appear that they have managed to keep drugs away from most people. High school and general population surveys indicate that most Americans don't use drugs, have never even tried them, and don't know where to get them. Thus, the numbers "at

risk" are dramatically fewer than is the case with the legal drugs. Or stated differently, there is a rather large population that might be at risk if illicit drugs were suddenly available.

2. Marijuana, heroin, cocaine, crack, and the rest are not "benign" substances. Their health consequences, addiction liability, and/or abuse potential are considerable.

3. There is extensive physiological, neurological, and anthropological evidence to suggest that people are of a species that has been honed for pleasure. Nearly all people want and enjoy pleasure, and the pursuit of drugs—whether caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, opium, heroin, marijuana, or cocaine—seems to be universal and inescapable. It is found across time and across cultures. Moreover, history and research have demonstrated that "availability creates demand."

4. Crack-cocaine is especially problematic because of its pharmacological and socio-cultural effects. Because crack makes its users ecstatic and yet is so short-acting, it has an extremely high addiction potential. Use rapidly becomes compulsive use. Crack acquisition thus becomes enormously more important than family, work, social responsibility, health, values, modesty, morality, or self-respect. Because of its chemistry, crack is easy and inexpensive to produce, and it will likely remain so, regardless of its legal status. A benefit of its current criminalization is that since it is against the law, it doesn't have widespread availability, and proportionately few people use it.

5. The research literature on the criminal careers of heroin and other drug users have convincingly documented that while drug use tends to intensify and perpetuate criminal behavior, it usually does not initiate criminal careers. In fact, the evidence suggests that among the majority of street drug users who are involved in crime, their criminal careers were well established prior to the onset of either narcotics or cocaine use.

6. There is a large body of work suggesting that drug abuse is overdetermined behavior. That is, physical dependence is secondary to the wide range of influences that instigate and regulate drug-taking and drug-seeking. Drug abuse is a disorder of the whole person, affecting some or all areas of functioning. In the vast majority of drug offenders, there are cognitive problems, psychological dysfunction is common, thinking may be unrealistic or disorganized, values are misshapen, and frequently there are deficits in educational and employment skills. As such, drug abuse is a response to a series of social and psychological disturbances. Thus, the goal of treatment should be "habilitation" rather than rehabilitation." Whereas rehabilitation emphasizes the return to a way of life previously known and perhaps forgotten or rejected, habilitation involves the client's initial socialization into a productive and responsible way of life.

7. The focus of the war on drugs can be shifted. I believe that we do indeed need drug enforcement, but it is stressed far too much in current policy. Shift a portion of those funds to criminal justice-based treatment programs.

8. Drug control should remain within the criminal justice sector for some very good reasons. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program clearly demonstrates that the majority of arrestees in urban areas are drug-involved. Moreover, recent research has demonstrated not only that drug abuse treatment works, but also that

coerced treatment works best. The key variable most related to success in treatment is "length of stay in treatment," and those who are forced into treatment remain longer than volunteers, and by remaining longer, they benefit more. As such, compulsory treatment efforts should be expanded for those who are dependent on drugs and are involved in drug-related crime.

9. Since the "war on drugs" will continue, then a more humane use of the criminal justice system should be structured. This is best done through treatment in lieu of incarceration, and corrections-based treatment for those who do end up in jails and prisons.

Having said all of this, where do we go from here? Is any purpose served by further debating the legalization of drugs? People on both sides of the discussion seem to be galvanized, unwilling to make substantial concessions to one another. The government of the United States is not going to legalize drugs at any time soon, if ever, and certainly not in this century. So why spend so much time, expense, and intellectual and emotional effort on a Quixotic undertaking? Aside from the positive or negative merits of the legalization thesis, it represents a problematic approach to a very complex predicament.

Finally, there is far too much suffering as the result of drug abuse that is not being addressed. Many things warrant discussion, debate, and prodding on the steps of the U.S. Capitol and the White House lawn. More drug abuse treatment slots, a repeal of the statutes designed to prosecute pregnant addicts and prohibit needle exchange programs, and the wider use of treatment as an alternative to incarceration — all of these are worthy of vigorous consideration and lobbying. But not legalizing drugs. It is an argument that is going nowhere.

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*James A. Inciardi, Ph.D., is a professor and the Director of the Center for Drug and Alcohol Studies at the University of Delaware.*



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## DRUG BUST

By Samantha Stainburn

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Last summer, Colombian police arrested six of the seven leaders of the Cali mafia, a notorious drug-trafficking organization that controlled 80 percent of the world's cocaine market and almost one-third of its heroin production. Gen. Rosso Serano, the director of the Colombian police, was quick to acknowledge U.S. government assistance: "The help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was fundamental," he said.

The CIA had supplied Colombian officials with telephone monitoring devices and had flown surveillance missions to trace the movements of the traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration had helped to gather intelligence and plan operations. In September, the DEA persuaded the Cali mafia's chief administrative officer, an insider expected to provide details about the organization's trade routes, security, and communications, to surrender to U.S. authorities.

U.S. agency officials heralded the Cali arrests as a good use of federal drug-control dollars: "Taking out the leadership of the Cali cartel was a remarkable achievement," one official told *The Washington Post*. "It dramatically changes the face of narcotics trafficking."

Back in the United States, citizens groups are not so sure. "The effect of the arrests might be a temporary lessening of supply of illegal drugs in the United States," says Cheryl

Anthony Epps, director of governmental affairs at the Drug Policy Foundation, a Washington-based drug policy reform group. "But it will be temporary. That is, until the next rung of traffickers moves up and takes control" of the Cali mafia's old business.

Congress, too, is critical of federal drug control efforts, but for the opposite reason. It thinks federal agencies should be spending more money on the kind of activities that contributed to the capture of the Cali mafia bosses — investigating drug-trafficking organizations at home and abroad, cooperating with counter-narcotics officials in drug-producing countries, interdicting drugs at the U.S. border. Over the past few years, Congress has done its best to restrain what many members perceive as the Clinton Administration's overeager embrace of treatment and prevention initiatives by refusing to appropriate additional funds for these initiatives.

Whether federal agencies need to support more drug treatment or practice more law enforcement is a hotly debated question because both sides agree on one point: In its present incarnation, the United States' national drug policy, a strategy that engages over 50 federal agencies in programs designed to halt the distribution and use of illegal drugs, has managed to curb neither the supply of narcotics nor Americans' demand for them. Last year alone, Americans purchased \$ 70 billion worth of illegal drugs.

The U.S. State Department estimates that the worldwide potential net production of opium increased from 2,590 metric tons to 3,699 metric tons, or by 43 percent, between 1988 and 1994. While the cultivation of coca leaf in South America — from which the cocaine consumed in the United States is derived — declined by nine percent over the same period, according to Abt Associates Inc., U.S. officials estimate that coca cultivators are still producing three times what is necessary to supply the U.S. drug market. Based on drug prices (which tend to go down as availability increases) and purity levels (which tend to go up), U.S. agencies report that cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are more readily available in the United States today than they were five years ago.

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that there are 2.7 million “hardcore” drug users — those most likely to commit crimes to obtain drugs — in America today. This is more than triple the estimated number five years ago. Casual drug use among all Americans has remained constant since 1992, according to the 1994 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, but it is rising sharply among teenagers. The study reports that twice as many 12-to 17-year-olds smoked marijuana in 1994 as in 1992.

Agency heads ascribe the inability of their anti-drug programs to reverse the growth of either the supply of drugs or demand for them to insufficient funding and the lack of political will to make drug control a top priority. “I don’t think the war [on drugs] has ever been fought,” Drug Enforcement Administration Director Thomas Constantine told Government Executive in an interview earlier this year. “Because, if you’re going to fight a war to win and survive, you use tremendous assets, sacrifice, and national will.” It may strike some as odd that Constantine and other

agency personnel consider their current assets to be insufficient: At a time when most federal agency programs are facing cuts or even elimination, the President’s budget request for fiscal 1996 would create the biggest drug-control budget ever, totalling \$14.6 billion, or \$2.4 billion more than in fiscal 1995. But, Constantine explains, “the drug peddlers can keep spending billions of dollars a year, so they’re outstripping us.”

### **More of the Same**

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Federal anti-drug programs cost taxpayers \$13.2 billion in fiscal 1995, with supply-reduction initiatives — domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs — consuming 64 percent of the drug-control budget. Demand-reduction initiatives — treatment, prevention, and research programs — shared the rest.

Still, it is commonly held that the Clinton Administration’s most significant departure from the drug-fighting strategies of the past is in its anti-drug rhetoric rather than in its policies. While President Bush spoke of federal agencies waging a “war” against drug users as well as drug traffickers and promised Americans that his policies would ensure that “this scourge will stop,” Clinton Administration officials strike a less draconian pose. Lee Brown, then director of ONDCP, announced in 1993 that he would not use the term “war” to describe federal anti-drug activities since, he said, it implies the government is fighting “a ‘war’ against its own people.” The 1995 strategy document promotes education and treatment rather than prosecution and punishment as the way out of the drug crisis. Attorney General Janet Reno has spoken out against mandatory minimum sentences, criticizing them for filling prisons with small-time drug offenders when space is needed for violent criminals.

Congress has repeatedly denied Clinton White House attempts to turn such new rhetoric into a new emphasis in federal drug-control programs. For example, when the Administration proposed to increase funds for treatment programs by \$355 million — the largest increase ever — in its drug control budget request for fiscal 1994, Congress appropriated only \$57 million worth of new funds; when Administration officials wrote a provision authorizing \$100 million to be spent on drug courts in fiscal 1995 into the 1994 Crime Act, Congress appropriated only \$11.9 million.

Malthea Falco, a former assistant secretary of state for international narcotics matters and president of Drug Strategies, a nonprofit drug policy reform group, says that because the treatment and prevention programs that “the strategy itself talks quite eloquently about” aren’t backed up by increased funding, Clinton era anti-drug programs only offer “more of the same.” Unfortunately, as drug policy reformers see it, that means more programs that don’t work.

### **The Small Picture**

Many federal anti-drug initiatives are successful in arresting drug peddlers and seizing contraband (see page 22). Nevertheless, three-quarters of the American public thinks the drug war is a failure, according to an August 1994 CBS poll.

Drug policy reformers such as Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke argue that the federal effort “has not borne fruit; that is, it has not made the United States even close to drug free. Millions of Americans continue to violate our drug laws every year by using or selling illegal drugs.”

Agency heads say that the fruit of their anti-drug programs is to be found in the small pic-

ture. “To those who say we’ve spent \$100 billion, what do we have to show for it,” says David Mactas, director of the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment at the Department of Health and Human Services, “I say tens of thousands of lives restored to people, some of whom are now legislators, judges, counselors, bus drivers.”

DEA Director Constantine sees success in the neighborhoods that federal law enforcement agencies have helped reclaim for residents. He offers New Haven, Connecticut, as an example. In 1992, the DEA, Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and U.S. Marshals Service combined forces with New Haven municipal law enforcement agencies to squelch drug-related violence and drug trafficking in New Haven’s crime-ridden neighborhoods. The group, called the New Haven Drug Gang Task Force, used intelligence gathered by the New Haven Police Department and stiff federal sentencing laws to dismantle or disrupt three gangs in two years. New Haven’s murder rate dropped from a high of 34 in 1991 to 20 in 1993, its lowest point since 1986.

Critics also contend that federal agencies fail to fight the drug war cost-effectively. A recent report by the Drug Strategies group asserts that agencies could get more bang for their buck if they increased spending on treatment programs and research. The report cites a 1994 Rand Corp. study that found that every \$1 spent treating cocaine users is worth \$7 spent on law enforcement. The report argues that more research is needed to ensure that the programs agencies fund are the programs that produce the best results.

Presently, four percent of the federal drug-control budget supports research, and agencies spend only one-tenth of this



funding to evaluate law enforcement and interdiction programs, even though such programs comprise the bulk of federal agencies' anti-drug efforts.

Agency heads, however, say they are seeking to improve their programs' cost-effectiveness by increasing interagency cooperation rather than by adjusting spending priorities. As Constantine sees it, law enforcement, treatment, and prevention programs are intertwined: "Community groups can only be effective if you stabilize the community. You can't infuse rehabilitation and prevention programs in the middle of chaos." Therefore, he argues, law enforcement, treatment, and prevention initiatives all "have to be funded adequately to be successful. To take money from rehabilitation or prevention to increase law enforcement would be a mistake. And to take money from law enforcement to increase rehabilitation or prevention would be a mistake."

Mactas attributes the public's poor assessment of federal drug-control programs to unrealistic expectations. Federal drug control programs "are held to a standard that no one else is," he says. "'Solution' is a goal to which no other agencies are working. I believe this is all rooted in the way people feel about substance abusers — they're dirty, they're no one I know, they threaten my safety." Compare this to assessments of federal cancer research, Mactas says. "Does that receive the stigma that it has wasted money

because it has failed to find a solution?" Yet some drug policy reformers maintain that all they expect from federal anti-drug programs is that they grapple with what Colombian attorney general Gustavo de Grieff has called "the central fact of the drug trade": In de Grieff's words, the fact that "as long as a kilo of cocaine changes in value from \$ 500 to perhaps \$ 20,000 by virtue of the short flight from Colombia to the United States, there will always be people who will be willing to enter the business." Drug Policy Foundation president Arnold Trebach says he believes federal drug policy "is wrong, root and branch, because it attempts to enforce prohibition" and argues that "there should be a broader debate" on what constitutes effective drug control. Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke has called for the federal government to create a national commission to study how all drugs, legal and illegal, might be regulated.

Meanwhile, agency heads expect the impact of their programs to become more apparent in the future. Says Mactas, federal agencies "haven't been fighting very long." The DEA's Constantine agrees. "The best I can see," he says, "it took us 30 years to get into this. It might take 10 or 15 years of tremendous effort to get out."

*Samantha Stainburn is Assistant Editor at Government Executive.*

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## A BATTLE THAT KNOWS NO BORDERS

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, headed by a cabinet-level director, coordinates the federal government's anti-drug programs by issuing a national drug-control strategy each year and ensuring that agencies comply with the strategy's guidelines.

Agencies wrestle with the drug crisis on three fronts. Inside the United States, the Justice Department (primarily through the Bureau of Prisons and the Drug Enforcement Administration), the Treasury Department and the federal courts run law enforcement programs that target drug traffickers, financiers and users.

Other domestic efforts include programs operated by the departments of Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs and Justice to expand and improve the drug-treatment system, research medications for treating addiction and incorporate drug treatment into the criminal justice system. And HHS and the Department of Education administer federal prevention initiatives, which include disseminating prevention information and ensuring that federally funded educational institutions implement drug prevention programs.

Along the U.S. border, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service attempt to interdict and destroy drugs entering the country by land, air and sea. The Defense Department provides detection, monitoring and intelligence support.

Outside the United States, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development run programs that support, train and assist foreign drug-law

enforcement and crop-eradication units and encourage foreign farmers to switch from growing drug crops to growing legal crops. The State Department also annually reviews the anti-drug actions taken by the governments of major illicit drug-producing nations and grants them "certification" if it deems that the governments are fully cooperating with U.S. counter narcotics efforts. Only certified countries may receive foreign aid from the United States.

Inter-agency initiatives are a growing trend in federal drug control. For example:

The DEA and Internal Revenue Service set up a private bank in Anguilla, British West Indies, in 1994, where, for six months, DEA special agents William Malarney, Albert "Skip" Latson and IRS agent Bill Bruton laundered drug proceeds for members of the Cali mafia. The initiative, dubbed Operation Dinero, resulted in 88 arrests and the seizure of about nine tons of cocaine and more than \$ 50 million in cash and property, including paintings by Picasso, Rubens and Reynolds.

Last November, the DEA and the Department of Health and Human Services' Center for Substance Abuse Prevention teamed up to host a conference in Charlotte, North Carolina, to promote partnerships between law enforcement and prevention agencies and community-based anti-drug organizations.

The FBI and the DEA have established DRUGX, a common drug index database which combines information on counter drug investigations from FBI's databases with data in the DEA's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System.

# i n f o r m a t i o n



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## THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: 1996

By the Office of National Drug Control Policy

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*The Office of National Drug Control Policy of the Executive Office of the President recently issued its annual The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996. Following are excerpts from the 101-page Strategy.*

### CAUSE FOR GUARDED OPTIMISM

Despite the recent upturn in casual drug use by our youth, we have made real progress in the past decade as a result of a principled, long-term effort. Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of the Congress and three successive Administrations, along with the broad-based efforts of citizens and communities throughout the United States, we have made substantial progress since the 1970s when drug use was at its peak. We have moved from widespread social tolerance of drug abuse to a current environment in which the vast majority of Americans strongly disapprove of substance abuse and do not use illegal drugs.

#### Consider how far we have progressed:

- While 72 million Americans have experimented with illegal drugs, the overwhelming majority quit of their own accord and oppose the use of illicit drugs.
- As a result of aggressive prevention efforts, the number of illegal drug users has fallen by half since 1985, from 22.3 million to 12.2 million “past-month” users.

- The number of new cocaine users plummeted from a million and a half in 1980 to about half a million in 1992. Overall, cocaine use has fallen 30 percent in the last three years alone.

- Between 1975 and the early 1990s, the number of new heroin users dropped by 25 percent.

- Homicides have decreased by 5 percent, and those that are judged to be drug-related are down approximately 25 percent.

- Workplaces are safer and more productive: drug use among U.S. workers decreased from 19 percent in 1979 to 8.1 percent in 1993, and three out of four companies with more than 250 employees have formal antidrug programs and policies in place.

- Since the late 1980s, U.S. Government seizures of drug trafficker assets have been about \$700 million a year.

- Drug treatment programs have improved dramatically and are better linked with offender management and drug court programs, creating a mutually supporting dynamic between law enforcement and rehabilitation. Progress is being made in helping those who want help.

- Internationally, we moved from a standing start to a web of increasingly effective alliances, partnerships, and cooperative agreements:

(a) We essentially blocked the free flow of cocaine through the western Caribbean into Florida and the Southeast.

(b) Our interdiction efforts in South America have disrupted the trafficking patterns of cocaine traffickers in Peru, causing them to change flight routes and modes of transportation.

(c) Six of the seven ringleaders of the Cali Cartel were arrested in 1995, and one recently was killed by the Colombian police while resisting arrest. Continued pressure on Colombian drug lords has resulted in a recent flurry of surrenders and arrests of "next generation" traffickers, causing further disruption of cartel operations.

(d) A third of the cocaine produced in South America is intercepted before it hits our streets or those of other countries.

(e) Due to increased enforcement activity and greater international focus and cooperation, money laundering has become tougher for traffickers and their front businesses.

(f) Key Asian countries have begun to arrest kingpins involved in heroin trafficking and to extradite them to the United States. Such efforts to attack these drug trafficking organizations are being intensified.

## **STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE 1996 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY**

**Goal 1:** Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.

**Goal 2:** Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

**Goal 3:** Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.

**Goal 4:** Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

**Goal 5:** Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

## **RESOURCES TO MEET THE STRATEGIC GOALS**

The President's drug control budget request totals \$15.1 billion for FY 1997. These resources are grouped into four major categories: domestic law enforcement, demand reduction, drug interdiction, and international programs. In each of these general program areas there is an increase in the level of funding requested for FY 1997:

**1.** Resources for Domestic Law Enforcement increase by 9.3 percent in FY 1997 from \$7.6 billion in FY 1996 to \$8.3 billion in FY 1997. These resources support activities such as investigations, prosecutions, corrections, state and local law enforcement assistance, regulatory and compliance programs, and other law enforcement efforts. Some examples of programs the Administration will fund in FY 1997 in this area are:

□ \$644 million in drug-related funding for community-oriented policing grants.

□ \$535 million for the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Enforcement Assistance Program to provide assistance to State and local governments involved in reducing drug use and violent crime.

□ \$103 million for the HIDTA program, which targets the seven most critical drug trafficking areas of the country.

These resources are directed toward achieving the Strategy goal of increasing the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

**2.** Resources for Demand Reduction increase by 8.7 percent, from \$4.6 billion in FY 1996 to \$5 billion in FY 1997. Demand reduction includes resources for treatment, prevention, education, and research. Some of the major funding initiatives for this area include:

□ \$540 million for the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program, which serves 40 million students in 97 percent of the Nation's school districts.

□ \$371 million for drug prevention activities within SAMHSA. In addition, \$904 million in drug-related treatment resources is requested through SAMHSA's Substance Abuse Performance Partnership Grant.

□ \$100 million for DRUG Courts to provide court-mandated drug treatment and related services to nonviolent offenders.

These resources support two Strategy goals: Motivating America's Youth to Reject Illegal Drugs and Substance Abuse, and Reducing Health, Welfare, and Crime Costs Resulting From Illegal Drug Use.

**3.** Resources for Interdiction increase by 7.3 percent, from the FY 1996 estimated enacted level of \$1.3 billion to \$1.4 billion in FY 1997. These resources fund enhanced efforts to stop the flow of drugs in source and transit nations and along the U.S. border.

□ \$504 million for the U.S. Customs Service's interdiction efforts, which include the Southwest Border Initiative.

□ \$307 million for the INS to support drug-related activities, including \$107 million in drug-related resources for the Border Patrol, which is an increase of 23 percent over the estimated level for FY 1996.

□ \$432 million for the Department of Defense's interdiction efforts in support of the counterdrug objective of the President's International Action Plan — to "reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers, and reducing demand at home."

These resources are directed toward achieving the Strategy goal of shielding America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

**4.** Resources for International programs increase by 25.4 percent, from \$320 million in FY 1996 to \$401 million in FY 1997.

Most of the resources for international programs support two agencies: the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the justice Department's Drug Enforcement Administration.

□ \$193 million for international narcotics control for the INL, an increase of \$78 million over the FY 1996 enacted level of \$115 million. In FY 1997 this program will continue the implementation of the President's directive to place more emphasis on source countries, focus on programs that promote alternative development, dismantle narcotics trafficking organizations, and interdict drugs. It will also strengthen democratic institutions in source countries, enabling them to fight international drug trafficking organizations more effectively. Further, it will place greater emphasis on multilateral efforts that can complement our programs.

□ \$175 million for DEA's international drug control efforts to support activities such as the Foreign Cooperative Investigations program, which establishes diplomatic liaison, collects intelligence, and provides investigative assistance and training to host country officials. In addition, DEA cooperates with international organizations on matters related to global supply and trafficking, and demand reduction issues.

These resources are directed toward achieving the Strategy goal of Breaking Foreign and Domestic Drug Sources of Supply.



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## INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT

By the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

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*The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. Department of State issued its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report in March 1996. The following has been excerpted from the 600-page annual Report.*

### **POLICY AND PROGRAM OVERVIEW FOR 1995**

The international drug trade had little to cheer about in 1995, as several key countries intensified their efforts against it. Though some governments acted more vigorously than others, by early 1996 there were more prominent drug figures behind bars than in any comparable period in the past few years. Drug crop eradication, a measure once fiercely resisted by many of the major drug cultivation countries, gained better acceptance as a means of limiting cocaine and opium production. National drug enforcement units, often supported by U.S. government resources, continued to disrupt trafficking organizations, choke off key trafficking routes, destroy drug refining laboratories, and seize important quantities of cocaine and heroin. More countries enacted tougher money laundering laws and tightened restrictions on the commerce in precursor chemicals. And perhaps most importantly, governments of several countries pivotal to the drug trade found themselves obliged to confront the corruption that has given the drug trade access to the highest levels of government. These encouraging developments confirmed the overall soundness of current antidrug policies.

**Drug Trade Still Strong.** Yet 1995 offered no grounds for complacency. The international drug trade remains a powerful, sophisticated, and adaptable force. Despite our collective effort, in 1995, trafficking organizations managed to produce and move tons of cocaine and heroin to nearly every country in the world. They nurtured new markets in Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East. They flaunted their undeniable capacity to corrupt governments. And they showed that often, far from crippling an organization, the arrest of a drug baron may only create a temporary job opening.

The drug trade always seeks new opportunities. To offset potential losses in the Western Hemisphere, the cocaine syndicates have set their sights on new markets throughout the world. In Europe, where a combination of new affluence and social discontent provides the ideal conditions for drug consumption, cocaine was seized in nearly every country between Denmark and Turkey, traditional markets for Southwest Asian heroin. Eastern Europe was a prime target. For example, shipyard workers in Gdansk found over 200 kg of cocaine aboard a Greek freighter in dry-dock; Czech authorities in August arrested a Venezuelan courier smuggling cocaine; Turkish police stopped a Bulgarian courier carrying cocaine intended for sale in Istanbul's bars; Romanian police confiscated liquid cocaine shipped from Colombia. Brazil became a hub for Nigerians moving cocaine

to Africa and Europe. And Nigerian traffickers can be found in nearly every prison population in the world.

But cocaine only supplemented the already robust heroin trade. Heroin trafficking rings in Southeast and Southwest Asia respectively poured drugs into the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In 1995, Southwest Asian heroin became especially plentiful in Europe, with traffickers splitting and expanding the traditional Balkan smuggling route northward into Romania, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, and southward through former Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, and Albania. Illegal drugs unfortunately remain a growth industry.

**The Rise Of Synthetics.** A disturbing development in 1995 has been the astonishing spread of synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine, on the illicit world drug market. Synthetics, which have been growing in popularity over the last few years, may become the drug control nightmare of the next century. As the INCSR country chapters report, the demand for methamphetamine has been increasing not only in the industrialized nations, but in most of the countries of the developing world. From the United States to Europe, from the countries of the former Soviet Union to Africa the appetite for methamphetamine and MDNU ("Ecstasy") has been on the rise. Synthetics allow trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. They free traffickers from reliance upon potentially vulnerable drug crops like coca or opium poppy and can be manufactured relatively cheaply from easily obtainable chemicals. With a pool of under- or unemployed Eastern European chemists to draw from, the drug mafias are making synthetics a third "drug pillar" to rival the mainstays of drug trade, cocaine, and heroin.

There were already signs in 1995 that Mexican trafficking organizations that dominate the cocaine pipeline are aiming to control the U.S. methamphetamine trade.

**Accomplishments.** In 1995, it was the cocaine trade that suffered most as Colombian forces arrested many of the key leaders of the Cali drug mafia, until now the most powerful of the cocaine trafficking syndicates. While the subsequent escape of Jose Santacruz Londono — who drove away in January from a Bogota prison — took some of the luster off the triumph, it was nonetheless a major achievement. Coming two years after the fragmentation of the Medellin drug cartel in 1993, the Colombian government's attack on the Cali drug cartel has sown disarray in the Colombian cocaine trade, at least for the time being.

The cocaine trade suffered other losses elsewhere in Latin America. Colombian and Peruvian military forces, supported by the U.S. government, severely constricted the "air-bridge" carrying semi-finished cocaine products from Peru to Colombia for refining and distribution. The bottlenecks briefly caused the price of coca in Peru to plummet, since traffickers were unable to move perishable commodities to market.

There were notable achievements in other parts of the world. Pakistani authorities reported seizing nearly 17 metric tons of heroin. If pure, this quantity alone would be enough to satisfy demand for the year in most of Western Europe. Pakistan also extradited to the United States three leading heroin traffickers, Iqbal Baig and two of his deputies, key figures long sought by U.S. government authorities. In Southeast Asia, Thailand began extradition proceedings against the ten major drug traffickers associated with the region's most notorious drug warlord, Khun Sa (Chiang Chi-Fu). The ten were arrested in late 1994 in Operation

Tiger Trap, as Thai military and security forces shut off major roads and trafficking routes close to insurgent-held areas of Burma. An eleventh associate was arrested in 1995 and also is facing extradition to the U.S. to stand trial on federal drug trafficking charges.

**Drug Cultivation.** Drug crop data were less encouraging: both coca and opium poppy enjoyed a bumper year in 1995. Hectarage and potential yield estimates set a new record for each crop. Good weather was primarily to blame, though government inaction was also a boon to the growers.

**The Elements of Controlling Supply: Simple Concept, Difficult Application.**

The goal of significantly reducing the supply of illegal drugs is attainable, but not without a sustained commitment. The basic principles of supply reduction are straightforward. A five-stage grower-to-user chain links the drug producer in a foreign land with the consumer in the United States. These stages are: cultivation, processing, transit, wholesale distribution, and finally retail sales on the street. The U.S. government's international drug control programs target the first three links of this chain — cultivation, processing, and transit. Severing the chain at the source is the most cost-effective means of cutting the flow; the drugs never enter the system at all. It is analogous to removing a tumor before it metastasizes.

**The Determining Factor: Political Will.**

The cornerstone of any successful antidrug strategy is political will. A country can have state-of-the-art antidrug hardware and enforcement units and still not cripple the drug trade — unless its government is willing to weather the short-term political backlash that effective antidrug measures inevitably trigger. Except in those rare cases where governments lack physical control of national territory, the ground that antidrug forces gain one year is

often lost the following year when governments lack the political courage to stand by their decisions. The effects of flagging political will are quite visible to all, especially the major drug organizations. And they make the most of it.

The drug trade learned long ago that where political will is weak it can establish a *modus vivendi* with a government. Trafficking organizations as a matter of course will absorb losses in a given area if their overall operations in other areas are profitable. That is the cost of doing business. Most governments, in turn, tend to concentrate their antidrug operations in sectors least likely to trigger a political backlash from drug interests.

In a typical pattern, a major drug cultivation country concentrates on interdiction, when what is necessary is eradication; a major drug refining country eradicates crops while major trafficking organizations operate profitably by manipulating corrupt enforcement and weak judicial systems; or a major banking country actively pursues trafficking organizations, while guarding bank secrecy and avoiding effective money laundering reforms. Once a *modus vivendi* takes hold, the drug problem becomes endemic. The short-term political peace that the politicians enjoy only allows drug interests to dig in for the long term. One of the basic tenets of U.S. government antidrug policy has been to expose and where possible prevent such capitulation by encouraging political will in the principal drug producing and transit countries. For once a drug problem becomes endemic, corruption inevitably thrives; and where there is large-scale corruption, democratic government is in jeopardy.

**Corruption.** At the core of the struggle against the drug trade is a battle against corruption. Drugs are primarily a means to make vast sums of money. Gram for gram there is no more lucrative commodity than drugs.



Substances that are relatively cheap to produce generate criminal revenues on a scale that has no historical precedent. At an average of one hundred dollars a gram on the streets of the U.S., a metric ton of cocaine is worth \$100 million if pure, double that amount if the cocaine is cut. The U.S. government typically seizes more than 100 metric tons annually, or a quantity of drugs exceeding \$10 billion to the drug trade, as much as the gross domestic product of many countries. To put these numbers in perspective, the U.S. government in fiscal year 1995 spent a little over \$810 million on all its international drug control activities. In quantities of cocaine, that translates into approximately eight metric tons of cocaine. Large jets flying into Mexico have carried in as much or more in one shipment.

With such resources at their command, large trafficking organizations have an almost unlimited capacity to corrupt. The more entrenched the drug organization, the better its chances to corrupt. For example, in this hemisphere the two countries that have struggled the longest against the drug trade — Mexico and Colombia — are also those that have had to face the drug corruption that has crept into the uppermost reaches of government. The nightmare scenario, of course, is that one day traffickers could simply control governments through elected officials who actually owe their office to drug syndicates. While this has not happened in recent times, there have been some disturbing near misses. We can expect the drug trade to keep pressing at every opportunity, since its survival depends upon the right combination of government impotence, neglect, and complicity that corruption feasts upon.

### **Certification: a Spotlight on Cooperation.**

One way to help keep governments honest is through periodic scrutiny. Drug corruption, like any other form of subversion, can only flourish in the shadows. Thanks to a revision in the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States Government has the equivalent of an international spotlight to focus on the major drug-related countries: the drug certification process. Every year the President must certify whether each major drug producing or transit country has cooperated fully or has taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, including rooting out public corruption. The certification process gives the President an international platform for a candid, public evaluation of the performance of the major drug-affected countries.

Though denial of certification carries important foreign assistance sanctions, as well as a mandatory negative U.S. vote against lending by six multilateral development banks, the potential material losses are often less important than the public opprobrium of failing the standard. The last thing any government wants impugned before its international peers is its honor or integrity, especially when it must publicly confront objective, if often damaging evidence that it has not cooperated fully in countering the drug trade. Most governments now realize that every year the President of United States is legally bound to make such a public assessment. And most know that the nature of that assessment depends largely on their efforts during the year.

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## U.S. SPEAKERS PROGRAM

By Judith Greenspan

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### School-based Prevention

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A substance abuse program that focuses on school-based prevention has been particularly effective both in terms of cost and demonstrable results. It involves sending a team of two American trainers/consultants abroad to work with representatives from various professional fields over the course of several two-week workshops. The U.S. trainers guide and direct the sessions, but the local participants themselves develop the prevention curriculums in their own languages and according to their own cultural norms.

One U.S. speaker who has provided this kind of expertise now in several countries around the world is Juan Jose Callejas. Juan has a Ph.D. in education and many years experience in prevention, public awareness, and curriculum development, as well as in the area of cultural diversity. Each of his programs has been regarded as extremely successful.

The most recent programs took place in Hungary and Slovakia and involved collaboration and cost-sharing among USIA, the

Department of State, the Slovak and Hungarian governments, and NGOs in both countries. The programs have been effective beyond the immediate goal of school-based prevention. Against the background of transition from communism to democracy and civil society in these countries, the programs have provided social skills that participants will be able to pass on to those whom they in turn will train.

Citizens become better able to participate actively in civil society when they acquire skills in problem solving, decision making, organization, conflict resolution, and teamwork, among others. All these skills are an intrinsic component in any good substance-abuse prevention program and have positive effects far beyond the program itself.

Most importantly, perhaps, the goal of these programs is to enable the countries where they are used to sustain substance-abuse activities on their own.

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