For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
March 24, 2004
Press Briefing by Scott McClellan
The James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
1:10 P.M. EST
MR. McCLELLAN: Good afternoon. I have one update from yesterday
and a couple of announcements, to begin with. The President spoke with
Chancellor Schroeder yesterday afternoon. The President and Chancellor
Schroeder had a constructive and friendly call. They discussed the
need for the international community to show strength and determination
in the face of terrorists, especially after the murderous attacks in
Madrid. The President expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor's
solidarity in the fight against terrorism and for Germany's
contribution in Afghanistan.
Now for a couple of announcements. The President will travel to
Paris on June 5, 2004, to meet with President Chirac. He will then
travel to Normandy on June6, 2004, to participate in ceremonies marking
the 60th anniversary of the D-Day invasion. The Normandy invasion
stands as an historic achievement in which the forces of freedom, at
great risk and sacrifice, joined together to turn the tide of war
against fascism. Today our nations stand together still, equally
committed to defeat terrorism and advance the cause of freedom.
And finally, the President looks forward to welcoming Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis to the White House on May 20, 2004. This visit
will provide an opportunity to deepen our partnership with Greece in
pursuit of democracy, prosperity and peace in Southeastern Europe and
the greater Middle East. The leaders will also discuss final
preparations for a successful and safe Olympics in Athens, as the
summer games return to the land of their birth this August.
And with that, I will be glad to take your questions. Mike, you
had it up first.
Q Scott, your main complaint with Mr. Clarke's strategy has
been that he wanted to roll back terrorism, while the President wanted
to -- or roll back al Qaeda, while the President wanted to eliminate al
Qaeda. What would have been wrong with taking interim steps in the
months before September 11th, instead of waiting for the grand plan
that was presented on September 4th?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, Mike, I think that we did take steps to
change some of the ideas that had been discussed in the previous
administration. In fact, Mr. Clarke has stated such in his comments
that have now been released in a transcript by a news station. He made
that very clear, that we were -- immediately upon coming into office,
this President directed the administration to provide -- or to pursue a
comprehensive strategy to eliminate al Qaeda, not roll it back. And
that process began very early on. But at the same time, this
administration began looking at some of the ideas that had been
discussed, but not decided on in the previous administration, and
worked to come to some decisions on those ideas and begin changing
policy.
In fact, yesterday Secretary Powell spoke to one part of the policy
that we began to change early on in the administration. He, in his
testimony, cited the President's February 16th letter to President
Musharraf, of Pakistan, and this was in 2001, shortly after coming into
office.
The President said in the letter: "Pakistan is an important member
of the community of nations and one with which I hope to build better
relations, particularly as you move ahead to return to civilian
constitutional government. We have concerns of which you are aware,
but I am hopeful we can work together on our differences in the years
ahead. We should work together to address Afghanistan's many
problems. The most pressing of these is terrorism, and it inhibits
progress on all other issues. The continued presence of Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda organization is a direct threat to the United
States and its interests that must be addressed. I believe al Qaeda
also threatens Pakistan's long-term interest. We join the United
Nations in passing additional sanctions against the Taliban to bring
bin Laden to justice and to close the network of terrorist camps in
their territory."
So this administration, from the very beginning, looked at al Qaeda
and took that threat very seriously.
Q If that's the case, why do you -- repeatedly, from the
podium, other administration officials, have complained that he was
talking about rolling back al Qaeda. What was wrong with rolling back
al Qaeda while you pursued this comprehensive strategy?
MR. McCLELLAN: No, there were ideas, again, that were discussed in
the previous administration going back to -- I believe it was 1998, as
Mr. Clarke points out in his own words -- but those ideas were not
decided upon when it came to our policy towards Pakistan, our policy to
Uzbekistan, or policy toward the Taliban. And we began pursuing
changes in those policies from very early on, as Mr. Clarke has said in
his very own words.
Q Okay, just one other quick thing. His status was demoted
-- he was demoted, his status was reduced. He was not replaced by
anyone else. Why isn't it a fair conclusion that that reflected a
lower level of attention and concern about terrorism than the previous
administration --
MR. McCLELLAN: No, I think actually he suggested that his position
be split off and that there be a cyber-security --
Q I'm sorry, this is before that --
MR. McCLELLAN: -- there be a cyber-security position and there be
a counterterrorism head.
Q -- at the beginning of the administration, as you know, he
felt his rank had been reduced. That's why he didn't show up at
meetings --
MR. McCLELLAN: I think he made a suggestion that maybe it had
Cabinet rank, and that wasn't the case. That was clearly not the
case.
Q Before I get to my question, can I ask you about the Chirac
meeting and what the agenda is there, and whether it's fair to look at
that through the prism of the Spanish elections? Is this
bridge-building with France?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, one, we want to continue to work together on
common challenges with France. The President has made that very
clear. We have had a strong relationship, despite differences that we
may have had, but -- in the past. There are many areas where we work
together. And as we get closer to that meeting, we will obviously
provide you more information about the agenda. It's just now been
scheduled, so those are details that have yet to be fully worked on.
Q Can I ask you, too, about the government's, or the
trustee's finding that Medicare goes broke in 2019? Do you have any
reason to dispute that finding?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, one, I think it's -- what we look at is the
reasons behind their analysis. And I think that you have to look -- go
to that. Health care costs have been rising, and this President has a
plan to reduce rising health care costs. And Congress needs to act on
that plan. We need to act to reform our medical liability system.
That has been stuck in the Senate. And it will provide savings. We
need to act on the health care credits that the President has proposed,
to help low-income workers. Congress needs to act on the President's
call for association health plans, to where small businesses can band
together to purchase insurance. And we need to act to, also, reduce
medical errors. Those are ways that we can address the rising health
care costs, and this President has a plan to do that.
Q Is it fair to blame the new law that he signed in
December?
MR. McCLELLAN: The biggest reason, if you look at the report, the
biggest reason for the change in the bottom line is rising health care
costs. It makes that very clear in the report. Now, in terms of the
reforms and improvements that we made for our seniors by providing them
prescription drug coverage and providing them more choices and better
benefits so that they can get the health care that meets their
individual needs, those reforms, obviously, were just passed. We need
to give them time to work. There were some cost-control measures
within that legislation that will help address some of the long-term
issues related to Medicare.
Q Scott, in the week following September 11th, there was a
presidential directive that dealt largely with the plan to invade
Afghanistan. But also in that document, Rumsfeld requested and
received permission to draw up new contingency plans for Iraq. Why was
that necessary?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, Iraq was shooting at our pilots who were
patrolling the no-fly zone. Iraq remained a threat in that time
period. And so, obviously, when the President is making a decision to
go into Afghanistan and remove the Taliban regime from power, and to go
after the al Qaeda network that had been provided a safe harbor in
Afghanistan, it's important to keep in mind that a country, or a
regime, like the one that was in Iraq, might try to take advantage of
the situation.
Q Why would you need different plans that what were already on the
shelf?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, again, it's looking at contingencies. Iraq
may try to -- Iraq might have tried to take advantage of the action
that we were taking in Afghanistan. And they were firing at our pilots
in the no-fly zone on an almost daily basis during that time period.
Q As you know, Richard Clarke has used this to make the
suggestion that this is an example of this administration using 9/11 as
a pretext for going to war with Iraq, and that this was the first step
in that process --
MR. McCLELLAN: Norah, I think that the facts just contradict his
assertions. I think you all in the media documented this very well.
The fact of the matter is that the directive to drop a plan to go to
war in Iraq, and the decision to go to war in Iraq, was made much
later. The priority in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th
attacks was on Afghanistan, and going after the Taliban and al Qaeda,
and bringing those individuals who were involved in terrorism to
justice. And that's exactly what this President did.
He met at Camp David with his National Security Council and said,
we are going to act decisively to go into Afghanistan with military
action to remove the Taliban regime from power, and to go after the al
Qaeda network. And that's exactly what we did, and it was
well-documented in the media, I might point out.
Q Thank you. And then you have suggested, in talking about
Clarke, that part of his failures were that he called for a rolling
back, rather than eliminating al Qaeda, is that right? That that was
something that Clarke had advocated, rolling back rather than
eliminating?
MR. McCLELLAN: There were some ideas of the previous
administration that, at the request of Dr. Rice, Mr. Clarke presented
to us very early on in the administration. And they were aimed more at
rolling back al Qaeda. I think Mike went to this question. Very early
on, the President wanted to take decisive action to go after al Qaeda
and eliminate the al Qaeda network.
Q I asked that question because I went back and I looked at
your statements, and I looked at Dr. Rice's statements about Clarke's
failure in wanting to roll back, and yet in this new transcript that's
been released, Clarke specifically says, "and then we changed the
strategy from one of roll-back with al Qaeda over the course of five
years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for rapid
elimination."
MR. McCLELLAN: That's referring to the administration, Norah.
That's referring to the White House, the President, this
administration.
Q Right, so, so -- but previously, you had suggested that
Clarke was only calling for a roll-back and not an elimination. And
here --
MR. McCLELLAN: The President is the one that directed the
administration to pursue a comprehensive strategy to eliminate al
Qaeda. I'm glad you brought this up. Let me refer back to this
transcript because I think it's important, given the recent assertions
that have been made by Mr. Clarke. I mean, Dick Clarke -- and this is
Dick Clarke in his own words, and this is in a conversation with some
members of the media, including some White House reporters, a
conference call. And Dick Clarke in his own words says: "I've got
about seven points" -- and let me put this in context. This was
following a Time Magazine article in the Spring * of 2002 that was
essentially saying the White House didn't do anything to follow through
on a plan that was supposedly given to it by the previous
administration.
Mr. Clarke says: "I've got about seven points. The first point, I
think the overall point is, there was no plan on al Qaeda that was
passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.
Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in
place, effectively dating from 1998" -- goes to Mike's question here --
"and there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they
remained on the table when that administration went out office --
issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; changing our
Pakistan policy; changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January
2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing
strategy."
Mr. Clarke continued, "They were also briefed on these issues,
these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of
years. The third point is, the Bush administration decided then -- you
know, mid January -- to do two things, one, vigorously pursue the
existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings."
Then he went on to -- Mr. Clarke went on to say, "The second thing the
administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those
issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them
decided. So point five, that process which was initiated in the first
week in February, decided in principle in the spring to add to the
existing Clinton strategy, and to increase CIA resources, for example,
for covert action fivefold to go after al Qaeda. The sixth point, the
newly-appointed deputies" -- and he goes on to say -- "then tasked the
development of the implementation details of these new decisions that
they were endorsing and sending out to the principals.
"Over the course of the summer," -- last point -- Mr. Clarke goes
on to say -- "they developed implementation details. The principals
met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting,
changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding fivefold;
changing the policy on Pakistan; changing the policy on Uzbekistan;
changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance; and then
change the strategy from one of roll-back with al Qaeda over the course
of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the
rapid elimination al Qaeda." That is, in fact, the time line Mr.
Clarke says.
And then there's a question asked, "When was that presented to the
President?" Mr. Clarke says, "Well, the President was briefed
throughout the process."
Q Scott, as you just told Norah, that he's speaking on behalf
of the President, on behalf of the White House in that background
briefing.
MR. McCLELLAN: Dick Clarke, in his own words, provides a
point-by-point rebuttal of what he now asserts. This shatters the
cornerstone of Mr. Clarke's assertions.
Q Fair enough. What would you say -- and my hunch is he will
say something like, well, I'm the briefer paid by the White House to
mouth the party line here -- he'll say, now I'm a free man, and here's
what I really think.
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I'm not sure exactly what he will say in
response to this because these are his own words. This goes directly
to Mr. Clarke's credibility. And I think he has some questions to
answer. He was the one saying this to members of the White House press
corps and some other media -- members of the media.
Q So why did you decide to out him, as the background
briefer?
MR. McCLELLAN: I don't think that's a correct -- I disagree with
the premise of your question, because it was Fox News who yesterday
came to us and said they had a tape of this conversation with Mr.
Clarke.
Q Wait, wait, wait, wait -- but it was on background. I've
got tapes with plenty of people speaking on background. Can I go and
tell the world who they are?
MR. McCLELLAN: Yes, and I think that we always listen to your
request when you come to us and ask if something can be put on the
record. And there are times when we are able to fulfill those
requests. You are very well aware of some of those times. In fact,
after Fox News was able to air this, we reached out to other members of
the media, including yourself, I believe, to let you know that you
could go back and use this information on the record.
Q And I appreciate that, but --
MR. McCLELLAN: But let's -- no, no --
Q -- the question is, why? Why did this one --
MR. McCLELLAN: Let's -- let's remember why are we are having this
conversation -- because Mr. Clarke made assertions that we have said
are flat-out wrong. And it's important for the American people to have
the facts. Mr. Clarke, certainly decided on his own to go ahead and
reveal conversations that were considered private previously.
Q On the issue of credibility, a staff report of the 9/11
Commission was released yesterday, and in it, it said that they had not
found any reliable evidence to support the Sudanese claim that they
offered Osama bin Laden to the United States in 1996. This is despite
a speech by President Clinton to the Long Island Association in 2002,
where he said, and I'll quote: "I did not bring him here because we
had no basis to hold him." And he also went on to say, "And he pleaded
with the Saudis to take him." Unquote. Do you think something like
this undermines the credibility of the conclusions that the commission
is going to reach in matters like this?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, one, I haven't had a chance to look at the
commission report. We certainly are working very closely and
cooperatively with the commission so that they can get to bottom of
this matter.
Q It's in their opening statement before any witnesses
testified yesterday. That's why --
MR. McCLELLAN: And they made the claim that --
Q Yes, that there was no evidence to support the Sudanese
claim that they offered Osama bin Laden to the United States in 1996.
MR. McCLELLAN: Yes, and again, I think that these are issues that
the commission is looking into. We are working to make sure from our
standpoint that they have access to all the information that they
requested -- that they have requested. That's exactly what we have
done. We have provided unprecedented access to information, including
our most sensitive national security documents. And that's the spirit
in which we're working.
Obviously, their work continues. They're looking at a number of
issues, and we want to help them. But what's most important is that we
learn the lessons of September 11th, and this administration has by the
actions that we are taking. Obviously, if there's additional
information that the commission can provide us that would help us
prevent another tragedy like September 11th from ever happening again,
we want to have that information sooner than later.
Q On Monday, you and Condoleezza Rice both had to respond to
numerous aggressive questions about the Israeli killing of --
MR. McCLELLAN: Just on Monday?
Q Well, just -- I'm talking about Monday.
MR. McCLELLAN: Okay. It's kind of a daily thing for me.
Q -- about the Israeli killing of mass murdering Hamas
leader, Yassin, which you both did very effectively, and in accordance
with the President's expressed defense on Monday of Israel's right to
defend herself from terror. My first part of the question --
MR. McCLELLAN: How many parts are there to this question?
Q Just two. Just two. Will that State Department spokesman,
who completely contradicted you and contradicted Ms. Rice and
contradicted the President by announcing, "we are deeply troubled,"
will he be either fired or required to publicly apologize?
MR. McCLELLAN: I don't think my friend and colleague at the State
Department contradicted anything we said --
Q Yes, he did. He said, we're deeply troubled.
MR. McCLELLAN: And I said the same thing, Les.
Q Yes, but this spokesman called the Israeli killing of
Yassin something which "increases tension and doesn't help our efforts
to resume progress toward peace." And my question: To your knowledge,
has this spokesman also criticized our killing of both of Saddam's sons
and our efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden?
MR. McCLELLAN: I think that my colleague at the State Department
has said what we have said here at the White House, that it's important
for there to be a Palestinian Prime Minister and cabinet that cracks
down on terrorism and that dismantles terrorist organizations. But we
--
Q Do you disagree with The New York Times, when they said
that the White House -- that the Bush administration has contradicted
itself? That was their headline yesterday, that you contradicted
yourself.
MR. McCLELLAN: Les, I think we were saying the same thing. I said
the very same thing that he said.
Q Scott, two quick questions. On the contingency planning on
the directive a couple of days after September 11th, was it just Iraq
that there was a contingency plan for, or were there -- sort of a
global thing, other potential hotspots?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, again -- and I didn't get into any specifics
about what may have been -- what may or may not have been a supposed
policy directive, and I hope you will keep that in context, one. We're
talking about some highly classified national security matters. But I
think at the time period, it was well-documented that the President's
focus was on Afghanistan and going after the Taliban, and going after
al Qaeda. That was very clear. You all reported that all during that
time period.
Now, what I said earlier was that, obviously, when the President
made a decision to take decisive action to go into Afghanistan, it's
important to keep in mind that in that region, which is a dangerous
area, there are countries like Iraq that remained a threat, a country
-- or a regime that was firing on our pilots patrolling the no-fly zone
on a daily basis. That was the circumstances at that time period.
And obviously, you want to make sure you take into account
contingencies if -- if -- or in the case that Iraq decides to take
advantage of that situation. That's what we did.
Q Was that a "yes," Iraq was the only contingency?
MR. McCLELLAN: That's what we did at that time period.
Q Both those regimes are now gone. Would you consider
declassifying that directive?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, Terry, we always consider those issues. But
I don't know of anything that's going to change on this matter at this
time period. I think that's something that's declassified at a much
later time period. Obviously, there's still progress we are working to
make in both those countries, as well.
Q Scott, just one more on Clarke. Given the fact that you're
pointing to this transcript, reading through it, saying it's a question
of his credibility --
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, it's his own words.
Q Right.
MR. McCLELLAN: I'm just repeating his own words.
Q Right. So given that, given the fact that he definitely
had this quoted as toeing the administration's line before reporters,
why do you think he is saying what he's saying?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, like I said, this goes to his credibility,
and I think that those are questions that Mr. Clarke needs to answer.
It was Mr. Clarke who went out and made assertions that this
administration was doing nothing prior to 9/11, that we were not taking
the threat from al Qaeda seriously, that there was a delay, that we
moved slowly. But Dick Clarke, in his words acknowledges, one, that
the administration took al Qaeda very seriously and began a process to
address the threat very early on; and two, our administration was able
to come to quick decisions on a number of issues that had been on the
table for several years; and three, that the President directed the
White House to develop a new comprehensive strategy of eliminating
rather than rolling al Qaeda. You cannot square Dick Clarke's new
assertions with his past words. That's very clear.
I would like to just point to a couple of other parts of this
transcript from Mr. Clarke's interview with reporters. There's a
question by a reporter. Question: What is your response to the
suggestion in the August 12th -- well, in the Time Magazine article
that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the
suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus
against the -- general animus against the foreign policy?
Mr. Clark: "I think if if there was a general animus that clouded
their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with the
terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security
Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same
guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus
against the previous team to me," Mr. Clarke went on to say.
Then a reporter -- here it's listed, Jim Angle, White House
Correspondent: "You're saying that the Bush administration did not
stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was
making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased
money for covert action fivefold, is that correct?"
Mr. Clarke: "All of that is correct."
Now, two other parts I want to refer to, as well:
Question by a reporter: "Were all of those issues part of an
alleged plan that was late December, and the Clinton team decided not
to pursue because it was too close to --" Mr. Clarke jumps in here:
"There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was, was these two things
-- one a description of the existing strategy, which included a
description of the threat; and two, those things which had been looked
at over the course of two years and which were still on the table."
So the follow-up question: "So there was nothing that developed,
no documents or no new plan of any sort?
Mr. Clarke: "There was no new plan."
Question: "No new strategy, I mean. I don't want to get into
semantics."
Mr. Clarke: "Plan, strategy -- there was no, nothing new."
And later on, again this is Jim Angle here, asking this question:
"So just to finish up, if we could then, so what you're saying is that
there was no -- one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and
that actually, the first changes since October of '98 were made in the
spring months just after the administration came into office?
Mr. Clarke: "You got it. That's right."
And finally, because I think this one is important, as well, Mr.
Clarke towards the end of the interview went on to say: "You know, the
other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the roll-back strategy to
the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop
swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the
strategic direction that changed the NSPD" -- meaning the National
Security Policy Directive -- "from one of roll-back to one of
elimination."
So those are Mr. Clarke in his own words, and his own words
contradict what he now asserts.
Q Is he a liar or is he just forgetful?
Q Scott, Scott?
MR. McCLELLAN: April.
Q Is he a liar or just forgetful?
MR. McCLELLAN: You've had your turn.
April.
Q Scott, back to Terry's question. Are these just basically
talking points? We know every day all of you start from the beginning
of the day to disseminate -- well, to figure out what you're going to
say to the media, how you're going to present your spin, I guess, you
would say in some ways. And was he just following talking points, the
spin line?
MR. McCLELLAN: I don't know if that's -- I don't know if that's
quite an accurate description of the way we start our day or what we
do.
Q Well, I mean when you start your day, you guys are talking
about what you want to put out there and how you're going to put it out
there, and what you should not say. And was he, indeed, following the
line that you were given here that day?
MR. McCLELLAN: This was Mr. Clarke describing what he knew in his
own words. This was not anybody but Mr. Clarke making these comments.
Q But, Scott, in this administration when reporters go and
ask you, other persons around here, we get the same words -- the same
words come out. There's no variation or anything. Was he --
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think that's a sign that we're following
the President's direction and his policies.
Q You're following talking points, correct?
MR. McCLELLAN: No. Again, you need to separate out some of this.
This was Mr. Clarke, on his own, making these comments back in the
spring * of 2002. This was him in his own words.
Q Scott, a couple of things. Back on Hamas, first of all, on
Monday you described Yassin as a terrorist leader of a terrorist
organization. Why then is his death deeply troubling?
MR. McCLELLAN: I think what we described was the incident.
Obviously, we've always said that Israel has a right to defend herself,
but we also have always said Israel needs to keep in mind the
consequences of the actions that she decides to take. All parties need
to keep in sight the consequences of their actions.
There is a peace process that we are working with the parties in
the region to help the Israelis and Palestinians move forward on, the
President's two-state vision that he outlined. And obviously, all
parties under that process have obligations and responsibility that are
important to meet. And our focus is on trying to get the parties to
work together to move forward on the President's two-state vision.
That's why the President announced yesterday that if circumstances
permit, we're going to be sending our team back into the Middle East
next week to talk to some parties in the region. It's important that
during this time period, that all parties work to restore calm.
Q On other subject, if I could. The Pledge of Allegiance
case was argued before the High Court today. How significant is this
issue and legal case in the President's view?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think that we've made our view very clear.
We believe that the Pledge of Allegiance is an important right that
ought to be upheld by the Supreme Court. We've stated that
repeatedly. And we continue to hold that view.
Someone is interrupting me. Thank you all.
END 2:02 P.M. EST * Summer
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